@mastra/factory 0.12.0-alpha.13 → 0.12.0-alpha.15

package/dist/integrations/github/sandbox.js

@@ -1,6 +1,23 @@
 import { timedPhase } from "../../timing.js";
+import { repoCloneCommand } from "../../packages/_internals/workspace/dist/index.js";
 //#region src/integrations/github/sandbox.ts
 /**
+* Repo materialization for GitHub-backed repositories.
+*
+* A GitHub repo is never cloned onto the server host. The repo is cloned
+* *inside* the session's sandbox, so the agent's file tools and command tools
+* operate entirely against the remote checkout.
+*
+* - `materializeRepo(row, token)` clones the repo inside the sandbox when no
+*   checkout exists yet (a base-image boot, a wiped disk), using a short-lived
+*   installation token that is scrubbed from the git remote afterwards so it
+*   never persists in the VM. A checkout that is already there, from a repo
+*   template image or an earlier start, is left exactly as it is.
+*
+* This module owns everything git/GitHub: clone, commit/push, setup/teardown commands,
+* and `gh pr create`. Workdir layout lives in `../sandbox/workdir`.
+*/
+/**
 * Single-quote a string for safe POSIX shell interpolation. Wraps the value in
 * single quotes and escapes any embedded single quote using the canonical
 * close-quote / escaped-quote / reopen-quote sequence (`'\''`). This is the
@@ -42,16 +59,22 @@ const SH_RETRY_DELAY_MS = 2e3;
 */
 async function sh(sandbox, script, options = {}) {
 	const deadlineMs = Date.now() + (options.timeoutMs ?? 9e5);
-	for (let attempt = 0;; attempt++) try {
-		return await shOnce(sandbox, script, {
-			...options,
-			timeoutMs: Math.max(deadlineMs - Date.now(), 1)
-		});
-	} catch (error) {
-		if (attempt >= SH_RETRIES || !isTransientTransportError(error)) throw error;
-		const delayMs = SH_RETRY_DELAY_MS * (attempt + 1);
-		if (deadlineMs - Date.now() <= delayMs) throw error;
-		await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, delayMs));
+	for (let attempt = 0;; attempt++) {
+		const started = performance.now();
+		try {
+			const result = await shOnce(sandbox, script, {
+				...options,
+				timeoutMs: Math.max(deadlineMs - Date.now(), 1)
+			});
+			if (options.phase) process.stderr.write(`[factory:timing] ${options.phase} attempt=${attempt + 1} exit=${result.exitCode} ${Math.round(performance.now() - started)}ms\n`);
+			return result;
+		} catch (error) {
+			if (options.phase) process.stderr.write(`[factory:timing] ${options.phase} attempt=${attempt + 1} threw after ${Math.round(performance.now() - started)}ms: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)}\n`);
+			if (attempt >= SH_RETRIES || !isTransientTransportError(error)) throw error;
+			const delayMs = SH_RETRY_DELAY_MS * (attempt + 1);
+			if (deadlineMs - Date.now() <= delayMs) throw error;
+			await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, delayMs));
+		}
 	}
 }
 /** Single `sh -c` execution attempt, bounded by the hang guard. */
@@ -109,6 +132,7 @@ async function gitTransfer(sandbox, script, options = {}) {
 			timeoutMs: Math.max(deadlineMs - Date.now(), 1)
 		});
 		if (result.exitCode === 0 || attempt >= GIT_TRANSFER_RETRIES || !isTransientGitFailure(result)) return result;
+		process.stderr.write(`[factory:timing] git ${shOptions.phase ?? "transfer"} retrying after attempt ${attempt + 1}\n`);
 		const delayMs = GIT_TRANSFER_RETRY_DELAY_MS * (attempt + 1);
 		if (deadlineMs - Date.now() <= delayMs) return result;
 		await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, delayMs));
@@ -135,9 +159,10 @@ function cleanUrl(repoFullName) {
 	return `https://github.com/${repoFullName}.git`;
 }
 /**
-* Materialize the repo inside the user's sandbox. Clones on first open, pulls on
-* re-open. Always scrubs the install token from the remote afterwards and sets
-* `materialized_at` on the per-user sandbox binding row.
+* Materialize the repo inside the user's sandbox: clone when no checkout of
+* this repo exists, otherwise nothing. Scrubs the install token from the
+* remote after a clone and sets `materialized_at` on the per-user sandbox
+* binding row.
 */
 async function materializeRepo(options) {
 	return timedPhase("workspace.materialize", () => materializeRepoImpl(options));
@@ -149,13 +174,18 @@ async function materializeRepoImpl(options) {
 	if (!/^[\w.-]+\/[\w.-]+$/.test(repo)) throw new MaterializeError(`Refusing to materialize: invalid repo full name '${repo}'.`, "clone-failed");
 	if (!/^[A-Za-z0-9_./-]+$/.test(repoInfo.defaultBranch)) throw new MaterializeError(`Refusing to materialize: invalid default branch '${repoInfo.defaultBranch}'.`, "clone-failed");
 	if ((await sh(sandbox, "git --version")).exitCode !== 0) throw new MaterializeError("git is not installed in the sandbox. The sandbox template must include git.", "git-missing");
-	const authUrl = tokenUrl(repo, token);
-	const alreadyMaterialized = await hasExistingCheckout(sandbox, workdir, repo);
-	let tokenInRemote = false;
-	try {
-		if (!alreadyMaterialized) {
-			await sh(sandbox, `mkdir -p ${shellQuote(workdir)} && find ${shellQuote(workdir)} -mindepth 1 -maxdepth 1 -exec rm -rf -- {} +`);
-			const clone = await gitTransfer(sandbox, `git clone --depth=1 --single-branch --branch ${shellQuote(repoInfo.defaultBranch)} ${shellQuote(authUrl)} ${shellQuote(workdir)}`, {
+	const existing = await existingCheckoutRemote(sandbox, workdir, repo);
+	if (existing !== null) {
+		if (/\/\/[^/]*@/.test(existing)) await scrubRemote(sandbox, workdir, repo, true);
+	} else {
+		await sh(sandbox, `mkdir -p ${shellQuote(workdir)} && find ${shellQuote(workdir)} -mindepth 1 -maxdepth 1 -exec rm -rf -- {} +`);
+		let tokenInRemote = false;
+		try {
+			const clone = await gitTransfer(sandbox, repoCloneCommand({
+				cloneUrl: tokenUrl(repo, token),
+				destination: workdir,
+				branch: repoInfo.defaultBranch
+			}), {
 				phase: "repository clone",
 				beforeRetry: async () => {
 					await sh(sandbox, `mkdir -p ${shellQuote(workdir)} && find ${shellQuote(workdir)} -mindepth 1 -maxdepth 1 -exec rm -rf -- {} +`);
@@ -166,19 +196,11 @@ async function materializeRepoImpl(options) {
 				throw classifyGitFailure(clone, "clone-failed");
 			}
 			tokenInRemote = true;
-		} else {
-			const setUrl = await sh(sandbox, `git -C ${shellQuote(workdir)} remote set-url origin ${shellQuote(authUrl)}`);
-			if (setUrl.exitCode !== 0) throw new MaterializeError(`Failed to set git remote: ${setUrl.stderr}`, "pull-failed");
-			tokenInRemote = true;
-			const pull = await gitTransfer(sandbox, `git -C ${shellQuote(workdir)} pull --ff-only`, { phase: "repository pull" });
-			if (pull.exitCode !== 0) {
-				if (!isBenignNonFastForward(pull)) throw classifyGitFailure(pull, "pull-failed");
-			}
+		} catch (primary) {
+			throw await scrubbedFailure(sandbox, workdir, repo, tokenInRemote, primary, "clone-failed");
 		}
-	} catch (primary) {
-		throw await scrubbedFailure(sandbox, workdir, repo, tokenInRemote, primary, "pull-failed");
+		await scrubRemote(sandbox, workdir, repo, tokenInRemote);
 	}
-	await scrubRemote(sandbox, workdir, repo, tokenInRemote);
 	await storage.markMaterialized({ id: sandboxRow.id });
 }
 /** Check out a session's branch inside its isolated repository clone. */
@@ -199,7 +221,7 @@ async function checkoutSessionBranchImpl(sandbox, workdir, { branch, baseBranch,
 	}
 	const authUrl = tokenUrl(repoFullName, token);
 	try {
-		const setUrl = await sh(sandbox, `git -C ${shellQuote(workdir)} remote set-url origin ${shellQuote(authUrl)}`);
+		const setUrl = await sh(sandbox, `git -C ${shellQuote(workdir)} remote set-url origin ${shellQuote(authUrl)}`, { phase: "branch checkout remote" });
 		if (setUrl.exitCode !== 0) throw classifyGitFailure(setUrl, "pull-failed");
 		const fetch = await sh(sandbox, `git -C ${shellQuote(workdir)} fetch origin ${shellQuote(baseBranch)} && git -C ${shellQuote(workdir)} checkout -b ${shellQuote(branch)} FETCH_HEAD`, {
 			timeoutMs: CHECKOUT_COMMAND_TIMEOUT_MS,
@@ -244,16 +266,27 @@ function isBlockedByLocalWork(result) {
 	return /Your local changes to the following files would be overwritten by checkout|untracked working tree files would be overwritten by checkout/i.test(output);
 }
 /**
-* True when the workdir already holds a git checkout whose `origin` points at
-* this exact repo. Matches both the clean and token-auth URL forms; any other
-* remote (or no git dir at all) falls back to the clone path.
+* The `origin` URL of a checkout of this exact repo in the workdir, or null
+* when there is none. Matches both the clean and token-auth URL forms; any
+* other remote (or no git dir at all) sends materialize down the clone path.
 */
-async function hasExistingCheckout(sandbox, workdir, repoFullName) {
+async function existingCheckoutRemote(sandbox, workdir, repoFullName) {
 	const result = await sh(sandbox, `git -C ${shellQuote(workdir)} remote get-url origin`);
-	if (result.exitCode !== 0) return false;
-	const url = result.stdout.trim().toLowerCase();
-	const suffix = `github.com/${repoFullName.toLowerCase()}`;
-	return url.endsWith(`${suffix}.git`) || url.endsWith(suffix);
+	if (result.exitCode !== 0) return null;
+	const url = result.stdout.trim();
+	return isRemoteForRepo(url, repoFullName) ? url : null;
+}
+/** True only for `https://github.com/<repo>[.git]`, with or without embedded credentials. */
+function isRemoteForRepo(url, repoFullName) {
+	let parsed;
+	try {
+		parsed = new URL(url);
+	} catch {
+		return false;
+	}
+	if (parsed.protocol !== "https:" || parsed.hostname.toLowerCase() !== "github.com") return false;
+	if (parsed.port !== "" || parsed.search !== "" || parsed.hash !== "") return false;
+	return parsed.pathname.replace(/\.git$/, "").toLowerCase() === `/${repoFullName.toLowerCase()}`;
 }
 /** Probed without `git -C` so a missing workdir returns false instead of throwing. */
 async function hasGitDir(sandbox, workdir) {
@@ -302,30 +335,6 @@ async function scrubbedFailure(sandbox, workdir, repoFullName, tokenInRemote, pr
 	}
 }
 /**
-* True when a failed `git pull --ff-only` on re-open just means the current
-* branch can't be fast-forwarded — not that anything is broken. The shared
-* workdir is routinely left on a session's working branch, which may have
-* local commits diverging from upstream, no upstream at all (session branches
-* are created from `FETCH_HEAD`), or a detached HEAD. A checkout can also
-* hold uncommitted or untracked files (a build or script run left residue,
-* or an older session worked directly in the shared checkout), which makes
-* git refuse the merge outright. A checkout carrying `pull.rebase` in its git
-* config refuses for the same reason but says so in rebase's words instead of
-* merge's. After a PR merges with branch auto-delete, the configured upstream
-* ref may also be gone (`no such ref was fetched` / `couldn't find remote ref`);
-* there is nothing to pull and the checkout is still intact. In all of these
-* cases materialization must keep it as-is rather than fail the workspace open
-* — and must never discard the local state to force the pull through.
-*/
-function isDeletedUpstreamRef(result) {
-	const output = `${result.stderr || ""}\n${result.stdout || ""}`;
-	return /no such ref was fetched|couldn't find remote ref/i.test(output);
-}
-function isBenignNonFastForward(result) {
-	const output = `${result.stderr || ""}\n${result.stdout || ""}`;
-	return isDeletedUpstreamRef(result) || /Not possible to fast-forward|Diverging branches can't be fast-forwarded|no tracking information for the current branch|You are not currently on a branch|Your local changes to the following files would be overwritten by merge|untracked working tree files would be overwritten by merge|cannot pull with rebase|cannot rebase: You have unstaged changes|Your index contains uncommitted changes/i.test(output);
-}
-/**
 * Turn a failed git command into an actionable error, detecting the common
 * "cannot reach github.com" egress failure.
 */
@@ -524,6 +533,6 @@ async function createPullRequest(sandbox, workdir, { token, base, head, title, b
 	return { url };
 }
 //#endregion
-export { CHECKOUT_COMMAND_TIMEOUT_MS, DEFAULT_COMMAND_TIMEOUT_MS, MaterializeError, SetupCommandError, checkoutSessionBranch, commitAll, configureGitIdentity, createPullRequest, hasExistingCheckout, isValidGitRef, materializeRepo, pushBranch, resolveGitIdentity, runSetupCommand, runTeardownCommand, sh, shellQuote, withInstallToken };
+export { CHECKOUT_COMMAND_TIMEOUT_MS, DEFAULT_COMMAND_TIMEOUT_MS, MaterializeError, SetupCommandError, checkoutSessionBranch, commitAll, configureGitIdentity, createPullRequest, isValidGitRef, materializeRepo, pushBranch, resolveGitIdentity, runSetupCommand, runTeardownCommand, sh, shellQuote, withInstallToken };
 
 //# sourceMappingURL=sandbox.js.map

package/dist/integrations/github/sandbox.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"sandbox.js","names":[],"sources":["../../../src/integrations/github/sandbox.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Repo materialization for GitHub-backed repositories.\n *\n * A GitHub repo is never cloned onto the server host. The repo is cloned\n * *inside* the session's sandbox, so the agent's file tools and command tools\n * operate entirely against the remote checkout.\n *\n * - `materializeRepo(row, token)` runs `git clone` (first open) or `git pull`\n *   (re-open) inside the sandbox, using a short-lived installation token that is\n *   scrubbed from the git remote afterwards so it never persists in the VM.\n *\n * This module owns everything git/GitHub: clone/pull, commit/push, setup/teardown commands,\n * and `gh pr create`. Workdir layout lives in `../sandbox/workdir`.\n */\n\nimport type { ExecutableSandbox, SandboxCommandResult } from '../../sandbox/materialization.js';\nimport type { SourceControlStorageHandle } from '../../storage/domains/source-control/base.js';\nimport { timedPhase } from '../../timing.js';\n\ntype MaterializationStore = Pick<SourceControlStorageHandle['sessions'], 'markMaterialized'>;\n\ninterface RepoMaterializationBinding {\n  id: string;\n  sandboxWorkdir: string;\n  materializedAt: Date | null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Single-quote a string for safe POSIX shell interpolation. Wraps the value in\n * single quotes and escapes any embedded single quote using the canonical\n * close-quote / escaped-quote / reopen-quote sequence (`'\\''`). This is the\n * standard POSIX-safe construction and prevents the quoted string from being\n * terminated early.\n */\nexport function shellQuote(value: string): string {\n  // Replace each ' with the four-character sequence: ' \\ ' '\n  return `'` + value.split(`'`).join(`'\\\\''`) + `'`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Default hang guard for sandbox shell commands. Generous by design — large\n * clones and dependency installs legitimately take minutes; the guard exists\n * so a wedged sandbox surfaces a failure instead of hanging the request that\n * triggered materialization forever.\n */\nexport const DEFAULT_COMMAND_TIMEOUT_MS = 15 * 60_000;\n/** Branch checkout only fetches one ref — a much tighter budget applies. */\nexport const CHECKOUT_COMMAND_TIMEOUT_MS = 5 * 60_000;\n\ninterface ShOptions {\n  /** Override the hang-guard budget for this command. */\n  timeoutMs?: number;\n  /** Human-readable phase name included in the timeout error. */\n  phase?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * A thrown transport-level failure that is worth retrying: remote sandbox\n * providers (e.g. the platform workspace proxy) surface transient 5xx errors\n * as exceptions carrying an HTTP `status` — typically while a freshly\n * provisioned VM is still coming up. Command failures are NOT exceptions\n * (they resolve with a non-zero exit code), so retrying here never re-runs a\n * command that the sandbox already executed and rejected.\n */\nfunction isTransientTransportError(error: unknown): boolean {\n  const status = (error as { status?: unknown })?.status;\n  return typeof status === 'number' && status >= 500;\n}\n\nconst SH_RETRIES = 2;\nconst SH_RETRY_DELAY_MS = 2000;\n\n/**\n * Run a shell script in the sandbox via `sh -c`, bounded by a hang guard.\n * Transient transport-level 5xx failures (proxy hiccups while the VM boots)\n * are retried with a short backoff; every script routed through here is safe\n * to re-run. Hang-guard timeouts are NOT retried — the budget applies to the\n * command as a whole.\n */\nexport async function sh(\n  sandbox: ExecutableSandbox,\n  script: string,\n  options: ShOptions = {},\n): Promise<SandboxCommandResult> {\n  // One budget for the command as a whole: each attempt only gets the time\n  // remaining, so transport retries can never multiply the hang guard.\n  const deadlineMs = Date.now() + (options.timeoutMs ?? DEFAULT_COMMAND_TIMEOUT_MS);\n  for (let attempt = 0; ; attempt++) {\n    try {\n      return await shOnce(sandbox, script, { ...options, timeoutMs: Math.max(deadlineMs - Date.now(), 1) });\n    } catch (error) {\n      if (attempt >= SH_RETRIES || !isTransientTransportError(error)) throw error;\n      const delayMs = SH_RETRY_DELAY_MS * (attempt + 1);\n      if (deadlineMs - Date.now() <= delayMs) throw error;\n      await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, delayMs));\n    }\n  }\n}\n\n/** Single `sh -c` execution attempt, bounded by the hang guard. */\nasync function shOnce(\n  sandbox: ExecutableSandbox,\n  script: string,\n  options: ShOptions,\n): Promise<SandboxCommandResult> {\n  const timeoutMs = options.timeoutMs ?? DEFAULT_COMMAND_TIMEOUT_MS;\n  let timer: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | undefined;\n  const hangGuard = new Promise<never>((_, reject) => {\n    timer = setTimeout(() => {\n      const phase = options.phase ? ` during ${options.phase}` : '';\n      reject(new Error(`Sandbox command timed out after ${Math.round(timeoutMs / 1000)}s${phase}.`));\n    }, timeoutMs);\n    timer.unref?.();\n  });\n  try {\n    // Forward the budget to the provider too so it can terminate the wedged\n    // process; the race stays as the outer guard for providers that ignore it.\n    return await Promise.race([sandbox.executeCommand('sh', ['-c', script], { timeout: timeoutMs }), hangGuard]);\n  } finally {\n    clearTimeout(timer);\n  }\n}\n\nconst GIT_TRANSFER_RETRIES = 2;\nconst GIT_TRANSFER_RETRY_DELAY_MS = 2000;\n\n/**\n * True when a git transfer died mid-flight rather than being refused.\n *\n * `sh` already retries transport errors the sandbox provider *throws*, but a\n * git command that reaches the network and then loses it exits non-zero\n * instead — so a single HTTP/2 framing glitch or dropped connection to\n * github.com would otherwise permanently fail opening a workspace. These\n * patterns all mean \"the bytes stopped arriving\", which says nothing about\n * whether the operation would succeed if attempted again.\n *\n * Deliberately narrow: a refusal (bad credentials, missing repo, blocked\n * egress) is terminal and must surface immediately rather than be retried into\n * a slow failure.\n */\nfunction isTransientGitFailure(result: SandboxCommandResult): boolean {\n  const output = `${result.stderr || ''}\\n${result.stdout || ''}`;\n  return /HTTP2 framing layer|RPC failed; curl|RPC failed; HTTP 5\\d\\d|the remote end hung up unexpectedly|early EOF|unexpected disconnect|connection reset by peer|Recv failure|Send failure|GnuTLS recv error|TLS connection was non-properly terminated|502 Bad Gateway|503 Service Unavailable/i.test(\n    output,\n  );\n}\n\n/**\n * Run a git command that only *reads* from the remote, retrying it when the\n * transfer dies mid-flight. Restricted to read-only transfers on purpose:\n * re-running a clone or a fetch is free, whereas re-running a push could\n * duplicate work already accepted by the remote before the connection dropped.\n *\n * `beforeRetry` lets a call site clear whatever the aborted attempt left\n * behind — a half-written clone directory blocks the next `git clone` outright.\n */\nasync function gitTransfer(\n  sandbox: ExecutableSandbox,\n  script: string,\n  options: ShOptions & { beforeRetry?: (attempt: number) => Promise<void> } = {},\n): Promise<SandboxCommandResult> {\n  const { beforeRetry, ...shOptions } = options;\n  const deadlineMs = Date.now() + (shOptions.timeoutMs ?? DEFAULT_COMMAND_TIMEOUT_MS);\n  for (let attempt = 0; ; attempt++) {\n    const result = await sh(sandbox, script, {\n      ...shOptions,\n      timeoutMs: Math.max(deadlineMs - Date.now(), 1),\n    });\n    if (result.exitCode === 0 || attempt >= GIT_TRANSFER_RETRIES || !isTransientGitFailure(result)) return result;\n    const delayMs = GIT_TRANSFER_RETRY_DELAY_MS * (attempt + 1);\n    if (deadlineMs - Date.now() <= delayMs) return result;\n    await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, delayMs));\n    await beforeRetry?.(attempt + 1);\n  }\n}\n\n/** Error raised when the sandbox cannot materialize the repo (actionable). */\nexport class MaterializeError extends Error {\n  constructor(\n    message: string,\n    readonly code:\n      | 'git-missing'\n      | 'egress-blocked'\n      | 'clone-failed'\n      | 'pull-failed'\n      | 'push-failed'\n      | 'commit-failed'\n      | 'gh-missing'\n      | 'pr-failed',\n  ) {\n    super(message);\n    this.name = 'MaterializeError';\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the token-auth clone/pull URL for a repo. The token lives only inside\n * this URL and is scrubbed from the remote after the operation.\n */\nfunction tokenUrl(repoFullName: string, token: string): string {\n  return `https://x-access-token:${token}@github.com/${repoFullName}.git`;\n}\n\nfunction cleanUrl(repoFullName: string): string {\n  return `https://github.com/${repoFullName}.git`;\n}\n\n/** Repo metadata needed to materialize, read from the org-owned project row. */\nexport interface RepoMaterializeInfo {\n  repoFullName: string;\n  defaultBranch: string;\n}\n\n/** Options for {@link materializeRepo}. */\nexport interface MaterializeRepoOptions {\n  /** The per-(project,user) sandbox binding whose workdir this materializes into. */\n  row: RepoMaterializationBinding;\n  /** Repo metadata from the org-owned project row. */\n  repoInfo: RepoMaterializeInfo;\n  /** The live sandbox to run git inside. */\n  sandbox: ExecutableSandbox;\n  /** A freshly minted, short-lived installation access token. */\n  token: string;\n  storage: MaterializationStore;\n}\n\n/**\n * Materialize the repo inside the user's sandbox. Clones on first open, pulls on\n * re-open. Always scrubs the install token from the remote afterwards and sets\n * `materialized_at` on the per-user sandbox binding row.\n */\nexport async function materializeRepo(options: MaterializeRepoOptions): Promise<void> {\n  return timedPhase('workspace.materialize', () => materializeRepoImpl(options));\n}\n\nasync function materializeRepoImpl(options: MaterializeRepoOptions): Promise<void> {\n  const { row: sandboxRow, repoInfo, sandbox, token, storage } = options;\n  const workdir = sandboxRow.sandboxWorkdir;\n  const repo = repoInfo.repoFullName;\n\n  // 0. Defense in depth: never build a git command from values that aren't\n  // strictly shaped, even if a malformed row reached the DB. Inputs are also\n  // validated at the route boundary before storage.\n  if (!/^[\\w.-]+\\/[\\w.-]+$/.test(repo)) {\n    throw new MaterializeError(`Refusing to materialize: invalid repo full name '${repo}'.`, 'clone-failed');\n  }\n  if (!/^[A-Za-z0-9_./-]+$/.test(repoInfo.defaultBranch)) {\n    throw new MaterializeError(\n      `Refusing to materialize: invalid default branch '${repoInfo.defaultBranch}'.`,\n      'clone-failed',\n    );\n  }\n\n  // 1. Preflight: git must be installed in the sandbox template.\n  const gitVersion = await sh(sandbox, 'git --version');\n  if (gitVersion.exitCode !== 0) {\n    throw new MaterializeError(\n      'git is not installed in the sandbox. The sandbox template must include git.',\n      'git-missing',\n    );\n  }\n\n  const authUrl = tokenUrl(repo, token);\n\n  // The DB's `materializedAt` can drift from disk in both directions: a fresh\n  // binding row over an already-populated workdir (local dev DB resets,\n  // repaired rows, earlier flows) must pull instead of failing `git clone` on\n  // the non-empty directory, and a stale `materializedAt` over an empty\n  // sandbox (an expired/recreated VM whose disk was wiped) must re-clone\n  // instead of running `git -C <workdir>` against a directory that no longer\n  // exists. Disk is the source of truth: detect the checkout instead of\n  // trusting the row.\n  const alreadyMaterialized = await hasExistingCheckout(sandbox, workdir, repo);\n\n  let tokenInRemote = false;\n  try {\n    if (!alreadyMaterialized) {\n      // 2a. First open: shallow-clone the default branch into the workdir. A\n      // shallow single-branch clone is dramatically faster for large repos; the\n      // later re-open uses `git pull --ff-only`, which works on shallow clones.\n      // The workdir holds no usable checkout of this repo, but it may not be\n      // empty: a checkpoint seed or a clone that died partway (a crashed or\n      // OOM-killed server) leaves a partial tree behind, and `git clone`\n      // refuses a non-empty destination with a non-retryable fatal. Nothing\n      // here is recoverable — `hasExistingCheckout` already ruled out a\n      // checkout of this repo — so clear its contents before cloning, exactly\n      // as the retry path does. Keep the workdir itself because LocalSandbox\n      // runs commands with this directory as the child process cwd.\n      await sh(\n        sandbox,\n        `mkdir -p ${shellQuote(workdir)} && find ${shellQuote(workdir)} -mindepth 1 -maxdepth 1 -exec rm -rf -- {} +`,\n      );\n      const clone = await gitTransfer(\n        sandbox,\n        `git clone --depth=1 --single-branch --branch ${shellQuote(repoInfo.defaultBranch)} ${shellQuote(authUrl)} ${shellQuote(workdir)}`,\n        {\n          phase: 'repository clone',\n          beforeRetry: async () => {\n            // A clone that died partway leaves the destination non-empty, which\n            // git refuses to clone into. Clear its contents so the retry starts\n            // clean without removing LocalSandbox's process cwd.\n            await sh(\n              sandbox,\n              `mkdir -p ${shellQuote(workdir)} && find ${shellQuote(workdir)} -mindepth 1 -maxdepth 1 -exec rm -rf -- {} +`,\n            );\n          },\n        },\n      );\n      if (clone.exitCode !== 0) {\n        // git can fail after creating the checkout (\"Clone succeeded, but\n        // checkout failed\") with the tokenized origin persisted — probe the\n        // disk instead of assuming the failed clone left nothing behind.\n        tokenInRemote = await hasGitDir(sandbox, workdir);\n        throw classifyGitFailure(clone, 'clone-failed');\n      }\n      tokenInRemote = true;\n    } else {\n      // 2b. Re-open: refresh remote to the token URL and fast-forward pull.\n      const setUrl = await sh(sandbox, `git -C ${shellQuote(workdir)} remote set-url origin ${shellQuote(authUrl)}`);\n      if (setUrl.exitCode !== 0) {\n        throw new MaterializeError(`Failed to set git remote: ${setUrl.stderr}`, 'pull-failed');\n      }\n      tokenInRemote = true;\n      const pull = await gitTransfer(sandbox, `git -C ${shellQuote(workdir)} pull --ff-only`, {\n        phase: 'repository pull',\n      });\n      if (pull.exitCode !== 0) {\n        if (!isBenignNonFastForward(pull)) {\n          throw classifyGitFailure(pull, 'pull-failed');\n        }\n        // The workdir was left on a session's working branch that can't be\n        // fast-forwarded (diverged from upstream, no upstream, or detached\n        // HEAD), or its configured upstream ref was deleted after merge.\n        // That checkout still holds usable work — never rebase or reset it\n        // here. Leave it as-is and let the session reconcile with the remote\n        // itself.\n      }\n    }\n  } catch (primary) {\n    // 3a. The clone/pull failed — still scrub the token from the VM's git\n    // config. The scrub must never hide the actionable failure, but once the\n    // token reached the remote its own failure can't stay silent either:\n    // report both, primary cause and classification first.\n    throw await scrubbedFailure(sandbox, workdir, repo, tokenInRemote, primary, 'pull-failed');\n  }\n\n  // 3b. Success — the token is in the remote and the workdir has a `.git`, so\n  // a failed scrub means the token may still be persisted: surface it.\n  await scrubRemote(sandbox, workdir, repo, tokenInRemote);\n\n  // 4. Mark materialized.\n  await storage.markMaterialized({ id: sandboxRow.id });\n}\n\n/** Check out a session's branch inside its isolated repository clone. */\nexport async function checkoutSessionBranch(\n  sandbox: ExecutableSandbox,\n  workdir: string,\n  options: { branch: string; baseBranch: string; token: string; repoFullName: string },\n): Promise<void> {\n  return timedPhase('workspace.checkout', () => checkoutSessionBranchImpl(sandbox, workdir, options));\n}\n\nasync function checkoutSessionBranchImpl(\n  sandbox: ExecutableSandbox,\n  workdir: string,\n  {\n    branch,\n    baseBranch,\n    token,\n    repoFullName,\n  }: { branch: string; baseBranch: string; token: string; repoFullName: string },\n): Promise<void> {\n  if (!isValidGitRef(branch) || !isValidGitRef(baseBranch)) {\n    throw new MaterializeError('Refusing to create a session from an invalid branch name.', 'clone-failed');\n  }\n\n  const current = await sh(sandbox, `git -C ${shellQuote(workdir)} branch --show-current`);\n  if (current.exitCode === 0 && current.stdout.trim() === branch) return;\n\n  const local = await sh(\n    sandbox,\n    `git -C ${shellQuote(workdir)} show-ref --verify --quiet refs/heads/${shellQuote(branch)}`,\n  );\n  if (local.exitCode === 0) {\n    const checkout = await sh(sandbox, `git -C ${shellQuote(workdir)} checkout ${shellQuote(branch)}`);\n    if (checkout.exitCode !== 0) {\n      // The session's agent may have switched branches itself (e.g. `gh pr\n      // checkout`) and left uncommitted work in the tree. Git refuses to\n      // switch back over those files — that work must win. The checkout is\n      // intact and usable on its current branch; keep it as-is rather than\n      // fail the workspace open, and never reset or stash to force the\n      // switch through.\n      if (isBlockedByLocalWork(checkout)) return;\n      throw classifyGitFailure(checkout, 'clone-failed');\n    }\n    return;\n  }\n\n  const authUrl = tokenUrl(repoFullName, token);\n  try {\n    const setUrl = await sh(sandbox, `git -C ${shellQuote(workdir)} remote set-url origin ${shellQuote(authUrl)}`);\n    if (setUrl.exitCode !== 0) throw classifyGitFailure(setUrl, 'pull-failed');\n    const fetch = await sh(\n      sandbox,\n      `git -C ${shellQuote(workdir)} fetch origin ${shellQuote(baseBranch)} && git -C ${shellQuote(workdir)} checkout -b ${shellQuote(branch)} FETCH_HEAD`,\n      { timeoutMs: CHECKOUT_COMMAND_TIMEOUT_MS, phase: 'branch checkout' },\n    );\n    if (fetch.exitCode !== 0) {\n      // Same rule as above: uncommitted work in the tree blocks the switch\n      // to the new branch. Leave the checkout on its current branch.\n      if (isBlockedByLocalWork(fetch)) return;\n      if (!isBranchCollision(fetch)) throw classifyGitFailure(fetch, 'clone-failed');\n      // The branch exists even though the show-ref probe missed it: either a\n      // concurrent materialization of this session created it between the\n      // probe and `checkout -b` (adopt it), or a reused sandbox carries a\n      // broken loose ref the probe cannot resolve (replace it and retry —\n      // \"already exists\" means the fetch half succeeded, so FETCH_HEAD is\n      // set).\n      const adopt = await sh(sandbox, `git -C ${shellQuote(workdir)} checkout ${shellQuote(branch)}`);\n      if (adopt.exitCode === 0 || isBlockedByLocalWork(adopt)) return;\n      const drop = await sh(\n        sandbox,\n        // `--no-deref` so a broken symref is deleted itself instead of git\n        // following it to some other branch. `update-ref -d` can still refuse\n        // a broken ref; fall back to removing the loose ref file (branch\n        // passed isValidGitRef, so the interpolation inside the double quotes\n        // is inert).\n        `git -C ${shellQuote(workdir)} update-ref --no-deref -d refs/heads/${shellQuote(branch)} || rm -f -- \"$(git -C ${shellQuote(workdir)} rev-parse --absolute-git-dir)/refs/heads/${branch}\"`,\n      );\n      if (drop.exitCode !== 0) throw classifyGitFailure(fetch, 'clone-failed');\n      const retry = await sh(sandbox, `git -C ${shellQuote(workdir)} checkout -b ${shellQuote(branch)} FETCH_HEAD`, {\n        timeoutMs: CHECKOUT_COMMAND_TIMEOUT_MS,\n        phase: 'branch checkout retry',\n      });\n      if (retry.exitCode !== 0) {\n        if (isBlockedByLocalWork(retry)) return;\n        throw classifyGitFailure(retry, 'clone-failed');\n      }\n    }\n  } finally {\n    await sh(sandbox, `git -C ${shellQuote(workdir)} remote set-url origin ${shellQuote(cleanUrl(repoFullName))}`);\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * True when `git checkout -b` failed only because the branch ref already\n * exists — the collision Factory hits when a pooled sandbox carries a ref the\n * show-ref probe could not see (broken loose ref) or a concurrent\n * materialization created the branch after the probe ran.\n */\nfunction isBranchCollision(result: SandboxCommandResult): boolean {\n  return /a branch named .* already exists/i.test(`${result.stderr || ''}\\n${result.stdout || ''}`);\n}\n\n/**\n * True when a failed `git checkout` just means uncommitted or untracked files\n * in the working tree would be clobbered by the branch switch. Those files are\n * a session's work in progress — the switch must yield to them, never the\n * other way around.\n */\nfunction isBlockedByLocalWork(result: SandboxCommandResult): boolean {\n  const output = `${result.stderr || ''}\\n${result.stdout || ''}`;\n  return /Your local changes to the following files would be overwritten by checkout|untracked working tree files would be overwritten by checkout/i.test(\n    output,\n  );\n}\n\n/**\n * True when the workdir already holds a git checkout whose `origin` points at\n * this exact repo. Matches both the clean and token-auth URL forms; any other\n * remote (or no git dir at all) falls back to the clone path.\n */\nexport async function hasExistingCheckout(\n  sandbox: ExecutableSandbox,\n  workdir: string,\n  repoFullName: string,\n): Promise<boolean> {\n  const result = await sh(sandbox, `git -C ${shellQuote(workdir)} remote get-url origin`);\n  if (result.exitCode !== 0) return false;\n  const url = result.stdout.trim().toLowerCase();\n  const suffix = `github.com/${repoFullName.toLowerCase()}`;\n  return url.endsWith(`${suffix}.git`) || url.endsWith(suffix);\n}\n\n/** Probed without `git -C` so a missing workdir returns false instead of throwing. */\nasync function hasGitDir(sandbox: ExecutableSandbox, workdir: string): Promise<boolean> {\n  const probe = await sh(sandbox, `test -d ${shellQuote(`${workdir}/.git`)}`).catch(() => null);\n  return probe?.exitCode === 0;\n}\n\n/**\n * Reset the git remote back to the tokenless URL. Strict when the token\n * reached the remote: any failure — a non-zero exit or a provider throw —\n * means the token may still be persisted, so it is thrown for the caller to\n * surface. Best-effort when it never did: the workdir may not exist (e.g. a\n * failed clone), which makes providers that spawn with `cwd` throw rather\n * than return a non-zero exit code; both outcomes are tolerated so neither\n * masks the primary failure.\n */\nasync function scrubRemote(\n  sandbox: ExecutableSandbox,\n  workdir: string,\n  repoFullName: string,\n  tokenInRemote: boolean,\n): Promise<void> {\n  const scrub = `git -C ${shellQuote(workdir)} remote set-url origin ${shellQuote(cleanUrl(repoFullName))}`;\n  if (!tokenInRemote) {\n    await sh(sandbox, scrub).catch(() => undefined);\n    return;\n  }\n  let failure: string;\n  try {\n    const result = await sh(sandbox, scrub);\n    if (result.exitCode === 0) return;\n    failure = result.stderr.trim() || result.stdout.trim();\n  } catch (error) {\n    failure = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);\n  }\n  throw new MaterializeError(`Failed to scrub installation token from git remote: ${failure}`, 'pull-failed');\n}\n\n/**\n * Scrub after `primary` already failed and return the error to throw. A failed\n * scrub is appended to `primary` rather than replacing it, so the caller gets\n * the error it would have had without the scrub — same class, same `code` —\n * carrying the leaked-token warning in its message.\n */\nasync function scrubbedFailure(\n  sandbox: ExecutableSandbox,\n  workdir: string,\n  repoFullName: string,\n  tokenInRemote: boolean,\n  primary: unknown,\n  fallback: MaterializeError['code'],\n): Promise<unknown> {\n  try {\n    await scrubRemote(sandbox, workdir, repoFullName, tokenInRemote);\n    return primary;\n  } catch (scrubError) {\n    const scrubMessage = scrubError instanceof Error ? scrubError.message : String(scrubError);\n    if (!(primary instanceof Error)) {\n      return new MaterializeError(`${String(primary)} — additionally: ${scrubMessage}`, fallback);\n    }\n    primary.message = `${primary.message} — additionally: ${scrubMessage}`;\n    return primary;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * True when a failed `git pull --ff-only` on re-open just means the current\n * branch can't be fast-forwarded — not that anything is broken. The shared\n * workdir is routinely left on a session's working branch, which may have\n * local commits diverging from upstream, no upstream at all (session branches\n * are created from `FETCH_HEAD`), or a detached HEAD. A checkout can also\n * hold uncommitted or untracked files (a build or script run left residue,\n * or an older session worked directly in the shared checkout), which makes\n * git refuse the merge outright. A checkout carrying `pull.rebase` in its git\n * config refuses for the same reason but says so in rebase's words instead of\n * merge's. After a PR merges with branch auto-delete, the configured upstream\n * ref may also be gone (`no such ref was fetched` / `couldn't find remote ref`);\n * there is nothing to pull and the checkout is still intact. In all of these\n * cases materialization must keep it as-is rather than fail the workspace open\n * — and must never discard the local state to force the pull through.\n */\nfunction isDeletedUpstreamRef(result: SandboxCommandResult): boolean {\n  const output = `${result.stderr || ''}\\n${result.stdout || ''}`;\n  return /no such ref was fetched|couldn't find remote ref/i.test(output);\n}\n\nfunction isBenignNonFastForward(result: SandboxCommandResult): boolean {\n  const output = `${result.stderr || ''}\\n${result.stdout || ''}`;\n  return (\n    isDeletedUpstreamRef(result) ||\n    /Not possible to fast-forward|Diverging branches can't be fast-forwarded|no tracking information for the current branch|You are not currently on a branch|Your local changes to the following files would be overwritten by merge|untracked working tree files would be overwritten by merge|cannot pull with rebase|cannot rebase: You have unstaged changes|Your index contains uncommitted changes/i.test(\n      output,\n    )\n  );\n}\n\n/**\n * Turn a failed git command into an actionable error, detecting the common\n * \"cannot reach github.com\" egress failure.\n */\nfunction classifyGitFailure(\n  result: SandboxCommandResult,\n  fallback: 'clone-failed' | 'pull-failed' | 'push-failed',\n): MaterializeError {\n  const stderr = result.stderr || '';\n  if (/could not resolve host|failed to connect|network is unreachable|Connection timed out/i.test(stderr)) {\n    return new MaterializeError(\n      'The sandbox could not reach github.com. The sandbox network must allow outbound egress to github.com.',\n      'egress-blocked',\n    );\n  }\n  const verb = fallback === 'clone-failed' ? 'clone' : fallback === 'pull-failed' ? 'pull' : 'push';\n  return new MaterializeError(`git ${verb} failed: ${stderr}`, fallback);\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Phase 1 — git identity + token-scoped push primitive\n//\n// These helpers let the sandbox author and push commits safely. The install\n// token is short-lived, minted per-operation server-side, injected only into\n// the temporary remote URL inside the sandbox, and always scrubbed afterwards\n// so it never persists in `.git/config`.\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * Validate a git ref (branch) name. Server-side defense-in-depth: only allow a\n * conservative character set so a branch can never be built into a shell\n * command in a way that escapes quoting. Mirrors the route-layer check.\n */\nexport function isValidGitRef(value: unknown): value is string {\n  return (\n    typeof value === 'string' &&\n    value.length > 0 &&\n    value.length <= 255 &&\n    // Reject leading-dash refs (e.g. `--mirror`) so the value can never be\n    // parsed as a git option when interpolated into a command.\n    !value.startsWith('-') &&\n    /^[A-Za-z0-9_./-]+$/.test(value)\n  );\n}\n\n/** Identity used to author commits inside the sandbox. */\nexport interface GitIdentity {\n  name?: string | null;\n  email?: string | null;\n  /** GitHub login, used to derive a stable noreply identity when name/email are absent. */\n  login?: string | null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolve a concrete `{ name, email }` for git authorship from a possibly-sparse\n * identity. Falls back to a GitHub-style noreply identity so commits are never\n * authored with an empty or host-derived identity.\n */\nexport function resolveGitIdentity(identity: GitIdentity): { name: string; email: string } {\n  const login = (identity.login || '').trim();\n  const name = (identity.name || '').trim() || login || 'Mastra Code';\n  const email =\n    (identity.email || '').trim() ||\n    (login ? `${login}@users.noreply.github.com` : 'mastra-code@users.noreply.github.com');\n  return { name, email };\n}\n\n/**\n * Configure `user.name` / `user.email` for the given repo working tree inside\n * the sandbox so commits are authored correctly. Values are shell-quoted.\n */\nexport async function configureGitIdentity(\n  sandbox: ExecutableSandbox,\n  workdir: string,\n  identity: GitIdentity,\n): Promise<void> {\n  const { name, email } = resolveGitIdentity(identity);\n  const setName = await sh(sandbox, `git -C ${shellQuote(workdir)} config user.name ${shellQuote(name)}`);\n  if (setName.exitCode !== 0) {\n    throw new MaterializeError(`Failed to set git user.name: ${setName.stderr.trim()}`, 'commit-failed');\n  }\n  const setEmail = await sh(sandbox, `git -C ${shellQuote(workdir)} config user.email ${shellQuote(email)}`);\n  if (setEmail.exitCode !== 0) {\n    throw new MaterializeError(`Failed to set git user.email: ${setEmail.stderr.trim()}`, 'commit-failed');\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Temporarily rewrite `origin` to a tokenized URL, run `fn` (e.g. a push), and\n * **always** scrub the remote back to the tokenless URL afterwards. The token\n * therefore only ever lives in the remote URL for the duration of the\n * operation and is never left in the VM's git config.\n *\n * Once the tokenized URL is installed a failed scrub may leave the token\n * persisted, so it is always surfaced: on its own after a successful `fn`,\n * appended to `fn`'s own error otherwise — `fn`'s error is never replaced.\n * Only a failed set-url (the token never reached the remote) downgrades the\n * scrub to best-effort.\n */\nexport async function withInstallToken<T>(\n  sandbox: ExecutableSandbox,\n  workdir: string,\n  repoFullName: string,\n  token: string,\n  fn: () => Promise<T>,\n): Promise<T> {\n  if (!/^[\\w.-]+\\/[\\w.-]+$/.test(repoFullName)) {\n    throw new MaterializeError(`Refusing to push: invalid repo full name '${repoFullName}'.`, 'push-failed');\n  }\n\n  const setUrl = await sh(\n    sandbox,\n    `git -C ${shellQuote(workdir)} remote set-url origin ${shellQuote(tokenUrl(repoFullName, token))}`,\n  );\n  if (setUrl.exitCode !== 0) {\n    // Best-effort scrub even though set-url failed, then surface the failure.\n    await scrubRemote(sandbox, workdir, repoFullName, false);\n    throw new MaterializeError(`Failed to set git remote: ${setUrl.stderr.trim()}`, 'push-failed');\n  }\n\n  let result: T;\n  try {\n    result = await fn();\n  } catch (primary) {\n    throw await scrubbedFailure(sandbox, workdir, repoFullName, true, primary, 'push-failed');\n  }\n  // Restore the tokenless remote. The workdir has a `.git` (we just rewrote\n  // its remote) so a scrub failure means the token may still persist — surface it.\n  await scrubRemote(sandbox, workdir, repoFullName, true);\n  return result;\n}\n\n/**\n * Push a branch back to GitHub from inside the sandbox using a short-lived\n * installation token. The branch is ref-validated, the token is injected only\n * into the remote URL via `withInstallToken`, and egress failures are\n * classified into actionable errors.\n */\nexport async function pushBranch(\n  sandbox: ExecutableSandbox,\n  workdir: string,\n  branch: string,\n  token: string,\n  repoFullName: string,\n): Promise<void> {\n  if (!isValidGitRef(branch)) {\n    throw new MaterializeError(`Refusing to push: invalid branch name '${branch}'.`, 'push-failed');\n  }\n\n  await withInstallToken(sandbox, workdir, repoFullName, token, async () => {\n    const push = await sh(sandbox, `git -C ${shellQuote(workdir)} push -u origin ${shellQuote(branch)}`);\n    if (push.exitCode !== 0) {\n      throw classifyGitFailure(push, 'push-failed');\n    }\n  });\n}\n\nexport interface CommitResult {\n  /** True when a commit was created; false when there was nothing to commit. */\n  committed: boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Stage every change in the working tree and create a commit inside the\n * sandbox. The git identity is configured first so authorship is correct. When\n * there is nothing to commit this is a no-op (`committed: false`) rather than an\n * error, so callers can safely commit-then-push without first diffing.\n *\n * @param sandbox  the live sandbox containing the checkout\n * @param workdir  the session workdir to commit in\n * @param message  the commit message (quoted; arbitrary text is safe)\n * @param identity authorship identity for the commit\n */\nexport async function commitAll(\n  sandbox: ExecutableSandbox,\n  workdir: string,\n  message: string,\n  identity: GitIdentity,\n): Promise<CommitResult> {\n  await configureGitIdentity(sandbox, workdir, identity);\n\n  const add = await sh(sandbox, `git -C ${shellQuote(workdir)} add -A`);\n  if (add.exitCode !== 0) {\n    throw new MaterializeError(`git add failed: ${add.stderr.trim() || add.stdout.trim()}`, 'commit-failed');\n  }\n\n  // Nothing staged → nothing to commit. `git diff --cached --quiet` exits 1 when\n  // there are staged changes, 0 when the index is clean.\n  const staged = await sh(sandbox, `git -C ${shellQuote(workdir)} diff --cached --quiet`);\n  if (staged.exitCode === 0) {\n    return { committed: false };\n  }\n\n  const commit = await sh(sandbox, `git -C ${shellQuote(workdir)} commit -m ${shellQuote(message)}`);\n  if (commit.exitCode !== 0) {\n    throw new MaterializeError(`git commit failed: ${commit.stderr.trim() || commit.stdout.trim()}`, 'commit-failed');\n  }\n\n  return { committed: true };\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Phase 2 — setup / teardown lifecycle commands\n//\n// The org-configured setup and teardown shell commands run in the session's\n// materialized workdir. The workdir is always resolved server-side from the\n// live sandbox; client input never reaches a filesystem path.\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/** Error raised when the org's setup or teardown command fails in the sandbox. */\nexport class SetupCommandError extends Error {\n  constructor(\n    message: string,\n    readonly code: 'setup-failed' | 'teardown-failed',\n  ) {\n    super(message);\n    this.name = 'SetupCommandError';\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Run the project's setup command (e.g. `pnpm i && pnpm build`) inside the\n * freshly materialized session workdir. Called before the checkout is handed\n * to any agent run so it is ready to build/test. A non-zero exit is a hard\n * error — starting agent work in a half-set-up tree is worse than failing the\n * request.\n *\n * Security model: the command is intentionally arbitrary shell — that is the\n * feature (install deps, build, seed fixtures). It is only configurable by\n * authenticated org members (the settings route is gated by\n * `resolveOrgTenant` + org-scoped project lookup, with length and\n * control-character validation), and it executes exclusively inside the\n * project's isolated sandbox — the same environment where org members already\n * run arbitrary shell via the agent's command tool. It never runs on the web\n * server host, so it grants no privilege beyond what sandbox access already\n * provides.\n *\n * @param sandbox  live sandbox containing the checkout\n * @param workdir  the server-resolved session workdir the command runs in\n * @param command  the org-configured setup shell command\n */\nasync function runLifecycleCommand(\n  sandbox: ExecutableSandbox,\n  workdir: string,\n  command: string,\n  options: { phase: 'setup' | 'teardown'; timeoutMs?: number },\n): Promise<void> {\n  const result = await sh(sandbox, `cd ${shellQuote(workdir)} && { ${command}\\n}`, {\n    phase: `${options.phase} command`,\n    ...(options.timeoutMs !== undefined ? { timeoutMs: options.timeoutMs } : {}),\n  });\n  if (result.exitCode !== 0) {\n    const detail = (result.stderr.trim() || result.stdout.trim()).slice(-1800);\n    const label = options.phase === 'setup' ? 'Setup' : 'Teardown';\n    throw new SetupCommandError(\n      `${label} command failed (exit ${result.exitCode}): ${detail}`,\n      options.phase === 'setup' ? 'setup-failed' : 'teardown-failed',\n    );\n  }\n}\n\nexport async function runSetupCommand(\n  sandbox: ExecutableSandbox,\n  workdir: string,\n  command: string,\n): Promise<void> {\n  return runLifecycleCommand(sandbox, workdir, command, { phase: 'setup' });\n}\n\n/**\n * Run the repository's best-effort teardown command from the materialized\n * session workdir. Callers own lifecycle policy: this helper reports failures\n * so the retirement coordinator can log them while still continuing with\n * scrub, pooling/destruction, cache invalidation, and row deletion.\n */\nexport async function runTeardownCommand(\n  sandbox: ExecutableSandbox,\n  workdir: string,\n  command: string,\n  options: { timeoutMs?: number } = {},\n): Promise<void> {\n  return runLifecycleCommand(sandbox, workdir, command, {\n    phase: 'teardown',\n    ...(options.timeoutMs !== undefined ? { timeoutMs: options.timeoutMs } : {}),\n  });\n}\n\nexport interface CreatePullRequestArgs {\n  /** Short-lived installation token, injected only into the `gh` process env. */\n  token: string;\n  /** Base branch the PR merges into. Ref-validated. */\n  base: string;\n  /** Head branch the PR is opened from. Ref-validated. */\n  head: string;\n  /** PR title. */\n  title: string;\n  /** PR body (optional). */\n  body?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface CreatePullRequestResult {\n  /** The PR URL parsed from `gh pr create` stdout. */\n  url: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Preflight that `gh` is installed in the sandbox. Only called on the PR path so\n * a missing `gh` never blocks clone/open. Surfaces an actionable error naming\n * the sandbox template requirement.\n */\nasync function assertGhAvailable(sandbox: ExecutableSandbox): Promise<void> {\n  const version = await sh(sandbox, 'gh --version');\n  if (version.exitCode !== 0) {\n    throw new MaterializeError(\n      'The GitHub CLI (gh) is not installed in the sandbox. The sandbox template must include gh to open pull requests.',\n      'gh-missing',\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n/** Match the first GitHub PR URL in `gh pr create` output. */\nfunction parsePullRequestUrl(stdout: string): string | undefined {\n  const match = stdout.match(/https:\\/\\/github\\.com\\/[^\\s]+\\/pull\\/\\d+/);\n  return match?.[0];\n}\n\n/**\n * Open a pull request from inside the sandbox via `gh pr create`. 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'')}`,\n  ].join(' ');\n  const script = `cd ${shellQuote(workdir)} && ${ghCommand}`;\n\n  const result = await sh(sandbox, script);\n  if (result.exitCode !== 0) {\n    const classified = classifyGitFailure(result, 'push-failed');\n    if (classified.code === 'egress-blocked') {\n      throw classified;\n    }\n    throw new MaterializeError(`gh pr create failed: ${result.stderr.trim() || result.stdout.trim()}`, 'pr-failed');\n  }\n\n  const url = parsePullRequestUrl(result.stdout);\n  if (!url) {\n    throw new MaterializeError(\n      `gh pr create succeeded but no PR URL was found in its output: ${result.stdout.trim()}`,\n      'pr-failed',\n    );\n  }\n\n  return { url 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+{"version":3,"file":"sandbox.js","names":[],"sources":["../../../src/integrations/github/sandbox.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Repo materialization for GitHub-backed repositories.\n *\n * A GitHub repo is never cloned onto the server host. The repo is cloned\n * *inside* the session's sandbox, so the agent's file tools and command tools\n * operate entirely against the remote checkout.\n *\n * - `materializeRepo(row, token)` clones the repo inside the sandbox when no\n *   checkout exists yet (a base-image boot, a wiped disk), using a short-lived\n *   installation token that is scrubbed from the git remote afterwards so it\n *   never persists in the VM. A checkout that is already there, from a repo\n *   template image or an earlier start, is left exactly as it is.\n *\n * This module owns everything git/GitHub: clone, commit/push, setup/teardown commands,\n * and `gh pr create`. Workdir layout lives in `../sandbox/workdir`.\n */\n\nimport { repoCloneCommand } from '@internal/workspace';\nimport type { ExecutableSandbox, SandboxCommandResult } from '../../sandbox/materialization.js';\nimport type { SourceControlStorageHandle } from '../../storage/domains/source-control/base.js';\nimport { timedPhase } from '../../timing.js';\n\ntype MaterializationStore = Pick<SourceControlStorageHandle['sessions'], 'markMaterialized'>;\n\ninterface RepoMaterializationBinding {\n  id: string;\n  sandboxWorkdir: string;\n  materializedAt: Date | null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Single-quote a string for safe POSIX shell interpolation. Wraps the value in\n * single quotes and escapes any embedded single quote using the canonical\n * close-quote / escaped-quote / reopen-quote sequence (`'\\''`). This is the\n * standard POSIX-safe construction and prevents the quoted string from being\n * terminated early.\n */\nexport function shellQuote(value: string): string {\n  // Replace each ' with the four-character sequence: ' \\ ' '\n  return `'` + value.split(`'`).join(`'\\\\''`) + `'`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Default hang guard for sandbox shell commands. Generous by design — large\n * clones and dependency installs legitimately take minutes; the guard exists\n * so a wedged sandbox surfaces a failure instead of hanging the request that\n * triggered materialization forever.\n */\nexport const DEFAULT_COMMAND_TIMEOUT_MS = 15 * 60_000;\n/** Branch checkout only fetches one ref — a much tighter budget applies. */\nexport const CHECKOUT_COMMAND_TIMEOUT_MS = 5 * 60_000;\n\ninterface ShOptions {\n  /** Override the hang-guard budget for this command. */\n  timeoutMs?: number;\n  /** Human-readable phase name included in the timeout error. */\n  phase?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * A thrown transport-level failure that is worth retrying: remote sandbox\n * providers (e.g. the platform workspace proxy) surface transient 5xx errors\n * as exceptions carrying an HTTP `status` — typically while a freshly\n * provisioned VM is still coming up. Command failures are NOT exceptions\n * (they resolve with a non-zero exit code), so retrying here never re-runs a\n * command that the sandbox already executed and rejected.\n */\nfunction isTransientTransportError(error: unknown): boolean {\n  const status = (error as { status?: unknown })?.status;\n  return typeof status === 'number' && status >= 500;\n}\n\nconst SH_RETRIES = 2;\nconst SH_RETRY_DELAY_MS = 2000;\n\n/**\n * Run a shell script in the sandbox via `sh -c`, bounded by a hang guard.\n * Transient transport-level 5xx failures (proxy hiccups while the VM boots)\n * are retried with a short backoff; every script routed through here is safe\n * to re-run. Hang-guard timeouts are NOT retried — the budget applies to the\n * command as a whole.\n */\nexport async function sh(\n  sandbox: ExecutableSandbox,\n  script: string,\n  options: ShOptions = {},\n): Promise<SandboxCommandResult> {\n  // One budget for the command as a whole: each attempt only gets the time\n  // remaining, so transport retries can never multiply the hang guard.\n  const deadlineMs = Date.now() + (options.timeoutMs ?? DEFAULT_COMMAND_TIMEOUT_MS);\n  for (let attempt = 0; ; attempt++) {\n    const started = performance.now();\n    try {\n      const result = await shOnce(sandbox, script, { ...options, timeoutMs: Math.max(deadlineMs - Date.now(), 1) });\n      // Phased commands are the session start path; report each so a slow\n      // start names the command that took the time rather than the phase.\n      if (options.phase) {\n        process.stderr.write(\n          `[factory:timing] ${options.phase} attempt=${attempt + 1} exit=${result.exitCode} ${Math.round(performance.now() - started)}ms\\n`,\n        );\n      }\n      return result;\n    } catch (error) {\n      if (options.phase) {\n        process.stderr.write(\n          `[factory:timing] ${options.phase} attempt=${attempt + 1} threw after ${Math.round(performance.now() - started)}ms: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)}\\n`,\n        );\n      }\n      if (attempt >= SH_RETRIES || !isTransientTransportError(error)) throw error;\n      const delayMs = SH_RETRY_DELAY_MS * (attempt + 1);\n      if (deadlineMs - Date.now() <= delayMs) throw error;\n      await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, delayMs));\n    }\n  }\n}\n\n/** Single `sh -c` execution attempt, bounded by the hang guard. */\nasync function shOnce(\n  sandbox: ExecutableSandbox,\n  script: string,\n  options: ShOptions,\n): Promise<SandboxCommandResult> {\n  const timeoutMs = options.timeoutMs ?? DEFAULT_COMMAND_TIMEOUT_MS;\n  let timer: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | undefined;\n  const hangGuard = new Promise<never>((_, reject) => {\n    timer = setTimeout(() => {\n      const phase = options.phase ? ` during ${options.phase}` : '';\n      reject(new Error(`Sandbox command timed out after ${Math.round(timeoutMs / 1000)}s${phase}.`));\n    }, timeoutMs);\n    timer.unref?.();\n  });\n  try {\n    // Forward the budget to the provider too so it can terminate the wedged\n    // process; the race stays as the outer guard for providers that ignore it.\n    return await Promise.race([sandbox.executeCommand('sh', ['-c', script], { timeout: timeoutMs }), hangGuard]);\n  } finally {\n    clearTimeout(timer);\n  }\n}\n\nconst GIT_TRANSFER_RETRIES = 2;\nconst GIT_TRANSFER_RETRY_DELAY_MS = 2000;\n\n/**\n * True when a git transfer died mid-flight rather than being refused.\n *\n * `sh` already retries transport errors the sandbox provider *throws*, but a\n * git command that reaches the network and then loses it exits non-zero\n * instead — so a single HTTP/2 framing glitch or dropped connection to\n * github.com would otherwise permanently fail opening a workspace. These\n * patterns all mean \"the bytes stopped arriving\", which says nothing about\n * whether the operation would succeed if attempted again.\n *\n * Deliberately narrow: a refusal (bad credentials, missing repo, blocked\n * egress) is terminal and must surface immediately rather than be retried into\n * a slow failure.\n */\nfunction isTransientGitFailure(result: SandboxCommandResult): boolean {\n  const output = `${result.stderr || ''}\\n${result.stdout || ''}`;\n  return /HTTP2 framing layer|RPC failed; curl|RPC failed; HTTP 5\\d\\d|the remote end hung up unexpectedly|early EOF|unexpected disconnect|connection reset by peer|Recv failure|Send failure|GnuTLS recv error|TLS connection was non-properly terminated|502 Bad Gateway|503 Service Unavailable/i.test(\n    output,\n  );\n}\n\n/**\n * Run a git command that only *reads* from the remote, retrying it when the\n * transfer dies mid-flight. Restricted to read-only transfers on purpose:\n * re-running a clone or a fetch is free, whereas re-running a push could\n * duplicate work already accepted by the remote before the connection dropped.\n *\n * `beforeRetry` lets a call site clear whatever the aborted attempt left\n * behind — a half-written clone directory blocks the next `git clone` outright.\n */\nasync function gitTransfer(\n  sandbox: ExecutableSandbox,\n  script: string,\n  options: ShOptions & { beforeRetry?: (attempt: number) => Promise<void> } = {},\n): Promise<SandboxCommandResult> {\n  const { beforeRetry, ...shOptions } = options;\n  const deadlineMs = Date.now() + (shOptions.timeoutMs ?? DEFAULT_COMMAND_TIMEOUT_MS);\n  for (let attempt = 0; ; attempt++) {\n    const result = await sh(sandbox, script, {\n      ...shOptions,\n      timeoutMs: Math.max(deadlineMs - Date.now(), 1),\n    });\n    if (result.exitCode === 0 || attempt >= GIT_TRANSFER_RETRIES || !isTransientGitFailure(result)) return result;\n    process.stderr.write(`[factory:timing] git ${shOptions.phase ?? 'transfer'} retrying after attempt ${attempt + 1}\\n`);\n    const delayMs = GIT_TRANSFER_RETRY_DELAY_MS * (attempt + 1);\n    if (deadlineMs - Date.now() <= delayMs) return result;\n    await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, delayMs));\n    await beforeRetry?.(attempt + 1);\n  }\n}\n\n/** Error raised when the sandbox cannot materialize the repo (actionable). */\nexport class MaterializeError extends Error {\n  constructor(\n    message: string,\n    readonly code:\n      | 'git-missing'\n      | 'egress-blocked'\n      | 'clone-failed'\n      | 'pull-failed'\n      | 'push-failed'\n      | 'commit-failed'\n      | 'gh-missing'\n      | 'pr-failed',\n  ) {\n    super(message);\n    this.name = 'MaterializeError';\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the token-auth clone/pull URL for a repo. The token lives only inside\n * this URL and is scrubbed from the remote after the operation.\n */\nfunction tokenUrl(repoFullName: string, token: string): string {\n  return `https://x-access-token:${token}@github.com/${repoFullName}.git`;\n}\n\nfunction cleanUrl(repoFullName: string): string {\n  return `https://github.com/${repoFullName}.git`;\n}\n\n/** Repo metadata needed to materialize, read from the org-owned project row. */\nexport interface RepoMaterializeInfo {\n  repoFullName: string;\n  defaultBranch: string;\n}\n\n/** Options for {@link materializeRepo}. */\nexport interface MaterializeRepoOptions {\n  /** The per-(project,user) sandbox binding whose workdir this materializes into. */\n  row: RepoMaterializationBinding;\n  /** Repo metadata from the org-owned project row. */\n  repoInfo: RepoMaterializeInfo;\n  /** The live sandbox to run git inside. */\n  sandbox: ExecutableSandbox;\n  /** A freshly minted, short-lived installation access token. */\n  token: string;\n  storage: MaterializationStore;\n}\n\n/**\n * Materialize the repo inside the user's sandbox: clone when no checkout of\n * this repo exists, otherwise nothing. Scrubs the install token from the\n * remote after a clone and sets `materialized_at` on the per-user sandbox\n * binding row.\n */\nexport async function materializeRepo(options: MaterializeRepoOptions): Promise<void> {\n  return timedPhase('workspace.materialize', () => materializeRepoImpl(options));\n}\n\nasync function materializeRepoImpl(options: MaterializeRepoOptions): Promise<void> {\n  const { row: sandboxRow, repoInfo, sandbox, token, storage } = options;\n  const workdir = sandboxRow.sandboxWorkdir;\n  const repo = repoInfo.repoFullName;\n\n  // 0. Defense in depth: never build a git command from values that aren't\n  // strictly shaped, even if a malformed row reached the DB. Inputs are also\n  // validated at the route boundary before storage.\n  if (!/^[\\w.-]+\\/[\\w.-]+$/.test(repo)) {\n    throw new MaterializeError(`Refusing to materialize: invalid repo full name '${repo}'.`, 'clone-failed');\n  }\n  if (!/^[A-Za-z0-9_./-]+$/.test(repoInfo.defaultBranch)) {\n    throw new MaterializeError(\n      `Refusing to materialize: invalid default branch '${repoInfo.defaultBranch}'.`,\n      'clone-failed',\n    );\n  }\n\n  // 1. Preflight: git must be installed in the sandbox template.\n  const gitVersion = await sh(sandbox, 'git --version');\n  if (gitVersion.exitCode !== 0) {\n    throw new MaterializeError(\n      'git is not installed in the sandbox. The sandbox template must include git.',\n      'git-missing',\n    );\n  }\n\n  // The DB's `materializedAt` can drift from disk in both directions: a fresh\n  // binding row over an already-populated workdir (a repo template image,\n  // local dev DB resets, repaired rows) must not fail `git clone` on the\n  // non-empty directory, and a stale `materializedAt` over an empty sandbox\n  // (an expired/recreated VM whose disk was wiped) must re-clone instead of\n  // running `git -C <workdir>` against a directory that no longer exists.\n  // Disk is the source of truth: detect the checkout instead of trusting the\n  // row. An existing checkout is left as it is, whatever it is on: a template\n  // image sits detached at its pinned commit, a resumed session on its\n  // branch. Syncing with the remote is the session's business; the branch\n  // checkout that follows fetches the base branch it needs.\n  const existing = await existingCheckoutRemote(sandbox, workdir, repo);\n  if (existing !== null) {\n    // A token an earlier start failed to scrub must not outlive it; the\n    // remote already carries the plain URL otherwise, so this costs nothing\n    // on the common path.\n    if (/\\/\\/[^/]*@/.test(existing)) await scrubRemote(sandbox, workdir, repo, true);\n  } else {\n    // 2. First open: shallow-clone the default branch into the workdir, the\n    // same clone a repo template bakes into its image. The workdir holds no\n    // usable checkout of this repo, but it may not be empty: a checkpoint\n    // seed or a clone that died partway (a crashed or OOM-killed server)\n    // leaves a partial tree behind, and `git clone` refuses a non-empty\n    // destination with a non-retryable fatal. Nothing here is recoverable,\n    // the probe above already ruled out a checkout of this repo, so\n    // clear its contents before cloning, exactly as the retry path does. Keep\n    // the workdir itself because LocalSandbox runs commands with this\n    // directory as the child process cwd.\n    await sh(\n      sandbox,\n      `mkdir -p ${shellQuote(workdir)} && find ${shellQuote(workdir)} -mindepth 1 -maxdepth 1 -exec rm -rf -- {} +`,\n    );\n    let tokenInRemote = false;\n    try {\n      const clone = await gitTransfer(\n        sandbox,\n        repoCloneCommand({ cloneUrl: tokenUrl(repo, token), destination: workdir, branch: repoInfo.defaultBranch }),\n        {\n          phase: 'repository clone',\n          beforeRetry: async () => {\n            // A clone that died partway leaves the destination non-empty, which\n            // git refuses to clone into. Clear its contents so the retry starts\n            // clean without removing LocalSandbox's process cwd.\n            await sh(\n              sandbox,\n              `mkdir -p ${shellQuote(workdir)} && find ${shellQuote(workdir)} -mindepth 1 -maxdepth 1 -exec rm -rf -- {} +`,\n            );\n          },\n        },\n      );\n      if (clone.exitCode !== 0) {\n        // git can fail after creating the checkout (\"Clone succeeded, but\n        // checkout failed\") with the tokenized origin persisted: probe the\n        // disk instead of assuming the failed clone left nothing behind.\n        tokenInRemote = await hasGitDir(sandbox, workdir);\n        throw classifyGitFailure(clone, 'clone-failed');\n      }\n      tokenInRemote = true;\n    } catch (primary) {\n      // 3a. The clone failed: still scrub the token from the VM's git config.\n      // The scrub must never hide the actionable failure, but once the token\n      // reached the remote its own failure can't stay silent either: report\n      // both, primary cause and classification first.\n      throw await scrubbedFailure(sandbox, workdir, repo, tokenInRemote, primary, 'clone-failed');\n    }\n\n    // 3b. Success: the token is in the remote and the workdir has a `.git`, so\n    // a failed scrub means the token may still be persisted: surface it.\n    await scrubRemote(sandbox, workdir, repo, tokenInRemote);\n  }\n\n  // 4. Mark materialized.\n  await storage.markMaterialized({ id: sandboxRow.id });\n}\n\n/** Check out a session's branch inside its isolated repository clone. */\nexport async function checkoutSessionBranch(\n  sandbox: ExecutableSandbox,\n  workdir: string,\n  options: { branch: string; baseBranch: string; token: string; repoFullName: string },\n): Promise<void> {\n  return timedPhase('workspace.checkout', () => checkoutSessionBranchImpl(sandbox, workdir, options));\n}\n\nasync function checkoutSessionBranchImpl(\n  sandbox: ExecutableSandbox,\n  workdir: string,\n  {\n    branch,\n    baseBranch,\n    token,\n    repoFullName,\n  }: { branch: string; baseBranch: string; token: string; repoFullName: string },\n): Promise<void> {\n  if (!isValidGitRef(branch) || !isValidGitRef(baseBranch)) {\n    throw new MaterializeError('Refusing to create a session from an invalid branch name.', 'clone-failed');\n  }\n\n  const current = await sh(sandbox, `git -C ${shellQuote(workdir)} branch --show-current`);\n  if (current.exitCode === 0 && current.stdout.trim() === branch) return;\n\n  const local = await sh(\n    sandbox,\n    `git -C ${shellQuote(workdir)} show-ref --verify --quiet refs/heads/${shellQuote(branch)}`,\n  );\n  if (local.exitCode === 0) {\n    const checkout = await sh(sandbox, `git -C ${shellQuote(workdir)} checkout ${shellQuote(branch)}`);\n    if (checkout.exitCode !== 0) {\n      // The session's agent may have switched branches itself (e.g. `gh pr\n      // checkout`) and left uncommitted work in the tree. Git refuses to\n      // switch back over those files — that work must win. The checkout is\n      // intact and usable on its current branch; keep it as-is rather than\n      // fail the workspace open, and never reset or stash to force the\n      // switch through.\n      if (isBlockedByLocalWork(checkout)) return;\n      throw classifyGitFailure(checkout, 'clone-failed');\n    }\n    return;\n  }\n\n  const authUrl = tokenUrl(repoFullName, token);\n  try {\n    const setUrl = await sh(sandbox, `git -C ${shellQuote(workdir)} remote set-url origin ${shellQuote(authUrl)}`, {\n      phase: 'branch checkout remote',\n    });\n    if (setUrl.exitCode !== 0) throw classifyGitFailure(setUrl, 'pull-failed');\n    const fetch = await sh(\n      sandbox,\n      `git -C ${shellQuote(workdir)} fetch origin ${shellQuote(baseBranch)} && git -C ${shellQuote(workdir)} checkout -b ${shellQuote(branch)} FETCH_HEAD`,\n      { timeoutMs: CHECKOUT_COMMAND_TIMEOUT_MS, phase: 'branch checkout' },\n    );\n    if (fetch.exitCode !== 0) {\n      // Same rule as above: uncommitted work in the tree blocks the switch\n      // to the new branch. Leave the checkout on its current branch.\n      if (isBlockedByLocalWork(fetch)) return;\n      if (!isBranchCollision(fetch)) throw classifyGitFailure(fetch, 'clone-failed');\n      // The branch exists even though the show-ref probe missed it: either a\n      // concurrent materialization of this session created it between the\n      // probe and `checkout -b` (adopt it), or a reused sandbox carries a\n      // broken loose ref the probe cannot resolve (replace it and retry —\n      // \"already exists\" means the fetch half succeeded, so FETCH_HEAD is\n      // set).\n      const adopt = await sh(sandbox, `git -C ${shellQuote(workdir)} checkout ${shellQuote(branch)}`);\n      if (adopt.exitCode === 0 || isBlockedByLocalWork(adopt)) return;\n      const drop = await sh(\n        sandbox,\n        // `--no-deref` so a broken symref is deleted itself instead of git\n        // following it to some other branch. `update-ref -d` can still refuse\n        // a broken ref; fall back to removing the loose ref file (branch\n        // passed isValidGitRef, so the interpolation inside the double quotes\n        // is inert).\n        `git -C ${shellQuote(workdir)} update-ref --no-deref -d refs/heads/${shellQuote(branch)} || rm -f -- \"$(git -C ${shellQuote(workdir)} rev-parse --absolute-git-dir)/refs/heads/${branch}\"`,\n      );\n      if (drop.exitCode !== 0) throw classifyGitFailure(fetch, 'clone-failed');\n      const retry = await sh(sandbox, `git -C ${shellQuote(workdir)} checkout -b ${shellQuote(branch)} FETCH_HEAD`, {\n        timeoutMs: CHECKOUT_COMMAND_TIMEOUT_MS,\n        phase: 'branch checkout retry',\n      });\n      if (retry.exitCode !== 0) {\n        if (isBlockedByLocalWork(retry)) return;\n        throw classifyGitFailure(retry, 'clone-failed');\n      }\n    }\n  } finally {\n    await sh(sandbox, `git -C ${shellQuote(workdir)} remote set-url origin ${shellQuote(cleanUrl(repoFullName))}`);\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * True when `git checkout -b` failed only because the branch ref already\n * exists — the collision Factory hits when a pooled sandbox carries a ref the\n * show-ref probe could not see (broken loose ref) or a concurrent\n * materialization created the branch after the probe ran.\n */\nfunction isBranchCollision(result: SandboxCommandResult): boolean {\n  return /a branch named .* already exists/i.test(`${result.stderr || ''}\\n${result.stdout || ''}`);\n}\n\n/**\n * True when a failed `git checkout` just means uncommitted or untracked files\n * in the working tree would be clobbered by the branch switch. Those files are\n * a session's work in progress — the switch must yield to them, never the\n * other way around.\n */\nfunction isBlockedByLocalWork(result: SandboxCommandResult): boolean {\n  const output = `${result.stderr || ''}\\n${result.stdout || ''}`;\n  return /Your local changes to the following files would be overwritten by checkout|untracked working tree files would be overwritten by checkout/i.test(\n    output,\n  );\n}\n\n/**\n * The `origin` URL of a checkout of this exact repo in the workdir, or null\n * when there is none. Matches both the clean and token-auth URL forms; any\n * other remote (or no git dir at all) sends materialize down the clone path.\n */\nasync function existingCheckoutRemote(\n  sandbox: ExecutableSandbox,\n  workdir: string,\n  repoFullName: string,\n): Promise<string | null> {\n  const result = await sh(sandbox, `git -C ${shellQuote(workdir)} remote get-url origin`);\n  if (result.exitCode !== 0) return null;\n  const url = result.stdout.trim();\n  return isRemoteForRepo(url, repoFullName) ? url : null;\n}\n\n/** True only for `https://github.com/<repo>[.git]`, with or without embedded credentials. */\nfunction isRemoteForRepo(url: string, repoFullName: string): boolean {\n  let parsed: URL;\n  try {\n    parsed = new URL(url);\n  } catch {\n    return false;\n  }\n  if (parsed.protocol !== 'https:' || parsed.hostname.toLowerCase() !== 'github.com') return false;\n  if (parsed.port !== '' || parsed.search !== '' || parsed.hash !== '') return false;\n  return parsed.pathname.replace(/\\.git$/, '').toLowerCase() === `/${repoFullName.toLowerCase()}`;\n}\n\n/** Probed without `git -C` so a missing workdir returns false instead of throwing. */\nasync function hasGitDir(sandbox: ExecutableSandbox, workdir: string): Promise<boolean> {\n  const probe = await sh(sandbox, `test -d ${shellQuote(`${workdir}/.git`)}`).catch(() => null);\n  return probe?.exitCode === 0;\n}\n\n/**\n * Reset the git remote back to the tokenless URL. Strict when the token\n * reached the remote: any failure — a non-zero exit or a provider throw —\n * means the token may still be persisted, so it is thrown for the caller to\n * surface. Best-effort when it never did: the workdir may not exist (e.g. a\n * failed clone), which makes providers that spawn with `cwd` throw rather\n * than return a non-zero exit code; both outcomes are tolerated so neither\n * masks the primary failure.\n */\nasync function scrubRemote(\n  sandbox: ExecutableSandbox,\n  workdir: string,\n  repoFullName: string,\n  tokenInRemote: boolean,\n): Promise<void> {\n  const scrub = `git -C ${shellQuote(workdir)} remote set-url origin ${shellQuote(cleanUrl(repoFullName))}`;\n  if (!tokenInRemote) {\n    await sh(sandbox, scrub).catch(() => undefined);\n    return;\n  }\n  let failure: string;\n  try {\n    const result = await sh(sandbox, scrub);\n    if (result.exitCode === 0) return;\n    failure = result.stderr.trim() || result.stdout.trim();\n  } catch (error) {\n    failure = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);\n  }\n  throw new MaterializeError(`Failed to scrub installation token from git remote: ${failure}`, 'pull-failed');\n}\n\n/**\n * Scrub after `primary` already failed and return the error to throw. A failed\n * scrub is appended to `primary` rather than replacing it, so the caller gets\n * the error it would have had without the scrub — same class, same `code` —\n * carrying the leaked-token warning in its message.\n */\nasync function scrubbedFailure(\n  sandbox: ExecutableSandbox,\n  workdir: string,\n  repoFullName: string,\n  tokenInRemote: boolean,\n  primary: unknown,\n  fallback: MaterializeError['code'],\n): Promise<unknown> {\n  try {\n    await scrubRemote(sandbox, workdir, repoFullName, tokenInRemote);\n    return primary;\n  } catch (scrubError) {\n    const scrubMessage = scrubError instanceof Error ? scrubError.message : String(scrubError);\n    if (!(primary instanceof Error)) {\n      return new MaterializeError(`${String(primary)} — additionally: ${scrubMessage}`, fallback);\n    }\n    primary.message = `${primary.message} — additionally: ${scrubMessage}`;\n    return primary;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Turn a failed git command into an actionable error, detecting the common\n * \"cannot reach github.com\" egress failure.\n */\nfunction classifyGitFailure(\n  result: SandboxCommandResult,\n  fallback: 'clone-failed' | 'pull-failed' | 'push-failed',\n): MaterializeError {\n  const stderr = result.stderr || '';\n  if (/could not resolve host|failed to connect|network is unreachable|Connection timed out/i.test(stderr)) {\n    return new MaterializeError(\n      'The sandbox could not reach github.com. The sandbox network must allow outbound egress to github.com.',\n      'egress-blocked',\n    );\n  }\n  const verb = fallback === 'clone-failed' ? 'clone' : fallback === 'pull-failed' ? 'pull' : 'push';\n  return new MaterializeError(`git ${verb} failed: ${stderr}`, fallback);\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Phase 1 — git identity + token-scoped push primitive\n//\n// These helpers let the sandbox author and push commits safely. The install\n// token is short-lived, minted per-operation server-side, injected only into\n// the temporary remote URL inside the sandbox, and always scrubbed afterwards\n// so it never persists in `.git/config`.\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * Validate a git ref (branch) name. Server-side defense-in-depth: only allow a\n * conservative character set so a branch can never be built into a shell\n * command in a way that escapes quoting. Mirrors the route-layer check.\n */\nexport function isValidGitRef(value: unknown): value is string {\n  return (\n    typeof value === 'string' &&\n    value.length > 0 &&\n    value.length <= 255 &&\n    // Reject leading-dash refs (e.g. `--mirror`) so the value can never be\n    // parsed as a git option when interpolated into a command.\n    !value.startsWith('-') &&\n    /^[A-Za-z0-9_./-]+$/.test(value)\n  );\n}\n\n/** Identity used to author commits inside the sandbox. */\nexport interface GitIdentity {\n  name?: string | null;\n  email?: string | null;\n  /** GitHub login, used to derive a stable noreply identity when name/email are absent. */\n  login?: string | null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolve a concrete `{ name, email }` for git authorship from a possibly-sparse\n * identity. Falls back to a GitHub-style noreply identity so commits are never\n * authored with an empty or host-derived identity.\n */\nexport function resolveGitIdentity(identity: GitIdentity): { name: string; email: string } {\n  const login = (identity.login || '').trim();\n  const name = (identity.name || '').trim() || login || 'Mastra Code';\n  const email =\n    (identity.email || '').trim() ||\n    (login ? `${login}@users.noreply.github.com` : 'mastra-code@users.noreply.github.com');\n  return { name, email };\n}\n\n/**\n * Configure `user.name` / `user.email` for the given repo working tree inside\n * the sandbox so commits are authored correctly. Values are shell-quoted.\n */\nexport async function configureGitIdentity(\n  sandbox: ExecutableSandbox,\n  workdir: string,\n  identity: GitIdentity,\n): Promise<void> {\n  const { name, email } = resolveGitIdentity(identity);\n  const setName = await sh(sandbox, `git -C ${shellQuote(workdir)} config user.name ${shellQuote(name)}`);\n  if (setName.exitCode !== 0) {\n    throw new MaterializeError(`Failed to set git user.name: ${setName.stderr.trim()}`, 'commit-failed');\n  }\n  const setEmail = await sh(sandbox, `git -C ${shellQuote(workdir)} config user.email ${shellQuote(email)}`);\n  if (setEmail.exitCode !== 0) {\n    throw new MaterializeError(`Failed to set git user.email: ${setEmail.stderr.trim()}`, 'commit-failed');\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Temporarily rewrite `origin` to a tokenized URL, run `fn` (e.g. a push), and\n * **always** scrub the remote back to the tokenless URL afterwards. The token\n * therefore only ever lives in the remote URL for the duration of the\n * operation and is never left in the VM's git config.\n *\n * Once the tokenized URL is installed a failed scrub may leave the token\n * persisted, so it is always surfaced: on its own after a successful `fn`,\n * appended to `fn`'s own error otherwise — `fn`'s error is never replaced.\n * Only a failed set-url (the token never reached the remote) downgrades the\n * scrub to best-effort.\n */\nexport async function withInstallToken<T>(\n  sandbox: ExecutableSandbox,\n  workdir: string,\n  repoFullName: string,\n  token: string,\n  fn: () => Promise<T>,\n): Promise<T> {\n  if (!/^[\\w.-]+\\/[\\w.-]+$/.test(repoFullName)) {\n    throw new MaterializeError(`Refusing to push: invalid repo full name '${repoFullName}'.`, 'push-failed');\n  }\n\n  const setUrl = await sh(\n    sandbox,\n    `git -C ${shellQuote(workdir)} remote set-url origin ${shellQuote(tokenUrl(repoFullName, token))}`,\n  );\n  if (setUrl.exitCode !== 0) {\n    // Best-effort scrub even though set-url failed, then surface the failure.\n    await scrubRemote(sandbox, workdir, repoFullName, false);\n    throw new MaterializeError(`Failed to set git remote: ${setUrl.stderr.trim()}`, 'push-failed');\n  }\n\n  let result: T;\n  try {\n    result = await fn();\n  } catch (primary) {\n    throw await scrubbedFailure(sandbox, workdir, repoFullName, true, primary, 'push-failed');\n  }\n  // Restore the tokenless remote. The workdir has a `.git` (we just rewrote\n  // its remote) so a scrub failure means the token may still persist — surface it.\n  await scrubRemote(sandbox, workdir, repoFullName, true);\n  return result;\n}\n\n/**\n * Push a branch back to GitHub from inside the sandbox using a short-lived\n * installation token. The branch is ref-validated, the token is injected only\n * into the remote URL via `withInstallToken`, and egress failures are\n * classified into actionable errors.\n */\nexport async function pushBranch(\n  sandbox: ExecutableSandbox,\n  workdir: string,\n  branch: string,\n  token: string,\n  repoFullName: string,\n): Promise<void> {\n  if (!isValidGitRef(branch)) {\n    throw new MaterializeError(`Refusing to push: invalid branch name '${branch}'.`, 'push-failed');\n  }\n\n  await withInstallToken(sandbox, workdir, repoFullName, token, async () => {\n    const push = await sh(sandbox, `git -C ${shellQuote(workdir)} push -u origin ${shellQuote(branch)}`);\n    if (push.exitCode !== 0) {\n      throw classifyGitFailure(push, 'push-failed');\n    }\n  });\n}\n\nexport interface CommitResult {\n  /** True when a commit was created; false when there was nothing to commit. */\n  committed: boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Stage every change in the working tree and create a commit inside the\n * sandbox. The git identity is configured first so authorship is correct. When\n * there is nothing to commit this is a no-op (`committed: false`) rather than an\n * error, so callers can safely commit-then-push without first diffing.\n *\n * @param sandbox  the live sandbox containing the checkout\n * @param workdir  the session workdir to commit in\n * @param message  the commit message (quoted; arbitrary text is safe)\n * @param identity authorship identity for the commit\n */\nexport async function commitAll(\n  sandbox: ExecutableSandbox,\n  workdir: string,\n  message: string,\n  identity: GitIdentity,\n): Promise<CommitResult> {\n  await configureGitIdentity(sandbox, workdir, identity);\n\n  const add = await sh(sandbox, `git -C ${shellQuote(workdir)} add -A`);\n  if (add.exitCode !== 0) {\n    throw new MaterializeError(`git add failed: ${add.stderr.trim() || add.stdout.trim()}`, 'commit-failed');\n  }\n\n  // Nothing staged → nothing to commit. `git diff --cached --quiet` exits 1 when\n  // there are staged changes, 0 when the index is clean.\n  const staged = await sh(sandbox, `git -C ${shellQuote(workdir)} diff --cached --quiet`);\n  if (staged.exitCode === 0) {\n    return { committed: false };\n  }\n\n  const commit = await sh(sandbox, `git -C ${shellQuote(workdir)} commit -m ${shellQuote(message)}`);\n  if (commit.exitCode !== 0) {\n    throw new MaterializeError(`git commit failed: ${commit.stderr.trim() || commit.stdout.trim()}`, 'commit-failed');\n  }\n\n  return { committed: true };\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Phase 2 — setup / teardown lifecycle commands\n//\n// The org-configured setup and teardown shell commands run in the session's\n// materialized workdir. The workdir is always resolved server-side from the\n// live sandbox; client input never reaches a filesystem path.\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/** Error raised when the org's setup or teardown command fails in the sandbox. */\nexport class SetupCommandError extends Error {\n  constructor(\n    message: string,\n    readonly code: 'setup-failed' | 'teardown-failed',\n  ) {\n    super(message);\n    this.name = 'SetupCommandError';\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Run the project's setup command (e.g. `pnpm i && pnpm build`) inside the\n * freshly materialized session workdir. Called before the checkout is handed\n * to any agent run so it is ready to build/test. A non-zero exit is a hard\n * error — starting agent work in a half-set-up tree is worse than failing the\n * request.\n *\n * Security model: the command is intentionally arbitrary shell — that is the\n * feature (install deps, build, seed fixtures). It is only configurable by\n * authenticated org members (the settings route is gated by\n * `resolveOrgTenant` + org-scoped project lookup, with length and\n * control-character validation), and it executes exclusively inside the\n * project's isolated sandbox — the same environment where org members already\n * run arbitrary shell via the agent's command tool. It never runs on the web\n * server host, so it grants no privilege beyond what sandbox access already\n * provides.\n *\n * @param sandbox  live sandbox containing the checkout\n * @param workdir  the server-resolved session workdir the command runs in\n * @param command  the org-configured setup shell command\n */\nasync function runLifecycleCommand(\n  sandbox: ExecutableSandbox,\n  workdir: string,\n  command: string,\n  options: { phase: 'setup' | 'teardown'; timeoutMs?: number },\n): Promise<void> {\n  const result = await sh(sandbox, `cd ${shellQuote(workdir)} && { ${command}\\n}`, {\n    phase: `${options.phase} command`,\n    ...(options.timeoutMs !== undefined ? { timeoutMs: options.timeoutMs } : {}),\n  });\n  if (result.exitCode !== 0) {\n    const detail = (result.stderr.trim() || result.stdout.trim()).slice(-1800);\n    const label = options.phase === 'setup' ? 'Setup' : 'Teardown';\n    throw new SetupCommandError(\n      `${label} command failed (exit ${result.exitCode}): ${detail}`,\n      options.phase === 'setup' ? 'setup-failed' : 'teardown-failed',\n    );\n  }\n}\n\nexport async function runSetupCommand(\n  sandbox: ExecutableSandbox,\n  workdir: string,\n  command: string,\n): Promise<void> {\n  return runLifecycleCommand(sandbox, workdir, command, { phase: 'setup' });\n}\n\n/**\n * Run the repository's best-effort teardown command from the materialized\n * session workdir. Callers own lifecycle policy: this helper reports failures\n * so the retirement coordinator can log them while still continuing with\n * scrub, pooling/destruction, cache invalidation, and row deletion.\n */\nexport async function runTeardownCommand(\n  sandbox: ExecutableSandbox,\n  workdir: string,\n  command: string,\n  options: { timeoutMs?: number } = {},\n): Promise<void> {\n  return runLifecycleCommand(sandbox, workdir, command, {\n    phase: 'teardown',\n    ...(options.timeoutMs !== undefined ? { timeoutMs: options.timeoutMs } : {}),\n  });\n}\n\nexport interface CreatePullRequestArgs {\n  /** Short-lived installation token, injected only into the `gh` process env. */\n  token: string;\n  /** Base branch the PR merges into. Ref-validated. */\n  base: string;\n  /** Head branch the PR is opened from. Ref-validated. */\n  head: string;\n  /** PR title. */\n  title: string;\n  /** PR body (optional). */\n  body?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface CreatePullRequestResult {\n  /** The PR URL parsed from `gh pr create` stdout. */\n  url: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Preflight that `gh` is installed in the sandbox. Only called on the PR path so\n * a missing `gh` never blocks clone/open. Surfaces an actionable error naming\n * the sandbox template requirement.\n */\nasync function assertGhAvailable(sandbox: ExecutableSandbox): Promise<void> {\n  const version = await sh(sandbox, 'gh --version');\n  if (version.exitCode !== 0) {\n    throw new MaterializeError(\n      'The GitHub CLI (gh) is not installed in the sandbox. The sandbox template must include gh to open pull requests.',\n      'gh-missing',\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n/** Match the first GitHub PR URL in `gh pr create` output. */\nfunction parsePullRequestUrl(stdout: string): string | undefined {\n  const match = stdout.match(/https:\\/\\/github\\.com\\/[^\\s]+\\/pull\\/\\d+/);\n  return match?.[0];\n}\n\n/**\n * Open a pull request from inside the sandbox via `gh pr create`. The token is\n * passed only through a per-invocation `GH_TOKEN` env scoped to the single `gh`\n * process (never persisted), all arguments are shell-quoted, and the resulting\n * PR URL is parsed from stdout.\n *\n * @param sandbox live sandbox containing the checkout\n * @param workdir the worktree (or repo) path the PR head branch is checked out in\n */\nexport async function createPullRequest(\n  sandbox: ExecutableSandbox,\n  workdir: string,\n  { token, base, head, title, body }: CreatePullRequestArgs,\n): Promise<CreatePullRequestResult> {\n  if (!isValidGitRef(base)) {\n    throw new MaterializeError(`Refusing to open PR: invalid base branch '${base}'.`, 'pr-failed');\n  }\n  if (!isValidGitRef(head)) {\n    throw new MaterializeError(`Refusing to open PR: invalid head branch '${head}'.`, 'pr-failed');\n  }\n\n  await assertGhAvailable(sandbox);\n\n  // GH_TOKEN is prefixed inline so it is exported only to the single `gh`\n  // process and never to the wider shell session, git config, or VM env. `gh`\n  // is run from inside the checkout so it targets the correct repo/head branch.\n  const ghCommand = [\n    `GH_TOKEN=${shellQuote(token)} gh pr create`,\n    `--base ${shellQuote(base)}`,\n    `--head ${shellQuote(head)}`,\n    `--title ${shellQuote(title)}`,\n    `--body ${shellQuote(body ?? 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package/dist/packages/_internals/workspace/dist/index.js

@@ -19,7 +19,17 @@ function normalizeSetupCommands(setupCommand) {
 function setupMarkerContent(setupCommand) {
 	return `sha256:${createHash("sha256").update(normalizeSetupCommands(setupCommand).join("\n")).digest("hex")}`;
 }
+function repoCloneCommand({ cloneUrl, destination, branch, tokenEnv }) {
+	return `git ${tokenEnv ? `${gitAuthFlag(tokenEnv)} ` : ""}clone --depth=1 --single-branch ${branch ? `--branch ${shellQuote(branch)} ` : ""}${shellQuote(cloneUrl)} ${shellQuote(destination)}`;
+}
+/** Per-invocation auth header; `-c` config never reaches `.git/config`. */
+function gitAuthFlag(tokenEnv) {
+	return `-c http.extraheader="AUTHORIZATION: basic $(printf 'x-access-token:%s' "$${tokenEnv}" | base64 -w0)"`;
+}
+function shellQuote(value) {
+	return `'${value.replace(/'/g, `'\\''`)}'`;
+}
 //#endregion
-export { SETUP_MARKER_PATH, normalizeSetupCommands, setupMarkerContent };
+export { SETUP_MARKER_PATH, normalizeSetupCommands, repoCloneCommand, setupMarkerContent };
 
 //# sourceMappingURL=index.js.map

package/dist/packages/_internals/workspace/dist/index.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"index.js","names":[],"sources":["../../../../../../../packages/_internals/workspace/dist/index.js"],"sourcesContent":["import { createHash } from \"crypto\";\n//#region src/setup-marker.ts\n/**\n* Setup completion marker shared by repo templates and their consumers.\n*\n* A repo template writes this file beside the checkout as its last build\n* step, so it exists only in images where every setup command succeeded. Its\n* content is a digest of the setup commands the image ran, letting a sandbox\n* booted from the image tell whether the setup it is about to run already\n* happened. Relative to the template's build cwd, which is also the runtime\n* working directory the repo was cloned into.\n*/\nconst SETUP_MARKER_PATH = \".mastra-sandbox/setup\";\n/** Blank entries never become build steps, so they never count toward the digest either. */\nfunction normalizeSetupCommands(setupCommand) {\n\treturn (setupCommand === void 0 ? [] : Array.isArray(setupCommand) ? setupCommand : [setupCommand]).filter((command) => command.trim() !== \"\");\n}\n/** The marker content for a setup command list: `sha256:<hex>` over the commands joined by newlines. */\nfunction setupMarkerContent(setupCommand) {\n\treturn `sha256:${createHash(\"sha256\").update(normalizeSetupCommands(setupCommand).join(\"\\n\")).digest(\"hex\")}`;\n}\n/** Shell step that writes the marker relative to the cwd. `content` is a digest, so it is shell-safe. */\nfunction setupMarkerCommand(content) {\n\treturn `mkdir -p \"$(dirname \"${SETUP_MARKER_PATH}\")\" && printf '%s' '${content}' > \"${SETUP_MARKER_PATH}\"`;\n}\n//#endregion\n//#region src/repo-clone.ts\nfunction repoCloneCommand({ cloneUrl, destination, branch, tokenEnv }) {\n\treturn `git ${tokenEnv ? `${gitAuthFlag(tokenEnv)} ` : \"\"}clone --depth=1 --single-branch ${branch ? `--branch ${shellQuote(branch)} ` : \"\"}${shellQuote(cloneUrl)} ${shellQuote(destination)}`;\n}\n/** Per-invocation auth header; `-c` config never reaches `.git/config`. */\nfunction gitAuthFlag(tokenEnv) {\n\treturn `-c http.extraheader=\"AUTHORIZATION: basic $(printf 'x-access-token:%s' \"$${tokenEnv}\" | base64 -w0)\"`;\n}\nfunction shellQuote(value) {\n\treturn `'${value.replace(/'/g, `'\\\\''`)}'`;\n}\n//#endregion\nexport { SETUP_MARKER_PATH, normalizeSetupCommands, repoCloneCommand, setupMarkerCommand, setupMarkerContent };\n\n//# sourceMappingURL=index.js.map"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;AAYA,MAAM,oBAAoB;;AAE1B,SAAS,uBAAuB,cAAc;CAC7C,QAAQ,iBAAiB,KAAK,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,YAAY,IAAI,eAAe,CAAC,YAAY,EAAA,CAAG,QAAQ,YAAY,QAAQ,KAAK,MAAM,EAAE;AAC9I;;AAEA,SAAS,mBAAmB,cAAc;CACzC,OAAO,UAAU,WAAW,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,uBAAuB,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,KAAK;AAC3G;AAOA,SAAS,iBAAiB,EAAE,UAAU,aAAa,QAAQ,YAAY;CACtE,OAAO,OAAO,WAAW,GAAG,YAAY,QAAQ,EAAE,KAAK,GAAG,kCAAkC,SAAS,YAAY,WAAW,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK,KAAK,WAAW,QAAQ,EAAE,GAAG,WAAW,WAAW;AAC7L;;AAEA,SAAS,YAAY,UAAU;CAC9B,OAAO,4EAA4E,SAAS;AAC7F;AACA,SAAS,WAAW,OAAO;CAC1B,OAAO,IAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,OAAO,EAAE;AACzC"}

package/dist/routes/work-items.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"work-items.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/routes/work-items.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;GAOG;AAEH,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,qBAAqB,CAAC;AAKpD,OAAO,KAAK,EACV,uBAAuB,EAGxB,MAAM,+BAA+B,CAAC;AAGvC,OAAO,KAAK,EAA4B,wBAAwB,EAAE,MAAM,gCAAgC,CAAC;AAGzG,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,6BAA6B,CAAC;AAChE,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,oCAAoC,CAAC;AACvE,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,uBAAuB,EAAE,MAAM,qCAAqC,CAAC;AACnF,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,sBAAsB,EAAE,MAAM,qCAAqC,CAAC;AAClF,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,yCAAyC,CAAC;AAElF,OAAO,KAAK,EACV,mBAAmB,EAInB,mBAAmB,EAKnB,gBAAgB,EACjB,MAAM,uCAAuC,CAAC;AAQ/C,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,MAAM,YAAY,CAAC;AACpD,OAAO,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,YAAY,CAAC;AAEnC,MAAM,WAAW,kBAAmB,SAAQ,iBAAiB;IAC3D,KAAK,EAAE,YAAY,CAAC;IACpB,yFAAyF;IACzF,QAAQ,EAAE,sBAAsB,CAAC;IACjC,kDAAkD;IAClD,SAAS,EAAE,gBAAgB,CAAC;IAC5B,8DAA8D;IAC9D,QAAQ,EAAE,uBAAuB,CAAC;IAClC,iDAAiD;IACjD,WAAW,EAAE,kBAAkB,CAAC;IAChC,sEAAsE;IACtE,iBAAiB,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,wBAAwB,EAAE,YAAY,GAAG,gBAAgB,CAAC,CAAC;IACpF,2EAA2E;IAC3E,gBAAgB,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,uBAAuB,EAAE,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC;IAC5D,wFAAwF;IACxF,YAAY,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,YAAY,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC,CAAC;CAC/C;AAsGD,mEAAmE;AACnE,wBAAgB,mBAAmB,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,OAAO,GAAG,mBAAmB,GAAG,IAAI,CA2B7E;AAED,kEAAkE;AAClE,wBAAgB,mBAAmB,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,OAAO,GAAG,mBAAmB,GAAG,IAAI,CAgC7E;AAgND,qBAAa,cAAe,SAAQ,KAAK,CAAC,kBAAkB,CAAC;;IAyJ3D,gEAAgE;IAChE,MAAM,IAAI,QAAQ,EAAE;CAgYrB"}

package/dist/routes/work-items.js

@@ -274,6 +274,12 @@ function summaryRole(decision) {
 	if (board !== "work" && board !== "review" || !isFactoryRuleStage(stage)) return null;
 	return roleForStage(board, stage);
 }
+/** A linked-card decision names where the card is synced from, so the UI can say "GitHub" rather than "a linked card". */
+function summarySource(decision) {
+	if (decision.type !== "upsertLinkedWorkItem") return null;
+	const source = decision.source;
+	return source === "github-issue" || source === "github-pr" || source === "linear-issue" || source === "manual" ? source : null;
+}
 function decisionSummary(decision) {
 	return {
 		id: decision.id,
@@ -281,6 +287,7 @@ function decisionSummary(decision) {
 		workItemId: decision.workItemId,
 		type: factoryDecisionType(decision),
 		role: summaryRole(decision.decision),
+		source: summarySource(decision.decision),
 		status: decision.status,
 		attempts: decision.attempts,
 		failureOccurrence: decision.failureOccurrence,