@mega-yfue/eufy-sdk 0.5.0-beta.69 → 0.5.0-beta.70

package/dist/model/capabilities/index.d.ts

@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ import type { DisplayActions } from "./display.js";
 import type { SuctionActions } from "./suction.js";
 import type { MowerActions } from "./mower.js";
 import type { LocateActions } from "./locate.js";
+import type { SmartDropActions } from "./smart-drop.js";
 import type { DeviceInfo } from "./info.js";
 import type { CusPushAlarmType } from "../push-events.js";
 /**
@@ -431,6 +432,8 @@ export interface DeviceActionMap {
     mower: MowerActions;
     /** RoboVac locate (find-robot beep): `locating`; `locate(on?)`. */
     locate: LocateActions;
+    /** SmartDrop parcel box: `openLid()`. */
+    smartDrop: SmartDropActions;
     /** Smart Display (read-only): `battery`. No display write is captured. */
     display: DisplayActions;
     /** Identity metadata (read-only): `{ manufacturer, model, serialNumber, name, deviceType?, firmwareVersion?, hardwareVersion? }`. */
@@ -524,7 +527,7 @@ export type { ActionSpec } from "./types.js";
  * `undefined` for an action nothing describes.
  */
 export { actionSpecOf } from "./access.js";
-export type { PtzActions, LightActions, SmartLightActions, RgbColor, CameraActions, LockActions, SirenActions, ArmingActions, BatteryActions, MotionActions, ContactActions, LeakActions, SmokeActions, CoActions, KeypadActions, RtspActions, VacuumCleanActions, SuctionActions, MowerActions, LocateActions, };
+export type { PtzActions, LightActions, SmartLightActions, RgbColor, CameraActions, LockActions, SirenActions, ArmingActions, BatteryActions, MotionActions, ContactActions, LeakActions, SmokeActions, CoActions, KeypadActions, RtspActions, VacuumCleanActions, SuctionActions, MowerActions, LocateActions, SmartDropActions, };
 /**
  * The member table each `*Actions` type is DERIVED from (`LockActions = Surface<typeof LOCK_MEMBERS>`),
  * so the type names the table and the table is part of the published surface.
@@ -549,6 +552,7 @@ export { MOTION_MEMBERS } from "./motion.js";
 export { PTZ_MEMBERS } from "./ptz.js";
 export { RTSP_MEMBERS } from "./rtsp.js";
 export { SIREN_MEMBERS } from "./siren.js";
+export { SMART_DROP_MEMBERS } from "./smart-drop.js";
 export { SMART_LIGHT_MEMBERS } from "./smart-light.js";
 export { SMOKE_MEMBERS } from "./smoke.js";
 export { DISPLAY_MEMBERS, type DisplayActions } from "./display.js";

package/dist/model/capabilities/smart-drop.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+import { type Surface } from "./members.js";
+import type { CapabilityModule } from "./types.js";
+/**
+ * Every `smart_drop` feature, declared once.
+ *
+ * Exported but NOT published: each entry states its wire id and the evidence it was confirmed on,
+ * which the reference site does not carry.
+ * @internal
+ */
+export declare const SMART_DROP_MEMBERS: {
+    /**
+     * Opens the lid with `SET_PAYLOAD` 2100 at level 2. Verified on a standalone T8790, whose cipher has
+     * only an RSA key: the frame sealed AES-128-ECB opened the lid, the same frame at level 1 did not.
+     */
+    readonly openLid: import("./members.js").MethodMember<() => Promise<void>>;
+};
+/** Bound SmartDrop controls — the object returned by `dev.smartDrop()`. */
+export type SmartDropActions = Surface<typeof SMART_DROP_MEMBERS>;
+/** `smart_drop` — a standalone SmartDrop (T8790) parcel box: open the lid. */
+export declare const SMART_DROP: CapabilityModule;

package/dist/model/types.d.ts

@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ export type Codec = "station" | "camera" | "sensor" | "lock" | "keypad" | "vacuu
  * it maps to a {@link CapabilityModule} that owns its property schema. Extend this union as
  * new capabilities are modelled — adding one never requires a subclass.
  */
-export type Capability = "video" | "snapshot" | "motion" | "person_detection" | "battery" | "light" | "ptz" | "doorbell" | "contact" | "leak" | "smoke" | "co" | "siren" | "lock" | "keypad" | "arming" | "storage" | "rtsp" | "camera" | "audio" | "vacuum_clean" | "vacuum_dock" | "suction" | "locate" | "mower" | "smart_light" | "display" | "info";
+export type Capability = "video" | "snapshot" | "motion" | "person_detection" | "battery" | "light" | "ptz" | "doorbell" | "contact" | "leak" | "smoke" | "co" | "siren" | "lock" | "keypad" | "arming" | "storage" | "rtsp" | "camera" | "audio" | "vacuum_clean" | "vacuum_dock" | "suction" | "locate" | "mower" | "smart_drop" | "smart_light" | "display" | "info";
 /** Value type of a property. */
 export type PropertyValueType = "bool" | "number" | "string" | "enum";
 /**

package/dist/transport/p2p/codec.d.ts

@@ -111,6 +111,22 @@ export declare function eciesUnwrap(envelope: Buffer, eccPrivateKeyHex: string,
  * Returns the 32-byte key, or undefined if the inputs don't parse.
  */
 export declare function deriveLevel2KeyFromGatewayInfo(gwPayload: Buffer, eccPrivateKeyHex: string): Buffer | undefined;
+/**
+ * Derive the P2P **level-2** AES-128-ECB session key from a *decrypted* `CMD_GATEWAYINFO` (1100)
+ * payload and the RSA private key of a cipher whose `get_ciphers` answer carries no ECC key.
+ *
+ * Layout of the decrypted payload: `cipher_id(2 LE) ‖ 0000 ‖ RSA ciphertext ‖ …`, the ciphertext as
+ * long as the key's modulus. It is the 16-byte session key under PKCS#1 v1.5 encryption padding
+ * (`00 02 ‖ ≥8 non-zero bytes ‖ 00 ‖ key`). The padding is checked here over the raw RSA result so a wrong
+ * key fails closed: under OpenSSL's implicit rejection, `RSA_PKCS1_PADDING` answers random bytes for it
+ * instead of throwing, and those can be 16 bytes long.
+ *
+ * `rsaPrivateKey` is the `get_ciphers` `private_key`: base64 PKCS#8 DER.
+ *
+ * Returns the 16-byte key, or `undefined` when the key does not parse, the payload is short, or the
+ * padding or key length is wrong (fails closed, never throws).
+ */
+export declare function deriveLevel2KeyFromRsaGatewayInfo(gwPayload: Buffer, rsaPrivateKey: string): Buffer | undefined;
 /** Local-lookup payload: two zero bytes. */
 export declare function buildLocalLookupPayload(): Buffer;
 /** Cloud-lookup payload (variant 2): `[p2pDid:20][dskKey][0x00000000]`. */

package/dist/transport/p2p/command-router.d.ts

@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ export declare class P2PCommandRouter {
      * shared — see {@link P2PCommandRouter.openTalkback}.
      */
     private readonly talkbacks;
-    /** cipher_id → ECC private key (one eufylife get_ciphers call per cipher), shared across (re)opens. */
+    /** cipher_id → its ECC and RSA private keys (one eufylife get_ciphers call per cipher), shared across (re)opens. */
     private readonly cipherKeyCache;
     /** The recording download in flight per station; a station serves one at a time. */
     private readonly recordingDownloads;
@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ export declare class P2PCommandRouter {
      * Build + wire a {@link P2PSession} for a station (NOT yet connected — the caller awaits `connect()`).
      *
      * `resolveCipherKey` auto-negotiates the level-2 session key from `CMD_GATEWAYINFO` by resolving the
-     * cipher's ECC private key via cloud `get_ciphers`, so signCode 2/8 frames decrypt live; results are
+     * cipher's private keys via cloud `get_ciphers`, so signCode 2/8 frames decrypt live; results are
      * cached on the router instance so a lazy re-open (after idle-detach) reuses the lookup. Only a
      * SUCCESSFUL lookup is cached — caching `undefined` after a transient failure would permanently
      * disable level-2 for the session's life.
@@ -229,11 +229,12 @@ export declare class P2PCommandRouter {
      */
     private makeSession;
     /**
-     * The ECC private key of `cipherId`, from the router's cache or one `get_ciphers` call. When the cloud
-     * answers with another cipher, that one is used and traced on `session`. Only a successful lookup is
-     * cached.
+     * The ECC and RSA private keys of `cipherId` (`ecc_private_key`, `private_key`), from the router's cache
+     * or one `get_ciphers` call. When the cloud answers with another cipher that carries an ECC key and the
+     * asked one does not, that one is used and traced on `session`. Only a successful lookup — one that
+     * yields either key — is cached.
      */
-    private cipherKeyFor;
+    private cipherKeysFor;
     /**
      * Open (or reuse) a station's P2P session and await its completed handshake. An optional abort only
      * stops this wait; session ownership remains with {@link SessionManager} and its normal teardown.
@@ -690,7 +691,9 @@ export declare class P2PCommandRouter {
      * HomeBase-attached device takes the GCM signCode-8 form, a standalone one the level-1 form. A
      * standalone camera never negotiates a level-2 key, so pinning this to level 2 makes the envelope
      * unreachable on exactly the devices that serve their own RTSP stream. Verified live: a standalone
-     * camera accepts the level-1 form. With no `form` (default) it stays level-2 only.
+     * camera accepts the level-1 form. With no `form` (default) it stays level-2 only and waits for the
+     * key every level-2 sender uses; `level2Sender: "set-payload"` also takes an RSA cipher's AES-128-ECB
+     * key (see {@link P2PSession.sendControlLevel2}). A `resolved` session keeps the wait its caller gave it.
      *
      * Both seals REPLAY the frame {@link DIRECT_CMD_SENDS}× at 200ms, as every other fire-and-forget
      * control on this router does: these are unacknowledged datagrams, and a level-1 device is the one

package/dist/transport/p2p/live-trace.d.ts

@@ -118,11 +118,19 @@ export type LiveTrace =
     phase: "level2-wait";
     waitMs: number;
 }
-/** The station's level-2 key was negotiated, under the cipher it selected. */
+/** The station's AES-256-GCM level-2 key was negotiated, under the cipher it selected. */
  | {
     phase: "level2-ready";
     cipherId: number;
 }
+/**
+ * The station's cipher negotiated only the AES-128-ECB level-2 key of an RSA cipher, under the cipher it
+ * selected. That key seals a level-2 set-payload and nothing else, so this is not `level2-ready`.
+ */
+ | {
+    phase: "level2-set-payload-only";
+    cipherId: number;
+}
 /**
  * The station's key is not coming, why, and the cipher where a station named one.
  *
@@ -145,7 +153,8 @@ export type LiveTrace =
  * A station's cipher was answered with material for a DIFFERENT cipher, which was used in its place.
  *
  * The one lookup outcome no other phase accounts for: material for the cipher the station named is followed
- * by `level2-ready` or by `level2-unavailable` with `derivation-failed`, an answer holding none by
+ * by `level2-ready`, `level2-set-payload-only` or `level2-unavailable` with `derivation-failed`, an answer
+ * holding none by
  * `no-cipher-key`, and a lookup that threw is reported as an error. Substituted material derives to
  * nothing and otherwise reads as a station fault. `cipherId` is the cipher the station asked for,
  * `answeredCipherId` the one whose material was used.

package/dist/transport/p2p/p2p-session.d.ts

@@ -46,12 +46,18 @@ export interface P2PSessionConfig {
     /** Disable UDP broadcast local lookup (e.g. cloud-only). Default false. */
     noBroadcast?: boolean;
     /**
-     * Resolve a station `cipher_id` → its ECC private key hex (from cloud `get_ciphers`). When
-     * provided, the session auto-negotiates the **level-2** session key on connect: it reads the
-     * `cipher_id` + ECIES envelope from the `CMD_GATEWAYINFO` reply, derives the key, and calls
-     * `setLevel2Key()` — so signCode 2/8 frames (camera info, event DB, event images) decrypt live.
-     */
-    resolveCipherKey?: (cipherId: number) => Promise<string | undefined>;
+     * Resolve a station `cipher_id` → its private keys (from cloud `get_ciphers`): `ecc`, the ECC private
+     * key hex (`ecc_private_key`), and `rsa`, the RSA private key (`private_key`). A plain string is the ECC key. Called once per
+     * negotiation. When provided, the session auto-negotiates the **level-2** session key on connect: it
+     * reads the `cipher_id` + envelope from the `CMD_GATEWAYINFO` reply and derives the key. With an ECC
+     * key that is the ECIES unwrap and `setLevel2Key()` — so signCode 2/8 frames (camera info, event DB,
+     * event images) decrypt live. A cipher with no ECC key carries the key RSA-encrypted instead, and only
+     * {@link P2PSession.sendControlLevel2} seals with it.
+     */
+    resolveCipherKey?: (cipherId: number) => Promise<string | {
+        ecc?: string;
+        rsa?: string;
+    } | undefined>;
     /** Diagnostics sink. Omit for silence. */
     logger?: Logger;
 }
@@ -149,6 +155,12 @@ export declare class P2PSession extends EventEmitter {
     private readonly level1Key;
     /** Negotiated 32-byte level-2/gateway key (AES-256-GCM). Set via setLevel2Key once known. */
     private level2Key?;
+    /**
+     * Negotiated 16-byte level-2 key of a cipher with no ECC key (RSA-encrypted in `CMD_GATEWAYINFO`). Only
+     * {@link sendControlLevel2} seals with it, AES-128-ECB in the level-1 layout at encryption type 2; never
+     * held beside {@link level2Key}.
+     */
+    private level2EcbKey?;
     private level2Seq;
     private rsaPrivateKey?;
     private rsaModulusHex?;
@@ -204,10 +216,18 @@ export declare class P2PSession extends EventEmitter {
     private trace;
     /** Provide the negotiated 32-byte session key so level-2 (signCode 2/8) frames can be decrypted. */
     setLevel2Key(key: Buffer): void;
-    /** Whether the level-2 session key has been negotiated/set. */
+    /** Whether the AES-256-GCM level-2 session key has been negotiated/set. */
     get hasLevel2Key(): boolean;
+    /**
+     * Whether the held level-2 key can frame for `sender`: every level-2 sender needs the AES-256-GCM key,
+     * and `"set-payload"` ({@link sendControlLevel2}) also takes the AES-128-ECB key of an RSA cipher.
+     */
+    private level2KeyServes;
     /**
      * Resolve with whether a level-2 key is available, waiting only while waiting can still change that.
+     * `sender` names who will frame with it: by default every level-2 sender, which needs the AES-256-GCM
+     * key; `"set-payload"` is {@link sendControlLevel2} alone, which also takes the AES-128-ECB key of an RSA
+     * cipher, so `true` for it does not imply {@link hasLevel2Key}.
      *
      * A `"session"` grace is measured once, not restarted per call. Best-effort media uses it because every
      * egress asks this same session and can proceed without the key on an own-session camera; a per-call
@@ -232,7 +252,7 @@ export declare class P2PSession extends EventEmitter {
      * `terminal` outcome is the one already stated where the negotiation concluded, since that is where the
      * cipher and the cause are known, and re-stating it here would double every settled negotiation.
      */
-    awaitLevel2Key(graceMs: number, graceFrom?: "call" | "session"): Promise<boolean>;
+    awaitLevel2Key(graceMs: number, graceFrom?: "call" | "session", sender?: "every" | "set-payload"): Promise<boolean>;
     /**
      * Ask the station for its gateway info a second time, re-opening a negotiation that concluded without a key.
      *
@@ -253,9 +273,12 @@ export declare class P2PSession extends EventEmitter {
     private settleLevel2;
     /**
      * Negotiate the level-2 session key from the decrypted CMD_GATEWAYINFO payload: read its
-     * `cipher_id`, resolve that cipher's ECC private key (cloud `get_ciphers`, via the configured
-     * `resolveCipherKey`), run the ECIES unwrap, and `setLevel2Key()`. One-shot; emits `level2Ready`
-     * on success and `error` on failure (non-fatal — level-1 traffic keeps working regardless).
+     * `cipher_id`, resolve that cipher's private keys once (cloud `get_ciphers`, via the configured
+     * `resolveCipherKey`), run the ECIES unwrap with the ECC key, and `setLevel2Key()`. A cipher with no
+     * ECC key uses its RSA key instead and holds the RSA-decrypted 16-byte key as the AES-128-ECB level-2
+     * key. One-shot; emits `level2Ready` only when the AES-256-GCM key is negotiated, traces
+     * `level2-set-payload-only` instead for the AES-128-ECB key, and emits `error` on failure
+     * (non-fatal — level-1 traffic keeps working regardless).
      *
      * Every outcome settles the wait in {@link awaitLevel2Key}, because being one-shot is what makes a
      * failure final for this connection generation: nothing will retry it there, so a later command must be
@@ -421,6 +444,10 @@ export declare class P2PSession extends EventEmitter {
      * mechanism proven for camera selection in media start. Use for control commands routed through a
      * HomeBase (where level-1 ECB is rejected). Returns `false` if the level-2 key isn't negotiated
      * yet (caller can fall back to {@link sendStringPayloadCommand}).
+     *
+     * On a session holding only the AES-128-ECB level-2 key of an RSA cipher, the frame is the level-1
+     * layout ({@link sendRawLevel1Bytes}) sealed under that key at encryption type 2: the encryption-type
+     * byte names the key the body is sealed with (1 = level-1 key, 2 = the negotiated key).
      */
     sendControlLevel2(cmd: number, channel: number, accountId: string, payload: Record<string, unknown>, mValue3?: number): boolean;
     /**

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@mega-yfue/eufy-sdk",
-  "version": "0.5.0-beta.69",
+  "version": "0.5.0-beta.70",
   "description": "One typed TypeScript client for the Anker eufy v6 cloud — capability-driven devices, realtime events over P2P/MQTT/push, and live media",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "author": "mega-yfue",