@lunora/auth 1.0.0-alpha.2 → 1.0.0-alpha.21

package/dist/packem_shared/create-auth.d-Mwhb4gSc.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+import { betterAuth, BetterAuthOptions } from 'better-auth';
+/**
+* Lunora's options pass straight through to better-auth — the only thing we add
+* is requiring `secret` up front so a misconfigured deployment fails loudly
+* instead of at the first sign-in.
+*
+* For `database`, prefer `lunoraD1Adapter` (`database: lunoraD1Adapter(env.DB)`)
+* over passing the raw `env.DB`. better-auth *does* accept a D1Database directly,
+* but it then resolves its Kysely adapter via a runtime `await import(...)` inside
+* `auth.$context` — and that import never settles under `@cloudflare/vite-plugin`'s
+* worker runner, hanging every auth request in `pnpm dev`. The explicit adapter
+* skips it, so dev and prod behave the same. (Raw `env.DB` is still correct for
+* the migration-only instance — see `lunoraD1Adapter`'s note.)
+*
+* Session rotation / richer session policies are configured via the `session`
+* field (a `SessionPolicy`); Lunora validates it for obviously-broken
+* durations and forwards it verbatim to better-auth. See `sessionPresets`
+* for ready-made rotation/expiry trade-offs.
+*
+* ## Serverless background tasks (Cloudflare Workers)
+*
+* better-auth runs some work *after* sending the response — most importantly the
+* password-reset email, whose background send is what keeps reset responses
+* constant-time (a timing-attack defence: the response doesn't reveal whether
+* the account exists). On Cloudflare Workers a promise that isn't handed to
+* `ctx.waitUntil` can be cancelled the moment the response returns, dropping
+* that send and weakening the guarantee. Wire your request's `ctx.waitUntil`
+* into better-auth's background handler so the work survives:
+*
+* ```ts
+* // in your worker fetch handler, where `ctx: ExecutionContext` is in scope
+* const auth = createAuth({
+*     secret: env.AUTH_SECRET,
+*     database: lunoraD1Adapter(env.DB),
+*     advanced: {
+*         backgroundTasks: { handler: (promise) => ctx.waitUntil(promise) },
+*     },
+* });
+* ```
+*
+* (Lunora can't set this for you — `ctx.waitUntil` is per-request, but
+* `createAuth` runs once at worker setup.)
+*/
+type LunoraAuthOptions = BetterAuthOptions;
+/**
+* The full better-auth instance: `auth.handler` accepts a `Request` and
+* returns a `Response` (used by `handleAuthRequest`); `auth.api`
+* exposes the typed endpoint surface for server-side calls (e.g.
+* `auth.api.getSession({ headers })` inside a query/mutation).
+*/
+type LunoraAuth = ReturnType<typeof betterAuth>;
+/**
+* Resolve the caller's options into the exact shape `createAuth` hands to
+* `betterAuth` — the hardened, default-filled options the running worker uses.
+* Exported (and pure) so the migration path can compile the schema from the
+* same resolved options: `compileMigrationsSql` routes through here, so the
+* `rateLimit` table the worker's durable limiter writes to is included in the
+* migration rather than silently omitted (it would be, if migrations saw the
+* raw options while the worker ran the resolved ones).
+*
+* ## What it fills (each gated independently on caller silence)
+*
+* Secure-by-default cookies + secret-strength warning via {@link hardenAuthOptions},
+* applied first so all hardening composes onto one options object.
+*
+* Rate limiting is ON by default for `/api/auth/*`.
+*
+* better-auth's own default is `rateLimit.enabled ?? isProduction`, and its
+* `isProduction` is `"development" === "production"` resolved at
+* module-load time. On Cloudflare Workers that check is unreliable: the
+* runtime has no Node `process.env` (absent entirely without
+* `nodejs_compat`, and even with it `NODE_ENV` is rarely `"production"` at
+* request time). So better-auth would silently leave auth endpoints
+* _unthrottled_ on a real deployment — the surprise we refuse to ship.
+*
+* We therefore default `enabled: true` whenever the caller hasn't made an
+* explicit choice. We only fill the `enabled` flag and otherwise forward
+* the caller's `rateLimit` verbatim, so better-auth's `window` (10s) / `max`
+* (100) defaults and any custom rules still apply. Callers who genuinely
+* want it off can pass `rateLimit: { enabled: false }` (e.g. when fronting
+* auth with their own limiter), and any explicit `enabled` value wins.
+*
+* We also default `storage: "database"` — but only when rate limiting is not
+* explicitly disabled (`enabled !== false`). Filling storage under a disabled
+* limiter is harmless at runtime but makes `getAuthTables` emit an unused
+* `rateLimit` table, so we skip it there.
+*
+* better-auth's own default is `storage: "memory"` — a per-isolate,
+* non-durable counter. On Cloudflare Workers that means each isolate keeps
+* its own tally, counters vanish on isolate recycle, and traffic spread
+* across isolates never sums to the configured `max` — a limiter that
+* reports "enabled" while never enforcing a global limit (the exact
+* brute-force / credential-stuffing protection on `/sign-in`, OTP, and
+* password-reset it is meant to buy). `storage: "database"` rides the counter
+* through the configured `database` adapter — Lunora's store over the D1 auth
+* tables — so the limit is durable *and* atomic (the store's native
+* `incrementOne` gives a one-winner guarantee across isolates). Callers with
+* their own durable store can pass an explicit `rateLimit: { storage: … }`
+* (or `customStorage`), and any explicit value wins.
+*
+* Session cookie cache is ON by default too.
+*
+* Every authenticated call resolves identity through better-auth's
+* `getSession`, which — without a cache — is a DB (D1) read on the hot path
+* of every query/mutation/action that reads `ctx.auth` and of the WebSocket
+* upgrade. better-auth's `session.cookieCache` carries the session payload in
+* a short-lived signed cookie so `getSession` can answer without hitting the
+* database until the cache window elapses. We default it on with a
+* deliberately short 60s `maxAge` (better-auth's own default is 300s): long
+* enough to erase the per-request read for a burst of calls, short enough
+* that a revoked or role-changed session self-corrects within a minute.
+* The one tradeoff — a revoked session stays valid until the cache expires —
+* is bounded by that TTL; callers who need immediate revocation opt out with
+* `session: { cookieCache: { enabled: false } }` (or the `strict` preset).
+*
+* Every explicit caller value is forwarded verbatim. The two `rateLimit` fills
+* merge into a single `rateLimit` object so neither clobbers the other.
+*/
+declare const resolveAuthOptions: (options: LunoraAuthOptions) => LunoraAuthOptions;
+/**
+* Create the auth instance. Thin wrapper around `betterAuth` that enforces
+* the `secret` requirement at construction time so misconfigured deployments
+* fail loudly at the first fetch rather than the first sign-in attempt, then
+* hands {@link resolveAuthOptions}'s hardened, default-filled options to
+* better-auth.
+*/
+declare const createAuth: (options: LunoraAuthOptions) => LunoraAuth;
+export { LunoraAuth as L, LunoraAuthOptions as a, createAuth as c, resolveAuthOptions as r };

package/dist/packem_shared/{createAuth-B-tvsvQU.mjs → createAuth-BVMMllTm.mjs}

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
+import { LunoraError } from '@lunora/errors';
 import { betterAuth } from 'better-auth';
-import { validateSessionPolicy } from './sessionPresets-B95rXrd8.mjs';
+import { validateSessionPolicy } from './sessionPresets-Dwwd74_J.mjs';
 
 const MIN_SECRET_LENGTH = 32;
 const isWeakSecret = (secret) => {
@@ -21,11 +22,26 @@ const isHttpsBaseUrl = (baseURL) => {
   }
   return false;
 };
+const isExplicitHttpBaseUrl = (baseURL) => {
+  if (typeof baseURL === "string") {
+    return baseURL.toLowerCase().startsWith("http://");
+  }
+  if (baseURL && typeof baseURL === "object") {
+    if (baseURL.protocol === "http") {
+      return true;
+    }
+    if (baseURL.protocol === "https") {
+      return false;
+    }
+    return typeof baseURL.fallback === "string" && baseURL.fallback.toLowerCase().startsWith("http://");
+  }
+  return false;
+};
 const hardenAuthOptions = (options) => {
   if (isWeakSecret(options.secret)) {
     const message = `@lunora/auth: AUTH_SECRET is only ${String(options.secret?.trim().length)} characters. Use at least ${String(MIN_SECRET_LENGTH)} for a brute-force-resistant secret — generate one with \`openssl rand -hex 32\`.`;
     if (isHttpsBaseUrl(options.baseURL)) {
-      throw new Error(message);
+      throw new LunoraError("INTERNAL", message);
     }
     console.warn(message);
   }
@@ -35,22 +51,37 @@ const hardenAuthOptions = (options) => {
     advanced: {
       ...advanced,
       defaultCookieAttributes: advanced.defaultCookieAttributes ?? { httpOnly: true, path: "/", sameSite: "lax" },
-      ...advanced.useSecureCookies === void 0 && isHttpsBaseUrl(options.baseURL) ? { useSecureCookies: true } : {}
+      ...advanced.useSecureCookies === void 0 ? { useSecureCookies: !isExplicitHttpBaseUrl(options.baseURL) } : {}
     }
   };
 };
+const resolveAuthOptions = (options) => {
+  const hardened = hardenAuthOptions(options);
+  const needsRateLimitEnabled = hardened.rateLimit?.enabled === void 0;
+  const needsRateLimitStorage = hardened.rateLimit?.storage === void 0 && hardened.rateLimit?.enabled !== false;
+  return {
+    ...hardened,
+    ...needsRateLimitEnabled || needsRateLimitStorage ? {
+      rateLimit: {
+        ...hardened.rateLimit,
+        ...needsRateLimitEnabled ? { enabled: true } : {},
+        ...needsRateLimitStorage ? { storage: "database" } : {}
+      }
+    } : {},
+    ...hardened.session?.cookieCache === void 0 ? { session: { ...hardened.session, cookieCache: { enabled: true, maxAge: 60 } } } : {}
+  };
+};
 const createAuth = (options) => {
   if (!options.secret || options.secret.trim() === "") {
-    throw new Error(
+    throw new LunoraError(
+      "INTERNAL",
       '@lunora/auth: `secret` is required. Set AUTH_SECRET locally in .dev.vars (`lunora env set AUTH_SECRET "$(openssl rand -hex 32)"`), and in production with `wrangler secret put AUTH_SECRET`.'
     );
   }
   if (options.session) {
     validateSessionPolicy(options.session);
   }
-  const hardened = hardenAuthOptions(options);
-  const resolvedOptions = hardened.rateLimit?.enabled === void 0 ? { ...hardened, rateLimit: { ...hardened.rateLimit, enabled: true } } : hardened;
-  return betterAuth(resolvedOptions);
+  return betterAuth(resolveAuthOptions(options));
 };
 
-export { createAuth };
+export { createAuth, resolveAuthOptions };

package/dist/packem_shared/{sessionPresets-B95rXrd8.mjs → sessionPresets-Dwwd74_J.mjs}

@@ -16,16 +16,19 @@ const validateSessionPolicy = (policy) => {
 };
 const sessionPresets = {
   longLived: {
+    cookieCache: { enabled: true, maxAge: 60 },
     expiresIn: 30 * DAY,
     freshAge: DAY,
     updateAge: DAY
   },
   rolling: {
+    cookieCache: { enabled: true, maxAge: 60 },
     expiresIn: 7 * DAY,
     freshAge: DAY,
     updateAge: DAY
   },
   strict: {
+    cookieCache: { enabled: false },
     expiresIn: HOUR,
     freshAge: 5 * MINUTE,
     updateAge: 15 * MINUTE

package/dist/schema.d.mts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 import { TableDefinition } from '@lunora/server';
-import { a as LunoraAuthOptions } from "./packem_shared/create-auth.d-M36jwG_Y.mjs";
+import { a as LunoraAuthOptions } from "./packem_shared/create-auth.d-Mwhb4gSc.mjs";
 import 'better-auth';
 /**
 * Derive Lunora table definitions from a better-auth config — the bridge that

package/dist/schema.d.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 import { TableDefinition } from '@lunora/server';
-import { a as LunoraAuthOptions } from "./packem_shared/create-auth.d-M36jwG_Y.js";
+import { a as LunoraAuthOptions } from "./packem_shared/create-auth.d-Mwhb4gSc.js";
 import 'better-auth';
 /**
 * Derive Lunora table definitions from a better-auth config — the bridge that

package/dist/sql-store.mjs

@@ -111,6 +111,28 @@ const createSqlAuthStore = (executor) => {
       );
       return { ...data };
     },
+    incrementOne: async (model, where, increment, set) => {
+      const table = quoteId(model);
+      const incrementColumns = Object.keys(increment);
+      const setColumns = set ? Object.keys(set) : [];
+      const fragment = compileWhere(where);
+      if (incrementColumns.length === 0 && setColumns.length === 0) {
+        const [row2] = await executor.all(`SELECT * FROM ${table}${whereSuffix(fragment)} LIMIT 1`, fragment.params);
+        return row2;
+      }
+      const assignments = [
+        // COALESCE(col, 0) so a NULL counter advances from 0 rather than staying
+        // NULL (`NULL + ? = NULL` in SQLite/D1) — matches the memory store, which
+        // treats a non-numeric/absent counter as 0.
+        ...incrementColumns.map((column) => `${quoteId(column)} = COALESCE(${quoteId(column)}, 0) + ?`),
+        ...setColumns.map((column) => `${quoteId(column)} = ?`)
+      ].join(", ");
+      const [row] = await executor.all(
+        `UPDATE ${table} SET ${assignments} WHERE rowid IN (SELECT rowid FROM ${table}${whereSuffix(fragment)} LIMIT 1) RETURNING *`,
+        [...incrementColumns.map((column) => increment[column]), ...setColumns.map((column) => set[column]), ...fragment.params]
+      );
+      return row;
+    },
     read: async (model, query) => {
       const fragment = compileWhere(query.where);
       const parameters = [...fragment.params];

package/dist/store.d.mts

@@ -43,6 +43,24 @@ interface AuthStore {
   count: (model: string, where: ReadonlyArray<AuthWhereClause>) => Promise<number>;
   /** Insert `data` into `model`; return the stored row (the adapter pre-fills `id`). */
   create: (model: string, data: AuthRow) => Promise<AuthRow>;
+  /**
+  * Atomically apply signed numeric deltas to **at most one** row in `model`
+  * matching `where`, then return the updated row (or `undefined` if the guard
+  * matched none). For each `increment` entry it applies `field = field + delta`
+  * (a negative delta decrements); the optional `set` map assigns absolute
+  * values in the same step. The `where` clause is both selector **and** guard
+  * — comparison operators are honoured, so a guard like
+  * `{ field: "count", operator: "lt", value: max }` only mutates the row while
+  * it still satisfies the predicate.
+  *
+  * Backs better-auth's durable (`storage: "database"`) rate limiter, whose
+  * counter rides these tables. Implementing it natively — one statement that
+  * guards, increments, and returns — gives the **one-winner-across-isolates**
+  * guarantee the read-then-update fallback cannot: on Workers two concurrent
+  * requests would otherwise both read `count=4` and both write `5`, letting a
+  * `max` of 5 pass 6+. Same race-closing rationale as {@link AuthStore.consumeOne}.
+  */
+  incrementOne: (model: string, where: ReadonlyArray<AuthWhereClause>, increment: Record<string, number>, set?: AuthRow) => Promise<AuthRow | undefined>;
   /** Read rows from `model` honouring the filter/sort/window in `query`. */
   read: (model: string, query: AuthQuery) => Promise<AuthRow[]>;
   /** Delete rows in `model` matching `where`; return how many were removed. */

package/dist/store.d.ts

@@ -43,6 +43,24 @@ interface AuthStore {
   count: (model: string, where: ReadonlyArray<AuthWhereClause>) => Promise<number>;
   /** Insert `data` into `model`; return the stored row (the adapter pre-fills `id`). */
   create: (model: string, data: AuthRow) => Promise<AuthRow>;
+  /**
+  * Atomically apply signed numeric deltas to **at most one** row in `model`
+  * matching `where`, then return the updated row (or `undefined` if the guard
+  * matched none). For each `increment` entry it applies `field = field + delta`
+  * (a negative delta decrements); the optional `set` map assigns absolute
+  * values in the same step. The `where` clause is both selector **and** guard
+  * — comparison operators are honoured, so a guard like
+  * `{ field: "count", operator: "lt", value: max }` only mutates the row while
+  * it still satisfies the predicate.
+  *
+  * Backs better-auth's durable (`storage: "database"`) rate limiter, whose
+  * counter rides these tables. Implementing it natively — one statement that
+  * guards, increments, and returns — gives the **one-winner-across-isolates**
+  * guarantee the read-then-update fallback cannot: on Workers two concurrent
+  * requests would otherwise both read `count=4` and both write `5`, letting a
+  * `max` of 5 pass 6+. Same race-closing rationale as {@link AuthStore.consumeOne}.
+  */
+  incrementOne: (model: string, where: ReadonlyArray<AuthWhereClause>, increment: Record<string, number>, set?: AuthRow) => Promise<AuthRow | undefined>;
   /** Read rows from `model` honouring the filter/sort/window in `query`. */
   read: (model: string, query: AuthQuery) => Promise<AuthRow[]>;
   /** Delete rows in `model` matching `where`; return how many were removed. */

package/dist/store.mjs

@@ -128,6 +128,19 @@ const createMemoryAuthStore = () => {
       tableOf(model).push(row);
       return Promise.resolve({ ...row });
     },
+    incrementOne: (model, where, increment, set) => {
+      const row = tableOf(model).find((candidate) => matchesWhere(candidate, where));
+      if (!row) {
+        return Promise.resolve(void 0);
+      }
+      for (const [field, delta] of Object.entries(increment)) {
+        row[field] = (typeof row[field] === "number" ? row[field] : 0) + delta;
+      }
+      if (set) {
+        Object.assign(row, set);
+      }
+      return Promise.resolve({ ...row });
+    },
     read: (model, query) => {
       let rows = tableOf(model).filter((row) => matchesWhere(row, query.where));
       if (query.sortBy) {

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@lunora/auth",
-  "version": "1.0.0-alpha.2",
+  "version": "1.0.0-alpha.21",
   "description": "Auth for Lunora — a thin better-auth wrapper: email/password, OAuth, plugins, D1-backed",
   "keywords": [
     "auth",
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
     "directory": "packages/auth"
   },
   "files": [
-    "dist",
+    "./dist",
     "__assets__",
     "README.md",
     "LICENSE.md"
@@ -82,10 +82,11 @@
     "access": "public"
   },
   "dependencies": {
-    "@better-auth/passkey": "^1.6.19",
-    "@lunora/server": "1.0.0-alpha.1",
-    "@lunora/values": "1.0.0-alpha.1",
-    "better-auth": "^1.6.19"
+    "@better-auth/passkey": "^1.6.23",
+    "@lunora/errors": "1.0.0-alpha.1",
+    "@lunora/server": "1.0.0-alpha.16",
+    "@lunora/values": "1.0.0-alpha.4",
+    "better-auth": "^1.6.23"
   },
   "engines": {
     "node": "^22.15.0 || >=24.11.0"

package/dist/packem_shared/LunoraAuthAdminError-BxrfEeA_.mjs

@@ -1,249 +0,0 @@
-class LunoraAuthAdminError extends Error {
-  code;
-  constructor(message, code) {
-    super(message);
-    this.name = "LunoraAuthAdminError";
-    this.code = code;
-  }
-}
-const DEFAULT_LIMIT = 50;
-const MAX_LIMIT = 500;
-const DEFAULT_IMPERSONATION_SECONDS = 3600;
-const MAX_IMPERSONATION_SECONDS = DEFAULT_IMPERSONATION_SECONDS * 24;
-const MAX_BAN_SECONDS = 100 * 365 * 24 * 60 * 60;
-const SENSITIVE_FIELDS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["accessToken", "backupCodes", "idToken", "password", "publicKey", "refreshToken", "secret", "token"]);
-const clampLimit = (limit) => Math.min(Math.max(Math.trunc(limit ?? DEFAULT_LIMIT), 1), MAX_LIMIT);
-const clampOffset = (offset) => Math.max(0, Math.trunc(offset ?? 0));
-const normalizeRow = (row) => {
-  const out = {};
-  for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(row)) {
-    if (SENSITIVE_FIELDS.has(key)) {
-      continue;
-    }
-    out[key] = value instanceof Date ? value.getTime() : value;
-  }
-  return out;
-};
-const serializeRole = (role) => Array.isArray(role) ? role.join(",") : role;
-const asAdminError = (error) => {
-  if (error instanceof LunoraAuthAdminError) {
-    return error;
-  }
-  const candidate = error;
-  const code = candidate?.body?.code ?? candidate?.code ?? "AUTH_ADMIN_ERROR";
-  const message = candidate?.body?.message ?? candidate?.message ?? "auth admin operation failed";
-  return new LunoraAuthAdminError(message, code);
-};
-const createAuthAdmin = (auth, options = {}) => {
-  const context = auth.$context;
-  const features = options.features ?? {};
-  const withContext = async (function_) => {
-    try {
-      return await function_(await context);
-    } catch (error) {
-      throw asAdminError(error);
-    }
-  };
-  const toUser = (row) => normalizeRow(row);
-  const page = async (context_, model, options_) => {
-    const where = options_.where && options_.where.length > 0 ? options_.where : void 0;
-    const [rows, total] = await Promise.all([
-      context_.adapter.findMany({
-        limit: clampLimit(options_.limit),
-        model,
-        offset: clampOffset(options_.offset),
-        sortBy: options_.sortBy,
-        where
-      }),
-      context_.adapter.count({ model, where })
-    ]);
-    return { rows: rows.map((row) => normalizeRow(row)), total };
-  };
-  return {
-    banUser: ({ expiresInSeconds, reason, userId }) => withContext(async (context_) => {
-      const seconds = typeof expiresInSeconds === "number" && Number.isFinite(expiresInSeconds) ? Math.min(Math.trunc(expiresInSeconds), MAX_BAN_SECONDS) : 0;
-      const banExpires = seconds > 0 ? new Date(Date.now() + seconds * 1e3) : void 0;
-      const user = await context_.internalAdapter.updateUser(userId, {
-        banExpires,
-        banned: true,
-        banReason: reason ?? "No reason"
-      });
-      await context_.internalAdapter.deleteUserSessions(userId);
-      return toUser(user);
-    }),
-    cancelInvitation: ({ invitationId }) => withContext(async (context_) => {
-      await context_.adapter.delete({ model: "invitation", where: [{ field: "id", value: invitationId }] });
-    }),
-    capabilities: () => withContext((context_) => {
-      const ids = new Set((context_.options.plugins ?? []).map((plugin) => plugin.id));
-      const has = (id) => ids.has(id);
-      return Promise.resolve({
-        accounts: features.accounts ?? true,
-        admin: features.admin ?? has("admin"),
-        organization: features.organization ?? has("organization"),
-        passkey: features.passkey ?? has("passkey"),
-        twoFactor: features.twoFactor ?? has("two-factor")
-      });
-    }),
-    // The one op that genuinely builds a row rather than mutating one. Replicates
-    // the plugin's create-user handler over `internalAdapter` (lowercase + dedupe
-    // email, create the row, then link a credential account when a password is given).
-    createUser: ({ data, email, name, password, role }) => withContext(async (context_) => {
-      const normalizedEmail = email.toLowerCase();
-      if (await context_.internalAdapter.findUserByEmail(normalizedEmail)) {
-        throw new LunoraAuthAdminError("a user with this email already exists", "USER_ALREADY_EXISTS");
-      }
-      const user = await context_.internalAdapter.createUser({
-        email: normalizedEmail,
-        name,
-        role: role === void 0 ? void 0 : serializeRole(role),
-        ...data
-      });
-      if (password !== void 0 && password !== "") {
-        const hashed = await context_.password.hash(password);
-        await context_.internalAdapter.linkAccount({
-          accountId: user.id,
-          password: hashed,
-          providerId: "credential",
-          userId: user.id
-        });
-      }
-      return toUser(user);
-    }),
-    deletePasskey: ({ passkeyId }) => withContext(async (context_) => {
-      await context_.adapter.delete({ model: "passkey", where: [{ field: "id", value: passkeyId }] });
-    }),
-    disableTwoFactor: ({ userId }) => withContext(async (context_) => {
-      await context_.adapter.deleteMany({ model: "twoFactor", where: [{ field: "userId", value: userId }] });
-      await context_.internalAdapter.updateUser(userId, { twoFactorEnabled: false });
-    }),
-    impersonateUser: ({ userId }) => withContext(async (context_) => {
-      const user = await context_.internalAdapter.findUserById(userId);
-      if (!user) {
-        throw new LunoraAuthAdminError("user not found", "USER_NOT_FOUND");
-      }
-      const rawSeconds = options.impersonationSeconds;
-      let ttlSeconds = DEFAULT_IMPERSONATION_SECONDS;
-      if (rawSeconds !== void 0) {
-        if (!Number.isInteger(rawSeconds) || !Number.isFinite(rawSeconds) || rawSeconds <= 0) {
-          throw new LunoraAuthAdminError("impersonationSeconds must be a positive finite integer", "INVALID_IMPERSONATION_SECONDS");
-        }
-        ttlSeconds = Math.min(rawSeconds, MAX_IMPERSONATION_SECONDS);
-      }
-      const expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + ttlSeconds * 1e3);
-      const session = await context_.internalAdapter.createSession(
-        userId,
-        true,
-        { expiresAt, impersonatedBy: options.impersonatedBy ?? userId },
-        true
-      );
-      return {
-        expiresAt: session.expiresAt instanceof Date ? session.expiresAt.getTime() : expiresAt.getTime(),
-        token: session.token,
-        user: toUser(user)
-      };
-    }),
-    listAccounts: ({ userId }) => withContext(async (context_) => {
-      const rows = await context_.adapter.findMany({ model: "account", where: [{ field: "userId", value: userId }] });
-      return rows.map((row) => normalizeRow(row));
-    }),
-    listInvitations: ({ limit, offset, organizationId }) => withContext(
-      (context_) => page(context_, "invitation", {
-        limit,
-        offset,
-        where: [{ field: "organizationId", value: organizationId }]
-      })
-    ),
-    listMembers: ({ limit, offset, organizationId }) => withContext(
-      (context_) => page(context_, "member", {
-        limit,
-        offset,
-        sortBy: { direction: "desc", field: "createdAt" },
-        where: [{ field: "organizationId", value: organizationId }]
-      })
-    ),
-    listOrganizations: ({ limit, offset }) => withContext((context_) => page(context_, "organization", { limit, offset, sortBy: { direction: "desc", field: "createdAt" } })),
-    listPasskeys: ({ userId }) => withContext(async (context_) => {
-      const rows = await context_.adapter.findMany({ model: "passkey", where: [{ field: "userId", value: userId }] });
-      return rows.map((row) => normalizeRow(row));
-    }),
-    listSessions: ({ limit, offset, userId }) => withContext(
-      (context_) => page(context_, "session", {
-        limit,
-        offset,
-        sortBy: { direction: "desc", field: "createdAt" },
-        where: userId === void 0 || userId === "" ? void 0 : [{ field: "userId", value: userId }]
-      })
-    ),
-    listUsers: ({ filterField, filterValue, limit, offset, search, searchField, sortBy, sortDirection }) => withContext((context_) => {
-      const where = [];
-      if (search !== void 0 && search !== "") {
-        where.push({ field: searchField ?? "email", operator: "contains", value: search });
-      }
-      if (filterValue !== void 0) {
-        where.push({ field: filterField ?? "email", operator: "eq", value: filterValue });
-      }
-      return page(context_, "user", {
-        limit,
-        offset,
-        sortBy: { direction: sortDirection ?? "desc", field: sortBy ?? "createdAt" },
-        where
-      });
-    }),
-    removeMember: ({ memberId }) => withContext(async (context_) => {
-      await context_.adapter.delete({ model: "member", where: [{ field: "id", value: memberId }] });
-    }),
-    removeUser: ({ userId }) => withContext(async (context_) => {
-      await context_.internalAdapter.deleteUserSessions(userId);
-      await context_.internalAdapter.deleteUser(userId);
-    }),
-    // Keyed on the session *id*, not its token: tokens are bearer credentials we
-    // deliberately never surface to the studio. Resolve the row to recover its
-    // token, then delete via `internalAdapter.deleteSession` — which also clears
-    // secondary (KV) storage, unlike a raw `adapter.delete` on the DB row.
-    revokeUserSession: ({ sessionId }) => withContext(async (context_) => {
-      const session = await context_.adapter.findOne({ model: "session", where: [{ field: "id", value: sessionId }] });
-      if (session?.token) {
-        await context_.internalAdapter.deleteSession(session.token);
-      }
-    }),
-    revokeUserSessions: ({ userId }) => withContext(async (context_) => {
-      await context_.internalAdapter.deleteUserSessions(userId);
-    }),
-    setRole: ({ role, userId }) => withContext(async (context_) => {
-      const user = await context_.internalAdapter.updateUser(userId, { role: serializeRole(role) });
-      return toUser(user);
-    }),
-    setUserPassword: ({ newPassword, userId }) => withContext(async (context_) => {
-      const min = context_.password.config.minPasswordLength;
-      const max = context_.password.config.maxPasswordLength;
-      if (newPassword.length < min) {
-        throw new LunoraAuthAdminError(`password must be at least ${min.toString()} characters`, "PASSWORD_TOO_SHORT");
-      }
-      if (newPassword.length > max) {
-        throw new LunoraAuthAdminError(`password must be at most ${max.toString()} characters`, "PASSWORD_TOO_LONG");
-      }
-      const hashed = await context_.password.hash(newPassword);
-      await context_.internalAdapter.updatePassword(userId, hashed);
-    }),
-    unbanUser: ({ userId }) => withContext(async (context_) => {
-      const user = await context_.internalAdapter.updateUser(userId, { banExpires: null, banned: false, banReason: null });
-      return toUser(user);
-    }),
-    unlinkAccount: ({ accountId, userId }) => withContext(async (context_) => {
-      await context_.adapter.delete({
-        model: "account",
-        where: [
-          { field: "id", value: accountId },
-          { connector: "AND", field: "userId", value: userId }
-        ]
-      });
-    }),
-    updateUser: ({ data, userId }) => withContext(async (context_) => {
-      const user = await context_.internalAdapter.updateUser(userId, data);
-      return toUser(user);
-    })
-  };
-};
-
-export { LunoraAuthAdminError, createAuthAdmin };