@lwrjs/client-modules 0.23.6 → 0.23.7

package/build/modules/lwr/lockerSandbox/lockerSandbox.js

@@ -1511,7 +1511,7 @@ const {
 const PromiseResolve$LWS = PromiseCtor$LWS.resolve.bind(PromiseCtor$LWS);
 const PromiseReject$LWS = PromiseCtor$LWS.reject.bind(PromiseCtor$LWS);
 const trustedResources$LWS = toSafeSet$LWS(new SetCtor$LWS$1());
-/*! version: 0.28.2 */
+/*! version: 0.28.3 */
 
 /*!
  * Copyright (C) 2019 salesforce.com, inc.
@@ -2261,6 +2261,7 @@ const {
 } = ReflectGetOwnPropertyDescriptor$LWS(HTMLAnchorElementProto$LWS, 'href');
 const HTMLAnchorElementProtoPathnameGetter$LWS = ObjectLookupOwnGetter$LWS$1(HTMLAnchorElementProto$LWS, 'pathname');
 const HTMLAnchorElementProtoProtocolGetter$LWS = ObjectLookupOwnGetter$LWS$1(HTMLAnchorElementProto$LWS, 'protocol');
+const HTMLAnchorElementProtoProtocolSetter$LWS = ObjectLookupOwnSetter$LWS(HTMLAnchorElementProto$LWS, 'protocol');
 const {
   prototype: HTMLButtonElementProto$LWS
 } = HTMLButtonElement;
@@ -2514,7 +2515,7 @@ const {
 const XhrProtoResponseTextGetter$LWS = ObjectLookupOwnGetter$LWS$1(XhrProto$LWS, 'responseText');
 const XhrProtoStatusGetter$LWS = ObjectLookupOwnGetter$LWS$1(XhrProto$LWS, 'status');
 ObjectLookupOwnSetter$LWS(XhrProto$LWS, 'withCredentials');
-/*! version: 0.28.2 */
+/*! version: 0.28.3 */
 
 /*!
  * Copyright (C) 2019 salesforce.com, inc.
@@ -2542,7 +2543,21 @@ const DISALLOWED_ENDPOINTS_LIST$LWS = ['/aura', '/webruntime'];
 const DISALLOWED_BROWSING_CONTEXT_ENDPOINTS_LIST$LWS = ['/chatter'];
 const TRUSTED_DOMAINS_REG_EXP$LWS = /\.(force|salesforce|visualforce|documentforce|my\.site|salesforce-sites)\.com$/;
 const URL_SCHEMES_LIST$LWS = toSafeArray$LWS$1(['about:', 'http:', 'https:']);
-const newlinesAndTabsRegExp$LWS = /[\u2028\u2029\n\r\t]/g;
+// Characters that browsers strip or ignore when resolving a URL, but that defeat
+// LWS's string-based scheme/endpoint checks if left in place. A leading invisible
+// character (e.g. U+200B before "javascript:") makes the URL parser treat the input
+// as authority-relative, leaving the scheme empty so the allowlist check is fooled;
+// an embedded one (e.g. "/se\u200btup") slips past endpoint denylist matching.
+// Stripping them before parsing closes both for every URL-bearing distortion at once.
+//
+// \p{Cc} - control characters (covers \t \n \r and the NULL byte)
+// \p{Cf} - format characters (zero-width space/joiners, soft hyphen, BOM, bidi marks
+//          U+200E/U+200F/U+202A-U+202E, word joiner, etc.)
+// \u034f  - combining grapheme joiner (category Mn, not Cc/Cf, but perceptually
+//          invisible and ignored by the URL parser, so listed explicitly)
+// \u2028  - line separator (category Zl, not covered by Cc)
+// \u2029  - paragraph separator (category Zp, not covered by Cc)
+const strippableURLCharsRegExp$LWS = /[\0-\x1F\x7F-\x9F\xAD\u034F\u0600-\u0605\u061C\u06DD\u070F\u0890\u0891\u08E2\u180E\u200B-\u200F\u2028-\u202E\u2060-\u2064\u2066-\u206F\uFEFF\uFFF9-\uFFFB\u{110BD}\u{110CD}\u{13430}-\u{1343F}\u{1BCA0}-\u{1BCA3}\u{1D173}-\u{1D17A}\u{E0001}\u{E0020}-\u{E007F}]/gu;
 const normalizerAnchor$LWS = ReflectApply$LWS$1(DocumentProtoCreateElement$LWS$1, rootDocument$LWS, ['a']);
 function isSameOriginURL$LWS(resourceValue$LWS) {
   let validParsedURL$LWS;
@@ -2566,13 +2581,18 @@ function isAttemptingToExploitURL$LWS(resourceValue$LWS) {
   const locationHref$LWS = rootWindow$LWS$1.location.href;
   return loweredResourceValue$LWS === '/' || loweredResourceValue$LWS[0] === '#' || loweredResourceValue$LWS[0] === '?' || ReflectApply$LWS$1(StringProtoStartsWith$LWS, loweredResourceValue$LWS, [`${locationHref$LWS}#`]) || ReflectApply$LWS$1(StringProtoStartsWith$LWS, loweredResourceValue$LWS, [`${locationHref$LWS}?`]);
 }
-// Validates that a URL doesn't target disallowed endpoints
+// Validates that a URL doesn't target disallowed endpoints.
 // @TODO: W-7302311 Make paths and domains configurable.
 function isAllowedEndpointURL$LWS(parsedURL$LWS) {
   const loweredPathname$LWS = ReflectApply$LWS$1(StringProtoToLowerCase$LWS, parsedURL$LWS.pathname, []);
   // This MUST be done inside the function because the gate may not be enabled when the
   // module code is loaded and evaluated (as would be the case for test environments)
   if (isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS('changesSince.262')) {
+    // Cross-origin URLs bypass the denylist — they cannot carry the user's session
+    // credentials to this instance's platform-internal endpoints (W-23009170).
+    if (!isSameOriginURL$LWS(parsedURL$LWS.normalizedURL)) {
+      return true;
+    }
     DISALLOWED_ENDPOINTS_LIST$LWS.push('/_nc_external', '/force', '/setup');
   }
   for (let i$LWS = 0, {
@@ -2623,7 +2643,7 @@ function sanitizeURLForElement$LWS(url$LWS) {
   return resolveURL$LWS(sanitizeURLString$LWS(url$LWS));
 }
 function sanitizeURLString$LWS(urlString$LWS) {
-  return urlString$LWS === '' ? urlString$LWS : ReflectApply$LWS$1(StringProtoReplace$LWS, urlString$LWS, [newlinesAndTabsRegExp$LWS, '']);
+  return urlString$LWS === '' ? urlString$LWS : ReflectApply$LWS$1(StringProtoReplace$LWS, urlString$LWS, [strippableURLCharsRegExp$LWS, '']);
 }
 // Per the HTML spec, srcset candidates are comma-delimited. A candidate is a
 // URL optionally followed by whitespace and a width/density descriptor like
@@ -2663,7 +2683,7 @@ function sanitizeSrcsetAndValidateEndpoints$LWS(rawSrcset$LWS) {
   }
   return sanitized$LWS;
 }
-/*! version: 0.28.2 */
+/*! version: 0.28.3 */
 
 /*! @license DOMPurify 3.2.4 | (c) Cure53 and other contributors | Released under the Apache license 2.0 and Mozilla Public License 2.0 | github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/blob/3.2.4/LICENSE */
 
@@ -4075,7 +4095,7 @@ try {
   // swallow
 }
 const trusted = createPolicy('trusted', policyOptions);
-/*! version: 0.28.2 */
+/*! version: 0.28.3 */
 
 /*!
  * Copyright (C) 2019 salesforce.com, inc.
@@ -4384,7 +4404,7 @@ function blobSanitizer$LWS(sandboxKey$LWS) {
   }
   return getSanitizerForConfig$LWS(sandboxKey$LWS, 'STRING_BLOB_HTML');
 }
-/*! version: 0.28.2 */
+/*! version: 0.28.3 */
 
 /*!
  * Copyright (C) 2023 salesforce.com, inc.
@@ -4593,7 +4613,7 @@ function createScriptSrcURLSetter$LWS(targetElement$LWS) {
     ReflectApply$LWS$1(ElementProtoSetAttributeNS$LWS, targetElement$LWS, [attributeNamespaceURI$LWS, attributeName$LWS, src$LWS]);
   };
 }
-/*! version: 0.28.2 */
+/*! version: 0.28.3 */
 
 /*!
  * Copyright (C) 2019 salesforce.com, inc.
@@ -8237,6 +8257,151 @@ function initDistortionEventTargetDispatchEvent$LWS({
     return [originalDispatchEvent$LWS, dispatchEvent$LWS];
   };
 }
+
+// W-22602807: shared helper for distorting an iframe contentWindow realm's
+// function-invocation primitives (Function.prototype.call/apply/bind,
+// Reflect.apply/construct).
+//
+// The cross-realm leak: sandbox code obtains a same-origin iframe's invocation
+// primitive and uses it to invoke a constructor/evaluator. The callee can
+// arrive as a RAW callable whose realm's `document` is undistorted, so
+// `document.cookie` in a compiled body resolves to the native getter and leaks
+// the top-level cookie.
+//
+// Containment tracks the OUTERMOST primitive actually invoked through the
+// membrane (composition depth is irrelevant: in `apply.call(F, ...)` only the
+// outer `.call` is invoked). So every invocation primitive reachable on the
+// iframe realm must be distorted. Each re-resolves the callee (the function
+// being invoked) to its distorted counterpart in the ROOT record's map when
+// one exists, then delegates to the native primitive — so a raw native
+// Function/eval reached cross-realm becomes the sandbox-distorted version,
+// while ordinary usage is an untouched passthrough.
+// Returns the host iframe element if `globalObject
+// ` is a same-origin iframe
+// contentWindow realm (the only realm we distort), else undefined. Gated on
+// changesSince.264: when the gate is off, no entry is installed and the
+// primitive keeps its native behavior. One check here covers all five
+// invocation-primitive distortions.
+function getDistortableFrameElement$LWS(globalObject$LWS) {
+  if (!isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS('changesSince.264')) {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  let frameElement$LWS;
+  try {
+    frameElement$LWS = ReflectApply$LWS$1(WindowFrameElementGetter$LWS, globalObject$LWS, []);
+  } catch (_unused2$LWS) {
+    // Cross-origin / non-window realm: not our target.
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  return frameElement$LWS || undefined;
+}
+// Re-resolve `callee` to its distorted counterpart from the root distortion
+// map, if one exists; otherwise return it unchanged.
+//
+// This reads the assembled `root.distortions` map at invocation time — the same
+// map the near-membrane's distortionCallback consults. That is deliberate: a
+// foreign invocation primitive can deliver a callee (e.g. the sandbox `Function`
+// ctor) that has crossed the membrane as a RAW reference, bypassing the
+// distortion the membrane would normally apply on a direct call. Looking the
+// callee up in the map re-attaches that distortion. We rely on the map's
+// invariant that a callable key maps to a callable replacement; the
+// `distorted !== callee` check skips identity mappings (e.g. `document`,
+// `location`, the global object, which map to themselves), and the invocation
+// primitives require a callable target regardless, so a non-callable could
+// never be reached here without throwing at the call site.
+function substituteDistortedCallee$LWS(root$LWS, callee$LWS) {
+  const distorted$LWS = root$LWS.distortions.get(callee$LWS);
+  if (distorted$LWS !== undefined && distorted$LWS !== callee$LWS) {
+    return distorted$LWS;
+  }
+  return callee$LWS;
+}
+
+// W-22602807: distort an iframe contentWindow realm's Function.prototype.apply.
+// See cross-realm-invocation.ts for the threat model.
+function initDistortionFunctionApply$LWS({
+  globalObject: {
+    Function: {
+      prototype: {
+        apply: originalApply$LWS
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}) {
+  return function distortionFunctionApply$LWS({
+    globalObject: globalObject$LWS,
+    root: root$LWS
+  }) {
+    if (!getDistortableFrameElement$LWS(globalObject$LWS)) {
+      return undefined;
+    }
+    return [originalApply$LWS,
+    // `this` is the callee; (thisArg, argsArray) its binding and args.
+    // `apply` accepts a null/undefined argsArray, which ReflectApply
+    // rejects, so normalize to [].
+    function apply$LWS(thisArg$LWS, argsArray$LWS) {
+      return ReflectApply$LWS$1(substituteDistortedCallee$LWS(root$LWS, this), thisArg$LWS, argsArray$LWS == null ? [] : argsArray$LWS);
+    }];
+  };
+}
+
+// W-22602807: distort an iframe contentWindow realm's Function.prototype.bind.
+// See cross-realm-invocation.ts for the threat model.
+//
+// bind defers invocation: it returns a bound function invoked later. We
+// substitute the callee for its distorted counterpart FIRST, then bind that,
+// so the returned bound function wraps the sandbox-distorted callee.
+function initDistortionFunctionBind$LWS({
+  globalObject: {
+    Function: {
+      prototype: {
+        bind: originalBind$LWS
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}) {
+  return function distortionFunctionBind$LWS({
+    globalObject: globalObject$LWS,
+    root: root$LWS
+  }) {
+    if (!getDistortableFrameElement$LWS(globalObject$LWS)) {
+      return undefined;
+    }
+    return [originalBind$LWS,
+    // `this` is the callee; (thisArg, ...boundArgs) the binding and
+    // partially-applied args. Bind the substituted callee with the
+    // sandbox-realm bind so the result is a sandbox-realm bound function.
+    function bind$LWS(thisArg$LWS, ...boundArgs$LWS) {
+      return ReflectApply$LWS$1(FunctionProtoBind$LWS, substituteDistortedCallee$LWS(root$LWS, this), [thisArg$LWS, ...boundArgs$LWS]);
+    }];
+  };
+}
+
+// W-22602807: distort an iframe contentWindow realm's Function.prototype.call.
+// See cross-realm-invocation.ts for the threat model.
+function initDistortionFunctionCall$LWS({
+  globalObject: {
+    Function: {
+      prototype: {
+        call: originalCall$LWS
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}) {
+  return function distortionFunctionCall$LWS({
+    globalObject: globalObject$LWS,
+    root: root$LWS
+  }) {
+    if (!getDistortableFrameElement$LWS(globalObject$LWS)) {
+      return undefined;
+    }
+    return [originalCall$LWS,
+    // `this` is the callee; (thisArg, ...args) its binding and arguments.
+    function call$LWS(thisArg$LWS, ...args$LWS) {
+      return ReflectApply$LWS$1(substituteDistortedCallee$LWS(root$LWS, this), thisArg$LWS, args$LWS);
+    }];
+  };
+}
 function initDistortionFunction$LWS({
   UNCOMPILED_CONTEXT: UNCOMPILED_CONTEXT$LWS,
   globalObject: {
@@ -8337,11 +8502,35 @@ function initDistortionHistoryReplaceState$LWS({
   };
 }
 
-// Anchor elements allow blob: URLs in addition to standard schemes for download links
-const ANCHOR_URL_SCHEMES_LIST$LWS = toSafeArray$LWS$1(['about:', 'blob:', 'http:', 'https:']);
-function isValidAnchorURLScheme$LWS(url$LWS) {
+// Only schemes that can trigger arbitrary JavaScript execution when an anchor is
+// navigated are blocked. Everything else (mailto:, tel:, sms:, http:, https:,
+// blob:, about:, relative urls) is permitted: those navigate or hand off to an
+// external app and cannot execute script.
+// eslint-disable-next-line no-script-url
+const ANCHOR_BLOCKED_URL_SCHEMES_LIST$LWS = toSafeArray$LWS$1(['data:', 'javascript:', 'vbscript:']);
+const ANCHOR_BLOCKED_SCHEME_ERROR_MESSAGE$LWS = 'HTMLAnchorElement href does not support data:, javascript: or vbscript: schemes.';
+// The scheme is read back through the browser's own URL parser via the
+// normalizer anchor, so case/whitespace/zero-width evasion variants resolve to
+// the same normalized protocol the browser would execute. A payload that does
+// not normalize to a blocked scheme is also not executed as one by the browser.
+function normalizedSchemeIsBlocked$LWS() {
+  return ANCHOR_BLOCKED_URL_SCHEMES_LIST$LWS.includes(ReflectApply$LWS$1(HTMLAnchorElementProtoProtocolGetter$LWS, normalizerAnchor$LWS, []));
+}
+// Guards the `href` setter / `href` attribute: the whole URL is assigned to the
+// normalizer, then its resolved protocol is checked.
+function isBlockedAnchorHref$LWS(url$LWS) {
   ReflectApply$LWS$1(HTMLAnchorElementProtoHrefSetter$LWS, normalizerAnchor$LWS, [url$LWS]);
-  return ANCHOR_URL_SCHEMES_LIST$LWS.includes(ReflectApply$LWS$1(HTMLAnchorElementProtoProtocolGetter$LWS, normalizerAnchor$LWS, []));
+  return normalizedSchemeIsBlocked$LWS();
+}
+// Guards the `protocol` setter: `a.protocol = value` resolves against the
+// anchor's current href, so the same current href is replayed onto the
+// normalizer before applying the new scheme. This mirrors exactly what the
+// native setter would produce, on a throwaway anchor.
+function isBlockedAnchorProtocolChange$LWS(anchor$LWS, value$LWS) {
+  const currentHref$LWS = ReflectApply$LWS$1(HTMLAnchorElementProtoHrefGetter$LWS, anchor$LWS, []);
+  ReflectApply$LWS$1(HTMLAnchorElementProtoHrefSetter$LWS, normalizerAnchor$LWS, [currentHref$LWS]);
+  ReflectApply$LWS$1(HTMLAnchorElementProtoProtocolSetter$LWS, normalizerAnchor$LWS, [value$LWS]);
+  return normalizedSchemeIsBlocked$LWS();
 }
 function initDistortionHTMLAnchorElementHrefSetter$LWS({
   globalObject: {
@@ -8352,8 +8541,8 @@ function initDistortionHTMLAnchorElementHrefSetter$LWS({
   function href$LWS(value$LWS) {
     const urlString$LWS = sanitizeURLForElement$LWS(value$LWS);
     if (isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS('htmlAnchorElementHrefValidation')) {
-      if (!isValidAnchorURLScheme$LWS(urlString$LWS)) {
-        throw new LockerSecurityError$LWS('HTMLAnchorElement.href supports http://, https://, blob: schemes, relative urls and about:blank.');
+      if (isBlockedAnchorHref$LWS(urlString$LWS)) {
+        throw new LockerSecurityError$LWS(ANCHOR_BLOCKED_SCHEME_ERROR_MESSAGE$LWS);
       }
       const parsedURL$LWS = parseURL$LWS(urlString$LWS);
       if (!isAllowedEndpointURL$LWS(parsedURL$LWS)) {
@@ -8371,6 +8560,25 @@ function initDistortionHTMLAnchorElementHrefSetter$LWS({
     return distortionEntry$LWS;
   };
 }
+function initDistortionHTMLAnchorElementProtocolSetter$LWS({
+  globalObject: {
+    HTMLAnchorElement: HTMLAnchorElement$LWS
+  }
+}) {
+  const originalProtocolSetter$LWS = ObjectLookupOwnSetter$LWS(HTMLAnchorElement$LWS.prototype, 'protocol');
+  function protocol$LWS(value$LWS) {
+    if (isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS('changesSince.264')) {
+      if (isBlockedAnchorProtocolChange$LWS(this, value$LWS)) {
+        throw new LockerSecurityError$LWS(ANCHOR_BLOCKED_SCHEME_ERROR_MESSAGE$LWS);
+      }
+    }
+    ReflectApply$LWS$1(originalProtocolSetter$LWS, this, [value$LWS]);
+  }
+  const distortionEntry$LWS = [originalProtocolSetter$LWS, protocol$LWS];
+  return function distortionHTMLAnchorElementProtocolSetter$LWS() {
+    return distortionEntry$LWS;
+  };
+}
 function initDistortionHTMLBaseElementHrefSetter$LWS({
   globalObject: {
     HTMLBaseElement: HTMLBaseElement$LWS
@@ -8848,7 +9056,7 @@ function enforceSandboxAllowScriptsForSameOriginIframeRealm$LWS(iframe$LWS, srcV
       if (!isSameOriginURL$LWS(srcValue$LWS)) {
         return;
       }
-    } catch (_unused2$LWS) {
+    } catch (_unused3$LWS) {
       /* empty */
     }
     if (!ReflectApply$LWS$1(DOMTokenListProtoContains$LWS, sandboxTokenList$LWS, [ALLOW_SCRIPTS_TOKEN$LWS])) {
@@ -11640,6 +11848,63 @@ function initDistortionRangeToString$LWS({
     return distortionEntry$LWS;
   };
 }
+
+// W-22602807: distort an iframe contentWindow realm's Reflect.apply.
+// See Function/cross-realm-invocation.ts for the threat model.
+//
+// Unlike Function.prototype.apply, the callee is the FIRST ARGUMENT (not
+// `this`) and the invocation never routes through Function.prototype.call, so
+// it is an independent doorway that must be distorted separately.
+function initDistortionReflectApply$LWS({
+  globalObject: {
+    Reflect: {
+      apply: originalReflectApply$LWS
+    }
+  }
+}) {
+  return function distortionReflectApply$LWS({
+    globalObject: globalObject$LWS,
+    root: root$LWS
+  }) {
+    if (!getDistortableFrameElement$LWS(globalObject$LWS)) {
+      return undefined;
+    }
+    return [originalReflectApply$LWS, function apply$LWS(target$LWS, thisArg$LWS, argsArray$LWS) {
+      return ReflectApply$LWS$1(substituteDistortedCallee$LWS(root$LWS, target$LWS), thisArg$LWS, argsArray$LWS == null ? [] : argsArray$LWS);
+    }];
+  };
+}
+
+// W-22602807: distort an iframe contentWindow realm's Reflect.construct.
+// See Function/cross-realm-invocation.ts for the threat model.
+//
+// Construct semantics (not call): the callee is the FIRST ARGUMENT and is
+// invoked as a constructor. Substitute it for its distorted counterpart, then
+// construct with the sandbox-realm Reflect.construct, preserving the optional
+// newTarget argument.
+function initDistortionReflectConstruct$LWS({
+  globalObject: {
+    Reflect: {
+      construct: originalReflectConstruct$LWS
+    }
+  }
+}) {
+  return function distortionReflectConstruct$LWS({
+    globalObject: globalObject$LWS,
+    root: root$LWS
+  }) {
+    if (!getDistortableFrameElement$LWS(globalObject$LWS)) {
+      return undefined;
+    }
+    return [originalReflectConstruct$LWS, function construct$LWS(target$LWS, argsArray$LWS, newTarget$LWS) {
+      const substituted$LWS = substituteDistortedCallee$LWS(root$LWS, target$LWS);
+      if (arguments.length > 2) {
+        return ReflectConstruct$LWS(substituted$LWS, argsArray$LWS == null ? [] : argsArray$LWS, newTarget$LWS);
+      }
+      return ReflectConstruct$LWS(substituted$LWS, argsArray$LWS == null ? [] : argsArray$LWS);
+    }];
+  };
+}
 function initDistortionReportingObserverCtor$LWS({
   globalObject: {
     ReportingObserver: originalReportingObserverCtor$LWS
@@ -12287,7 +12552,7 @@ function createDistortionStorageFactoryInitializer$LWS(storageName$LWS) {
     try {
       originalStorageObject$LWS = globalObject$LWS[storageName$LWS];
       // eslint-disable-next-line no-empty
-    } catch (_unused3$LWS) {}
+    } catch (_unused4$LWS) {}
     // istanbul ignore if: currently unreachable via tests
     if (!isObject$LWS$1(originalStorageObject$LWS)) {
       return noop$LWS$1;
@@ -12713,7 +12978,7 @@ function initDistortionTrustedTypePolicyFactoryCreatePolicy$LWS({
     try {
       // istanbul ignore next: needs default platform behavior test
       return ReflectApply$LWS$1(originalCreatePolicy$LWS, this, args$LWS);
-    } catch (_unused4$LWS) {
+    } catch (_unused5$LWS) {
       // istanbul ignore next: this is tested, but currently cannot be tested in the coverage environment
       consoleWarn$LWS(`${createTrustedTypesExceptionMessage$LWS(name$LWS)} Substituting with Lightning Web Security policy.`);
     }
@@ -12786,7 +13051,7 @@ function initDistortionURLCreateObjectURL$LWS({
         ReflectApply$LWS$1(XhrProtoOpen$LWS, xhr$LWS, ['GET', outURL$LWS, false]);
         try {
           ReflectApply$LWS$1(XhrProtoSend$LWS, xhr$LWS, []);
-        } catch (_unused5$LWS) {
+        } catch (_unused6$LWS) {
           throw new LockerSecurityError$LWS(`Unable to verify ${toSafeTemplateStringValue$LWS(blobObject$LWS)} is secure.`);
         }
         const responseText$LWS = ReflectApply$LWS$1(XhrProtoResponseTextGetter$LWS, xhr$LWS, []);
@@ -13573,7 +13838,7 @@ initDistortionDOMTokenListAdd$LWS, initDistortionDOMTokenListReplace$LWS, initDi
 // Element
 initDistortionElementAttributesGetter$LWS, initDistortionElementGetInnerHTML$LWS, initDistortionElementInnerHTMLGetter$LWS, initDistortionElementOuterHTMLGetter$LWS, initDistortionElementRemove$LWS, initDistortionElementRemoveAttribute$LWS, initDistortionElementRemoveAttributeNS$LWS, initDistortionElementRemoveAttributeNode$LWS, initDistortionElementReplaceChildren$LWS, initDistortionElementReplaceWith$LWS,
 // Function
-initDistortionFunction$LWS,
+initDistortionFunction$LWS, initDistortionFunctionApply$LWS, initDistortionFunctionBind$LWS, initDistortionFunctionCall$LWS,
 // History
 initDistortionHistoryPushState$LWS, initDistortionHistoryReplaceState$LWS,
 // HTMLElement
@@ -13626,6 +13891,8 @@ initDistortionPromiseAll$LWS, initDistortionPromiseAllSettled$LWS, initDistortio
 initDistortionNotificationCtor$LWS,
 // Range
 initDistortionRangeCloneContents$LWS, initDistortionRangeCloneRange$LWS, initDistortionRangeDeleteContents$LWS, initDistortionRangeExtractContents$LWS, initDistortionRangeGetBoundingClientRect$LWS, initDistortionRangeInsertNode$LWS, initDistortionRangeSelectNode$LWS, initDistortionRangeSelectNodeContents$LWS, initDistortionRangeSetEnd$LWS, initDistortionRangeSetEndAfter$LWS, initDistortionRangeSetEndBefore$LWS, initDistortionRangeSetStart$LWS, initDistortionRangeSetStartAfter$LWS, initDistortionRangeSetStartBefore$LWS, initDistortionRangeSurroundContents$LWS, initDistortionRangeToString$LWS,
+// Reflect
+initDistortionReflectApply$LWS, initDistortionReflectConstruct$LWS,
 // Selection
 initDistortionSelectionAnchorNodeGetter$LWS, initDistortionSelectionCollapse$LWS, initDistortionSelectionExtend$LWS, initDistortionSelectionFocusNodeGetter$LWS, initDistortionSelectionSelectAllChildren$LWS, initDistortionSelectionSetBaseAndExtent$LWS, initDistortionSelectionSetPosition$LWS, initDistortionSelectionToString$LWS,
 // ServiceWorkerContainer
@@ -13678,7 +13945,7 @@ initDistortionEventComposedPath$LWS, initDistortionEventPathGetter$LWS,
 // EventTarget
 initDistortionEventTargetAddEventListener$LWS, initDistortionEventTargetDispatchEvent$LWS,
 // HTMLAnchorElement
-initDistortionHTMLAnchorElementHrefSetter$LWS,
+initDistortionHTMLAnchorElementHrefSetter$LWS, initDistortionHTMLAnchorElementProtocolSetter$LWS,
 // HTMLBaseElement
 initDistortionHTMLBaseElementHrefSetter$LWS,
 // HTMLBodyElement
@@ -13751,7 +14018,7 @@ const SVGElementProtoBlockedProperties$LWS = ['nonce'];
 const UIEventProtoBlockedProperties$LWS = ['rangeParent'];
 const WindowBlockedProperties$LWS = ['find', 'requestFileSystem', 'webkitRequestFileSystem'];
 const XSLTProcessorProtoBlockedProperties$LWS = ['transformToDocument', 'transformToFragment'];
-/*! version: 0.28.2 */
+/*! version: 0.28.3 */
 
 /*!
  * Copyright (C) 2021 salesforce.com, inc.
@@ -13760,7 +14027,7 @@ let pdpSchema$LWS;
 function getPdpSchema$LWS() {
   return pdpSchema$LWS;
 }
-/*! version: 0.28.2 */
+/*! version: 0.28.3 */
 
 /*!
  * Copyright (C) 2019 salesforce.com, inc.
@@ -19154,7 +19421,7 @@ function toSourceText$LWS(value$LWS, sourceType$LWS) {
   // tools from mistaking the regexp or the replacement string for an
   // actual source mapping URL.
   /\/\/# sandbox(?=MappingURL=.*?\s*$)/, '//# source']);
-  sourceText$LWS = `\n//# LWS Version = "0.28.2"\n${sourceText$LWS}`;
+  sourceText$LWS = `\n//# LWS Version = "0.28.3"\n${sourceText$LWS}`;
   return sourceType$LWS === 1 /* SourceType.Module */ && indexOfPragma$LWS(sourceText$LWS, 'use strict') === -1 ?
   // Append "'use strict'" to the extracted function body so it is
   // evaluated in strict mode.
@@ -19988,7 +20255,7 @@ function wrapPlatformResourceLoader$LWS(dep$LWS, key$LWS) {
   depRegistry$LWS.set(dep$LWS, secureDep$LWS);
   return secureDep$LWS;
 }
-/*! version: 0.28.2 */
+/*! version: 0.28.3 */
 
 export { $LWS, CORE_SANDBOX_KEY$LWS as CORE_SANDBOX_KEY, createRootWindowSandboxRecord$LWS as createRootWindowSandboxRecord, evaluateFunction$LWS as evaluateFunction, evaluateInCoreSandbox$LWS as evaluateInCoreSandbox, evaluateInSandbox$LWS as evaluateInSandbox, trusted, wrapDependency$LWS as wrapDependency };
 //# sourceMappingURL=lockerSandbox.js.map

package/package.json

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
     "publishConfig": {
         "access": "public"
     },
-    "version": "0.23.6",
+    "version": "0.23.7",
     "homepage": "https://developer.salesforce.com/docs/platform/lwr/overview",
     "repository": {
         "type": "git",
@@ -33,11 +33,11 @@
         "build:minify": "node scripts/minify-bundles.mjs"
     },
     "dependencies": {
-        "@locker/sandbox": "0.28.2",
-        "@lwrjs/shared-utils": "0.23.6"
+        "@locker/sandbox": "0.28.3",
+        "@lwrjs/shared-utils": "0.23.7"
     },
     "devDependencies": {
-        "@lwrjs/types": "0.23.6",
+        "@lwrjs/types": "0.23.7",
         "@rollup/plugin-node-resolve": "^15.2.3",
         "@rollup/plugin-sucrase": "^5.1.0",
         "@rollup/plugin-terser": "^0.4.4",
@@ -70,5 +70,5 @@
     "volta": {
         "extends": "../../../package.json"
     },
-    "gitHead": "39e89890152606679168b0e6beb972e0b1aa47ba"
+    "gitHead": "0d3feeddda81c7d6c6e6165fcb97654aa925bcea"
 }