@marinoscar/platform-api 0.1.0-next.3 → 0.1.0-next.5

package/dist/notifications/notifications.service.js

@@ -0,0 +1,1221 @@
+"use strict";
+var __decorate = (this && this.__decorate) || function (decorators, target, key, desc) {
+    var c = arguments.length, r = c < 3 ? target : desc === null ? desc = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(target, key) : desc, d;
+    if (typeof Reflect === "object" && typeof Reflect.decorate === "function") r = Reflect.decorate(decorators, target, key, desc);
+    else for (var i = decorators.length - 1; i >= 0; i--) if (d = decorators[i]) r = (c < 3 ? d(r) : c > 3 ? d(target, key, r) : d(target, key)) || r;
+    return c > 3 && r && Object.defineProperty(target, key, r), r;
+};
+var __metadata = (this && this.__metadata) || function (k, v) {
+    if (typeof Reflect === "object" && typeof Reflect.metadata === "function") return Reflect.metadata(k, v);
+};
+var __param = (this && this.__param) || function (paramIndex, decorator) {
+    return function (target, key) { decorator(target, key, paramIndex); }
+};
+var NotificationsService_1;
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.NotificationsService = void 0;
+const common_1 = require("@nestjs/common");
+const api_1 = require("@opentelemetry/api");
+const index_1 = require("../core/index");
+const ports_1 = require("./ports");
+const describe_thrown_1 = require("./describe-thrown");
+const notification_delivery_service_1 = require("./notification-delivery.service");
+const notification_events_1 = require("./notification-events");
+const notification_policy_service_1 = require("./notification-policy.service");
+const channel_sender_registry_1 = require("./registry/channel-sender.registry");
+const channel_registry_1 = require("./registry/channel.registry");
+const notification_preferences_1 = require("./notification-preferences");
+const notification_types_1 = require("./notification.types");
+/** The longest `display` stored in a delivery row's `recipient`. */
+const MAX_DISPLAY_LENGTH = 255;
+// =============================================================================
+// NotificationsService — the dispatcher (issue #125, epic #109)
+// =============================================================================
+//
+// ONE ENTRY POINT: `notify(eventKey, userId, data)`. It resolves the event
+// from the registry (#121), resolves the user's per-channel preference, and
+// fans out to each enabled channel, recording what happened.
+//
+// Five public methods now share that ONE resolution point rather than
+// multiplying it: `notify` (the detached default), `notifyAddress` (#128 — a
+// second way of BUILDING a recipient, for somebody with no account yet),
+// `notifyNow` (#321 — the same dispatch, awaited, for a job handler that must
+// not return before its work has committed), and the pair added by #288 (epic
+// #254) — `notifyPermissionHolders` and `notifyPermissionHoldersNow`, a third
+// way of building recipients, for an OPERATIONAL event whose audience is
+// "whoever can act on this" rather than any one user. All five converge on the
+// private `dispatch()`, which is the only place a preference or a policy is
+// consulted.
+//
+// The alternative — emit an event and let each channel subscribe — is more
+// decoupled and scatters the preference gate across subscribers, where one of
+// them can forget it. `mandatory` is a security gate; there is ONE resolution
+// point and ONE gate.
+//
+// -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// INLINE, NOT QUEUED — AND THE TRADE-OFF THAT BUYS
+// -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+//
+// DECISION: dispatch happens in this process, immediately, and is DETACHED
+// from the caller. `notify` schedules the work on a later microtask and
+// returns; it never awaits a settings read, a render, or a socket to an SMTP
+// server.
+//
+// WHY NOT A QUEUE. A durable queue (BullMQ + Redis, or a `jobs` table with a
+// poller) is real machinery: a broker or a table, a worker process, its own
+// deployment unit, its own failure modes, its own dashboard. This baseline has
+// none of that anywhere — no Redis, no background worker, no job table — and
+// introducing the first one to send three emails puts the ops cost of a job
+// system into an epic about notifications. #125 says as much.
+//
+// WHY NOT PLAIN INLINE-AND-AWAITED. Because then a slow SMTP server is a slow
+// request: the admin who changed a user's roles waits on the mail server
+// before their PATCH returns, and a hung connection holds a Fastify request
+// open for the transport's full timeout. The action and its notification have
+// no reason to share a latency budget.
+//
+// THE TRADE-OFF ACCEPTED, STATED PLAINLY: there is NO DURABILITY AND NO RETRY.
+// If this process dies between the schedule and the send — a deploy, an OOM
+// kill, a crash — that notification is gone and nothing will try again. Two
+// things bound the damage, and neither eliminates it:
+//
+//   * The `queued` delivery row is written BEFORE the attempt (see
+//     notification-delivery.service.ts), so a lost send leaves evidence: a row
+//     stuck at `queued`, findable through an index built for that query. The
+//     notification is lost; the KNOWLEDGE that it was lost is not.
+//   * `onModuleDestroy` drains in-flight dispatches, so an ORDERLY shutdown
+//     (the common case — a rolling deploy, `docker compose down`) finishes
+//     what it started instead of dropping it.
+//
+// There is also no backpressure: a burst of events becomes a burst of
+// concurrent sends. Acceptable at this baseline's scale — notifications here
+// are triggered by human actions, not by a firehose — and it is the first
+// thing to revisit if that changes. When a queue is eventually justified, the
+// seam is `schedule()` below and nothing above it moves.
+//
+// -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// HOW `notify` IS GUARANTEED NOT TO THROW
+// -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+//
+// Structurally, not by inspection. `notify` itself does exactly two things
+// that could fail — a synchronous map lookup, and handing a closure to
+// `schedule` — and `schedule` routes it through `runContained`, which attaches
+// a `.catch()` before the promise can reject. `notifyNow` (#321, below) makes
+// the same promise by calling the SAME `runContained`, not a second try/catch
+// of its own: one guarantee, one implementation, so it cannot be weakened on
+// one path only. Every layer below it is separately defensive: the channel contract
+// returns failures instead of throwing, the delivery service swallows its own
+// database errors, and `deliverOne` wraps every channel call in a `try`/`catch`
+// regardless. The point of the redundancy is that the guarantee must survive a
+// channel added by somebody who did not read the contract.
+//
+// It also never participates in the caller's transaction: the dispatch runs
+// after the caller's turn ends, on this service's own `PrismaService` calls,
+// outside any `$transaction` the caller may be holding. A notification cannot
+// roll back a role change, and a role change's rollback cannot un-send mail.
+// =============================================================================
+/**
+ * How long an orderly shutdown waits for in-flight dispatches.
+ *
+ * BOUNDED, because the thing being waited on is a network call to a mail
+ * server: an unbounded drain lets one hung SMTP connection hold a container in
+ * `stopping` until the orchestrator SIGKILLs it, which loses the same work
+ * AND makes the deploy slow. Five seconds is enough for a send already in
+ * flight and short enough to stay well inside a typical 10s stop grace period.
+ */
+const SHUTDOWN_DRAIN_MS = 5_000;
+const tracer = api_1.trace.getTracer('@marinoscar/platform-api/notifications');
+/**
+ * The {@link NotifyNowResult} for every dispatch that met no throttle —
+ * including the ones that sent nothing at all (unknown event, missing user,
+ * every channel muted) and the one whose internals threw. Frozen and shared
+ * because it is returned from many exits and must never be mutated by one.
+ */
+const NOT_THROTTLED = Object.freeze({
+    rateLimited: false,
+    retryAfterMs: null,
+});
+/**
+ * Folds one channel's result into the dispatch-wide {@link NotifyNowResult}:
+ * rate-limited if ANY channel was, and the LONGEST provider-named wait.
+ *
+ * Tolerant of a malformed `retryAfterMs` (non-finite, zero, negative) because
+ * it comes from a channel, and the dispatcher does not trust channels — see
+ * `deliverOne`'s own belt-and-braces `try`. A bad value is "no opinion", never
+ * a zero that a caller could read as "retry immediately".
+ */
+function mergeThrottle(acc, result) {
+    if (result.rateLimited !== true) {
+        return acc;
+    }
+    const named = typeof result.retryAfterMs === 'number' &&
+        Number.isFinite(result.retryAfterMs) &&
+        result.retryAfterMs > 0
+        ? result.retryAfterMs
+        : null;
+    const retryAfterMs = named === null
+        ? acc.retryAfterMs
+        : acc.retryAfterMs === null
+            ? named
+            : Math.max(acc.retryAfterMs, named);
+    return { rateLimited: true, retryAfterMs };
+}
+/**
+ * The dispatcher: raise a registered event to a user, an address or the
+ * holders of a permission. Every entry point converges on one dispatch that
+ * applies the policy in force for the recipient's organization (system, then
+ * org layer), then the recipient's preferences (a `mandatory` event ignores
+ * them), then hands each surviving channel to its sender, writing one
+ * `notification_deliveries` row per attempt. It never throws to its caller.
+ *
+ * ⚠ Call it AFTER the triggering write has committed and OUTSIDE any
+ * `$transaction` (the conformance suite's `notify-after-commit` case).
+ *
+ * @example
+ * ```ts
+ * await this.notifications.notify('billing.invoice_ready', userId, { invoiceId });
+ * ```
+ *
+ * @extensionPoint token
+ * @stability stable
+ */
+let NotificationsService = NotificationsService_1 = class NotificationsService {
+    prisma;
+    deliveries;
+    policy;
+    metrics;
+    senderRegistry;
+    handles;
+    logger = new common_1.Logger(NotificationsService_1.name);
+    /**
+     * Channel -\> sender, built once from whatever the module registered.
+     *
+     * A Map rather than a `switch` or a chain of `if`s: the dispatcher iterates
+     * the channels the event and the user's preferences agree on, and asks this
+     * for each. A channel the registry declares but nothing implements —
+     * `browser`, until #127 — is simply absent, and absent is handled in one
+     * place.
+     */
+    senders;
+    /**
+     * Dispatches that have been scheduled and have not finished.
+     *
+     * Tracked ONLY so shutdown can drain them (and so tests can await them —
+     * see {@link flush}). Nothing reads it to make a delivery decision.
+     */
+    inFlight = new Set();
+    constructor(prisma, deliveries, 
+    // The deployment-wide gate (#226). Injected rather than read inline so the
+    // never-throw guarantee lives in one place; see the service's own header.
+    policy, senders, metrics = ports_1.NOOP_NOTIFICATIONS_METRICS, senderRegistry, handles) {
+        this.prisma = prisma;
+        this.deliveries = deliveries;
+        this.policy = policy;
+        this.metrics = metrics;
+        this.senderRegistry = senderRegistry;
+        this.handles = handles;
+        this.senders = new Map();
+        for (const sender of senders) {
+            if (this.senders.has(sender.channel)) {
+                // FAIL AT BOOT, LOUDLY. Two senders claiming one channel means the
+                // second silently shadows the first, and the symptom is "some
+                // notifications go out over the wrong transport", which is close to
+                // undiagnosable from a delivery record. This is the one place in this
+                // file that is allowed to throw: it runs at module construction, not
+                // on a business action, and a misconfigured graph should not start.
+                throw new Error(`Duplicate notification channel sender registered for '${sender.channel}'.`);
+            }
+            this.senders.set(sender.channel, sender);
+        }
+    }
+    /**
+     * Raise a notification for one user.
+     *
+     * THE ONLY PUBLIC ENTRY POINT, and deliberately the whole API: a call site
+     * needs an event key, a user id and a payload, and nothing about channels,
+     * templates, transports or preferences. That is what makes "adding a
+     * notification costs one registry entry" (epic #109) true at the call site
+     * as well as in the registry.
+     *
+     * RETURNS AS SOON AS THE WORK IS SCHEDULED. The returned promise resolves
+     * before anything is rendered or sent — see the header. Awaiting it is
+     * correct and cheap; it just does not mean "delivered". Callers that need to
+     * know what happened read `notification_deliveries`.
+     *
+     * NEVER REJECTS. Not for a database failure, not for a mail server, not for
+     * a template bug, not for an event key that does not exist.
+     *
+     * @param eventKey - a key from `NOTIFICATION_EVENTS`. An UNKNOWN KEY IS A
+     *        NO-OP THAT RECORDS NOTHING — not a throw, and not a delivery row.
+     *        Both matter: a throw would fail the action that raised the stale
+     *        event (the exact coupling this issue exists to prevent), and a row
+     *        for a non-existent event would put a key in
+     *        `notification_deliveries` that no registry entry explains, poisoning
+     *        the table that answers "what did we send?".
+     * @param userId - the recipient's account.
+     * @param data - the event's payload, passed to the channel's template
+     *        untouched. Never logged.
+     * @param options - per-dispatch options (#321). Today that is a
+     *        NARROWING-ONLY channel subset — see {@link NotifyOptions}, which
+     *        states at length what it cannot do. OMITTING IT REPRODUCES THE
+     *        PRE-#321 BEHAVIOUR EXACTLY, which is why the existing call sites
+     *        did not move.
+     */
+    async notify(eventKey, userId, data, options) {
+        const event = (0, notification_events_1.findEvent)(eventKey);
+        if (!event) {
+            // `debug`, not `warn`: the overwhelmingly likely cause is a key that
+            // was legitimately retired, raised by a code path nobody updated, and
+            // an unknown event is defined to be harmless. A `warn` here would train
+            // operators to ignore this logger.
+            this.logger.debug(`Ignoring notification for unknown event '${eventKey}'.`);
+            return;
+        }
+        // The dispatch's throttle summary is dropped on this path on purpose:
+        // nobody is awaiting a detached send, so there is no caller who could
+        // back off. `notify()` behaves exactly as it did before #456.
+        this.schedule(async () => {
+            await this.dispatchToUser(event, userId, data, options);
+        });
+    }
+    /**
+     * Raise a notification for one user and AWAIT ITS DELIVERY.
+     *
+     * The awaited sibling of {@link notify}: same registry lookup, same recipient
+     * resolution, same single gate in `dispatch()`, same never-rejects
+     * containment. The ONE difference is that it does not detach — when this
+     * promise resolves, every channel has been attempted and every delivery row
+     * has been written.
+     *
+     * ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+     * WHY THIS EXISTS, BECAUSE IT IS THE DECISION MOST LIKELY TO BE UNDONE
+     * ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+     *
+     * A reader who has just absorbed this file's header — which argues at length
+     * that dispatch SHOULD be detached — will reasonably ask why there is now a
+     * method that isn't, and be tempted to delete it in favour of `notify`. Here
+     * is the answer, so that deletion is at least an informed one.
+     *
+     * The caller this exists for is a JOB HANDLER (epic #254; the broadcast
+     * fan-out of epic #319 is the first). `JobHandler.process` is contracted so
+     * that "returning normally means the work is done and durable; do not return
+     * before the writes this job is responsible for have committed"
+     * (`apps/api/src/jobs/job-handler.interface.ts`). A handler built on
+     * `notify()` would violate that contract three ways at once:
+     *
+     *   1. It would leave N dispatches in flight AFTER `process()` returned.
+     *   2. The worker would then mark the job row `succeeded` for work that had
+     *      not happened — the queue's record would assert a lie, which is worse
+     *      than a failure, because a failure retries and a lie does not.
+     *   3. A SIGTERM would drop everything past the `SHUTDOWN_DRAIN_MS`
+     *      5 s drain, with no job row left claiming responsibility for it.
+     *
+     * AND `flush()` IS NOT A SUBSTITUTE, which is the other reflex worth heading
+     * off. `flush()` awaits every dispatch in flight — including every unrelated
+     * one raised by any concurrent request — and it LOOPS until the set drains.
+     * Under a broadcast that set is being refilled continuously, so the loop has
+     * no bound: a handler awaiting it would be waiting on other people's work,
+     * for an unbounded time, and would still have no per-dispatch outcome.
+     *
+     * ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+     * WHEN NOT TO USE IT
+     * ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+     *
+     * NEVER FROM A REQUEST PATH. This is the "plain inline-and-awaited" shape the
+     * header rejects: it puts a mail server's latency inside an HTTP request, and
+     * a hung transport holds a Fastify request open for its full timeout. It is
+     * for BACKGROUND WORKERS that own their own concurrency and need backpressure
+     * — which is exactly the property a chunked fan-out wants and a controller
+     * does not. If you are in a controller or a service called by one, use
+     * {@link notify}.
+     *
+     * NEVER REJECTS, by the same mechanism as `notify`: both route their work
+     * through `runContained`. A dispatch failure is a log line and, where
+     * one could be written, a `notification_deliveries` row — never an exception
+     * reaching the job handler, which would fail and retry the whole job over one
+     * recipient's bad mailbox.
+     *
+     * It is deliberately NOT tracked in `inFlight`: that set exists so an
+     * orderly shutdown can drain work NOBODY IS AWAITING. This work has an
+     * awaiting owner by definition, and that owner — not this service — decides
+     * what to do about it on shutdown.
+     *
+     * ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+     * WHAT IT RESOLVES TO (issue #456)
+     * ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+     *
+     * A {@link NotifyNowResult}: whether any channel of this dispatch was
+     * refused by a THROTTLING PROVIDER, and the longest wait any of them named.
+     * Nothing else — see that type for why a per-channel report would be the
+     * wrong thing to hand a job handler.
+     *
+     * This is the ONE way a provider throttle can reach a caller, and it exists
+     * because the channels cannot throw: the broadcast fan-out used to keep
+     * sending into a refusing email provider because every refusal looked like
+     * an ordinary failed row. Now the chunk reads this, stops launching sends,
+     * and throws `RateLimitError` itself — the queue's own deferral mechanism,
+     * raised from a job handler, which is the one place a throw belongs.
+     *
+     * THE DELIVERY ROWS ARE UNCHANGED BY IT: a throttled channel still writes a
+     * `failed` row, because for this recipient it did fail. A caller that
+     * ignores the result (the broadcast `sendTest` path does) gets exactly the
+     * pre-#456 behaviour.
+     *
+     * @param eventKey - a key from `NOTIFICATION_EVENTS`. Unknown is a no-op that
+     *        records nothing, exactly as in `notify`.
+     * @param userId - the recipient's account.
+     * @param data - the event's payload, passed to the template untouched.
+     * @param options - the narrowing-only per-dispatch options; see
+     *        {@link NotifyOptions}.
+     */
+    async notifyNow(eventKey, userId, data, options) {
+        const event = (0, notification_events_1.findEvent)(eventKey);
+        if (!event) {
+            this.logger.debug(`Ignoring notification for unknown event '${eventKey}'.`);
+            return NOT_THROTTLED;
+        }
+        // `NOT_THROTTLED` is the containment fallback: a dispatch that threw
+        // despite every layer below being written not to has no throttle verdict
+        // to report, and "nothing to back off from" is the reading that keeps the
+        // caller moving — the same outcome as before #456, where it resolved void.
+        return this.runContained(() => this.dispatchToUser(event, userId, data, options), NOT_THROTTLED);
+    }
+    /**
+     * Raise a notification for an EMAIL ADDRESS THAT MAY HAVE NO ACCOUNT.
+     *
+     * ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+     * WHY THIS EXISTS AT ALL (#128, and the design problem of that issue)
+     * ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+     *
+     * `allowlist.invitation` is sent to somebody an administrator has just
+     * authorised to sign in. By definition they have no user row, no
+     * `user_settings` row and no open tab — that is what being newly allowlisted
+     * MEANS — so `notify(eventKey, userId, data)` has nothing to pass as
+     * `userId`, and there are no stored preferences to resolve.
+     *
+     * Two ways to handle that were on the table:
+     *
+     *   1. **REJECTED — let the event bypass preference resolution.** A flag on
+     *      the registry entry, or a branch in `dispatch`, saying "this one skips
+     *      the gate". That puts a documented hole in the ONE place the
+     *      `mandatory` override and the sparse absent-key contract are enforced,
+     *      and the hole is selected by a string. Every future event is then one
+     *      copied line away from silently opting out of preferences for
+     *      recipients who DO have them. The gate is only a gate if there is no
+     *      way around it.
+     *
+     *   2. **CHOSEN — a second way to BUILD a recipient, feeding the same gate.**
+     *      This method resolves a `NotificationRecipient` and hands it to the
+     *      identical `dispatch`. Nothing about resolution changes: preferences
+     *      are still read, `resolveChannels` still runs, `mandatory` still
+     *      overrides. For a recipient with no account the preferences are simply
+     *      empty — and empty resolves to the registry's `defaultEnabled`, which
+     *      is the correct answer for somebody who has never had a settings row
+     *      to express an opinion in. That is not a bypass; it is the sparse
+     *      contract's own definition of "absent".
+     *
+     * ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+     * AND IT LOOKS THE ADDRESS UP FIRST, WHICH IS THE PART THAT MATTERS
+     * ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+     *
+     * The danger in (2) is not the no-account case, which has no preferences to
+     * ignore. It is the case where the address TURNS OUT to belong to an
+     * account: an admin re-adds an address that already has a user (the initial
+     * admin bypasses the allowlist entirely and can be allowlisted afterwards;
+     * an entry can be removed and added again). Dispatching that as an
+     * account-less recipient would deliver to a real user while ignoring the
+     * preferences they actually set — exactly the weakening #128 forbids.
+     *
+     * So this looks the address up, and if it resolves to an account it hands
+     * off to the ordinary user path. Preference resolution is therefore never
+     * skipped for anybody who has preferences. The cost is one indexed query on
+     * a path that is already detached from the caller.
+     *
+     * NEVER REJECTS, and never joins the caller's transaction — same guarantees
+     * as {@link notify}, by the same mechanism (`schedule`).
+     *
+     * @param eventKey - a key from `NOTIFICATION_EVENTS`. Unknown is a no-op.
+     * @param email - the recipient's address. Matched case-insensitively, because
+     *        the allowlist stores addresses lower-cased while `users.email`
+     *        holds whatever the OAuth provider returned.
+     * @param data - the event's payload, passed to the template untouched.
+     * @param options - the narrowing-only per-dispatch options (#321), carried
+     *        here as well as on {@link notify} so the two public paths cannot
+     *        end up with different capabilities — the divergence this method's
+     *        whole design (one gate, two ways of building a recipient) exists to
+     *        avoid. See {@link NotifyOptions}.
+     */
+    async notifyAddress(eventKey, email, data, options) {
+        const event = (0, notification_events_1.findEvent)(eventKey);
+        if (!event) {
+            this.logger.debug(`Ignoring notification for unknown event '${eventKey}'.`);
+            return;
+        }
+        this.schedule(() => this.dispatchToAddress(event, email, data, options));
+    }
+    /**
+     * Raise a notification for EVERYBODY WHO CAN ACT ON IT — issue #288, epic
+     * #254.
+     *
+     * ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+     * WHY THIS EXISTS: AN OPERATIONAL FAILURE HAS NO USER ID
+     * ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+     *
+     * Every entry point above resolves ONE recipient the caller already knows:
+     * `notify` is handed a user id, `notifyAddress` an address. That works
+     * because the events they were built for are facts ABOUT a person — you
+     * signed in, you were invited, your roles changed.
+     *
+     * `jobs.job_failed`, `nodes.node_offline` and `db_backup.backup_failed` are
+     * not. A job that exhausted its retries, a worker that stopped heartbeating
+     * and a backup that never finished are facts about the DEPLOYMENT, and the
+     * question "who should hear about this?" has no user id in it. The honest
+     * answer is WHOEVER CAN ACT ON IT — and in this application, "can act on it"
+     * is spelled as a permission.
+     *
+     * ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+     * WHY A PERMISSION AND NOT A ROLE
+     * ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+     *
+     * The alternative — "send it to the Admin role" — is one string shorter and
+     * wrong for the same reason the Settings UI Pattern (CLAUDE.md, rule 3)
+     * insists a card's `permission` field be the exact string the controller
+     * enforces rather than an approximation of it.
+     *
+     *   * A ROLE IS A BUNDLE SOMEBODY ELSE OWNS. A deployment that adds an
+     *     `Operator` role holding `db_backup:read`, or splits `Admin` in two, has
+     *     changed who can act on a failed backup — and a role-addressed
+     *     notification would keep mailing the old bundle, silently, with nothing
+     *     to fail and nothing to notice. Roles are seeded data a fork edits;
+     *     permission strings are the contract the API is written against.
+     *
+     *   * THE PERMISSION IS ALREADY THE ANSWER TO THIS EXACT QUESTION. Passing
+     *     `PERMISSIONS.DB_BACKUP_READ` here means the audience for "your backup
+     *     failed" is, BY CONSTRUCTION, the set of people
+     *     `db-backup.controller.ts` would let look at the backup. There is no
+     *     second definition of that audience to drift from the first.
+     *
+     *   * IT COMPOSES WITH RBAC RATHER THAN AROUND IT. Grant a role the
+     *     permission and its holders start receiving the event; revoke it and
+     *     they stop. Nothing in this file, and no notification-specific list,
+     *     has to be edited for either.
+     *
+     * ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+     * WHAT IT IS NOT: A SECOND DISPATCH PATH
+     * ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+     *
+     * This resolves a SET OF USER IDS and then fans out through
+     * `dispatchToUser` — the identical method `notify` uses. The preference
+     * gate, the `mandatory` override, the admin policy, the delivery rows and the
+     * per-channel containment are therefore the SAME CODE, not a parallel
+     * implementation of it. That is the same argument `notifyAddress` makes: a
+     * new way of BUILDING a recipient is safe; a new way of DELIVERING to one is
+     * a second place the gate can be forgotten.
+     *
+     * ONLY ACTIVE USERS. `isActive: false` is a deactivated account — somebody
+     * who cannot sign in and therefore cannot act on any of this. Note this is a
+     * DIFFERENT question from the one `loadRecipient` deliberately refuses
+     * to answer: there, dropping an inactive recipient would silently defeat a
+     * `mandatory` event aimed AT that account. Here the account is not the
+     * subject of the event at all, it is a candidate audience for somebody else's
+     * incident, and an audience of people who cannot log in is not an audience.
+     *
+     * ZERO RECIPIENTS IS A `debug` LOG AND A NO-OP, not a warning. A template
+     * deployment can perfectly legitimately have nobody holding `nodes:read`
+     * because it runs no worker nodes; warning about that on every sweep would
+     * train operators to ignore the log line that matters.
+     *
+     * NEVER REJECTS — including when the RECIPIENT QUERY ITSELF THROWS, which is
+     * the failure mode unique to this method. The whole body runs inside
+     * `runContained` via `schedule`, and the query has its own
+     * try/catch so a database blip is one log line rather than an unresolvable
+     * dispatch. Every call site of this method is a failure path already (a
+     * backup that failed, a sweep that found a dead node); a throw from here
+     * would turn one failure into two.
+     *
+     * @param eventKey - a key from `NOTIFICATION_EVENTS`. Unknown is a no-op that
+     *        records nothing, exactly as in `notify`.
+     * @param permission - the permission string — use `PERMISSIONS` from
+     *        `common/constants/roles.constants.ts`, never a literal, and use THE
+     *        SAME ONE the controller for this area enforces.
+     * @param data - the event's payload, passed to the template untouched.
+     * @param options - narrowing-only channels, plus `alsoNotifyUserIds` for an
+     *        audience that is "the permission holders AND this specific person".
+     *        See {@link NotifyPermissionHoldersOptions}.
+     */
+    async notifyPermissionHolders(eventKey, permission, data, options) {
+        const event = (0, notification_events_1.findEvent)(eventKey);
+        if (!event) {
+            this.logger.debug(`Ignoring notification for unknown event '${eventKey}'.`);
+            return;
+        }
+        this.schedule(() => this.dispatchToPermissionHolders(event, permission, data, options));
+    }
+    /**
+     * {@link notifyPermissionHolders}, AWAITED — issue #288, epic #254.
+     *
+     * Stands to `notifyPermissionHolders` exactly as {@link notifyNow} stands to
+     * {@link notify}: same registry lookup, same recipient resolution, same fan
+     * out through `dispatchToUser`, same never-rejects containment. The ONE
+     * difference is that it does not detach — when this promise resolves, every
+     * recipient's channels have been attempted and every delivery row written.
+     *
+     * ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+     * ⚠ IT EXISTS FOR EXACTLY ONE CALLER, AND THAT CALLER IS A `process.exit(0)`
+     * ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+     *
+     * `DatabaseRestoreService.swap()` finishes a restore by exiting, so that a
+     * supervisor can start a process whose connection pool is built against the
+     * promoted database. A DETACHED dispatch raised just before that exit is
+     * simply dropped: `schedule()` puts the work on a microtask, `exitProcess`
+     * tears the process down, and the shutdown drain in {@link onModuleDestroy}
+     * never runs because nothing is shutting Nest down — the process is ending.
+     *
+     * The result would be the worst possible failure for a `mandatory` event:
+     * `db_backup.restore_completed` would appear to be wired, would pass every
+     * unit test of the registry and the templates, and would deliver nothing at
+     * all, in production, only on the path that matters.
+     *
+     * So the restore AWAITS this, and the ordering — swap, then notify, then exit
+     * — is spelled out at that call site as well as here, because it is the thing
+     * a later refactor will silently break.
+     *
+     * LEGITIMATE HERE, AND STILL FORBIDDEN IN A REQUEST PATH, for the reason
+     * {@link notifyNow} gives: this is a background path that owns its own
+     * lifetime, not a controller with a client waiting on a socket.
+     *
+     * Like `notifyNow`, deliberately NOT tracked in `inFlight`: that set
+     * exists to drain work nobody is awaiting, and this work has an awaiting
+     * owner by definition.
+     */
+    async notifyPermissionHoldersNow(eventKey, permission, data, options) {
+        const event = (0, notification_events_1.findEvent)(eventKey);
+        if (!event) {
+            this.logger.debug(`Ignoring notification for unknown event '${eventKey}'.`);
+            return;
+        }
+        await this.runContained(() => this.dispatchToPermissionHolders(event, permission, data, options), undefined);
+    }
+    /**
+     * Wait for every scheduled dispatch to finish.
+     *
+     * The shutdown drain, and the seam tests use to assert on what a
+     * fire-and-forget `notify` eventually did — without it, a test would be
+     * reduced to polling or to an arbitrary `setTimeout`, which is how a suite
+     * acquires flakes.
+     *
+     * Loops rather than awaiting the set once, because a dispatch may schedule
+     * further work; awaiting a snapshot would return while that work is still
+     * running.
+     */
+    async flush() {
+        while (this.inFlight.size > 0) {
+            await Promise.all([...this.inFlight]);
+        }
+    }
+    /**
+     * Finish what has been started, within a bound.
+     *
+     * Without this, an orderly shutdown drops every in-flight notification —
+     * and an orderly shutdown is the COMMON case (a rolling deploy), so the
+     * fire-and-forget model would lose notifications routinely rather than only
+     * on a crash.
+     */
+    async onModuleDestroy() {
+        if (this.inFlight.size === 0)
+            return;
+        this.logger.log(`Draining ${this.inFlight.size} in-flight notification dispatch(es).`);
+        let timer;
+        // The timer is `unref`'d so it can never be the reason the process stays
+        // alive, and cleared in `finally` so a fast drain does not leave a pending
+        // handle behind for a test runner to complain about.
+        const deadline = new Promise((resolve) => {
+            timer = setTimeout(resolve, SHUTDOWN_DRAIN_MS);
+            timer.unref?.();
+        });
+        try {
+            await Promise.race([this.flush(), deadline]);
+        }
+        finally {
+            if (timer)
+                clearTimeout(timer);
+        }
+        if (this.inFlight.size > 0) {
+            // Their `queued` rows stay `queued`, which is the evidence trail
+            // described in notification-delivery.service.ts.
+            this.logger.warn(`Shutdown drain timed out with ${this.inFlight.size} dispatch(es) ` +
+                `unfinished; their delivery records remain 'queued'.`);
+        }
+    }
+    // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+    // Internals
+    // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+    /**
+     * Detach a unit of work from the caller.
+     *
+     * THE SINGLE PLACE THE INLINE/QUEUED DECISION LIVES. Swapping this body for
+     * an enqueue is the entire change if a durable queue is ever justified;
+     * `notify` and `dispatchToUser` do not move.
+     *
+     * The deferral and the never-throws containment both live in
+     * `runContained`, which this shares with the awaited `notifyNow` path
+     * (#321) so the two cannot drift apart. What is left HERE is the part that
+     * is genuinely about detaching: the promise is stored in `inFlight` — the
+     * already-contained one, so there is no window in which an unhandled
+     * rejection can escape — and removed when it settles, which is what lets the
+     * shutdown drain finish work whose caller is long gone.
+     */
+    schedule(work) {
+        const task = this.runContained(work, undefined);
+        this.inFlight.add(task);
+        void task.finally(() => {
+            this.inFlight.delete(task);
+        });
+    }
+    /**
+     * Run a unit of work such that its promise CANNOT REJECT.
+     *
+     * ONE COPY OF THE NEVER-THROWS GUARANTEE, shared by the detached path
+     * (`schedule`, and so `notify`/`notifyAddress`) and the awaited one
+     * ({@link notifyNow}). Both make the identical promise to their callers, and
+     * a promise made in two places is a promise that can be weakened in one of
+     * them — a `catch` narrowed here, a rethrow added there — with the two
+     * entry points then differing in a way no test of either would notice. So
+     * they share this rather than each holding a try/catch of their own.
+     *
+     * Note what is NOT here: `inFlight` bookkeeping. Whether a dispatch is
+     * tracked for the shutdown drain depends on whether anybody is awaiting it,
+     * which is the caller's question, not this function's — see `notifyNow` for
+     * why it opts out.
+     *
+     * `Promise.resolve().then(work)` rather than calling `work()` here for the
+     * reason `schedule` gives: it keeps the deferral independent of what
+     * the work happens to do synchronously first. For `notifyNow`, where the
+     * caller is awaiting anyway, the extra microtask is invisible.
+     *
+     * GENERIC OVER THE RESULT since #456, because `notifyNow` now resolves a
+     * {@link NotifyNowResult} rather than `void`. The containment is unchanged:
+     * a rejection still becomes a resolved promise — carrying `fallback`, which
+     * is whatever "nothing happened that you need to act on" means for that
+     * caller (`undefined` for the detached path, `NOT_THROTTLED` for
+     * `notifyNow`). The fallback is a PARAMETER, not a default computed here,
+     * so this function still knows nothing about what the work is.
+     */
+    runContained(work, fallback) {
+        return Promise.resolve()
+            .then(work)
+            .catch((err) => {
+            // Reaching here means something below threw despite every layer being
+            // written not to. That is a bug worth an `error`, and it is still
+            // contained: on the detached path the caller returned long ago, and on
+            // the awaited path the caller gets a resolved promise rather than a
+            // rejection that would fail an entire job over one recipient.
+            this.logger.error(`Notification dispatch failed unexpectedly: ${(0, describe_thrown_1.describeThrown)(err)}`);
+            return fallback;
+        });
+    }
+    /**
+     * Resolve the recipient from their account, then dispatch.
+     *
+     * SPLIT FROM {@link dispatch} so the no-account case (#128's
+     * `allowlist.invitation`, where there is no user row and `userId` is null on
+     * the delivery record) is a different way of BUILDING a
+     * `NotificationRecipient` rather than a second copy of the fan-out, the
+     * preference gate and the containment rules.
+     */
+    async dispatchToUser(event, userId, data, options) {
+        const user = await this.loadRecipient(userId);
+        if (!user) {
+            // No user, no address, no delivery row: `recipient` is NOT NULL and
+            // there is nothing truthful to put in it. Logged because a notification
+            // raised for a user id that does not exist is a caller bug (or a user
+            // deleted between the action and this dispatch — a real race, given the
+            // dispatch is detached).
+            this.logger.warn(`Cannot dispatch '${event.key}': user ${userId} was not found.`);
+            return NOT_THROTTLED;
+        }
+        return this.dispatch(event, user, data, options);
+    }
+    /**
+     * Resolve the audience from a permission, then fan out to it.
+     *
+     * SPLIT FROM the two public entry points for the same reason
+     * `dispatchToUser` is split from `notify`/`notifyNow`: the detached and
+     * the awaited callers must share ONE body, or the day somebody fixes a
+     * de-duplication bug in one of them the other keeps it.
+     *
+     * ⚠ EVERY RECIPIENT IS DISPATCHED INDEPENDENTLY. `dispatchToUser` can throw
+     * — `loadRecipient` issues a query, and a query can fail — and one recipient
+     * whose row could not be read must not silence the notification for everybody
+     * after them in the set. The outer `runContained` would catch it, but it would
+     * catch it by ABANDONING THE LOOP, which is the wrong containment boundary for
+     * a fan-out. Hence the per-recipient try/catch.
+     *
+     * SEQUENTIAL, like `dispatch`'s channel loop and for the same reason: the
+     * audiences here are administrators of one deployment (single digits, in
+     * practice), so there is no latency worth parallelising for, and sequencing
+     * keeps one event's log lines adjacent. The bounded-pool fan-out in
+     * `broadcast-chunk.handler.ts` exists because a BROADCAST addresses every
+     * user in the database; this does not.
+     */
+    async dispatchToPermissionHolders(event, permission, data, options) {
+        const holders = await this.resolvePermissionHolders(event, permission);
+        if (holders === null)
+            return;
+        // THE UNION AND THE DE-DUPLICATION, in one place and before anything is
+        // dispatched. A `Set` keyed on the user id is the whole mechanism: the
+        // actor who triggered a restore AND holds `db_backup:read` is one
+        // recipient, not two. See `NotifyPermissionHoldersOptions`.
+        const recipients = new Set(holders);
+        for (const extra of options?.alsoNotifyUserIds ?? []) {
+            recipients.add(extra);
+        }
+        if (recipients.size === 0) {
+            // `debug`, NOT `warn`. A deployment running no worker nodes legitimately
+            // has nobody holding `nodes:read`, and a warning on every ten-minute
+            // sweep is how a log stops being read. See the public method's header.
+            this.logger.debug(`'${event.key}' has no recipient: no active user holds '${permission}'.`);
+            return;
+        }
+        for (const userId of recipients) {
+            try {
+                await this.dispatchToUser(event, userId, data, options);
+            }
+            catch (err) {
+                this.logger.error(`Dispatching '${event.key}' to ${userId} failed; the remaining ` +
+                    `recipient(s) are unaffected: ${(0, describe_thrown_1.describeThrown)(err)}`);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    /**
+     * The user ids of every ACTIVE account holding `permission` through any role.
+     *
+     * ONE INDEXED QUERY, not a role lookup followed by a user lookup: the join
+     * runs in the database, where `user_roles`, `role_permissions` and the unique
+     * index on `permissions.name` already are. Selecting ONLY `id` matters as
+     * much as the join does — this is a failure path, and pulling settings blobs
+     * or profile rows for an audience the caller may not even dispatch to would
+     * make an incident more expensive to report than to have.
+     *
+     * Returns `null` — not `[]` — WHEN THE QUERY ITSELF FAILED, and the
+     * distinction is load-bearing: `[]` means "nobody holds this permission",
+     * which is an ordinary, silent outcome, while `null` means "we do not know
+     * who holds it", which is a logged failure and must not be mistaken for an
+     * empty audience.
+     */
+    async resolvePermissionHolders(event, permission) {
+        try {
+            const holders = await this.prisma.user.findMany({
+                where: {
+                    isActive: true,
+                    userRoles: {
+                        some: {
+                            role: {
+                                rolePermissions: { some: { permission: { name: permission } } },
+                            },
+                        },
+                    },
+                },
+                select: { id: true },
+            });
+            return holders.map((holder) => holder.id);
+        }
+        catch (err) {
+            // A LOG LINE, NEVER AN EXCEPTION. The caller is already reporting a
+            // failure; a throw here would replace their failure with this one.
+            this.logger.error(`Cannot dispatch '${event.key}': resolving the holders of ` +
+                `'${permission}' failed: ${(0, describe_thrown_1.describeThrown)(err)}`);
+            return null;
+        }
+    }
+    /**
+     * Resolve an email address to a recipient, preferring the account behind it.
+     *
+     * THE ORDER IS THE SECURITY PROPERTY. The account lookup happens FIRST, and
+     * an address with an account is dispatched as that account — with its stored
+     * preferences — rather than as an anonymous address. See
+     * `notifyAddress` for why the reverse would be a hole in the preference gate.
+     */
+    async dispatchToAddress(event, email, data, options) {
+        let existing;
+        try {
+            // `findFirst` with a case-insensitive `equals` rather than `findUnique`:
+            // `users.email` is unique but stored with the provider's casing, while
+            // the caller's address (an allowlist entry) is lower-cased. A
+            // case-sensitive miss here would silently produce the anonymous path for
+            // a user who does have preferences, which is the one outcome this lookup
+            // exists to prevent.
+            existing = await this.prisma.user.findFirst({
+                where: { email: { equals: email, mode: 'insensitive' } },
+                select: { id: true },
+            });
+        }
+        catch (err) {
+            // ABORT, DO NOT FALL BACK. Falling through to the anonymous path here
+            // would mean a transient database error downgrades a preference-checked
+            // send into an unchecked one — a gate that fails OPEN. Failing closed
+            // costs at most one undelivered notification, and the database is also
+            // where the delivery record would have gone, so nothing is being
+            // silently lost that would otherwise have been recorded.
+            this.logger.error(`Cannot dispatch '${event.key}': resolving the recipient address ` +
+                `failed: ${(0, describe_thrown_1.describeThrown)(err)}`);
+            return;
+        }
+        if (existing) {
+            // A real account. Ordinary path, ordinary preference resolution.
+            await this.dispatchToUser(event, existing.id, data, options);
+            return;
+        }
+        // Genuinely no account. `preferences: {}` is not a bypass: under the
+        // sparse absent-key contract an absent preference resolves to the event's
+        // `defaultEnabled`, which is precisely the right answer for somebody who
+        // has never had a settings row. `mandatory` still applies, and a channel
+        // that cannot reach an account-less recipient — the browser channel, whose
+        // `resolveTo` returns the user id — skips itself.
+        await this.dispatch(event, { userId: null, email, preferences: {} }, data, options);
+    }
+    /**
+     * Read the recipient's address and preferences in ONE query.
+     *
+     * The settings blob is read RAW, through `user_settings.value`, and
+     * deliberately NOT through `UserSettingsService.getSettings`, for three
+     * independent reasons — any one of which would be disqualifying:
+     *
+     *   1. `getSettings` CREATES A ROW when none exists. A read on a
+     *      fire-and-forget send path must not write, and materialising a
+     *      settings row as a side effect of sending an email is precisely the
+     *      "silently materialises preference blobs" failure #125 warns about.
+     *   2. Its response projection lists the namespaces it knows and would drop
+     *      `notifications` entirely.
+     *   3. `userSettingsSchema.parse` STRIPS unknown keys, so the namespace
+     *      would not survive the parse even if the projection kept it. (That
+     *      schema is #126's to widen, on the write side; resolution does not
+     *      depend on it, which is why preference READING works today with no
+     *      change to the settings module.)
+     *
+     * Returns `null` when there is no such user.
+     */
+    async loadRecipient(userId) {
+        const user = await this.prisma.user.findUnique({
+            where: { id: userId },
+            select: {
+                id: true,
+                email: true,
+                userSettings: { select: { value: true } },
+                // The recipient's organization for the policy's org layer (#738): the
+                // active membership they were most recently active in.
+                memberships: {
+                    where: { status: 'active' },
+                    orderBy: [{ lastActiveAt: { sort: 'desc', nulls: 'last' } }, { createdAt: 'asc' }],
+                    take: 1,
+                    select: { orgId: true },
+                },
+            },
+        });
+        if (!user)
+            return null;
+        // NO `isActive` GATE, DELIBERATELY. Skipping deactivated accounts is a
+        // POLICY, it is not stated anywhere in #109/#125, and putting it here
+        // would make it a hidden one: `security.role_changed` is mandatory
+        // precisely so that a privilege change is never silent, and a silent drop
+        // in the dispatcher would defeat that for the accounts an incident review
+        // is most likely to care about. If an offboarded mailbox is gone, the send
+        // bounces and the delivery record says so — which is a visible answer
+        // rather than an invisible one. Whoever raises an event decides whether it
+        // applies (#128).
+        return {
+            userId: user.id,
+            email: user.email,
+            preferences: (0, notification_preferences_1.readNotificationPreferences)(user.userSettings?.value),
+            orgId: user.memberships?.[0]?.orgId ?? null,
+        };
+    }
+    /**
+     * Fan one event out to a resolved recipient's enabled channels.
+     *
+     * Channel-agnostic and recipient-agnostic: this is the method #128's
+     * no-account path will call with `{ userId: null, ... }`.
+     *
+     * Resolves the dispatch's throttle summary (#456) for `notifyNow` to hand
+     * back; every other caller awaits it as a statement and discards it.
+     */
+    async dispatch(event, recipient, data, options) {
+        // THE ADMIN GATE (#226), read ONCE per dispatch and carried in the context
+        // below. Both halves of the browser decision — which channels to fan out to,
+        // and whether the streamed event may raise an OS toast — are then derived
+        // from the SAME snapshot, so a policy change mid-dispatch cannot produce a
+        // row whose `toast` flag disagrees with the decision that wrote it.
+        //
+        // `getPolicy` never throws and degrades to the permissive default; see its
+        // own comment for why that direction, on a path whose whole purpose is to
+        // make sure a privilege change is not silent.
+        //
+        // PER ORGANIZATION (#738): the caller's `orgId` when it names one (a
+        // broadcast to one org), else the recipient's own; `null` reads the
+        // deployment-wide policy. The org layer may only tighten it.
+        const orgId = options?.orgId !== undefined ? options.orgId : (recipient.orgId ?? null);
+        const policy = await this.policy.getPolicy(orgId);
+        // THE GATE. `resolveChannels` applies the admin policy, then the sparse
+        // absent-key contract and the `mandatory` override; nothing else in this
+        // file consults a preference or a policy. One resolution point, one gate.
+        let channels = (0, notification_preferences_1.resolveChannels)(event, recipient.preferences, policy);
+        // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+        // THE PER-DISPATCH NARROWING (#321, epic #319) — AND WHY IT IS *HERE*
+        // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+        //
+        // An admin composing a broadcast picks the medium ("email only"), and that
+        // choice has to reach the dispatcher somehow. It arrives as
+        // `NotifyOptions.channels` and is applied RIGHT HERE: as a set intersection
+        // against the list the gate above already produced, and before the
+        // every-channel-muted check below.
+        //
+        // NOT BY WIDENING `resolveChannels`, WHICH IS THE LOAD-BEARING PART.
+        // `resolveChannels` is a PURE FUNCTION SHARED WITH
+        // `GET /api/notifications/events` — the endpoint that builds the per-user
+        // preferences matrix, which has no per-dispatch subset and never will.
+        // Adding the parameter there would put a dispatch-time concept into the
+        // function the preferences page calls, and would invite the next caller to
+        // pass it from the wrong side of that seam.
+        //
+        // Intersecting an ALREADY-RESOLVED list is also what makes "this can only
+        // ever narrow" STRUCTURALLY TRUE rather than a property someone has to
+        // re-verify every time this file changes: there is no path from here by
+        // which a channel `resolveChannels` did not return can be delivered over.
+        // A requested channel the event does not declare, one the admin policy
+        // dropped, one the user muted — each is simply an element with nothing to
+        // intersect with.
+        //
+        // AND IT PERMITS NARROWING A `mandatory` EVENT, DELIBERATELY. That looks
+        // like a hole in the flag and is not: `mandatory` binds the RECIPIENT, not
+        // the sender. It means "the user may not mute this", not "the sender may
+        // not choose a medium" — an admin picking email for an announcement is not
+        // a user opting out of it. The rule that a CRITICAL broadcast must include
+        // the in-app channel is a composition rule about one product surface, so it
+        // is enforced in the admin API's DTO (#324), not here.
+        //
+        // Say the consequence plainly rather than leaving it implied: a future call
+        // site that bypasses that DTO could send `admin.broadcast_critical`
+        // email-only, and no durable in-app record of it would exist. If that
+        // becomes a real risk — a second composer, a scripted sender — the answer
+        // is a check at THAT entry point, not a special case in this intersection,
+        // which would make `mandatory` mean two different things in two files.
+        if (options?.channels) {
+            const requested = new Set(options.channels);
+            channels = channels.filter((channel) => requested.has(channel));
+        }
+        // #746: a channel another resolved channel covers is dropped (`push`
+        // already reaches every `android_app` subscription), so nobody gets the
+        // same message twice. After preferences and narrowing: a user who muted
+        // `push` still gets `android_app`. See `collapseOverlappingChannels`.
+        channels = (0, channel_registry_1.collapseOverlappingChannels)(channels);
+        if (channels.length === 0) {
+            // Every channel muted — or narrowed away to nothing by `options.channels`
+            // above, which lands here on purpose rather than in a branch of its own:
+            // "nothing left to deliver over" is one outcome however it was reached.
+            // No rows: nothing was attempted, and recording a "we did not try" row
+            // per muted event would fill the table with the absence of activity.
+            this.logger.debug(`'${event.key}' resolved to no enabled channel for user ` +
+                `${recipient.userId ?? '(no account)'}.`);
+            return NOT_THROTTLED;
+        }
+        const context = {
+            event,
+            recipient,
+            data,
+            policy,
+            // The narrowed list, exactly what the loop below dispatches over (#625).
+            // Channels only READ it (the browser frame's `pushed`); no channel's
+            // result is threaded into another's.
+            channels,
+        };
+        // SEQUENTIAL, not `Promise.all`. Two channels at most today, so there is
+        // no latency worth parallelising for, and sequencing keeps the log lines
+        // for one notification adjacent and ordered — which matters when the
+        // question being answered is "what happened to this one event?". Failure
+        // containment does not depend on it either way: each iteration is
+        // independently wrapped below.
+        //
+        // A THROTTLED CHANNEL DOES NOT STOP THE NEXT ONE (#456). The email
+        // provider refusing us says nothing about the in-app row, which is a
+        // local database write; skipping it would make a mail outage erase the
+        // durable record too. The verdict is only accumulated and reported.
+        // One span per fan-out (#738): the event, the channels attempted and the
+        // organization whose policy applied (`org.id`, a span attribute and never
+        // a metric label). No recipient address or payload is recorded.
+        return tracer.startActiveSpan('notifications.dispatch', {
+            attributes: {
+                'notification.event_key': event.key,
+                'notification.channels': channels.join(','),
+                ...(orgId ? { 'org.id': orgId } : {}),
+            },
+        }, async (span) => {
+            try {
+                let throttle = NOT_THROTTLED;
+                for (const channel of channels) {
+                    throttle = mergeThrottle(throttle, await this.deliverOne(context, channel));
+                }
+                if (throttle.rateLimited)
+                    span.setAttribute('notification.rate_limited', true);
+                return throttle;
+            }
+            finally {
+                span.end();
+            }
+        });
+    }
+    /**
+     * Where `sender` would deliver for this dispatch: its async
+     * `resolveRecipient` when it has one (PP-14.10), else its synchronous
+     * `resolveTo` (the address doubles as the row's label). `null` means the
+     * channel cannot reach this recipient; a sender that throws while resolving
+     * is treated the same way (logged, never rethrown), because resolution runs
+     * on the dispatch path and `notify` never rejects.
+     */
+    async resolveDestination(sender, channel, context) {
+        const { event, recipient } = context;
+        try {
+            if (sender.resolveRecipient) {
+                const resolveContext = {
+                    channel,
+                    event,
+                    handle: () => this.handleFor(recipient, channel),
+                };
+                const resolved = await sender.resolveRecipient(recipient, resolveContext);
+                if (!resolved || typeof resolved.to !== 'string' || resolved.to === '')
+                    return null;
+                // The row stores `display`, never `to` (which may be a secret). A sender
+                // that forgot it gets a placeholder rather than its destination.
+                const display = typeof resolved.display === 'string' && resolved.display !== '' ? resolved.display : '(redacted)';
+                return { to: resolved.to, display: display.slice(0, MAX_DISPLAY_LENGTH) };
+            }
+            const to = sender.resolveTo?.(recipient) ?? null;
+            return to ? { to, display: to } : null;
+        }
+        catch (err) {
+            this.logger.warn(`Could not resolve the '${channel}' destination for '${event.key}': ${(0, describe_thrown_1.describeThrown)(err)}`);
+            return null;
+        }
+    }
+    /** The app's handle for this recipient on `channel`, or `null`; never throws. */
+    async handleFor(recipient, channel) {
+        if (!this.handles || !recipient.userId)
+            return null;
+        try {
+            return (await this.handles.handleFor(recipient.userId, channel)) ?? null;
+        }
+        catch (err) {
+            this.logger.warn(`The recipient handle source failed for channel '${channel}': ${(0, describe_thrown_1.describeThrown)(err)}`);
+            return null;
+        }
+    }
+    /**
+     * The transport for `channel`: a platform sender from the module factory, or
+     * an app sender that registered itself in `NotificationChannelSenderRegistry`
+     * (#678). Resolved per delivery because app senders register in their own
+     * `onModuleInit`, which runs after this service was constructed.
+     */
+    senderFor(channel) {
+        return this.senders.get(channel) ?? this.senderRegistry?.get(channel);
+    }
+    /**
+     * One (event, recipient, channel) attempt, with its delivery record.
+     *
+     * EVERY EXIT FROM THIS METHOD IS NORMAL. It has no throwing path, so one
+     * channel's failure can never prevent the next channel's attempt.
+     *
+     * Resolves the channel's throttle verdict (#456) — the `rateLimited` /
+     * `retryAfterMs` pair off its result, or none for every exit that did not
+     * reach a result (no sender, no address, a channel that threw). A throw is
+     * deliberately NOT read as a throttle: it is a bug in the channel, and a
+     * bug must not be able to pause a broadcast.
+     */
+    async deliverOne(context, channel) {
+        const { event, recipient } = context;
+        const sender = this.senderFor(channel);
+        if (!sender) {
+            // A channel the registry declares with no transport implemented —
+            // `browser` on `security.role_changed`, until #127. NO DELIVERY ROW, and
+            // `debug` not `warn`: this is the documented, expected state
+            // (notification-events.ts: "declaring a channel before its
+            // implementation lands is safe — it simply has nowhere to go"). A failed
+            // row per event would fill the table with a known, deliberate gap and
+            // bury the real failures an operator is looking for.
+            this.logger.debug(`No transport registered for channel '${channel}'; ` +
+                `skipping '${event.key}'.`);
+            return {};
+        }
+        const resolved = await this.resolveDestination(sender, channel, context);
+        if (!resolved) {
+            // The channel cannot reach this recipient at all. Still no row:
+            // `NotificationDelivery.recipient` is NOT NULL and exists to answer
+            // "where did this go?", so filling it with a placeholder to record a
+            // non-attempt corrupts the one column that must stay literal.
+            this.logger.warn(`No '${channel}' address for user ${recipient.userId ?? '(no account)'}; ` +
+                `skipping '${event.key}'.`);
+            return {};
+        }
+        // Written BEFORE the attempt. See notification-delivery.service.ts for why
+        // the extra write is worth it. `null` means the row could not be written;
+        // the send proceeds anyway and the mark* calls below become no-ops.
+        //
+        // `display` is what the row stores (PP-14.10): the sender's redacted form of
+        // the destination, or the address itself for a sender with only `resolveTo`.
+        // The raw `to` goes to `deliver` and never into the row.
+        const deliveryId = await this.deliveries.queue({
+            eventKey: event.key,
+            userId: recipient.userId,
+            recipient: resolved.display,
+            channel,
+        });
+        // Declared with its type rather than left to inference from the assignment
+        // inside the `try`: a bare `let result;` is an evolving `any`, which would
+        // silently stop typechecking `result.messageId` below.
+        let result;
+        try {
+            result = await sender.deliver(context, resolved.to);
+        }
+        catch (err) {
+            // BELT AND BRACES. `NotificationChannelSender.deliver` is contracted not
+            // to throw and today's one implementation does not — but #125's
+            // never-throws guarantee has to hold for a channel written later by
+            // somebody who did not read that contract, and this is where that is
+            // enforced rather than assumed.
+            const error = `Channel '${channel}' threw: ${(0, describe_thrown_1.describeThrown)(err)}`;
+            this.logger.error(`Delivery of '${event.key}' failed: ${error}`);
+            this.metrics.notificationDelivery(channel, 'error', event.key);
+            await this.deliveries.markFailed(deliveryId, error);
+            return {};
+        }
+        if (!result.success) {
+            const error = result.error ?? `Channel '${channel}' reported a failure with no message.`;
+            // `warn`, not `error`: a refused send is usually an operator-side
+            // configuration or mailbox problem, not a fault in this service. The
+            // event key and channel are here; the address, the subject and the body
+            // are not — they belong in the delivery record, which is the controlled
+            // place for them.
+            this.logger.warn(`Delivery of '${event.key}' over '${channel}' failed: ${error}`);
+            this.metrics.notificationDelivery(channel, result.rateLimited ? 'rate_limited' : 'failed', event.key);
+            await this.deliveries.markFailed(deliveryId, error);
+            // Reported AFTER the row is written, so a caller that stops on this
+            // verdict never races the record of what it is stopping over.
+            return { rateLimited: result.rateLimited, retryAfterMs: result.retryAfterMs };
+        }
+        this.metrics.notificationDelivery(channel, 'sent', event.key);
+        await this.deliveries.markSent(deliveryId, result.messageId);
+        return {};
+    }
+};
+exports.NotificationsService = NotificationsService;
+exports.NotificationsService = NotificationsService = NotificationsService_1 = __decorate([
+    (0, common_1.Injectable)(),
+    __param(0, (0, common_1.Inject)(index_1.PLATFORM_PRISMA)),
+    __param(3, (0, common_1.Inject)(notification_types_1.NOTIFICATION_CHANNEL_SENDERS)),
+    __param(4, (0, common_1.Optional)()),
+    __param(4, (0, common_1.Inject)(ports_1.NOTIFICATIONS_METRICS)),
+    __param(5, (0, common_1.Optional)()),
+    __param(6, (0, common_1.Optional)()),
+    __param(6, (0, common_1.Inject)(ports_1.NOTIFICATION_RECIPIENT_HANDLES)),
+    __metadata("design:paramtypes", [Object, notification_delivery_service_1.NotificationDeliveryService,
+        notification_policy_service_1.NotificationPolicyService, Array, Object, channel_sender_registry_1.NotificationChannelSenderRegistry, Object])
+], NotificationsService);
+//# sourceMappingURL=notifications.service.js.map