@matt82198/aesop 0.1.0 → 0.2.0

package/driver/wave_bridge.py

@@ -0,0 +1,246 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Wave bridge: connects AgentDriver backends to wave-flat-dispatch manifest items.
+
+Phase 3: the driver->wave-manifest seam that makes the tier-2 wiring from PR #215
+actually driven by a backend's honest self-report.
+
+ARCHITECTURE
+------------
+Two core functions bridge the gap between AgentDriver backends and the wave's
+item manifest:
+
+1. build_manifest_item(driver, item) -> dict
+   Given an AgentDriver + a backlog item {slug, ownsFiles, prompt, testCmd, workDir},
+   produce the manifest-item dict the wave expects, with verificationTier and model
+   baked in from the driver's probe. This makes tier-driven verification tier driven
+   by backend capability, not config knobs.
+
+2. dispatch_item(driver, item) -> dict
+   Route execution by the driver's capabilities:
+   - If worker_filesystem_access is True (Claude/tier-1 harness path): return a
+     descriptor indicating the item should go through the normal harness worker
+     path (do NOT try to fake a Claude agent here — return {route:'harness', ...}).
+   - If False (codex/tier-2 non-agentic): DRIVE it via orchestrator-side contract:
+     call driver.dispatch_worker(WorkerRequest(...)), then run the item's test via
+     driver.run_command() and decide pass ONLY from exit code 0 (NEVER from the
+     model's say-so). Return {route:'driver', ok, testExit, filesWritten}.
+
+HONESTY & FAIL-SAFE
+-------------------
+Any exception -> a failed result, never a false green. Green only from run_command
+exit 0. Ownership is enforced at the driver level (dispatch_worker rejects
+out-of-scope paths). The bridge trusts the driver's probe truthfulness — if it
+lies about worker_filesystem_access, the routing will be wrong, but the failure
+will be loud and caught in CI.
+
+stdlib-only, ASCII-only, Windows + Linux safe.
+"""
+
+import json
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Dict, Optional, Any
+
+# Add driver/ to path for imports.
+REPO = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
+DRIVER_DIR = REPO / "driver"
+if str(DRIVER_DIR) not in sys.path:
+    sys.path.insert(0, str(DRIVER_DIR))
+
+from agent_driver import (
+    AgentDriver,
+    WorkerRequest,
+    ROLE_WORKER,
+)
+from verification_policy import verification_policy
+
+
+def build_manifest_item(driver: AgentDriver, item: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+    """Build a manifest item from a backlog item and an AgentDriver.
+
+    Takes a backlog item {slug, ownsFiles, prompt, testCmd, workDir, ...} and an
+    AgentDriver, and produces a manifest-item dict that the wave expects, with
+    verificationTier and model baked in from the driver's probed capabilities,
+    PLUS all four resolved policy knobs.
+
+    This is the seam that makes tier-driven verification actually driven by the
+    backend's honest self-report: a weak backend raises the orchestrator's burden
+    via recommended_verification_tier, not config.
+
+    The policy is RESOLVED ONCE here in Python and carried as literal manifest
+    fields, so JS cannot recompute/drift. The template consumes these resolved
+    values; tier-1/Claude path with no verificationTier must behave exactly as
+    before (tier-1 defaults: repairCap=1, requireAdversarialReview=false,
+    spotCheckFrac=0.10, validateAllJson=false).
+
+    Args:
+        driver: AgentDriver instance (provides probe_capabilities, resolve_model).
+        item: dict with at least {slug, ownsFiles, prompt}. May also have
+              testCmd, workDir, selfCheckCmd, label, phase, effort.
+
+    Returns:
+        dict with all item fields PLUS:
+          - model: concrete model id from driver.resolve_model('worker')
+          - verificationTier: recommended tier from driver.probe_capabilities()
+          - repairCap: resolved repair budget for this tier
+          - requireAdversarialReview: resolved adversarial review requirement
+          - spotCheckFrac: resolved spot-check fraction for this tier
+          - validateAllJson: resolved JSON validation strictness for this tier
+        The dict is suitable for passing to wave-flat-dispatch.template.mjs as an
+        item in the items[] array. All four policy fields are consumed directly
+        by the template; it does NOT recompute them.
+    """
+    caps = driver.probe_capabilities()
+    model = driver.resolve_model(ROLE_WORKER)
+
+    # Resolve all four policy knobs from the backend's verification tier.
+    policy = verification_policy(caps)
+
+    # Copy the input item and enrich with model, tier, and all four policy knobs.
+    result = dict(item)
+    result["model"] = model
+    result["verificationTier"] = caps.recommended_verification_tier
+    result["repairCap"] = policy["repair_cap"]
+    result["requireAdversarialReview"] = policy["require_adversarial_review"]
+    result["spotCheckFrac"] = policy["spot_check_frac"]
+    result["validateAllJson"] = policy["validate_all_json"]
+
+    return result
+
+
+def dispatch_item(
+    driver: AgentDriver, item: Dict[str, Any], workdir: Optional[str] = None
+) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+    """Route execution of a backlog item through an AgentDriver backend.
+
+    Dispatches a single item through the driver, honoring its capabilities:
+
+    - If driver.probe_capabilities().worker_filesystem_access is True (Claude Code
+      tier-1 harness path): return {route:'harness', ...} to indicate the item
+      should go through the normal harness worker path. We do NOT attempt to fake
+      a Claude agent here — the harness will handle it.
+
+    - If False (Codex/tier-2, non-agentic): DRIVE it via orchestrator-side contract:
+      1. Call driver.dispatch_worker(WorkerRequest(...)) with the item's prompt,
+         owned files, and workdir. The driver injects file context, returns produced
+         files.
+      2. Run the item's test via driver.run_command(...) and decide pass ONLY from
+         exit code 0 (NEVER from the model's say-so). This is the center verification
+         rule: the orchestrator is the ground truth, not the model.
+      3. Return a structured result {route:'driver', ok, testExit, filesWritten}.
+
+    FAIL-SAFE: any exception -> a failed result (ok=False), never a false green.
+    Ownership is enforced at the driver level (dispatch_worker rejects out-of-scope
+    paths wholesale). Green only from run_command exit code 0.
+
+    Args:
+        driver: AgentDriver instance.
+        item: dict with at least {slug, ownsFiles, prompt, testCmd}. May also have
+              workDir, selfCheckCmd, label, phase, effort.
+        workdir: optional override for the working directory (defaults to item.workDir
+                 or '.').
+
+    Returns:
+        dict with the following keys:
+          - route: 'harness' or 'driver'
+          - ok: bool (only True if driver route AND test passed)
+          - testExit: int (exit code from run_command, if route=='driver'; None otherwise)
+          - filesWritten: list of str (files written by the driver, if route=='driver'; None if 'harness')
+          - error: str (error message, if ok=False; None otherwise)
+          - workerId: str (worker id from dispatch_worker, if route=='driver'; None otherwise)
+          - verified: bool (True only if test was run and passed; False if not tested or test failed)
+          - reason: str (optional; present when item could not be verified, e.g. 'no_test_command')
+    """
+    try:
+        caps = driver.probe_capabilities()
+        slug = item.get("slug", "unknown")
+
+        # Determine working directory.
+        exec_workdir = workdir or item.get("workdir") or item.get("workDir") or "."
+
+        # Route by driver capability.
+        if caps.worker_filesystem_access:
+            # Claude Code tier-1 path: harness will handle it.
+            return {
+                "route": "harness",
+                "ok": False,  # Unknown status; harness will set actual result
+                "testExit": None,
+                "filesWritten": None,
+                "error": None,
+                "workerId": None,
+                "verified": False,  # Not verified by orchestrator (harness will verify)
+            }
+
+        # Codex/tier-2 non-agentic path: orchestrator-managed dispatch.
+        # Extract fields from item.
+        prompt = item.get("prompt", "")
+        owned_files = tuple(item.get("ownsFiles", []))
+        test_cmd = item.get("testCmd", "")
+        model = item.get("model")
+
+        # Dispatch the worker.
+        request = WorkerRequest(
+            prompt=prompt,
+            owned_files=owned_files,
+            workdir=exec_workdir,
+            model=model,
+            role=ROLE_WORKER,
+            label=f"dispatch:{slug}",
+        )
+        result = driver.dispatch_worker(request)
+
+        if not result.ok:
+            # Worker dispatch failed (malformed JSON, ownership violation, etc.).
+            return {
+                "route": "driver",
+                "ok": False,
+                "testExit": None,
+                "filesWritten": None,
+                "error": f"dispatch_worker failed: {result.error}",
+                "workerId": result.worker_id,
+                "verified": False,  # Not verified (dispatch failed)
+            }
+
+        # Worker succeeded; now run the test command.
+        # Green is decided ONLY by exit code 0, never by the model's done:true.
+        if not test_cmd:
+            # No test command: MUST fail-closed. An unverified item must never
+            # report success — that violates aesop's core honesty guarantee:
+            # "no test to fail" is NOT the same as "verified correct."
+            return {
+                "route": "driver",
+                "ok": False,
+                "testExit": None,
+                "filesWritten": list(result.files_written or []),
+                "error": "no testCmd: cannot verify, refusing to report success",
+                "workerId": result.worker_id,
+                "verified": False,  # Not verified (no test to run)
+                "reason": "no_test_command",
+            }
+
+        test_result = driver.run_command(test_cmd, cwd=exec_workdir)
+
+        # Decision: ok=True ONLY if test exit code is 0.
+        ok = test_result.exit_code == 0
+
+        return {
+            "route": "driver",
+            "ok": ok,
+            "testExit": test_result.exit_code,
+            "filesWritten": list(result.files_written or []),
+            "error": None if ok else f"test failed with exit {test_result.exit_code}",
+            "workerId": result.worker_id,
+            "verified": ok,  # Verified if and only if test passed (exit 0)
+        }
+
+    except Exception as exc:
+        # Catch-all: any unexpected error -> failed result, never a false green.
+        return {
+            "route": "driver",
+            "ok": False,
+            "testExit": None,
+            "filesWritten": None,
+            "error": f"dispatch_item internal error: {exc}",
+            "workerId": None,
+            "verified": False,  # Not verified (exception during execution)
+        }