@memberjunction/server 6.2.0-edge.2 → 6.2.0-edge.3

package/src/resolvers/AdhocQueryResolver.ts

@@ -1,14 +1,14 @@
 import { Arg, Ctx, Query, Resolver, Field, Int, InputType } from 'type-graphql';
-import { DatabasePlatform, LogError } from '@memberjunction/core';
-import { SQLExpressionValidator } from '@memberjunction/global';
+import { LogError } from '@memberjunction/core';
+import type { DatabasePlatform, IMetadataProvider, RunQueryResult, UserInfo } from '@memberjunction/core';
 import { RenderPipeline } from '@memberjunction/generic-database-provider';
 import { AppContext } from '../types.js';
-import { GetReadOnlyDataSource, GetReadOnlyProvider } from '../util.js';
+import { configInfo } from '../config.js';
+import { GetReadOnlyProvider } from '../util.js';
 import { ResolverBase } from '../generic/ResolverBase.js';
 import { IsScopeLimitedPrincipal } from '../auth/scopeLimitedPrincipal.js';
 import { RunQueryResultType } from './QueryResolver.js';
-import { ExactTotalFromPage, ResolveAdhocTotalRowCount } from './adhoc-query-helpers.js';
-import sql from 'mssql';
+import { ClampAdhocTimeoutSeconds } from './adhocTimeout.js';
 
 /**
  * Input type for executing ad-hoc SQL queries directly.
@@ -32,10 +32,19 @@ class AdhocQueryInput {
 /**
  * Resolver for executing ad-hoc (unsaved) SQL queries.
  *
+ * The query runs through the read-only provider's own ad-hoc path (`RunQuery` with `SQL`), the
+ * same one in-process callers use, so it behaves identically on every database platform: the SQL
+ * is validated and rendered there, paged in the database with a count, run under the caller's
+ * timeout, and on PostgreSQL inside a read-only transaction that is rolled back.
+ *
  * Security:
- * - SQL validated via SQLExpressionValidator (full_query context) — blocks mutations, dangerous operations
- * - Executes on read-only connection pool only (no fallback to read-write)
- * - Configurable timeout (default 30s)
+ * - SQL validated by the provider (SQLExpressionValidator, single read query) — blocks mutations
+ * - Authorizes the RENDERED SQL: every table reference must be an entity base view the caller
+ *   reads unscoped (CanRead, no row-level filter, no denied fields). Entities with row/field
+ *   policy for this user are refused — raw SQL cannot apply that policy, so those reads belong
+ *   on RunView.
+ * - Read-only provider only (no fallback to read-write)
+ * - Configurable timeout (default 30s), enforced by the database
  * - Requires authenticated user (standard GraphQL auth, no @RequireSystemUser)
  * - Refuses scope-limited principals (see {@link IsScopeLimitedPrincipal}). Raw SQL bypasses
  *   RunView, entity permissions and row-level security, so the RLS scope tokens that confine a
@@ -52,201 +61,92 @@ export class AdhocQueryResolver extends ResolverBase {
         @Ctx() context: AppContext
     ): Promise<RunQueryResultType> {
         const startTime = Date.now();
-
+        // SECURITY: refuse principals whose read authority is narrower than their role grant.
+        // Ad-hoc SQL does not go through RunView, entity permissions or row-level security, so the
+        // RLS scope tokens that confine a magic-link session are never substituted. There is no
+        // filter to narrow, so the only correct answer for such a principal is no.
+        if (IsScopeLimitedPrincipal(context.userPayload?.userRecord)) {
+            return this.buildErrorResult('Ad-hoc SQL execution is not permitted for scope-limited sessions.');
+        }
+        const provider = GetReadOnlyProvider(context.providers, { allowFallbackToReadWrite: false });
+        if (!provider) {
+            return this.buildErrorResult('No read-only data source available for ad-hoc query execution');
+        }
+        const contextUser = context.userPayload?.userRecord;
+        const refusal = this.authorizeRenderedSQL(input.SQL, provider.PlatformKey, context, contextUser);
+        if (refusal) {
+            return this.buildErrorResult(refusal, Date.now() - startTime);
+        }
+        const timeoutSeconds = ClampAdhocTimeoutSeconds(input.TimeoutSeconds, configInfo.databaseSettings.requestTimeout);
+        // A negative offset must not reach paging, where it would turn paging off.
+        const startRow = Math.max(0, Number.isInteger(input.StartRow) ? input.StartRow! : 0);
         try {
-            // 1. SECURITY: refuse principals whose read authority is narrower than their role
-            // grant. This resolver runs a raw SELECT on the read-only pool — it does NOT go
-            // through RunView, entity permissions or row-level security, so the RLS scope tokens
-            // that confine a magic-link session are never substituted here. There is no filter
-            // to narrow, so the only correct answer for such a principal is no. Checked before
-            // the SQL is even validated: authorization gates the work, it does not race it.
-            if (IsScopeLimitedPrincipal(context.userPayload?.userRecord)) {
-                return this.buildErrorResult('Ad-hoc SQL execution is not permitted for scope-limited sessions.');
-            }
-
-            // 2. Security: validate SQL using SQLExpressionValidator
-            const validator = SQLExpressionValidator.Instance;
-            const validation = validator.validateFullQuery(input.SQL);
-            if (!validation.valid) {
-                return this.buildErrorResult(validation.error || 'SQL validation failed');
-            }
-
-            // 3. Get READ-ONLY data source (no fallback to read-write)
-            let readOnlyDS: sql.ConnectionPool;
-            try {
-                readOnlyDS = GetReadOnlyDataSource(context.dataSources, { allowFallbackToReadWrite: false });
-            } catch {
-                return this.buildErrorResult('No read-only data source available for ad-hoc query execution');
-            }
-
-            // 4. Resolve platform from the read-only provider for the render pipeline.
-            let platform: DatabasePlatform = 'sqlserver';
-            try {
-                const provider = GetReadOnlyProvider(context.providers, { allowFallbackToReadWrite: false });
-                if (provider?.PlatformKey) platform = provider.PlatformKey;
-            } catch {
-                // Provider not configured — keep the default platform.
-            }
-            const contextUser = context.userPayload?.userRecord;
-
-            // 5. Route the SQL through RenderPipeline so composition tokens
-            // resolve, comments and templates are processed, and the row cap
-            // is applied at the database (via TOP / LIMIT / OFFSET-FETCH).
-            //
-            // Page whenever a positive MaxRows is requested — INCLUDING the first
-            // page (StartRow 0). This yields OFFSET/FETCH data SQL *and* a
-            // COUNT(*) query so the response reports the true total row count
-            // rather than just the returned page size. It mirrors the saved-query
-            // path (GenericDatabaseProvider.InternalRunQuery → WrapWithPaging).
-            // (Previously paging was gated on StartRow > 0, so page 1 fell back to
-            // a TOP-N cap with TotalRowCount = page size — hiding the pager.)
-            // Clamp StartRow to a non-negative integer. A negative offset must not slip
-            // past the paging gate (which would then run the query with no row cap at all).
-            const startRow = Math.max(0, Number.isInteger(input.StartRow) ? input.StartRow! : 0);
-            const maxRows = input.MaxRows;
-            const usePaging = maxRows != null && Number.isInteger(maxRows) && maxRows > 0;
-
-            let dataSQL: string;
-            let countSQL: string | null = null;
-            try {
-                const rendered = RenderPipeline.Run(input.SQL, {
-                    Platform: platform,
-                    ContextUser: contextUser,
-                    ...(usePaging ? { Paging: { StartRow: startRow, MaxRows: maxRows! } } : {}),
-                });
-                dataSQL = rendered.FinalSQL;
-                countSQL = rendered.PagingResult?.CountSQL ?? null;
-            } catch (renderErr) {
-                const renderMsg = renderErr instanceof Error ? renderErr.message : String(renderErr);
-                return this.buildErrorResult(`Ad-hoc query rendering failed: ${renderMsg}`);
-            }
-
-            // 6. Execute the page (and, only when a full page needs it, the count) under
-            // a shared wall-clock deadline derived from the request's timeout budget.
-            const deadline = startTime + (input.TimeoutSeconds ?? 30) * 1000;
-            const { recordset, totalRowCount } = await this.executeDataAndCount(
-                readOnlyDS, dataSQL, countSQL, startRow, usePaging ? maxRows! : null, deadline
-            );
-            const executionTimeMs = Date.now() - startTime;
-
-            // 7. Return as RunQueryResultType
-            return {
-                QueryID: '',
-                QueryName: 'Ad-Hoc Query',
-                Success: true,
-                Results: JSON.stringify(recordset),
-                RowCount: recordset.length,
-                TotalRowCount: totalRowCount,
-                PageNumber: usePaging ? Math.floor(startRow / maxRows!) + 1 : undefined,
-                PageSize: usePaging ? maxRows! : undefined,
-                ExecutionTime: executionTimeMs,
-                ErrorMessage: ''
-            };
+            const result = await provider.RunQuery({
+                SQL: input.SQL,
+                MaxRows: input.MaxRows,
+                StartRow: startRow,
+                TimeoutSeconds: timeoutSeconds,
+            }, contextUser);
+            return this.toResultType(result, startRow, input.MaxRows, timeoutSeconds, Date.now() - startTime);
         } catch (err: unknown) {
-            const executionTimeMs = Date.now() - startTime;
             const errorMessage = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
-
-            // Handle timeout
-            if (errorMessage.includes('timeout') || errorMessage.includes('Timeout')) {
-                return {
-                    QueryID: '',
-                    QueryName: 'Ad-Hoc Query',
-                    Success: false,
-                    Results: '[]',
-                    RowCount: 0,
-                    TotalRowCount: 0,
-                    PageNumber: undefined,
-                    PageSize: undefined,
-                    ExecutionTime: executionTimeMs,
-                    ErrorMessage: `Query execution exceeded ${input.TimeoutSeconds ?? 30} second timeout`
-                };
-            }
-
             LogError(`Ad-hoc query execution failed: ${errorMessage}`);
-            return {
-                QueryID: '',
-                QueryName: 'Ad-Hoc Query',
-                Success: false,
-                Results: '[]',
-                RowCount: 0,
-                TotalRowCount: 0,
-                PageNumber: undefined,
-                PageSize: undefined,
-                ExecutionTime: executionTimeMs,
-                ErrorMessage: `Query execution failed: ${errorMessage}`
-            };
+            return this.buildErrorResult(`Query execution failed: ${errorMessage}`, Date.now() - startTime);
         }
     }
 
     /**
-     * Runs the page's data SQL, then — only when the page is FULL (so more rows may
-     * exist) — a COUNT(*) for the true total. A short (or unpaged) page needs no
-     * count: the exact total is `startRow + rowsReturned` (see {@link exactTotalFromPage}).
-     *
-     * The count is NON-FATAL: some queries page fine but cannot be counted — e.g.
-     * duplicate column names are legal in a result set but rejected inside the COUNT
-     * CTE wrap. A count failure must never sink the whole result, so we log it and
-     * report a lower-bound total (`startRow + rowsReturned`) and let the data render.
+     * SECURITY: authorizes the READ itself, against the SQL that will actually run. The provider
+     * validates that the SQL is a single read statement but places no restriction on WHAT is read.
+     * Rendering comes first because composition (`{{query:"..."}}`) and templates can introduce
+     * table references the raw input never named. Every table reference must be an entity base
+     * view the caller can read UNSCOPED — CanRead with no row-level filter and no denied fields —
+     * because raw SQL applies neither (see assertFullQueryUsesReadableEntityViews). The provider
+     * renders the same input the same way and only wraps it in server-built paging and a count,
+     * so the rendered SQL is the full set of reads. Returns the refusal message, or null.
      */
-    private async executeDataAndCount(
-        ds: sql.ConnectionPool,
-        dataSQL: string,
-        countSQL: string | null,
-        startRow: number,
-        maxRows: number | null,
-        deadline: number,
-    ): Promise<{ recordset: Record<string, unknown>[]; totalRowCount: number }> {
-        const dataResult = await this.runSqlWithDeadline<Record<string, unknown>>(ds, dataSQL, deadline);
-        const recordset = (dataResult.recordset ?? []) as Record<string, unknown>[];
-
-        // Total already known from the page alone (unpaged, or a short page)? Skip the count.
-        const exact = ExactTotalFromPage(startRow, recordset.length, maxRows);
-        if (exact != null || !countSQL) {
-            return { recordset, totalRowCount: exact ?? recordset.length };
-        }
-
-        // Full page — a COUNT(*) is required to know the true total.
-        const lowerBound = startRow + recordset.length;
+    private authorizeRenderedSQL(sqlText: string, platform: DatabasePlatform, context: AppContext, contextUser: UserInfo | undefined): string | null {
         try {
-            const countResult = await this.runSqlWithDeadline<{ TotalRowCount: number }>(ds, countSQL, deadline);
-            return { recordset, totalRowCount: ResolveAdhocTotalRowCount(countResult.recordset, lowerBound) };
-        } catch (countErr) {
-            const msg = countErr instanceof Error ? countErr.message : String(countErr);
-            LogError(`Ad-hoc query row-count failed; reporting a lower-bound total (${lowerBound}). ${msg}`);
-            return { recordset, totalRowCount: lowerBound };
+            const rendered = RenderPipeline.Run(sqlText, { Platform: platform, ContextUser: contextUser, RequireReadStatement: true });
+            const mdProvider: IMetadataProvider | undefined = GetReadOnlyProvider(context.providers, { allowFallbackToReadWrite: true }) ?? undefined;
+            this.assertFullQueryUsesReadableEntityViews(rendered.Trace.AfterTemplates, mdProvider, contextUser, 'ad-hoc SQL');
+            return null;
+        } catch (err) {
+            return err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
         }
     }
 
-    /**
-     * Executes one SQL statement on the read-only pool, racing it against the shared
-     * wall-clock `deadline`. The timer is always cleared on completion so a settled
-     * query never leaves a dangling timeout armed.
-     */
-    private async runSqlWithDeadline<T>(
-        ds: sql.ConnectionPool,
-        sqlText: string,
-        deadline: number,
-    ): Promise<sql.IResult<T>> {
-        const remaining = deadline - Date.now();
-        if (remaining <= 0) {
-            throw new Error('Query timeout exceeded');
-        }
-        let timer: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | undefined;
-        try {
-            return await Promise.race([
-                new sql.Request(ds).query<T>(sqlText),
-                new Promise<never>((_, reject) => {
-                    timer = setTimeout(() => reject(new Error('Query timeout exceeded')), remaining);
-                }),
-            ]);
-        } finally {
-            if (timer) {
-                clearTimeout(timer);
-            }
+    /** Maps the provider's result to the GraphQL shape, naming a timeout plainly. */
+    private toResultType(
+        result: RunQueryResult,
+        startRow: number,
+        maxRows: number | undefined,
+        timeoutSeconds: number,
+        executionTimeMs: number,
+    ): RunQueryResultType {
+        if (!result.Success) {
+            const message = result.ErrorMessage ?? 'Ad-hoc query failed';
+            return this.buildErrorResult(
+                /timeout/i.test(message) ? `Query execution exceeded ${timeoutSeconds} second timeout` : message,
+                executionTimeMs,
+            );
         }
+        const paged = maxRows != null && Number.isInteger(maxRows) && maxRows > 0;
+        return {
+            QueryID: '',
+            QueryName: 'Ad-Hoc Query',
+            Success: true,
+            Results: JSON.stringify(result.Results),
+            RowCount: result.RowCount,
+            TotalRowCount: result.TotalRowCount,
+            PageNumber: paged ? Math.floor(startRow / maxRows!) + 1 : undefined,
+            PageSize: paged ? maxRows : undefined,
+            ExecutionTime: executionTimeMs,
+            ErrorMessage: ''
+        };
     }
 
-    private buildErrorResult(errorMessage: string): RunQueryResultType {
+    private buildErrorResult(errorMessage: string, executionTimeMs = 0): RunQueryResultType {
         return {
             QueryID: '',
             QueryName: 'Ad-Hoc Query',
@@ -256,7 +156,7 @@ export class AdhocQueryResolver extends ResolverBase {
             TotalRowCount: 0,
             PageNumber: undefined,
             PageSize: undefined,
-            ExecutionTime: 0,
+            ExecutionTime: executionTimeMs,
             ErrorMessage: errorMessage
         };
     }

package/src/resolvers/EntityRecordNameResolver.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { CompositeKey, DatabaseProviderBase, EntityInfo, LogDebug, UserInfo } from '@memberjunction/core';
+import { CompositeKey, DatabaseProviderBase } from '@memberjunction/core';
 import { Arg, Ctx, Field, InputType, ObjectType, Query, Resolver } from 'type-graphql';
 import { AppContext, UserPayload } from '../types.js';
 import { CompositeKeyInputType, CompositeKeyOutputType } from '../generic/KeyInputOutputTypes.js';
@@ -36,20 +36,13 @@ export class EntityRecordNameResult {
  * Resolves a record's display NAME from its primary key — the lookup behind every foreign-key
  * link, breadcrumb and picker label in the UI.
  *
- * **This is a read of entity data and is gated like one.** It historically took no user context
- * at all, which made it an open side channel: a caller denied READ on an entity's name field
- * could still obtain that name here, because the name never travelled through the resolver that
- * strips denied fields. Field-level security turned that latent gap into a live bypass — the
- * form-field FK control falls through to this query precisely WHEN the joined display column is
- * denied, so the one case the fallback exists for was the case that leaked.
+ * Entity-level read permission is checked here ({@link ResolverBase.CheckUserReadPermissions}).
+ * Field- and row-level security are applied by the provider's lookup, for the acting user passed
+ * to it: when any field the name is built from is withheld, it answers with no name.
  *
- * Two gates now apply, matching what the generated single-record resolvers do:
- *   1. entity-level read permission ({@link ResolverBase.CheckUserReadPermissions});
- *   2. field-level read permission on the entity's own name field.
- *
- * A field-level denial answers `Success: false` with no name rather than throwing. Callers
- * already treat "no name" as "show the primary key", which is the intended degradation — and it
- * keeps this query from becoming a probe that distinguishes "restricted" from "missing".
+ * A withheld name answers `Success: false` with the same status as a record that does not exist.
+ * Callers already treat "no name" as "show the primary key", and the identical answer keeps this
+ * query from becoming a probe that distinguishes "restricted" from "missing".
  */
 @Resolver(EntityRecordNameResult)
 export class EntityRecordNameResolver extends ResolverBase {
@@ -91,53 +84,18 @@ export class EntityRecordNameResolver extends ResolverBase {
     const e = md.Entities.find((e) => e.Name === EntityName);
     if (e) {
       const contextUser = userPayload ? this.GetUserFromPayload(userPayload) : undefined;
-      if (this.IsNameFieldDeniedToUser(e, contextUser)) {
-        LogDebug(
-          `[FieldSecurity] Suppressed GetEntityRecordName for '${EntityName}': ` +
-          `the name field is not readable by this user`
-        );
-        return {
-          Success: false,
-          Status: `Name for record, or record ${pk.ToString()} itself not found, could be an access issue`,
-          CompositeKey: pk,
-          EntityName,
-        };
-      }
-      // Pass the acting user through: the provider signature accepts it, and omitting it ran the
-      // underlying lookup with no identity at all — so row-level security had nothing to filter on
-      // either. The field-level gate above is the column half; this is the row half.
+      // The acting user is what field- and row-level security are applied for.
       const recordName = await md.GetEntityRecordName(e.Name, pk, contextUser);
       if (recordName) return { Success: true, Status: 'OK', CompositeKey: pk, RecordName: recordName, EntityName };
       else
         return {
           Success: false,
-          Status: `Name for record, or record ${pk.ToString()} itself not found, could be an access issue if user doesn't have Row Level Access (RLS) if RLS is enabled for this entity`,
+          Status: `Name for record, or record ${pk.ToString()} itself not found, could be an access issue`,
           CompositeKey: pk,
           EntityName,
         };
     } else return { Success: false, Status: `Entity ${EntityName} not found`, CompositeKey: pk, EntityName };
   }
-
-  /**
-   * Whether field security withholds this entity's NAME field from the user.
-   *
-   * Resolves the name field the same way the provider's own lookup does — the designated
-   * `IsNameField`, else a field literally called `Name` — so the check cannot drift from the
-   * value it is guarding. Fails OPEN only where field security does not apply at all (flag off,
-   * no user, no name field), matching every other FLS gate.
-   */
-  protected IsNameFieldDeniedToUser(entity: EntityInfo, contextUser?: UserInfo): boolean {
-    if (!entity?.EnableFieldLevelSecurity || !contextUser) {
-      return false;
-    }
-    const nameField =
-      entity.Fields?.find(f => f.IsNameField) ??
-      entity.Fields?.find(f => f.Name?.trim().toLowerCase() === 'name');
-    if (!nameField) {
-      return false;
-    }
-    return entity.GetDeniedReadFields(contextUser).has(nameField.Name.trim().toLowerCase());
-  }
 }
 
 export default EntityRecordNameResolver;

package/src/resolvers/GetDataResolver.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 import { Arg, Ctx, Field, InputType, ObjectType, Query } from 'type-graphql';
+import { SQLExpressionValidator } from '@memberjunction/global';
 import { AppContext } from '../types.js';
 import { LogError, LogStatus, LogStatusEx, Metadata } from '@memberjunction/core';
 import { QueryCompositionEngine } from '@memberjunction/generic-database-provider';
@@ -154,6 +155,15 @@ export class GetDataResolver {
                             resolvedSQL = compositionResult.ResolvedSQL;
                         }
 
+                        // Defense-in-depth: even system-token holders get SELECT-only SQL here.
+                        // The read-only pool is the primary control, but if it is ever
+                        // misconfigured to a read-write login this validator still refuses DML/DDL
+                        // (mirrors AdhocQueryResolver).
+                        const validation = SQLExpressionValidator.Instance.validateFullQuery(resolvedSQL);
+                        if (!validation.valid) {
+                            return { result: null, error: validation.error || 'SQL validation failed' };
+                        }
+
                         const request = new sql.Request(readOnlyDataSource);
                         const result = await request.query(resolvedSQL);
                         return { result: result.recordset, error: null };