@mega-yfue/eufy-sdk 0.1.2 → 0.2.0-beta.1

package/dist/client/eufy-mega.d.ts

@@ -707,11 +707,38 @@ export declare class EufyMega extends EventEmitter {
      * {@link ensureMqttStarted} owns installing it, subscribing devices, and the epoch check, so that
      * lifecycle lives in exactly one place. Only ever called through {@link ensureMqttStarted}.
      *
+     * Identified by a client id built from this client's `openudid`, not by the certificate's name:
+     * that name is `{user_id}-{app_name}`, which every client on the account shares per line, and a
+     * duplicate client id is a takeover the broker resolves by evicting the incumbent. The id shape is
+     * the app's own (`android-{app_name}-{uid}-{uuid}-{ts}`, see {@link buildAppShapedClientId}), which
+     * the broker grants on the `eufy_security` credential.
+     *
+     * It separates two clients exactly as far as their `openudid` does: a caller that supplies none
+     * gets the value derived from the account, which every such client shares — the same condition
+     * under which their logins already displace each other (`MegaClientConfig.openudid`).
+     *
+     * A client id the broker REFUSES falls back to the certificate's name, since a shared channel beats
+     * none, and that transport then keeps that name until {@link disconnect}. Only a refusal: a connect
+     * that fails for any other reason rejects the bring-up, which clears its memo in
+     * {@link ensureMqttStarted} so the next one asks under this client's own id again — a dropped
+     * socket must not be what moves a process onto the shared name for good.
+     */
+    private startMqtt;
+    /**
+     * Connect one secure-MQTT transport under `clientId`, or under the certificate's own name when it is
+     * omitted, and wire its decode and fan-out. See {@link startMqtt} for which id is used and why.
+     *
+     * The fan-out is wired once the connection stands, so an attempt that is discarded — a client id the
+     * broker refuses, a socket that dies mid-handshake — never reports a connection a consumer never had;
+     * the connect it just completed is announced here instead. Errors raised while connecting are held
+     * only to keep an emitter without an `error` listener from throwing, and are reported once the
+     * transport is one a consumer owns.
+     *
      * The inbound decode is gated by the reporting device's own capabilities, so one line's decoder never
      * runs against another's traffic, and the DP frame is unwrapped here — the layer that may import the
      * transport — so a capability reads tags without owning any framing.
      */
-    private startMqtt;
+    private connectMqtt;
     /**
      * Subscribe the devices on one credential scope; a failing subscribe is reported, not fatal (one
      * unreachable device must not stop the rest of the roster from coming up).

package/dist/index.js

@@ -967,7 +967,15 @@ var MegaHttpClient = class {
    *  restored-session short-circuit must NOT treat it as a usable session. Cleared on Ok/reset. */
   pending2fa = false;
   tokenExpiresAt = 0;
-  /** Stable per-install device id — the auth token is bound to it. */
+  /**
+   * Stable per-install device id: `openudid` as configured, as restored from the session store, or as
+   * derived from the ACCOUNT when neither supplied one — two clients that configure none therefore
+   * share it, and are one install as far as everything keyed on this is concerned.
+   *
+   * Two things are keyed on it, and both fail the same way when it is shared: the auth token is bound
+   * to it, so each login displaces the other's session, and the secure-MQTT client id is built from it,
+   * so each connection evicts the other's channel.
+   */
   openudid;
   /** The device model reported to the cloud (explicit `phoneModel`, else a stable random one). */
   phoneModel;
@@ -1805,6 +1813,9 @@ function parseSecureTopic(topic) {
 
 // dist/transport/mqtt/secure-mqtt.js
 var SUBACK_FAILURE = 128;
+function isNotAuthorized(err) {
+  return err instanceof Error && /connection refused/i.test(err.message) && /not authori[sz]ed/i.test(err.message);
+}
 var SecureMqtt = class extends EventEmitter {
   kind = "smqtt";
   client;
@@ -1864,6 +1875,7 @@ var SecureMqtt = class extends EventEmitter {
         }
         this.emit("connect");
       });
+      client.on("connect", () => this.logger.info(`[smqtt] connected (${c.app_name ?? "default"})`));
       client.on("reconnect", () => this.logger.warn("[smqtt] reconnecting"));
       client.on("close", () => this.emit("disconnect", "close"));
       client.on("error", (err) => {
@@ -1932,6 +1944,16 @@ var SecureMqtt = class extends EventEmitter {
   }
 };
 
+// dist/transport/mqtt/app-client-id.js
+import { createHash as createHash4 } from "node:crypto";
+function buildAppShapedClientId(input) {
+  const ts = input.timestamp ?? Math.floor(Date.now() / 1e3);
+  return `android-${input.appName}-${input.uid}-${input.mqttUuid}-${ts}`;
+}
+function mqttUuidFrom(installId) {
+  return createHash4("sha256").update(installId).digest("hex").slice(0, 16);
+}
+
 // dist/core/util.js
 var Timer = class {
   handle;
@@ -20168,17 +20190,7 @@ var P2PCommandRouter = class _P2PCommandRouter {
 };
 
 // dist/transport/mqtt/command-router.js
-import { randomBytes as randomBytes4 } from "node:crypto";
-
-// dist/transport/mqtt/app-client-id.js
 import { randomBytes as randomBytes3 } from "node:crypto";
-function buildAppShapedClientId(input) {
-  const ts = input.timestamp ?? Math.floor(Date.now() / 1e3);
-  return `android-${input.appName}-${input.uid}-${input.mqttUuid}-${ts}`;
-}
-function generateMqttUuid() {
-  return randomBytes3(8).toString("hex");
-}
 
 // dist/transport/mqtt/broker-discovery.js
 import { resolve4 } from "node:dns/promises";
@@ -20556,9 +20568,9 @@ function buildFf09MqttEnvelope(input) {
   const head = {
     version: "1.0.0.1",
     client_id: input.clientId,
-    sess_id: input.sessId ?? randomBytes4(2).toString("hex"),
+    sess_id: input.sessId ?? randomBytes3(2).toString("hex"),
     msg_seq: 1,
-    seed: input.seed ?? randomBytes4(16).toString("hex"),
+    seed: input.seed ?? randomBytes3(16).toString("hex"),
     timestamp: input.timestamp ?? Math.floor(Date.now() / 1e3),
     cmd_status: 2,
     cmd: 9,
@@ -20569,9 +20581,6 @@ function buildFf09MqttEnvelope(input) {
 var MqttCommandRouter = class _MqttCommandRouter {
   deps;
   logger;
-  /** Stable per-process install id for the app-shaped MQTT client_id (see {@link buildAppShapedClientId}) —
-   * generated once, reused for every security-MQTT connect this router makes. */
-  mqttUuid;
   constructor(deps) {
     this.deps = deps;
     this.logger = deps.logger ?? noopLogger;
@@ -20678,9 +20687,7 @@ var MqttCommandRouter = class _MqttCommandRouter {
    */
   async ensureSecurityMqttFor(dev) {
     const creds = await this.deps.mega.getUserMqttInfo("eufy_security");
-    if (!this.mqttUuid)
-      this.mqttUuid = generateMqttUuid();
-    const mqttUuid = this.mqttUuid;
+    const mqttUuid = mqttUuidFrom(this.deps.mega.openudid);
     const clientIdFor = () => buildAppShapedClientId({ appName: "eufy_security", uid: creds.user_id ?? "", mqttUuid });
     const results = await discoverReachableInstance({
       hostname: creds.endpoint_addr,
@@ -21175,7 +21182,7 @@ function deriveTuyaAccount(eufyUserId, phoneCode) {
 }
 
 // dist/transport/tuya/sign.js
-import { createHash as createHash4, createHmac as createHmac3 } from "node:crypto";
+import { createHash as createHash5, createHmac as createHmac3 } from "node:crypto";
 var SIGN_ALLOWLIST = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
   "a",
   "v",
@@ -21199,7 +21206,7 @@ var SIGN_ALLOWLIST = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
   "sp"
 ]);
 function swapMd5(postData) {
-  const h = createHash4("md5").update(postData, "utf-8").digest("hex");
+  const h = createHash5("md5").update(postData, "utf-8").digest("hex");
   return h.slice(8, 16) + h.slice(0, 8) + h.slice(24, 32) + h.slice(16, 24);
 }
 function buildSignPreimage(params) {
@@ -21224,7 +21231,7 @@ var HmacSigner = class {
 var TUYA_CHKEY = "7cbfe6d8";
 
 // dist/transport/tuya/client.js
-import { randomBytes as randomBytes5, createHash as createHash5, createPublicKey, publicEncrypt, constants as constants2 } from "node:crypto";
+import { randomBytes as randomBytes4, createHash as createHash6, createPublicKey, publicEncrypt, constants as constants2 } from "node:crypto";
 
 // dist/transport/tuya/request.js
 import { randomUUID as randomUUID3 } from "node:crypto";
@@ -21336,7 +21343,7 @@ function buildUidTokenCreateAction(countryCode, uid) {
 
 // dist/transport/tuya/client.js
 function genDeviceId() {
-  return randomBytes5(22).toString("hex");
+  return randomBytes4(22).toString("hex");
 }
 function rsaEncryptPassword(password, publicKeyDecimal, exponentDecimal) {
   const bigintToBuffer = (n) => {
@@ -21351,7 +21358,7 @@ function rsaEncryptPassword(password, publicKeyDecimal, exponentDecimal) {
     },
     format: "jwk"
   });
-  const md5Hex = createHash5("md5").update(password).digest("hex");
+  const md5Hex = createHash6("md5").update(password).digest("hex");
   return publicEncrypt({ key: rsaKey, padding: constants2.RSA_PKCS1_PADDING }, Buffer.from(md5Hex)).toString("hex");
 }
 var TuyaClient = class {
@@ -22443,7 +22450,7 @@ var PushClient = class _PushClient extends EventEmitter8 {
 };
 
 // dist/transport/push/fcm.js
-import { randomBytes as randomBytes6 } from "node:crypto";
+import { randomBytes as randomBytes5 } from "node:crypto";
 import { setTimeout as sleep3 } from "node:timers/promises";
 var FCM = {
   PROJECT_ID: "batterycam-3250a",
@@ -22456,7 +22463,7 @@ var FCM = {
   SDK_VERSION: "a:16.3.1"
 };
 function generateFid() {
-  const b = randomBytes6(17);
+  const b = randomBytes5(17);
   b[0] = 112 + b[0] % 16;
   return b.toString("base64url").slice(0, 22);
 }
@@ -24750,9 +24757,21 @@ var EufyMega = class extends EventEmitter9 {
    * {@link ensureMqttStarted} owns installing it, subscribing devices, and the epoch check, so that
    * lifecycle lives in exactly one place. Only ever called through {@link ensureMqttStarted}.
    *
-   * The inbound decode is gated by the reporting device's own capabilities, so one line's decoder never
-   * runs against another's traffic, and the DP frame is unwrapped here — the layer that may import the
-   * transport — so a capability reads tags without owning any framing.
+   * Identified by a client id built from this client's `openudid`, not by the certificate's name:
+   * that name is `{user_id}-{app_name}`, which every client on the account shares per line, and a
+   * duplicate client id is a takeover the broker resolves by evicting the incumbent. The id shape is
+   * the app's own (`android-{app_name}-{uid}-{uuid}-{ts}`, see {@link buildAppShapedClientId}), which
+   * the broker grants on the `eufy_security` credential.
+   *
+   * It separates two clients exactly as far as their `openudid` does: a caller that supplies none
+   * gets the value derived from the account, which every such client shares — the same condition
+   * under which their logins already displace each other (`MegaClientConfig.openudid`).
+   *
+   * A client id the broker REFUSES falls back to the certificate's name, since a shared channel beats
+   * none, and that transport then keeps that name until {@link disconnect}. Only a refusal: a connect
+   * that fails for any other reason rejects the bring-up, which clears its memo in
+   * {@link ensureMqttStarted} so the next one asks under this client's own id again — a dropped
+   * socket must not be what moves a process onto the shared name for good.
    */
   async startMqtt(scope) {
     const auth = this.mega.auth;
@@ -24761,7 +24780,41 @@ var EufyMega = class extends EventEmitter9 {
     if (!this.registry.list().length)
       await this.getDevices();
     const creds = await this.getUserMqttInfo(mqttAppName(scope));
-    const transport = new SecureMqtt({ credentials: creds, logger: this.opts.logger });
+    const ownClientId = buildAppShapedClientId({
+      appName: creds.app_name ?? mqttAppName(scope) ?? "eufy_mega",
+      uid: creds.user_id ?? auth.userId,
+      mqttUuid: mqttUuidFrom(this.mega.openudid)
+    });
+    try {
+      return await this.connectMqtt(creds, ownClientId);
+    } catch (e) {
+      if (!isNotAuthorized(e))
+        throw e;
+      this.opts.logger?.warn("[smqtt] the broker refused this client's own id; connecting under the certificate's name, which another client signed in to this account takes over", e);
+      return await this.connectMqtt(creds);
+    }
+  }
+  /**
+   * Connect one secure-MQTT transport under `clientId`, or under the certificate's own name when it is
+   * omitted, and wire its decode and fan-out. See {@link startMqtt} for which id is used and why.
+   *
+   * The fan-out is wired once the connection stands, so an attempt that is discarded — a client id the
+   * broker refuses, a socket that dies mid-handshake — never reports a connection a consumer never had;
+   * the connect it just completed is announced here instead. Errors raised while connecting are held
+   * only to keep an emitter without an `error` listener from throwing, and are reported once the
+   * transport is one a consumer owns.
+   *
+   * The inbound decode is gated by the reporting device's own capabilities, so one line's decoder never
+   * runs against another's traffic, and the DP frame is unwrapped here — the layer that may import the
+   * transport — so a capability reads tags without owning any framing.
+   */
+  async connectMqtt(creds, clientId) {
+    const transport = new SecureMqtt({ credentials: creds, clientId, logger: this.opts.logger });
+    const whileConnecting = [];
+    const hold = (e) => void whileConnecting.push(e);
+    transport.on("error", hold);
+    await transport.connect();
+    transport.off("error", hold);
     transport.on("connect", () => this.emit("connect"));
     transport.on("disconnect", (r) => this.emit("disconnect", r));
     transport.on("message", (m) => {
@@ -24800,7 +24853,9 @@ var EufyMega = class extends EventEmitter9 {
         this.emitSemantic(out.event, out.payload, { edge: true, refresh: out.refresh });
     });
     transport.on("error", (e) => this.reportError(e));
-    await transport.connect();
+    this.emit("connect");
+    for (const e of whileConnecting)
+      this.reportError(e);
     return transport;
   }
   /**
@@ -25443,7 +25498,6 @@ export {
   freshestLanIp,
   genId,
   generateFid,
-  generateMqttUuid,
   getCapabilityModule,
   getIdSuffix,
   getImageBaseCode,
@@ -25456,6 +25510,7 @@ export {
   inferName,
   inspectParams,
   isKnownValueKind,
+  isNotAuthorized,
   isPrivateIpv4,
   isSessionValid,
   isV1Image,
@@ -25471,6 +25526,7 @@ export {
   mergeProperties,
   mqttAppName,
   mqttScopeFor,
+  mqttUuidFrom,
   namespaceForCodec,
   needsRealtimeInit,
   noopLogger,