@manhnv319/codexkit 0.1.0

package/.codex/hooks/lib/git-info-cache.cjs

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+#!/usr/bin/env node
+'use strict';
+
+/**
+ * Git Info Cache - Cross-platform git information batching
+ *
+ * Problem: 5-6 git process spawns per statusline render are slow on Windows (CreateProcess overhead)
+ * Solution: Cache git query results for 3 seconds — subsequent renders read cache (zero processes)
+ *
+ * Performance: 5 spawns per render → event-driven refresh + 30s TTL fallback
+ * Cross-platform: No bash-only syntax (no 2>/dev/null), windowsHide on all exec calls
+ */
+
+const { execSync } = require('child_process');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const path = require('path');
+const os = require('os');
+
+// Cache TTL — long fallback for external changes (git checkout outside Claude)
+// Active invalidation happens via PostToolUse hooks after Edit/Write/Bash
+const CACHE_TTL = 30000;
+const CACHE_MISS = Symbol('cache_miss');
+
+/**
+ * Safe command execution wrapper with optional cwd
+ */
+function execIn(cmd, cwd) {
+  try {
+    return execSync(cmd, {
+      encoding: 'utf8',
+      stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'ignore'],
+      windowsHide: true,
+      cwd: cwd || undefined
+    }).trim();
+  } catch {
+    return '';
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Get cache file path for current working directory
+ */
+function getCachePath(cwd) {
+  const hash = require('crypto')
+    .createHash('md5')
+    .update(cwd)
+    .digest('hex')
+    .slice(0, 8);
+  return path.join(os.tmpdir(), `ck-git-cache-${hash}.json`);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Read cache if valid (not expired). Returns CACHE_MISS on miss.
+ * No existsSync check (TOCTOU race) — just try read and catch.
+ */
+function readCache(cachePath) {
+  try {
+    const cache = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(cachePath, 'utf8'));
+    if (Date.now() - cache.timestamp < CACHE_TTL) {
+      return cache.data; // Can be null (non-git dir) or object (git info)
+    }
+  } catch {
+    // File missing, corrupted, or expired — all treated as cache miss
+  }
+  return CACHE_MISS;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Write cache atomically (temp file + rename to avoid partial reads on Windows)
+ */
+function writeCache(cachePath, data) {
+  const tmpPath = cachePath + '.tmp';
+  try {
+    fs.writeFileSync(tmpPath, JSON.stringify({ timestamp: Date.now(), data }));
+    fs.renameSync(tmpPath, cachePath);
+  } catch {
+    try { fs.unlinkSync(tmpPath); } catch {}
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Count non-empty lines in a newline-delimited string
+ */
+function countLines(str) {
+  if (!str) return 0;
+  return str.split('\n').filter(l => l.trim()).length;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Fetch git info directly in-process
+ * The cache is what eliminates redundant spawns — not subprocess wrapping
+ * @param {string} cwd - Directory to run git commands in
+ * Returns: { branch, unstaged, staged, ahead, behind } or null if not git repo
+ */
+function fetchGitInfo(cwd) {
+  // Check if git repo (fast check) — run in target cwd, not process.cwd()
+  if (!execIn('git rev-parse --git-dir', cwd)) {
+    return null;
+  }
+
+  const branch = execIn('git branch --show-current', cwd) || execIn('git rev-parse --short HEAD', cwd);
+  const unstaged = countLines(execIn('git diff --name-only', cwd));
+  const staged = countLines(execIn('git diff --cached --name-only', cwd));
+
+  // Ahead/behind — no 2>/dev/null (invalid on Windows cmd.exe)
+  let ahead = 0, behind = 0;
+  const aheadBehind = execIn('git rev-list --left-right --count @{u}...HEAD', cwd);
+  if (aheadBehind) {
+    const parts = aheadBehind.split(/\s+/);
+    behind = parseInt(parts[0], 10) || 0;
+    ahead = parseInt(parts[1], 10) || 0;
+  }
+
+  return { branch, unstaged, staged, ahead, behind };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Get git info with caching
+ * Main export function used by statusline
+ */
+function getGitInfo(cwd = process.cwd()) {
+  const cachePath = getCachePath(cwd);
+
+  // Try cache first (includes cached null for non-git dirs)
+  const cached = readCache(cachePath);
+  if (cached !== CACHE_MISS) return cached;
+
+  // Cache miss or expired, fetch fresh data in target cwd
+  const data = fetchGitInfo(cwd);
+  // Cache both positive and null results (avoids re-spawning git in non-git dirs)
+  writeCache(cachePath, data);
+
+  return data;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Invalidate cache for a directory (call after file changes to trigger fresh git query)
+ */
+function invalidateCache(cwd = process.cwd()) {
+  try { fs.unlinkSync(getCachePath(cwd)); } catch {}
+}
+
+module.exports = { getGitInfo, invalidateCache };

package/.codex/hooks/lib/hook-logger.cjs

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+/**
+ * hook-logger.cjs - Zero-dependency structured logger for hooks
+ *
+ * Logs to .codex/hooks/.logs/hook-log.jsonl (JSON Lines format)
+ * Auto-creates .logs/ directory and handles rotation (1000 lines max → 500 last)
+ * Uses only Node builtins (fs, path) — no external dependencies
+ *
+ * Export: logHook(hookName, data), createHookTimer(hookName)
+ */
+
+const fs = require('fs');
+const path = require('path');
+
+const LOG_DIR = path.join(__dirname, '..', '.logs');
+const LOG_FILE = path.join(LOG_DIR, 'hook-log.jsonl');
+const MAX_LINES = 1000;
+const TRUNCATE_TO = 500;
+
+/**
+ * Ensure log directory exists
+ */
+function ensureLogDir() {
+  try {
+    if (!fs.existsSync(LOG_DIR)) {
+      fs.mkdirSync(LOG_DIR, { recursive: true });
+    }
+  } catch (_) {
+    // Fail silently — never crash
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Rotate log file if it exceeds MAX_LINES
+ */
+function rotateIfNeeded() {
+  try {
+    if (!fs.existsSync(LOG_FILE)) return;
+    const lines = fs.readFileSync(LOG_FILE, 'utf-8').split('\n').filter(Boolean);
+    if (lines.length >= MAX_LINES) {
+      const truncated = lines.slice(-TRUNCATE_TO).join('\n') + '\n';
+      fs.writeFileSync(LOG_FILE, truncated, 'utf-8');
+    }
+  } catch (_) {
+    // Fail silently
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Log a hook event
+ * @param {string} hookName - Hook filename (e.g., 'scout-block')
+ * @param {object} data - Log data { tool?, dur?, status, exit?, error? }
+ */
+function logHook(hookName, data) {
+  try {
+    ensureLogDir();
+    rotateIfNeeded();
+
+    const entry = {
+      ts: new Date().toISOString(),
+      hook: hookName,
+      tool: data.tool || '',
+      dur: data.dur || 0,
+      status: data.status || 'ok',
+      exit: data.exit !== undefined ? data.exit : 0,
+      error: data.error || ''
+    };
+
+    fs.appendFileSync(LOG_FILE, JSON.stringify(entry) + '\n', 'utf-8');
+  } catch (_) {
+    // Never crash — fail silently
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Create a duration timer for a hook
+ * @param {string} hookName - Hook filename
+ * @returns {{ end: (data) => void }} Timer object with end() method
+ */
+function createHookTimer(hookName) {
+  const start = Date.now();
+  return {
+    end(data = {}) {
+      const dur = Date.now() - start;
+      logHook(hookName, { ...data, dur });
+    }
+  };
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+  logHook,
+  createHookTimer
+};

package/.codex/hooks/lib/privacy-checker.cjs

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+#!/usr/bin/env node
+/**
+ * privacy-checker.cjs - Privacy pattern matching logic for sensitive file detection
+ *
+ * Extracted from privacy-block.cjs for reuse in both Claude hooks and OpenCode plugins.
+ * Pure logic module - no stdin/stdout, no exit codes.
+ *
+ * @module privacy-checker
+ */
+
+const path = require('path');
+const fs = require('fs');
+
+// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+// CONSTANTS
+// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+
+const APPROVED_PREFIX = 'APPROVED:';
+
+// Safe file patterns - exempt from privacy checks (documentation/template files)
+const SAFE_PATTERNS = [
+  /\.example$/i,   // .env.example, config.example
+  /\.sample$/i,    // .env.sample
+  /\.template$/i,  // .env.template
+];
+
+// Privacy-sensitive patterns
+const PRIVACY_PATTERNS = [
+  /^\.env$/,              // .env
+  /^\.env\./,             // .env.local, .env.production, etc.
+  /\.env$/,               // path/to/.env
+  /\/\.env\./,            // path/to/.env.local
+  /credentials/i,         // credentials.json, etc.
+  /secrets?\.ya?ml$/i,    // secrets.yaml, secret.yml
+  /\.pem$/,               // Private keys
+  /\.key$/,               // Private keys
+  /id_rsa/,               // SSH keys
+  /id_ed25519/,           // SSH keys
+];
+
+// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+// HELPER FUNCTIONS
+// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+
+/**
+ * Check if path is a safe file (example/sample/template)
+ * @param {string} testPath - Path to check
+ * @returns {boolean} true if file matches safe patterns
+ */
+function isSafeFile(testPath) {
+  if (!testPath) return false;
+  const basename = path.basename(testPath);
+  return SAFE_PATTERNS.some(p => p.test(basename));
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check if path has APPROVED: prefix
+ * @param {string} testPath - Path to check
+ * @returns {boolean} true if path starts with APPROVED:
+ */
+function hasApprovalPrefix(testPath) {
+  return testPath && testPath.startsWith(APPROVED_PREFIX);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Strip APPROVED: prefix from path
+ * @param {string} testPath - Path to process
+ * @returns {string} Path without APPROVED: prefix
+ */
+function stripApprovalPrefix(testPath) {
+  if (hasApprovalPrefix(testPath)) {
+    return testPath.slice(APPROVED_PREFIX.length);
+  }
+  return testPath;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check if stripped path is suspicious (path traversal or absolute)
+ * @param {string} strippedPath - Path after stripping APPROVED: prefix
+ * @returns {boolean} true if path looks suspicious
+ */
+function isSuspiciousPath(strippedPath) {
+  return strippedPath.includes('..') || path.isAbsolute(strippedPath);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check if path matches privacy patterns
+ * @param {string} testPath - Path to check
+ * @returns {boolean} true if path matches privacy-sensitive patterns
+ */
+function isPrivacySensitive(testPath) {
+  if (!testPath) return false;
+
+  // Strip prefix for pattern matching
+  const cleanPath = stripApprovalPrefix(testPath);
+  let normalized = cleanPath.replace(/\\/g, '/');
+
+  // Decode URI components to catch obfuscated paths (%2e = '.')
+  try {
+    normalized = decodeURIComponent(normalized);
+  } catch (e) {
+    // Invalid encoding, use as-is
+  }
+
+  // Check safe patterns first - exempt example/sample/template files
+  if (isSafeFile(normalized)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  const basename = path.basename(normalized);
+
+  for (const pattern of PRIVACY_PATTERNS) {
+    if (pattern.test(basename) || pattern.test(normalized)) {
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Extract paths from tool input
+ * @param {Object} toolInput - Tool input object with file_path, path, pattern, or command
+ * @returns {Array<{value: string, field: string}>} Array of extracted paths with field names
+ */
+function extractPaths(toolInput) {
+  const paths = [];
+  if (!toolInput) return paths;
+
+  if (toolInput.file_path) paths.push({ value: toolInput.file_path, field: 'file_path' });
+  if (toolInput.path) paths.push({ value: toolInput.path, field: 'path' });
+  if (toolInput.pattern) paths.push({ value: toolInput.pattern, field: 'pattern' });
+
+  // Check bash commands for file paths
+  if (toolInput.command) {
+    // Look for APPROVED:.env or .env patterns
+    const approvedMatch = toolInput.command.match(/APPROVED:[^\s]+/g) || [];
+    approvedMatch.forEach(p => paths.push({ value: p, field: 'command' }));
+
+    // Only look for .env if no APPROVED: version found
+    if (approvedMatch.length === 0) {
+      const envMatch = toolInput.command.match(/\.env[^\s]*/g) || [];
+      envMatch.forEach(p => paths.push({ value: p, field: 'command' }));
+
+      // Also check bash variable assignments (FILE=.env, ENV_FILE=.env.local)
+      const varAssignments = toolInput.command.match(/\w+=[^\s]*\.env[^\s]*/g) || [];
+      varAssignments.forEach(a => {
+        const value = a.split('=')[1];
+        if (value) paths.push({ value, field: 'command' });
+      });
+
+      // Check command substitution containing sensitive patterns - extract .env from inside
+      const cmdSubst = toolInput.command.match(/\$\([^)]*?(\.env[^\s)]*)[^)]*\)/g) || [];
+      for (const subst of cmdSubst) {
+        const inner = subst.match(/\.env[^\s)]*/);
+        if (inner) paths.push({ value: inner[0], field: 'command' });
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  return paths.filter(p => p.value);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Load .ck.json config to check if privacy block is disabled
+ * @param {string} [configDir] - Directory containing .ck.json (defaults to .claude in cwd)
+ * @returns {boolean} true if privacy block should be skipped
+ */
+function isPrivacyBlockDisabled(configDir) {
+  try {
+    const configPath = configDir
+      ? path.join(configDir, '.ck.json')
+      : path.join(process.cwd(), '.codex', '.ck.json');
+    const config = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(configPath, 'utf8'));
+    return config.privacyBlock === false;
+  } catch {
+    return false; // Default to enabled on error (file not found or invalid JSON)
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Build prompt data for AskUserQuestion tool
+ * @param {string} filePath - Blocked file path
+ * @returns {Object} Prompt data object
+ */
+function buildPromptData(filePath) {
+  const basename = path.basename(filePath);
+  return {
+    type: 'PRIVACY_PROMPT',
+    file: filePath,
+    basename: basename,
+    question: {
+      header: 'File Access',
+      text: `I need to read "${basename}" which may contain sensitive data (API keys, passwords, tokens). Do you approve?`,
+      options: [
+        { label: 'Yes, approve access', description: `Allow reading ${basename} this time` },
+        { label: 'No, skip this file', description: 'Continue without accessing this file' }
+      ]
+    }
+  };
+}
+
+// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+// MAIN ENTRY POINT
+// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+
+/**
+ * Check if a tool call accesses privacy-sensitive files
+ *
+ * @param {Object} params
+ * @param {string} params.toolName - Name of tool (Read, Write, Bash, etc.)
+ * @param {Object} params.toolInput - Tool input with file_path, path, command, etc.
+ * @param {Object} [params.options]
+ * @param {boolean} [params.options.disabled] - Skip checks if true
+ * @param {string} [params.options.configDir] - Directory for .ck.json config
+ * @param {boolean} [params.options.allowBash] - Allow Bash tool without blocking (default: true)
+ * @returns {{
+ *   blocked: boolean,
+ *   filePath?: string,
+ *   reason?: string,
+ *   approved?: boolean,
+ *   isBash?: boolean,
+ *   suspicious?: boolean,
+ *   promptData?: Object
+ * }}
+ */
+function checkPrivacy({ toolName, toolInput, options = {} }) {
+  const { disabled, configDir, allowBash = true } = options;
+
+  // Check if disabled via options or config
+  if (disabled || isPrivacyBlockDisabled(configDir)) {
+    return { blocked: false };
+  }
+
+  const isBashTool = toolName === 'Bash';
+  const paths = extractPaths(toolInput);
+
+  // Check each path
+  for (const { value: testPath } of paths) {
+    if (!isPrivacySensitive(testPath)) continue;
+
+    // Check for approval prefix
+    if (hasApprovalPrefix(testPath)) {
+      const strippedPath = stripApprovalPrefix(testPath);
+      return {
+        blocked: false,
+        approved: true,
+        filePath: strippedPath,
+        suspicious: isSuspiciousPath(strippedPath)
+      };
+    }
+
+    // For Bash: warn but don't block (allows "Yes → bash cat" flow)
+    if (isBashTool && allowBash) {
+      return {
+        blocked: false,
+        isBash: true,
+        filePath: testPath,
+        reason: `Bash command accesses sensitive file: ${testPath}`
+      };
+    }
+
+    // Block - sensitive file without approval
+    return {
+      blocked: true,
+      filePath: testPath,
+      reason: `Sensitive file access requires user approval`,
+      promptData: buildPromptData(testPath)
+    };
+  }
+
+  // No sensitive paths found
+  return { blocked: false };
+}
+
+// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+// EXPORTS
+// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+
+module.exports = {
+  // Main entry point
+  checkPrivacy,
+
+  // Helper functions (for testing and direct use)
+  isSafeFile,
+  isPrivacySensitive,
+  hasApprovalPrefix,
+  stripApprovalPrefix,
+  isSuspiciousPath,
+  extractPaths,
+  isPrivacyBlockDisabled,
+  buildPromptData,
+
+  // Constants
+  APPROVED_PREFIX,
+  SAFE_PATTERNS,
+  PRIVACY_PATTERNS
+};