@mcsherrylabs/evolver-mcp 0.13.0 → 0.14.0

package/dist/content.js

@@ -1,215 +0,0 @@
-// The content cache is a SECOND non-signing verb family, alongside `claimIdentity` (SIGN-08): it
-// is a DIRECT node call through `NodeClient.postContent`/`getContentStream`, because the MCP holds
-// no key for the content it publishes or fetches — content is a loopback byte store on its OWN
-// listener (a different port from the chain API), and reaching that listener is the entire
-// authorization. Nothing is recorded in the session stores, no `txId` is returned, and nothing
-// reaches `evolver_submit`.
-//
-// The digest is NEVER trusted from the node: `sha256Hex` is computed locally over the exact
-// ORIGINAL bytes (never a base64 transport string), so a reader verifies against what the
-// PUBLISHER asserted, not against what the node claims (a node-trusted digest would verify the
-// node against itself — T-5-04).
-//
-// A GET that returns `null` is a DEFINITIVE negative ("no reachable holder had it" — the node
-// walked the overlay on a miss), NOT a throw: a throw is `unreachable` (transport failure), and
-// the two are never collapsed (Pitfall 3).
-//
-// ⚠️ READ GRANTS (#8). `access` is REQUIRED and never inferred: "open" sends no grant, "restricted"
-// sends `authorizedPrincipals` through the SDK's own grant header. Every malformed/blank/oversized
-// grant list is refused BEFORE the node is asked, so an intended restriction can never become an
-// open publish. The grant governs which authenticated remote peer NODE may read on the node's
-// peer route — not the MCP signer, not the trusted local listener this module talks to — and it
-// is a serving control, not encryption. Grants on identical bytes merge by union on the node, so a
-// narrower re-publication cannot retract an earlier wider one.
-//
-// ⚠️ BOUNDS. Everything is inline in model context, so both directions are capped at
-// `CONTENT_MAX_BYTES` of ORIGINAL bytes. An over-bound GET returns NO content: there is no preview
-// and no truncated object reported as complete. Streaming/range reads are a follow-up.
-import { ContentHttpError, isValidPrincipalName } from "@mcsherrylabs/evolver-client";
-import { unreachableFrom } from "./result.js";
-/** Inline bound on ORIGINAL (decoded) bytes, for both PUT and GET: 256 KiB. */
-export const CONTENT_MAX_BYTES = 262_144;
-/** Longest canonical base64 accepted/returned for `CONTENT_MAX_BYTES` bytes (349 528 chars). */
-export const CONTENT_MAX_BASE64_CHARS = 4 * Math.ceil(CONTENT_MAX_BYTES / 3);
-/** Most principal names one restricted publication may grant. */
-export const CONTENT_MAX_PRINCIPALS = 32;
-/** SHA-256 of the given bytes, hex-encoded. Computed locally via Web Crypto — never trusted from
- *  the node (T-5-04). */
-export async function sha256Hex(bytes) {
-    const d = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-256", new Uint8Array(bytes));
-    return Array.from(new Uint8Array(d))
-        .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))
-        .join("");
-}
-export const OPEN_NOTE = "OPEN: any peer node that can reach this node's content peer route and knows the key may read it. " +
-    "Not encryption; there is no retraction.";
-export const RESTRICTED_NOTE = "RESTRICTED: remote reads are served only to authenticated peer NODES matching a granted identity, " +
-    "or currently in/owning a granted group. The trusted local content listener is NOT restricted, the " +
-    "storage operator and prior recipients are not excluded, and grants on identical bytes merge by union — " +
-    "an earlier open or wider publication is not narrowed. Not encryption, not an availability guarantee.";
-/** Canonical, padded, standard-alphabet base64 — no whitespace, no URL-safe alphabet. */
-const BASE64 = /^(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{4})*(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{2}==|[A-Za-z0-9+/]{3}=)?$/;
-/** A lone UTF-16 surrogate cannot be UTF-8 encoded losslessly (TextEncoder writes U+FFFD). */
-const LONE_SURROGATE = /[\uD800-\uDBFF](?![\uDC00-\uDFFF])|(?<![\uD800-\uDBFF])[\uDC00-\uDFFF]/;
-/** The access the caller DELIBERATELY asked for, or a refusal. Nothing is trimmed, filtered or
- *  defaulted: an entry the node would reinterpret (blank, whitespace, comma-joined) is refused,
- *  because the alternative is publishing to a set the caller did not name. */
-export function parseAccess(access, grants) {
-    if (access === "open") {
-        if (grants !== undefined)
-            return { kind: "partial", what: "authorizedPrincipals",
-                cause: 'access "open" takes no authorizedPrincipals — use access "restricted" to grant read access' };
-        return { mode: "open" };
-    }
-    if (access !== "restricted")
-        return { kind: "partial", what: "access",
-            cause: 'say access "open" (any peer with the key may read) or "restricted" (with authorizedPrincipals) — it is never inferred' };
-    if (!Array.isArray(grants) || grants.length === 0)
-        return { kind: "partial", what: "authorizedPrincipals",
-            cause: 'access "restricted" needs a non-empty list of identity/group names — nothing was published' };
-    if (grants.length > CONTENT_MAX_PRINCIPALS)
-        return { kind: "partial", what: "authorizedPrincipals",
-            cause: `at most ${CONTENT_MAX_PRINCIPALS} principals per publication — nothing was published` };
-    const principals = [];
-    for (const g of grants) {
-        if (typeof g !== "string" || !isValidPrincipalName(g))
-            return { kind: "partial", what: "authorizedPrincipals",
-                cause: `${JSON.stringify(g).slice(0, 80)} is not a principal name (1-128 of A-Z a-z 0-9 . _ -, no spaces or commas) — nothing was published` };
-        if (!principals.includes(g))
-            principals.push(g);
-    }
-    return { mode: "restricted", principals };
-}
-/** The ORIGINAL bytes to publish from exactly one of `text` / `base64`, or a refusal. */
-function parsePayload(text, base64) {
-    if ((text === undefined) === (base64 === undefined))
-        return { kind: "partial", what: "content", cause: "give exactly one of `text` (UTF-8) or `base64` (binary)" };
-    if (text !== undefined) {
-        if (typeof text !== "string" || text.trim().length === 0)
-            return { kind: "partial", what: "text", cause: "publishing empty content is refused — write something first" };
-        if (LONE_SURROGATE.test(text))
-            return { kind: "partial", what: "text", cause: "text contains an unpaired surrogate that UTF-8 cannot carry losslessly — use `base64`" };
-        const bytes = new TextEncoder().encode(text);
-        if (bytes.length > CONTENT_MAX_BYTES)
-            return { kind: "partial", what: "text", cause: `${bytes.length} UTF-8 bytes exceeds the ${CONTENT_MAX_BYTES}-byte inline bound` };
-        return { bytes, encoding: "text" };
-    }
-    if (typeof base64 !== "string" || base64.length === 0)
-        return { kind: "partial", what: "base64", cause: "publishing empty content is refused — give non-empty base64" };
-    if (base64.length > CONTENT_MAX_BASE64_CHARS)
-        return { kind: "partial", what: "base64",
-            cause: `${base64.length} base64 characters exceeds the ${CONTENT_MAX_BASE64_CHARS}-character bound (${CONTENT_MAX_BYTES} bytes)` };
-    const buf = BASE64.test(base64) ? Buffer.from(base64, "base64") : undefined;
-    // Round-trip equality rejects non-zero pad bits, so exactly one string names each byte sequence.
-    if (buf === undefined || buf.toString("base64") !== base64)
-        return { kind: "partial", what: "base64",
-            cause: "not canonical standard base64 (A-Z a-z 0-9 + /, `=` padding, no whitespace or URL-safe alphabet)" };
-    if (buf.length > CONTENT_MAX_BYTES)
-        return { kind: "partial", what: "base64", cause: `${buf.length} bytes exceeds the ${CONTENT_MAX_BYTES}-byte inline bound` };
-    return { bytes: new Uint8Array(buf), encoding: "base64" };
-}
-/** Publish text or binary to the content cache (READ-11, #8). `access` must be stated; a
- *  restricted publication forwards its grants through the SDK's `authorizedPrincipals`. Every
- *  refusal happens BEFORE any call. A node answer that is not 201 (e.g. HTTP 400 for an unknown
- *  principal) is `partial publish` naming the node's answer — never `ok`, and never retried open;
- *  a transport throw is `unreachable`. */
-export async function publishBytes(deps, req) {
-    const access = parseAccess(req.access, req.authorizedPrincipals);
-    if ("kind" in access)
-        return access;
-    const payload = parsePayload(req.text, req.base64);
-    if ("kind" in payload)
-        return payload;
-    const { bytes, encoding } = payload;
-    let r;
-    let sha256;
-    try {
-        sha256 = await sha256Hex(bytes);
-        r = access.mode === "restricted"
-            ? await deps.client.postContent(bytes, { authorizedPrincipals: access.principals })
-            : await deps.client.postContent(bytes);
-    }
-    catch (e) {
-        const message = e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e);
-        const status = e instanceof ContentHttpError ? String(e.status) : /^postContent(?:Stream)?: HTTP (\d{3})\b/.exec(message)?.[1];
-        if (status === undefined)
-            return unreachableFrom(e, deps.contentUrl);
-        return {
-            kind: "partial",
-            what: "publish",
-            cause: status.startsWith("4")
-                ? `the content node refused it (${message}) — nothing was stored; an unknown principal name is answered HTTP 400. Not retried, never re-sent open.`
-                : `the content node answered ${message} — NOT a successful publication, and storage is unconfirmed. Not retried.`,
-        };
-    }
-    if (r.size !== bytes.length)
-        return { kind: "partial", what: "publish",
-            cause: `the node reported ${r.size} bytes for key ${r.key} but ${bytes.length} were sent — treat this publication as unverified` };
-    return {
-        kind: "ok",
-        value: access.mode === "restricted"
-            ? { key: r.key, size: bytes.length, sha256, encoding, access: "restricted", authorizedPrincipals: access.principals, note: RESTRICTED_NOTE }
-            : { key: r.key, size: bytes.length, sha256, encoding, access: "open", note: OPEN_NOTE },
-    };
-}
-/** Fetch content from the cache by key (READ-10, #8), returning the COMPLETE object as strict
- *  UTF-8 `text` (default) or `base64` of the actual bytes. Empty/blank key or unknown encoding is
- *  refused locally BEFORE any call. `null` is the DEFINITIVE negative (Pitfall 3); a throw or a
- *  short/overlong transfer is `unreachable`. Over `CONTENT_MAX_BYTES`, or not valid UTF-8 in text
- *  mode, answers `partial` with NO content — never a preview, never a lossy decode. */
-export async function fetchBytes(deps, key, encoding = "text") {
-    const k = String(key ?? "").trim();
-    if (k.length === 0)
-        return { kind: "partial", what: "key", cause: "which content? a non-empty key is required" };
-    if (encoding !== "text" && encoding !== "base64")
-        return { kind: "partial", what: "encoding", cause: 'encoding is "text" (strict UTF-8) or "base64"' };
-    let bytes;
-    try {
-        const got = await deps.client.getContentStream(k);
-        if (got === null)
-            return { kind: "ok", value: null };
-        if (got.size > CONTENT_MAX_BYTES) {
-            await got.stream.cancel().catch(() => undefined);
-            return { kind: "partial", what: "content",
-                cause: `the object is ${got.size} bytes, over the ${CONTENT_MAX_BYTES}-byte inline bound — nothing returned (no preview); streaming/range reads are not exposed` };
-        }
-        const reader = got.stream.getReader();
-        const parts = [];
-        let total = 0;
-        for (;;) {
-            const { done, value } = await reader.read();
-            if (done)
-                break;
-            total += value.length;
-            if (total > got.size) {
-                await reader.cancel().catch(() => undefined);
-                throw new Error(`content transfer overran its declared ${got.size} bytes — discarded`);
-            }
-            parts.push(value);
-        }
-        // The SDK errors the stream on a short read, so reaching here means exactly `got.size` bytes.
-        bytes = new Uint8Array(total);
-        let off = 0;
-        for (const p of parts) {
-            bytes.set(p, off);
-            off += p.length;
-        }
-    }
-    catch (e) {
-        return unreachableFrom(e, deps.contentUrl);
-    }
-    const sha256 = await sha256Hex(bytes);
-    if (encoding === "base64")
-        return { kind: "ok", value: { key: k, size: bytes.length, sha256, complete: true, encoding: "base64", base64: Buffer.from(bytes).toString("base64") } };
-    let text;
-    try {
-        // fatal: refuse rather than substitute U+FFFD; ignoreBOM: keep a leading BOM as content.
-        text = new TextDecoder("utf-8", { fatal: true, ignoreBOM: true }).decode(bytes);
-    }
-    catch {
-        return { kind: "partial", what: "text",
-            cause: `the object (${bytes.length} bytes, sha256 ${sha256}) is not valid UTF-8 — nothing lossy is returned; fetch with encoding "base64"` };
-    }
-    return { kind: "ok", value: { key: k, size: bytes.length, sha256, complete: true, encoding: "text", text } };
-}
-//# sourceMappingURL=content.js.map

package/dist/content.js.map

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package/dist/group-ownership.d.ts

@@ -1,78 +0,0 @@
-import type { Signer } from "@mcsherrylabs/evolver-client";
-import type { ChainReads } from "./read.js";
-import type { ToolResult } from "./result.js";
-import type { SignedGroup } from "./write.js";
-export interface OwnershipDeps {
-    readonly identity: string;
-    readonly signer: Signer;
-    readonly reads: ChainReads;
-}
-/** Rounds of life for a two-party transfer. Longer than `DEFAULT_TTL_OFFSET` (50, sized for no
- *  human wait) because a second party must act, but never beyond the node's default
- *  `max-ttl-offset` (RoutingConfig.DefaultMaxTtlOffset = 100): a longer ttl is `ttl_too_far`, and
- *  a long-lived co-signed envelope is a bearer artefact. The default stays 10 rounds inside that
- *  bound so the two parties' nodes may disagree slightly about the tip. Expiry is final. */
-export declare const OWNERSHIP_TTL_MAX = 100;
-export declare const OWNERSHIP_TTL_DEFAULT = 90;
-/** The one key type whose consent can be verified with a published SDK primitive. */
-export declare const CONSENT_KEY_TYPE = "Ed25519";
-export declare const INTENT_KIND = "evolver.group_ownership_intent.v1";
-export declare const CONSENT_KIND = "evolver.group_ownership_consent.v1";
-declare const PURPOSE = "AUTHORIZE";
-export interface OwnershipIntent {
-    readonly kind: typeof INTENT_KIND;
-    readonly txId: string;
-    readonly ledgerId: string;
-    readonly groupName: string;
-    readonly outgoingOwner: string;
-    readonly incomingOwner: string;
-    readonly expiresAtRound: number;
-    readonly preparedAtRound: number;
-    readonly maxToll: "0";
-    readonly next: string;
-}
-export interface OwnershipConsent {
-    readonly kind: typeof CONSENT_KIND;
-    readonly txId: string;
-    readonly ledgerId: string;
-    readonly groupName: string;
-    readonly outgoingOwner: string;
-    readonly incomingOwner: string;
-    readonly expiresAtRound: number;
-    readonly maxToll: "0";
-    readonly auth: {
-        readonly nodeId: string;
-        readonly keyType: string;
-        readonly keyLabel: string;
-        readonly purpose: typeof PURPOSE;
-        readonly signatureHex: string;
-    };
-    readonly next: string;
-}
-/**
- * PREPARE (outgoing owner). Signs nothing; returns the public intent for the incoming owner.
- */
-export declare function prepareOwnershipTransfer(deps: OwnershipDeps, params: {
-    groupName: unknown;
-    incomingOwner: unknown;
-    ttlRounds?: unknown;
-}): Promise<ToolResult<OwnershipIntent>>;
-/**
- * CONSENT (incoming owner). Recomputes the intent's txId and signs it with THIS session's key.
- */
-export declare function consentOwnershipTransfer(deps: OwnershipDeps, params: {
-    txId: unknown;
-    groupName: unknown;
-    outgoingOwner: unknown;
-    incomingOwner: unknown;
-    expiresAtRound: unknown;
-}): Promise<ToolResult<OwnershipConsent>>;
-/**
- * FINALIZE (outgoing owner). Verifies the consent, signs as sender, assembles both auths, records.
- */
-export declare function finalizeOwnershipTransfer(deps: OwnershipDeps, params: {
-    txId: unknown;
-    consent: unknown;
-}): Promise<ToolResult<SignedGroup>>;
-export {};
-//# sourceMappingURL=group-ownership.d.ts.map

package/dist/group-ownership.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
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package/dist/group-ownership.js

@@ -1,324 +0,0 @@
-// Group OWNERSHIP transfer (issue #9) — a two-party prepare → consent → finalize → submit workflow.
-// NOT a credit transfer: `evolver_sign_transfer_many` moves credit; this hands a group to a new owner.
-//
-// The chain applies `TransferGroupOwnershipTxBody` only when the SignedTx carries an auth whose
-// `node_id` is the incoming owner (GroupLedgerOrchestrator.applyTransferOwnership), and admission
-// verifies EVERY auth against the named identity's REGISTERED (node_id, key_type, key_label) key
-// over the same auth-free digest (BlockPayloadValidator.admitFilter / resolveAuths). So:
-//
-//   1. PREPARE  (outgoing owner's session) — composes the intent with the SDK body composer and the
-//      SDK canonical digest. Signs NOTHING and records no bytes, so `evolver_submit` cannot find it.
-//   2. CONSENT  (incoming owner's session, its own host-held key) — recomputes the digest from the
-//      structured intent, refuses a mismatching txId, signs the digest with ITS signer and returns
-//      one public auth. It never holds a submittable envelope.
-//   3. FINALIZE (outgoing owner's session) — re-reads the chain, verifies the consent signature
-//      against the incoming owner's REGISTERED key, then signs as sender and assembles BOTH auths
-//      with the SDK `encodeSignedTx`. Recorded once, strictly, by id.
-//   4. `evolver_submit` — the ordinary path and its guards, unchanged.
-//
-// ⚠️ THE txId IS AUTH-FREE. SDK `txId` = node `signingMaterial` = SHA-256 over the tx-auth tag,
-// ledger, sender, ttl, body hash and maxToll — no auths (SignedTxOps.txId, signed_tx.proto). So the
-// prepared id, the consented id and the submitted id are one value; finalize re-derives and checks
-// it rather than assuming.
-//
-// ⚠️ ONLY Ed25519 CONSENT IS ACCEPTED BY THIS WORKFLOW. Verifying before assembly is the point;
-// a BLS consent remains refused locally, never assembled blind or verified by a hand-rolled
-// pairing check. Published SDK 0.22.0 `edVerify` uses strict RFC 8032 verification (`zip215:false`),
-// matching the node's strict Ed25519 mode rather than the former permissive ZIP215 behavior.
-// This dependency update does not broaden accepted consent algorithms or remove local guards.
-//
-// ⚠️ KEY MATERIAL NEVER ENTERS OR LEAVES. Arguments and results carry names, the digest-bound
-// intent, key type/label and the single consent signature; never a private key or signed envelope.
-//
-// ⚠️ THE CONSENT IS SAFE TO HAND OVER ONLY ON A NODE THAT REQUIRES THE SENDER'S OWN AUTH. Before
-// the #9 node fix, admission/validation/apply accepted ANY verified auth, so the incoming owner's
-// consent alone was a submittable transfer "from" the outgoing owner: a bearer artefact that seized
-// the group and charged a sender who never signed. Every step therefore refuses unless the
-// connected node's /status says `senderAuthorizationRequired: true` (SDK `nodeStatus`). That is
-// the connected node's assertion only: the whole chain must run compatible nodes (a deployment
-// prerequisite, not something this process can verify), and the canonical digest has no chain id,
-// so a consent remains replayable on another chain with the same names/keys until it expires.
-import { LEDGER, encodeSignedTx, txId as txDigest, transferGroupOwnershipBody, isValidGroupName, isValidNodeId, hexToBytes, edVerify, edSpkiToRaw, } from "@mcsherrylabs/evolver-client";
-import { recordAssembledOnce, recordPendingOwnership, pendingOwnershipById, dropPendingOwnership, pruneExpiredPendingOwnership, recordedById, namedInRefusal, MAX_PENDING_OWNERSHIP, } from "./write.js";
-/** Rounds of life for a two-party transfer. Longer than `DEFAULT_TTL_OFFSET` (50, sized for no
- *  human wait) because a second party must act, but never beyond the node's default
- *  `max-ttl-offset` (RoutingConfig.DefaultMaxTtlOffset = 100): a longer ttl is `ttl_too_far`, and
- *  a long-lived co-signed envelope is a bearer artefact. The default stays 10 rounds inside that
- *  bound so the two parties' nodes may disagree slightly about the tip. Expiry is final. */
-export const OWNERSHIP_TTL_MAX = 100;
-export const OWNERSHIP_TTL_DEFAULT = 90;
-/** The one key type whose consent can be verified with a published SDK primitive. */
-export const CONSENT_KEY_TYPE = "Ed25519";
-export const INTENT_KIND = "evolver.group_ownership_intent.v1";
-export const CONSENT_KIND = "evolver.group_ownership_consent.v1";
-const PURPOSE = "AUTHORIZE"; // TxAuth.purpose default; encodeSignedTx writes no other.
-const MAX_LABEL = 128;
-const refuse = (what, cause) => ({ kind: "partial", what, cause });
-const unreachable = (e) => ({ kind: "unreachable", chain: "", cause: e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e) });
-const hex = (b) => Buffer.from(b).toString("hex");
-const str = (v) => (typeof v === "string" ? v.trim() : "");
-/** The canonical digest (== txId) for one transfer intent, from the SDK composer and SDK digest.
- *  maxToll is 0: the groups ledger charges no toll and this workflow consents to none. */
-function digestFor(outgoing, groupName, incoming, ttl) {
-    const body = transferGroupOwnershipBody({ groupName, newOwnerNodeId: incoming });
-    return { body, digest: txDigest(LEDGER.groups, outgoing, ttl, body, 0n) };
-}
-/** Refusals shared by every step, before any read: names and the outgoing/incoming distinction. */
-function validNames(groupName, outgoing, incoming) {
-    if (!isValidGroupName(groupName))
-        return refuse("groupName", "not a valid group name");
-    if (!isValidNodeId(outgoing))
-        return refuse("outgoingOwner", "not a valid identity id");
-    if (!isValidNodeId(incoming))
-        return refuse("incomingOwner", "not a valid identity id");
-    if (outgoing === incoming)
-        return refuse("incomingOwner", "the incoming owner equals the outgoing owner — the chain fines that rather than refusing it");
-    return null;
-}
-/** Chain facts the chain will itself enforce at apply (a mismatch is a FINE, too late to refuse):
- *  the group's committed owner, and that the incoming owner is an existing identity, not a group. */
-async function checkChainFacts(reads, groupName, outgoing, incoming) {
-    try {
-        const listed = (await reads.listGroups()).find((g) => g.ledgerId === groupName);
-        if (listed === undefined)
-            return { kind: "not_found", what: `group "${groupName}"` };
-        if (listed.owner !== outgoing)
-            return refuse("outgoingOwner", `group "${groupName}" is owned by "${listed.owner}" at the node's applied state, not "${outgoing}"`);
-        if ((await reads.getGroup(incoming)) !== null)
-            return refuse("incomingOwner", `"${incoming}" is a group; only an identity can own a group`);
-        if ((await reads.getIdentity(incoming)) === null)
-            return { kind: "not_found", what: `identity "${incoming}" (incoming owner)` };
-    }
-    catch (e) {
-        return unreachable(e);
-    }
-    return null;
-}
-/** Freshness under the chain's own admit rule: `tip < ttl <= tip + max-ttl-offset`. */
-function checkFresh(tip, expiresAtRound) {
-    if (expiresAtRound <= tip)
-        return refuse("expiresAtRound", `expired: round ${expiresAtRound} is not after the current round ${tip}. Expiry is final; prepare a NEW transfer (a new txId) rather than reusing this one`);
-    if (expiresAtRound - tip > OWNERSHIP_TTL_MAX)
-        return refuse("expiresAtRound", `round ${expiresAtRound} is more than ${OWNERSHIP_TTL_MAX} rounds after the current round ${tip}; refused as over-long`);
-    return null;
-}
-/** The incoming owner's REGISTERED key for (identity, Ed25519, label), raw 32 bytes. Knowing a
- *  public key is not authority; only the chain's registration of it for this identity is. */
-async function registeredEdKey(reads, who, keyLabel) {
-    let rows;
-    try {
-        rows = await reads.getIdentityKeys(who);
-    }
-    catch (e) {
-        return unreachable(e);
-    }
-    if (rows === null)
-        return { kind: "not_found", what: `identity "${who}"` };
-    const match = rows.filter((r) => r.keyType === CONSENT_KEY_TYPE && r.label === keyLabel);
-    if (match.length !== 1)
-        return refuse("consent.auth", `"${who}" has no single registered ${CONSENT_KEY_TYPE} key labelled "${keyLabel}" at the node's applied state (unknown_key on chain)`);
-    try {
-        return edSpkiToRaw(hexToBytes(match[0].publicKeyHex));
-    }
-    catch {
-        return refuse("consent.auth", `the registered ${CONSENT_KEY_TYPE} key for "${who}" is not a recognisable Ed25519 public key`);
-    }
-}
-/** Fail closed unless the CONNECTED node states it requires the sender's own AUTHORIZE auth.
- *  Absent/null/false/non-boolean is unsupported (`partial`); a failed read is `unreachable`. */
-async function requireSenderAuthorizationNode(reads) {
-    let flag;
-    try {
-        flag = (await reads.nodeStatus()).senderAuthorizationRequired;
-    }
-    catch (e) {
-        return unreachable(e);
-    }
-    if (flag === true)
-        return null;
-    return refuse("node", "the connected node does not advertise senderAuthorizationRequired: true. On such a node the " +
-        "incoming owner's consent alone could be submitted as a transfer the outgoing owner never signed, " +
-        "so nothing is prepared, signed or returned. Use a node (and a chain) running the sender-authorization fix.");
-}
-async function tip(reads) {
-    try {
-        return await reads.currentRound();
-    }
-    catch (e) {
-        return unreachable(e);
-    }
-}
-/**
- * PREPARE (outgoing owner). Signs nothing; returns the public intent for the incoming owner.
- */
-export async function prepareOwnershipTransfer(deps, params) {
-    const groupName = str(params.groupName), incoming = str(params.incomingOwner), outgoing = deps.identity;
-    const bad = validNames(groupName, outgoing, incoming);
-    if (bad)
-        return bad;
-    const ttlRounds = params.ttlRounds === undefined ? OWNERSHIP_TTL_DEFAULT : params.ttlRounds;
-    if (typeof ttlRounds !== "number" || !Number.isSafeInteger(ttlRounds) || ttlRounds < 1 || ttlRounds > OWNERSHIP_TTL_MAX)
-        return refuse("ttlRounds", `must be an integer 1..${OWNERSHIP_TTL_MAX} (the node's default max-ttl-offset)`);
-    const policy = await requireSenderAuthorizationNode(deps.reads);
-    if (policy)
-        return policy;
-    const facts = await checkChainFacts(deps.reads, groupName, outgoing, incoming);
-    if (facts)
-        return facts;
-    const now = await tip(deps.reads);
-    if (typeof now !== "number")
-        return now;
-    const expiresAtRound = now + ttlRounds;
-    const id = hex(digestFor(outgoing, groupName, incoming, expiresAtRound).digest);
-    const fields = { ledgerId: LEDGER.groups, groupName, outgoingOwner: outgoing, incomingOwner: incoming, maxToll: "0" };
-    const pending = {
-        txId: id, expiresAtRound, preparedAtRound: now, verb: "group_ownership_transfer_pending", fields,
-        summary: { sender: outgoing, ...fields },
-        status: "awaiting incoming-owner consent: NOT signed by this session and NOT submittable",
-    };
-    if (recordedById(id) !== undefined || pendingOwnershipById(id) !== undefined)
-        return refuse("txId", `transfer ${id} is already prepared or finalized in this session`);
-    pruneExpiredPendingOwnership(now);
-    if (!recordPendingOwnership(pending))
-        return refuse("pending", `at most ${MAX_PENDING_OWNERSHIP} prepared transfers may await consent per session`);
-    return {
-        kind: "ok",
-        value: {
-            kind: INTENT_KIND, txId: id, ...fields, maxToll: "0", expiresAtRound, preparedAtRound: now,
-            next: `Send these public fields to "${incoming}". Their own MCP session calls evolver_group_ownership_consent ` +
-                `with them; then call evolver_group_ownership_finalize here with the returned consent before round ${expiresAtRound}.`,
-        },
-    };
-}
-/**
- * CONSENT (incoming owner). Recomputes the intent's txId and signs it with THIS session's key.
- */
-export async function consentOwnershipTransfer(deps, params) {
-    const groupName = str(params.groupName), outgoing = str(params.outgoingOwner), incoming = str(params.incomingOwner);
-    const claimedId = str(params.txId).toLowerCase();
-    const expiresAtRound = params.expiresAtRound;
-    if (incoming !== deps.identity)
-        return refuse("incomingOwner", `this session signs as "${deps.identity}", not "${incoming || "(empty)"}"; only the incoming owner's own session can consent`);
-    const bad = validNames(groupName, outgoing, incoming);
-    if (bad)
-        return bad;
-    if (typeof expiresAtRound !== "number" || !Number.isSafeInteger(expiresAtRound) || expiresAtRound < 1)
-        return refuse("expiresAtRound", "must be a positive integer round");
-    if (!/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(claimedId))
-        return refuse("txId", "must be the 64-character hex txId from the intent");
-    if (deps.signer.keyType !== CONSENT_KEY_TYPE)
-        return refuse("signer", `this session's key is ${deps.signer.keyType}; the outgoing owner can verify only ${CONSENT_KEY_TYPE} consent ` +
-            `(SDK 0.21.0 exports no BLS verify). Use a session configured with this identity's registered Ed25519 key (EVOLVER_KEY_TYPE=ed25519). Nothing was signed.`);
-    const { digest } = digestFor(outgoing, groupName, incoming, expiresAtRound);
-    if (hex(digest) !== claimedId)
-        return refuse("txId", `the intent's txId ${namedInRefusal(claimedId)} does not match the transfer these fields describe; nothing was signed`);
-    // Before signing: an old node would let this consent stand alone as the sender's transfer.
-    const policy = await requireSenderAuthorizationNode(deps.reads);
-    if (policy)
-        return policy;
-    const now = await tip(deps.reads);
-    if (typeof now !== "number")
-        return now;
-    const stale = checkFresh(now, expiresAtRound);
-    if (stale)
-        return stale;
-    const facts = await checkChainFacts(deps.reads, groupName, outgoing, incoming);
-    if (facts)
-        return facts;
-    // The configured key must be the one the chain will verify against: sign, then check our own
-    // signature against the registered key, so a wrong key file fails here rather than at admit.
-    const pub = await registeredEdKey(deps.reads, incoming, deps.signer.keyLabel);
-    if (!(pub instanceof Uint8Array))
-        return pub;
-    const signature = deps.signer.sign(digest);
-    if (!edVerify(digest, signature, pub))
-        return refuse("signer", `this session's Ed25519 key is not the key registered for "${incoming}"; the consent was discarded`);
-    return {
-        kind: "ok",
-        value: {
-            kind: CONSENT_KIND, txId: claimedId, ledgerId: LEDGER.groups, groupName, outgoingOwner: outgoing,
-            incomingOwner: incoming, expiresAtRound, maxToll: "0",
-            auth: { nodeId: incoming, keyType: deps.signer.keyType, keyLabel: deps.signer.keyLabel, purpose: PURPOSE, signatureHex: hex(signature) },
-            next: `Return this consent to "${outgoing}". It authorizes ONLY txId ${claimedId}, which expires at round ` +
-                `${expiresAtRound}; it does not submit anything and cannot be used for any other operation.`,
-        },
-    };
-}
-/**
- * FINALIZE (outgoing owner). Verifies the consent, signs as sender, assembles both auths, records.
- */
-export async function finalizeOwnershipTransfer(deps, params) {
-    const id = str(params.txId).toLowerCase();
-    if (recordedById(id) !== undefined)
-        return refuse("txId", `transfer ${namedInRefusal(id)} is already finalized in this session; submit or reconcile that id, never finalize again`);
-    const pending = pendingOwnershipById(id);
-    if (pending === undefined)
-        return refuse("txId", `no transfer ${namedInRefusal(id)} was prepared by this session; only a transfer prepared here can be finalized`);
-    const f = pending.fields;
-    if (f.outgoingOwner !== deps.identity)
-        return refuse("txId", "prepared for a different sender");
-    // The consent must describe exactly the prepared intent — every field, not just the id.
-    const c = (typeof params.consent === "object" && params.consent !== null ? params.consent : {});
-    const a = (typeof c["auth"] === "object" && c["auth"] !== null ? c["auth"] : {});
-    if (c["kind"] !== CONSENT_KIND)
-        return refuse("consent.kind", `must be "${CONSENT_KIND}"`);
-    // Hex case carries no meaning; compare the canonical lowercase form (the id is already lowercase).
-    const consentId = typeof c["txId"] === "string" ? c["txId"].trim().toLowerCase() : c["txId"];
-    const mismatch = [
-        ["txId", consentId, id], ["ledgerId", c["ledgerId"], f.ledgerId], ["groupName", c["groupName"], f.groupName],
-        ["outgoingOwner", c["outgoingOwner"], f.outgoingOwner], ["incomingOwner", c["incomingOwner"], f.incomingOwner],
-        ["expiresAtRound", c["expiresAtRound"], pending.expiresAtRound], ["maxToll", c["maxToll"], f.maxToll],
-        ["auth.nodeId", a["nodeId"], f.incomingOwner], ["auth.purpose", a["purpose"], PURPOSE],
-    ].find(([, got, want]) => got !== want);
-    if (mismatch)
-        return refuse(`consent.${mismatch[0]}`, "does not match the prepared transfer (wrong intent, principal or purpose); nothing was signed");
-    const keyType = a["keyType"], keyLabel = a["keyLabel"], sigHex = a["signatureHex"];
-    if (keyType !== CONSENT_KEY_TYPE)
-        return refuse("consent.auth.keyType", `only ${CONSENT_KEY_TYPE} consent can be verified (SDK 0.21.0 exports no BLS verify); nothing was signed`);
-    if (typeof keyLabel !== "string" || keyLabel.length > MAX_LABEL)
-        return refuse("consent.auth.keyLabel", "must be a string of at most 128 characters");
-    if (typeof sigHex !== "string" || !/^[0-9a-f]{128}$/.test(sigHex))
-        return refuse("consent.auth.signatureHex", "must be a 64-byte Ed25519 signature as lowercase hex");
-    // Re-derive the digest from the prepared fields with the SDK: the id must still be the intent.
-    const { body, digest } = digestFor(f.outgoingOwner, f.groupName, f.incomingOwner, pending.expiresAtRound);
-    if (hex(digest) !== id)
-        return refuse("txId", "the prepared fields no longer derive this txId; refused");
-    // Rechecked at finalization: the session may now be pointed at (or answered by) an older node.
-    const policy = await requireSenderAuthorizationNode(deps.reads);
-    if (policy)
-        return policy;
-    const now = await tip(deps.reads);
-    if (typeof now !== "number")
-        return now;
-    const stale = checkFresh(now, pending.expiresAtRound);
-    if (stale)
-        return stale;
-    const facts = await checkChainFacts(deps.reads, f.groupName, f.outgoingOwner, f.incomingOwner);
-    if (facts)
-        return facts;
-    const pub = await registeredEdKey(deps.reads, f.incomingOwner, keyLabel);
-    if (!(pub instanceof Uint8Array))
-        return pub;
-    if (!edVerify(digest, hexToBytes(sigHex), pub))
-        return refuse("consent.auth.signatureHex", `does not verify for txId ${id} under "${f.incomingOwner}"'s registered ${CONSENT_KEY_TYPE} key; nothing was signed`);
-    // Verified. Sign as sender (empty node_id ⇒ the sender) and assemble with the SDK encoder.
-    const auths = [
-        { keyType: deps.signer.keyType, keyLabel: deps.signer.keyLabel, nodeId: "", signature: deps.signer.sign(digest) },
-        { keyType: CONSENT_KEY_TYPE, keyLabel, nodeId: f.incomingOwner, signature: hexToBytes(sigHex) },
-    ];
-    const bytes = encodeSignedTx({ ledgerId: LEDGER.groups, senderNodeId: f.outgoingOwner, body, ttlRound: pending.expiresAtRound, auths, maxToll: 0n });
-    const fields = {
-        groupName: f.groupName, outgoingOwner: f.outgoingOwner, incomingOwner: f.incomingOwner, maxToll: "0",
-        outgoingAuth: `${f.outgoingOwner} ${deps.signer.keyType} label="${deps.signer.keyLabel}"`,
-        incomingAuth: `${f.incomingOwner} ${CONSENT_KEY_TYPE} label="${keyLabel}" (verified against registered key at round ${now})`,
-    };
-    const signed = {
-        txId: id, expiresAtRound: pending.expiresAtRound, signedAtRound: now, verb: "group_ownership_transfer",
-        fields, summary: { sender: f.outgoingOwner, ...fields },
-    };
-    if (!recordAssembledOnce(signed, bytes))
-        return refuse("txId", `transfer ${id} is already recorded in this session; nothing was replaced`);
-    dropPendingOwnership(id);
-    return { kind: "ok", value: signed };
-}
-//# sourceMappingURL=group-ownership.js.map