@mcp-abap-adt/auth-providers 3.0.0 → 4.1.0

package/README.md

@@ -35,9 +35,19 @@ Since 2.0.0 an interactive login is conducted by an **authorization strategy**
 and the token exchange; everything between them (reaching the URL, receiving
 what comes back, the port, the timeout) belongs to the strategy, which a
 consumer may replace wholesale. See
-[Choosing an authorization strategy](#choosing-an-authorization-strategy) and,
-if you are on an earlier major, [Migrating from 2.x to 3.0](#migrating-from-2x-to-30)
-and [Migrating from 1.x to 2.0](#migrating-from-1x-to-20).
+[Choosing an authorization strategy](#choosing-an-authorization-strategy).
+
+Since 4.0.0 both SAML providers **validate the assertion before trusting it** —
+its signature, issuer, audience, recipient, time window, the request it answers,
+and whether it has been seen before — and must therefore be told which identity
+provider to trust. This is a breaking change: a 3.x SAML configuration fails at
+construction. See [SAML assertion validation](#saml-assertion-validation).
+
+If you are on an earlier version, see
+[Upgrading from 4.0 to 4.1](#upgrading-from-40-to-41),
+[Migrating from 3.x to 4.0](#migrating-from-3x-to-40),
+[Migrating from 2.x to 3.0](#migrating-from-2x-to-30) and
+[Migrating from 1.x to 2.0](#migrating-from-1x-to-20).
 
 ## Responsibilities and Design Principles
 
@@ -65,6 +75,7 @@ This package is responsible for:
 2. **Token acquisition**: Handles OAuth2 flows (browser-based, refresh token, client credentials) to obtain JWT tokens
 3. **Token validation**: Validates JWT locally by checking exp claim (no HTTP requests)
 4. **OAuth2 flows**: Manages browser-based OAuth2 authorization code flow and refresh token flow
+5. **SAML assertion validation**: Verifies a SAML assertion — signature, issuer, audience, recipient, time window, request ID, replay — before either SAML provider uses it
 
 #### What This Package Does
 
@@ -73,6 +84,7 @@ This package is responsible for:
 - **Obtains tokens**: Makes HTTP requests to UAA endpoints to obtain JWT tokens
 - **Validates tokens**: Validates JWT locally by checking exp claim (no HTTP requests)
 - **Returns tokens**: Returns `ITokenResult` with `authorizationToken` and optional `refreshToken`
+- **Validates SAML assertions**: Ships two validators (`createSignedResponseValidator`, `createSignedAssertionValidator`) and an in-memory replay store; both SAML providers use one by default, and a consumer may supply its own `IAssertionValidator` or `IAssertionReplayStore`
 
 #### What This Package Does NOT Do
 
@@ -81,6 +93,7 @@ This package is responsible for:
 - **Does NOT know about service keys**: Service key loading is handled by stores
 - **Does NOT manage sessions**: Session management is handled by stores
 - **Does NOT return `serviceUrl` if unknown**: Providers may not return `serviceUrl` because they only handle token acquisition, not connection configuration
+- **Does NOT fetch identity provider metadata**: The certificates and entity ID a SAML assertion is checked against come from configuration; reading them from a file or a metadata URL is the consumer's job
 
 ### External Dependencies
 
@@ -328,88 +341,91 @@ The redirect URI is no longer a provider field: it belongs to the strategy,
 because with an ephemeral port nothing knows it until the socket is bound. The
 one the strategy reports is the one sent to the token endpoint.
 
-SAML bearer example (manual paste):
-
-```typescript
-import { AuthBroker } from '@mcp-abap-adt/auth-broker';
-import {
-  Saml2BearerProvider,
-  manualSamlResponseStrategy,
-} from '@mcp-abap-adt/auth-providers';
-
-const acsUrl = 'https://sp.example.com/saml/acs';
-
-const provider = new Saml2BearerProvider({
-  idpSsoUrl: 'https://idp.example.com/sso',
-  spEntityId: 'my-sp-entity',
-  acsUrl,
-  uaaUrl: 'https://uaa.example.com',
-  clientId: '...',
-  clientSecret: '...',
-  // `redirectUri` must equal `acsUrl`, or the provider refuses the mismatch.
-  authorization: manualSamlResponseStrategy({ redirectUri: acsUrl, read: promptUser }),
-});
-
-const broker = new AuthBroker({ tokenProvider: provider }, 'none');
-```
+Both SAML providers validate every assertion before using it, so every SAML
+example below says whom to trust: `idpCertificates` and `idpEntityId`. See
+[SAML assertion validation](#saml-assertion-validation) for what is checked and
+what else can be configured.
 
-**Read that `redirectUri` twice.** A SAML strategy defaults its redirect URI to
-`http://localhost:61001/callback`, and the provider requires the assertion
-consumer service the IdP posts to be exactly the one the strategy names. If you
-declare a real `acsUrl` and leave `redirectUri` off, the login fails with
-*"SAML acsUrl is … but the authorization strategy is listening on …"* before
-anything is opened. Declare neither and the default is used for both, which is
-consistent — and only reachable when the IdP will post to your localhost.
-
-SAML bearer example (headless, assertion fetched elsewhere):
+SAML bearer example (UAA or XSUAA — an IdP-initiated assertion):
 
 ```typescript
+import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
 import { AuthBroker } from '@mcp-abap-adt/auth-broker';
-import {
-  Saml2BearerProvider,
-  externalCodeStrategy,
-} from '@mcp-abap-adt/auth-providers';
-
-const acsUrl = 'https://sp.example.com/saml/acs';
+import type { IAuthorizationStrategy } from '@mcp-abap-adt/interfaces-auth';
+import { Saml2BearerProvider } from '@mcp-abap-adt/auth-providers';
+
+// The Recipient the assertion names: the URI-binding assertion consumer
+// service in the token endpoint's SAML metadata (UAA's is /oauth/token/alias/…).
+const acsUrl = 'https://uaa.example.com/oauth/token/alias/uaa.example';
+
+// An IdP-initiated login answers no AuthnRequest, so this strategy never calls
+// request.buildAuthorizationUrl — with idpInitiated: true and no
+// authorizationUrl, the builder refuses before producing a URL, since the only
+// one it could build carries an AuthnRequest. It fetches a fresh assertion on every login;
+// the same assertion presented twice is refused as a replay.
+const fromSsoProxy: IAuthorizationStrategy<string> = {
+  async authorize() {
+    return { payload: await getSamlResponseFromSsoProxy(), redirectUri: acsUrl };
+  },
+};
 
 const provider = new Saml2BearerProvider({
   idpSsoUrl: 'https://idp.example.com/sso',
-  spEntityId: 'my-sp-entity',
+  spEntityId: 'uaa.example', // the entityID in that metadata: the Audience
   acsUrl,
   uaaUrl: 'https://uaa.example.com',
   clientId: '...',
   clientSecret: '...',
-  authorization: externalCodeStrategy({
-    redirectUri: acsUrl,
-    provide: async (_authorizationUrl) => getSamlResponseFromSsoProxy(),
-  }),
+  // Whom to trust: the identity provider's signing certificate and entity ID.
+  idpCertificates: [readFileSync('idp-signing.pem', 'utf8')],
+  idpEntityId: 'https://idp.example.com/metadata',
+  // UAA and XSUAA refuse an assertion carrying InResponseTo.
+  idpInitiated: true,
+  authorization: fromSsoProxy,
 });
 
 const broker = new AuthBroker({ tokenProvider: provider }, 'none');
 ```
 
 **Who starts the login matters.** An identity provider answering an
-`AuthnRequest` — which is what the provider's own URL, and every shipped SAML
-strategy, sends — puts `InResponseTo` on the assertion's subject
-confirmation. UAA's saml2-bearer grant refuses any assertion that carries it:
-there is no request on its side to match it against, and UAA's
-`disableInResponseToCheck` applies to web SSO only. Measured against Cloud
-Foundry UAA with Keycloak as the identity provider, an SP-initiated login is
-refused with *"SubjectConfirmationData/@InResponseTo … did not match the valid
-value: null"*, and an IdP-initiated one — started at the IdP, answering no
-request — is accepted. Against UAA, supply the assertion from an IdP-initiated
-login, for instance through `externalCodeStrategy` whose `provide` ignores the
-URL it is handed. Whether XSUAA behaves the same has not been verified.
+`AuthnRequest` — which is what the provider's own URL carries, and so what every
+shipped strategy that opens or shows that URL sends — puts `InResponseTo` on
+the assertion's subject confirmation. The saml2-bearer grant of Cloud Foundry UAA and of SAP
+XSUAA refuses any assertion that carries it: there is no request on their side
+to match it against, and UAA's `disableInResponseToCheck` applies to web SSO
+only. Measured: UAA, with Keycloak as the identity provider, refuses the answer
+to an SP-initiated login with *"SubjectConfirmationData/@InResponseTo … did not
+match the valid value: null"*, and XSUAA — measured with 3.x, which sent such an
+assertion on — refuses one carrying `InResponseTo` with *"No subject
+confirmation methods were met"*; both accept an IdP-initiated one — started at
+the IdP, answering no request. (4.0 refuses that case itself, at
+`bearerConfirmation`, before XSUAA sees it.) Against either,
+supply an IdP-initiated assertion, declare `idpInitiated: true`, and use a
+strategy that does not call
+`buildAuthorizationUrl`: `staticCodeStrategy`, or your own as above.
+`samlCallbackStrategy`, `manualSamlResponseStrategy` and `externalCodeStrategy`
+all call it, and with `idpInitiated: true` and no `authorizationUrl` the builder
+refuses: a `ValidationError` (`missingFields: ['authorizationUrl']`) thrown
+before any URL is produced, so before a browser opens. (3.0's advice —
+`externalCodeStrategy` whose `provide` ignores the URL — no longer works for
+that reason.) See
+[Where the expected request ID comes from](#where-the-expected-request-id-comes-from).
+
+The `redirectUri` your strategy reports is the ACS the assertion is checked
+against — its `SubjectConfirmationData/@Recipient` must equal it — so for the
+bearer grant it is the token endpoint's bearer ACS, not a local callback.
 
 **What is sent.** The saml2-bearer grant takes one SAML Assertion,
 base64url-encoded (RFC 7522 §2.1). A strategy may deliver either that or the
 whole `SAMLResponse` an identity provider posts, in standard base64 —
-`Saml2BearerProvider` takes the Assertion out of a Response and re-encodes it,
-copying onto it every namespace declaration it inherited — including one used
-only inside a value such as `xsi:type="xs:string"`. The Assertion must carry
-its own signature: one over the Response alone does not survive the cut, and
-the token endpoint refuses the Assertion. An `EncryptedAssertion` is refused
-before anything is sent.
+`Saml2BearerProvider` validates what it received, then takes the Assertion out
+of a Response and re-encodes it, copying onto it every namespace declaration it
+inherited — including one used only inside a value such as
+`xsi:type="xs:string"`. The Assertion must carry its own signature: one over the
+Response alone does not survive the cut, and the token endpoint refuses the
+Assertion — which is why this provider's default validator is the one that
+requires the Assertion to be signed. An `EncryptedAssertion` is refused before
+anything is sent.
 
 **Refresh.** When the token endpoint returns a `refresh_token` with the SAML
 bearer exchange, `Saml2BearerProvider` spends it once the access token expires:
@@ -419,9 +435,10 @@ browser involved. Pass a stored one back as `refreshToken` in the config and the
 next `getTokens()` uses it. If the grant is refused, or no refresh token was
 ever issued, the provider falls back to a full login through `authorization`.
 
-Pure SAML example (cookie-based):
+Pure SAML example (cookie-based, SP-initiated):
 
 ```typescript
+import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
 import { AuthBroker } from '@mcp-abap-adt/auth-broker';
 import {
   Saml2PureProvider,
@@ -434,6 +451,10 @@ const provider = new Saml2PureProvider({
   idpSsoUrl: 'https://idp.example.com/sso',
   spEntityId: 'my-sp-entity',
   acsUrl,
+  idpCertificates: [readFileSync('idp-signing.pem', 'utf8')],
+  idpEntityId: 'https://idp.example.com/metadata',
+  // Shows the URL the provider builds — so the response must answer that
+  // request's ID — and reads the pasted SAMLResponse.
   authorization: manualSamlResponseStrategy({ redirectUri: acsUrl, read: promptUser }),
   // Convert SAMLResponse to session cookies for SAP (implementation-specific)
   cookieProvider: async (samlResponse) => {
@@ -444,6 +465,17 @@ const provider = new Saml2PureProvider({
 const broker = new AuthBroker({ tokenProvider: provider }, 'none');
 ```
 
+`cookieProvider` receives the payload unchanged, only after it has been
+validated, and the session's `expiresAt` is the validated assertion's expiry.
+
+**Read that `redirectUri` twice.** A SAML strategy defaults its redirect URI to
+`http://localhost:61001/callback`, and the provider requires the assertion
+consumer service the IdP posts to be exactly the one the strategy names. If you
+declare a real `acsUrl` and leave `redirectUri` off, the login fails with
+*"SAML acsUrl is … but the authorization strategy is listening on …"* before
+anything is opened. Declare neither and the default is used for both, which is
+consistent — and only reachable when the IdP will post to your localhost.
+
 Both SAML providers now reject at construction when `authorizationUrl` is set
 without `acsUrl`:
 
@@ -455,7 +487,496 @@ SAML request cannot be read, so it must be declared.
 The ACS is buried in a deflated `SAMLRequest` this package did not build and
 cannot read, so it cannot be verified against whatever the strategy binds. 1.x
 accepted the combination and defaulted the ACS to
-`http://localhost:3001/callback` — usually not where the IdP posted.
+`http://localhost:3001/callback` — usually not where the IdP posted. The same
+holds for the request ID: this package cannot read it out of a URL it did not
+build, so a pre-built `authorizationUrl` also needs `authnRequestId` — unless
+the login is declared `idpInitiated`.
+
+### SAML assertion validation
+
+Since 4.0.0, `Saml2BearerProvider` and `Saml2PureProvider` validate the
+assertion a login delivers before anything else happens to it — before the
+token exchange, before `cookieProvider`. Until 3.x nothing verified it: the
+callback checked only that the payload was non-empty, and `Saml2PureProvider`
+took its session lifetime from a regular expression over the unverified XML.
+
+**This is a breaking change.** Each provider constructs its validator in its
+constructor, and a configuration that does not say whom to trust fails there —
+a `ValidationError` whose `missingFields` names what is missing — before any
+browser opens or any request is sent. Supply `idpCertificates` and
+`idpEntityId`, or an `assertionValidator` of your own.
+
+#### Configuration
+
+On both providers' configuration (`Saml2BearerProviderConfig`, `Saml2PureProviderConfig`):
+
+| Field | Default | Meaning |
+|---|---|---|
+| `idpCertificates` | — | The identity provider's signing certificates, PEM or bare base64 DER — the form `<X509Certificate>` has in IdP metadata. A list, because providers rotate keys and two are live during a rotation. **Required unless `assertionValidator` is supplied.** Each entry is parsed at construction, so a malformed one fails there, not at login |
+| `idpEntityId` | — | The `Issuer` the assertion must name, passed to the validator as `expectedIssuer`. **Required unless the `assertionValidator` supplied is your own**: a shipped validator (`createSignedResponseValidator`, `createSignedAssertionValidator`) refuses every assertion without an expected issuer, so supplying one without `idpEntityId` fails at construction. A custom validator does not need it, and receives it when given |
+| `spEntityId` | — | Your entity ID. The assertion's `AudienceRestriction` must name it — whichever validator is in play |
+| `assertionValidator` | the provider's default | An `IAssertionValidator`: `createSignedResponseValidator(…)`, `createSignedAssertionValidator(…)`, or your own. When supplied, the provider builds no default, and `idpCertificates`, `clockSkewMs` and `assertionReplayStore` are not used — set them on the validator's own options. `idpEntityId` is still required with a shipped one |
+| `assertionReplayStore` | the process-wide in-memory store | An `IAssertionReplayStore` for the default validator — see [Replay](#replay) |
+| `clockSkewMs` | `0` | Tolerance for the default validator's time checks — see [Clock skew](#clock-skew) |
+| `authnRequestId` | — | The AuthnRequest ID this login answers, when the package did not build the request — see [Where the expected request ID comes from](#where-the-expected-request-id-comes-from) |
+| `idpInitiated` | `false` | Declares that no AuthnRequest was sent, so the assertion must carry no `InResponseTo`. Required for `Saml2BearerProvider` against UAA or XSUAA |
+
+The package performs no I/O for any of these: it fetches no metadata and reads
+no file. Reading the certificate is the consumer's job.
+
+#### Choosing a validator
+
+This is the first decision to make, and **the default differs by provider**:
+
+| | `createSignedResponseValidator` | `createSignedAssertionValidator` |
+|---|---|---|
+| The signature must cover | the `Response` | the `Assertion` — bare, or inside a Response |
+| Default of | `Saml2PureProvider` | `Saml2BearerProvider` |
+| Reads `Status`, `Response/Issuer`, `Destination` | yes — inside the signature | **not at all** |
+| Accepts a bare `saml:Assertion` | no | yes |
+| Checks performed | all twelve below | all but rows 4, 5b and 11 |
+
+Both take the same options (`ShippedValidatorOptions`) and return the same
+interface, so switching is one identifier:
+
+```typescript
+import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
+import {
+  Saml2PureProvider,
+  createSignedAssertionValidator,
+} from '@mcp-abap-adt/auth-providers';
+
+const idpCertificates = [readFileSync('idp-signing.pem', 'utf8')];
+
+const provider = new Saml2PureProvider({
+  idpSsoUrl: 'https://idp.example.com/sso',
+  spEntityId: 'my-sp-entity',
+  acsUrl: 'https://sp.example.com/saml/acs',
+  // Still required with a shipped validator, which refuses every assertion
+  // without an expected issuer; construction fails without it.
+  idpEntityId: 'https://idp.example.com/metadata',
+  // Our identity provider signs only its assertions.
+  assertionValidator: createSignedAssertionValidator({
+    idpCertificates,
+    clockSkewMs: 30_000,
+  }),
+  cookieProvider: exchangeSamlForCookies,
+});
+```
+
+**`createSignedResponseValidator`** requires the identity provider to sign the
+`Response`. Every field all twelve checks read is then inside the signature, so
+every check is a control. It is `Saml2PureProvider`'s default because there the
+whole response is handed on to `cookieProvider`, and `Status` and `Destination`
+must be inside a signature.
+
+**`createSignedAssertionValidator`** accepts a signature over the `Assertion`,
+and **does not read** `Status`, `Response/Issuer` or `Destination` at all — not
+weakly: with an assertion-only signature those fields sit outside it, where
+anyone able to deliver a response sets them to whatever is expected, and a check
+on a field an attacker controls reads in the code and the logs as if something
+had been verified. It is `Saml2BearerProvider`'s default because the token
+endpoint receives the Assertion alone, taken out of any Response, so the
+Assertion's own signature is what counts there. Configuring the signed-Response
+validator on the bearer path would refuse a bare Assertion, and accept responses
+signed only at the Response level, which the token endpoint then refuses.
+
+**Who needs the second one.** Identity providers that sign only assertions —
+which is many. A `Saml2PureProvider` consumer whose IdP does so gets a
+`signedNode` refusal from the default, and selects
+`createSignedAssertionValidator` explicitly. What that gives up is the three
+checks above. It is still sound:
+
+- **`Status`** — a declined login carries no assertion. An identity provider
+  that refuses does not mint one, so flipping `Status` to `Success` leaves an
+  attacker with nothing signed to put beneath it. Success is established by a
+  signed assertion passing every assertion-level check.
+- **`Destination`** — addressing rests on
+  `SubjectConfirmationData/@Recipient`, which is inside the signed assertion and
+  required by check 10.
+- **`Response/Issuer`** — the assertion's own `Issuer`, inside the signature, is
+  checked against `idpEntityId`.
+
+An identity provider that signs both the Response and the Assertion — Keycloak
+does by default — satisfies either validator.
+
+#### What the validators check
+
+In this order; each refusal is an `AssertionValidationError` whose `check`
+names the row. Rows marked *(signed-Response only)* are not performed by
+`createSignedAssertionValidator`.
+
+| # | Check | Refused when | `check` |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| 1 | Parses as XML, with no `DOCTYPE`; the document element is `samlp:Response` — or, for the assertion-only validator, a bare `saml:Assertion` | it is not, or it carries a `<!DOCTYPE` declaration | `document` |
+| 1b | Every `ID` attribute in the document is unique | any value appears twice | `duplicateId` |
+| 2 | Every signature is valid against `idpCertificates` — never against a certificate the document carries in its own `KeyInfo` | none, wrong key, content altered after signing, a malformed `Signature` element, no `ds:Reference` or more than one, a reference that is not same-document or names no element by `ID`, or a signature not inside the element it references | `signature` |
+| 3 | The signed node is the node read | the Response carries no direct-child `Assertion`, or more than one; the signature does not cover the element this validator requires — the `Response`, or the bare root `Assertion` or the Response's direct-child `Assertion`; or any SAML 2.0 `Assertion` / `EncryptedAssertion`, or SAML 1.x `Assertion`, lies outside the signed assertion or inside a `ds:Signature` | `signedNode` |
+| 4 | `samlp:Status` *(signed-Response only)* | absent or more than one; its `StatusCode` absent or more than one; the `StatusCode` without a `Value`; or a `Value` other than `…:status:Success` | `status` |
+| 4b | `Assertion/@ID` | absent or empty | `assertionId` |
+| 5 | `Assertion/Issuer` | absent, more than one, empty, not the expected issuer, or no expected issuer was given | `issuer` |
+| 5b | `Response/Issuer` *(signed-Response only; optional)* | present and disagreeing with `Assertion/Issuer`, or present twice — absent is accepted | `issuer` |
+| 6 | `Conditions` | absent, or more than one | `conditions` |
+| 7 | `Conditions/@NotBefore` *(optional)* | present and not a valid `xsd:dateTime`, or in the future beyond `clockSkewMs` — absent is accepted | `notBefore` |
+| 8 | `Conditions/@NotOnOrAfter` | absent, not a valid `xsd:dateTime`, or in the past beyond `clockSkewMs` | `notOnOrAfter` |
+| 9 | `Conditions/AudienceRestriction` | absent, **any one** restriction naming no `Audience` at all, or **any one** failing to name `spEntityId` | `audience` |
+| 10 | One bearer `SubjectConfirmation` | the `Subject` absent or more than one, holding no `SubjectConfirmation`, or no confirmation satisfying every part — see below | `bearerConfirmation` |
+| 11 | `Response/@Destination` *(signed-Response only)* | absent, or not the ACS the response arrived at | `destination` |
+| 12 | Replay | the store has already recorded this `{issuer, ID}` | `replay` |
+
+What the table compresses:
+
+- **Every required field is refused when absent**, not skipped: a rule
+  phrased "present and not X" is one an attacker satisfies by deleting the
+  field. That covers `Status` and `Destination` (signed-Response only),
+  `Assertion/@ID`, `Assertion/Issuer`, `Conditions`, `Conditions/@NotOnOrAfter`,
+  the `AudienceRestriction`, and, in the bearer confirmation, `Recipient`,
+  `NotOnOrAfter` and — when a request ID is expected — `InResponseTo`. Of the
+  fields the validators read, only these may be missing, each for a reason:
+  - `Conditions/@NotBefore` and `SubjectConfirmationData/@NotBefore` — a
+    missing `NotBefore` only means "valid from issue"; when present it is
+    checked;
+  - `Response/Issuer` — optional in SAML Core, and the assertion's own `Issuer`
+    is checked inside the signature; when present it must agree (5b);
+  - `NameID` — surfaced on the result, not trusted for anything.
+- **The signature must cover the element that is read.** A wrapping attack
+  supplies a document holding a genuinely signed fragment beside a forged one;
+  the validator resolves which element each signature covers and reads the
+  assertion's fields from that element only. And since a payload travels on
+  whole — `Saml2PureProvider` hands it to `cookieProvider` — **every**
+  SAML 2.0 `Assertion` or `EncryptedAssertion`, and every SAML 1.x
+  `Assertion` (`urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:assertion`), anywhere in the
+  document must be the signed assertion or inside it, under both validators,
+  but never inside a `ds:Signature`, whose subtree an enveloped signature
+  leaves unsigned. An extra assertion in `Extensions`, a sibling or a wrapper
+  ends the login rather than being ignored. Encrypted assertions are not
+  supported.
+- **Several signatures are accepted** when every one verifies against
+  `idpCertificates`, carries exactly one same-document reference, and sits
+  directly inside the element it references. A signature that fails refuses the
+  whole document, even when another covers the element read. A document with no
+  signature is refused.
+- **Unique IDs (1b)** are the wrapping defence again: XML-DSig resolves its
+  reference by `ID`, so a duplicate makes "which element is signed" ambiguous.
+  They are refused wherever they appear, before any reference is resolved.
+- **Check 10 is one element, not four fields — and one is enough.** The
+  assertion must carry exactly one `Subject`, holding at least one
+  `SubjectConfirmation`. It is accepted when **at least one** confirmation
+  passes every sub-rule on its own; values scattered across several
+  confirmations do not add up to one. A candidate's sub-rules, in the order
+  they are evaluated: `Method` is `urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:bearer`; it
+  holds exactly one `SubjectConfirmationData`; `InResponseTo` equals the
+  expected request ID — or is **absent** for a login declared `idpInitiated`;
+  `Recipient` equals the ACS the response arrived at; `NotOnOrAfter` is
+  present and a valid `xsd:dateTime`; `NotBefore`, if present, is a valid
+  `xsd:dateTime`; `NotOnOrAfter` has not passed beyond `clockSkewMs`;
+  `NotBefore` has arrived within it. When none qualifies, the refusal names
+  every candidate in document order with the first sub-rule it failed —
+  `no bearer confirmation qualifies: #1 Recipient is not the ACS; #2
+  NotOnOrAfter has passed` — listing at most five, then `and N more`.
+- **Check 9 is AND across restrictions, OR within one**, as SAML Core §2.5.1.4
+  says: every `AudienceRestriction` must name you; the `Audience` elements
+  inside one are alternatives.
+- **Dates are parsed strictly.** An `xsd:dateTime` must have real calendar
+  components — `2026-02-30T00:00:00Z`, which `Date.parse` quietly turns into
+  2 March, is refused.
+- **No DTD.** A `<!DOCTYPE` anywhere in the payload is refused at `document`
+  before it is parsed: a SAML message has no use for one, and the document is
+  parsed twice — by `@xmldom/xmldom` 0.9 here and by the 0.8 inside
+  `xml-crypto` — where a DTD is exactly what parsers disagree about.
+- **Any XML fault is a refusal, and nothing reaches the console.** The parser
+  is given an error handler that throws on every level, so a payload it would
+  have repaired — an undeclared entity, say — is refused at `document` rather
+  than validated in its repaired form, and a malformed callback never writes
+  to stderr past your `ILogger`. The same holds for the bearer conversion.
+- **SHA-1 is accepted.** RSA-SHA1 signatures and SHA-1 digests verify, as they
+  do under `xml-crypto`'s defaults, because identity providers still emit them
+  and refusing them would refuse genuine logins. To refuse them, supply an
+  `assertionValidator` of your own that rejects a `SignatureMethod` or
+  `DigestMethod` naming `…xmldsig#rsa-sha1` or `…xmldsig#sha1` before
+  delegating to a shipped validator — and keep `idpEntityId` configured, since
+  the shipped validator inside still refuses without an expected issuer.
+
+#### Refusal messages
+
+Since 4.1.0 no two rules under one `check` share a message, and an element
+that must appear exactly once says which way it failed — absent, or more than
+one. Every value a message takes from the document is JSON-quoted and cut to
+64 characters, so a newline smuggled in as `&#10;` shows as `\n` and cannot
+forge a log line. Match on `check` in code; the message is for the person
+reading the log. `<n>` is a count of two or more; `"…"` is a quoted document
+value.
+
+| `check` | message |
+|---|---|
+| `document` | `the SAMLResponse carries a DOCTYPE declaration, which is never accepted` |
+| `document` | `the SAMLResponse did not parse as XML` |
+| `document` | `expected a samlp:Response or a saml:Assertion, got "…"` |
+| `document` | `expected the document element to be a samlp:Response, got "…"` |
+| `duplicateId` | `the document uses the ID "…" more than once, so which element is signed is ambiguous` |
+| `signature` | `the document carries no signature` |
+| `signature` | `the signature element is malformed: "…"` |
+| `signature` | `the signature does not verify against any configured certificate` |
+| `signature` | `the signature carries no ds:Reference` |
+| `signature` | `the signature carries <n> ds:Reference; exactly one is allowed` |
+| `signature` | `the signature reference is not a same-document URI: "…"` |
+| `signature` | `the signature references "…", which is not in the document` |
+| `signature` | `the signature is not inside the element it references, so it does not envelope it` |
+| `signedNode` | `the response carries no direct-child saml:Assertion` |
+| `signedNode` | `the response carries <n> direct-child saml:Assertion; exactly one is allowed` |
+| `signedNode` | `the signature does not cover the samlp:Response this validator requires` |
+| `signedNode` | `the signature does not cover the saml:Assertion this validator requires` |
+| `signedNode` | `the document carries an Assertion or EncryptedAssertion, SAML 2.0 or 1.x, outside the one the signature covers` |
+| `signedNode` | `the document carries an Assertion or EncryptedAssertion inside a ds:Signature, where no signature covers it` |
+| `status` | `the response carries no samlp:Status` |
+| `status` | `the response carries <n> samlp:Status; exactly one is allowed` |
+| `status` | `the samlp:Status carries no samlp:StatusCode` |
+| `status` | `the samlp:Status carries <n> samlp:StatusCode; exactly one is allowed` |
+| `status` | `the samlp:StatusCode carries no Value` |
+| `status` | `the identity provider declined the login: "…"` |
+| `assertionId` | `the assertion carries no ID` |
+| `issuer` | `the assertion carries no saml:Issuer` |
+| `issuer` | `the assertion carries <n> saml:Issuer; exactly one is allowed` |
+| `issuer` | `the assertion's saml:Issuer is empty` |
+| `issuer` | `no expectedIssuer was configured, so the assertion issuer cannot be trusted` |
+| `issuer` | `the assertion was issued by "…", not the trusted issuer` |
+| `issuer` | `the response must carry at most one saml:Issuer` |
+| `issuer` | `the response and the assertion name different issuers` |
+| `conditions` | `the assertion carries no saml:Conditions` |
+| `conditions` | `the assertion carries <n> saml:Conditions; exactly one is allowed` |
+| `notBefore` | `Conditions NotBefore is not a valid xsd:dateTime: "…"` |
+| `notBefore` | `the assertion is not valid yet` |
+| `notOnOrAfter` | `Conditions carries no NotOnOrAfter, so the assertion states no lifetime` |
+| `notOnOrAfter` | `Conditions NotOnOrAfter is not a valid xsd:dateTime: "…"` |
+| `notOnOrAfter` | `the assertion has expired` |
+| `audience` | `the assertion restricts no audience` |
+| `audience` | `an AudienceRestriction names no audience` |
+| `audience` | `an AudienceRestriction on this assertion does not name us` |
+| `bearerConfirmation` | `the assertion carries no saml:Subject` |
+| `bearerConfirmation` | `the assertion carries <n> saml:Subject; exactly one is allowed` |
+| `bearerConfirmation` | `the saml:Subject holds no SubjectConfirmation` |
+| `bearerConfirmation` | `no bearer confirmation qualifies: #1 <reason>; #2 <reason>; …` |
+| `destination` | `the response carries no Destination` |
+| `destination` | `the response is addressed to "…", not to us` |
+| `replay` | `this assertion has been presented before` |
+
+A `bearerConfirmation` refusal naming candidates lists each one's first failed
+sub-rule, in document order, joined by `; `; past five candidates it ends
+`; and N more`, N being how many were not listed. The eleven reasons:
+
+| # | `<reason>`, in the order a candidate is tested |
+|---|---|
+| 1 | `Method is not bearer` |
+| 2 | `carries no SubjectConfirmationData` |
+| 3 | `carries <n> SubjectConfirmationData; exactly one is allowed` |
+| 4 | `InResponseTo is present, but this login sent no request` |
+| 5 | `InResponseTo does not answer our request` |
+| 6 | `Recipient is not the ACS` |
+| 7 | `SubjectConfirmationData has no NotOnOrAfter` |
+| 8 | `SubjectConfirmationData NotOnOrAfter is not a valid xsd:dateTime` |
+| 9 | `SubjectConfirmationData NotBefore is not a valid xsd:dateTime` |
+| 10 | `NotOnOrAfter has passed` |
+| 11 | `NotBefore has not arrived` |
+
+Two messages from outside a validator changed in 4.1.0 and carry no `check`.
+A provider configured with both `idpInitiated: true` and `authnRequestId`
+throws a `ValidationError` (`missingFields: ['idpInitiated']`) at
+construction: `SAML idpInitiated is true and authnRequestId is set: an
+IdP-initiated login sends no request, so the two describe different logins.
+Remove one of them.` And `Saml2BearerProvider`'s conversion of a validated
+payload into the bearer grant's Assertion throws a plain `Error` whose parser
+text is quoted the same way — reachable only when a custom validator accepted
+a payload that does not parse: `SAML bearer payload is not well-formed XML:
+"…"`.
+
+**Expiry comes from the verified document.** A validated assertion's
+`expiresAt` is the earlier of `Conditions/@NotOnOrAfter` and the `NotOnOrAfter`
+of the bearer confirmation accepted — the earliest, if several qualify — so a
+session cannot outlive a window the assertion itself closed.
+`Saml2PureProvider` takes its session's `expiresAt` from it.
+`parseSamlNotOnOrAfter`, the regular expression over unverified XML it replaces,
+is gone.
+
+**What remains unproven.** The validators verify signatures with `xml-crypto`.
+They are tested against signatures `xml-crypto` itself produced (through
+`@mcp-abap-adt/auth-mocks`) and against Keycloak, a real identity provider, on
+the provider stand. Whether every other identity provider's canonicalisation
+matches is not proven; a refusal at `signature` from a genuine response is the
+symptom to report.
+
+#### Where the expected request ID comes from
+
+`InResponseTo` must answer the request that was sent — or, where none was sent
+by explicit choice, be absent. The expected ID is decided before validation,
+from one of three sources, and never inferred from the assertion:
+
+| Source | When | `InResponseTo` must be |
+|---|---|---|
+| minted | the strategy called `buildAuthorizationUrl`, and the package built the AuthnRequest — `samlCallbackStrategy`, `manualSamlResponseStrategy`, `externalCodeStrategy`, or the default | equal to the ID the package minted |
+| declared | `authnRequestId` is configured | equal to `authnRequestId` |
+| none, by declaration | `idpInitiated: true`, and no request was sent | **absent** |
+
+`authnRequestId` is **required** whenever the package did not build the request
+and the login is not declared IdP-initiated. Two flows trigger it:
+
+- a pre-built `authorizationUrl` — the package cannot read the ID out of a
+  request it did not build;
+- a strategy that returns a payload without calling `buildAuthorizationUrl` —
+  `staticCodeStrategy`, or your own — after a request you sent some other way.
+
+Without it, the login fails with a `ValidationError` (`missingFields:
+['authnRequestId']`) after the strategy returns and before the assertion is
+read — as a configuration fault, not a refusal blamed on the assertion. A
+strategy that merely forgot to call the builder must not silently switch the
+provider into accepting unsolicited responses.
+
+**`idpInitiated: true`** declares that the identity provider started the login
+and no AuthnRequest exists, so the assertion must carry no `InResponseTo`.
+`Saml2BearerProvider` against UAA or XSUAA needs it: both refuse an assertion
+carrying `InResponseTo` on the saml2-bearer grant. What it gives up is the
+**login-CSRF defence** of a request ID: with one, a response must answer the
+request just sent; without it, whoever can deliver a validly signed response
+of their own to your receiver can log your user in as themselves. That is
+sometimes the right trade — for UAA and XSUAA it is the only one — but it must
+be a decision visible in your configuration. **It is never inferred**: an
+assertion without `InResponseTo` does not make a login IdP-initiated; only
+`idpInitiated: true` does. The other checks apply unchanged.
+
+`idpInitiated: true` together with a request ID is a configuration error too:
+the two describe different logins. With a declared `authnRequestId` the
+provider refuses at construction — a `ValidationError` (`missingFields:
+['idpInitiated']`) — before any browser opens. A strategy that calls
+`buildAuthorizationUrl` with no
+`authorizationUrl` configured is refused inside the builder, before a URL — and
+so a request ID — exists: a `ValidationError` with `missingFields:
+['authorizationUrl']`. Use a strategy that does not call the builder, and leave
+`authnRequestId` unset; or configure the identity provider's IdP-initiated SSO
+URL as `authorizationUrl`, which the builder hands over without minting
+anything.
+
+#### Replay
+
+The default replay store is **process-wide**: one module-level in-memory store,
+`defaultReplayStore`, shared by every default validator in the process — both
+providers, every instance. An assertion accepted once is refused as a replay
+(`check: 'replay'`) for as long as it could still be accepted, however many
+providers are constructed; a store per provider would let a second provider
+accept what the first had seen. It is keyed by `{issuer, assertionId}`, since an
+ID is unique only within the identity provider that minted it. Only an assertion
+that passed every other check is recorded.
+
+What it does **not** protect: anything across processes. A second process, a
+restart, or a horizontally scaled deployment each start with an empty memory.
+For those, supply a shared store — `assertionReplayStore` on the provider, or
+`replayStore` on a shipped validator's options. Its `recordIfUnseen` must be
+atomic — a single conditional write, never a read followed by a write — because
+that race is exactly the one a replay exploits:
+
+```typescript
+import type { IAssertionReplayStore } from '@mcp-abap-adt/interfaces-auth';
+
+const sharedReplayStore: IAssertionReplayStore = {
+  async recordIfUnseen({ issuer, assertionId }, retainUntil) {
+    // e.g. Redis `SET key 1 NX PXAT <ms>`: true only when newly written.
+    return setIfAbsent(
+      `saml-replay:${issuer.length}:${issuer}:${assertionId}`,
+      retainUntil,
+    );
+  },
+};
+```
+
+The issuer is length-prefixed, as in the in-memory store, because both parts
+may contain `:` — without the length, issuer `a:b` with ID `c` and issuer `a`
+with ID `b:c` would share one key, and one would be refused as the other's
+replay.
+
+`createInMemoryReplayStore()` returns a store of your own, for isolation — a
+test, or a component that must not share memory with the rest of the process.
+The in-memory store prunes lazily when consulted, so it holds no timer and
+needs no disposal.
+
+#### Clock skew
+
+`clockSkewMs` defaults to **`0`**: this package applies no leniency you did not
+choose. It must be a finite, non-negative integer; anything else fails at
+construction. It widens the `NotBefore` and `NotOnOrAfter` checks of both
+`Conditions` and the bearer confirmation. A replay entry is retained until
+the earlier of `Conditions/@NotOnOrAfter` and the **latest** `NotOnOrAfter` of
+a bearer confirmation that answers the request and names the ACS — one not
+open yet included — plus `clockSkewMs`: the last instant the assertion could
+still be accepted. That is not `expiresAt`, which takes the earliest
+confirmation; with confirmations closing at +120 s and +600 s the session ends
+at +120 s, but the second still admits the assertion at +200 s, so the entry
+must outlive it. Neither window nor tolerance cuts a hole in replay detection.
+
+#### What a validated assertion carries: `raw` and `signedXml`
+
+You meet a `ValidatedAssertion` when you call a validator yourself or wrap one
+in an `IAssertionValidator` of your own. The shipped validators fill
+`expiresAt`, `assertionId`, `issuer`, `nameId` (the `Subject`'s `NameID`;
+`undefined` when it carries none or more than one — `NameID` is surfaced,
+never refused),
+`raw` and `signedXml`; they leave `sessionIndex` and `attributes` unset.
+
+- **`raw`** is the validator's input, unchanged — a `samlp:Response`, or a bare
+  `saml:Assertion` where the validator accepts one. It makes no promise about
+  what a provider forwards: `Saml2PureProvider` hands the payload to
+  `cookieProvider` as it is, while `Saml2BearerProvider` sends the extracted
+  Assertion, not `raw`. **Holding a `ValidatedAssertion` does not make all of
+  `raw` trustworthy**: a Response validated by `createSignedAssertionValidator`
+  carries `Status`, `Response/Issuer` and `Destination`, which nothing read and
+  nothing checked.
+- **`signedXml`** is what the signature covered, serialised: the `Assertion`,
+  or the `Response` when that is what was signed. Anything this interface does
+  not surface — attributes, a session index — must be parsed from `signedXml`,
+  never from `raw`. The difference between the two is the difference between
+  "signed" and "arrived".
+
+#### Using a shipped validator directly
+
+```typescript
+import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
+import {
+  AssertionValidationError,
+  createSignedResponseValidator,
+} from '@mcp-abap-adt/auth-providers';
+
+const validator = createSignedResponseValidator({
+  idpCertificates: [readFileSync('idp-signing.pem', 'utf8')],
+});
+
+try {
+  const validated = await validator.validate(samlResponseBase64, {
+    expectedInResponseTo: requestId, // omit only for an IdP-initiated login
+    audience: 'my-sp-entity',
+    acsUrl: 'https://sp.example.com/saml/acs',
+    expectedIssuer: 'https://idp.example.com/metadata', // required — see below
+  });
+  console.error(validated.nameId, validated.expiresAt);
+} catch (error) {
+  if (error instanceof AssertionValidationError) {
+    console.error(`refused at ${error.check}: ${error.message}`);
+  }
+  throw error;
+}
+```
+
+**Pass `expectedIssuer`.** It is optional on `AssertionContext`, for custom
+validators that establish trust some other way, but the shipped validators
+**fail closed** without it: every assertion is refused at `issuer`, since
+otherwise any issuer holding a key on your list would pass. The providers
+always pass `idpEntityId` there; a caller of a shipped validator must pass it
+itself. `expectedInResponseTo` follows the request-ID rule: given, the
+assertion must answer it; absent, the assertion must carry no `InResponseTo`.
+
+#### Errors
+
+| Error | When |
+|---|---|
+| `AssertionValidationError` | an assertion was refused. `check` (type `AssertionCheck`) names the row above — tell "your IdP declined" (`status`) from "not addressed to us" (`audience`, `bearerConfirmation`, `destination`) without parsing the message. `code` is `'ASSERTION_VALIDATION_ERROR'` (`ASSERTION_ERROR_CODES.VALIDATION_ERROR` from `@mcp-abap-adt/interfaces-auth`) |
+| `ValidationError` | configuration: `idpCertificates` or `idpEntityId` missing with no `assertionValidator`, or `idpEntityId` missing with a shipped validator supplied as `assertionValidator` (at construction); `idpInitiated` with no `authorizationUrl` and a strategy that calls `buildAuthorizationUrl` (inside the builder, before any URL is produced); `idpInitiated` combined with a declared `authnRequestId` (at construction); `authnRequestId` missing (at login, after the strategy returns and before the assertion is read). `missingFields` names the field |
+| `Error` | a certificate that is neither PEM nor base64 DER, or not a valid X.509 certificate; a `clockSkewMs` that is not a finite non-negative integer; and, for a shipped validator called directly, an empty `idpCertificates` (*"must not be empty"*) — all at construction. Through a provider, an empty `idpCertificates` is a `ValidationError` instead |
 
 ### With Stores
 
@@ -708,12 +1229,17 @@ import {
   SessionDataError,
   ServiceKeyError,
   BrowserAuthError,
+  AssertionValidationError,
 } from '@mcp-abap-adt/auth-providers';
 
 try {
   const result = await provider.getTokens();
 } catch (error) {
-  if (error instanceof ValidationError) {
+  if (error instanceof AssertionValidationError) {
+    // A SAML provider refused the assertion; `check` says which check failed
+    console.error('Assertion refused at:', error.check); // e.g. 'audience'
+    console.error('Error code:', error.code); // 'ASSERTION_VALIDATION_ERROR'
+  } else if (error instanceof ValidationError) {
     // provider config validation failed
     console.error('Missing required fields:', error.missingFields);
     console.error('Error code:', error.code); // 'VALIDATION_ERROR'
@@ -736,8 +1262,163 @@ try {
 - `SessionDataError` - Session data invalid, includes `missingFields: string[]`
 - `ServiceKeyError` - Service key data invalid, includes `missingFields: string[]`
 - `BrowserAuthError` - Browser auth failed, includes `cause?: Error`
+- `AssertionValidationError` - a SAML assertion was refused, includes `check: AssertionCheck` naming the check that failed — see [SAML assertion validation](#errors)
+
+All error codes are defined in `@mcp-abap-adt/interfaces-auth` package as `TOKEN_PROVIDER_ERROR_CODES`, and `AssertionValidationError`'s as `ASSERTION_ERROR_CODES`.
+
+## Upgrading from 4.0 to 4.1
+
+4.1.0 changes no export, configuration field or error class. It closes what
+the 4.0.0 reviews deferred, and three refusals get stricter.
+
+**What now fails that used to pass:**
+
+- a document carrying a SAML 1.x `Assertion`
+  (`urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:assertion`) outside the signed assertion — in
+  an unsigned `Extensions`, say — under either validator (`signedNode`). 4.0
+  refused a stray SAML 2.0 assertion but not a SAML 1.x one;
+- a document carrying an `Assertion` or `EncryptedAssertion` (SAML 2.0) or a
+  SAML 1.x `Assertion` inside a `ds:Signature` — in `ds:Object`, say — under
+  either validator (`signedNode`). An enveloped signature leaves its own
+  subtree unsigned, and 4.0's assertion-only validator accepted such an
+  element inside the signed assertion's signature, `Saml2BearerProvider`'s
+  default included;
+- a provider configured with both `idpInitiated: true` and `authnRequestId`.
+  Its constructor now throws a `ValidationError` (`missingFields:
+  ['idpInitiated']`); in 4.0 it constructed, and a `ValidationError` with the
+  same `missingFields` came only after `authorize()` returned. It could never
+  log in. A `Saml2BearerProvider` seeded with a `refreshToken` did work in 4.0
+  until that token lapsed, since a refresh never reaches the strategy; it now
+  fails at construction.
+
+Nothing else 4.0 accepted is refused now, and no refusal moved to a different
+`check`. Every other count rule — one `ds:Reference` per signature, one
+`Status`, `StatusCode`, `Issuer`, `Conditions`, `Subject` and
+`SubjectConfirmationData`, an `AudienceRestriction` naming an `Audience` —
+refused the same documents in 4.0; only its message is new.
+
+**Also changed:**
+
+- **Refusal messages are reworded** so each names its rule — see
+  [Refusal messages](#refusal-messages). `check` is unchanged for every
+  refusal. Code matching on message text must match on `check` instead.
+- `bearerConfirmation` refusals list why each candidate failed, in document
+  order, at most five.
+- Values from the document are quoted and cut in every message, including
+  the `Status` code, the issuer, `Destination`, the `Conditions` dates,
+  xml-crypto's own messages about a malformed signature, and the parser
+  message in `Saml2BearerProvider`'s bearer conversion.
+- The `bin` commands `auth-authorization-code` and `auth-client-credentials`
+  are removed. They never ran from an npm install: they pointed at `.ts`
+  files needing `tsx`, a devDependency, and imported `src/`, which is not
+  published.
+
+## Migrating from 3.x to 4.0
+
+4.0.0 changes nothing outside the two SAML providers. For those, it validates
+every assertion — see [SAML assertion validation](#saml-assertion-validation) —
+and a 3.x configuration no longer constructs:
 
-All error codes are defined in `@mcp-abap-adt/interfaces-auth` package as `TOKEN_PROVIDER_ERROR_CODES`.
+```
+The default assertion validator needs the identity provider it should trust:
+missing idpCertificates, idpEntityId. Supply these, or supply an
+assertionValidator of your own.
+```
+
+What to add, on `Saml2BearerProvider` and `Saml2PureProvider` alike:
+
+- **Whom to trust: `idpCertificates` and `idpEntityId`, or an
+  `assertionValidator`.** The certificates are the identity provider's signing
+  certificates, PEM or the bare base64 of `<X509Certificate>` in its metadata;
+  `idpEntityId` is the `Issuer` its assertions carry — its `entityID`. A
+  shipped validator supplied as `assertionValidator` still needs
+  `idpEntityId`; only a validator of your own does without.
+- **`spEntityId` must be your real entity ID.** It was already required, but in
+  3.x it only named the issuer of the AuthnRequest, and a login that never built
+  one never used it. It is now the `Audience` every `AudienceRestriction` must
+  name — for the bearer grant against UAA or XSUAA, the `entityID` in their SAML
+  metadata.
+- **`idpInitiated: true` for `Saml2BearerProvider` against UAA or XSUAA**, whose
+  saml2-bearer grant refuses an assertion carrying `InResponseTo`. With it, use
+  a strategy that does not call `buildAuthorizationUrl` — `staticCodeStrategy`
+  or your own. The 3.0 advice, `externalCodeStrategy` whose `provide` ignores
+  the URL, now fails: with `idpInitiated: true` and no `authorizationUrl`, the
+  builder refuses before producing a URL, since the only one it could build
+  carries an AuthnRequest.
+- **`authnRequestId` when the package does not build the request**: with a
+  pre-built `authorizationUrl`, or a strategy that returns a payload without
+  calling `buildAuthorizationUrl` after a request you sent — unless the login is
+  `idpInitiated`. Without either, the login fails before the assertion is read.
+- **The strategy's `redirectUri` must be the ACS the assertion names** in
+  `SubjectConfirmationData/@Recipient` — for the bearer grant, the token
+  endpoint's bearer ACS. `staticCodeStrategy` defaults it to
+  `http://localhost:61001/callback`, which such an assertion does not name.
+
+For the bearer grant against UAA or XSUAA, a 3.x configuration becomes:
+
+```typescript
+// 3.x
+new Saml2BearerProvider({
+  idpSsoUrl, spEntityId, uaaUrl, clientId, clientSecret,
+  authorization: externalCodeStrategy({ provide: async () => fetchAssertion() }),
+});
+
+// 4.0
+new Saml2BearerProvider({
+  idpSsoUrl, uaaUrl, clientId, clientSecret,
+  spEntityId: uaaEntityId,              // the entityID in UAA's SAML metadata
+  acsUrl: uaaBearerAcs,                 // its bearer ACS: the Recipient
+  idpCertificates: [idpSigningCertPem],
+  idpEntityId: 'https://idp.example.com/metadata',
+  idpInitiated: true,
+  authorization: {
+    // Never calls buildAuthorizationUrl; a fresh assertion per login.
+    authorize: async () => ({ payload: await fetchAssertion(), redirectUri: uaaBearerAcs }),
+  },
+});
+```
+
+**What now fails that used to pass:**
+
+- an unsigned assertion, one signed with a key not in `idpCertificates`, or one
+  altered after signing (`signature`);
+- under `Saml2PureProvider`'s default, a response whose `Response` is not
+  signed — an identity provider that signs only assertions. Select
+  `createSignedAssertionValidator` for it (`signedNode`);
+- under `Saml2PureProvider`'s default, a response whose `Status` is absent or
+  not `Success` (`status`), or whose `Destination` is absent or not the ACS it
+  arrived at (`destination`). `Saml2BearerProvider`'s default,
+  `createSignedAssertionValidator`, does not read `Status`, so a bearer
+  consumer sees no change there — a declining identity provider mints no
+  signed assertion, and the login is refused for want of one;
+- an assertion from another issuer (`issuer`), for another audience
+  (`audience`), expired or not yet valid (`notOnOrAfter`, `notBefore`,
+  `bearerConfirmation`), or whose bearer confirmation names another ACS as
+  `Recipient`, or none (`bearerConfirmation`);
+- an `InResponseTo` that does not answer the request sent, one present on a
+  login declared `idpInitiated`, or one missing from a login that sent a
+  request (`bearerConfirmation`);
+- the same assertion presented twice while it is still valid (`replay`) — for
+  instance a `staticCodeStrategy` payload reused by a second login;
+- a document carrying a second assertion, or an `EncryptedAssertion`, outside
+  the signed one (`signedNode`), or a duplicated `ID` (`duplicateId`).
+
+**Also changed:**
+
+- `Saml2PureProvider`'s `expiresAt` comes from the validated assertion — the
+  earlier of the `Conditions` and bearer-confirmation windows — not from the
+  first `NotOnOrAfter` a regular expression found. It can be earlier than
+  under 3.x.
+- `parseSamlNotOnOrAfter` is removed; `buildSamlAuthorizationUrl` returns
+  `{ url, requestId? }` instead of a string, and `getSamlAssertion` a
+  `SamlAssertionResult` instead of the payload string. None was exported from
+  the package root; only a deep import of `dist/auth/saml2Auth` or
+  `dist/providers/saml2Utils` is affected.
+- `@mcp-abap-adt/interfaces-auth` is `^2.0.0`, where
+  `AssertionContext.expectedInResponseTo` is optional. That matters only to an
+  implementer of `IAssertionValidator`, which must refuse an assertion carrying
+  `InResponseTo` when it is absent.
+- `xml-crypto` is a new runtime dependency, for signature verification.
 
 ## Migrating from 2.x to 3.0
 
@@ -880,6 +1561,13 @@ The package includes both unit tests (with mocks) and integration tests (with re
 npm test
 ```
 
+`npm test` also runs both shipped assertion validators end to end, through
+`Saml2PureProvider` and a real callback, against responses produced by a
+separately published mock identity provider, `@mcp-abap-adt/auth-mocks`. Every
+corruption variant it ships is refused at the check it targets — except
+`statusFailure` and `wrongDestination`, which the assertion-only validator,
+reading neither field, accepts; both halves are asserted.
+
 ### Integration Tests
 
 Integration tests work with real files from `tests/test-config.yaml`:
@@ -949,9 +1637,9 @@ it.
 
 | provider | server | what the suite proves |
 |---|---|---|
-| `Saml2BearerProvider` | UAA | a bearer assertion — and a whole `SAMLResponse` — is exchanged for a token; UAA issues a refresh token exactly when the client may hold one, and the provider refreshes without its authorization strategy |
-| `Saml2BearerProvider` | Keycloak → UAA | end to end with no assertion built by the tests: an IdP-initiated Keycloak login becomes a UAA token; the answer to the provider's own AuthnRequest is refused for its `InResponseTo` |
-| `Saml2PureProvider` | Keycloak | the identity-provider half: Keycloak accepts the provider's AuthnRequest and posts a signed response for that service provider to the ACS it named, which reaches `cookieProvider` unchanged |
+| `Saml2BearerProvider` | UAA | a bearer assertion — and a whole `SAMLResponse` — passes the default validator, declared `idpInitiated`, and is exchanged for a token; UAA issues a refresh token exactly when the client may hold one, and the provider refreshes without its authorization strategy |
+| `Saml2BearerProvider` | Keycloak → UAA | end to end with no assertion built by the tests: an IdP-initiated Keycloak login passes validation and becomes a UAA token; the answer to the provider's own AuthnRequest passes validation against the ID it minted, and UAA refuses it for its `InResponseTo` |
+| `Saml2PureProvider` | Keycloak | the identity-provider half: Keycloak accepts the provider's AuthnRequest and posts a response, signed at both levels, to the ACS it named; the default signed-Response validator accepts it against the ID the provider minted, and it reaches `cookieProvider` unchanged |
 | `ClientCredentialsProvider` | UAA | a client token |
 | `UaaPasscodeProvider` | UAA | a code fetched from `/passcode` after logging in there, exchanged for tokens; a refresh that does not ask for another code; a spent code refused |
 | `AuthorizationCodeProvider` | UAA | a login through UAA's own form, and a refresh without logging in again |
@@ -1021,13 +1709,20 @@ not-found message counts as absence.
 `XSUAA_KEEP=1` keeps the environment for another run. A full run takes about a minute and
 a half. It is not part of CI.
 
+Results of the 4.0 suite on a BTP trial subaccount, 2026-09-25 — 4 passed,
+1 skipped. Every SAML login is validated first, by `Saml2BearerProvider`'s default
+assertion-only validator, against the per-run test identity provider's
+certificate, declared `idpInitiated`:
+
 | check | result on XSUAA |
 |---|---|
-| `Saml2BearerProvider`, assertion without `InResponseTo` (IdP-initiated) | token and refresh token |
+| `Saml2BearerProvider`, assertion without `InResponseTo` (IdP-initiated) | passes validation; token and refresh token |
 | `Saml2BearerProvider`, a whole `SAMLResponse` | converted by the provider, accepted |
 | `Saml2BearerProvider`, refresh | never reaches the strategy |
-| `Saml2BearerProvider`, assertion with `InResponseTo` | refused — as UAA does |
-| `UaaPasscodeProvider` (with `XSUAA_PASSCODE=<code from /passcode>`) | token, refresh |
+| `Saml2BearerProvider`, assertion with `InResponseTo` | refused locally at `bearerConfirmation`, before any request reaches XSUAA |
+| `UaaPasscodeProvider` (with `XSUAA_PASSCODE=<code from /passcode>`) | skipped — no `XSUAA_PASSCODE` was set |
+
+Teardown removed everything setup had created.
 
 `UaaPasscodeProvider` was also checked by hand with an ABAP environment's own
 service key: its client accepts the passcode, and the token opens ADT. That
@@ -1080,10 +1775,11 @@ Example output:
 
 ## Dependencies
 
-- `@mcp-abap-adt/interfaces-auth` (^1.2.0) - Token provider and authorization contracts (`ITokenProvider`, `IAuthorizationStrategy`, `CallbackServerFactory`) and error code constants
-- `@mcp-abap-adt/interfaces-auth-sap` (^1.0.0) - XSUAA authorization configuration (`IAuthorizationConfig`)
+- `@mcp-abap-adt/interfaces-auth` (^2.0.1) - Token provider, authorization and assertion-validation contracts (`ITokenProvider`, `IAuthorizationStrategy`, `CallbackServerFactory`, `IAssertionValidator`, `IAssertionReplayStore`) and error code constants
+- `@mcp-abap-adt/interfaces-auth-sap` (^1.0.1) - XSUAA authorization configuration (`IAuthorizationConfig`)
 - `@mcp-abap-adt/interfaces-utils` (^1.1.0) - `ILogger`
-- `@xmldom/xmldom` - XML parsing, to take the Assertion out of a SAMLResponse for the saml2-bearer grant
+- `@xmldom/xmldom` - XML parsing: SAML assertion validation, and taking the Assertion out of a SAMLResponse for the saml2-bearer grant
+- `xml-crypto` - XML-DSig signature verification for SAML assertion validation
 - `axios` - HTTP client
 - `express` - OAuth2 callback server
 - `open` - Browser opening utility