@mannyc1/ts-release 0.0.7 → 0.3.0

package/src/platform/credentials.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,1151 @@
+import { Buffer } from "node:buffer"
+import { chmod, copyFile, mkdir, mkdtemp, readFile, realpath, rm, stat, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises"
+import { tmpdir } from "node:os"
+import { basename, isAbsolute, join, resolve } from "node:path"
+import * as Config from "effect/Config"
+import * as Effect from "effect/Effect"
+import * as Exit from "effect/Exit"
+import * as Layer from "effect/Layer"
+import * as Option from "effect/Option"
+import * as Redacted from "effect/Redacted"
+import * as Schema from "effect/Schema"
+import * as Stream from "effect/Stream"
+import * as ChildProcess from "effect/unstable/process/ChildProcess"
+import type { ChildProcessSpawner } from "effect/unstable/process/ChildProcessSpawner"
+import * as Semver from "semver"
+import {
+  EnvironmentName,
+  type CanonicalAudience,
+  type CredentialRef,
+  type CredentialRequest,
+  type SubjectId,
+  type ResolvedTrustedPublishingAuthStrategy
+} from "../model/authority.js"
+import { redactOutput } from "../drivers/redact.js"
+import {
+  CredentialAudienceMismatch,
+  CredentialProvider,
+  CredentialPurposeMismatch,
+  CredentialStrategyUnsupported,
+  CredentialSubjectMismatch,
+  CredentialUnavailable,
+  type AnonymousAccess,
+  type CredentialGrantAcquirer,
+  type CredentialProviderShape,
+  type MutationCredentialGrant,
+  type ScopedSecret,
+  type WorkloadIdentity,
+  makeCredentialProvider,
+  validateGrantForOperation
+} from "../publication/authority.js"
+import {
+  AuthorizedMutationHttp,
+  HttpAuthorizer,
+  type AuthorizedMutationHttpShape,
+  type HttpAuthorizerShape,
+  type HttpObservationRequest,
+  type HttpResponse,
+  type MutationHttpRequest,
+  type PublicationHttp
+} from "../publication/http.js"
+import {
+  CertifiedPublisherSpawn,
+  NpmUserConfigResource,
+  PublisherExited,
+  PublisherOutcomeUnknown,
+  RejectedBeforeStart,
+  makeNpmUserConfigHandle,
+  npmPublishArgv,
+  type CertifiedPublisherResult,
+  type CertifiedPublisherSpawnShape,
+  type CertifiedPublisherSpec,
+  type NpmPublishOperation,
+  type NpmPublisherSpec,
+  type NpmUserConfig,
+  type NpmUserConfigInput,
+  type NpmUserConfigResourceShape,
+  type WorkloadPublisherSpec
+} from "../publication/publisher.js"
+import { canonicalizeRegistryUrl } from "../release/graph.js"
+
+export {
+  AuthorizedMutationHttp,
+  CertifiedPublisherSpawn,
+  HttpAuthorizer,
+  NpmUserConfigResource,
+  PublisherExited,
+  PublisherOutcomeUnknown,
+  RejectedBeforeStart
+}
+export type {
+  AuthorizedMutationHttpShape,
+  CertifiedPublisherResult,
+  CertifiedPublisherSpawnShape,
+  CertifiedPublisherSpec,
+  HttpAuthorizerShape,
+  HttpObservationRequest,
+  MutationHttpRequest,
+  NpmPublishOperation,
+  NpmPublisherSpec,
+  NpmUserConfig,
+  NpmUserConfigInput,
+  NpmUserConfigResourceShape,
+  WorkloadPublisherSpec
+}
+
+export class CredentialPlatformError
+  extends Schema.TaggedErrorClass<CredentialPlatformError>()("CredentialPlatformError", {
+    phase: Schema.Literals(["observe", "mutate", "resource", "spawn"]),
+    commitment: Schema.Literals(["before-dispatch", "unknown"]),
+    reason: Schema.NonEmptyString
+  }) {}
+
+export type CredentialPlatformServices =
+  | CredentialProvider
+  | HttpAuthorizer
+  | AuthorizedMutationHttp
+  | NpmUserConfigResource
+  | CertifiedPublisherSpawn
+
+// These are deliberately the only literal spellings in production code. The
+// import-rules AST gate keeps OIDC request material in this host module.
+const oidcRequestUrlName = EnvironmentName.make("ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL")
+const oidcRequestTokenName = EnvironmentName.make("ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN")
+const oidcNames = [oidcRequestUrlName, oidcRequestTokenName] as const
+const githubActionsName = "GITHUB_ACTIONS"
+const githubRepositoryName = "GITHUB_REPOSITORY"
+const githubWorkflowRefName = "GITHUB_WORKFLOW_REF"
+const githubServerUrlName = "GITHUB_SERVER_URL"
+const githubEventName = "GITHUB_EVENT_NAME"
+const githubRepositoryIdName = "GITHUB_REPOSITORY_ID"
+const githubRepositoryOwnerIdName = "GITHUB_REPOSITORY_OWNER_ID"
+const githubRefName = "GITHUB_REF"
+const githubShaName = "GITHUB_SHA"
+const runnerEnvironmentName = "RUNNER_ENVIRONMENT"
+const githubRunIdName = "GITHUB_RUN_ID"
+const githubRunAttemptName = "GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT"
+
+const portableEnvironmentName = /^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*$/u
+const certifiedWorkflow = /^\.github\/workflows\/[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+\.ya?ml$/u
+const certifiedRepository = /^[A-Za-z0-9._-]+\/[A-Za-z0-9._-]+$/u
+const certifiedWorkflowRef = /^(?:refs\/(?:heads|tags)\/[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._/-]*|[a-f0-9]{40}(?:[a-f0-9]{24})?)$/u
+const certifiedSourceCommit = /^[a-f0-9]{40}(?:[a-f0-9]{24})?$/u
+const certifiedEvent = /^[a-z][a-z0-9_]*$/u
+const certifiedDecimalId = /^[1-9][0-9]*$/u
+const certifiedSourceRef = /^refs\/(?:heads|tags)\/[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._/-]*$/u
+
+type SecretVault = Map<string, Redacted.Redacted<string>>
+
+interface TrustedHostSnapshot {
+  readonly GITHUB_ACTIONS: "true"
+  readonly GITHUB_REPOSITORY: string
+  readonly GITHUB_WORKFLOW_REF: string
+  readonly GITHUB_SERVER_URL: "https://github.com"
+  readonly GITHUB_EVENT_NAME: string
+  readonly GITHUB_REPOSITORY_ID: string
+  readonly GITHUB_REPOSITORY_OWNER_ID: string
+  readonly GITHUB_REF: string
+  readonly GITHUB_SHA: string
+  readonly RUNNER_ENVIRONMENT: "github-hosted"
+  readonly GITHUB_RUN_ID: string
+  readonly GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT: string
+}
+
+interface TrustedWorkloadMaterial {
+  readonly snapshot: TrustedHostSnapshot
+  readonly oidc: ReadonlyMap<EnvironmentName, Redacted.Redacted<string>>
+}
+
+type TrustedWorkloadVault = WeakMap<WorkloadIdentity, TrustedWorkloadMaterial>
+
+type ObservationGrant = AnonymousAccess | ScopedSecret
+
+type ObservationGrantMetadata =
+  | {
+    readonly _tag: "AnonymousAccess"
+    readonly subject: SubjectId
+    readonly audience: CanonicalAudience
+    readonly purposes: ReadonlySet<"observe" | "publish" | "correct">
+  }
+  | {
+    readonly _tag: "ScopedSecret"
+    readonly subject: SubjectId
+    readonly audience: CanonicalAudience
+    readonly purposes: ReadonlySet<"observe" | "publish" | "correct">
+    readonly ref: CredentialRef
+  }
+
+type ObservationGrantRegistry = WeakMap<ObservationGrant, ObservationGrantMetadata>
+
+const rememberObservationGrant = (
+  observationGrants: ObservationGrantRegistry,
+  grant: ObservationGrant
+): void => {
+  observationGrants.set(grant, grant._tag === "AnonymousAccess"
+    ? {
+      _tag: grant._tag,
+      subject: grant.subject,
+      audience: grant.audience,
+      purposes: new Set(grant.purposes)
+    }
+    : {
+      _tag: grant._tag,
+      subject: grant.subject,
+      audience: grant.audience,
+      purposes: new Set(grant.purposes),
+      ref: grant.ref
+    })
+}
+
+const vaultKey = (subject: SubjectId, name: string): string => `${subject}\u0000${name}`
+
+const platformError = (
+  phase: CredentialPlatformError["phase"],
+  commitment: CredentialPlatformError["commitment"],
+  reason: string
+): CredentialPlatformError => new CredentialPlatformError({ phase, commitment, reason })
+
+const unavailable = (request: CredentialRequest, reason: string): CredentialUnavailable =>
+  new CredentialUnavailable({
+    subject: request.subject,
+    provider: request.provider,
+    purpose: request.purpose,
+    reason
+  })
+
+const unsupported = (request: CredentialRequest, reason: string): CredentialStrategyUnsupported =>
+  new CredentialStrategyUnsupported({
+    subject: request.subject,
+    provider: request.provider,
+    strategy: request.strategy.kind,
+    reason
+  })
+
+const readSecret = (
+  request: CredentialRequest,
+  name: string
+): Effect.Effect<Redacted.Redacted<string>, CredentialUnavailable> =>
+  Config.redacted(name).pipe(
+    Effect.mapError(() => unavailable(request, `Credential reference ${name} is unavailable.`))
+  )
+
+const trustedStrategyIssue = (request: CredentialRequest): string | undefined => {
+  const strategy = request.strategy
+  if (strategy.kind !== "trusted-publishing") return "The request does not carry trusted-publishing intent."
+  if (request.provider !== "npm" || request.audience !== "https://registry.npmjs.org/" ||
+    request.purpose !== "publish") {
+    return "Trusted publishing is certified only for npm publish at the canonical npm registry."
+  }
+  if (strategy.identityProvider !== "github-actions" || strategy.runnerClass !== "github-hosted" ||
+    !certifiedRepository.test(strategy.repository) || !certifiedWorkflow.test(strategy.workflow) ||
+    !certifiedWorkflowRef.test(strategy.workflowRef) ||
+    !certifiedSourceCommit.test(strategy.sourceCommit) ||
+    strategy.provenanceEnvironmentContract !== "github-actions-npm-provenance-v1" ||
+    strategy.allowedAction !== "npm-publish-direct" || strategy.publisherSink !== "certified-npm-cli") {
+    return "Trusted publishing requires one exact GitHub-hosted workflow/ref, source commit, provenance environment contract, and certified direct npm sink."
+  }
+  return undefined
+}
+
+/** Validate non-secret GitHub host facts before either OIDC request value is read. */
+const verifyTrustedHostIdentity = Effect.fn("EnvironmentCredentialProvider.verifyTrustedHostIdentity")(
+  function*(request: CredentialRequest) {
+    const issue = trustedStrategyIssue(request)
+    if (issue !== undefined) return yield* unsupported(request, issue)
+    if (request.strategy.kind !== "trusted-publishing") return yield* unsupported(request, issue ?? "Invalid strategy.")
+    const expected: ReadonlyArray<readonly [string, string]> = [
+      [githubActionsName, "true"],
+      [githubRepositoryName, request.strategy.repository],
+      [githubWorkflowRefName,
+        `${request.strategy.repository}/${request.strategy.workflow}@${request.strategy.workflowRef}`],
+      [githubServerUrlName, "https://github.com"],
+      [githubShaName, request.strategy.sourceCommit],
+      [runnerEnvironmentName, "github-hosted"]
+    ]
+    const values: Record<string, string> = {}
+    for (const [name, value] of expected) {
+      const observed = yield* Config.string(name).pipe(
+        Effect.mapError(() => unsupported(request, `Trusted publishing host identity ${name} is unavailable.`))
+      )
+      if (observed !== value) {
+        return yield* unsupported(request, `Trusted publishing host identity ${name} does not match prepared intent.`)
+      }
+      values[name] = observed
+    }
+    const shaped: ReadonlyArray<readonly [string, RegExp, string]> = [
+      [githubEventName, certifiedEvent, "a canonical GitHub event name"],
+      [githubRepositoryIdName, certifiedDecimalId, "a canonical positive decimal repository ID"],
+      [githubRepositoryOwnerIdName, certifiedDecimalId, "a canonical positive decimal repository-owner ID"],
+      [githubRefName, certifiedSourceRef, "a canonical heads/tags source ref"],
+      [githubRunIdName, certifiedDecimalId, "a canonical positive decimal run ID"],
+      [githubRunAttemptName, certifiedDecimalId, "a canonical positive decimal run attempt"]
+    ]
+    for (const [name, pattern, description] of shaped) {
+      const observed = yield* Config.string(name).pipe(
+        Effect.mapError(() => unsupported(request, `Trusted publishing provenance fact ${name} is unavailable.`))
+      )
+      if (!pattern.test(observed)) {
+        return yield* unsupported(request, `Trusted publishing provenance fact ${name} is not ${description}.`)
+      }
+      values[name] = observed
+    }
+    return Object.freeze({
+      GITHUB_ACTIONS: values[githubActionsName] as "true",
+      GITHUB_REPOSITORY: values[githubRepositoryName]!,
+      GITHUB_WORKFLOW_REF: values[githubWorkflowRefName]!,
+      GITHUB_SERVER_URL: values[githubServerUrlName] as "https://github.com",
+      GITHUB_EVENT_NAME: values[githubEventName]!,
+      GITHUB_REPOSITORY_ID: values[githubRepositoryIdName]!,
+      GITHUB_REPOSITORY_OWNER_ID: values[githubRepositoryOwnerIdName]!,
+      GITHUB_REF: values[githubRefName]!,
+      GITHUB_SHA: values[githubShaName]!,
+      RUNNER_ENVIRONMENT: values[runnerEnvironmentName] as "github-hosted",
+      GITHUB_RUN_ID: values[githubRunIdName]!,
+      GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT: values[githubRunAttemptName]!
+    }) satisfies TrustedHostSnapshot
+  }
+)
+
+/**
+ * A raw environment token has no host-verifiable downscope metadata. Treat it
+ * conservatively as bundled provider authority instead of relabeling the same
+ * bearer as a purpose-specific secret merely because one method requested it.
+ */
+const environmentTokenPurposes = (
+  purpose: CredentialRequest["purpose"]
+): readonly ["observe", "publish", ...Array<"correct">] => purpose === "correct"
+  ? ["observe", "publish", "correct"]
+  : ["observe", "publish"]
+
+const makeEnvironmentAcquirer = (
+  vault: SecretVault,
+  onTrustedWorkload?: (material: TrustedWorkloadMaterial) => void
+): CredentialGrantAcquirer => ({
+  acquire: Effect.fn("EnvironmentCredentialProvider.acquire")(function*(request) {
+    switch (request.strategy.kind) {
+      case "anonymous":
+        return { _tag: "AnonymousAccess", purposes: ["observe"] } as const
+      case "token": {
+        if (request.provider === "npm" && request.purpose === "observe") {
+          return yield* unsupported(
+            request,
+            "Authenticated npm observation is unsupported without a distinct typed read credential."
+          )
+        }
+        const name = request.strategy.credential.toString()
+        if (!portableEnvironmentName.test(name)) {
+          return yield* unsupported(request, "Token credential references must be portable environment names.")
+        }
+        const value = yield* readSecret(request, name)
+        vault.set(vaultKey(request.subject, name), value)
+        return {
+          _tag: "ScopedSecret",
+          purposes: environmentTokenPurposes(request.purpose),
+          ref: request.strategy.credential
+        } as const
+      }
+      case "trusted-publishing": {
+        if (onTrustedWorkload === undefined) {
+          return yield* unsupported(request, "Trusted workload acquisition requires a private host-material binding.")
+        }
+        const snapshot = yield* verifyTrustedHostIdentity(request)
+        const oidcValues = new Map<EnvironmentName, Redacted.Redacted<string>>()
+        for (const name of oidcNames) {
+          const value = yield* readSecret(request, name)
+          oidcValues.set(name, value)
+        }
+        onTrustedWorkload(Object.freeze({ snapshot, oidc: oidcValues }))
+        return {
+          _tag: "WorkloadIdentity",
+          purposes: [request.purpose],
+          names: oidcNames
+        } as const
+      }
+    }
+  })
+})
+
+const makeProvider = (
+  vault: SecretVault,
+  trustedWorkloads: TrustedWorkloadVault,
+  observationGrants: ObservationGrantRegistry
+): CredentialProviderShape => {
+  const provider = makeCredentialProvider(makeEnvironmentAcquirer(vault))
+  return {
+    acquireForObservation: Effect.fn("EnvironmentCredentialProvider.acquireForObservation")(function*(request) {
+      const grant = yield* provider.acquireForObservation(request)
+      if (grant._tag !== "WorkloadIdentity") {
+        rememberObservationGrant(observationGrants, grant)
+      }
+      return grant
+    }),
+    acquireForMutation: Effect.fn("EnvironmentCredentialProvider.acquireForMutation")(function*(request, decision) {
+      let grant: MutationCredentialGrant
+      if (request.strategy.kind === "trusted-publishing") {
+        let material: TrustedWorkloadMaterial | undefined
+        const trustedProvider = makeCredentialProvider(makeEnvironmentAcquirer(
+          vault,
+          (acquired) => { material = acquired }
+        ))
+        grant = yield* trustedProvider.acquireForMutation(request, decision)
+        if (grant._tag !== "WorkloadIdentity" || material === undefined) {
+          return yield* unavailable(request, "Trusted publishing host evidence was not bound to its workload grant.")
+        }
+        trustedWorkloads.set(grant, material)
+      } else {
+        grant = yield* provider.acquireForMutation(request, decision)
+      }
+      // npm publication tokens never become observation capabilities. GitHub
+      // retains its truthfully bundled installation-token read/write model.
+      if (grant._tag === "ScopedSecret" && request.provider !== "npm") {
+        rememberObservationGrant(observationGrants, grant)
+      }
+      return grant
+    })
+  }
+}
+
+/** Environment-backed provider projection for hosts that need no sinks. */
+export const makeEnvironmentCredentialProvider = (): CredentialProviderShape =>
+  makeProvider(new Map(), new WeakMap(), new WeakMap())
+
+const hasAuthorizationHeader = (headers: Readonly<Record<string, string>> | undefined): boolean =>
+  headers !== undefined && Object.keys(headers).some((name) => name.toLowerCase() === "authorization")
+
+const audienceAllows = (audience: CanonicalAudience, requested: string): boolean => {
+  try {
+    const expected = new URL(audience)
+    const observed = new URL(requested)
+    if (expected.protocol !== "https:" || observed.protocol !== "https:") return false
+    if (expected.username !== "" || expected.password !== "" || expected.search !== "" || expected.hash !== "") return false
+    if (expected.origin !== observed.origin) return false
+    const base = expected.pathname.endsWith("/") ? expected.pathname : `${expected.pathname}/`
+    return observed.pathname === expected.pathname || observed.pathname.startsWith(base)
+  } catch {
+    return false
+  }
+}
+
+const githubUploadAudienceAllows = (audience: CanonicalAudience, requested: string): boolean => {
+  try {
+    const expected = new URL(audience)
+    const observed = new URL(requested)
+    if (expected.protocol !== "https:" || expected.hostname !== "api.github.com" ||
+      expected.port !== "" || expected.username !== "" || expected.password !== "" ||
+      expected.search !== "" || expected.hash !== "") return false
+    if (observed.protocol !== "https:" || observed.hostname !== "uploads.github.com" ||
+      observed.port !== "" || observed.username !== "" || observed.password !== "" ||
+      observed.hash !== "") return false
+    const repository = /^\/repos\/[A-Za-z0-9._-]+\/[A-Za-z0-9._-]+$/u.exec(expected.pathname)?.[0]
+    if (repository === undefined ||
+      !new RegExp(`^${repository.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/gu, "\\$&")}\/releases\/[1-9][0-9]*\/assets$`, "u")
+        .test(observed.pathname)) return false
+    const keys = [...observed.searchParams.keys()]
+    return /^\?name=[^&]+(?:&label=[^&]*)?$/u.test(observed.search) &&
+      new Set(keys).size === keys.length && observed.searchParams.get("name")!.length > 0
+  } catch {
+    return false
+  }
+}
+
+const checkAudience = (
+  subject: SubjectId,
+  audience: CanonicalAudience,
+  requested: string,
+  allowGithubUpload = false
+): Effect.Effect<void, CredentialAudienceMismatch> => audienceAllows(audience, requested) ||
+  (allowGithubUpload && githubUploadAudienceAllows(audience, requested))
+  ? Effect.void
+  : Effect.fail(new CredentialAudienceMismatch({
+    subject,
+    expected: audience,
+    observed: requested
+  }))
+
+const lookupToken = (
+  vault: SecretVault,
+  subject: SubjectId,
+  ref: CredentialRef
+): Effect.Effect<Redacted.Redacted<string>, CredentialUnavailable> => {
+  const value = vault.get(vaultKey(subject, ref))
+  return value === undefined
+    ? Effect.fail(new CredentialUnavailable({
+      subject,
+      provider: "unknown",
+      purpose: "unknown",
+      reason: "The credential grant has no host-owned secret in this platform boundary."
+    }))
+    : Effect.succeed(value)
+}
+
+const validateObservationGrant = Effect.fn("HttpAuthorizer.validateGrant")(function*(
+  input: HttpObservationRequest,
+  grant: ObservationGrant,
+  observationGrants: ObservationGrantRegistry
+) {
+  const issued = observationGrants.get(grant)
+  if (issued === undefined) {
+    return yield* new CredentialUnavailable({
+      subject: input.subject,
+      provider: "unknown",
+      purpose: "observe",
+      reason: "The supplied observation grant was not issued by this platform boundary."
+    })
+  }
+  if (issued.subject !== input.subject) {
+    return yield* new CredentialSubjectMismatch({
+      expected: input.subject,
+      observed: issued.subject
+    })
+  }
+  if (!issued.purposes.has("observe")) {
+    return yield* new CredentialPurposeMismatch({
+      subject: input.subject,
+      required: "observe",
+      granted: [...issued.purposes]
+    })
+  }
+  yield* checkAudience(input.subject, issued.audience, input.url)
+  return issued
+})
+
+const sendAnonymous = (
+  http: PublicationHttp,
+  request: HttpObservationRequest
+): Effect.Effect<HttpResponse, CredentialPlatformError> => {
+  if (hasAuthorizationHeader(request.headers)) {
+    return Effect.fail(platformError("observe", "before-dispatch", "Callers may not supply an Authorization header."))
+  }
+  return http.request({
+    method: request.method,
+    url: request.url,
+    ...(request.headers === undefined ? {} : { headers: request.headers }),
+    ...(request.body === undefined ? {} : { body: request.body })
+  }).pipe(
+    Effect.mapError(() => platformError("observe", "unknown", "Observation HTTP transport failed after dispatch."))
+  )
+}
+
+const sendAuthorized = (
+  http: PublicationHttp,
+  request: HttpObservationRequest | MutationHttpRequest,
+  token: Redacted.Redacted<string>,
+  phase: "observe" | "mutate",
+  credentialScheme: "bearer" | "pypi-token-basic" = "bearer"
+): Effect.Effect<HttpResponse, CredentialPlatformError> => {
+  if (hasAuthorizationHeader(request.headers)) {
+    return Effect.fail(platformError(phase, "before-dispatch", "Callers may not supply an Authorization header."))
+  }
+  const headers = {
+    ...(request.headers ?? {}),
+    authorization: credentialScheme === "pypi-token-basic"
+      ? `Basic ${Buffer.from(`__token__:${Redacted.value(token)}`, "utf8").toString("base64")}`
+      : `Bearer ${Redacted.value(token)}`
+  }
+  return http.request({
+    method: request.method,
+    url: request.url,
+    headers,
+    ...(request.body === undefined ? {} : { body: request.body })
+  }).pipe(
+    Effect.mapError(() => platformError(phase, "unknown", "Authorized HTTP transport failed after dispatch."))
+  )
+}
+
+const makeHttpAuthorizer = (
+  http: PublicationHttp,
+  vault: SecretVault,
+  observationGrants: ObservationGrantRegistry
+): HttpAuthorizerShape => ({
+  execute: Effect.fn("HttpAuthorizer.execute")(function*(input, grant) {
+    const issued = yield* validateObservationGrant(input, grant, observationGrants)
+    if (issued._tag === "AnonymousAccess") {
+      return yield* sendAnonymous(http, input)
+    }
+    const token = yield* lookupToken(vault, issued.subject, issued.ref)
+    return yield* sendAuthorized(http, input, token, "observe")
+  })
+})
+
+const makeAuthorizedMutationHttp = (
+  http: PublicationHttp,
+  vault: SecretVault
+): AuthorizedMutationHttpShape => ({
+  execute: Effect.fn("AuthorizedMutationHttp.execute")(function*(operation, request, grant) {
+    yield* validateGrantForOperation(operation, grant)
+    if ((operation.provider === "pypi") !== (request.credentialScheme === "pypi-token-basic")) {
+      return yield* platformError(
+        "mutate", "before-dispatch",
+        "The PyPI Basic credential projection is accepted only for typed PyPI mutations and is mandatory for them."
+      )
+    }
+    yield* checkAudience(operation.subject, operation.audience, request.url, operation.provider === "github")
+    const token = yield* lookupToken(vault, grant.subject, grant.ref)
+    return yield* sendAuthorized(http, request, token, "mutate", request.credentialScheme)
+  })
+})
+
+type NpmUserConfigMetadata = {
+  readonly directory: string
+  readonly path: string
+  readonly globalConfigPath: string
+  readonly subject: SubjectId
+  readonly grant: ScopedSecret
+  readonly token: Redacted.Redacted<string>
+}
+
+const npmUserConfigs = new WeakMap<NpmUserConfig, NpmUserConfigMetadata>()
+
+const npmAuthLine = (registryUrl: string, token: Redacted.Redacted<string>): string => {
+  const registry = new URL(registryUrl)
+  const pathname = registry.pathname.endsWith("/") ? registry.pathname : `${registry.pathname}/`
+  return `//${registry.host}${pathname}:_authToken=${Redacted.value(token)}`
+}
+
+const makeNpmUserConfigResource = (
+  vault: SecretVault,
+  temporaryRoot?: string
+): NpmUserConfigResourceShape => ({
+  acquire: Effect.fn("NpmUserConfigResource.acquire")(function*(input, grant) {
+    yield* validateGrantForOperation(input.operation, grant)
+    if (input.operation.provider !== "npm") {
+      return yield* platformError("resource", "before-dispatch", "npm user config accepts only the npm provider.")
+    }
+    yield* checkAudience(input.operation.subject, input.operation.audience, input.registryUrl)
+    const token = yield* lookupToken(vault, grant.subject, grant.ref)
+    const root = temporaryRoot ?? tmpdir()
+    const handle = makeNpmUserConfigHandle()
+    const acquired = Effect.tryPromise({
+      try: async () => {
+        await mkdir(root, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 })
+        const directory = await mkdtemp(join(root, "ts-release-npm-"))
+        try {
+          const path = join(directory, "userconfig")
+          const globalConfigPath = join(directory, "globalconfig")
+          const contents = `${npmAuthLine(input.registryUrl, token)}\nignore-scripts=true\n`
+          await writeFile(path, contents, { mode: 0o600, flag: "wx" })
+          await writeFile(globalConfigPath, "", { mode: 0o600, flag: "wx" })
+          npmUserConfigs.set(handle, {
+            directory,
+            path,
+            globalConfigPath,
+            subject: input.operation.subject,
+            grant,
+            token
+          })
+          return handle
+        } catch (cause) {
+          await rm(directory, { recursive: true, force: true })
+          throw cause
+        }
+      },
+      catch: () => platformError("resource", "before-dispatch", "Unable to create the scoped npm user config.")
+    })
+    return yield* Effect.acquireRelease(acquired, (resource) => {
+      const metadata = npmUserConfigs.get(resource)
+      npmUserConfigs.delete(resource)
+      return metadata === undefined
+        ? Effect.void
+        : Effect.tryPromise({
+          try: () => rm(metadata.directory, { recursive: true, force: true }),
+          catch: () => undefined
+        }).pipe(Effect.catch(() => Effect.void))
+    })
+  })
+})
+
+const collect = (stream: Stream.Stream<Uint8Array, unknown>): Effect.Effect<string, unknown> =>
+  Stream.mkString(Stream.decodeText(stream))
+
+const minimumTrustedNode = [22, 14, 0] as const
+const minimumTrustedNpm = [11, 5, 1] as const
+
+const parseVersion = (value: string): readonly [number, number, number] | undefined => {
+  const match = /^v?(\d+)\.(\d+)\.(\d+)(?:[-+].*)?\s*$/u.exec(value)
+  if (match === null) return undefined
+  return [Number(match[1]), Number(match[2]), Number(match[3])]
+}
+
+const versionAtLeast = (
+  value: readonly [number, number, number],
+  minimum: readonly [number, number, number]
+): boolean => value[0] > minimum[0] ||
+  (value[0] === minimum[0] && (value[1] > minimum[1] ||
+    (value[1] === minimum[1] && value[2] >= minimum[2])))
+
+const optionalPath = Config.option(Config.string("PATH")).pipe(
+  Effect.map(Option.getOrUndefined),
+  Effect.orElseSucceed(() => undefined)
+)
+
+const closedBaseEnvironment = (path: string | undefined): Record<string, string> =>
+  path === undefined ? {} : { PATH: path }
+
+const optionalReleaseHome = Config.option(Config.string("TS_RELEASE_HOME")).pipe(
+  Effect.map(Option.getOrUndefined),
+  Effect.orElseSucceed(() => undefined)
+)
+
+const privateTrustedNpmEnvironment = Effect.fn("CertifiedPublisherSpawn.privateTrustedNpmEnvironment")(
+  function*(grant: WorkloadIdentity) {
+    const configured = yield* optionalReleaseHome
+    if (configured === undefined || !isAbsolute(configured) || resolve(configured) !== configured) {
+      return yield* new CredentialUnavailable({
+        subject: grant.subject,
+        provider: grant.provider,
+        purpose: "publish",
+        reason: "Trusted npm publishing requires one canonical absolute TS_RELEASE_HOME."
+      })
+    }
+    return yield* Effect.tryPromise({
+      try: async () => {
+        const canonicalHome = await realpath(configured)
+        if (canonicalHome !== configured) throw new Error("TS_RELEASE_HOME is not canonical.")
+        const homeMetadata = await stat(canonicalHome)
+        const owner = typeof process.getuid === "function" ? process.getuid() : undefined
+        if (!homeMetadata.isDirectory() || (homeMetadata.mode & 0o077) !== 0 ||
+          (owner !== undefined && homeMetadata.uid !== owner)) {
+          throw new Error("TS_RELEASE_HOME is not one private caller-owned directory.")
+        }
+        const userConfig = join(canonicalHome, "npm-userconfig")
+        const globalConfig = join(canonicalHome, "npm-globalconfig")
+        for (const path of [userConfig, globalConfig]) {
+          if (await realpath(path) !== path) throw new Error("A trusted npm config path is not canonical.")
+          const metadata = await stat(path)
+          if (!metadata.isFile() || (metadata.mode & 0o777) !== 0o600 ||
+            (owner !== undefined && metadata.uid !== owner) || (await readFile(path)).length !== 0) {
+            throw new Error("A trusted npm config is not an empty private caller-owned file.")
+          }
+        }
+        return {
+          HOME: canonicalHome,
+          NPM_CONFIG_USERCONFIG: userConfig,
+          NPM_CONFIG_GLOBALCONFIG: globalConfig
+        }
+      },
+      catch: () => new CredentialUnavailable({
+        subject: grant.subject,
+        provider: grant.provider,
+        purpose: "publish",
+        reason: "Trusted npm publishing requires validated empty private npm configuration files."
+      })
+    })
+  }
+)
+
+const workloadEnvironment = Effect.fn("CertifiedPublisherSpawn.workloadEnvironment")(function*(
+  trustedWorkloads: TrustedWorkloadVault,
+  grant: WorkloadIdentity
+) {
+  if (grant.names.size !== oidcNames.length || oidcNames.some((name) => !grant.names.has(name))) {
+    return yield* new CredentialStrategyUnsupported({
+      subject: grant.subject,
+      provider: grant.provider,
+      strategy: "trusted-publishing",
+      reason: "Workload identity lacks the exact certified GitHub Actions OIDC names."
+    })
+  }
+  const material = trustedWorkloads.get(grant)
+  if (material === undefined) {
+    return yield* new CredentialUnavailable({
+      subject: grant.subject,
+      provider: grant.provider,
+      purpose: "publish",
+      reason: "Certified GitHub Actions provenance facts are unavailable in this platform boundary."
+    })
+  }
+  const path = yield* optionalPath
+  const privateEnvironment = yield* privateTrustedNpmEnvironment(grant)
+  const env: Record<string, string> = {
+    ...closedBaseEnvironment(path),
+    ...privateEnvironment
+  }
+  for (const name of oidcNames) {
+    const value = material.oidc.get(name)
+    if (value === undefined) {
+      return yield* new CredentialUnavailable({
+        subject: grant.subject,
+        provider: grant.provider,
+        purpose: "publish",
+        reason: "Certified workload identity material is unavailable in this platform boundary."
+      })
+    }
+    env[name] = Redacted.value(value)
+  }
+  // npm's OIDC exchange consumes the two host-held request values. Its
+  // libnpmpublish provenance builder separately consumes this exact validated
+  // non-secret GitHub run snapshot. No ambient environment is inherited.
+  Object.assign(env, material.snapshot)
+  env.NPM_CONFIG_IGNORE_SCRIPTS = "true"
+  return env
+})
+
+const validateTrustedNpmOperation = Effect.fn("CertifiedPublisherSpawn.validateTrustedNpmOperation")(
+  function*(operation: NpmPublishOperation, grant: WorkloadIdentity) {
+    if (operation.provider !== "npm" || operation.purpose !== "publish" ||
+      operation.audience !== "https://registry.npmjs.org/" ||
+      grant.strategy.identityProvider !== "github-actions" ||
+      grant.strategy.runnerClass !== "github-hosted" ||
+      grant.strategy.allowedAction !== "npm-publish-direct" ||
+      grant.strategy.publisherSink !== "certified-npm-cli") {
+      return yield* new CredentialStrategyUnsupported({
+        subject: operation.subject,
+        provider: operation.provider,
+        strategy: "trusted-publishing",
+        reason: "The workload grant is not bound to the certified direct npm publisher sink."
+      })
+    }
+  }
+)
+
+const publisherSpecKeys = Object.freeze({
+  NpmPublisherSpec: [
+    "_tag", "access", "cwd", "distTag", "operation", "packageName", "provenance",
+    "registryUrl", "tarballPath", "userConfig", "version"
+  ],
+  WorkloadPublisherSpec: [
+    "_tag", "access", "cwd", "distTag", "operation", "packageName", "provenance",
+    "registryUrl", "tarballPath", "version"
+  ]
+} satisfies Record<CertifiedPublisherSpec["_tag"], ReadonlyArray<string>>)
+
+const sameKeys = (value: object, expected: ReadonlyArray<string>): boolean => {
+  const observed = Object.keys(value).sort()
+  return observed.length === expected.length && observed.every((key, index) => key === expected[index])
+}
+
+const certifiedNpmSpecIssue = (spec: CertifiedPublisherSpec): string | undefined => {
+  const tagDescriptor = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(spec, "_tag")
+  const tag: unknown = tagDescriptor !== undefined && "value" in tagDescriptor
+    ? tagDescriptor.value
+    : undefined
+  if (tag !== "NpmPublisherSpec" && tag !== "WorkloadPublisherSpec") {
+    return "The certified npm publisher accepts only its two closed typed spec variants."
+  }
+  const expectedKeys = publisherSpecKeys[tag]
+  const descriptors = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptors(spec)
+  if (!sameKeys(spec, expectedKeys) || expectedKeys.some((key) => {
+    const descriptor = descriptors[key]
+    return descriptor === undefined || !("value" in descriptor)
+  })) {
+    return "The certified npm publisher accepts only its exact typed fields; generic argv and override fields are forbidden."
+  }
+  const operation = spec.operation
+  if (operation._tag !== "PublishOperation" || operation.provider !== "npm" || operation.purpose !== "publish") {
+    return "The certified npm publisher accepts only an npm publish operation."
+  }
+  if (typeof spec.packageName !== "string" || spec.packageName.length === 0 ||
+      typeof spec.version !== "string" || Semver.valid(spec.version) !== spec.version) {
+    return "The certified npm publisher requires one nonempty package name and canonical semantic version."
+  }
+  if (operation.subject !== `npm:${spec.packageName}@${spec.version}`) {
+    return "The certified npm publisher package and version do not match the authorized operation subject."
+  }
+  try {
+    if (canonicalizeRegistryUrl(spec.registryUrl) !== spec.registryUrl ||
+        operation.audience.toString() !== spec.registryUrl.toString()) {
+      return "The certified npm publisher registry does not match the authorized canonical audience."
+    }
+  } catch {
+    return "The certified npm publisher requires a canonical registry and npm distribution tag."
+  }
+  if (Semver.validRange(spec.distTag) !== null || spec.distTag.trim() !== spec.distTag ||
+      encodeURIComponent(spec.distTag) !== spec.distTag) {
+    return "The certified npm publisher requires a canonical registry and npm distribution tag."
+  }
+  if ((spec.access !== "public" && spec.access !== "restricted") ||
+      (spec.provenance !== "required" && spec.provenance !== "automatic" && spec.provenance !== "disabled") ||
+      (spec._tag === "NpmPublisherSpec" && spec.provenance === "automatic") ||
+      (spec.access === "restricted" && !spec.packageName.startsWith("@")) ||
+      (Semver.prerelease(spec.version) !== null && spec.distTag === "latest")) {
+    return "The certified npm publisher access, provenance, or dist-tag policy is not an allowed canonical value."
+  }
+  try {
+    const fileName = basename(spec.tarballPath)
+    if (!isAbsolute(spec.cwd) || resolve(spec.cwd) !== spec.cwd ||
+        !/^[a-f0-9]{64}$/u.test(fileName) ||
+        resolve(spec.cwd, "blobs", fileName) !== spec.tarballPath) {
+      return "The certified npm publisher tarball must be the canonical prepared-store blob path."
+    }
+  } catch {
+    return "The certified npm publisher tarball must be the canonical prepared-store blob path."
+  }
+  return undefined
+}
+
+const validateCertifiedNpmSpec = Effect.fn("CertifiedPublisherSpawn.validateCertifiedNpmSpec")(
+  function*(spec: CertifiedPublisherSpec) {
+    const issue = certifiedNpmSpecIssue(spec)
+    if (issue !== undefined) {
+      return yield* new CredentialStrategyUnsupported({
+        subject: spec.operation.subject,
+        provider: spec.operation.provider,
+        strategy: spec._tag === "WorkloadPublisherSpec" ? "trusted-publishing" : "token",
+        reason: issue
+      })
+    }
+  }
+)
+
+/** Snapshot caller data once so accessors or concurrent mutation cannot change the admitted command after validation. */
+const snapshotCertifiedNpmSpec = (spec: CertifiedPublisherSpec): CertifiedPublisherSpec => {
+  const operation = Object.freeze({
+    ...spec.operation,
+    decision: Object.freeze({ ...spec.operation.decision })
+  }) as NpmPublishOperation
+  return Object.freeze({ ...spec, operation }) as CertifiedPublisherSpec
+}
+
+const publisherEnvironment = Effect.fn("CertifiedPublisherSpawn.environment")(function*(
+  vault: SecretVault,
+  trustedWorkloads: TrustedWorkloadVault,
+  spec: CertifiedPublisherSpec,
+  grant: ScopedSecret | WorkloadIdentity
+) {
+  yield* validateCertifiedNpmSpec(spec)
+  if (spec._tag === "NpmPublisherSpec") {
+    if (grant._tag !== "ScopedSecret") {
+      return yield* new CredentialStrategyUnsupported({
+        subject: spec.operation.subject,
+        provider: spec.operation.provider,
+        strategy: "trusted-publishing",
+        reason: "A scoped npm user config requires a scoped-secret grant."
+      })
+    }
+    const metadata = npmUserConfigs.get(spec.userConfig)
+    if (metadata === undefined || metadata.subject !== spec.operation.subject || metadata.grant !== grant) {
+      return yield* new CredentialUnavailable({
+        subject: spec.operation.subject,
+        provider: spec.operation.provider,
+        purpose: spec.operation.purpose,
+        reason: "The npm user config is not active for this exact operation and grant."
+      })
+    }
+    const path = yield* optionalPath
+    return {
+      ...closedBaseEnvironment(path),
+      HOME: metadata.directory,
+      NPM_CONFIG_USERCONFIG: metadata.path,
+      NPM_CONFIG_GLOBALCONFIG: metadata.globalConfigPath,
+      NPM_CONFIG_IGNORE_SCRIPTS: "true"
+    }
+  }
+  if (grant._tag !== "WorkloadIdentity") {
+    return yield* new CredentialStrategyUnsupported({
+      subject: spec.operation.subject,
+      provider: spec.operation.provider,
+      strategy: "token",
+      reason: "The workload publisher requires a workload-identity grant."
+    })
+  }
+  yield* validateTrustedNpmOperation(spec.operation, grant)
+  return yield* workloadEnvironment(trustedWorkloads, grant)
+})
+
+const redactPublisherOutput = (
+  value: string,
+  env: Readonly<Record<string, string>>,
+  spec: CertifiedPublisherSpec
+): string => {
+  const metadata = spec._tag === "NpmPublisherSpec" ? npmUserConfigs.get(spec.userConfig) : undefined
+  const known = metadata === undefined
+    ? env
+    : { ...env, PUBLISH_CREDENTIAL: Redacted.value(metadata.token) }
+  return redactOutput(value, known)
+}
+
+interface NpmPublishTransport {
+  readonly directory: string
+  readonly path: string
+}
+
+/**
+ * npm classifies a suffixless local path as a package directory. Prepared
+ * artifacts deliberately use digest-only blob names, so expose the already
+ * admitted bytes through a private `.tgz` transport name only while npm runs.
+ */
+const makeNpmPublishTransport = (
+  sourcePath: string,
+  temporaryRoot?: string
+) => {
+  const root = temporaryRoot ?? tmpdir()
+  const acquired = Effect.tryPromise({
+    try: async () => {
+      await mkdir(root, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 })
+      const directory = await mkdtemp(join(root, "ts-release-npm-tarball-"))
+      try {
+        const path = join(directory, "package.tgz")
+        await copyFile(sourcePath, path)
+        await chmod(path, 0o600)
+        return { directory, path }
+      } catch (cause) {
+        await rm(directory, { recursive: true, force: true })
+        throw cause
+      }
+    },
+    catch: () => platformError(
+      "resource",
+      "before-dispatch",
+      "Unable to materialize the verified npm tarball transport path."
+    )
+  })
+  return Effect.acquireRelease(acquired, ({ directory }) => Effect.tryPromise({
+    try: () => rm(directory, { recursive: true, force: true }),
+    catch: () => undefined
+  }).pipe(Effect.catch(() => Effect.void)))
+}
+
+const makeCertifiedPublisherSpawn = (
+  spawner: ChildProcessSpawner["Service"],
+  vault: SecretVault,
+  trustedWorkloads: TrustedWorkloadVault,
+  temporaryRoot?: string
+): CertifiedPublisherSpawnShape => {
+  const runClosed = Effect.fn("CertifiedPublisherSpawn.runClosed")(function*(
+    argv: readonly [string, ...Array<string>]
+  ) {
+    const path = yield* optionalPath
+    const command = ChildProcess.make(argv[0], [...argv.slice(1)], {
+      env: closedBaseEnvironment(path),
+      extendEnv: false,
+      stdin: "ignore",
+      stdout: "pipe",
+      stderr: "pipe"
+    })
+    return yield* Effect.scoped(Effect.gen(function*() {
+      const spawned = yield* Effect.exit(spawner.spawn(command))
+      if (Exit.isFailure(spawned)) {
+        return yield* platformError("spawn", "before-dispatch", "Trusted npm preflight could not start its version probe.")
+      }
+      const output = yield* Effect.exit(Effect.all({
+        stdout: collect(spawned.value.stdout),
+        stderr: collect(spawned.value.stderr),
+        exitCode: spawned.value.exitCode
+      }, { concurrency: "unbounded" }))
+      if (Exit.isFailure(output)) {
+        return yield* platformError("spawn", "before-dispatch", "Trusted npm preflight could not observe its version probe.")
+      }
+      if (Number(output.value.exitCode) !== 0) {
+        return yield* platformError("spawn", "before-dispatch", "Trusted npm preflight version probe was rejected.")
+      }
+      return output.value.stdout
+    }))
+  })
+
+  return {
+  preflightTrustedNpm: Effect.fn("CertifiedPublisherSpawn.preflightTrustedNpm")(function*(operation, grant) {
+    yield* validateGrantForOperation(operation, grant)
+    if (grant._tag !== "WorkloadIdentity") {
+      return yield* new CredentialStrategyUnsupported({
+        subject: operation.subject,
+        provider: operation.provider,
+        strategy: "token",
+        reason: "Trusted npm preflight requires a workload-identity grant."
+      })
+    }
+    yield* validateTrustedNpmOperation(operation, grant)
+    // Validate the exact host-held OIDC names before any provider authority is dispatched.
+    yield* workloadEnvironment(trustedWorkloads, grant)
+    const node = parseVersion(yield* runClosed(["node", "--version"]))
+    const npm = parseVersion(yield* runClosed(["npm", "--version"]))
+    if (node === undefined || !versionAtLeast(node, minimumTrustedNode) ||
+      npm === undefined || !versionAtLeast(npm, minimumTrustedNpm)) {
+      return yield* platformError(
+        "spawn",
+        "before-dispatch",
+        "Trusted npm publishing requires Node >=22.14.0 and npm >=11.5.1."
+      )
+    }
+  }),
+  spawn: Effect.fn("CertifiedPublisherSpawn.spawn")(function*(inputSpec, grant) {
+    yield* validateGrantForOperation(inputSpec.operation, grant)
+    yield* validateCertifiedNpmSpec(inputSpec)
+    const spec = snapshotCertifiedNpmSpec(inputSpec)
+    const env = yield* publisherEnvironment(vault, trustedWorkloads, spec, grant)
+    return yield* Effect.scoped(Effect.gen(function*() {
+      const transport = yield* makeNpmPublishTransport(spec.tarballPath, temporaryRoot)
+      const argv = npmPublishArgv({ ...spec, tarballPath: transport.path })
+      const command = ChildProcess.make(argv[0], [...argv.slice(1)], {
+        cwd: spec.cwd,
+        env,
+        extendEnv: false,
+        stdin: "ignore",
+        stdout: "pipe",
+        stderr: "pipe"
+      })
+      const spawned = yield* Effect.exit(spawner.spawn(command))
+      if (Exit.isFailure(spawned)) {
+        return {
+          _tag: "RejectedBeforeStart",
+          commitment: "before-dispatch",
+          reason: "The certified publisher process did not return a started handle."
+        } satisfies CertifiedPublisherResult
+      }
+      const output = yield* Effect.exit(Effect.all({
+        stdout: collect(spawned.value.stdout),
+        stderr: collect(spawned.value.stderr),
+        exitCode: spawned.value.exitCode
+      }, { concurrency: "unbounded" }))
+      if (Exit.isFailure(output)) {
+        return {
+          _tag: "PublisherOutcomeUnknown",
+          commitment: "unknown",
+          reason: "The certified publisher started, but its final outcome could not be observed."
+        } satisfies CertifiedPublisherResult
+      }
+      return {
+        _tag: "PublisherExited",
+        commitment: "started",
+        exitCode: Number(output.value.exitCode),
+        stdout: redactPublisherOutput(output.value.stdout, env, spec),
+        stderr: redactPublisherOutput(output.value.stderr, env, spec)
+      } satisfies CertifiedPublisherResult
+    }))
+  })
+  }
+}
+
+export interface EnvironmentCredentialPlatform {
+  readonly credentialProvider: CredentialProviderShape
+  readonly httpAuthorizer: HttpAuthorizerShape
+  readonly authorizedMutationHttp: AuthorizedMutationHttpShape
+  readonly npmUserConfigResource: NpmUserConfigResourceShape
+  readonly certifiedPublisherSpawn: CertifiedPublisherSpawnShape
+}
+
+export interface EnvironmentCredentialPlatformOptions {
+  readonly temporaryRoot?: string
+}
+
+/** All host sinks share one private vault; no secret is returned from it. */
+export const makeEnvironmentCredentialPlatform = (
+  http: PublicationHttp,
+  spawner: ChildProcessSpawner["Service"],
+  options: EnvironmentCredentialPlatformOptions = {}
+): EnvironmentCredentialPlatform => {
+  const vault: SecretVault = new Map()
+  const trustedWorkloads: TrustedWorkloadVault = new WeakMap()
+  const observationGrants: ObservationGrantRegistry = new WeakMap()
+  return {
+    credentialProvider: makeProvider(vault, trustedWorkloads, observationGrants),
+    httpAuthorizer: makeHttpAuthorizer(http, vault, observationGrants),
+    authorizedMutationHttp: makeAuthorizedMutationHttp(http, vault),
+    npmUserConfigResource: makeNpmUserConfigResource(vault, options.temporaryRoot),
+    certifiedPublisherSpawn: makeCertifiedPublisherSpawn(spawner, vault, trustedWorkloads, options.temporaryRoot)
+  }
+}
+
+export const makeEnvironmentCredentialPlatformLayer = (
+  http: PublicationHttp,
+  spawner: ChildProcessSpawner["Service"],
+  options: EnvironmentCredentialPlatformOptions = {}
+): Layer.Layer<CredentialPlatformServices> => {
+  const platform = makeEnvironmentCredentialPlatform(http, spawner, options)
+  return Layer.mergeAll(
+    Layer.succeed(CredentialProvider)(platform.credentialProvider),
+    Layer.succeed(HttpAuthorizer)(platform.httpAuthorizer),
+    Layer.succeed(AuthorizedMutationHttp)(platform.authorizedMutationHttp),
+    Layer.succeed(NpmUserConfigResource)(platform.npmUserConfigResource),
+    Layer.succeed(CertifiedPublisherSpawn)(platform.certifiedPublisherSpawn)
+  )
+}