@mcsherrylabs/evolver-mcp 0.0.0-stage → 0.8.0

package/dist/cli.js

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+// Package `bin` entry (`evolver-mcp`). Thin dispatcher over the two faces of the program:
+//
+//   - `--bootstrap`                → the Phase 7 first-run bootstrap (mint/PoP/claim/register).
+//   - anything else                → the ordinary stdio MCP server (`main()` in index.ts).
+//
+// The reason this file exists (instead of naming dist/index.js as the bin) is package mode:
+// when the bootstrap runs out of a published install, the registration it derives must resolve
+// the PACKAGE (`npx -y @mcsherrylabs/evolver-mcp`), not a checkout realpath that a fresh box
+// never has. This wrapper injects `EVOLVER_MCP_ENTRY_COMMAND` before delegating so the bootstrap
+// emits a package-resolving registration, while the unchanged default (env unset) keeps the
+// checkout-entry form Phase 7 locked in.
+import { main } from "./index.js";
+import { hasBootstrapFlag, runBootstrap } from "./bootstrap.js";
+const PACKAGE_NAME = "@mcsherrylabs/evolver-mcp";
+const BOOTSTRAP_ENTRY_COMMAND = () => `npx -y ${PACKAGE_NAME}`;
+await (async () => {
+    if (hasBootstrapFlag(process.argv)) {
+        // Package mode: only if the operator has not already chosen an entry command, default the
+        // registration to `npx -y @mcsherrylabs/evolver-mcp` so the printed `claude mcp add` resolves
+        // the published package on the second launch.
+        const env = { ...process.env, EVOLVER_BOOTSTRAP_CWD: process.cwd() };
+        if (env.EVOLVER_MCP_ENTRY_COMMAND === undefined) {
+            env.EVOLVER_MCP_ENTRY_COMMAND = BOOTSTRAP_ENTRY_COMMAND();
+        }
+        const r = await runBootstrap(process.argv, env);
+        if (r.toStderr)
+            console.error(r.output);
+        else
+            process.stdout.write(r.output);
+        process.exit(r.exitCode);
+    }
+    await main();
+})();
+//# sourceMappingURL=cli.js.map

package/dist/cli.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/config.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+/** How to trust the endpoint. A node's own API presents a self-signed identity certificate; a
+ *  reverse proxy in front of one presents an ordinary trusted certificate. Both are real
+ *  deployments here, so this cannot be left unstated. */
+export interface TlsOptions {
+    readonly caFile?: string;
+    /** Accept a certificate that does not chain to a trusted root — for a node's own listener. */
+    readonly insecure?: boolean;
+}
+export interface EvolverConfig {
+    readonly url: string;
+    readonly identity: string;
+    readonly tls?: TlsOptions;
+    /** The event processor's read server endpoint (the inbox lives there, not on the node). The
+     *  processor is a SEPARATE process from the node this config's `url` points at, and it is
+     *  read-only and no-auth (FR-034): reaching it is the access control, and the MCP only ever
+     *  GETs `/inbox` and `/inbox/<ledgerId>`. It is OPTIONAL — an unset processor answers `inbox`
+     *  calls as `misconfigured`, never a guess. It widens NOTHING on the signing boundary: the
+     *  processor can never sign and never sees key material (T-6-01). */
+    readonly processorUrl?: string;
+}
+export type ConfigResult = {
+    readonly ok: true;
+    readonly config: EvolverConfig;
+} | {
+    readonly ok: false;
+    readonly error: string;
+};
+/** The default chain is a node on this host. Addressing a remote one is an explicit choice. */
+export declare const DEFAULT_URL = "http://127.0.0.1:8440";
+export declare const isLocal: (url: string) => boolean;
+/**
+ * Resolve the raw config file contents to a validated `EvolverConfig`.
+ *
+ * Pure: no filesystem, no environment. `loadConfig` does the reading and calls this.
+ */
+export declare function resolveConfig(raw: unknown): ConfigResult;
+/** Read the single config file and apply the rule. The only part that touches a filesystem. */
+export declare function loadConfig(path: string): ConfigResult;
+//# sourceMappingURL=config.d.ts.map

package/dist/config.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/config.js

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+// Configuration: the single explicit config file, and the rule that governs it.
+//
+// One file only — a spawned-per-session stdio server has no project directory to anchor a
+// two-file project/home precedence to (D-06). The file holds the node endpoint, the identity
+// name, and TLS trust — and NOTHING that could be key material (D-07). A config that names a key
+// is refused; reading a repository is never allowed to change which key signs.
+//
+// The rule is a PURE function (`resolveConfig`) with the file reading kept separate, so it can be
+// exercised without a filesystem. A rule only checked by hand on a real box is a rule that drifts.
+import { existsSync, readFileSync } from "node:fs";
+/** The default chain is a node on this host. Addressing a remote one is an explicit choice. */
+export const DEFAULT_URL = "http://127.0.0.1:8440";
+export const isLocal = (url) => {
+    try {
+        const h = new URL(url).hostname;
+        return h === "localhost" || h === "127.0.0.1" || h === "::1" || h === "[::1]";
+    }
+    catch {
+        return false;
+    }
+};
+const asRecord = (v) => typeof v === "object" && v !== null ? v : undefined;
+/** Keys that must never appear in the config file — a key path (or any other key-material
+ *  carrier) has no place in a committable file. Rejected outright, not ignored. */
+const FORBIDDEN_KEYS = ["keyLocation", "keyPath", "contentUrl"];
+/**
+ * Resolve the raw config file contents to a validated `EvolverConfig`.
+ *
+ * Pure: no filesystem, no environment. `loadConfig` does the reading and calls this.
+ */
+export function resolveConfig(raw) {
+    const r = asRecord(raw);
+    if (r === undefined)
+        return { ok: false, error: "configuration file must contain a JSON object" };
+    for (const key of FORBIDDEN_KEYS) {
+        if (r[key] !== undefined)
+            return { ok: false, error: "config must not carry key material" };
+    }
+    const identity = r["identity"];
+    if (typeof identity !== "string" || identity.length === 0)
+        return { ok: false, error: "configuration has no `identity` (a non-empty string is required)" };
+    const url = typeof r["url"] === "string" && r["url"].length > 0 ? r["url"] : DEFAULT_URL;
+    const tls = asRecord(r["tls"]);
+    // The processor URL is a distinct, OPTIONAL endpoint name (NOT a signing/content path), so it
+    // is never added to FORBIDDEN_KEYS. It is honoured only when present as a non-empty string;
+    // anything else is ignored (the inbox is optional and answers `misconfigured` per-call when
+    // unset, rather than failing config resolution).
+    const rawProcessorUrl = r["processorUrl"];
+    const trimmedProcessorUrl = typeof rawProcessorUrl === "string" ? rawProcessorUrl.trim() : "";
+    // Normalize so a trailing slash (or slashes) never yields a double-slash `/inbox` path that 404s
+    // as a misleading `unreachable` — mirroring the reference meerkatUrl's `replace(/\/$/, "")`.
+    const processorUrl = trimmedProcessorUrl.length > 0 ? trimmedProcessorUrl.replace(/\/+$/, "") : undefined;
+    return {
+        ok: true,
+        config: {
+            url,
+            identity,
+            ...(tls ? { tls } : {}),
+            ...(processorUrl ? { processorUrl } : {}),
+        },
+    };
+}
+const readJson = (file) => {
+    if (!existsSync(file))
+        return undefined;
+    try {
+        return JSON.parse(readFileSync(file, "utf8"));
+    }
+    catch {
+        return undefined;
+    }
+};
+/** Read the single config file and apply the rule. The only part that touches a filesystem. */
+export function loadConfig(path) {
+    return resolveConfig(readJson(path));
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=config.js.map

package/dist/config.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/content.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+import type { ToolResult } from "./result.js";
+/** Only what the content verbs need from a client. `NodeClient` satisfies it structurally, which
+ *  is what lets the rules be exercised against a fake — a rule only checked against a live node
+ *  is a rule that drifts. */
+export interface ContentClient {
+    postContent(bytes: Uint8Array, opts?: {
+        authorizedPrincipals?: string[];
+    }): Promise<{
+        key: string;
+        size: number;
+    }>;
+    getContent(key: string): Promise<Uint8Array | null>;
+}
+/** What the content verbs need from the world: the SEPARATE content client (built against
+ *  `contentBaseUrl`, never the chain client) plus that content endpoint name for refusals.
+ *  Injected so the whole flow is exercisable against a structural fake, exactly like `ChainReads`
+ *  (read.ts) and `ClaimFn` (claim.ts). */
+export interface ContentDeps {
+    readonly client: ContentClient;
+    readonly contentUrl: string;
+}
+/** What a successful publish answers: the node's key and size, plus a locally-computed sha256
+ *  over the exact published bytes. No `txId` — content has nothing to submit later. */
+export interface Published {
+    readonly key: string;
+    readonly size: number;
+    readonly sha256: string;
+}
+/** What a successful fetch answers: the key, size, locally-recomputed sha256, and the bytes
+ *  decoded to UTF-8 `text`. The raw `bytes` field is DROPPED — never surfaced to the model
+ *  (Pitfall 5). `null` is the DEFINITIVE "no reachable holder" negative (Pitfall 3). */
+export interface Fetched {
+    readonly key: string;
+    readonly size: number;
+    readonly sha256: string;
+    readonly text: string;
+}
+/** SHA-256 of the given bytes, hex-encoded. Computed locally via Web Crypto — never trusted from
+ *  the node (T-5-04). */
+export declare function sha256Hex(bytes: Uint8Array): Promise<string>;
+/** Publish UTF-8 text to the content cache (READ-11). OPEN-only publish for v1: no
+ *  `authorizedPrincipals` is exposed, closing the blank-grant-list footgun (Pitfall 4). Empty or
+ *  blank text is refused locally as `partial` BEFORE any call. Returns `{ key, size, sha256 }`
+ *  with the sha256 computed locally over the exact bytes published. */
+export declare function publishBytes(deps: ContentDeps, text: string): Promise<ToolResult<Published>>;
+/** Fetch content from the cache by key and decode it to text (READ-10). Empty/blank key refused
+ *  locally as `partial` BEFORE any call. A `null` from the SDK is the DEFINITIVE negative — no
+ *  reachable holder — surfaced as `ok { value: null }`, NOT `not_found` (Pitfall 3); a throw is
+ *  `unreachable`. Raw bytes are decoded to `text` and dropped (Pitfall 5). */
+export declare function fetchBytes(deps: ContentDeps, key: string): Promise<ToolResult<Fetched | null>>;
+//# sourceMappingURL=content.d.ts.map

package/dist/content.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/content.js

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+// The content cache is a SECOND non-signing verb family, alongside `claimIdentity` (SIGN-08): it
+// is a DIRECT node call through `NodeClient.postContent`/`getContent`, because the MCP holds no
+// key for the content it publishes or fetches — content is a loopback byte store on its OWN
+// listener (a different port from the chain API), and reaching that listener is the entire
+// authorization. Nothing is recorded in the session stores, no `txId` is returned, and nothing
+// reaches `evolver_submit`.
+//
+// The digest is NEVER trusted from the node: `sha256Hex` is computed locally over the exact
+// bytes, so a reader verifies against what the PUBLISHER asserted, not against what the node
+// claims (a node-trusted digest would verify the node against itself — T-5-04).
+//
+// A GET that returns `null` is a DEFINITIVE negative ("no reachable holder had it" — the node
+// walked the overlay on a miss), NOT a throw: a throw is `unreachable` (transport failure), and
+// the two are never collapsed (Pitfall 3).
+import { unreachableFrom } from "./result.js";
+/** SHA-256 of the given bytes, hex-encoded. Computed locally via Web Crypto — never trusted from
+ *  the node (T-5-04). */
+export async function sha256Hex(bytes) {
+    const d = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-256", new Uint8Array(bytes));
+    return Array.from(new Uint8Array(d))
+        .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))
+        .join("");
+}
+/** Publish UTF-8 text to the content cache (READ-11). OPEN-only publish for v1: no
+ *  `authorizedPrincipals` is exposed, closing the blank-grant-list footgun (Pitfall 4). Empty or
+ *  blank text is refused locally as `partial` BEFORE any call. Returns `{ key, size, sha256 }`
+ *  with the sha256 computed locally over the exact bytes published. */
+export async function publishBytes(deps, text) {
+    const textStr = String(text ?? "");
+    if (textStr.trim().length === 0)
+        return { kind: "partial", what: "text", cause: "publishing empty content is refused — write something first" };
+    const bytes = new TextEncoder().encode(textStr);
+    try {
+        const sha256 = await sha256Hex(bytes);
+        const r = await deps.client.postContent(bytes);
+        return { kind: "ok", value: { key: r.key, size: r.size, sha256 } };
+    }
+    catch (e) {
+        return unreachableFrom(e, deps.contentUrl);
+    }
+}
+/** Fetch content from the cache by key and decode it to text (READ-10). Empty/blank key refused
+ *  locally as `partial` BEFORE any call. A `null` from the SDK is the DEFINITIVE negative — no
+ *  reachable holder — surfaced as `ok { value: null }`, NOT `not_found` (Pitfall 3); a throw is
+ *  `unreachable`. Raw bytes are decoded to `text` and dropped (Pitfall 5). */
+export async function fetchBytes(deps, key) {
+    const k = String(key ?? "").trim();
+    if (k.length === 0)
+        return { kind: "partial", what: "key", cause: "which content? a non-empty key is required" };
+    try {
+        const bytes = await deps.client.getContent(k);
+        if (bytes === null)
+            return { kind: "ok", value: null };
+        return { kind: "ok", value: { key: k, size: bytes.length, sha256: await sha256Hex(bytes), text: new TextDecoder().decode(bytes) } };
+    }
+    catch (e) {
+        return unreachableFrom(e, deps.contentUrl);
+    }
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=content.js.map

package/dist/content.js.map

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package/dist/group.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+import type { Signer } from "@mcsherrylabs/evolver-client";
+import type { ChainReads } from "./read.js";
+import type { SignedGroup } from "./write.js";
+import type { ToolResult } from "./result.js";
+/** What the group verbs need from the world. NO `submitTx` — deliberately: the signing verbs submit
+ *  nothing, so the capability is not present to reach for (zero-submit is structural). */
+export interface GroupOpsDeps {
+    readonly identity: string;
+    readonly signer: Signer;
+    readonly ttlOffset?: number;
+    readonly reads: ChainReads;
+}
+/** A signed groups-ledger operation, as returned by a signing verb. */
+export type GroupSignResult = ToolResult<SignedGroup>;
+/**
+ * Create a new group (SIGN-09), signed for `deps.identity`. The name is validated STRUCTURALLY before
+ * anything is signed — the chain FINES an invalid name rather than refusing it.
+ */
+export declare function signCreateGroup(deps: GroupOpsDeps, params: {
+    name: string;
+}): Promise<GroupSignResult>;
+/**
+ * Delete a group (SIGN-10). The name is validated structurally before anything is signed. Ownership
+ * is NOT checked locally — a delete by a non-owner is chain-enforced and surfaces as an
+ * `invalid_group_body` fine via `classifySubmit`, not as a local refusal.
+ */
+export declare function signDeleteGroup(deps: GroupOpsDeps, params: {
+    name: string;
+}): Promise<GroupSignResult>;
+/**
+ * Add a member to a group (SIGN-11). Refusals fire FIRST, in order: invalid group name, empty member
+ * id, self-add, invalid node id — then the chain read, then compose.
+ */
+export declare function signAddMember(deps: GroupOpsDeps, params: {
+    groupName: string;
+    memberNodeId: string;
+}): Promise<GroupSignResult>;
+/**
+ * Remove a member from a group (SIGN-12). Same refusal order as add-member (invalid name, empty id,
+ * self-add, invalid id) BEFORE the chain read.
+ */
+export declare function signRemoveMember(deps: GroupOpsDeps, params: {
+    groupName: string;
+    memberNodeId: string;
+}): Promise<GroupSignResult>;
+/**
+ * Multi-recipient credit transfer (SIGN-02): move credit from the signing identity to 1..20
+ * recipients. This is the plain `transferBody` on `LEDGER.identity` — NOT a group-membership encoder
+ * and NOT an ownership transfer (group ownership transfer is deferred to v2; it always fines
+ * "missing co-signer auth"). "One verb = one tx"; the multi-entry array is the ONE thing that
+ * distinguishes it from the singleton `evolver_sign_transfer`. Order is significant — it decides
+ * which transfer survives a short-balance apply.
+ */
+export declare function signGroupTransfer(deps: GroupOpsDeps, params: {
+    entries: Array<{
+        recipient: string;
+        amount: string;
+    }>;
+}): Promise<GroupSignResult>;
+//# sourceMappingURL=group.d.ts.map

package/dist/group.d.ts.map

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package/dist/group.js

@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
+// Groups-ledger signing verbs (SIGN-09..12) plus the multi-recipient group credit transfer
+// (SIGN-02). Each is a compose→sign→record→return-txId operation with ZERO submit, mirroring the
+// identity verbs in `src/identity.ts` and resolving in the SAME `submitSigned`/`inspectSigned` path.
+//
+// The ledger is pinned to `LEDGER.groups` for the four membership verbs (never a caller-chosen id),
+// and to `LEDGER.identity` for the credit transfer (credit lives on identities; a group holds no
+// balance). Nothing here can reach a node before `evolver_submit`. The costly local refusals —
+// invalid group name, empty/invalid member id, self-add, a bad transfer entry — fire BEFORE anything
+// is signed, because the chain's answer for a malformed body arrives as a FINE, too late to refuse
+// (Pitfalls 4/5).
+//
+// ⚠️ KEY MATERIAL NEVER REACHES A RECORD OR A REFUSAL. Records carry the group name and member node
+// id and decimal amount strings only; refusals name the FIELD/PATH, never the bytes.
+import { LEDGER, createGroupBody, deleteGroupBody, addMemberBody, removeMemberBody, transferBody } from "@mcsherrylabs/evolver-client";
+import { isValidGroupName, isValidNodeId } from "@mcsherrylabs/evolver-client";
+import { parseAmount, formatAmount } from "./amount.js";
+import { DEFAULT_TTL_OFFSET, composeAndSign } from "./write.js";
+/** Read the chain tip to bound a transaction's life; an unreachable chain is `unreachable`, never a
+ *  submit. */
+async function tipOrUnreachable(deps) {
+    try {
+        return await deps.reads.currentRound();
+    }
+    catch (e) {
+        return { kind: "unreachable", chain: "", cause: e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e) };
+    }
+}
+/** The maximum number of recipients an on-chain credit transfer carries (the node's own 1..20 rule). */
+const MAX_TRANSFER_ENTRIES = 20;
+/**
+ * Create a new group (SIGN-09), signed for `deps.identity`. The name is validated STRUCTURALLY before
+ * anything is signed — the chain FINES an invalid name rather than refusing it.
+ */
+export async function signCreateGroup(deps, params) {
+    const name = String(params.name ?? "").trim();
+    if (!isValidGroupName(name))
+        return {
+            kind: "partial",
+            what: "name",
+            cause: `"${name}" is not a valid group name — the chain fines an invalid name rather than refusing it, so it is refused here`,
+        };
+    const tip = await tipOrUnreachable(deps);
+    if (typeof tip !== "number")
+        return tip;
+    const expiresAtRound = tip + (deps.ttlOffset ?? DEFAULT_TTL_OFFSET);
+    return composeAndSign(deps, {
+        ledgerId: LEDGER.groups, // hard-pinned, never caller-chosen
+        body: createGroupBody(name),
+        ttlRound: expiresAtRound,
+        signedAtRound: tip,
+        verb: "create_group",
+        fields: { groupName: name },
+    });
+}
+/** The refusal shared by the three member/file verbs: validate the group name BEFORE anything is
+ *  read or signed (the chain fines, it does not refuse, an invalid name). */
+function validGroupName(name) {
+    if (!isValidGroupName(name))
+        return {
+            kind: "partial",
+            what: "name",
+            cause: `"${name}" is not a valid group name — the chain fines an invalid name rather than refusing it, so it is refused here`,
+        };
+    return name;
+}
+/** The refusal shared by add/remove-member: the member id must be non-empty, not the sender, and a
+ *  syntactically valid node id — all refused BEFORE the chain read (the chain fines these). */
+function validMemberId(memberNodeId, identity) {
+    if (memberNodeId.length === 0)
+        return { kind: "partial", what: "memberNodeId", cause: "no member id given" };
+    if (memberNodeId === identity)
+        return {
+            kind: "partial",
+            what: "memberNodeId",
+            cause: `adding or removing "${identity}" (this agent) is a semantic no-op worth refusing cheaply — a group's owner is not its own member`,
+        };
+    if (!isValidNodeId(memberNodeId))
+        return {
+            kind: "partial",
+            what: "memberNodeId",
+            cause: `"${memberNodeId}" is not a valid node id — the chain fines an invalid id rather than refusing it, so it is refused here`,
+        };
+    return memberNodeId;
+}
+/**
+ * Delete a group (SIGN-10). The name is validated structurally before anything is signed. Ownership
+ * is NOT checked locally — a delete by a non-owner is chain-enforced and surfaces as an
+ * `invalid_group_body` fine via `classifySubmit`, not as a local refusal.
+ */
+export async function signDeleteGroup(deps, params) {
+    const groupName = validGroupName(String(params.name ?? "").trim());
+    if (typeof groupName !== "string")
+        return groupName;
+    const tip = await tipOrUnreachable(deps);
+    if (typeof tip !== "number")
+        return tip;
+    const expiresAtRound = tip + (deps.ttlOffset ?? DEFAULT_TTL_OFFSET);
+    return composeAndSign(deps, {
+        ledgerId: LEDGER.groups,
+        body: deleteGroupBody(groupName),
+        ttlRound: expiresAtRound,
+        signedAtRound: tip,
+        verb: "delete_group",
+        fields: { groupName },
+    });
+}
+/**
+ * Add a member to a group (SIGN-11). Refusals fire FIRST, in order: invalid group name, empty member
+ * id, self-add, invalid node id — then the chain read, then compose.
+ */
+export async function signAddMember(deps, params) {
+    const groupName = validGroupName(String(params.groupName ?? "").trim());
+    if (typeof groupName !== "string")
+        return groupName;
+    const member = validMemberId(String(params.memberNodeId ?? "").trim(), deps.identity);
+    if (typeof member !== "string")
+        return member;
+    const tip = await tipOrUnreachable(deps);
+    if (typeof tip !== "number")
+        return tip;
+    const expiresAtRound = tip + (deps.ttlOffset ?? DEFAULT_TTL_OFFSET);
+    return composeAndSign(deps, {
+        ledgerId: LEDGER.groups,
+        body: addMemberBody(groupName, member),
+        ttlRound: expiresAtRound,
+        signedAtRound: tip,
+        verb: "add_member",
+        fields: { groupName, memberNodeId: member },
+    });
+}
+/**
+ * Remove a member from a group (SIGN-12). Same refusal order as add-member (invalid name, empty id,
+ * self-add, invalid id) BEFORE the chain read.
+ */
+export async function signRemoveMember(deps, params) {
+    const groupName = validGroupName(String(params.groupName ?? "").trim());
+    if (typeof groupName !== "string")
+        return groupName;
+    const member = validMemberId(String(params.memberNodeId ?? "").trim(), deps.identity);
+    if (typeof member !== "string")
+        return member;
+    const tip = await tipOrUnreachable(deps);
+    if (typeof tip !== "number")
+        return tip;
+    const expiresAtRound = tip + (deps.ttlOffset ?? DEFAULT_TTL_OFFSET);
+    return composeAndSign(deps, {
+        ledgerId: LEDGER.groups,
+        body: removeMemberBody(groupName, member),
+        ttlRound: expiresAtRound,
+        signedAtRound: tip,
+        verb: "remove_member",
+        fields: { groupName, memberNodeId: member },
+    });
+}
+/**
+ * Multi-recipient credit transfer (SIGN-02): move credit from the signing identity to 1..20
+ * recipients. This is the plain `transferBody` on `LEDGER.identity` — NOT a group-membership encoder
+ * and NOT an ownership transfer (group ownership transfer is deferred to v2; it always fines
+ * "missing co-signer auth"). "One verb = one tx"; the multi-entry array is the ONE thing that
+ * distinguishes it from the singleton `evolver_sign_transfer`. Order is significant — it decides
+ * which transfer survives a short-balance apply.
+ */
+export async function signGroupTransfer(deps, params) {
+    const entries = Array.isArray(params.entries) ? params.entries : [];
+    if (entries.length === 0)
+        return { kind: "partial", what: "entries", cause: "at least one transfer entry is required" };
+    if (entries.length > MAX_TRANSFER_ENTRIES)
+        return {
+            kind: "partial",
+            what: "entries",
+            cause: `at most ${MAX_TRANSFER_ENTRIES} entries are allowed (the node's own limit) — got ${entries.length}`,
+        };
+    // Validate every entry BEFORE anything is signed: a bad amount or a missing recipient is refused
+    // here (naming the entry index, never the bytes) rather than fined on-chain.
+    const parsed = [];
+    for (let i = 0; i < entries.length; i++) {
+        const e = entries[i];
+        const recipient = String(e.recipient ?? "").trim();
+        if (recipient.length === 0)
+            return { kind: "partial", what: `entries.${i}.recipient`, cause: "no recipient given" };
+        const amount = parseAmount(String(e.amount ?? ""));
+        if (!amount.ok)
+            return { kind: "partial", what: `entries.${i}.amount`, cause: amount.error };
+        parsed.push({ recipient, amount: amount.value });
+    }
+    const tip = await tipOrUnreachable(deps);
+    if (typeof tip !== "number")
+        return tip;
+    const expiresAtRound = tip + (deps.ttlOffset ?? DEFAULT_TTL_OFFSET);
+    const fields = {};
+    for (let i = 0; i < parsed.length; i++) {
+        fields[`recipient.${i}`] = parsed[i].recipient;
+        fields[`amount.${i}`] = formatAmount(parsed[i].amount);
+    }
+    return composeAndSign(deps, {
+        ledgerId: LEDGER.identity, // NOT groups — credit lives on identities (ownership transfer is deferred to v2)
+        body: transferBody(parsed.map((e) => ({ recipient: e.recipient, amount: e.amount }))),
+        ttlRound: expiresAtRound,
+        signedAtRound: tip,
+        verb: "group_transfer",
+        fields,
+    });
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=group.js.map

package/dist/group.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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