@mega-yfue/eufy-sdk 0.2.0-beta.0 → 0.2.0-beta.10

package/dist/index.js

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ import { createCipheriv, createDecipheriv, createECDH, createHash, createHmac, r
 var P256 = "prime256v1";
 var EUFY_MEGA_LOCAL_KEY_HEX = "2500a7d5617812f9d52515b2c8f20a3d";
 var EUFYLIFE_LOCAL_KEY_HEX = "118c12c81e211149304bd70a0c071d01";
+var SOLIX_LOCAL_KEY_HEX = "e8ad18f61bbd3fbd52d5ed12d14d3b9c";
 var SERVER_STATIC_PUBLIC_KEY_HEX = "04c5c00c4f8d1197cc7c3167c52bf7acb054d722f0ef08dcd7e0883236e0d72a3868d9750cb47fa4619248f3d83f0f662671dadc6e2d31c2f41db0161651c7c076";
 function genId() {
   return randomBytes(16).toString("hex");
@@ -22,8 +23,11 @@ function genId() {
 function nowSec() {
   return Math.floor(Date.now() / 1e3).toString();
 }
+function md5Hex(input) {
+  return createHash("md5").update(input, "utf-8").digest("hex");
+}
 function gtoken(userId) {
-  return createHash("md5").update(userId, "utf-8").digest("hex");
+  return md5Hex(userId);
 }
 function aesKey(shareKeyHex) {
   return Buffer.from(shareKeyHex, "hex").subarray(0, 16);
@@ -142,13 +146,16 @@ var FileSessionStore = class {
     }
   }
 };
+function tokenNotExpired(tokenExpiresAt, skewSec = 300) {
+  if (tokenExpiresAt && tokenExpiresAt > 0) {
+    return Math.floor(Date.now() / 1e3) < tokenExpiresAt - skewSec;
+  }
+  return true;
+}
 function isSessionValid(s, skewSec = 300) {
   if (!s?.authToken || !s.shareKey || !s.keyIdent)
     return false;
-  if (s.tokenExpiresAt && s.tokenExpiresAt > 0) {
-    return Math.floor(Date.now() / 1e3) < s.tokenExpiresAt - skewSec;
-  }
-  return true;
+  return tokenNotExpired(s.tokenExpiresAt, skewSec);
 }
 
 // dist/core/logger.js
@@ -967,7 +974,15 @@ var MegaHttpClient = class {
    *  restored-session short-circuit must NOT treat it as a usable session. Cleared on Ok/reset. */
   pending2fa = false;
   tokenExpiresAt = 0;
-  /** Stable per-install device id — the auth token is bound to it. */
+  /**
+   * Stable per-install device id: `openudid` as configured, as restored from the session store, or as
+   * derived from the ACCOUNT when neither supplied one — two clients that configure none therefore
+   * share it, and are one install as far as everything keyed on this is concerned.
+   *
+   * Two things are keyed on it, and both fail the same way when it is shared: the auth token is bound
+   * to it, so each login displaces the other's session, and the secure-MQTT client id is built from it,
+   * so each connection evicts the other's channel.
+   */
   openudid;
   /** The device model reported to the cloud (explicit `phoneModel`, else a stable random one). */
   phoneModel;
@@ -1802,9 +1817,20 @@ function parseSecureTopic(topic) {
     return void 0;
   return { root, category, model, sn, tail: parts.slice(4).join("/") };
 }
+function solixDeviceTopics(appName, productCode, deviceSn) {
+  const dt = `dt/${appName}/${productCode}/${deviceSn}`;
+  const cmd = `cmd/${appName}/${productCode}/${deviceSn}`;
+  return { paramInfo: `${dt}/param_info`, cmdRes: `${cmd}/app/res`, req: `${cmd}/req` };
+}
+function solixUserTopics(appName, userId) {
+  return { cmdRes: `cmd/${appName}/${userId}/res`, powerSite: `dt/${appName}/${userId}/power_site` };
+}
 
 // dist/transport/mqtt/secure-mqtt.js
 var SUBACK_FAILURE = 128;
+function isNotAuthorized(err) {
+  return err instanceof Error && /connection refused/i.test(err.message) && /not authori[sz]ed/i.test(err.message);
+}
 var SecureMqtt = class extends EventEmitter {
   kind = "smqtt";
   client;
@@ -1864,6 +1890,7 @@ var SecureMqtt = class extends EventEmitter {
         }
         this.emit("connect");
       });
+      client.on("connect", () => this.logger.info(`[smqtt] connected (${c.app_name ?? "default"})`));
       client.on("reconnect", () => this.logger.warn("[smqtt] reconnecting"));
       client.on("close", () => this.emit("disconnect", "close"));
       client.on("error", (err) => {
@@ -1891,7 +1918,7 @@ var SecureMqtt = class extends EventEmitter {
    * four topics for `eufy_life`).
    *
    * The grants are INSPECTED, not assumed: AWS IoT answers a policy-denied filter with a
-   * `SUBACK_FAILURE` (`0x80`) grant rather than failing the SUBSCRIBE, so subscribing with a credential
+   * SUBACK_FAILURE (`0x80`) grant rather than failing the SUBSCRIBE, so subscribing with a credential
    * whose scope doesn't cover the topic looks identical to success and then delivers nothing. A denied
    * topic is reported via `error` naming the credential scope; only an all-denied device throws, so a
    * line that grants its state channel but refuses (say) the OTA leg still works.
@@ -1900,9 +1927,8 @@ var SecureMqtt = class extends EventEmitter {
     if (!this.client)
       throw new Error("SecureMqtt not connected");
     const topics = [...subscribeTopics(device)];
-    const grants = await this.client.subscribeAsync(topics, { qos: 1 });
+    const { denied } = this.partitionGrants(await this.client.subscribeAsync(topics, { qos: 1 }));
     const scope = this.o.credentials.app_name ?? "default";
-    const denied = grants.filter((g) => g.qos === SUBACK_FAILURE).map((g) => g.topic);
     if (denied.length === topics.length) {
       throw new Error(`subscribe ${device.sn}: every topic denied on credential scope "${scope}" \u2014 this line's topics are granted to a different scope (${denied.join(", ")})`);
     }
@@ -1910,6 +1936,29 @@ var SecureMqtt = class extends EventEmitter {
       this.emit("error", new Error(`subscribe ${device.sn}: "${topic}" denied on credential scope "${scope}"`));
     }
   }
+  /**
+   * Subscribe to explicit topic filters, returning the topics that were granted. A scope-denied filter
+   * comes back with SUBACK_FAILURE rather than an error (AWS IoT quirk), so it is dropped from the result
+   * instead of throwing — callers that need every leg check the returned list. Used by lines whose topic
+   * vocabulary isn't the eufy `subscribeTopics` shape (e.g. Anker Solix `dt/{app}/{pn}/{sn}`).
+   */
+  async subscribe(topics) {
+    if (!this.client)
+      throw new Error("SecureMqtt not connected");
+    return this.partitionGrants(await this.client.subscribeAsync(topics, { qos: 1 })).granted;
+  }
+  /**
+   * Split SUBACK grants into granted vs scope-denied topics. AWS IoT marks a policy-denied filter with a
+   * SUBACK_FAILURE (`0x80`) grant rather than failing the SUBSCRIBE, so the two subscribe paths share
+   * this split and layer their own policy (drop vs report) on top.
+   */
+  partitionGrants(grants) {
+    const granted = [];
+    const denied = [];
+    for (const g of grants)
+      (g.qos === SUBACK_FAILURE ? denied : granted).push(g.topic);
+    return { granted, denied };
+  }
   /**
    * Publish a raw payload to an MQTT topic (the command leg — `cmd/{app}/{pn}/{sn}/req`). The `body`
    * is a pre-built envelope the caller supplies (the command router builds it). QoS 1 by default (the
@@ -1932,6 +1981,16 @@ var SecureMqtt = class extends EventEmitter {
   }
 };
 
+// dist/transport/mqtt/app-client-id.js
+import { createHash as createHash4 } from "node:crypto";
+function buildAppShapedClientId(input) {
+  const ts = input.timestamp ?? Math.floor(Date.now() / 1e3);
+  return `android-${input.appName}-${input.uid}-${input.mqttUuid}-${ts}`;
+}
+function mqttUuidFrom(installId) {
+  return createHash4("sha256").update(installId).digest("hex").slice(0, 16);
+}
+
 // dist/core/util.js
 var Timer = class {
   handle;
@@ -2534,6 +2593,28 @@ var CameraDisabledError = class extends Error {
     this.name = "CameraDisabledError";
   }
 };
+var StationKeyUnavailableError = class extends Error {
+  stationSn;
+  /** Always true: the negotiation is per connection, so a later one may still produce a key. */
+  retryable = true;
+  constructor(stationSn, options) {
+    super(`station ${stationSn} did not provide its session key, so nothing that requires one could be sent`, options);
+    this.stationSn = stationSn;
+    this.name = "StationKeyUnavailableError";
+  }
+};
+var StationUnreachableError = class extends Error {
+  stationSn;
+  waitedMs;
+  /** Always true: a station unreachable now may answer on a later attempt. */
+  retryable = true;
+  constructor(stationSn, waitedMs, options) {
+    super(`station ${stationSn}'s P2P session did not connect within ${waitedMs}ms, so nothing could be sent to it`, options);
+    this.stationSn = stationSn;
+    this.waitedMs = waitedMs;
+    this.name = "StationUnreachableError";
+  }
+};
 var StationBusyError = class extends Error {
   servingChannel;
   /** Always true: the station is busy now, and stops being busy when the other stream is released. */
@@ -6868,6 +6949,26 @@ var KEYPAD = {
 // dist/model/capabilities/arming.js
 var STATION_CHANNEL2 = 255;
 var ArmingMode = {
+  /** Armed — full protection, nobody home (wire value 0). */
+  away: "away",
+  /** Armed for occupancy — reduced/perimeter protection while home (wire value 1). */
+  home: "home",
+  /** Scheduled — the station follows the timetable configured in the app (wire value 2). */
+  schedule: "schedule",
+  /** Custom 1 — a user-defined posture configured in the app (wire value 3). */
+  custom1: "custom1",
+  /** Custom 2 — a user-defined posture configured in the app (wire value 4). */
+  custom2: "custom2",
+  /** Custom 3 — a user-defined posture configured in the app (wire value 5). */
+  custom3: "custom3",
+  /** Off — the station's alarm system is switched off entirely (wire value 6). */
+  off: "off",
+  /** Geofenced — the station follows the app's location-based rules (wire value 47). */
+  geo: "geo",
+  /** Disarmed — no alarms; sensors still report state (wire value 63). */
+  disarmed: "disarmed"
+};
+var AlarmDelayMode = {
   /** Armed — full protection, nobody home (wire value 0). */
   away: "away",
   /** Armed for occupancy — reduced/perimeter protection while home (wire value 1). */
@@ -6883,10 +6984,11 @@ var ARMING_CMD = {
    * mValue3:0, `payload:{mode_type:<int>, user_name:<string>}`.
    *
    * ⚠️ Only 3 of the 9 modes were exercised in that capture — `mode_type` 0 (away), 63 (disarmed), 1
-   * (home), all confirmed byte-exact, and those three are the whole of {@link ArmingMode}. Re-confirmed
-   * live 2026-08-05: each reported its own MODE_SWITCH push within ~5s of the write. The remaining six are
-   * named by the app but never observed leaving it, so this capability reads them and refuses to send
-   * them. See `ARMING_MODE_WIRE` for the per-value breakdown.
+   * (home), all confirmed byte-exact. Re-confirmed live 2026-08-05: each reported its own MODE_SWITCH push
+   * within ~5s of the write. The remaining six are live confirmations rather than captures — `custom1` 3
+   * first, then `schedule` 2, `custom2` 4, `custom3` 5, `off` 6 and `geo` 47 — each sent as this exact
+   * frame and each observed to bring MODE_SWITCH back, so all nine are settable. `ARMING_MODE_WIRE` has
+   * the per-value evidence and the dates.
    */
   SET_ARMING: 1224,
   /**
@@ -6920,21 +7022,14 @@ var ARMING_MODE_WIRE = {
   away: 0,
   home: 1,
   schedule: 2,
-  // ⚠️ reportable, NOT settable — see the doc comment above
   custom1: 3,
-  // ⚠️ reportable, NOT settable — see the doc comment above
   custom2: 4,
-  // ⚠️ reportable, NOT settable — see the doc comment above
   custom3: 5,
-  // ⚠️ reportable, NOT settable — see the doc comment above
   off: 6,
-  // ⚠️ reportable, NOT settable — see the doc comment above
   geo: 47,
-  // ⚠️ reportable, NOT settable — see the doc comment above
   disarmed: 63
 };
 var ARMING_MODE_LABELS = enumLabels(ARMING_MODE_WIRE);
-var SETTABLE_MODES = Object.values(ArmingMode).map((m) => ARMING_MODE_WIRE[m]);
 function armingModeOf(v) {
   const name = String(v);
   if (name in ArmingMode)
@@ -6943,11 +7038,10 @@ function armingModeOf(v) {
   return Object.values(ArmingMode).find((m) => ARMING_MODE_WIRE[m] === wire);
 }
 function armingCommand(mode, ctx) {
-  const modeType = ARMING_MODE_WIRE[mode];
   if (!ctx.accountName) {
     throw new Error(`arming: missing account identity (user_name) [${describeDevice(ctx)}]`);
   }
-  return setPayload(ARMING_CMD.SET_ARMING, { mode_type: modeType, user_name: ctx.accountName }, ctx, 0);
+  return setPayload(ARMING_CMD.SET_ARMING, { mode_type: ARMING_MODE_WIRE[mode], user_name: ctx.accountName }, ctx, 0);
 }
 function alarmDelayCommand(mode, config, ctx) {
   const data = {
@@ -6964,11 +7058,10 @@ function alarmDelayCommand(mode, config, ctx) {
 }
 var ARMING_MEMBERS = {
   /**
-   * The one member whose write domain is NARROWER than its read: `enumValues` names all nine modes a
-   * station can report, and the argument's `values` publishes only the three whose wire was captured. That
-   * argument IS the domain the derived setter enforces and the refusal names, so an uncaptured mode is
-   * refused by naming the three that work — nine labels for the read and three for the write, off one
-   * declaration.
+   * Read and write are the same nine modes, so `enumValues` is the whole domain: `writeDomain` falls back
+   * to it, and the derived setter, the refusal message and the offered argument all read from that one
+   * declaration. A member states an `args` entry only where the two sides DIFFER. See
+   * {@link ARMING_MODE_WIRE} for the per-value evidence.
    *
    * `armingCommand` may also throw synchronously (missing account identity) and `bindMembers` turns that
    * into a rejection, so the builder stays plain.
@@ -6987,8 +7080,7 @@ var ARMING_MEMBERS = {
     kind: "enum",
     enumValues: ARMING_MODE_LABELS,
     provenance: "verified",
-    args: [{ name: "mode", kind: "enum", values: SETTABLE_MODES }],
-    description: "Guard mode (verified: param 1224 = GUARD_MODE, read/write mechanism confirmed). Reads all 9 modes the app defines; SETS only the 3 whose write is wire-captured (away/home/disarmed) \u2014 schedule/custom1/custom2/custom3/off/geo are named by the app but no capture shows one being sent, so they are refused rather than guessed; see ARMING_MODE_WIRE in arming.ts for the breakdown.",
+    description: "Guard mode (verified: param 1224 = GUARD_MODE, read/write mechanism confirmed). Reads and SETS all 9 modes the app defines \u2014 away/home/schedule/custom1/custom2/custom3/off/geo/disarmed. Three are byte-captured writes and six are live-confirmed (each sent and observed to report its own MODE_SWITCH); see ARMING_MODE_WIRE in arming.ts for the per-value evidence.",
     observation: {
       event: "armingModeChanged",
       reflects: (value) => ({ param: ARMING_CMD.SET_ARMING, expected: ARMING_MODE_WIRE[armingModeOf(value)] }),
@@ -7009,9 +7101,10 @@ var ARMING_MEMBERS = {
    * this mode — there is no known GET to fetch it automatically, and a wrong guess here can silently
    * misconfigure which sensors arm/trigger for real.
    *
-   * Takes {@link ArmingMode}, so a delay can only be configured for a mode whose `mode_id` integer is
-   * captured. The frame carries that same integer, so a schedule/custom mode would be the identical guess
-   * `setMode` refuses.
+   * Takes {@link AlarmDelayMode}, not {@link ArmingMode}: a delay is configurable only for a mode whose
+   * integer is captured on THIS command, and `custom1` is confirmed on cmd 1224 only. The frame carries
+   * that integer in `mode_id` with no runtime validation and no readback, so a mode outside this union
+   * would be the same unverified guess `setMode` refuses.
    */
   setAlarmDelayConfig: method(({ ctx, sink }) => (mode, config) => {
     try {
@@ -7682,6 +7775,89 @@ var ModeCtrlMethod = {
   STOP_SMART_FOLLOW: 18,
   START_GLOBAL_CRUISE: 20
 };
+var ModeCtrlParamMethod = {
+  /** `START_SELECT_ROOMS_CLEAN` — clean the named rooms of a named map. */
+  SELECT_ROOMS: { method: 1, param: 4 },
+  /** `START_SELECT_ZONES_CLEAN` — clean the given rectangles of a named map. */
+  SELECT_ZONES: { method: 2, param: 5 },
+  /** `START_GOTO_CLEAN` — drive to a point and clean around it. */
+  GOTO: { method: 4, param: 7 },
+  /** `START_SCENE_CLEAN` — run a saved scene by its id. */
+  SCENE: { method: 24, param: 14 }
+};
+var SELECT_ROOMS_FIELD = {
+  /** `rooms` — repeated, one entry per room. */
+  ROOMS: 1,
+  /** `clean_times` — how many passes to make. */
+  CLEAN_TIMES: 2,
+  /** `map_id` — WHICH saved map the room ids belong to. */
+  MAP_ID: 3,
+  /** `id` within a `Room`. */
+  ROOM_ID: 1,
+  /** `order` within a `Room` — the sequence to visit them in. */
+  ROOM_ORDER: 2
+};
+var SELECT_ZONES_FIELD = {
+  /** `zones` — repeated, one entry per rectangle. */
+  ZONES: 1,
+  /** `map_id` — which saved map the coordinates belong to. */
+  MAP_ID: 2,
+  /** `quadrangle` within a `Zone` — its four corners. */
+  QUADRANGLE: 1,
+  /** `clean_times` within a `Zone`. */
+  ZONE_CLEAN_TIMES: 2,
+  /** `x` within a `Point`, SIGNED centimetres. */
+  POINT_X: 1,
+  /** `y` within a `Point`, SIGNED centimetres. */
+  POINT_Y: 2
+};
+var SCENE_CLEAN_ID = 1;
+function encodeModeCtrlParam(method2, paramField, build) {
+  return rawDp((w) => {
+    if (method2 !== 0)
+      w.int(MODE_CTRL_FIELD.METHOD, method2);
+    w.int(MODE_CTRL_FIELD.SEQ, nextModeCtrlSeq());
+    w.sub(paramField, build);
+  });
+}
+function encodeSelectRoomsClean(mapId, rooms, cleanTimes = 1) {
+  const { method: method2, param } = ModeCtrlParamMethod.SELECT_ROOMS;
+  return encodeModeCtrlParam(method2, param, (p) => {
+    for (const room of rooms) {
+      p.sub(SELECT_ROOMS_FIELD.ROOMS, (r) => {
+        r.int(SELECT_ROOMS_FIELD.ROOM_ID, room.id);
+        if (room.order !== void 0)
+          r.int(SELECT_ROOMS_FIELD.ROOM_ORDER, room.order);
+      });
+    }
+    p.int(SELECT_ROOMS_FIELD.CLEAN_TIMES, cleanTimes);
+    p.int(SELECT_ROOMS_FIELD.MAP_ID, mapId);
+  });
+}
+function encodeSelectZonesClean(mapId, zones) {
+  const { method: method2, param } = ModeCtrlParamMethod.SELECT_ZONES;
+  return encodeModeCtrlParam(method2, param, (p) => {
+    for (const zone of zones) {
+      p.sub(SELECT_ZONES_FIELD.ZONES, (z) => {
+        z.sub(SELECT_ZONES_FIELD.QUADRANGLE, (q) => {
+          for (const [i, corner] of zone.corners.entries()) {
+            q.sub(i + 1, (pt) => {
+              pt.sint(SELECT_ZONES_FIELD.POINT_X, corner.x);
+              pt.sint(SELECT_ZONES_FIELD.POINT_Y, corner.y);
+            });
+          }
+        });
+        if (zone.cleanTimes !== void 0)
+          z.int(SELECT_ZONES_FIELD.ZONE_CLEAN_TIMES, zone.cleanTimes);
+      });
+    }
+    p.int(SELECT_ZONES_FIELD.MAP_ID, mapId);
+  });
+}
+function encodeSceneClean(sceneId) {
+  const { method: method2, param } = ModeCtrlParamMethod.SCENE;
+  return encodeModeCtrlParam(method2, param, (p) => p.int(SCENE_CLEAN_ID, sceneId));
+}
 var modeCtrlSeq = 111;
 function nextModeCtrlSeq() {
   return ++modeCtrlSeq;
@@ -9517,7 +9693,41 @@ var VACUUM_CLEAN_MEMBERS = {
   /** Return to the dock via ModeCtrlRequest method 6 (DP 152). AIoT only — Tuya write unverified. */
   returnToDock: method(({ sink }) => () => sink.dispatch(aiotDp(VACUUM_DP.MODE_CTRL, encodeModeCtrl(ModeCtrlMethod.START_GOHOME, nextModeCtrlSeq()))), "Return to the dock (ModeCtrlRequest method 6 over DP 152).", isAiotVacuum),
   /** Pause the current cleaning task via ModeCtrlRequest method 13 (DP 152). AIoT only — Tuya write unverified. */
-  pauseCleaning: method(({ sink }) => () => sink.dispatch(aiotDp(VACUUM_DP.MODE_CTRL, encodeModeCtrl(ModeCtrlMethod.PAUSE_TASK, nextModeCtrlSeq()))), "Pause the current cleaning task (ModeCtrlRequest method 13 over DP 152).", isAiotVacuum)
+  pauseCleaning: method(({ sink }) => () => sink.dispatch(aiotDp(VACUUM_DP.MODE_CTRL, encodeModeCtrl(ModeCtrlMethod.PAUSE_TASK, nextModeCtrlSeq()))), "Pause the current cleaning task (ModeCtrlRequest method 13 over DP 152).", isAiotVacuum),
+  /**
+   * Run a saved cleaning scene by its id (ModeCtrlRequest method 24 over DP 152).
+   *
+   * The id is the device's own, as {@link VACUUM_CLEAN_MEMBERS.scenes} reports it — `VacuumScene.id`
+   * off the `SceneResponse` on DP 180. A scene the device reports invalid stays reportable and running
+   * it is still a well-formed request; `VacuumScene.invalidReason` says why the device will refuse.
+   *
+   * Frame shape is byte-proven against the shared outer `ModeCtrlRequest`, and method 24 has been
+   * WATCHED: run on a T2351, it started the named scene.
+   */
+  startScene: method(({ sink }) => (sceneId) => sink.dispatch(aiotDp(VACUUM_DP.MODE_CTRL, encodeSceneClean(sceneId))), "Run a saved cleaning scene by its id (ModeCtrlRequest method 24 over DP 152).", isAiotVacuum),
+  /**
+   * Clean the named rooms of a named map (ModeCtrlRequest method 1 over DP 152).
+   *
+   * `mapId` has no default and that is deliberate: room ids are per map, so assuming the map a
+   * single-floor home would have sends a two-floor home's ids against the wrong floor. `SceneInfo.mapid`
+   * on DP 180 and a scheduled rooms-clean's `map_id` are the two real map ids the device reports.
+   *
+   * `cleanTimes` is how many passes to make over the set; rooms with no `order` are visited in the
+   * order given.
+   *
+   * Frame shape is byte-proven against the shared outer `ModeCtrlRequest`, and method 1 has been
+   * WATCHED: run on a T2351, it cleaned the rooms named.
+   */
+  cleanRooms: method(({ sink }) => (mapId, rooms, cleanTimes = 1) => sink.dispatch(aiotDp(VACUUM_DP.MODE_CTRL, encodeSelectRoomsClean(mapId, rooms, cleanTimes))), "Clean the named rooms of a named map (ModeCtrlRequest method 1 over DP 152).", isAiotVacuum),
+  /**
+   * Clean the given rectangles of a named map (ModeCtrlRequest method 2 over DP 152).
+   *
+   * Corners are SIGNED centimetres in the map's own frame, whose origin sits wherever the robot first
+   * mapped from — negative coordinates are ordinary and are ZigZag-encoded, not written as plain
+   * varints. Same `mapId` reasoning as {@link VACUUM_CLEAN_MEMBERS.cleanRooms}, and the same evidence:
+   * method 2 was run on a T2351 and cleaned the rectangles given.
+   */
+  cleanZones: method(({ sink }) => (mapId, zones) => sink.dispatch(aiotDp(VACUUM_DP.MODE_CTRL, encodeSelectZonesClean(mapId, zones))), "Clean the given rectangles of a named map (ModeCtrlRequest method 2 over DP 152).", isAiotVacuum)
 };
 var VACUUM_CLEAN = {
   capability: "vacuum_clean",
@@ -9693,6 +9903,70 @@ function toNumberArray(arr) {
   return result;
 }
 
+// dist/model/capabilities/display.js
+var DISPLAY_PARAM = { BATTERY: 8001, SOFTWARE_VERSION: 8003 };
+var DISPLAY_MEMBERS = {
+  /**
+   * Battery level, 0-100.
+   *
+   * **On this capability rather than on `battery`, and that is the line partition doing its job.** The
+   * security-line `battery` capability reads param 1101 and a Smart Display's charge is 8001 in its own
+   * id space — two wires that happen to mean the same thing. One capability reading both would be a claim
+   * that the two ecosystems share a param space, so a consumer reads a display's charge through
+   * `dev.display()` and a camera's through `dev.battery()`.
+   *
+   * `verified` rather than `mega`: the id is in the device's cloud record, but the NAME came from the
+   * maintainer's own knowledge of the hardware rather than from the cloud data-point list, and `"100"`
+   * fits brightness, volume or charge equally.
+   *
+   * The scale is `percent` on the reading itself, not on convention alone: a full charge reads `255` on a
+   * 0-255 scale and `1000` on a 0-1000 one, so `"100"` on a charged unit is positive evidence for 0-100
+   * rather than merely consistent with it. What nobody has done is watch it MOVE, which is why a value
+   * frozen at 100 would not yet be distinguishable from a healthy one.
+   */
+  battery: {
+    param: DISPLAY_PARAM.BATTERY,
+    type: "number",
+    unit: "%",
+    kind: "percent",
+    provenance: "verified",
+    description: "Battery level, 0-100 (param 8001)."
+  },
+  /**
+   * Version-shaped, and that shape is the whole of the evidence — hence `guessed`, and hence no typed
+   * getter: a caller reading this off a bound object cannot see the label.
+   *
+   * `unexposed` rather than absent, so the schema still carries its type and that label and
+   * `getProperty("softwareVersion")` still answers. `dev.info()?.firmwareVersion` is the field to trust
+   * where the cloud record carries one; on this display it does not, which is the only reason 8003 is
+   * named at all.
+   */
+  softwareVersion: {
+    param: DISPLAY_PARAM.SOFTWARE_VERSION,
+    type: "string",
+    kind: "text",
+    provenance: "guessed",
+    unexposed: true,
+    description: "Version-shaped string (param 8003), meaning unconfirmed \u2014 prefer `info.firmwareVersion`."
+  }
+};
+var DISPLAY = {
+  capability: "display",
+  line: "display",
+  description: "Smart Display battery level (param 8001, display namespace).",
+  members: DISPLAY_MEMBERS,
+  properties: propertiesOf(DISPLAY_MEMBERS),
+  /**
+   * Claimed by CODEC, not by an evidence param.
+   *
+   * 8001 is in the device's cloud record, so the ordinary evidence gate would install the getter anyway
+   * — but the capability should attach to a Smart Display that has reported nothing yet too, because a
+   * device on this line has no other capability to carry it. The line partition keeps this off
+   * everything else: `display` is the only codec in the `display` line.
+   */
+  detection: { codecs: ["display"] }
+};
+
 // dist/model/capabilities/locate.js
 var LOCATE_DP = 160;
 var LEGACY_LOCATE_DP = TUYA_VACUUM_DP.LOOK_FOR_SWEEPER;
@@ -9821,6 +10095,7 @@ var MODULES = [
   VACUUM_DOCK,
   SUCTION,
   LOCATE,
+  DISPLAY,
   INFO
 ];
 var BY_CAP = new Map(MODULES.map((m) => [m.capability, m]));
@@ -9865,11 +10140,11 @@ var CODEC_LINE = {
   mower: "clean",
   light: "life",
   printer: "print",
-  display: "security"
+  display: "display"
 };
 function lineAllows(module, codec) {
   const line = module.line ?? "security";
-  return line === "any" || line === CODEC_LINE[codec];
+  return line === "any" || codec !== void 0 && line === CODEC_LINE[codec];
 }
 function detectCapabilities(rec, codec) {
   const found = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
@@ -9899,10 +10174,10 @@ function detectCapabilities(rec, codec) {
     if (!matched && d.modelHints && haystack.length > 0) {
       matched = d.modelHints.some((re) => re.test(haystack));
     }
-    if (!matched && d.codecs) {
+    if (!matched && d.codecs && codec !== void 0) {
       matched = d.codecs.includes(codec);
     }
-    if (!matched && d.detect) {
+    if (!matched && d.detect && codec !== void 0) {
       try {
         matched = d.detect(rec, codec) === true;
       } catch {
@@ -11965,6 +12240,28 @@ var CLEAN_PARAMS = {
     provenance: "mega"
   }
 };
+var DISPLAY_PARAMS = {
+  8001: {
+    name: "battery",
+    type: "number",
+    provenance: "verified"
+  },
+  8003: {
+    name: "softwareVersion",
+    type: "string",
+    provenance: "guessed"
+  },
+  8005: {
+    name: "modelName",
+    type: "string",
+    provenance: "mega"
+  },
+  8006: {
+    name: "modelCode",
+    type: "string",
+    provenance: "mega"
+  }
+};
 
 // dist/model/life-params.js
 var LIFE_PARAMS = {
@@ -11992,7 +12289,10 @@ var TABLES = {
   // 3D-printer (ankermake) id space — empty until a live capture confirms the param↔semantic map
   // (printer-support plan Stage 3). Present so the printer codec resolves to its OWN namespace rather
   // than falling through to `security` and decoding another line's dictionary.
-  print: {}
+  print: {},
+  // Smart Display (T87Ax) — ids 8001-8006, four of them named. Same reason as `print`: its own
+  // dictionary rather than a corner of another line's.
+  display: DISPLAY_PARAMS
 };
 function paramDef(ns, paramType) {
   return TABLES[ns][paramType];
@@ -12007,7 +12307,7 @@ var NAMESPACE_BY_CODEC = {
   mower: "clean",
   light: "life",
   printer: "print",
-  display: "security"
+  display: "display"
 };
 function namespaceForCodec(codec) {
   return NAMESPACE_BY_CODEC[codec];
@@ -13070,6 +13370,174 @@ function inspectParams(rec, sn) {
   };
 }
 
+// dist/model/capabilities/solix.js
+var SOLIX_ENERGY_METER_MEMBERS = {
+  /**
+   * Line-1 voltage (V), ff09 tag `0xAC` — the ONE confirmed meter binding, matched against a live
+   * single-phase frame (a nominal mains voltage). Read-only; the evidence gate installs its getter only
+   * once a frame carrying `0xAC` has landed, so it is absent (not a fabricated `0`) until then.
+   */
+  meterVoltageL1: {
+    param: 172,
+    type: "number",
+    kind: "scalar",
+    unit: "V",
+    provenance: "verified",
+    description: "Meter line-1 voltage (V) \u2014 ff09 tag 0xAC, confirmed against a live single-phase frame."
+  }
+};
+var CATEGORY_CAPABILITIES = {
+  "Portable Power Station": ["battery", "acOutput", "solarInput"],
+  "Plug-in Home Battery": ["battery", "solarInput", "acOutput", "energyMeter"],
+  "Powered Cooler": ["battery", "cooler"],
+  "Power Bank": ["battery"],
+  "Smart EV Charger": ["evCharger"],
+  Charger: ["charger"],
+  Accessory: []
+};
+var SOLIX_METER_MODELS = ["AE1X0"];
+var SOLARBANK_MODELS = ["A1790", "A17C"];
+function detectSolixCapabilities(rec, category) {
+  const caps = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["identity"]);
+  if (rec.device_sw_version)
+    caps.add("firmware");
+  if (rec.wifi_online !== void 0 || rec.rssi != null || rec.wifi_name)
+    caps.add("connectivity");
+  for (const c of category && CATEGORY_CAPABILITIES[category] || [])
+    caps.add(c);
+  if (SOLIX_METER_MODELS.some((m) => rec.product_code?.startsWith(m)))
+    caps.add("energyMeter");
+  if (SOLARBANK_MODELS.some((m) => rec.product_code?.startsWith(m))) {
+    caps.add("battery");
+    caps.add("solarInput");
+  }
+  return caps;
+}
+
+// dist/model/solix-catalog.js
+function buildModelIndex(categories) {
+  const index = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+  for (const category of categories) {
+    for (const product of category.products ?? []) {
+      const entry = { name: product.name, category: category.name };
+      if (product.product_code)
+        index.set(product.product_code, entry);
+      for (const variant of product.p_codes ?? []) {
+        const code = typeof variant === "string" ? variant : variant?.product_code;
+        if (code)
+          index.set(code, entry);
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  return index;
+}
+
+// dist/model/solix-device.js
+var READ_ONLY_SINK = { dispatch: async () => {
+} };
+var SolixDevice = class {
+  serial;
+  productCode;
+  record;
+  caps;
+  identity_;
+  values = {};
+  constructor(record, opts = {}) {
+    this.record = record;
+    this.serial = record.device_sn;
+    this.productCode = record.product_code;
+    const label = opts.catalog ? buildModelIndex(opts.catalog).get(record.product_code) : void 0;
+    this.identity_ = {
+      serial: record.device_sn,
+      productCode: record.product_code,
+      name: label?.name ?? record.alias_name ?? record.device_name ?? record.product_code,
+      category: label?.category
+    };
+    this.caps = detectSolixCapabilities(record, this.identity_.category);
+  }
+  /** All capabilities this device carries. */
+  get capabilities() {
+    return [...this.caps];
+  }
+  /** Whether the device carries a capability — the only correct way to branch on behaviour. */
+  has(capability) {
+    return this.caps.has(capability);
+  }
+  /**
+   * Merge a live telemetry reading (a `SolixMqtt` `reading` event) so accessors reflect it. Takes the
+   * WHOLE reading, not just its values, and drops one addressed to a different device: the documented
+   * wiring is `mqtt.on("reading", r => device.applyReading(r))`, and one MQTT stream carries every
+   * watched meter on the account — so without this filter two meters would cross-feed each other's floats.
+   * A reading with no `deviceSn` (a hand-built one) is accepted as-is.
+   */
+  applyReading(reading) {
+    if (reading.deviceSn && reading.deviceSn !== this.serial)
+      return;
+    this.values = { ...this.values, ...reading.values };
+  }
+  /** All decoded float telemetry channels from the latest applied reading (raw, `channel_<tag>` keys). */
+  telemetry() {
+    return { ...this.values };
+  }
+  identity() {
+    return { ...this.identity_ };
+  }
+  firmware() {
+    return this.record.device_sw_version ? { version: this.record.device_sw_version } : void 0;
+  }
+  connectivity() {
+    if (!this.has("connectivity"))
+      return void 0;
+    const rssi = this.record.rssi != null ? Number(this.record.rssi) : void 0;
+    return {
+      online: !!this.record.wifi_online,
+      rssi: Number.isFinite(rssi) ? rssi : void 0,
+      ssid: this.record.wifi_name
+    };
+  }
+  /**
+   * The members-derived `energyMeter` reads, or `undefined` when the device has no meter. Each getter is
+   * installed only for a tag this device has actually reported, and reads `this.values` LIVE — a handle
+   * held across an {@link applyReading} reflects the newer values. Getter INSTALLATION is fixed at the
+   * time of this call, so re-call it to pick up a tag first seen since.
+   */
+  energyMeter() {
+    if (!this.has("energyMeter"))
+      return void 0;
+    return bindMembers(SOLIX_ENERGY_METER_MEMBERS, this.meterDeps());
+  }
+  /**
+   * The {@link MemberDeps} the members engine needs: a read closure over the live values store, and the
+   * evidence gate (`ctx.paramIds`) rebuilt from the ff09 tags this device has reported. No `codec` — the
+   * codecs are eufy transport families and a Solix device belongs to none of them. The sink is a no-op:
+   * Solix telemetry is read-only, no member here dispatches a command.
+   */
+  meterDeps() {
+    const read = (name) => {
+      const v = this.values[name];
+      return v === void 0 ? void 0 : { name, paramType: 0, value: v, ts: Date.now() };
+    };
+    return { ctx: { channel: 0, paramIds: this.seenTags() }, sink: READ_ONLY_SINK, read };
+  }
+  /** The ff09 tags this device has reported, derived from the decoder's `channel_<hex>` keys. */
+  seenTags() {
+    const tags = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+    for (const key of Object.keys(this.values)) {
+      const m = /^channel_([0-9a-f]+)$/.exec(key);
+      if (m)
+        tags.add(parseInt(m[1], 16));
+    }
+    return tags;
+  }
+};
+async function discoverSolixDevices(client, opts = {}) {
+  const [records, catalog] = await Promise.all([
+    client.getDevices(),
+    opts.catalog ? Promise.resolve(opts.catalog) : client.getProductCatalog().catch(() => [])
+  ]);
+  return records.map((r) => new SolixDevice(r, { catalog }));
+}
+
 // dist/client/map-channels.js
 var reader = (kind, decode) => (raw, codec) => {
   const value = decode(raw, codec);
@@ -14168,19 +14636,27 @@ var P2PSession = class _P2PSession extends EventEmitter2 {
    * cameras from that second group streamed normally at level-1 — including one of the same firmware as an
    * own-session camera that delivered no video at all for a reason of its own. An expired grace therefore
    * separates nothing on this path, and a start failure on such a session is not evidence about it.
+   *
+   * Every `false` answer carries a `level2-unavailable` trace naming its reason, wherever the wait ended: a
+   * `terminal` outcome is the one already stated where the negotiation concluded, since that is where the
+   * cipher and the cause are known, and re-stating it here would double every settled negotiation.
    */
   async awaitLevel2Key(graceMs, graceFrom = "call") {
-    if (this.closed)
+    if (this.closed) {
+      this.trace({ phase: "level2-unavailable", reason: "session-closed" });
       return false;
+    }
     if (this.level2Key)
       return true;
-    if (!this.level2Pending)
+    if (!this.level2Pending) {
+      this.trace({ phase: "level2-unavailable", reason: "not-negotiating" });
       return false;
+    }
     const since = graceFrom === "call" ? Date.now() : this.connectedAtMs ?? Date.now();
     const remaining = graceMs - (Date.now() - since);
     if (remaining <= 0) {
       this.logger.debug(`[p2p] ${this.cfg.stationSn} no level-2 key and its ${graceMs}ms grace has elapsed`);
-      this.trace({ phase: "level2-absent", waitedMs: graceMs });
+      this.trace({ phase: "level2-unavailable", reason: "grace-elapsed", waitedMs: graceMs });
       return false;
     }
     this.logger.debug(`[p2p] ${this.cfg.stationSn} waiting up to ${remaining}ms for the level-2 key`);
@@ -14206,10 +14682,12 @@ var P2PSession = class _P2PSession extends EventEmitter2 {
     });
     if (outcome === "timeout") {
       this.logger.debug(`[p2p] ${this.cfg.stationSn} level-2 key did not arrive within its grace`);
+      this.trace({ phase: "level2-unavailable", reason: "grace-elapsed", waitedMs: remaining });
     } else if (outcome === "terminal") {
       this.logger.debug(`[p2p] ${this.cfg.stationSn} level-2 negotiation concluded without a key`);
     } else if (outcome === "closed") {
       this.logger.debug(`[p2p] ${this.cfg.stationSn} session closed before the level-2 key arrived`);
+      this.trace({ phase: "level2-unavailable", reason: "session-closed" });
     }
     return outcome === "key";
   }
@@ -14260,6 +14738,7 @@ var P2PSession = class _P2PSession extends EventEmitter2 {
     this.level2Negotiating = true;
     const generation = this.connectionGeneration;
     const cipherId = gatewayInfoCipherId(gwPayload);
+    this.trace({ phase: "level2-negotiating", cipherId });
     void (async () => {
       try {
         const eccPrivHex = await this.cfg.resolveCipherKey?.(cipherId);
@@ -14267,11 +14746,13 @@ var P2PSession = class _P2PSession extends EventEmitter2 {
           return;
         if (!eccPrivHex) {
           this.logger.debug(`[p2p] ${this.cfg.stationSn} no ECC key for cipher_id ${cipherId}`);
+          this.trace({ phase: "level2-unavailable", reason: "no-cipher-key", cipherId });
           this.settleLevel2();
           return;
         }
         const key = deriveLevel2KeyFromGatewayInfo(gwPayload, eccPrivHex);
         if (!key) {
+          this.trace({ phase: "level2-unavailable", reason: "derivation-failed", cipherId });
           this.settleLevel2();
           this.emit("error", new Error(`level-2 key derivation failed (cipher_id ${cipherId})`));
           return;
@@ -14283,6 +14764,7 @@ var P2PSession = class _P2PSession extends EventEmitter2 {
       } catch (e) {
         if (this.closed || generation !== this.connectionGeneration)
           return;
+        this.trace({ phase: "level2-unavailable", reason: "derivation-failed", cipherId });
         this.settleLevel2();
         this.emit("error", e instanceof Error ? e : new Error(String(e)));
       }
@@ -15633,19 +16115,23 @@ function parseFf09SettingsResponse(plain) {
   if (plain.length < 1)
     throw new Error("ff09: settings response too short (missing status byte)");
   const status = plain[0];
+  const fields = walkFf09Tlv(plain, 1, plain.length);
+  return { status, fields };
+}
+function walkFf09Tlv(buf, start, end) {
   const fields = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
-  let i = 1;
-  while (i + 2 <= plain.length) {
-    const sep = plain[i];
-    if (sep === 0)
+  let i = start;
+  while (i + 2 <= end) {
+    const tag2 = buf[i];
+    if (tag2 === 0)
       break;
-    const len = plain[i + 1];
-    if (i + 2 + len > plain.length)
+    const len = buf[i + 1];
+    if (i + 2 + len > end)
       break;
-    fields.set(sep, plain.subarray(i + 2, i + 2 + len));
+    fields.set(tag2, buf.subarray(i + 2, i + 2 + len));
     i += 2 + len;
   }
-  return { status, fields };
+  return fields;
 }
 function readFf09U16LE(field, name) {
   if (!field || field.length < 2)
@@ -16348,10 +16834,12 @@ var LiveStream = class extends EventEmitter3 {
       if (!this.listening || this.kaTimer)
         return;
       if (this.opts.reassertWanted?.() === false) {
+        this.trace({ phase: "channel-silent", silentMs: stallMs, outcome: "declined" });
         this.logger.debug(`[live ch${this.channel}] no own media for ${stallMs}ms, and its owner does not want this channel re-asserted \u2014 staying quiet`);
         this.armStallWatch();
         return;
       }
+      this.trace({ phase: "channel-silent", silentMs: stallMs, outcome: "reasserted" });
       this.logger.debug(`[live ch${this.channel}] no own media for ${stallMs}ms \u2014 re-asserting this camera's channel`);
       this.sendStart();
       this.kaTimer = setInterval(() => this.sendStart(), keepAliveMs);
@@ -16572,10 +17060,12 @@ async function captureSnapshotFromShared(source, opts = {}) {
   const timeoutMs = opts.timeoutMs ?? 2e4;
   const collectMs = opts.collectMs ?? 1500;
   const skip = opts.skipKeyframes ?? 1;
+  opts.signal?.throwIfAborted();
   const consumer = source.attach();
   const primed = consumer.primed;
+  let burst;
   try {
-    const burst = await new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+    burst = await new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
       const bufs = [];
       let sets = source.parameterSets;
       let codec = "h264";
@@ -16610,6 +17100,10 @@ async function captureSnapshotFromShared(source, opts = {}) {
         cleanup();
         reject(new LiveSnapshotUnavailableError("source-failed", `source ended before a keyframe (state: ${source.state})`));
       };
+      const onAbandoned = () => {
+        cleanup();
+        reject(opts.signal?.reason);
+      };
       const cleanup = () => {
         clearTimeout(timer);
         if (settle)
@@ -16617,19 +17111,21 @@ async function captureSnapshotFromShared(source, opts = {}) {
         consumer.off("video", onVideo);
         consumer.off("error", onError);
         consumer.off("stop", onStop);
+        opts.signal?.removeEventListener("abort", onAbandoned);
       };
       consumer.on("video", onVideo);
       consumer.on("error", onError);
       consumer.on("stop", onStop);
-    });
-    return await annexbToJpeg(primeForDecode(burst.h264, burst.sets, burst.codec), {
-      logger: opts.logger ?? noopLogger,
-      level: opts.ffmpegLevel,
-      executable: opts.ffmpegPath
+      opts.signal?.addEventListener("abort", onAbandoned, { once: true });
     });
   } finally {
     consumer.detach();
   }
+  return annexbToJpeg(primeForDecode(burst.h264, burst.sets, burst.codec), {
+    logger: opts.logger ?? noopLogger,
+    level: opts.ffmpegLevel,
+    executable: opts.ffmpegPath
+  });
 }
 async function recordClip(session, seconds, opts = {}) {
   const timeoutMs = opts.timeoutMs ?? 2e4;
@@ -18836,6 +19332,11 @@ function abortable(work, signal) {
 }
 var LEVEL2_GRACE_MS = 25e3;
 var LEVEL2_SETTLE_MS = 8e3;
+var P2P_STATION_WAITS = {
+  connect: CONNECT_WAIT_MS,
+  level2Grace: LEVEL2_GRACE_MS,
+  level2Settle: LEVEL2_SETTLE_MS
+};
 var RTSP_URL_READ_TIMEOUT_MS = 12e3;
 var SHARED_LIVE_OPT_KEYS = [
   "eccPrivateKey",
@@ -18887,6 +19388,14 @@ var P2PCommandRouter = class _P2PCommandRouter {
     }
     return normalized;
   }
+  /**
+   * Emit a live trace under a station session's handle, for work this router does ON that session before
+   * the session itself records anything — reaching the station, and resolving what a device is on it. Same
+   * handle as everything the session goes on to trace, which is what groups one attempt.
+   */
+  traceOnStation(session, trace) {
+    traceLiveStart(this.deps.logger ?? noopLogger, trace, session.traceId);
+  }
   /**
    * Whether this transport stack drives `dev`'s `ff09-*` commands — true when the device has its own
    * usable P2P endpoint (a non-empty `p2p_did`). The command sink asks each stack this to route a
@@ -19027,7 +19536,15 @@ var P2PCommandRouter = class _P2PCommandRouter {
         let ecc;
         try {
           const ciphers = await this.deps.mega.getCiphers([cipherId], adminUserId, stationSn);
-          ecc = ciphers.find((c) => Number(c.cipher_id) === cipherId)?.ecc_private_key ?? ciphers[0]?.ecc_private_key;
+          ecc = ciphers.find((c) => Number(c.cipher_id) === cipherId)?.ecc_private_key;
+          if (ecc === void 0 && ciphers[0]?.ecc_private_key !== void 0) {
+            ecc = ciphers[0].ecc_private_key;
+            this.traceOnStation(session, {
+              phase: "cipher-fallback",
+              cipherId,
+              answeredCipherId: Number(ciphers[0].cipher_id)
+            });
+          }
         } catch (e) {
           this.deps.onError(e instanceof Error ? e : new Error(String(e)));
         }
@@ -19181,12 +19698,12 @@ var P2PCommandRouter = class _P2PCommandRouter {
     return {
       snapshotLive: async (opts) => {
         const source = await this.sharedLiveSourceFor(sn, opts ?? {});
-        return abortable(captureSnapshotFromShared(source, {
+        return captureSnapshotFromShared(source, {
           ...opts,
           logger: this.deps.logger ?? noopLogger,
           ffmpegLevel: this.deps.ffmpegLogLevel,
           ffmpegPath: this.deps.ffmpegPath
-        }), opts?.signal);
+        });
       },
       live: async (opts) => {
         const source = await this.sharedLiveSourceFor(sn, opts);
@@ -19658,9 +20175,9 @@ var P2PCommandRouter = class _P2PCommandRouter {
           s.sendStringPayloadCommand(P2P_ENVELOPE.CONTROL_PAYLOAD, json, ch);
           return Promise.resolve();
         },
-        l2: async ({ session: s, channel: ch }) => {
+        l2: async ({ session: s, channel: ch, parentSn }) => {
           if (!await s.awaitLevel2Key(LEVEL2_GRACE_MS, "call")) {
-            throw new Error(`level-2 key not ready for ${sn} \u2014 cannot query`);
+            throw new StationKeyUnavailableError(parentSn);
           }
           s.sendRawLevel2(json, ch, P2P_ENVELOPE.CONTROL_PAYLOAD);
         }
@@ -19827,15 +20344,28 @@ var P2PCommandRouter = class _P2PCommandRouter {
     }
     this.manager.bumpCommand(parentSn);
     const channel = typeof raw.device_channel === "number" ? raw.device_channel : 0;
-    const accountId = raw.member?.admin_user_id ?? this.deps.mega.auth?.userId ?? "";
+    const stationAdminId = raw.member?.admin_user_id;
+    const accountId = stationAdminId ?? this.deps.mega.auth?.userId ?? "";
     const t0 = Date.now();
-    while (!session.isConnected && Date.now() - t0 < CONNECT_WAIT_MS) {
-      opts.signal?.throwIfAborted();
-      await sleep2(200);
+    let waitedMs = 0;
+    if (!session.isConnected) {
+      this.traceOnStation(session, { phase: "session-connect-wait", waitMs: CONNECT_WAIT_MS });
+      while (!session.isConnected && Date.now() - t0 < CONNECT_WAIT_MS) {
+        opts.signal?.throwIfAborted();
+        await sleep2(200);
+      }
+      waitedMs = Date.now() - t0;
+      this.traceOnStation(session, session.isConnected ? { phase: "session-connected", waitedMs } : { phase: "session-unreachable", waitedMs });
     }
     opts.signal?.throwIfAborted();
     if (!session.isConnected)
-      throw new Error(`P2P session for ${parentSn} did not connect`);
+      throw new StationUnreachableError(parentSn, waitedMs);
+    this.traceOnStation(session, {
+      phase: "station-resolved",
+      topology: homeBaseAttached ? "attached" : "own",
+      channel,
+      stationAdmin: typeof stationAdminId !== "string" ? "unstated" : stationAdminId === this.deps.mega.auth?.userId ? "self" : "other"
+    });
     if (opts.waitLevel2) {
       if (opts.waitLevel2 === "settle") {
         await abortable(session.awaitLevel2Key(LEVEL2_SETTLE_MS, "session"), opts.signal);
@@ -19849,7 +20379,7 @@ var P2PCommandRouter = class _P2PCommandRouter {
         ready = await abortable(session.awaitLevel2Key(LEVEL2_GRACE_MS, "call"), opts.signal);
       }
       if (!ready)
-        throw new Error(`level-2 key not ready for ${parentSn}`);
+        throw new StationKeyUnavailableError(parentSn);
     }
     return { session, parentSn, channel, accountId, homeBaseAttached };
   }
@@ -20168,17 +20698,7 @@ var P2PCommandRouter = class _P2PCommandRouter {
 };
 
 // dist/transport/mqtt/command-router.js
-import { randomBytes as randomBytes4 } from "node:crypto";
-
-// dist/transport/mqtt/app-client-id.js
 import { randomBytes as randomBytes3 } from "node:crypto";
-function buildAppShapedClientId(input) {
-  const ts = input.timestamp ?? Math.floor(Date.now() / 1e3);
-  return `android-${input.appName}-${input.uid}-${input.mqttUuid}-${ts}`;
-}
-function generateMqttUuid() {
-  return randomBytes3(8).toString("hex");
-}
 
 // dist/transport/mqtt/broker-discovery.js
 import { resolve4 } from "node:dns/promises";
@@ -20556,9 +21076,9 @@ function buildFf09MqttEnvelope(input) {
   const head = {
     version: "1.0.0.1",
     client_id: input.clientId,
-    sess_id: input.sessId ?? randomBytes4(2).toString("hex"),
+    sess_id: input.sessId ?? randomBytes3(2).toString("hex"),
     msg_seq: 1,
-    seed: input.seed ?? randomBytes4(16).toString("hex"),
+    seed: input.seed ?? randomBytes3(16).toString("hex"),
     timestamp: input.timestamp ?? Math.floor(Date.now() / 1e3),
     cmd_status: 2,
     cmd: 9,
@@ -20569,9 +21089,6 @@ function buildFf09MqttEnvelope(input) {
 var MqttCommandRouter = class _MqttCommandRouter {
   deps;
   logger;
-  /** Stable per-process install id for the app-shaped MQTT client_id (see {@link buildAppShapedClientId}) —
-   * generated once, reused for every security-MQTT connect this router makes. */
-  mqttUuid;
   constructor(deps) {
     this.deps = deps;
     this.logger = deps.logger ?? noopLogger;
@@ -20678,9 +21195,7 @@ var MqttCommandRouter = class _MqttCommandRouter {
    */
   async ensureSecurityMqttFor(dev) {
     const creds = await this.deps.mega.getUserMqttInfo("eufy_security");
-    if (!this.mqttUuid)
-      this.mqttUuid = generateMqttUuid();
-    const mqttUuid = this.mqttUuid;
+    const mqttUuid = mqttUuidFrom(this.deps.mega.openudid);
     const clientIdFor = () => buildAppShapedClientId({ appName: "eufy_security", uid: creds.user_id ?? "", mqttUuid });
     const results = await discoverReachableInstance({
       hostname: creds.endpoint_addr,
@@ -21175,7 +21690,7 @@ function deriveTuyaAccount(eufyUserId, phoneCode) {
 }
 
 // dist/transport/tuya/sign.js
-import { createHash as createHash4, createHmac as createHmac3 } from "node:crypto";
+import { createHash as createHash5, createHmac as createHmac3 } from "node:crypto";
 var SIGN_ALLOWLIST = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
   "a",
   "v",
@@ -21199,7 +21714,7 @@ var SIGN_ALLOWLIST = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
   "sp"
 ]);
 function swapMd5(postData) {
-  const h = createHash4("md5").update(postData, "utf-8").digest("hex");
+  const h = createHash5("md5").update(postData, "utf-8").digest("hex");
   return h.slice(8, 16) + h.slice(0, 8) + h.slice(24, 32) + h.slice(16, 24);
 }
 function buildSignPreimage(params) {
@@ -21224,7 +21739,7 @@ var HmacSigner = class {
 var TUYA_CHKEY = "7cbfe6d8";
 
 // dist/transport/tuya/client.js
-import { randomBytes as randomBytes5, createHash as createHash5, createPublicKey, publicEncrypt, constants as constants2 } from "node:crypto";
+import { randomBytes as randomBytes4, createHash as createHash6, createPublicKey, publicEncrypt, constants as constants2 } from "node:crypto";
 
 // dist/transport/tuya/request.js
 import { randomUUID as randomUUID3 } from "node:crypto";
@@ -21336,7 +21851,7 @@ function buildUidTokenCreateAction(countryCode, uid) {
 
 // dist/transport/tuya/client.js
 function genDeviceId() {
-  return randomBytes5(22).toString("hex");
+  return randomBytes4(22).toString("hex");
 }
 function rsaEncryptPassword(password, publicKeyDecimal, exponentDecimal) {
   const bigintToBuffer = (n) => {
@@ -21351,8 +21866,8 @@ function rsaEncryptPassword(password, publicKeyDecimal, exponentDecimal) {
     },
     format: "jwk"
   });
-  const md5Hex = createHash5("md5").update(password).digest("hex");
-  return publicEncrypt({ key: rsaKey, padding: constants2.RSA_PKCS1_PADDING }, Buffer.from(md5Hex)).toString("hex");
+  const md5Hex2 = createHash6("md5").update(password).digest("hex");
+  return publicEncrypt({ key: rsaKey, padding: constants2.RSA_PKCS1_PADDING }, Buffer.from(md5Hex2)).toString("hex");
 }
 var TuyaClient = class {
   signer;
@@ -22443,7 +22958,7 @@ var PushClient = class _PushClient extends EventEmitter8 {
 };
 
 // dist/transport/push/fcm.js
-import { randomBytes as randomBytes6 } from "node:crypto";
+import { randomBytes as randomBytes5 } from "node:crypto";
 import { setTimeout as sleep3 } from "node:timers/promises";
 var FCM = {
   PROJECT_ID: "batterycam-3250a",
@@ -22456,7 +22971,7 @@ var FCM = {
   SDK_VERSION: "a:16.3.1"
 };
 function generateFid() {
-  const b = randomBytes6(17);
+  const b = randomBytes5(17);
   b[0] = 112 + b[0] % 16;
   return b.toString("base64url").slice(0, 22);
 }
@@ -23979,8 +24494,8 @@ var EufyMega = class extends EventEmitter9 {
    * @example
    * ```ts
    * const res = await eufy.login();
-   * if (res.status === "captcha") await eufy.solveCaptcha(await ask(res.image));
-   * else if (res.status === "2fa") await eufy.submitVerifyCode(await ask());
+   * if (res.status === "captcha") await eufy.solveCaptcha(await promptUser(res.image));
+   * else if (res.status === "2fa") await eufy.submitVerifyCode(await promptUser());
    * ```
    */
   async login(opts = {}) {
@@ -24305,7 +24820,7 @@ var EufyMega = class extends EventEmitter9 {
    * @example
    * ```ts
    * const dev = await eufy.getDevice(sn);
-   * if (dev.has("camera")) await dev.camera()?.snapshotStored();
+   * if (dev.has("camera")) await dev.camera?.()?.snapshotStored?.();
    * console.log(dev.getProperty("battery"));
    * ```
    */
@@ -24750,9 +25265,21 @@ var EufyMega = class extends EventEmitter9 {
    * {@link ensureMqttStarted} owns installing it, subscribing devices, and the epoch check, so that
    * lifecycle lives in exactly one place. Only ever called through {@link ensureMqttStarted}.
    *
-   * The inbound decode is gated by the reporting device's own capabilities, so one line's decoder never
-   * runs against another's traffic, and the DP frame is unwrapped here — the layer that may import the
-   * transport — so a capability reads tags without owning any framing.
+   * Identified by a client id built from this client's `openudid`, not by the certificate's name:
+   * that name is `{user_id}-{app_name}`, which every client on the account shares per line, and a
+   * duplicate client id is a takeover the broker resolves by evicting the incumbent. The id shape is
+   * the app's own (`android-{app_name}-{uid}-{uuid}-{ts}`, see {@link buildAppShapedClientId}), which
+   * the broker grants on the `eufy_security` credential.
+   *
+   * It separates two clients exactly as far as their `openudid` does: a caller that supplies none
+   * gets the value derived from the account, which every such client shares — the same condition
+   * under which their logins already displace each other (`MegaClientConfig.openudid`).
+   *
+   * A client id the broker REFUSES falls back to the certificate's name, since a shared channel beats
+   * none, and that transport then keeps that name until {@link disconnect}. Only a refusal: a connect
+   * that fails for any other reason rejects the bring-up, which clears its memo in
+   * {@link ensureMqttStarted} so the next one asks under this client's own id again — a dropped
+   * socket must not be what moves a process onto the shared name for good.
    */
   async startMqtt(scope) {
     const auth = this.mega.auth;
@@ -24761,7 +25288,41 @@ var EufyMega = class extends EventEmitter9 {
     if (!this.registry.list().length)
       await this.getDevices();
     const creds = await this.getUserMqttInfo(mqttAppName(scope));
-    const transport = new SecureMqtt({ credentials: creds, logger: this.opts.logger });
+    const ownClientId = buildAppShapedClientId({
+      appName: creds.app_name ?? mqttAppName(scope) ?? "eufy_mega",
+      uid: creds.user_id ?? auth.userId,
+      mqttUuid: mqttUuidFrom(this.mega.openudid)
+    });
+    try {
+      return await this.connectMqtt(creds, ownClientId);
+    } catch (e) {
+      if (!isNotAuthorized(e))
+        throw e;
+      this.opts.logger?.warn("[smqtt] the broker refused this client's own id; connecting under the certificate's name, which another client signed in to this account takes over", e);
+      return await this.connectMqtt(creds);
+    }
+  }
+  /**
+   * Connect one secure-MQTT transport under `clientId`, or under the certificate's own name when it is
+   * omitted, and wire its decode and fan-out. See {@link startMqtt} for which id is used and why.
+   *
+   * The fan-out is wired once the connection stands, so an attempt that is discarded — a client id the
+   * broker refuses, a socket that dies mid-handshake — never reports a connection a consumer never had;
+   * the connect it just completed is announced here instead. Errors raised while connecting are held
+   * only to keep an emitter without an `error` listener from throwing, and are reported once the
+   * transport is one a consumer owns.
+   *
+   * The inbound decode is gated by the reporting device's own capabilities, so one line's decoder never
+   * runs against another's traffic, and the DP frame is unwrapped here — the layer that may import the
+   * transport — so a capability reads tags without owning any framing.
+   */
+  async connectMqtt(creds, clientId) {
+    const transport = new SecureMqtt({ credentials: creds, clientId, logger: this.opts.logger });
+    const whileConnecting = [];
+    const hold = (e) => void whileConnecting.push(e);
+    transport.on("error", hold);
+    await transport.connect();
+    transport.off("error", hold);
     transport.on("connect", () => this.emit("connect"));
     transport.on("disconnect", (r) => this.emit("disconnect", r));
     transport.on("message", (m) => {
@@ -24800,7 +25361,9 @@ var EufyMega = class extends EventEmitter9 {
         this.emitSemantic(out.event, out.payload, { edge: true, refresh: out.refresh });
     });
     transport.on("error", (e) => this.reportError(e));
-    await transport.connect();
+    this.emit("connect");
+    for (const e of whileConnecting)
+      this.reportError(e);
     return transport;
   }
   /**
@@ -25217,6 +25780,553 @@ var EufyMega = class extends EventEmitter9 {
   }
 };
 
+// dist/transport/http/solix-constants.js
+var SOLIX_APP_NAME = "anker_power";
+var SOLIX_ESTIMATE_HOST = "uniapp-api-pr.anker.com";
+var SOLIX_DEFAULT_API_HOST = "ankerpower-api-eu.anker.com";
+var SOLIX_ENDPOINTS = {
+  estimateDomain: "/passport/estimate_domain",
+  keyExchange: "/openapi/oauth/key/exchange",
+  login: "/passport/login",
+  /** Bound devices for the account (flat list). */
+  getRelateAndBindDevices: "/power_service/v1/app/get_relate_and_bind_devices",
+  /** Sites (systems) the account owns; devices are grouped under a site. */
+  getSiteList: "/power_service/v1/site/get_site_list",
+  /** Per-user AWS-IoT MQTT credentials (cert/key/endpoint/thing) for the real-time device plane. */
+  getUserMqttInfo: "/v1/openapi/devicemanage/get_user_mqtt_info",
+  /** GET: the pairable-product catalog (categories → products), for labelling model codes. */
+  productCategories: "/power_service/v1/product_categories"
+};
+
+// dist/transport/http/solix-client.js
+function solixSessionFresh(s) {
+  return !!s?.authToken && tokenNotExpired(s.tokenExpiresAt);
+}
+var uuidFromHex = (hex) => `${hex.slice(0, 8)}-${hex.slice(8, 12)}-${hex.slice(12, 16)}-${hex.slice(16, 20)}-${hex.slice(20, 32)}`;
+var SolixClient = class {
+  email;
+  password;
+  country;
+  appVersion;
+  doFetch;
+  store;
+  openudid;
+  apiHost;
+  session_;
+  /** Carried between {@link login} and {@link submitVerifyCode} while a 2FA code is outstanding. */
+  pending2fa;
+  /**
+   * Resolve the device id (explicit → stored → deterministic from the email, so it is stable and does
+   * not re-trigger 2FA) and adopt a stored session that has not expired, so a warm start skips the
+   * handshake. An explicit `opts.apiHost` outranks a stored session's host in both cases: it is an
+   * override that also skips domain-estimate, and every read goes through `this.apiHost`.
+   */
+  constructor(opts) {
+    this.email = opts.email;
+    this.password = opts.password;
+    this.country = (opts.countryCode ?? "US").toUpperCase();
+    this.appVersion = opts.appVersion ?? "3.23.0";
+    this.doFetch = opts.fetchImpl ?? fetch;
+    this.apiHost = opts.apiHost ?? SOLIX_DEFAULT_API_HOST;
+    this.store = opts.store;
+    const saved = this.store?.load();
+    this.openudid = opts.openudid ?? saved?.openudid ?? uuidFromHex(md5Hex(`anker-solix:${opts.email}`));
+    if (saved?.session && solixSessionFresh(saved.session)) {
+      this.session_ = saved.session;
+      this.apiHost = opts.apiHost ?? saved.session.apiHost;
+    }
+  }
+  /** Persist the current device id (+ session, if any) when a store is configured. */
+  persist() {
+    this.store?.save({ openudid: this.openudid, session: this.session_ });
+  }
+  /** The authenticated session, once {@link login} has resolved to `ok`. */
+  get session() {
+    return this.session_;
+  }
+  /**
+   * Headers for the login/key-exchange path, which carry the device id. Authenticated resource reads
+   * must NOT send `openudid` — the gateway rejects a token-bearing read that also carries a device id
+   * (`401 token error`) — so those use {@link baseHeaders} directly.
+   */
+  authHeaders(extra = {}) {
+    return this.baseHeaders({ openudid: this.openudid, "x-terminal-id": this.openudid, ...extra });
+  }
+  /** Base headers common to every Solix request. */
+  baseHeaders(extra = {}) {
+    return {
+      "content-type": "application/json",
+      "app-name": SOLIX_APP_NAME,
+      "model-type": "PHONE",
+      "os-type": "android",
+      "os-version": "36",
+      "app-version": this.appVersion,
+      country: this.country,
+      timezone: "GMT+00:00",
+      language: "en",
+      "user-agent": "ktor-client",
+      accept: "application/json",
+      ...extra
+    };
+  }
+  /** One request path for every Solix call (GET or POST) — always parses through the non-JSON guard. */
+  async send(method2, host, path, headers, body) {
+    const res = await this.doFetch(`https://${host}${path}`, {
+      method: method2,
+      headers,
+      body,
+      signal: AbortSignal.timeout(2e4)
+    });
+    const text2 = await res.text();
+    try {
+      return JSON.parse(text2);
+    } catch {
+      throw new Error(`Solix ${path} \u2192 HTTP ${res.status}, non-JSON: ${text2.slice(0, 120)}`);
+    }
+  }
+  /** POST helper for the login/key-exchange path (which builds its own bespoke headers per request). */
+  post(host, path, body, headers) {
+    return this.send("POST", host, path, headers, body);
+  }
+  /** Resolve the regional API host via domain-estimate (best-effort; keeps the default on failure). */
+  async estimateHost() {
+    try {
+      const env = await this.post(SOLIX_ESTIMATE_HOST, SOLIX_ENDPOINTS.estimateDomain, JSON.stringify({ ab: this.country, mode: 1 }), this.baseHeaders());
+      const domain = env.data?.domain;
+      if (domain)
+        this.apiHost = domain;
+    } catch {
+    }
+  }
+  /** Do the localKey-bootstrapped ECDH key exchange and return the negotiated session key. */
+  async keyExchange() {
+    const prep = prepareKeyExchange(SOLIX_LOCAL_KEY_HEX);
+    const env = await this.post(this.apiHost, SOLIX_ENDPOINTS.keyExchange, JSON.stringify({ client_public_key: prep.encryptedClientPublicKey }), this.authHeaders(prep.headers));
+    const spk = env.data?.server_public_key;
+    if (env.code !== 0 || !spk)
+      throw new Error(`Solix key/exchange failed (${env.code}): ${env.msg}`);
+    return finishKeyExchange(prep, spk);
+  }
+  /** Build the encrypted, signed `/passport/login` request body + headers for the negotiated key. */
+  async postLogin(kx, verifyCode, limitedToken) {
+    const { clientPublicKeyHex, encryptedPassword } = encryptLoginPassword(this.password);
+    const bodyObj = {
+      email: this.email,
+      password: encryptedPassword,
+      ab: this.country,
+      client_secret_info: { public_key: clientPublicKeyHex },
+      answer: "",
+      captcha_id: "",
+      verify_code: verifyCode ?? "",
+      login_id: ""
+    };
+    const encBody = encryptBody(JSON.stringify(bodyObj), kx.shareKey);
+    const ts = nowSec();
+    const once = genId();
+    return this.post(this.apiHost, SOLIX_ENDPOINTS.login, encBody, this.authHeaders({
+      "x-encryption-info": "algo_ecdh",
+      "x-key-ident": kx.keyIdent,
+      "x-request-ts": ts,
+      "x-request-once": once,
+      "x-signature": signRequest(kx.shareKey, ts, once, encBody),
+      ...limitedToken ? { "x-auth-token": limitedToken } : {}
+    }));
+  }
+  /**
+   * Turn a decrypted `/passport/login` payload into an `ok`/`2fa` result, establishing the session on
+   * `ok`. The passport marks a pending 2FA with a non-empty `fa_info.info`, and empties it once the code
+   * has been satisfied.
+   */
+  classifyLogin(data, isVerify) {
+    const userId = data.ap_cloud_user_id ?? data.user_id;
+    const authToken = data.auth_token;
+    if (!userId || !authToken)
+      throw new Error(`Solix login returned no session: ${JSON.stringify(data).slice(0, 160)}`);
+    const faInfo = data.fa_info ?? {};
+    if (!isVerify && faInfo.info) {
+      this.pending2fa = { limitedToken: authToken, userId, geoKey: data.geo_key };
+      return { status: "2fa", method: "code sent by the passport" };
+    }
+    this.pending2fa = void 0;
+    this.session_ = {
+      authToken,
+      userId,
+      gtoken: gtoken(userId),
+      apiHost: this.apiHost,
+      tokenExpiresAt: Number(data.token_expires_at ?? 0) || 0
+    };
+    this.persist();
+    return { status: "ok", session: this.session_ };
+  }
+  /** Decrypt a login envelope's `data` (base64 `IV(16)||AES-128-CBC`, keyed by the share key). */
+  decryptLogin(env, kx) {
+    if (typeof env.data !== "string")
+      throw new Error(`Solix login (${env.code}): ${env.msg}`);
+    return JSON.parse(decryptBody(env.data, kx.shareKey).toString("utf-8"));
+  }
+  /**
+   * Authenticate with the account credentials. Resolves to `ok` with a {@link SolixSession}, or `2fa`
+   * when the passport sent a code — then call {@link submitVerifyCode}. A session that is already fresh
+   * (adopted from a store) is answered without a handshake.
+   */
+  async login() {
+    if (solixSessionFresh(this.session_)) {
+      return { status: "ok", session: this.session_ };
+    }
+    await this.estimateHost();
+    const kx = await this.keyExchange();
+    const env = await this.postLogin(kx);
+    return this.classifyLogin(this.decryptLogin(env, kx), false);
+  }
+  /** Complete a `2fa` login with the code the passport sent. */
+  async submitVerifyCode(code) {
+    if (!this.pending2fa)
+      throw new Error("no 2FA login is pending");
+    const kx = await this.keyExchange();
+    const env = await this.postLogin(kx, code, this.pending2fa.limitedToken);
+    return this.classifyLogin(this.decryptLogin(env, kx), true);
+  }
+  /**
+   * One authenticated PLAIN read for both GET and POST endpoints (no per-request encryption; carries
+   * the auth token + `gtoken` only). Routes through {@link send} so every read keeps the non-JSON guard.
+   */
+  async authed(method2, path, body) {
+    if (!this.session_)
+      throw new Error("not authenticated \u2014 call login() first");
+    const env = await this.send(method2, this.apiHost, path, this.baseHeaders({ gtoken: this.session_.gtoken, "x-auth-token": this.session_.authToken }), body ? JSON.stringify(body) : void 0);
+    if (env.code !== 0)
+      throw new Error(`Solix ${path} failed (${env.code}): ${env.msg}`);
+    return env.data ?? null;
+  }
+  /**
+   * The account's bound Solix devices (flat list; may be empty when devices live under sites). The
+   * gateway's JSON is asserted to {@link SolixDeviceRecord} here, at the one trust boundary — every field
+   * beyond `device_sn`/`product_code` is optional on the record, so a caller reads them defensively.
+   */
+  async getDevices() {
+    const data = await this.authed("POST", SOLIX_ENDPOINTS.getRelateAndBindDevices, {});
+    return Array.isArray(data) ? data : data?.data ?? [];
+  }
+  /** The account's sites (systems); devices are typically grouped under a site. */
+  async getSites() {
+    const data = await this.authed("POST", SOLIX_ENDPOINTS.getSiteList, {});
+    return data?.site_list ?? [];
+  }
+  /** Per-user AWS-IoT MQTT credentials (cert/key/endpoint/thing) for the real-time device plane. */
+  async getUserMqttInfo() {
+    return this.authed("POST", SOLIX_ENDPOINTS.getUserMqttInfo, {});
+  }
+  /**
+   * The pairable-product catalog (categories → products). This is Anker's product registry, not the
+   * account's devices — fetch it to label a discovered device's model code with a marketing name and
+   * category. Pair with {@link buildModelIndex}. It is a live endpoint, so it stays current without a
+   * baked-in table.
+   */
+  async getProductCatalog() {
+    return await this.authed("GET", SOLIX_ENDPOINTS.productCategories) ?? [];
+  }
+};
+
+// dist/transport/mqtt/solix-mqtt.js
+import { EventEmitter as EventEmitter10 } from "node:events";
+var SOLIX_METER_FIELD_NAMES = {
+  172: "meterVoltageL1"
+};
+function readSolixChannel(value) {
+  if (!value || value.length < 1)
+    return void 0;
+  const raw = value.subarray(1);
+  const ch = { type: value[0], raw };
+  if (raw.length === 4) {
+    ch.float = raw.readFloatLE(0);
+    ch.uint = raw.readUInt32LE(0);
+  }
+  return ch;
+}
+function decodeSolixParamFrame(buf) {
+  if (buf.length < 10 || buf[0] !== 255 || buf[1] !== 9)
+    return null;
+  const declaredLen = buf.readUInt16LE(2);
+  if (declaredLen < 5 || declaredLen > buf.length)
+    return null;
+  let xor = 0;
+  for (let i = 0; i < declaredLen; i++)
+    xor ^= buf[i];
+  if (xor !== 0)
+    return null;
+  const end = declaredLen - 1;
+  const start = buf.indexOf(161, 4);
+  if (start < 0 || start >= end)
+    return { fields: /* @__PURE__ */ new Map() };
+  const fields = walkFf09Tlv(buf, start, end);
+  let deviceSn;
+  const a2 = fields.get(162);
+  if (a2 && a2.length > 1)
+    deviceSn = a2.subarray(1).toString("latin1").replace(/\0+$/, "") || void 0;
+  return { deviceSn, fields };
+}
+function solixReadings(frame) {
+  const out = {};
+  for (const [tag2, value] of frame.fields) {
+    if (tag2 < 166)
+      continue;
+    const ch = readSolixChannel(value);
+    if (ch?.type !== 5 || ch.float === void 0)
+      continue;
+    out[`channel_${tag2.toString(16)}`] = ch.float;
+    const name = SOLIX_METER_FIELD_NAMES[tag2];
+    if (name)
+      out[name] = ch.float;
+  }
+  return out;
+}
+var SolixMqtt = class extends EventEmitter10 {
+  transport;
+  appName;
+  userId;
+  appClientId;
+  armIntervalMs;
+  logger;
+  siteId;
+  watched = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+  seq = 0;
+  armTimer;
+  /**
+   * Bind to one account's MQTT plane. The envelope `client_id` takes the app's shape
+   * (`android-{app}-{uid}-{mqttUuid}-{ts}`); its `mqttUuid` half must be stable across restarts, or every
+   * restart presents itself to the broker as a new client, so it defaults deterministically from the user
+   * id (see {@link SolixMqttOptions.mqttUuid}) rather than a fresh random per instance.
+   */
+  constructor(opts) {
+    super();
+    this.appName = opts.mqttInfo.app_name ?? "anker_power";
+    this.userId = opts.userId ?? opts.mqttInfo.user_id;
+    this.armIntervalMs = opts.armIntervalMs ?? 25e3;
+    this.siteId = opts.siteId;
+    this.logger = opts.logger;
+    const uid = this.userId ?? "anonymous";
+    this.appClientId = opts.appClientId ?? buildAppShapedClientId({
+      appName: this.appName,
+      uid,
+      mqttUuid: opts.mqttUuid ?? mqttUuidFrom(`anker-solix-mqtt:${uid}`)
+    });
+    this.transport = new SecureMqtt({
+      credentials: opts.mqttInfo,
+      clientId: opts.clientId ?? opts.mqttInfo.thing_name,
+      reconnectPeriod: 5e3,
+      logger: opts.logger
+    });
+    this.transport.on("error", (e) => this.emit("error", e));
+    this.transport.on("message", (msg) => this.onMessage(msg));
+  }
+  /**
+   * Connect, subscribe to the device's telemetry (+ command-reply) topics, ARM realtime reporting, and
+   * start the re-arm/heartbeat timer so telemetry keeps flowing without the app. Idempotent per device.
+   *
+   * Subscribes ONLY to what the device sends — `param_info` plus the device and account command-reply
+   * channels — never the `…/req` channels, which are the app→device request side this arms on, and would
+   * echo its own publishes back.
+   *
+   * Throws when `param_info` was not granted. A scope-denied filter comes back as SUBACK_FAILURE rather
+   * than an error (see `SecureMqtt.subscribe`), so an unusable subscription otherwise looks like
+   * success: the call would resolve and arm on every interval while no reading ever arrives.
+   *
+   * The re-arm timer is unreffed, so a caller that watches and returns can still exit.
+   */
+  async watch(device) {
+    await this.transport.connect();
+    const topics = solixDeviceTopics(this.appName, device.product_code, device.device_sn);
+    const granted = await this.transport.subscribe([
+      topics.paramInfo,
+      topics.cmdRes,
+      ...this.userId ? [solixUserTopics(this.appName, this.userId).cmdRes] : []
+    ]);
+    if (!granted.includes(topics.paramInfo)) {
+      const scope = this.appName;
+      throw new Error(`watch ${device.device_sn}: telemetry topic "${topics.paramInfo}" denied on credential scope "${scope}" \u2014 the subscription would arm but never deliver a reading`);
+    }
+    this.watched.set(device.device_sn, device);
+    if (this.armIntervalMs > 0) {
+      await this.armAll();
+      if (!this.armTimer) {
+        this.armTimer = setInterval(() => void this.armAll(), this.armIntervalMs);
+        this.armTimer.unref?.();
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  /** Tear down the connection and stop the re-arm timer. */
+  async close() {
+    if (this.armTimer) {
+      clearInterval(this.armTimer);
+      this.armTimer = void 0;
+    }
+    this.watched.clear();
+    await this.transport.disconnect();
+  }
+  /**
+   * Re-arm every watched device and send the site heartbeat. The device only pushes `param_info` while
+   * a client keeps requesting it — this replays the app's `requestDeviceInfo` (cmd 17) + `power_site`
+   * heartbeat (cmd 10); the request frames are reproduced byte-for-byte by {@link buildFf09Request}
+   * (checksum-verified against captured frames in its spec). Best-effort: a publish failure is emitted,
+   * not thrown, so one bad device doesn't stop the rest or kill the timer.
+   */
+  async armAll() {
+    for (const device of this.watched.values()) {
+      try {
+        await this.arm(device);
+      } catch (e) {
+        this.emit("error", e);
+      }
+    }
+    if (this.userId) {
+      try {
+        await this.transport.publish(solixUserTopics(this.appName, this.userId).powerSite, this.heartbeatEnvelope(), {
+          qos: 1
+        });
+      } catch (e) {
+        this.emit("error", e);
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  /** Publish the device-info arming request (both the "info" and "realtime" ff09 variants the app sends). */
+  async arm(device) {
+    const topic = solixDeviceTopics(this.appName, device.product_code, device.device_sn).req;
+    for (const variant of ["info", "realtime"]) {
+      const body = this.commandEnvelope(device, buildFf09Request(variant), variant === "info" ? { encoding_type: 2 } : {});
+      await this.transport.publish(topic, body, { qos: 1 });
+    }
+    this.logger?.debug?.(`[solix] armed ${device.device_sn} (param_info reporting requested)`);
+  }
+  /** The common `head` fields for every cmd envelope; callers add `cmd` + the per-message variable bits. */
+  makeHead(cmd, extra) {
+    return {
+      version: "1.0.0.1",
+      client_id: this.appClientId,
+      timestamp: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1e3),
+      cmd_status: 2,
+      sign_code: 1,
+      cmd,
+      ...extra
+    };
+  }
+  /**
+   * Build the `{head, payload}` cmd-17 (requestDeviceInfo) envelope carrying a base64 ff09 request.
+   * `account_id` is omitted when the user id is unknown: a live broker cannot tell an empty placeholder
+   * from a real value, so sending `""` would claim an account this client does not have.
+   */
+  commandEnvelope(device, frame, extra) {
+    this.seq += 1;
+    return JSON.stringify({
+      head: this.makeHead(17, {
+        sess_id: genId(),
+        msg_seq: this.seq,
+        seed: genId(),
+        device_pn: device.product_code,
+        device_sn: device.device_sn
+      }),
+      payload: JSON.stringify({
+        device_sn: device.device_sn,
+        ...this.userId ? { account_id: this.userId } : {},
+        data: frame.toString("base64"),
+        ...extra
+      })
+    });
+  }
+  /**
+   * The `power_site` heartbeat (cmd 10) envelope the app sends on a timer to keep the session alive.
+   * `site_id` is omitted when unknown, for the same reason `account_id` is in {@link commandEnvelope}.
+   */
+  heartbeatEnvelope() {
+    return JSON.stringify({
+      head: this.makeHead(10, { sess_id: "1", msg_seq: 1, seed: "1" }),
+      payload: JSON.stringify({ user_id: this.userId ?? "", ...this.siteId ? { site_id: this.siteId } : {} })
+    });
+  }
+  /**
+   * Decode one inbound MQTT message envelope and emit a `reading` if it carries an ff09 param frame. The
+   * product code and the fallback serial come from the topic (`dt/{app}/{pn}/{sn}/param_info`); the frame's
+   * own `a2` field wins for the serial when it carries one.
+   */
+  onMessage(msg) {
+    const topic = msg.topic ?? "";
+    const buf = extractFf09Payload(msg.raw);
+    if (!buf)
+      return;
+    const frame = decodeSolixParamFrame(buf);
+    if (!frame)
+      return;
+    const parts = topic.split("/");
+    const reading = {
+      deviceSn: frame.deviceSn ?? parts[3] ?? "",
+      productCode: parts[2] ?? "",
+      topic,
+      frame,
+      values: solixReadings(frame)
+    };
+    this.emit("reading", reading);
+  }
+};
+function extractFf09Payload(raw) {
+  if (Buffer.isBuffer(raw))
+    return raw;
+  if (!raw || typeof raw !== "object")
+    return null;
+  const env = raw;
+  let payload = env.payload;
+  if (typeof payload === "string") {
+    try {
+      payload = JSON.parse(payload);
+    } catch {
+      return null;
+    }
+  }
+  const p = payload;
+  const data = p?.data ?? p?.trans ?? env.data;
+  if (typeof data !== "string")
+    return null;
+  const buf = Buffer.from(data, "base64");
+  return buf.length ? buf : null;
+}
+function buildFf09Request(variant, atUnixSec) {
+  const ts = Buffer.alloc(4);
+  ts.writeUInt32LE((atUnixSec ?? Math.floor(Date.now() / 1e3)) >>> 0);
+  const body = variant === "info" ? Buffer.concat([Buffer.from([3, 0, 15, 0, 64, 161, 1, 34, 254, 4]), ts]) : Buffer.concat([
+    Buffer.from([
+      3,
+      0,
+      15,
+      0,
+      87,
+      161,
+      1,
+      34,
+      162,
+      2,
+      1,
+      1,
+      163,
+      3,
+      2,
+      44,
+      1,
+      254,
+      5,
+      3
+    ]),
+    ts
+  ]);
+  const frame = Buffer.alloc(body.length + 5);
+  frame[0] = 255;
+  frame[1] = 9;
+  frame.writeUInt16LE(frame.length, 2);
+  body.copy(frame, 4);
+  let xor = 0;
+  for (let i = 0; i < frame.length - 1; i++)
+    xor ^= frame[i];
+  frame[frame.length - 1] = xor;
+  return frame;
+}
+
 // dist/transport/tuya/index.js
 var tuya_exports = {};
 __export(tuya_exports, {
@@ -25257,6 +26367,7 @@ export {
   AUDIO_MEMBERS,
   AccessUnitAssembler,
   AiDetectType,
+  AlarmDelayMode,
   ArmingMode,
   BATTERY_MEMBERS,
   BIZ_CHANNEL,
@@ -25277,6 +26388,7 @@ export {
   CusPushEvent,
   CusPushMode,
   DEFAULT_KEEPALIVE_MS,
+  DISPLAY_MEMBERS,
   DOCK_ACTIVITIES,
   DOCK_KINDS,
   DOORBELL_MEMBERS,
@@ -25330,6 +26442,7 @@ export {
   P256,
   P2PSession,
   P2P_ENVELOPE,
+  P2P_STATION_WAITS,
   PRINTER_CATEGORY_RE,
   PTZ_MEMBERS,
   PowerSource,
@@ -25349,6 +26462,8 @@ export {
   SIREN_MEMBERS,
   SMART_LIGHT_MEMBERS,
   SMOKE_MEMBERS,
+  SOLIX_ENERGY_METER_MEMBERS,
+  SOLIX_LOCAL_KEY_HEX,
   STATE_EVENT_FIELDS,
   STATION_CHANNEL3 as STATION_CHANNEL,
   STATION_CHUNK_BYTES,
@@ -25361,8 +26476,13 @@ export {
   SirenAlarmDuration,
   SirenVolume,
   SmartDropPushEvent,
+  SolixClient,
+  SolixDevice,
+  SolixMqtt,
   StateConvergenceError,
   StationBusyError,
+  StationKeyUnavailableError,
+  StationUnreachableError,
   StoredSnapshotUnavailableError,
   StreamingQuality,
   SuctionLevel,
@@ -25393,6 +26513,7 @@ export {
   buildDeviceNameBody,
   buildDirectBinaryBody,
   buildEventIndex,
+  buildModelIndex,
   buildRealtimeInit,
   captureSnapshotFromShared,
   cellAtPoint,
@@ -25430,6 +26551,7 @@ export {
   detectCapabilities,
   detectionName,
   discoverReachableInstance,
+  discoverSolixDevices,
   encodeAiDetectType,
   encodeVarint,
   encryptBody,
@@ -25443,7 +26565,6 @@ export {
   freshestLanIp,
   genId,
   generateFid,
-  generateMqttUuid,
   getCapabilityModule,
   getIdSuffix,
   getImageBaseCode,
@@ -25456,6 +26577,7 @@ export {
   inferName,
   inspectParams,
   isKnownValueKind,
+  isNotAuthorized,
   isPrivateIpv4,
   isSessionValid,
   isV1Image,
@@ -25467,10 +26589,12 @@ export {
   lz4BlockDecompress,
   mapCellValue,
   mapCellValueAt,
+  md5Hex,
   mergeCandidateIps,
   mergeProperties,
   mqttAppName,
   mqttScopeFor,
+  mqttUuidFrom,
   namespaceForCodec,
   needsRealtimeInit,
   noopLogger,
@@ -25510,9 +26634,12 @@ export {
   secureTopic,
   signKey,
   signRequest,
+  solixDeviceTopics,
+  solixUserTopics,
   structuralEqual,
   subscribeTopics,
   suctionLevelName,
+  tokenNotExpired,
   tuya_exports as tuya,
   u16be,
   u16le,