@mctx-ai/mcp-server 0.3.0

package/dist/security.js

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+/**
+ * Security Module - MCP Server Security Protections
+ *
+ * Provides comprehensive security controls:
+ * - Error sanitization (secret redaction, stack trace removal)
+ * - Request/response size limits (DoS prevention)
+ * - URI scheme validation (injection prevention)
+ * - Prototype pollution protection (object sanitization)
+ *
+ * Defense in depth: Multiple layers protect against OWASP Top 10 threats.
+ */
+
+// Secret patterns to detect and redact
+// IMPORTANT: Order matters - more specific patterns must come before generic patterns
+const SECRET_PATTERNS = [
+  // AWS Access Keys (AKIA + 16 alphanumeric chars)
+  { regex: /AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}/g, label: "REDACTED_AWS_KEY" },
+
+  // JWT tokens (three base64url segments separated by dots)
+  {
+    regex: /eyJ[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+\.eyJ[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+\.[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+/g,
+    label: "REDACTED_JWT",
+  },
+
+  // Database connection strings
+  {
+    regex: /(?:mongodb|postgres|mysql|mariadb|mssql|oracle):\/\/[^\s]+/gi,
+    label: "REDACTED_CONNECTION_STRING",
+  },
+
+  // Bearer tokens
+  { regex: /Bearer\s+[a-zA-Z0-9_\-.]+/gi, label: "Bearer [REDACTED]" },
+
+  // GitHub tokens (personal access tokens, OAuth, app tokens, refresh tokens)
+  // MUST come before generic API key pattern (which would match "token:")
+  // GitHub tokens: gh[pors]_ prefix + 33-40 alphanumeric chars
+  // Note: gh[pors] matches ghp, gho, ghr, ghs
+  { regex: /gh[pors]_[a-zA-Z0-9]{33,40}/g, label: "REDACTED_GITHUB_TOKEN" },
+
+  // Slack tokens (format: xoxb-numbers-alphanumeric or similar hyphen-separated patterns)
+  // MUST come before generic API key pattern (which would match "token:")
+  {
+    regex: /xox[bpas]-[a-zA-Z0-9]+-[a-zA-Z0-9-]+/g,
+    label: "REDACTED_SLACK_TOKEN",
+  },
+
+  // Private keys (RSA, EC, DSA)
+  {
+    regex:
+      /-----BEGIN (?:RSA |EC |DSA )?PRIVATE KEY-----[\s\S]*?-----END (?:RSA |EC |DSA )?PRIVATE KEY-----/g,
+    label: "REDACTED_PRIVATE_KEY",
+  },
+
+  // GCP API keys (AIzaSy prefix + variable length alphanumeric/special chars)
+  { regex: /AIzaSy[0-9A-Za-z\-_]{21,}/g, label: "REDACTED_GCP_KEY" },
+
+  // Azure connection strings
+  { regex: /AccountKey=[a-zA-Z0-9+/=]{40,}/g, label: "REDACTED_AZURE_KEY" },
+
+  // Generic API key patterns (key=, token=, secret=, password= followed by value)
+  // ReDoS mitigation: bounded whitespace quantifiers (max 10 instead of unbounded \s*)
+  // MUST come LAST to avoid matching more specific token patterns above
+  {
+    regex:
+      /(?:api[_-]?key|token|secret|password)\s{0,10}[=:]\s{0,10}['"]?([a-zA-Z0-9_.-]{16,})['"]?/gi,
+    label: (match) =>
+      match.replace(/(['"]?)[a-zA-Z0-9_.-]{16,}(['"]?)/, "$1[REDACTED]$2"),
+  },
+];
+
+// Dangerous URI schemes that enable injection attacks
+const DANGEROUS_SCHEMES = ["file", "javascript", "data", "vbscript", "about"];
+
+/**
+ * Sanitize error messages for safe output
+ *
+ * Security: Prevents information disclosure through error messages
+ * - Removes stack traces in production (leak implementation details)
+ * - Redacts secrets (AWS keys, JWTs, connection strings, API keys)
+ * - Preserves error context for debugging
+ *
+ * @param {Error} error - Error object to sanitize
+ * @param {boolean} isProduction - True to strip stack traces (default: true)
+ * @returns {string} Sanitized error message
+ */
+export function sanitizeError(error, isProduction = true) {
+  if (!error) return "Unknown error";
+
+  let message = error.message || String(error);
+
+  // Redact secrets from message
+  for (const pattern of SECRET_PATTERNS) {
+    if (typeof pattern.label === "function") {
+      message = message.replace(pattern.regex, pattern.label);
+    } else {
+      message = message.replace(pattern.regex, `[${pattern.label}]`);
+    }
+  }
+
+  // In production: strip stack traces completely
+  // In development: include stack trace but redact secrets
+  if (!isProduction && error.stack) {
+    let stack = error.stack;
+
+    // Redact secrets from stack trace
+    for (const pattern of SECRET_PATTERNS) {
+      if (typeof pattern.label === "function") {
+        stack = stack.replace(pattern.regex, pattern.label);
+      } else {
+        stack = stack.replace(pattern.regex, `[${pattern.label}]`);
+      }
+    }
+
+    return stack;
+  }
+
+  return message;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Validate request body size
+ *
+ * Security: Prevents DoS attacks via large payloads
+ * - Default 1MB limit (configurable)
+ * - Validates before parsing to avoid memory exhaustion
+ *
+ * @param {string|Object} body - Request body (JSON string or parsed object)
+ * @param {number} maxSize - Maximum size in bytes (default: 1MB)
+ * @throws {Error} If body exceeds maxSize
+ */
+export function validateRequestSize(body, maxSize = 1048576) {
+  if (!body) return;
+
+  const size =
+    typeof body === "string" ? body.length : JSON.stringify(body).length;
+
+  if (size > maxSize) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `Request body too large: ${size} bytes (max: ${maxSize} bytes)`,
+    );
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Validate response body size
+ *
+ * Security: Prevents DoS attacks via large responses
+ * - Default 1MB limit (configurable)
+ * - Protects clients from memory exhaustion
+ *
+ * @param {string|Object} body - Response body (JSON string or object)
+ * @param {number} maxSize - Maximum size in bytes (default: 1MB)
+ * @throws {Error} If body exceeds maxSize
+ */
+export function validateResponseSize(body, maxSize = 1048576) {
+  if (!body) return;
+
+  const size =
+    typeof body === "string" ? body.length : JSON.stringify(body).length;
+
+  if (size > maxSize) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `Response body too large: ${size} bytes (max: ${maxSize} bytes)`,
+    );
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Validate string input length
+ *
+ * Security: Prevents DoS via excessively long strings
+ * - Default 10MB limit (configurable)
+ * - Useful for individual string fields
+ *
+ * @param {string} value - String to validate
+ * @param {number} maxLength - Maximum length in characters (default: 10MB)
+ * @throws {Error} If string exceeds maxLength
+ */
+export function validateStringInput(value, maxLength = 10485760) {
+  if (typeof value !== "string") return;
+
+  if (value.length > maxLength) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `String input too long: ${value.length} chars (max: ${maxLength} chars)`,
+    );
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Validate URI scheme against allowlist
+ *
+ * Security: Prevents injection attacks via dangerous URI schemes
+ * - Blocks file://, javascript:, data:, etc. by default
+ * - Allows http:// and https:// by default
+ * - Supports custom allowlists for special cases
+ *
+ * @param {string} uri - URI to validate
+ * @param {string[]} allowedSchemes - Allowed schemes (default: ['http', 'https'])
+ * @returns {boolean} True if URI scheme is allowed
+ */
+export function validateUriScheme(uri, allowedSchemes = ["http", "https"]) {
+  if (!uri || typeof uri !== "string") return false;
+
+  // Extract scheme (characters before first colon)
+  const schemeMatch = uri.match(/^([a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*?):/i);
+  if (!schemeMatch) return false;
+
+  const scheme = schemeMatch[1].toLowerCase();
+
+  // Check if scheme is explicitly dangerous
+  if (DANGEROUS_SCHEMES.includes(scheme)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // Check if scheme is in allowlist
+  return allowedSchemes.some((allowed) => allowed.toLowerCase() === scheme);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Canonicalize path and detect traversal attempts
+ *
+ * Security: Prevents path traversal attacks
+ * - Detects ../ sequences that escape intended directory
+ * - Handles double/triple encoding (%252e%252e%252f)
+ * - Detects null byte injection (%00 and literal \0)
+ * - Handles mixed encoding (%2e./, .%2e/)
+ * - Checks Unicode variants (\u002e\u002e/)
+ * - Normalizes path for consistent validation
+ *
+ * @param {string} uri - URI/path to canonicalize
+ * @returns {string} Canonicalized path
+ * @throws {Error} If path traversal detected
+ */
+export function canonicalizePath(uri) {
+  if (!uri || typeof uri !== "string") {
+    throw new Error("Invalid URI: must be a non-empty string");
+  }
+
+  // Decode URI repeatedly (max 3 iterations) to catch double/triple encoding
+  let decoded = uri;
+  for (let i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
+    try {
+      const nextDecoded = decodeURIComponent(decoded);
+      if (nextDecoded === decoded) break; // No more decoding needed
+      decoded = nextDecoded;
+    } catch {
+      // Invalid URI encoding, continue with current value
+      break;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Detect null byte injection (both encoded and literal)
+  if (decoded.includes("%00") || decoded.includes("\0")) {
+    throw new Error(
+      "Path traversal detected: null byte injection is not allowed",
+    );
+  }
+
+  // Detect Unicode variants of dots and slashes
+  // \u002e = '.', \u002f = '/'
+  if (
+    decoded.includes("\u002e\u002e\u002f") ||
+    decoded.includes("\u002e\u002e/") ||
+    decoded.includes("..\u002f")
+  ) {
+    throw new Error(
+      "Path traversal detected: Unicode-encoded ../ sequences are not allowed",
+    );
+  }
+
+  // Check fully decoded string for literal path traversal attempts
+  if (decoded.includes("../") || decoded.includes("..\\")) {
+    throw new Error("Path traversal detected: ../ sequences are not allowed");
+  }
+
+  // Check for mixed encoding in decoded string (case-insensitive)
+  const lowerDecoded = decoded.toLowerCase();
+  if (
+    lowerDecoded.includes("%2e%2e%2f") ||
+    lowerDecoded.includes("%2e%2e/") ||
+    lowerDecoded.includes("..%2f") ||
+    lowerDecoded.includes("%2e.") ||
+    lowerDecoded.includes(".%2e")
+  ) {
+    throw new Error(
+      "Path traversal detected: encoded ../ sequences are not allowed",
+    );
+  }
+
+  // Normalize path separators
+  let normalized = decoded.replace(/\\/g, "/");
+
+  // Remove duplicate slashes
+  normalized = normalized.replace(/\/+/g, "/");
+
+  return normalized;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Sanitize input object to prevent prototype pollution
+ *
+ * Security: Prevents prototype pollution attacks
+ * - Strips __proto__, constructor, prototype keys
+ * - Deep clones to avoid mutations
+ * - Handles nested objects and arrays
+ *
+ * Reference: OWASP Prototype Pollution Prevention
+ *
+ * @param {*} obj - Object to sanitize
+ * @returns {*} Clean copy with dangerous keys removed
+ */
+export function sanitizeInput(obj) {
+  // Handle non-objects (primitives, null, undefined)
+  if (obj === null || typeof obj !== "object") {
+    return obj;
+  }
+
+  // Handle arrays
+  if (Array.isArray(obj)) {
+    return obj.map((item) => sanitizeInput(item));
+  }
+
+  // Handle objects - create clean copy
+  const sanitized = {};
+
+  for (const key in obj) {
+    // Skip prototype pollution vectors
+    if (key === "__proto__" || key === "constructor" || key === "prototype") {
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    // Recursively sanitize nested values
+    if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(obj, key)) {
+      sanitized[key] = sanitizeInput(obj[key]);
+    }
+  }
+
+  return sanitized;
+}