@macula-io/martha 0.0.0 → 1.0.1

package/node_modules/@sigstore/verify/dist/key/index.js

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+"use strict";
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.verifyPublicKey = verifyPublicKey;
+exports.verifyCertificate = verifyCertificate;
+/*
+Copyright 2023 The Sigstore Authors.
+
+Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+You may obtain a copy of the License at
+
+    http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+
+Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+limitations under the License.
+*/
+const core_1 = require("@sigstore/core");
+const error_1 = require("../error");
+const certificate_1 = require("./certificate");
+const sct_1 = require("./sct");
+const OID_FULCIO_ISSUER_V1 = '1.3.6.1.4.1.57264.1.1';
+const OID_FULCIO_ISSUER_V2 = '1.3.6.1.4.1.57264.1.8';
+function verifyPublicKey(hint, timestamps, trustMaterial) {
+    const key = trustMaterial.publicKey(hint);
+    timestamps.forEach((timestamp) => {
+        if (!key.validFor(timestamp)) {
+            throw new error_1.VerificationError({
+                code: 'PUBLIC_KEY_ERROR',
+                message: `Public key is not valid for timestamp: ${timestamp.toISOString()}`,
+            });
+        }
+    });
+    return { key: key.publicKey };
+}
+function verifyCertificate(leaf, timestamps, trustMaterial) {
+    // Check that leaf certificate chains to a trusted CA
+    let path = [];
+    timestamps.forEach((timestamp) => {
+        path = (0, certificate_1.verifyCertificateChain)(timestamp, leaf, trustMaterial.certificateAuthorities);
+    });
+    return {
+        scts: (0, sct_1.verifySCTs)(path[0], path[1], trustMaterial.ctlogs),
+        signer: getSigner(path[0]),
+    };
+}
+function getSigner(cert) {
+    let issuer;
+    const issuerExtension = cert.extension(OID_FULCIO_ISSUER_V2);
+    /* istanbul ignore next */
+    if (issuerExtension) {
+        issuer = issuerExtension.valueObj.subs?.[0]?.value.toString('ascii');
+    }
+    else {
+        issuer = cert.extension(OID_FULCIO_ISSUER_V1)?.value.toString('ascii');
+    }
+    const oids = cert.extensions.map((ext) => {
+        const oid = ext.subs[0].toOID();
+        return {
+            oid: { id: oid.split('.').map(Number) },
+            value: ext.subs[ext.subs.length - 1].value,
+        };
+    });
+    const identity = {
+        extensions: { issuer },
+        subjectAlternativeName: cert.subjectAltName,
+        oids,
+    };
+    return {
+        key: core_1.crypto.createPublicKey(cert.publicKey),
+        identity,
+    };
+}

package/node_modules/@sigstore/verify/dist/key/sct.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+import { X509Certificate } from '@sigstore/core';
+import type { TLogAuthority } from '../trust';
+export type VerifiedSCTProvider = Buffer;
+export declare function verifySCTs(cert: X509Certificate, issuer: X509Certificate, ctlogs: TLogAuthority[]): VerifiedSCTProvider[];

package/node_modules/@sigstore/verify/dist/key/sct.js

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+"use strict";
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.verifySCTs = verifySCTs;
+/*
+Copyright 2023 The Sigstore Authors.
+
+Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+You may obtain a copy of the License at
+
+    http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+
+Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+limitations under the License.
+*/
+const core_1 = require("@sigstore/core");
+const error_1 = require("../error");
+const trust_1 = require("../trust");
+function verifySCTs(cert, issuer, ctlogs) {
+    let extSCT;
+    // Verifying the SCT requires that we remove the SCT extension and
+    // re-encode the TBS structure to DER -- this value is part of the data
+    // over which the signature is calculated. Since this is a destructive action
+    // we create a copy of the certificate so we can remove the SCT extension
+    // without affecting the original certificate.
+    const clone = cert.clone();
+    // Intentionally not using the findExtension method here because we want to
+    // remove the the SCT extension from the certificate before calculating the
+    // PreCert structure
+    for (let i = 0; i < clone.extensions.length; i++) {
+        const ext = clone.extensions[i];
+        if (ext.subs[0].toOID() === core_1.EXTENSION_OID_SCT) {
+            extSCT = new core_1.X509SCTExtension(ext);
+            // Remove the extension from the certificate
+            clone.extensions.splice(i, 1);
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    // No SCT extension found to verify
+    if (!extSCT) {
+        return [];
+    }
+    // Found an SCT extension but it has no SCTs
+    /* istanbul ignore if -- too difficult to fabricate test case for this */
+    if (extSCT.signedCertificateTimestamps.length === 0) {
+        return [];
+    }
+    // Construct the PreCert structure
+    // https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6962#section-3.2
+    const preCert = new core_1.ByteStream();
+    // Calculate hash of the issuer's public key
+    const issuerId = core_1.crypto.digest('sha256', issuer.publicKey);
+    preCert.appendView(issuerId);
+    // Re-encodes the certificate to DER after removing the SCT extension
+    const tbs = clone.tbsCertificate.toDER();
+    preCert.appendUint24(tbs.length);
+    preCert.appendView(tbs);
+    // Calculate and return the verification results for each SCT
+    return extSCT.signedCertificateTimestamps.map((sct) => {
+        // Find the ctlog instance that corresponds to the SCT's logID
+        const validCTLogs = (0, trust_1.filterTLogAuthorities)(ctlogs, {
+            logID: sct.logID,
+            targetDate: sct.datetime,
+        });
+        // See if the SCT is valid for any of the CT logs
+        const verified = validCTLogs.some((log) => sct.verify(preCert.buffer, log.publicKey));
+        if (!verified) {
+            throw new error_1.VerificationError({
+                code: 'CERTIFICATE_ERROR',
+                message: 'SCT verification failed',
+            });
+        }
+        return sct.logID;
+    });
+}

package/node_modules/@sigstore/verify/dist/policy.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+import { CertificateExtensions } from './shared.types';
+import type { ObjectIdentifierValuePair } from '@sigstore/protobuf-specs';
+export declare function verifySubjectAlternativeName(policyIdentity: string | RegExp, signerIdentity: string | undefined): void;
+export declare function verifyExtensions(policyExtensions: CertificateExtensions, signerExtensions?: CertificateExtensions): void;
+export declare function verifyOIDs(policyOIDs: ObjectIdentifierValuePair[], signerOIDs?: ObjectIdentifierValuePair[]): void;

package/node_modules/@sigstore/verify/dist/policy.js

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+"use strict";
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.verifySubjectAlternativeName = verifySubjectAlternativeName;
+exports.verifyExtensions = verifyExtensions;
+exports.verifyOIDs = verifyOIDs;
+const error_1 = require("./error");
+// Verifies that the signer's SAN matches the policy identity. The
+// policyIdentity is treated as a JavaScript regular expression pattern and
+// tested against the full signerIdentity string. For exact matching, use
+// anchored patterns (e.g. '^user@example\\.com$').
+function verifySubjectAlternativeName(policyIdentity, signerIdentity) {
+    if (signerIdentity === undefined || !signerIdentity.match(policyIdentity)) {
+        throw new error_1.PolicyError({
+            code: 'UNTRUSTED_SIGNER_ERROR',
+            message: `certificate identity error - expected ${policyIdentity}, got ${signerIdentity}`,
+        });
+    }
+}
+function verifyExtensions(policyExtensions, signerExtensions = {}) {
+    let key;
+    for (key in policyExtensions) {
+        if (signerExtensions[key] !== policyExtensions[key]) {
+            throw new error_1.PolicyError({
+                code: 'UNTRUSTED_SIGNER_ERROR',
+                message: `invalid certificate extension - expected ${key}=${policyExtensions[key]}, got ${key}=${signerExtensions[key]}`,
+            });
+        }
+    }
+}
+function verifyOIDs(policyOIDs, signerOIDs = []) {
+    for (const policyOID of policyOIDs) {
+        const match = signerOIDs.find((signerOID) => oidEquals(policyOID.oid?.id, signerOID.oid?.id) &&
+            policyOID.value.equals(signerOID.value));
+        if (!match) {
+            const oid = policyOID.oid?.id.join('.') ?? '<unknown>';
+            throw new error_1.PolicyError({
+                code: 'UNTRUSTED_SIGNER_ERROR',
+                message: `invalid certificate extension - missing OID ${oid}`,
+            });
+        }
+    }
+}
+function oidEquals(a, b) {
+    if (a === undefined || b === undefined) {
+        return false;
+    }
+    return a.length === b.length && a.every((v, i) => v === b[i]);
+}

package/node_modules/@sigstore/verify/dist/shared.types.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+import type { TransparencyLogEntry } from '@sigstore/bundle';
+import type { RFC3161Timestamp, X509Certificate, crypto } from '@sigstore/core';
+import type { ObjectIdentifierValuePair } from '@sigstore/protobuf-specs';
+export type CertificateExtensionName = 'issuer';
+export type CertificateExtensions = {
+    [key in CertificateExtensionName]?: string;
+};
+export type CertificateIdentity = {
+    subjectAlternativeName?: string;
+    extensions?: CertificateExtensions;
+    oids?: ObjectIdentifierValuePair[];
+};
+export type VerificationPolicy = {
+    subjectAlternativeName?: string | RegExp;
+    extensions?: CertificateExtensions;
+    oids?: ObjectIdentifierValuePair[];
+};
+export type Signer = {
+    key: crypto.KeyObject;
+    identity?: CertificateIdentity;
+};
+export type Timestamp = {
+    $case: 'timestamp-authority';
+    timestamp: RFC3161Timestamp;
+} | {
+    $case: 'transparency-log';
+    tlogEntry: TransparencyLogEntry;
+};
+export type VerificationKey = {
+    $case: 'public-key';
+    hint: string;
+} | {
+    $case: 'certificate';
+    certificate: X509Certificate;
+};
+export type SignatureContent = {
+    signature: Buffer;
+    compareSignature(signature: Buffer): boolean;
+    compareDigest(digest: Buffer): boolean;
+    compareSignedDigest(digest: Buffer): boolean;
+    verifySignature(key: crypto.KeyObject): boolean;
+};
+export type TimestampProvider = {
+    timestamps: Timestamp[];
+};
+export type SignatureProvider = {
+    signature: SignatureContent;
+};
+export type KeyProvider = {
+    key: VerificationKey;
+};
+export type TLogEntryProvider = {
+    tlogEntries: TransparencyLogEntry[];
+};
+export type SignedEntity = SignatureProvider & KeyProvider & TimestampProvider & TLogEntryProvider;

package/node_modules/@sigstore/verify/dist/shared.types.js

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+"use strict";
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });

package/node_modules/@sigstore/verify/dist/timestamp/index.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+import { RFC3161Timestamp } from '@sigstore/core';
+import type { TransparencyLogEntry } from '@sigstore/bundle';
+import type { CertAuthority } from '../trust';
+export type TimestampType = 'transparency-log' | 'timestamp-authority';
+export type TimestampVerificationResult = {
+    type: TimestampType;
+    logID: Buffer;
+    timestamp: Date;
+};
+export declare function getTSATimestamp(timestamp: RFC3161Timestamp, data: Buffer, timestampAuthorities: CertAuthority[]): TimestampVerificationResult;
+export declare function getTLogTimestamp(entry: TransparencyLogEntry): TimestampVerificationResult | undefined;

package/node_modules/@sigstore/verify/dist/timestamp/index.js

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+"use strict";
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.getTSATimestamp = getTSATimestamp;
+exports.getTLogTimestamp = getTLogTimestamp;
+const tsa_1 = require("./tsa");
+function getTSATimestamp(timestamp, data, timestampAuthorities) {
+    (0, tsa_1.verifyRFC3161Timestamp)(timestamp, data, timestampAuthorities);
+    return {
+        type: 'timestamp-authority',
+        logID: timestamp.signerSerialNumber,
+        timestamp: timestamp.signingTime,
+    };
+}
+function getTLogTimestamp(entry) {
+    // Only entries with an inclusion promise provide a verifiable timestamp
+    if (!entry.inclusionPromise) {
+        return undefined;
+    }
+    return {
+        type: 'transparency-log',
+        logID: entry.logId.keyId,
+        timestamp: new Date(Number(entry.integratedTime) * 1000),
+    };
+}

package/node_modules/@sigstore/verify/dist/timestamp/tsa.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+import { RFC3161Timestamp } from '@sigstore/core';
+import { CertAuthority } from '../trust';
+export declare function verifyRFC3161Timestamp(timestamp: RFC3161Timestamp, data: Buffer, timestampAuthorities: CertAuthority[]): void;

package/node_modules/@sigstore/verify/dist/timestamp/tsa.js

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+"use strict";
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.verifyRFC3161Timestamp = verifyRFC3161Timestamp;
+const core_1 = require("@sigstore/core");
+const error_1 = require("../error");
+const certificate_1 = require("../key/certificate");
+const trust_1 = require("../trust");
+function verifyRFC3161Timestamp(timestamp, data, timestampAuthorities) {
+    const signingTime = timestamp.signingTime;
+    // Filter for CAs which were valid at the time of signing
+    timestampAuthorities = (0, trust_1.filterCertAuthorities)(timestampAuthorities, signingTime);
+    // Filter for CAs which match serial and issuer embedded in the timestamp
+    timestampAuthorities = filterCAsBySerialAndIssuer(timestampAuthorities, {
+        serialNumber: timestamp.signerSerialNumber,
+        issuer: timestamp.signerIssuer,
+    });
+    // Check that we can verify the timestamp with AT LEAST ONE of the remaining
+    // CAs
+    const verified = timestampAuthorities.some((ca) => {
+        try {
+            verifyTimestampForCA(timestamp, data, ca);
+            return true;
+        }
+        catch (e) {
+            return false;
+        }
+    });
+    if (!verified) {
+        throw new error_1.VerificationError({
+            code: 'TIMESTAMP_ERROR',
+            message: 'timestamp could not be verified',
+        });
+    }
+}
+function verifyTimestampForCA(timestamp, data, ca) {
+    const [leaf, ...cas] = ca.certChain;
+    const signingKey = core_1.crypto.createPublicKey(leaf.publicKey);
+    const signingTime = timestamp.signingTime;
+    // Verify the certificate chain for the provided CA
+    try {
+        new certificate_1.CertificateChainVerifier({
+            untrustedCert: leaf,
+            trustedCerts: cas,
+            timestamp: signingTime,
+        }).verify();
+    }
+    catch (e) {
+        throw new error_1.VerificationError({
+            code: 'TIMESTAMP_ERROR',
+            message: 'invalid certificate chain',
+        });
+    }
+    // Check that the signing certificate's key can be used to verify the
+    // timestamp signature.
+    timestamp.verify(data, signingKey);
+}
+// Filters the list of CAs to those which have a leaf signing certificate which
+// matches the given serial number and issuer.
+function filterCAsBySerialAndIssuer(timestampAuthorities, criteria) {
+    return timestampAuthorities.filter((ca) => ca.certChain.length > 0 &&
+        core_1.crypto.bufferEqual(ca.certChain[0].serialNumber, criteria.serialNumber) &&
+        core_1.crypto.bufferEqual(ca.certChain[0].issuer, criteria.issuer));
+}

package/node_modules/@sigstore/verify/dist/tlog/checkpoint.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+import { TLogAuthority } from '../trust';
+import type { TLogEntryWithInclusionProof } from '@sigstore/bundle';
+export declare function verifyCheckpoint(entry: TLogEntryWithInclusionProof, tlogs: TLogAuthority[]): LogCheckpoint;
+export declare class LogCheckpoint {
+    readonly origin: string;
+    readonly logSize: bigint;
+    readonly logHash: Buffer;
+    readonly rest: string[];
+    constructor(origin: string, logSize: bigint, logHash: Buffer, rest: string[]);
+    static fromString(note: string): LogCheckpoint;
+}

package/node_modules/@sigstore/verify/dist/tlog/checkpoint.js

@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+"use strict";
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.LogCheckpoint = void 0;
+exports.verifyCheckpoint = verifyCheckpoint;
+/*
+Copyright 2025 The Sigstore Authors.
+
+Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+You may obtain a copy of the License at
+
+    http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+
+Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+limitations under the License.
+*/
+const core_1 = require("@sigstore/core");
+const error_1 = require("../error");
+// Separator between the note and the signatures in a checkpoint
+const CHECKPOINT_SEPARATOR = '\n\n';
+// Checkpoint signatures are of the following form:
+// "– <identity> <key_hint+signature_bytes>\n"
+// where:
+// - the prefix is an emdash (U+2014).
+// - <identity> gives a human-readable representation of the signing ID.
+// - <key_hint+signature_bytes> is the first 4 bytes of the SHA256 hash of the
+//   associated public key followed by the signature bytes.
+const SIGNATURE_REGEX = /\u2014 (\S+) (\S+)\n/g;
+// Verifies the checkpoint value in the given tlog entry. There are two steps
+// to the verification:
+// 1. Verify that all signatures in the checkpoint can be verified against a
+//    trusted public key
+// 2. Verify that the root hash in the checkpoint matches the root hash in the
+//    inclusion proof
+// See: https://github.com/transparency-dev/formats/blob/main/log/README.md
+function verifyCheckpoint(entry, tlogs) {
+    const inclusionProof = entry.inclusionProof;
+    const signedNote = SignedNote.fromString(inclusionProof.checkpoint.envelope);
+    const checkpoint = LogCheckpoint.fromString(signedNote.note);
+    // Verify that the signatures in the checkpoint are all valid
+    if (!verifySignedNote(signedNote, tlogs)) {
+        throw new error_1.VerificationError({
+            code: 'TLOG_INCLUSION_PROOF_ERROR',
+            message: 'invalid checkpoint signature',
+        });
+    }
+    return checkpoint;
+}
+// Verifies the signatures in the SignedNote. For each signature, the
+// corresponding transparency log is looked up by the key hint and the
+// signature is verified against the public key in the transparency log.
+// Throws an error if any of the signatures are invalid.
+function verifySignedNote(signedNote, tlogs) {
+    const data = Buffer.from(signedNote.note, 'utf-8');
+    return signedNote.signatures.some((signature) => {
+        // Find the transparency log instance with the matching key hint
+        const tlog = tlogs.find((tlog) => core_1.crypto.bufferEqual(tlog.logID.subarray(0, 4), signature.keyHint) &&
+            // Match the signature name to the base URL of the tlog. The name is
+            // attacker-controlled, so it MUST be compared as a literal substring
+            // and never coerced into a RegExp (as String.prototype.match would).
+            tlog.baseURL.includes(signature.name));
+        if (!tlog) {
+            return false;
+        }
+        return core_1.crypto.verify(data, tlog.publicKey, signature.signature);
+    });
+}
+// SignedNote represents a signed note from a transparency log checkpoint. Consists
+// of a body (or note) and one more signatures calculated over the body. See
+// https://github.com/transparency-dev/formats/blob/main/log/README.md#signed-envelope
+class SignedNote {
+    note;
+    signatures;
+    constructor(note, signatures) {
+        this.note = note;
+        this.signatures = signatures;
+    }
+    // Deserialize a SignedNote from a string
+    static fromString(envelope) {
+        if (!envelope.includes(CHECKPOINT_SEPARATOR)) {
+            throw new error_1.VerificationError({
+                code: 'TLOG_INCLUSION_PROOF_ERROR',
+                message: 'missing checkpoint separator',
+            });
+        }
+        // Split the note into the header and the data portions at the separator
+        const split = envelope.indexOf(CHECKPOINT_SEPARATOR);
+        const header = envelope.slice(0, split + 1);
+        const data = envelope.slice(split + CHECKPOINT_SEPARATOR.length);
+        // Find all the signature lines in the data portion
+        const matches = data.matchAll(SIGNATURE_REGEX);
+        // Parse each of the matched signature lines into the name and signature.
+        // The first four bytes of the signature are the key hint (should match the
+        // first four bytes of the log ID), and the rest is the signature itself.
+        const signatures = Array.from(matches, (match) => {
+            const [, name, signature] = match;
+            const sigBytes = Buffer.from(signature, 'base64');
+            if (sigBytes.length < 5) {
+                throw new error_1.VerificationError({
+                    code: 'TLOG_INCLUSION_PROOF_ERROR',
+                    message: 'malformed checkpoint signature',
+                });
+            }
+            return {
+                name,
+                keyHint: sigBytes.subarray(0, 4),
+                signature: sigBytes.subarray(4),
+            };
+        });
+        if (signatures.length === 0) {
+            throw new error_1.VerificationError({
+                code: 'TLOG_INCLUSION_PROOF_ERROR',
+                message: 'no signatures found in checkpoint',
+            });
+        }
+        return new SignedNote(header, signatures);
+    }
+}
+// LogCheckpoint represents a transparency log checkpoint. Consists of the
+// following:
+//  - origin: the name of the transparency log
+//  - logSize: the size of the log at the time of the checkpoint
+//  - logHash: the root hash of the log at the time of the checkpoint
+//  - rest: the rest of the checkpoint body, which is a list of log entries
+// See:
+// https://github.com/transparency-dev/formats/blob/main/log/README.md#checkpoint-body
+class LogCheckpoint {
+    origin;
+    logSize;
+    logHash;
+    rest;
+    constructor(origin, logSize, logHash, rest) {
+        this.origin = origin;
+        this.logSize = logSize;
+        this.logHash = logHash;
+        this.rest = rest;
+    }
+    static fromString(note) {
+        const lines = note.trimEnd().split('\n');
+        if (lines.length < 3) {
+            throw new error_1.VerificationError({
+                code: 'TLOG_INCLUSION_PROOF_ERROR',
+                message: 'too few lines in checkpoint header',
+            });
+        }
+        const origin = lines[0];
+        // logSize is attacker-controlled and parsed before any signature is
+        // verified, so guard against BigInt() throwing an uncaught SyntaxError on
+        // malformed input.
+        let logSize;
+        try {
+            logSize = BigInt(lines[1]);
+        }
+        catch {
+            throw new error_1.VerificationError({
+                code: 'TLOG_INCLUSION_PROOF_ERROR',
+                message: 'invalid checkpoint log size',
+            });
+        }
+        const rootHash = Buffer.from(lines[2], 'base64');
+        const rest = lines.slice(3);
+        return new LogCheckpoint(origin, logSize, rootHash, rest);
+    }
+}
+exports.LogCheckpoint = LogCheckpoint;

package/node_modules/@sigstore/verify/dist/tlog/dsse.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+import type { Entry } from '@sigstore/protobuf-specs/rekor/v2';
+import type { ProposedDSSEEntry } from '@sigstore/rekor-types';
+import type { SignatureContent } from '../shared.types';
+export declare const DSSE_API_VERSION_V1 = "0.0.1";
+export declare function verifyDSSETLogBody(tlogEntry: ProposedDSSEEntry, content: SignatureContent): void;
+export declare function verifyDSSETLogBodyV2(tlogEntry: Entry, content: SignatureContent): void;