@maci-protocol/circuits 0.0.0-ci.f4bc8a6 → 0.0.0-ci.f5db322
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/LICENSE +1 -2
- package/build/ts/{genZkeys.d.ts → generateZkeys.d.ts} +1 -1
- package/build/ts/generateZkeys.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/build/ts/{genZkeys.js → generateZkeys.js} +1 -1
- package/build/ts/generateZkeys.js.map +1 -0
- package/build/ts/types.d.ts +11 -12
- package/build/ts/types.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/build/tsconfig.build.tsbuildinfo +1 -1
- package/circom/circuits.json +23 -7
- package/circom/coordinator/full/MessageProcessor.circom +253 -0
- package/circom/coordinator/full/SingleMessageProcessor.circom +204 -0
- package/circom/coordinator/non-qv/processMessages.circom +119 -119
- package/circom/coordinator/non-qv/tallyVotes.circom +51 -45
- package/circom/coordinator/qv/processMessages.circom +120 -117
- package/circom/coordinator/qv/tallyVotes.circom +65 -63
- package/circom/utils/{calculateTotal.circom → CalculateTotal.circom} +8 -6
- package/circom/utils/{verifySignature.circom → EdDSAPoseidonVerifier.circom} +40 -66
- package/circom/utils/MessageHasher.circom +57 -0
- package/circom/utils/MessageToCommand.circom +107 -0
- package/circom/utils/PoseidonHasher.circom +29 -0
- package/circom/utils/{privToPubKey.circom → PrivateToPublicKey.circom} +12 -10
- package/circom/utils/VerifySignature.circom +39 -0
- package/circom/utils/full/MessageValidator.circom +91 -0
- package/circom/utils/full/StateLeafAndBallotTransformer.circom +122 -0
- package/circom/utils/non-qv/{messageValidator.circom → MessageValidator.circom} +17 -15
- package/circom/utils/non-qv/{stateLeafAndBallotTransformer.circom → StateLeafAndBallotTransformer.circom} +36 -36
- package/circom/utils/qv/{messageValidator.circom → MessageValidator.circom} +17 -15
- package/circom/utils/qv/{stateLeafAndBallotTransformer.circom → StateLeafAndBallotTransformer.circom} +36 -36
- package/circom/utils/trees/BinaryMerkleRoot.circom +62 -0
- package/circom/utils/trees/CheckRoot.circom +49 -0
- package/circom/utils/trees/LeafExists.circom +27 -0
- package/circom/utils/trees/MerklePathIndicesGenerator.circom +44 -0
- package/circom/utils/trees/MerkleTreeInclusionProof.circom +50 -0
- package/circom/utils/trees/QuinaryCheckRoot.circom +54 -0
- package/circom/utils/trees/QuinaryGeneratePathIndices.circom +44 -0
- package/circom/utils/trees/QuinaryLeafExists.circom +30 -0
- package/circom/utils/trees/QuinarySelector.circom +42 -0
- package/circom/utils/trees/QuinaryTreeInclusionProof.circom +55 -0
- package/circom/utils/trees/Splicer.circom +76 -0
- package/circom/voter/PollJoined.circom +43 -0
- package/circom/voter/PollJoining.circom +54 -0
- package/package.json +17 -14
- package/build/ts/genZkeys.d.ts.map +0 -1
- package/build/ts/genZkeys.js.map +0 -1
- package/circom/utils/hashers.circom +0 -78
- package/circom/utils/messageToCommand.circom +0 -78
- package/circom/utils/trees/incrementalMerkleTree.circom +0 -198
- package/circom/utils/trees/incrementalQuinaryTree.circom +0 -287
- package/circom/voter/poll.circom +0 -93
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@@ -5,10 +5,12 @@ include "./comparators.circom";
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// zk-kit import
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include "./unpack-element.circom";
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// local imports
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include "../../utils/trees/
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include "../../utils/trees/
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include "../../utils/
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include "../../utils/
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include "../../utils/trees/CheckRoot.circom";
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include "../../utils/trees/MerklePathIndicesGenerator.circom";
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include "../../utils/trees/LeafExists.circom";
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include "../../utils/trees/QuinaryCheckRoot.circom";
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include "../../utils/CalculateTotal.circom";
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include "../../utils/PoseidonHasher.circom";
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/**
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* Processes batches of votes and verifies their validity in a Merkle tree structure.
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@@ -16,33 +18,33 @@ include "../../utils/hashers.circom";
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*/
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template TallyVotes(
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stateTreeDepth,
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-
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tallyProcessingStateTreeDepth,
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voteOptionTreeDepth
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) {
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// Ensure there's at least one level in the vote option tree.
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assert(voteOptionTreeDepth > 0);
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// Ensure the intermediate state tree has at least one level.
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assert(
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assert(tallyProcessingStateTreeDepth > 0);
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// The intermediate state tree must be smaller than the full state tree.
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assert(
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assert(tallyProcessingStateTreeDepth < stateTreeDepth);
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// Number of children per node in the tree, defining the tree's branching factor.
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var TREE_ARITY = 5;
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var BALLOT_TREE_ARITY = 2;
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// The number of ballots processed at once, determined by the depth of the intermediate state tree.
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var batchSize = BALLOT_TREE_ARITY **
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var batchSize = BALLOT_TREE_ARITY ** tallyProcessingStateTreeDepth;
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// Number of voting options available, determined by the depth of the vote option tree.
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var
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var totalVoteOptions = TREE_ARITY ** voteOptionTreeDepth;
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// Number of elements in each ballot.
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var BALLOT_LENGTH = 2;
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// Index for the nonce in the ballot array.
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var
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var BALLOT_NONCE_INDEX = 0;
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// Index for the voting option root in the ballot array.
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var
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var BALLOT_VOTE_OPTION_ROOT_INDEX = 1;
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// Difference in tree depths, used in path calculations.
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var
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var STATE_TREE_DEPTH_DIFFERENCE = stateTreeDepth - tallyProcessingStateTreeDepth;
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// Root of the state Merkle tree, representing the overall state before voting.
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signal input stateRoot;
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@@ -59,13 +61,13 @@ template TallyVotes(
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// Start index of given batch
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signal input index;
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// Number of users that signup
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signal input
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signal input totalSignups;
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// Ballots and their corresponding path elements for verification in the tree.
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signal input ballots[batchSize][BALLOT_LENGTH];
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signal input ballotPathElements[
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signal input votes[batchSize][
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signal input ballotPathElements[STATE_TREE_DEPTH_DIFFERENCE][BALLOT_TREE_ARITY - 1];
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signal input votes[batchSize][totalVoteOptions];
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// Current results for each vote option.
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signal input currentResults[
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signal input currentResults[totalVoteOptions];
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// Salt for the root of the current results.
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signal input currentResultsRootSalt;
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// Total voice credits spent so far.
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// Salt for the total spent voice credits.
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signal input currentSpentVoiceCreditSubtotalSalt;
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// Spent voice credits per vote option.
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signal input
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signal input currentPerVoteOptionSpentVoiceCredits[totalVoteOptions];
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// Salt for the root of spent credits per option.
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signal input
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signal input currentPerVoteOptionSpentVoiceCreditsRootSalt;
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// Salt for the root of the new results.
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signal input newResultsRootSalt;
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// Salt for the new spent credits per vote option root.
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signal input
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signal input newPerVoteOptionSpentVoiceCreditsRootSalt;
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// Salt for the new total spent voice credits root.
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signal input newSpentVoiceCreditSubtotalSalt;
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@@ -88,21 +90,21 @@ template TallyVotes(
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computedSbCommitment === sbCommitment;
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// Validates that the index is within the valid range of sign-ups.
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var
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var totalSignupsValid = LessEqThan(50)([index, totalSignups]);
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totalSignupsValid === 1;
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// Hashes each ballot for subroot generation, and checks the existence of the leaf in the Merkle tree.
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var computedBallotHashers[batchSize];
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for (var i = 0; i < batchSize; i++) {
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computedBallotHashers[i] = PoseidonHasher(2)([ballots[i][
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computedBallotHashers[i] = PoseidonHasher(2)([ballots[i][BALLOT_NONCE_INDEX], ballots[i][BALLOT_VOTE_OPTION_ROOT_INDEX]]);
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}
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var computedBallotSubroot = CheckRoot(
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var computedBallotPathIndices[
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var computedBallotSubroot = CheckRoot(tallyProcessingStateTreeDepth)(computedBallotHashers);
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var computedBallotPathIndices[STATE_TREE_DEPTH_DIFFERENCE] = MerklePathIndicesGenerator(STATE_TREE_DEPTH_DIFFERENCE)(index / batchSize);
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// Verifies each ballot's existence within the ballot tree.
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LeafExists(
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LeafExists(STATE_TREE_DEPTH_DIFFERENCE)(
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computedBallotSubroot,
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ballotPathElements,
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computedBallotPathIndices,
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// Processes vote options, verifying each against its declared root.
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var computedVoteTree[batchSize];
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for (var i = 0; i < batchSize; i++) {
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computedVoteTree[i] =
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computedVoteTree[i] === ballots[i][
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computedVoteTree[i] = QuinaryCheckRoot(voteOptionTreeDepth)(votes[i]);
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computedVoteTree[i] === ballots[i][BALLOT_VOTE_OPTION_ROOT_INDEX];
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}
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// Calculates new results and spent voice credits based on the current and incoming votes.
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var computedIsZero = IsZero()(computedIsFirstBatch);
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// Tally the new results.
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var computedCalculateTotalResult[
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for (var i = 0; i <
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var computedCalculateTotalResult[totalVoteOptions];
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for (var i = 0; i < totalVoteOptions; i++) {
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var numsRC[batchSize + 1];
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numsRC[batchSize] = currentResults[i] * computedIsZero;
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for (var j = 0; j < batchSize; j++) {
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}
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// Tally the new spent voice credit total.
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var numsSVC[batchSize *
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numsSVC[batchSize *
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var numsSVC[batchSize * totalVoteOptions + 1];
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numsSVC[batchSize * totalVoteOptions] = currentSpentVoiceCreditSubtotal * computedIsZero;
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for (var i = 0; i < batchSize; i++) {
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for (var j = 0; j <
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numsSVC[i *
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for (var j = 0; j < totalVoteOptions; j++) {
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numsSVC[i * totalVoteOptions + j] = votes[i][j] * votes[i][j];
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}
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}
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var computedNewSpentVoiceCreditSubtotal = CalculateTotal(batchSize *
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var computedNewSpentVoiceCreditSubtotal = CalculateTotal(batchSize * totalVoteOptions + 1)(numsSVC);
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// Tally the spent voice credits per vote option.
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var computedNewPerVOSpentVoiceCredits[
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var computedNewPerVOSpentVoiceCredits[totalVoteOptions];
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var computedTotalVoiceCreditSpent[batchSize + 1];
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computedTotalVoiceCreditSpent[batchSize] = currentPerVoteOptionSpentVoiceCredits[i] * computedIsZero;
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computedTotalVoiceCreditSpent[j] = votes[j][i] * votes[j][i];
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}
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computedNewPerVOSpentVoiceCredits[i] = CalculateTotal(batchSize + 1)(
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computedNewPerVOSpentVoiceCredits[i] = CalculateTotal(batchSize + 1)(computedTotalVoiceCreditSpent);
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}
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// Verifies the updated results and spent credits, ensuring consistency and correctness of tally updates.
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// Number of children per node in the tree, defining the tree's branching factor.
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var TREE_ARITY = 5;
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// Number of voting options available, determined by the depth of the vote option tree.
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var totalVoteOptions = TREE_ARITY ** voteOptionTreeDepth;
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// Equal to 1 if this is the first batch, otherwise 0.
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signal input currentResults[totalVoteOptions];
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signal input newResults[totalVoteOptions];
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signal input currentPerVoteOptionSpentVoiceCredits[totalVoteOptions];
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signal input currentPerVoteOptionSpentVoiceCreditsRootSalt;
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signal input newPerVoteOptionSpentVoiceCredits[totalVoteOptions];
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signal input newPerVoteOptionSpentVoiceCreditsRootSalt;
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// Compute the commitment to the current results.
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var computedCurrentResultsRoot =
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var computedCurrentResultsRoot = QuinaryCheckRoot(voteOptionTreeDepth)(currentResults);
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// Verify currentResultsCommitmentHash.
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var computedCurrentResultsCommitment = PoseidonHasher(2)([computedCurrentResultsRoot, currentResultsRootSalt]);
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var computedCurrentSpentVoiceCreditsCommitment = PoseidonHasher(2)([currentSpentVoiceCreditSubtotal, currentSpentVoiceCreditSubtotalSalt]);
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// Compute the root of the spent voice credits per vote option.
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var
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var computedCurrentPerVoteOptionSpentVoiceCreditsRoot = QuinaryCheckRoot(voteOptionTreeDepth)(currentPerVoteOptionSpentVoiceCredits);
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var computedCurrentPerVoteOptionSpentVoiceCreditsCommitment = PoseidonHasher(2)([computedCurrentPerVoteOptionSpentVoiceCreditsRoot, currentPerVoteOptionSpentVoiceCreditsRootSalt]);
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// Commit to the current tally.
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var computedCurrentTallyCommitment = PoseidonHasher(3)([
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computedCurrentSpentVoiceCreditsCommitment,
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246
248
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247
249
|
// Check if the current tally commitment is correct only if this is not the first batch.
|
|
@@ -249,28 +251,28 @@ template ResultCommitmentVerifier(voteOptionTreeDepth) {
|
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249
251
|
// computedIsZero.out is 0 if this is the first batch.
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250
252
|
var computedIsZero = IsZero()(isFirstBatch);
|
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251
253
|
|
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252
|
-
//
|
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253
|
-
//
|
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254
|
-
signal
|
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255
|
-
|
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256
|
-
|
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254
|
+
// isFirstCommitment is 0 if this is the first batch, currentTallyCommitment should be 0 if this is the first batch.
|
|
255
|
+
// isFirstCommitment is 1 if this is not the first batch, currentTallyCommitment should not be 0 if this is the first batch.
|
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256
|
+
signal isFirstCommitment;
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257
|
+
isFirstCommitment <== computedIsZero * computedCurrentTallyCommitment;
|
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|
+
isFirstCommitment === currentTallyCommitment;
|
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257
259
|
|
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258
260
|
// Compute the root of the new results.
|
|
259
|
-
var computedNewResultsRoot =
|
|
261
|
+
var computedNewResultsRoot = QuinaryCheckRoot(voteOptionTreeDepth)(newResults);
|
|
260
262
|
var computedNewResultsCommitment = PoseidonHasher(2)([computedNewResultsRoot, newResultsRootSalt]);
|
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261
263
|
|
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262
264
|
// Compute the commitment to the new spent voice credits value.
|
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263
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|
var computedNewSpentVoiceCreditsCommitment = PoseidonHasher(2)([newSpentVoiceCreditSubtotal, newSpentVoiceCreditSubtotalSalt]);
|
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266
|
|
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265
267
|
// Compute the root of the spent voice credits per vote option.
|
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|
-
var
|
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267
|
-
var
|
|
268
|
+
var computedNewPerVoteOptionSpentVoiceCreditsRoot = QuinaryCheckRoot(voteOptionTreeDepth)(newPerVoteOptionSpentVoiceCredits);
|
|
269
|
+
var computedNewPerVoteOptionSpentVoiceCreditsCommitment = PoseidonHasher(2)([computedNewPerVoteOptionSpentVoiceCreditsRoot, newPerVoteOptionSpentVoiceCreditsRootSalt]);
|
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268
270
|
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269
271
|
// Commit to the new tally.
|
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270
272
|
var computedNewTallyCommitment = PoseidonHasher(3)([
|
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271
273
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computedNewResultsCommitment,
|
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272
274
|
computedNewSpentVoiceCreditsCommitment,
|
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-
|
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275
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+
computedNewPerVoteOptionSpentVoiceCreditsCommitment
|
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276
|
]);
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275
277
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|
computedNewTallyCommitment === newTallyCommitment;
|
|
@@ -1,22 +1,24 @@
|
|
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1
1
|
pragma circom 2.0.0;
|
|
2
2
|
|
|
3
3
|
/**
|
|
4
|
-
* Computes the cumulative sum of an array of
|
|
4
|
+
* Computes the cumulative sum of an array of length input signals.
|
|
5
5
|
* It iterates through each input, aggregating the sum up to that point,
|
|
6
6
|
* and outputs the total sum of all inputs. This template is useful for
|
|
7
7
|
* operations requiring the total sum of multiple signals, ensuring the
|
|
8
8
|
* final output reflects the cumulative total of the inputs provided.
|
|
9
9
|
*/
|
|
10
|
-
template CalculateTotal(
|
|
11
|
-
|
|
10
|
+
template CalculateTotal(length) {
|
|
11
|
+
// Array of values.
|
|
12
|
+
signal input nums[length];
|
|
13
|
+
// Total sum.
|
|
12
14
|
signal output sum;
|
|
13
15
|
|
|
14
|
-
signal sums[
|
|
16
|
+
signal sums[length];
|
|
15
17
|
sums[0] <== nums[0];
|
|
16
18
|
|
|
17
|
-
for (var i = 1; i <
|
|
19
|
+
for (var i = 1; i < length; i++) {
|
|
18
20
|
sums[i] <== sums[i - 1] + nums[i];
|
|
19
21
|
}
|
|
20
22
|
|
|
21
|
-
sum <== sums[
|
|
23
|
+
sum <== sums[length - 1];
|
|
22
24
|
}
|
|
@@ -8,60 +8,69 @@ include "./bitify.circom";
|
|
|
8
8
|
include "./escalarmulany.circom";
|
|
9
9
|
include "./escalarmulfix.circom";
|
|
10
10
|
// local imports
|
|
11
|
-
include "./
|
|
11
|
+
include "./PoseidonHasher.circom";
|
|
12
12
|
|
|
13
13
|
/**
|
|
14
14
|
* Variant of the EdDSAPoseidonVerifier template from circomlib
|
|
15
15
|
* https://github.com/iden3/circomlib/blob/master/circuits/eddsa.circom
|
|
16
16
|
*/
|
|
17
|
-
template
|
|
17
|
+
template EdDSAPoseidonVerifier() {
|
|
18
|
+
// The prime subgroup order.
|
|
19
|
+
var SUBGROUP_ORDER = 2736030358979909402780800718157159386076813972158567259200215660948447373041;
|
|
20
|
+
|
|
21
|
+
// The base point of the BabyJubJub curve.
|
|
22
|
+
var BASE8[2] = [
|
|
23
|
+
5299619240641551281634865583518297030282874472190772894086521144482721001553,
|
|
24
|
+
16950150798460657717958625567821834550301663161624707787222815936182638968203
|
|
25
|
+
];
|
|
26
|
+
|
|
18
27
|
// The x and y coordinates of the public key.
|
|
19
|
-
signal input
|
|
20
|
-
signal input
|
|
28
|
+
signal input publicKeyX;
|
|
29
|
+
signal input publicKeyY;
|
|
21
30
|
// Signature scalar.
|
|
22
|
-
signal input
|
|
31
|
+
signal input signatureScalar;
|
|
23
32
|
// The x and y coordinates of the signature point.
|
|
24
|
-
signal input
|
|
25
|
-
signal input
|
|
33
|
+
signal input signaturePointX;
|
|
34
|
+
signal input signaturePointY;
|
|
26
35
|
// Message hash.
|
|
27
|
-
signal input
|
|
36
|
+
signal input messageHash;
|
|
37
|
+
// Output signal for the validity of the signature.
|
|
38
|
+
signal output isValid;
|
|
28
39
|
|
|
29
|
-
|
|
30
|
-
|
|
31
|
-
|
|
32
|
-
// convert the signature scalar S into its binary representation.
|
|
33
|
-
var computedNum2Bits[254] = Num2Bits(254)(S);
|
|
40
|
+
// Ensure signatureScalar<Subgroup Order.
|
|
41
|
+
// convert the signature scalar signatureScalar into its binary representation.
|
|
42
|
+
var computedNum2Bits[254] = Num2Bits(254)(signatureScalar);
|
|
34
43
|
|
|
35
44
|
var computedCompConstantIn[254] = computedNum2Bits;
|
|
36
45
|
computedCompConstantIn[253] = 0;
|
|
37
46
|
|
|
38
|
-
// A component that ensures
|
|
47
|
+
// A component that ensures signatureScalar is within a valid range,
|
|
39
48
|
// comparing it against a constant representing the subgroup order.
|
|
40
|
-
var computedCompConstant = CompConstant(
|
|
49
|
+
var computedCompConstant = CompConstant(SUBGROUP_ORDER - 1)(computedCompConstantIn);
|
|
41
50
|
|
|
42
|
-
// Calculate the h = H(R,A, msg).
|
|
43
|
-
var computedH2Bits[254] = Num2Bits_strict()(PoseidonHasher(5)([
|
|
51
|
+
// Calculate the h = H(R, A, msg).
|
|
52
|
+
var computedH2Bits[254] = Num2Bits_strict()(PoseidonHasher(5)([
|
|
53
|
+
signaturePointX,
|
|
54
|
+
signaturePointY,
|
|
55
|
+
publicKeyX,
|
|
56
|
+
publicKeyY,
|
|
57
|
+
messageHash
|
|
58
|
+
]));
|
|
44
59
|
|
|
45
60
|
// These components perform point doubling operations on the public key
|
|
46
61
|
// to align it within the correct subgroup as part of the verification process.
|
|
47
|
-
var (
|
|
48
|
-
var (
|
|
49
|
-
var (
|
|
62
|
+
var (computedDouble1XOut, computedDouble1YOut) = BabyDbl()(publicKeyX, publicKeyY);
|
|
63
|
+
var (computedDouble2XOut, computedDouble2YOut) = BabyDbl()(computedDouble1XOut, computedDouble1YOut);
|
|
64
|
+
var (computedDouble3XOut, computedDouble3YOut) = BabyDbl()(computedDouble2XOut, computedDouble2YOut);
|
|
50
65
|
|
|
51
66
|
// A component that performs scalar multiplication of the
|
|
52
67
|
// adjusted public key by the hash output, essential for the verification calculation.
|
|
53
|
-
var computedEscalarMulAny[2] = EscalarMulAny(254)(computedH2Bits, [
|
|
68
|
+
var computedEscalarMulAny[2] = EscalarMulAny(254)(computedH2Bits, [computedDouble3XOut, computedDouble3YOut]);
|
|
54
69
|
|
|
55
70
|
// Compute the right side: right = R8 + right2.
|
|
56
|
-
var (computedAddRightXOut, computedAddRightYOut) = BabyAdd()(
|
|
57
|
-
|
|
58
|
-
// Calculate the left side: left = S * B8.
|
|
59
|
-
var BASE8[2] = [
|
|
60
|
-
5299619240641551281634865583518297030282874472190772894086521144482721001553,
|
|
61
|
-
16950150798460657717958625567821834550301663161624707787222815936182638968203
|
|
62
|
-
];
|
|
71
|
+
var (computedAddRightXOut, computedAddRightYOut) = BabyAdd()(signaturePointX, signaturePointY, computedEscalarMulAny[0], computedEscalarMulAny[1]);
|
|
63
72
|
|
|
64
|
-
// Fixed-base scalar multiplication of a base point by
|
|
73
|
+
// Fixed-base scalar multiplication of a base point by signatureScalar.
|
|
65
74
|
var computedEscalarMulFix[2] = EscalarMulFix(254, BASE8)(computedNum2Bits);
|
|
66
75
|
|
|
67
76
|
// Components to check the equality of x and y coordinates
|
|
@@ -73,45 +82,10 @@ template EdDSAPoseidonVerifier_patched() {
|
|
|
73
82
|
// Components to handle edge cases and ensure that all conditions
|
|
74
83
|
// for a valid signature are met, including the
|
|
75
84
|
// public key not being zero and other integrity checks.
|
|
76
|
-
var computedIsAxZero = IsZero()(
|
|
85
|
+
var computedIsAxZero = IsZero()(publicKeyX);
|
|
77
86
|
var computedIsAxEqual = IsEqual()([computedIsAxZero, 0]);
|
|
78
87
|
var computedIsCcZero = IsZero()(computedCompConstant);
|
|
79
88
|
var computedIsValid = IsEqual()([computedIsLeftRightValid + computedIsAxEqual + computedIsCcZero, 3]);
|
|
80
89
|
|
|
81
|
-
|
|
82
|
-
}
|
|
83
|
-
|
|
84
|
-
/**
|
|
85
|
-
* Verifies the EdDSA signature for a given command, which has exactly four elements in the hash preimage.
|
|
86
|
-
*/
|
|
87
|
-
template VerifySignature() {
|
|
88
|
-
// Public key of the signer, consisting of two coordinates [x, y].
|
|
89
|
-
signal input pubKey[2];
|
|
90
|
-
// R8 point from the signature, consisting of two coordinates [x, y].
|
|
91
|
-
signal input R8[2];
|
|
92
|
-
// Scalar component of the signature.
|
|
93
|
-
signal input S;
|
|
94
|
-
|
|
95
|
-
// Number of elements in the hash preimage.
|
|
96
|
-
var k = 4;
|
|
97
|
-
|
|
98
|
-
// The preimage data that was hashed, an array of four elements.
|
|
99
|
-
signal input preimage[k];
|
|
100
|
-
|
|
101
|
-
signal output valid;
|
|
102
|
-
|
|
103
|
-
// Hash the preimage using the Poseidon hashing function configured for four inputs.
|
|
104
|
-
var computedM = PoseidonHasher(4)(preimage);
|
|
105
|
-
|
|
106
|
-
// Instantiate the patched EdDSA Poseidon verifier with the necessary inputs.
|
|
107
|
-
var computedVerifier = EdDSAPoseidonVerifier_patched()(
|
|
108
|
-
pubKey[0],
|
|
109
|
-
pubKey[1],
|
|
110
|
-
S,
|
|
111
|
-
R8[0],
|
|
112
|
-
R8[1],
|
|
113
|
-
computedM
|
|
114
|
-
);
|
|
115
|
-
|
|
116
|
-
valid <== computedVerifier;
|
|
90
|
+
isValid <== computedIsValid;
|
|
117
91
|
}
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
pragma circom 2.0.0;
|
|
2
|
+
|
|
3
|
+
include "./PoseidonHasher.circom";
|
|
4
|
+
|
|
5
|
+
/**
|
|
6
|
+
* Hashes a MACI message and the public key used for message encryption.
|
|
7
|
+
* This template processes 10 message inputs and a 2-element public key
|
|
8
|
+
* combining them using the Poseidon hash function. The hashing process involves two stages:
|
|
9
|
+
* 1. hashing message parts data groups of five and,
|
|
10
|
+
* 2. hashing the grouped results alongside the first message input and
|
|
11
|
+
* the encryption public key to produce a final hash output.
|
|
12
|
+
*/
|
|
13
|
+
template MessageHasher() {
|
|
14
|
+
// Message parts
|
|
15
|
+
var MESSAGE_PARTS = 10;
|
|
16
|
+
var STATE_INDEX = 0;
|
|
17
|
+
var VOTE_OPTION_INDEX = 1;
|
|
18
|
+
var NEW_VOTE_WEIGHT = 2;
|
|
19
|
+
var NONCE = 3;
|
|
20
|
+
var POLL_ID = 4;
|
|
21
|
+
var SIGNATURE_POINT_X = 5;
|
|
22
|
+
var SIGNATURE_POINT_Y = 6;
|
|
23
|
+
var SIGNATURE_SCALAR = 7;
|
|
24
|
+
var ENCRYPTED_PUBLIC_KEY_X = 8;
|
|
25
|
+
var ENCRYPTED_PUBLIC_KEY_Y = 9;
|
|
26
|
+
|
|
27
|
+
// The MACI message is composed of 10 parts.
|
|
28
|
+
signal input data[MESSAGE_PARTS];
|
|
29
|
+
// the public key used to encrypt the message.
|
|
30
|
+
signal input encryptionPublicKey[2];
|
|
31
|
+
|
|
32
|
+
// we output an hash.
|
|
33
|
+
signal output hash;
|
|
34
|
+
|
|
35
|
+
var computedHasherPart1 = PoseidonHasher(5)([
|
|
36
|
+
data[STATE_INDEX],
|
|
37
|
+
data[VOTE_OPTION_INDEX],
|
|
38
|
+
data[NEW_VOTE_WEIGHT],
|
|
39
|
+
data[NONCE],
|
|
40
|
+
data[POLL_ID]
|
|
41
|
+
]);
|
|
42
|
+
|
|
43
|
+
var computedHasherPart2 = PoseidonHasher(5)([
|
|
44
|
+
data[SIGNATURE_POINT_X],
|
|
45
|
+
data[SIGNATURE_POINT_Y],
|
|
46
|
+
data[SIGNATURE_SCALAR],
|
|
47
|
+
data[ENCRYPTED_PUBLIC_KEY_X],
|
|
48
|
+
data[ENCRYPTED_PUBLIC_KEY_Y]
|
|
49
|
+
]);
|
|
50
|
+
|
|
51
|
+
hash <== PoseidonHasher(4)([
|
|
52
|
+
computedHasherPart1,
|
|
53
|
+
computedHasherPart2,
|
|
54
|
+
encryptionPublicKey[0],
|
|
55
|
+
encryptionPublicKey[1]
|
|
56
|
+
]);
|
|
57
|
+
}
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
pragma circom 2.0.0;
|
|
2
|
+
|
|
3
|
+
// circomlib import
|
|
4
|
+
include "./bitify.circom";
|
|
5
|
+
// zk-kit imports
|
|
6
|
+
include "./ecdh.circom";
|
|
7
|
+
include "./unpack-element.circom";
|
|
8
|
+
include "./poseidon-cipher.circom";
|
|
9
|
+
|
|
10
|
+
/**
|
|
11
|
+
* Converts a MACI message to a command by decrypting it.
|
|
12
|
+
* Processes encrypted MACI messages into structured MACI commands
|
|
13
|
+
* by decrypting using a shared key derived from ECDH. After decryption,
|
|
14
|
+
* unpacks and assigns decrypted values to specific command components.
|
|
15
|
+
*/
|
|
16
|
+
template MessageToCommand() {
|
|
17
|
+
var MESSAGE_LENGTH = 7;
|
|
18
|
+
var PACKED_COMMAND_LENGTH = 4;
|
|
19
|
+
var UNPACK_ELEMENT_LENGTH = 5;
|
|
20
|
+
var DECRYPTED_LENGTH = 9;
|
|
21
|
+
var MESSAGE_PARTS = 10;
|
|
22
|
+
|
|
23
|
+
// Element indices.
|
|
24
|
+
var ELEMENT_POLL_ID = 0;
|
|
25
|
+
var ELEMENT_NONCE = 1;
|
|
26
|
+
var ELEMENT_NEW_VOTE_WEIGHT = 2;
|
|
27
|
+
var ELEMENT_VOTE_OPTION_INDEX = 3;
|
|
28
|
+
var ELEMENT_STATE_INDEX = 4;
|
|
29
|
+
|
|
30
|
+
// Command indices.
|
|
31
|
+
var COMMAND_STATE_INDEX = 0;
|
|
32
|
+
var COMMAND_PUBLIC_KEY_X = 1;
|
|
33
|
+
var COMMAND_PUBLIC_KEY_Y = 2;
|
|
34
|
+
var COMMAND_SALT = 3;
|
|
35
|
+
|
|
36
|
+
// Decryptor indices.
|
|
37
|
+
var SIGNATURE_POINT_X = 4;
|
|
38
|
+
var SIGNATURE_POINT_Y = 5;
|
|
39
|
+
var SIGNATURE_SCALAR = 6;
|
|
40
|
+
|
|
41
|
+
// The message is an array of 10 parts.
|
|
42
|
+
signal input message[MESSAGE_PARTS];
|
|
43
|
+
// The encryption private key
|
|
44
|
+
signal input encryptionPrivateKey;
|
|
45
|
+
// The encryption public key
|
|
46
|
+
signal input encryptionPublicKey[2];
|
|
47
|
+
|
|
48
|
+
// Command parts.
|
|
49
|
+
signal output stateIndex;
|
|
50
|
+
// The new public key.
|
|
51
|
+
signal output newPublicKey[2];
|
|
52
|
+
// The vote option index.
|
|
53
|
+
signal output voteOptionIndex;
|
|
54
|
+
// The new vote weight.
|
|
55
|
+
signal output newVoteWeight;
|
|
56
|
+
// The nonce.
|
|
57
|
+
signal output nonce;
|
|
58
|
+
// The poll id.
|
|
59
|
+
signal output pollId;
|
|
60
|
+
// The salt.
|
|
61
|
+
signal output salt;
|
|
62
|
+
// The signature point.
|
|
63
|
+
signal output signaturePoint[2];
|
|
64
|
+
// The signature scalar.
|
|
65
|
+
signal output signatureScalar;
|
|
66
|
+
|
|
67
|
+
// Packed command.
|
|
68
|
+
signal output packedCommandOut[PACKED_COMMAND_LENGTH];
|
|
69
|
+
|
|
70
|
+
// Generate the shared key for decrypting the message.
|
|
71
|
+
var computedEcdh[2] = Ecdh()(encryptionPrivateKey, encryptionPublicKey);
|
|
72
|
+
|
|
73
|
+
// Decrypt the message using Poseidon decryption.
|
|
74
|
+
var computedDecryptor[DECRYPTED_LENGTH] = PoseidonDecryptWithoutCheck(MESSAGE_LENGTH)(
|
|
75
|
+
message,
|
|
76
|
+
0,
|
|
77
|
+
computedEcdh
|
|
78
|
+
);
|
|
79
|
+
|
|
80
|
+
// Save the decrypted message into a packed command signal.
|
|
81
|
+
signal packedCommand[PACKED_COMMAND_LENGTH];
|
|
82
|
+
|
|
83
|
+
for (var i = 0; i < PACKED_COMMAND_LENGTH; i++) {
|
|
84
|
+
packedCommand[i] <== computedDecryptor[i];
|
|
85
|
+
}
|
|
86
|
+
|
|
87
|
+
var computedUnpackElement[UNPACK_ELEMENT_LENGTH] = UnpackElement(UNPACK_ELEMENT_LENGTH)(
|
|
88
|
+
packedCommand[COMMAND_STATE_INDEX]
|
|
89
|
+
);
|
|
90
|
+
|
|
91
|
+
// Everything below were packed into the first element.
|
|
92
|
+
pollId <== computedUnpackElement[ELEMENT_POLL_ID];
|
|
93
|
+
nonce <== computedUnpackElement[ELEMENT_NONCE];
|
|
94
|
+
newVoteWeight <== computedUnpackElement[ELEMENT_NEW_VOTE_WEIGHT];
|
|
95
|
+
voteOptionIndex <== computedUnpackElement[ELEMENT_VOTE_OPTION_INDEX];
|
|
96
|
+
stateIndex <== computedUnpackElement[ELEMENT_STATE_INDEX];
|
|
97
|
+
|
|
98
|
+
newPublicKey[0] <== packedCommand[COMMAND_PUBLIC_KEY_X];
|
|
99
|
+
newPublicKey[1] <== packedCommand[COMMAND_PUBLIC_KEY_Y];
|
|
100
|
+
salt <== packedCommand[COMMAND_SALT];
|
|
101
|
+
|
|
102
|
+
signaturePoint[0] <== computedDecryptor[SIGNATURE_POINT_X];
|
|
103
|
+
signaturePoint[1] <== computedDecryptor[SIGNATURE_POINT_Y];
|
|
104
|
+
signatureScalar <== computedDecryptor[SIGNATURE_SCALAR];
|
|
105
|
+
|
|
106
|
+
packedCommandOut <== packedCommand;
|
|
107
|
+
}
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
pragma circom 2.0.0;
|
|
2
|
+
|
|
3
|
+
// zk-kit imports
|
|
4
|
+
include "./poseidon-cipher.circom";
|
|
5
|
+
|
|
6
|
+
/**
|
|
7
|
+
* Computes the Poseidon hash for an array of n inputs, including a default initial state
|
|
8
|
+
* of zero not counted in n. First, extends the inputs by prepending a zero, creating an array [0, inputs].
|
|
9
|
+
* Then, the Poseidon hash of the extended inputs is calculated, with the first element of the
|
|
10
|
+
* result assigned as the output.
|
|
11
|
+
*/
|
|
12
|
+
template PoseidonHasher(n) {
|
|
13
|
+
signal input inputs[n];
|
|
14
|
+
signal output out;
|
|
15
|
+
|
|
16
|
+
// [0, inputs].
|
|
17
|
+
var computedExtendedInputs[n + 1];
|
|
18
|
+
computedExtendedInputs[0] = 0;
|
|
19
|
+
|
|
20
|
+
for (var i = 0; i < n; i++) {
|
|
21
|
+
computedExtendedInputs[i + 1] = inputs[i];
|
|
22
|
+
}
|
|
23
|
+
|
|
24
|
+
// Compute the Poseidon hash of the extended inputs.
|
|
25
|
+
var computedPoseidonPerm[n + 1];
|
|
26
|
+
computedPoseidonPerm = PoseidonPerm(n + 1)(computedExtendedInputs);
|
|
27
|
+
|
|
28
|
+
out <== computedPoseidonPerm[0];
|
|
29
|
+
}
|