@memberjunction/generic-database-provider 6.1.0-edge.6 → 6.1.0

package/dist/GenericDatabaseProvider.js

@@ -75,6 +75,13 @@ export class GenericDatabaseProvider extends DatabaseProviderBase {
         this._savepointStack = [];
         /** Physical handle is gone but outer frames still must settle. Queued nested begins must not become outermost. */
         this._doomed = false;
+        /**
+         * Set when an outermost commit failed and the physical handle was already abandoned (rolled
+         * back) on the way out. A caller's own rollback in its catch block then finds no transaction —
+         * which is the CORRECT state, not a second failure — so that rollback is a no-op instead of
+         * throwing 'No active transaction to rollback' on top of the real error (#4447).
+         */
+        this._abandonedByFailedCommit = false;
         this._txMutex = Promise.resolve();
     }
     /**
@@ -936,6 +943,21 @@ export class GenericDatabaseProvider extends DatabaseProviderBase {
             // entity.Get(), which would assert active status (deprecation warning / disabled throw)
             // for what is NOT user use of the field. (EntityField.Value itself never asserts.)
             const theField = entity.GetFieldByName(f.Name);
+            // Not-loaded fields (the hydration source omitted them — e.g. field-security
+            // stripping) are OMITTED from the SP call entirely: every generated param has a
+            // default, the update procs' ISNULL(@p, [Col]) merge preserves the stored value,
+            // and the create procs substitute the column default. Skipping here also
+            // suppresses the _Clear companion, which RenderSaveCallBinding derives from the
+            // fieldValueMap this loop builds — so a not-loaded nullable field can never be
+            // wiped to NULL by its own construction state.
+            if (theField?.NotLoaded)
+                continue;
+            // Field security on INSERT: a field this user may not create is omitted so the
+            // column takes its database default. Distinct from NotLoaded — the value here is
+            // real, it is simply not one this user is permitted to supply — which is why the
+            // flag is separate and why validation still ran against it normally.
+            if (!isUpdate && theField?.CreateSuppressed)
+                continue;
             const rawValue = theField?.Value;
             // PK-on-CREATE with no explicit value: omit so the SP default fires.
             const isPKOnCreate = !isUpdate && f.IsPrimaryKey && !f.AutoIncrement;
@@ -1395,7 +1417,7 @@ export class GenericDatabaseProvider extends DatabaseProviderBase {
                 maxRowsForQuery = entityInfo.UserViewMaxRows;
             }
             // ── Field selection ──
-            const fields = this.getRunTimeViewFieldString(params, viewEntity);
+            const fields = this.getRunTimeViewFieldString(params, viewEntity, user);
             // ── Build SELECT and COUNT SQL ──
             // DataSource:'Materialized' routes the read to the entity's materialized wrapper view
             // (same shape, so RLS/paging/fields all apply identically); default stays the live base view.
@@ -1437,10 +1459,25 @@ export class GenericDatabaseProvider extends DatabaseProviderBase {
                 bHasWhere = true;
             }
             // 3. User search string
+            //
+            // 🚨 NOT screened by ValidateUserProvidedSQLClause (#4392). That denylist exists for
+            // caller-supplied SQL FRAGMENTS (ExtraFilter / OrderBy / OverrideExcludeFilter, both
+            // still screened above and below). UserSearchString is not a fragment — it is the free
+            // text a person typed into a search box, and createViewUserSearchSQL never splices it
+            // into SQL as one: it builds every predicate itself from IncludeInUserSearchAPI
+            // metadata and lands the text only INSIDE a string literal, with single quotes doubled
+            // and LIKE metacharacters escaped under an explicit ESCAPE.
+            //
+            // Screening it as SQL rejected ordinary searches. The denylist word-boundary-matches
+            // keywords against the raw text, so "Union Pacific", "Update Request" and "drop
+            // shipment" were all refused — and the grid surfaced a null error message, so the
+            // search box simply appeared broken.
+            //
+            // Quote-doubling, not keyword matching, is the correct protection for a value landing
+            // in a literal: it is what keeps the text inside the quotes, where no keyword it
+            // contains can mean anything to the parser.
             if (userSearchString.length > 0) {
-                if (!this.ValidateUserProvidedSQLClause(userSearchString))
-                    throw new Error(`Invalid User Search SQL clause: ${userSearchString}, contains one more for forbidden keywords`);
-                const sUserSearchSQL = this.createViewUserSearchSQL(entityInfo, userSearchString);
+                const sUserSearchSQL = this.createViewUserSearchSQL(entityInfo, userSearchString, user);
                 if (sUserSearchSQL.length > 0) {
                     whereSQL = bHasWhere ? `${whereSQL} AND (${sUserSearchSQL})` : `(${sUserSearchSQL})`;
                     bHasWhere = true;
@@ -1459,8 +1496,9 @@ export class GenericDatabaseProvider extends DatabaseProviderBase {
                     sExcludeSQL += ` UserViewID=${viewEntity?.ID})`;
                 else {
                     // SECURITY: excludeUserViewRunID is user-supplied (GraphQL input) and is
-                    // interpolated directly into SQL here. Unlike ExtraFilter/UserSearchString/
-                    // OverrideExcludeFilter (all passed through ValidateUserProvidedSQLClause),
+                    // interpolated directly into SQL here. Unlike ExtraFilter/OrderBy/
+                    // OverrideExcludeFilter (all passed through ValidateUserProvidedSQLClause —
+                    // UserSearchString is free text and is escaped into a literal instead, #4392),
                     // this value historically had NO validation — allowing SQL injection into the
                     // view WHERE clause. It is only ever a UserViewRun.ID (a GUID), so reject
                     // anything that is not a well-formed GUID before it reaches the query.
@@ -1697,12 +1735,36 @@ export class GenericDatabaseProvider extends DatabaseProviderBase {
     /**************************************************************************/
     // InternalRunView Helpers
     /**************************************************************************/
+    /**
+     * Returns the SELECT list for a single-record load: `*` normally, or an explicit list of
+     * the columns this user is allowed to read when field security denies them any.
+     *
+     * Deliberately NOT routed through RunView, which is the other way to get this behavior.
+     * That reroute is the tidier long-term shape and is planned separately (it must pass
+     * `BypassCache` — a PK load has never been cache-served and must not silently start being
+     * — and it changes relationship loading, which stays on its current path). Filtering the
+     * column list here buys the same protection without touching either.
+     */
+    buildFieldSecuritySelectList(entityInfo, user) {
+        if (!user || !entityInfo.EnableFieldLevelSecurity) {
+            return '*'; // the overwhelmingly common case — one boolean, unchanged SQL
+        }
+        const denied = entityInfo.GetDeniedReadFields(user);
+        if (denied.size === 0) {
+            return '*';
+        }
+        const allowed = entityInfo.Fields.filter(f => !denied.has(f.Name.trim().toLowerCase()));
+        if (allowed.length === 0) {
+            return '*'; // degenerate; PKs are unrestrictable so this should be unreachable
+        }
+        return allowed.map(f => this.QuoteIdentifier(f.Name)).join(', ');
+    }
     /**
      * Builds the SQL field list string for a view query, using dialect-neutral quoting.
      * Returns '*' if no specific fields are resolved.
      */
-    getRunTimeViewFieldString(params, viewEntity) {
-        const fieldList = this.getRunTimeViewFieldArray(params, viewEntity);
+    getRunTimeViewFieldString(params, viewEntity, contextUser) {
+        const fieldList = this.getRunTimeViewFieldArray(params, viewEntity, contextUser);
         if (fieldList.length === 0)
             return '*';
         return fieldList
@@ -1715,8 +1777,19 @@ export class GenericDatabaseProvider extends DatabaseProviderBase {
     /**
      * Resolves the list of EntityFieldInfo objects for a view query.
      * Priority: params.Fields > view columns > all entity fields (wildcard).
+     *
+     * Field-level security intersects every resolution path with the user's ALLOWED set, so a
+     * denied column never appears in the SELECT list and its values never leave the database:
+     *  - explicit `params.Fields` and saved-view columns are silently narrowed (a denied entry
+     *    is dropped without the "Field not found" error — `Fields` describes output shape, not
+     *    a predicate, and the caller learns nothing projection didn't already show them);
+     *  - an empty field list, which otherwise emits `SELECT *`, becomes the explicit
+     *    allowed-column list;
+     *  - `entity_object` requests are EXEMPT — entities must hydrate from every column (see
+     *    ApplyFieldSecurityProjection) and their enforcement stays at the output boundary;
+     *  - PKs are unrestrictable and always survive (the existing force-add).
      */
-    getRunTimeViewFieldArray(params, viewEntity) {
+    getRunTimeViewFieldArray(params, viewEntity, contextUser) {
         const fieldList = [];
         try {
             let entityInfo = null;
@@ -1728,12 +1801,18 @@ export class GenericDatabaseProvider extends DatabaseProviderBase {
                 if (!entityInfo)
                     throw new Error(`Entity ${params.EntityName} not found in metadata`);
             }
+            const flsUser = contextUser ?? this.CurrentUser;
+            const denied = params.ResultType !== 'entity_object' && flsUser && entityInfo.EnableFieldLevelSecurity
+                ? entityInfo.GetDeniedReadFields(flsUser)
+                : new Set();
             if (params.Fields) {
                 for (const ef of entityInfo.PrimaryKeys) {
                     if (!params.Fields.find((f) => f.trim().toLowerCase() === ef.Name.toLowerCase()))
                         fieldList.push(ef);
                 }
                 params.Fields.forEach((f) => {
+                    if (denied.has(f.trim().toLowerCase()))
+                        return; // silent narrowing — deliberately NOT the "not found" error
                     const field = entityInfo.FieldByName(f); // O(1) index (was O(F) Fields.find → O(F²) over the loop)
                     if (field)
                         fieldList.push(field);
@@ -1745,6 +1824,8 @@ export class GenericDatabaseProvider extends DatabaseProviderBase {
                 viewEntity.Columns.forEach((c) => {
                     if (!c.hidden) {
                         if (c.EntityField) {
+                            if (denied.has(c.EntityField.Name.trim().toLowerCase()))
+                                return; // silent narrowing
                             fieldList.push(c.EntityField);
                         }
                         else {
@@ -1757,6 +1838,15 @@ export class GenericDatabaseProvider extends DatabaseProviderBase {
                         fieldList.push(ef);
                 }
             }
+            else if (denied.size > 0) {
+                // No explicit fields and no saved view would emit `SELECT *` — for a restricted
+                // user that pulls denied columns out of the database, so emit the explicit
+                // allowed-column list instead (PKs are unrestrictable and always included).
+                for (const ef of entityInfo.Fields) {
+                    if (!denied.has(ef.Name.trim().toLowerCase()))
+                        fieldList.push(ef);
+                }
+            }
         }
         catch (e) {
             LogError(e);
@@ -1774,16 +1864,37 @@ export class GenericDatabaseProvider extends DatabaseProviderBase {
      *   - skips fields that are not sensible text-search targets (non-text types,
      *     unbounded text columns when FTX is off).
      */
-    createViewUserSearchSQL(entityInfo, userSearchString) {
+    createViewUserSearchSQL(entityInfo, userSearchString, contextUser) {
         let sUserSearchSQL = '';
         const safeUserSearchString = userSearchString.replace(/'/g, "''");
-        if (entityInfo.FullTextSearchEnabled) {
+        // Field-level security: never search fields the user cannot read. Matching against a
+        // denied column is a value oracle — "search for 250000 → the row comes back" probes the
+        // secret one term at a time. UserSearchString is not rejected (the term is not a
+        // caller-authored predicate; see AssertPredicatesRespectFieldSecurity) — the denied
+        // fields are simply excluded from the searched set. Computed once per call, never per
+        // field (the per-request precompute contract).
+        const user = contextUser ?? this.CurrentUser;
+        const deniedSearchFields = entityInfo.EnableFieldLevelSecurity && user
+            ? entityInfo.GetDeniedReadFields(user)
+            : new Set();
+        // The full-text index spans its indexed columns as one unit — a denied FTS-indexed
+        // column cannot be excluded from the index function. When (and only when) a denied
+        // field is FTS-indexed, fall back to the per-field LIKE path, which CAN exclude it.
+        const ftsCoversDeniedField = deniedSearchFields.size > 0 &&
+            entityInfo.Fields.some(f => f.FullTextSearchEnabled && deniedSearchFields.has(f.Name.trim().toLowerCase()));
+        if (entityInfo.FullTextSearchEnabled && !ftsCoversDeniedField) {
             let u = safeUserSearchString;
             const uUpper = u.toUpperCase();
-            if (uUpper.includes(' AND ') || uUpper.includes(' OR ') || uUpper.includes(' NOT ')) {
+            // WORD-boundary tests, not substring tests (#4392). As substrings, `OR` matches
+            // "C-OR-PORATE" and `AND` matches "ST-AND-ARD", so ordinary two-word searches —
+            // "Corporate Office", "Standard Rate", "North America" — fell into the branch below
+            // and were emitted as `Corporate%Office`. `%` is not a full-text operator, so those
+            // searches produced a syntax error instead of results. Only a STANDALONE AND/OR/NOT
+            // is a boolean operator the caller meant.
+            if (/ (AND|OR|NOT) /.test(uUpper)) {
                 u = uUpper.replace(/ /g, '%').replace(/%AND%/g, ' AND ').replace(/%OR%/g, ' OR ').replace(/%NOT%/g, ' NOT ');
             }
-            else if (uUpper.includes('AND') || uUpper.includes('OR') || uUpper.includes('NOT')) {
+            else if (/\b(AND|OR|NOT)\b/.test(uUpper)) {
                 u = u.replace(/ /g, '%');
             }
             else if (u.includes(' ')) {
@@ -1798,10 +1909,31 @@ export class GenericDatabaseProvider extends DatabaseProviderBase {
             sUserSearchSQL = `${pkName} IN (SELECT ${pkName} FROM ${this.QuoteSchemaAndView(entityInfo.SchemaName, entityInfo.FullTextSearchFunction ?? '')}('${u}'))`;
         }
         else {
+            // 🚨 SECURITY (#4392): the search term is free text, and on every predicate this
+            // method builds itself it is CONFINED — wrapped in a string literal with single
+            // quotes doubled — so no keyword it contains can reach the parser and the SQL
+            // fragment denylist is neither needed nor appropriate.
+            //
+            // `UserSearchParamFormatAPI` is the ONE exception. That format is admin-authored and
+            // may splice `{0}` in UNQUOTED: ` = {0}` on a numeric field is a documented, tested
+            // case (see createViewUserSearchSQL.test.ts). There the term IS SQL, with no quote
+            // keeping it contained, so the fragment denylist still has to apply. Screen only when
+            // such a field actually participates — ordinary entities keep accepting the ordinary
+            // searches that #4392 was about.
+            //
+            // Note this restores the pre-#4392 screen for this path; it does not close the
+            // unquoted-format hole, which the denylist never covered (`1) OR 1=1` carries no
+            // forbidden keyword). Quoting `{0}` in the format is what actually closes that.
+            if (this.userSearchFieldsUseCustomFormat(entityInfo, deniedSearchFields) && !this.ValidateUserProvidedSQLClause(userSearchString)) {
+                throw new Error(`Invalid User Search string: this entity has a field using UserSearchParamFormatAPI, ` +
+                    `which splices the term directly into SQL, and the term contains forbidden keywords.`);
+            }
             const escapedTerm = this.escapeLikeTerm(safeUserSearchString);
             for (const field of entityInfo.Fields) {
                 if (!field.IncludeInUserSearchAPI)
                     continue;
+                if (deniedSearchFields.has(field.Name.trim().toLowerCase()))
+                    continue; // field security: not searchable
                 const sParam = this.buildPerFieldSearchPredicate(field, escapedTerm, safeUserSearchString);
                 if (!sParam)
                     continue;
@@ -1835,6 +1967,23 @@ export class GenericDatabaseProvider extends DatabaseProviderBase {
         const columns = entityInfo.PrimaryKeys.map(pk => pk.Name).join(', ');
         throw new Error(`${feature} requires a single-column primary key. Entity "${entityInfo.Name}" has ${entityInfo.PrimaryKeys.length} primary key columns (${columns}).`);
     }
+    /**
+     * True when a field that will ACTUALLY PARTICIPATE in this search carries a
+     * `UserSearchParamFormatAPI`. Such a format is admin-authored and may place `{0}` outside
+     * quotes, so for those entities the search term is not guaranteed to land inside a literal
+     * and still needs the SQL-fragment denylist (#4392).
+     *
+     * `deniedFields` must be the same field-level-security exclusion set the predicate loop
+     * applies. A field the caller may not read is skipped there, so its format never reaches the
+     * SQL — screening the term on its behalf would refuse ordinary searches ("Union Pacific") for
+     * exactly the users with the LEAST access. Participation, not mere configuration, is what
+     * makes the denylist necessary.
+     */
+    userSearchFieldsUseCustomFormat(entityInfo, deniedFields) {
+        return entityInfo.Fields.some(f => f.IncludeInUserSearchAPI &&
+            !!f.UserSearchParamFormatAPI && f.UserSearchParamFormatAPI.length > 0 &&
+            !deniedFields?.has(f.Name.trim().toLowerCase()));
+    }
     /**
      * Build the SQL fragment that compares one EntityField against a user search term.
      *
@@ -2021,6 +2170,14 @@ export class GenericDatabaseProvider extends DatabaseProviderBase {
             // served cached rows unprojected — one client's shape poisoned the slot
             // for every subsequent caller.
             const callerFieldsByIndex = new Map();
+            // Field-security predicate rejections, per item. This operation is directly
+            // client-invokable over GraphQL and its legs call InternalRunView / the cache
+            // directly — the AssertPredicatesRespectFieldSecurity gate that PreRunView/
+            // PreRunViews run is otherwise SKIPPED here, leaving ExtraFilter/OrderBy/
+            // Aggregates over denied fields as a live reconstruction channel on this path.
+            // Rejection is per-item (the response shape has per-item error status), with
+            // the same deliberately ambiguous message as every other rejection path.
+            const gateRejectedByIndex = new Map();
             for (let i = 0; i < params.length; i++) {
                 // Shallow-clone: widening must never leak into the caller's objects
                 params[i] = { ...params[i], params: { ...params[i].params } };
@@ -2039,12 +2196,23 @@ export class GenericDatabaseProvider extends DatabaseProviderBase {
                 this.ResolvePlatformSQLInParams(params[i].params);
                 params[i].params = await this.RunPreRunViewHooks(params[i].params, user);
                 const p = params[i].params;
+                // Gate AFTER hooks (injected filters are scanned too), same as PreRunViews.
+                try {
+                    this.AssertPredicatesRespectFieldSecurity(p, user);
+                }
+                catch (gateError) {
+                    gateRejectedByIndex.set(i, gateError instanceof Error ? gateError.message : String(gateError));
+                    continue;
+                }
                 const widenEntity = p.EntityName ? this.EntityByName(p.EntityName) : null;
                 if (widenEntity && this.runViewCacheEligible(p)) {
                     const requested = p.Fields && p.Fields.length > 0
                         ? p.Fields.map(f => f.trim().toLowerCase())
                         : null;
-                    p.Fields = widenEntity.Fields.map(f => f.Name);
+                    // ALL fields, for every user: server slots are full-width and shared, and
+                    // field security narrows per request at read time via
+                    // ApplyFieldSecurityProjection rather than at fetch time.
+                    p.Fields = this.ComputeRunViewFetchFields(widenEntity);
                     if (requested) {
                         callerFieldsByIndex.set(i, ProviderBase.UnionFieldsWithPrimaryKeys(requested, widenEntity));
                     }
@@ -2063,6 +2231,13 @@ export class GenericDatabaseProvider extends DatabaseProviderBase {
             const errorResults = [];
             for (let i = 0; i < params.length; i++) {
                 const item = params[i];
+                // Field-security gate rejections short-circuit every leg for this item —
+                // no cache consult, no currency check, no execution.
+                const gateRejection = gateRejectedByIndex.get(i);
+                if (gateRejection !== undefined) {
+                    errorResults.push({ viewIndex: i, status: 'error', errorMessage: gateRejection });
+                    continue;
+                }
                 // Keyset queries bypass the cache entirely (per the AfterKey API contract):
                 // each call uses a different seek key, so cached entries would never be
                 // reusable. Route directly to standard execution path.
@@ -2163,7 +2338,8 @@ export class GenericDatabaseProvider extends DatabaseProviderBase {
             for (const entry of itemsWithoutCacheCheck) {
                 if (LocalCacheManager.Instance.IsInitialized) {
                     const rlsWhereClause = this.ComputeRunViewRLSWhereClause(entry.item.params, contextUser);
-                    const fingerprint = LocalCacheManager.Instance.GenerateRunViewFingerprint(entry.item.params, this.InstanceConnectionString, rlsWhereClause);
+                    const flsFieldsKey = this.ComputeRunViewFLSFingerprintKey(entry.item.params);
+                    const fingerprint = LocalCacheManager.Instance.GenerateRunViewFingerprint(entry.item.params, this.InstanceConnectionString, rlsWhereClause, undefined, flsFieldsKey);
                     const cached = await LocalCacheManager.Instance.GetRunViewResult(fingerprint);
                     if (cached) {
                         const entityLabel = entry.item.params.EntityName || 'unknown';
@@ -2205,6 +2381,41 @@ export class GenericDatabaseProvider extends DatabaseProviderBase {
             // cache, which was masked when an earlier 'stale'/'differential'
             // response populated it. Uses params[viewIndex] — the same hooked
             // params object the Pre hooks produced.
+            // ── Field-level security projection (OUTPUT boundary of this path) ──
+            // Every row-bearing leg above (serve-from-cache, full query, differential)
+            // returns rows WITHOUT traversing PostRunView, so the projections that guard
+            // the standard pipeline never run here — and unrestricted users' slots and
+            // full-width DB reads can carry denied columns. Apply them per item, for BOTH
+            // full results and differential updatedRows, before the Post hooks run.
+            //
+            // BOTH projections, in this order — they are siblings, not alternatives, and
+            // `PostRunView` calls them as a pair at all four of its projection points. Applying
+            // only the first leaves the audit trail leaking: `ApplyFieldSecurityProjection`
+            // short-circuits on the RunView entity's own `EnableFieldLevelSecurity`, and
+            // `MJ: Record Changes` has that flag OFF by design, so it is a no-op on exactly the
+            // rows that matter. The denied values there are INSIDE the `ChangesJSON` /
+            // `FullRecordJSON` payload columns, which no amount of column stripping reaches —
+            // `ApplyRecordChangeFieldSecurityProjection` is what projects them against the entity
+            // each row is about. Reachable from a browser: this transport is selected when
+            // `params.some(p => p.CacheLocal)` (providerBase.ts), so a Record Changes view
+            // batched alongside any cache-local view rides onto it.
+            for (const item of allResults) {
+                const flsBearing = item;
+                const flsParams = params[flsBearing.viewIndex]?.params;
+                if (!flsParams) {
+                    continue;
+                }
+                if (Array.isArray(flsBearing.results)) {
+                    flsBearing.results = this.ApplyFieldSecurityProjection(flsBearing.results, flsParams, user);
+                    flsBearing.results = this.ApplyRecordChangeFieldSecurityProjection(flsBearing.results, flsParams, user);
+                }
+                if (Array.isArray(flsBearing.differentialData?.updatedRows)) {
+                    flsBearing.differentialData.updatedRows =
+                        this.ApplyFieldSecurityProjection(flsBearing.differentialData.updatedRows, flsParams, user);
+                    flsBearing.differentialData.updatedRows =
+                        this.ApplyRecordChangeFieldSecurityProjection(flsBearing.differentialData.updatedRows, flsParams, user);
+                }
+            }
             for (const item of allResults) {
                 const rowBearing = item;
                 if (!Array.isArray(rowBearing.results)) {
@@ -2251,10 +2462,10 @@ export class GenericDatabaseProvider extends DatabaseProviderBase {
             whereSQL = `(${extraFilter})`;
             bHasWhere = true;
         }
+        // Free text, not a SQL fragment — deliberately NOT run through
+        // ValidateUserProvidedSQLClause. See the equivalent note on the view path above (#4392).
         if (params.UserSearchString && params.UserSearchString.length > 0) {
-            if (!this.ValidateUserProvidedSQLClause(params.UserSearchString))
-                throw new Error(`Invalid User Search SQL clause: ${params.UserSearchString}`);
-            const sUserSearchSQL = this.createViewUserSearchSQL(entityInfo, params.UserSearchString);
+            const sUserSearchSQL = this.createViewUserSearchSQL(entityInfo, params.UserSearchString, user);
             if (sUserSearchSQL.length > 0) {
                 whereSQL = bHasWhere ? `${whereSQL} AND (${sUserSearchSQL})` : `(${sUserSearchSQL})`;
                 bHasWhere = true;
@@ -2339,7 +2550,8 @@ export class GenericDatabaseProvider extends DatabaseProviderBase {
                 const ttlMs = await this.resolveExternalCacheTTLMs(params, contextUser);
                 if (ttlMs !== 0) {
                     const rlsWhereClause = this.ComputeRunViewRLSWhereClause(params, contextUser);
-                    const fingerprint = LocalCacheManager.Instance.GenerateRunViewFingerprint(params, this.InstanceConnectionString, rlsWhereClause);
+                    const flsFieldsKey = this.ComputeRunViewFLSFingerprintKey(params);
+                    const fingerprint = LocalCacheManager.Instance.GenerateRunViewFingerprint(params, this.InstanceConnectionString, rlsWhereClause, undefined, flsFieldsKey);
                     const maxUpdatedAt = result.maxUpdatedAt || new Date().toISOString();
                     // Pass the aggregates (B38-family omission #4). This slot is ALSO written by
                     // InternalRunView's normal PostRunView path WITH aggregates — two writers,
@@ -2485,7 +2697,8 @@ export class GenericDatabaseProvider extends DatabaseProviderBase {
         if (!LocalCacheManager.Instance.IsInitialized)
             return null;
         const rlsWhereClause = this.ComputeRunViewRLSWhereClause(item.params, contextUser);
-        const fingerprint = LocalCacheManager.Instance.GenerateRunViewFingerprint(item.params, this.InstanceConnectionString, rlsWhereClause);
+        const flsFieldsKey = this.ComputeRunViewFLSFingerprintKey(item.params);
+        const fingerprint = LocalCacheManager.Instance.GenerateRunViewFingerprint(item.params, this.InstanceConnectionString, rlsWhereClause, undefined, flsFieldsKey);
         const cached = await LocalCacheManager.Instance.GetRunViewResult(fingerprint);
         if (!cached)
             return null;
@@ -3850,7 +4063,17 @@ export class GenericDatabaseProvider extends DatabaseProviderBase {
                 fullWhere = `${where} AND (${rlsWhereClause})`;
             }
         }
-        const sql = `SELECT * FROM ${this.QuoteSchemaAndView(entityInfo.SchemaName, entityInfo.BaseView)} WHERE ${fullWhere}`;
+        // Field security: a user with denied columns gets an explicit allowed-column list
+        // instead of `SELECT *`, so denied values never leave the database — not even into
+        // server memory. This is the single-record counterpart of the SELECT-list filtering
+        // RunView already does, and it is what stops an agent running under a restricted
+        // service account from holding values its user may not read. The columns that ARE
+        // omitted come back as absent keys, which marks them not-loaded on the entity, so the
+        // next save skips them and the stored values survive.
+        //
+        // Unrestricted users keep the literal `SELECT *` — byte-identical SQL, no plan churn.
+        const selectList = this.buildFieldSecuritySelectList(entityInfo, user);
+        const sql = `SELECT ${selectList} FROM ${this.QuoteSchemaAndView(entityInfo.SchemaName, entityInfo.BaseView)} WHERE ${fullWhere}`;
         const rawData = await this.ExecuteSQL(sql, undefined, undefined, user);
         const d = await this.PostProcessRows(rawData, entityInfo, user);
         if (d && d.length > 0) {
@@ -4731,6 +4954,7 @@ export class GenericDatabaseProvider extends DatabaseProviderBase {
         this._transactionDepth++;
         try {
             if (this._transactionDepth === 1) {
+                this._abandonedByFailedCommit = false;
                 await this.BeginPhysicalTransaction();
                 return;
             }
@@ -4827,6 +5051,7 @@ export class GenericDatabaseProvider extends DatabaseProviderBase {
             catch (e) {
                 await this.AbandonPhysicalTransaction();
                 this.clearTransactionState();
+                this._abandonedByFailedCommit = true;
                 LogError(e);
                 throw e;
             }
@@ -4860,6 +5085,11 @@ export class GenericDatabaseProvider extends DatabaseProviderBase {
             this.popDoomedFrame();
             return;
         }
+        if (this._abandonedByFailedCommit) {
+            // The failed commit already rolled the doomed handle back; there is nothing left to undo.
+            this._abandonedByFailedCommit = false;
+            return;
+        }
         if (!this.HasPhysicalTransaction) {
             throw new Error('No active transaction to rollback');
         }