@lunora/advisor 1.0.0-alpha.4 → 1.0.0-alpha.41

package/dist/index.mjs

@@ -1,79 +1 @@
-import constraintValidator from './packem_shared/constraintValidator-Dr9Py3FD.mjs';
-import hotShard from './packem_shared/hotShard-Ir5D0B6J.mjs';
-import indexUtilization from './packem_shared/indexUtilization-B5DMQ3bI.mjs';
-import adminRouteWithoutGuard from './packem_shared/adminRouteWithoutGuard-UUGBkAjU.mjs';
-import authApiCallWithoutHeaders from './packem_shared/authApiCallWithoutHeaders-BeJhCZaf.mjs';
-import circularFk from './packem_shared/circularFk-B2freHrP.mjs';
-import containerOversizedInstance from './packem_shared/containerOversizedInstance-5U1VKPRM.mjs';
-import containerPublicInternet from './packem_shared/containerPublicInternet-CuNerJE5.mjs';
-import duplicateIndex from './packem_shared/duplicateIndex-BOublMSt.mjs';
-import emptyIndex from './packem_shared/emptyIndex-BX8EuEY7.mjs';
-import filterWithoutIndex from './packem_shared/filterWithoutIndex-BYVeJaSs.mjs';
-import hardcodedSecret from './packem_shared/hardcodedSecret-W2pz1UZB.mjs';
-import hyperdriveOutsideAction from './packem_shared/hyperdriveOutsideAction-BgZqX7Xg.mjs';
-import indexReferencesUnknownField from './packem_shared/indexReferencesUnknownField-DH0_dbUY.mjs';
-import maskUncoveredPiiColumn from './packem_shared/maskUncoveredPiiColumn-DjGIPG6M.mjs';
-import nondeterministicQueryMutation from './packem_shared/nondeterministicQueryMutation-GXES1fLp.mjs';
-import policyReferencesUnknownTable from './packem_shared/policyReferencesUnknownTable-DtaIEovd.mjs';
-import publicArgumentUsesAny from './packem_shared/publicArgumentUsesAny-C71b2NCf.mjs';
-import publicMutationWithoutRatelimit from './packem_shared/publicMutationWithoutRatelimit-xBpJ6GWK.mjs';
-import r2sqlOutsideAction from './packem_shared/r2sqlOutsideAction-CtqxvMuV.mjs';
-import relationReferencesUnknownField from './packem_shared/relationReferencesUnknownField-YznyXt_7.mjs';
-import relationReferencesUnknownTable from './packem_shared/relationReferencesUnknownTable-DrorpKYe.mjs';
-import rlsUncoveredTable from './packem_shared/rlsUncoveredTable-CxEfZ5eZ.mjs';
-import sqlInjectionRisk from './packem_shared/sqlInjectionRisk-zwytYGLt.mjs';
-import tableWithoutInsert from './packem_shared/tableWithoutInsert-CbbaYIP4.mjs';
-import unboundedStringArgument from './packem_shared/unboundedStringArgument-DThg2-wt.mjs';
-import unindexedForeignKey from './packem_shared/unindexedForeignKey-BgJbKyqK.mjs';
-import unindexedRelationTarget from './packem_shared/unindexedRelationTarget-D6eyj6Xx.mjs';
-import userCreatingMutationWithoutCaptcha from './packem_shared/userCreatingMutationWithoutCaptcha-CH31YsUZ.mjs';
-import workflowUnknownTarget from './packem_shared/workflowUnknownTarget-Cdd7WhKQ.mjs';
-import workflowUnused from './packem_shared/workflowUnused-D0jHxdz9.mjs';
-export { AE_METRIC_EVENTS, loadAnalyticsRuntimeMetrics } from './packem_shared/AE_METRIC_EVENTS-DexctYv6.mjs';
-export { fromServerSchema } from './packem_shared/fromServerSchema-DinF1nph.mjs';
-
-const STATIC_LINTS = [
-  indexReferencesUnknownField,
-  relationReferencesUnknownTable,
-  relationReferencesUnknownField,
-  workflowUnknownTarget,
-  emptyIndex,
-  circularFk,
-  unindexedForeignKey,
-  unindexedRelationTarget,
-  duplicateIndex,
-  tableWithoutInsert,
-  workflowUnused,
-  filterWithoutIndex,
-  nondeterministicQueryMutation,
-  hyperdriveOutsideAction,
-  r2sqlOutsideAction,
-  authApiCallWithoutHeaders,
-  policyReferencesUnknownTable,
-  rlsUncoveredTable,
-  maskUncoveredPiiColumn,
-  containerOversizedInstance,
-  containerPublicInternet,
-  publicMutationWithoutRatelimit,
-  userCreatingMutationWithoutCaptcha,
-  publicArgumentUsesAny,
-  unboundedStringArgument,
-  hardcodedSecret,
-  sqlInjectionRisk,
-  adminRouteWithoutGuard
-];
-const RUNTIME_LINTS = [hotShard, indexUtilization, constraintValidator];
-const ALL_LINTS = [...STATIC_LINTS, ...RUNTIME_LINTS];
-const runAdvisor = (context, options = {}) => {
-  const lints = options.lints ?? ALL_LINTS;
-  const findings = [];
-  for (const lint of lints) {
-    if (options.source !== void 0 && lint.source !== options.source) {
-      continue;
-    }
-    findings.push(...lint.run(context));
-  }
-  return findings;
-};
-
-export { ALL_LINTS, RUNTIME_LINTS, STATIC_LINTS, adminRouteWithoutGuard, authApiCallWithoutHeaders, circularFk, constraintValidator, containerOversizedInstance, containerPublicInternet, duplicateIndex, emptyIndex, filterWithoutIndex, hardcodedSecret, hotShard, hyperdriveOutsideAction, indexReferencesUnknownField, indexUtilization, maskUncoveredPiiColumn, nondeterministicQueryMutation, policyReferencesUnknownTable, publicArgumentUsesAny, publicMutationWithoutRatelimit, r2sqlOutsideAction, relationReferencesUnknownField, relationReferencesUnknownTable, rlsUncoveredTable, runAdvisor, sqlInjectionRisk, tableWithoutInsert, unboundedStringArgument, unindexedForeignKey, unindexedRelationTarget, userCreatingMutationWithoutCaptcha, workflowUnknownTarget, workflowUnused };
+import{dedupeCacheKeys as a}from"./packem_shared/dedupeCacheKeys-7JgxaQWV.mjs";import m from"./packem_shared/constraintValidator-N339mfyx.mjs";import s from"./packem_shared/hotShard-DVs_U17R.mjs";import n from"./packem_shared/indexUtilization-QfbIH_w4.mjs";import p from"./packem_shared/actionFetchSsrf-BbWxy1Yf.mjs";import f from"./packem_shared/adminRouteWithoutGuard-DSo4t9j4.mjs";import l from"./packem_shared/aiRawRunEscapeHatch-DfhjYm43.mjs";import u from"./packem_shared/aiToolSideEffectPromptInjection-DnWQOoKi.mjs";import d from"./packem_shared/aiUnboundedGenerationPublic-D3HZrh5_.mjs";import c from"./packem_shared/allowUnauthenticatedShardAccessEnabled-D4aMNBb0.mjs";import $ from"./packem_shared/authApiCallWithoutHeaders-BItMMdZP.mjs";import h from"./packem_shared/authCsrfCheckDisabled-De9ammtV.mjs";import g from"./packem_shared/authEmailVerificationDisabled-BFKdJcx4.mjs";import U from"./packem_shared/authSecureCookiesDisabled-B4WIzvMm.mjs";import b from"./packem_shared/authSessionFreshageZero-Bpcaf_Pe.mjs";import I from"./packem_shared/authTrustedOriginsWildcard-DjU9NXEm.mjs";import S from"./packem_shared/browserAllowPrivateTargets-Dxyeh6lg.mjs";import A from"./packem_shared/browserUserUrlWithoutAllowlist-BHBS6b0N.mjs";import y from"./packem_shared/circularFk-BMuJKmuZ.mjs";import T from"./packem_shared/containerInstanceKeyFromUserInput-C8S4T3ty.mjs";import w from"./packem_shared/containerOversizedInstance-B9wW_sU5.mjs";import R from"./packem_shared/containerPublicInternet-Bx2J7tha.mjs";import k from"./packem_shared/containerRuntimeEgressRelaxation-BQ2ZD1aV.mjs";import F from"./packem_shared/containerStartEnableInternetOverride-B62WUura.mjs";import W from"./packem_shared/duplicateIndex-DFT7qLQD.mjs";import x from"./packem_shared/emptyIndex-BiXEfyfN.mjs";import C from"./packem_shared/exportSinkMisconfigured-DvpAaa6j.mjs";import P from"./packem_shared/externalSourceIncrementalNoDeletePath-DnoL64YY.mjs";import v from"./packem_shared/externalSourceOnGlobal-DNPLoNUg.mjs";import M from"./packem_shared/externalSourceUnscoped-DqBp5jYr.mjs";import D from"./packem_shared/filterWithoutIndex-ht2GZQWV.mjs";import N from"./packem_shared/flagGatesSecurityWithUnsafeDefault-DPGFEHTt.mjs";import O from"./packem_shared/geoIndexFieldNotGeopoint-DAGLZtaH.mjs";import E from"./packem_shared/geoIndexUnused-BgDE6_AR.mjs";import G from"./packem_shared/hardcodedSecret-rIRc3aNk.mjs";import z from"./packem_shared/httpActionMissingAuthGuard-BZDdeW_D.mjs";import K from"./packem_shared/httpActionResponseHeaderInjection-D063rB7U.mjs";import L from"./packem_shared/hyperdriveOutsideAction-CRmOQz67.mjs";import V from"./packem_shared/identityUndeclaredClaimTrusted-BYRYGQ74.mjs";import j from"./packem_shared/imagesUrlSourceFromUserInput-Cy5pc_dA.mjs";import q from"./packem_shared/indexReferencesUnknownField-r3QHlaz6.mjs";import _ from"./packem_shared/insertManyUnsafeUserData-DrH7PdRs.mjs";import H from"./packem_shared/kvUnscopedUserKeyIdor-B4lGxRxh.mjs";import B from"./packem_shared/mailInboundDispatchWithoutVerify-BivYJ5F9.mjs";import Q from"./packem_shared/mailRecipientFromRequestInput-BR_oSh65.mjs";import Z from"./packem_shared/maskUncoveredPiiColumn-DqPfZM2O.mjs";import J from"./packem_shared/maskWeakHashStrategyOnPii-CEiiGgT7.mjs";import X from"./packem_shared/maskedRelationLeakViaWith-CxYk0MDW.mjs";import Y from"./packem_shared/mutatorFullRowReplace-CEgecSGm.mjs";import rr from"./packem_shared/nondeterministicQueryMutation-BaMfbAk_.mjs";import or from"./packem_shared/normalizeIdUsedAsAuthorization-FjISSXJm.mjs";import tr from"./packem_shared/notifyMissingPushConfig-C_GbVw3S.mjs";import ir from"./packem_shared/notifySendOutsideAction-B0jZuUP3.mjs";import er from"./packem_shared/outputProjectionMissingOnPublicRead-9Pm9766s.mjs";import ar from"./packem_shared/ownerFieldFromArgsNotAuth-BoR9vvst.mjs";import mr from"./packem_shared/paymentCreateWithoutAuthorize-CurtqN8K.mjs";import sr from"./packem_shared/paymentWebhookWideTolerance-I7ingfR8.mjs";import nr from"./packem_shared/plaintextSecretInWranglerVariables-DXjKIm8H.mjs";import pr from"./packem_shared/policyReferencesUnknownTable-D3WelAQa.mjs";import fr from"./packem_shared/privilegedDispatchUnvalidatedPayload-74GuGye1.mjs";import lr from"./packem_shared/privilegedFanoutFromPublicProcedure-C2j2GSUN.mjs";import ur from"./packem_shared/publicArgumentUsesAny-BJb4cTqL.mjs";import dr from"./packem_shared/publicMutationWithoutRatelimit-D9phluHW.mjs";import cr from"./packem_shared/publicTableRlsOptoutConfusion-CaWtPGAn.mjs";import $r from"./packem_shared/queueWithoutDlq-BLY3iy9Q.mjs";import hr from"./packem_shared/r2sqlOutsideAction-CKK_I1Ms.mjs";import gr from"./packem_shared/ratelimitDefaultMemoryStore-mOdI3Jmb.mjs";import Ur from"./packem_shared/ratelimitKeySpoofableOrGlobal-DaGId_Fh.mjs";import br from"./packem_shared/ratelimitMiddlewareFailOpen-CTWVosEc.mjs";import Ir from"./packem_shared/relationReferencesUnknownField-clqyB69Y.mjs";import Sr from"./packem_shared/relationReferencesUnknownTable-CLdrhkmS.mjs";import Ar from"./packem_shared/rlsUncoveredTable-DYHgnoos.mjs";import yr from"./packem_shared/shapeTargetsGlobalTable-Blz-aSkg.mjs";import Tr from"./packem_shared/shapeUnknownTable-DFxtyFio.mjs";import wr from"./packem_shared/signupMutationWithoutDisposableGating-3ir808Vz.mjs";import Rr from"./packem_shared/softDeleteIncludeDeletedFromArgs-DgxpQHRA.mjs";import kr from"./packem_shared/sqlInjectionRisk-D2NaT-5c.mjs";import Fr from"./packem_shared/storageGenerateUploadUrlNoContentTypePin-C9cjl6Jh.mjs";import Wr from"./packem_shared/storageKeyFromUserArgs-BeS5cp56.mjs";import xr from"./packem_shared/storagePresignedUrlForPrivateContent-j7VhwIdu.mjs";import Cr from"./packem_shared/storageUploadWithoutContentTypeAllowlist-oxKLecuf.mjs";import Pr from"./packem_shared/storageUploadWithoutMaxSize-DUDxPutk.mjs";import vr from"./packem_shared/tableWithoutInsert-D3AhaNzR.mjs";import Mr from"./packem_shared/ttlFieldNotTimestamp-BFiRkSZD.mjs";import Dr from"./packem_shared/unboundedStringArgument-AkkIcr-S.mjs";import Nr from"./packem_shared/unindexedForeignKey-DK4eWXkb.mjs";import Or from"./packem_shared/unindexedRelationTarget-B5fFq1E8.mjs";import Er from"./packem_shared/unrestrictedWhereBranch-YKiydie4.mjs";import Gr from"./packem_shared/userCreatingMutationWithoutCaptcha-iDjRkUFO.mjs";import zr from"./packem_shared/vectorsNamespaceFromUserInput-Cyq5B2kF.mjs";import Kr from"./packem_shared/workflowDuplicateStepName-cXF6Rpvg.mjs";import Lr from"./packem_shared/workflowUnknownTarget-JF8rITLP.mjs";import Vr from"./packem_shared/workflowUnused-Dx_FQwGE.mjs";import{AE_METRIC_EVENTS as Nt,loadAnalyticsRuntimeMetrics as Ot}from"./packem_shared/AE_METRIC_EVENTS-LP_0D7Uw.mjs";import{fromServerSchema as Gt}from"./packem_shared/fromServerSchema-CJ-AQ2kw.mjs";const jr=[q,Sr,Ir,Lr,Kr,Tr,P,v,M,x,O,E,C,Mr,y,Nr,Or,W,vr,Vr,$r,D,yr,Y,rr,L,hr,$,pr,Ar,Z,J,w,R,dr,Er,Gr,wr,ur,Dr,G,kr,f,mr,B,gr,S,lr,_,d,p,ar,Wr,H,T,l,zr,Q,A,fr,F,k,I,h,U,g,b,j,Ur,cr,c,Cr,Pr,Fr,xr,z,K,br,N,u,V,sr,Rr,X,er,or,ir,tr,nr],qr=[s,n,m],_r=[...jr,...qr],vt=(i,r={})=>{const e=r.lints??_r,o=[];for(const t of e)r.source!==void 0&&t.source!==r.source||o.push(...t.run(i));return a(o)};export{Nt as AE_METRIC_EVENTS,_r as ALL_LINTS,qr as RUNTIME_LINTS,jr as STATIC_LINTS,p as actionFetchSsrf,f as adminRouteWithoutGuard,l as aiRawRunEscapeHatch,u as aiToolSideEffectPromptInjection,d as aiUnboundedGenerationPublic,c as allowUnauthenticatedShardAccessEnabled,$ as authApiCallWithoutHeaders,h as authCsrfCheckDisabled,g as authEmailVerificationDisabled,U as authSecureCookiesDisabled,b as authSessionFreshageZero,I as authTrustedOriginsWildcard,S as browserAllowPrivateTargets,A as browserUserUrlWithoutAllowlist,y as circularFk,m as constraintValidator,T as containerInstanceKeyFromUserInput,w as containerOversizedInstance,R as containerPublicInternet,k as containerRuntimeEgressRelaxation,F as containerStartEnableInternetOverride,a as dedupeCacheKeys,W as duplicateIndex,x as emptyIndex,C as exportSinkMisconfigured,P as externalSourceIncrementalNoDeletePath,v as externalSourceOnGlobal,M as externalSourceUnscoped,D as filterWithoutIndex,N as flagGatesSecurityWithUnsafeDefault,Gt as fromServerSchema,O as geoIndexFieldNotGeopoint,E as geoIndexUnused,G as hardcodedSecret,s as hotShard,z as httpActionMissingAuthGuard,K as httpActionResponseHeaderInjection,L as hyperdriveOutsideAction,V as identityUndeclaredClaimTrusted,j as imagesUrlSourceFromUserInput,q as indexReferencesUnknownField,n as indexUtilization,_ as insertManyUnsafeUserData,H as kvUnscopedUserKeyIdor,Ot as loadAnalyticsRuntimeMetrics,B as mailInboundDispatchWithoutVerify,Q as mailRecipientFromRequestInput,Z as maskUncoveredPiiColumn,J as maskWeakHashStrategyOnPii,X as maskedRelationLeakViaWith,Y as mutatorFullRowReplace,rr as nondeterministicQueryMutation,or as normalizeIdUsedAsAuthorization,tr as notifyMissingPushConfig,ir as notifySendOutsideAction,er as outputProjectionMissingOnPublicRead,ar as ownerFieldFromArgsNotAuth,mr as paymentCreateWithoutAuthorize,sr as paymentWebhookWideTolerance,nr as plaintextSecretInWranglerVariables,pr as policyReferencesUnknownTable,fr as privilegedDispatchUnvalidatedPayload,lr as privilegedFanoutFromPublicProcedure,ur as publicArgumentUsesAny,dr as publicMutationWithoutRatelimit,cr as publicTableRlsOptoutConfusion,$r as queueWithoutDlq,hr as r2sqlOutsideAction,gr as ratelimitDefaultMemoryStore,Ur as ratelimitKeySpoofableOrGlobal,br as ratelimitMiddlewareFailOpen,Ir as relationReferencesUnknownField,Sr as relationReferencesUnknownTable,Ar as rlsUncoveredTable,vt as runAdvisor,yr as shapeTargetsGlobalTable,Tr as shapeUnknownTable,wr as signupMutationWithoutDisposableGating,Rr as softDeleteIncludeDeletedFromArgs,kr as sqlInjectionRisk,Fr as storageGenerateUploadUrlNoContentTypePin,Wr as storageKeyFromUserArgs,xr as storagePresignedUrlForPrivateContent,Cr as storageUploadWithoutContentTypeAllowlist,Pr as storageUploadWithoutMaxSize,vr as tableWithoutInsert,Mr as ttlFieldNotTimestamp,Dr as unboundedStringArgument,Nr as unindexedForeignKey,Or as unindexedRelationTarget,Er as unrestrictedWhereBranch,Gr as userCreatingMutationWithoutCaptcha,zr as vectorsNamespaceFromUserInput,Kr as workflowDuplicateStepName,Lr as workflowUnknownTarget,Vr as workflowUnused};

package/dist/packem_shared/AE_METRIC_EVENTS-LP_0D7Uw.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{LunoraError as m}from"@lunora/errors";const y=/^[\w.-]+$/u,c={indexHit:{event:"lunora.index.hit",index:"blob3",table:"blob2"},shardRequest:{event:"lunora.shard.request",group:"blob3",shardKey:"blob2"},tableScan:{event:"lunora.table.scan",table:"blob2"}},p=e=>{const a=typeof e=="number"?e:Number(e);return Number.isFinite(a)?a:0},o=e=>typeof e=="string"?e:typeof e=="number"||typeof e=="boolean"||typeof e=="bigint"?String(e):"",$=e=>{if(!y.test(e))throw new m("INTERNAL",`@lunora/advisor: invalid Analytics Engine dataset name "${e}" — expected a bare table identifier.`)},u=e=>`'${e.replaceAll("\\","\\\\").replaceAll("'","''")}'`,h=async(e,a)=>{try{return(await e.query(a)).rows}catch{return[]}},x=async(e,a)=>{const{event:s,group:n,shardKey:r}=c.shardRequest,l=a.group===void 0?"":` AND ${n} = ${u(a.group)}`,i=`SELECT ${r} AS shardKey, ${n} AS shardGroup, sum(_sample_interval) AS requests FROM ${a.dataset} WHERE blob1 = ${u(s)}${l} GROUP BY shardKey, shardGroup`;return(await h(e,i)).map(d=>{const b=o(d.shardGroup);return{...b===""?{}:{group:b},requests:p(d.requests),shardKey:o(d.shardKey)}})},E=async(e,a)=>{const{event:s,table:n}=c.tableScan,r=`SELECT ${n} AS scanTable, sum(_sample_interval) AS scans FROM ${a.dataset} WHERE blob1 = ${u(s)} GROUP BY scanTable`;return(await h(e,r)).map(l=>({scans:p(l.scans),table:o(l.scanTable)}))},S=async(e,a)=>{const{event:s,index:n,table:r}=c.indexHit,l=`SELECT ${r} AS hitTable, ${n} AS hitIndex, sum(_sample_interval) AS reads FROM ${a.dataset} WHERE blob1 = ${u(s)} GROUP BY hitTable, hitIndex`,i=(await h(e,l)).map(t=>({index:o(t.hitIndex),reads:p(t.reads),table:o(t.hitTable)}));if(a.declaredIndexes===void 0)return i;const d=new Set(i.map(t=>`${t.table}\0${t.index}`)),b=a.declaredIndexes.filter(t=>!d.has(`${t.table}\0${t.index}`)).map(t=>({index:t.index,reads:0,table:t.table}));return[...i,...b]},R=async(e,a)=>{$(a.dataset);const[s,n,r]=await Promise.all([x(e,a),E(e,a),S(e,a)]);return{indexHits:r,shardTraffic:s,tableScans:n}};export{c as AE_METRIC_EVENTS,R as loadAnalyticsRuntimeMetrics};

package/dist/packem_shared/actionFetchSsrf-BbWxy1Yf.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as a}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const r={categories:["SECURITY"],description:"An action's `ctx.fetch(url)` fetches a URL derived from the handler's `args`. `ctx.fetch` applies no host allowlist, so request-controlled URLs let a caller reach cloud metadata endpoints or internal services — server-side request forgery.",facing:"EXTERNAL",level:"ERROR",name:"action_fetch_ssrf",remediation:"Validate the URL against an allowlist of expected hosts before fetching, and reject private, loopback, and link-local addresses (notably `169.254.169.254`). Never pass request input straight to `ctx.fetch`.",run:t=>t.argumentDerivedFetches===void 0?[]:t.argumentDerivedFetches.map(e=>a(r,{cacheKey:`action_fetch_ssrf:${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}`,detail:`\`ctx.fetch\` in \`${e.exportName}\` (${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}) fetches a URL derived from \`args\` — a server-side request forgery vector. Validate the URL against a host allowlist and reject private/link-local targets before fetching.`,metadata:{exportName:e.exportName,file:e.file,line:e.line}})),source:"static",title:"Possible SSRF from arg-derived ctx.fetch URL"};export{r as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/adminRouteWithoutGuard-DSo4t9j4.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const r={categories:["SECURITY"],description:"An `httpRoute` on an admin/privileged path has no visible auth/admin guard. REST routes aren't covered by RLS, so an unguarded `/admin/*` route is callable by anyone who reaches the URL.",facing:"EXTERNAL",level:"WARN",name:"admin_route_without_guard",remediation:"Assert an authenticated, authorized caller at the top of the handler — check `ctx.auth` / `getSession(...)`, or a `requireAdmin`-style guard — and reject (401/403) before doing privileged work. For machine callers, verify a secret with a timing-safe compare.",run:a=>{if(a.adminRoutes===void 0)return[];const t=[];for(const e of a.adminRoutes)e.usesGuard||t.push(i(r,{cacheKey:`admin_route_without_guard:${e.file}:${e.method}:${e.path}`,detail:`Route \`${e.method} ${e.path}\` (\`${e.exportName}\` in ${e.file}) is on an admin/privileged path but its handler shows no auth/admin guard. Assert an authorized caller before doing privileged work.`,metadata:{exportName:e.exportName,file:e.file,method:e.method,path:e.path}}));return t},source:"static",title:"Admin route without an auth guard"};export{r as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/aiRawRunEscapeHatch-DfhjYm43.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as r}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const t={categories:["SECURITY"],description:"A `ctx.ai.run(model, …)` call selects its model from the handler's `args` with no server-side scoping. `ctx.ai.run` is the raw Workers AI binding passthrough, so an arg-derived model id lets any caller pick an arbitrary model — bypassing the typed `ctx.ai.model(...)` + AI-SDK layer's cap/schema.",facing:"EXTERNAL",level:"WARN",name:"ai_raw_run_escape_hatch",remediation:"Select the model from a fixed server-side allowlist — never from `args`. Prefer the typed `ctx.ai.model(...)` + `generateText`/`streamText` path with an output cap over the raw `ctx.ai.run` escape hatch.",run:a=>a.aiRawRuns===void 0?[]:a.aiRawRuns.map(e=>r(t,{cacheKey:`ai_raw_run_escape_hatch:${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}`,detail:`\`ctx.ai.run\` in \`${e.exportName}\` (${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}) selects its model from \`args\` with no server-side scoping — any caller can pick an arbitrary model, bypassing the typed AI-SDK layer's cap/schema. Select the model from a fixed server-side allowlist instead.`,metadata:{exportName:e.exportName,file:e.file,line:e.line}})),source:"static",title:"Possible arbitrary model selection from arg-derived ctx.ai.run"};export{t as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/aiToolSideEffectPromptInjection-DnWQOoKi.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as o}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const n={categories:["SECURITY"],description:"A `generateText` / `streamText` call whose prompt/messages carry user-supplied text and whose model-callable `tools` perform a privileged side effect (DB write, `ctx.run` dispatch, or outbound send). An injected instruction in the user text can steer the model into firing that action — the confused-deputy prompt-injection hazard.",facing:"EXTERNAL",level:"WARN",name:"ai_tool_side_effect_prompt_injection",remediation:"Don't let a model with user-derived input directly trigger a privileged action. Have the tool return a proposal the server validates and authorizes before executing, gate the side effect behind an explicit human/step confirmation, or keep side-effecting tools out of any generation whose prompt includes untrusted input.",run:t=>t.aiToolSideEffects===void 0?[]:t.aiToolSideEffects.filter(e=>e.userInputDerived).map(e=>{const i=`\`${e.exportName}\` (${e.file}:${e.line.toString()})`;return o(n,{cacheKey:`ai_tool_side_effect_prompt_injection:${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}`,detail:`\`${e.method}\` in ${i} feeds user-derived input to a model whose tools reach \`${e.sideEffect}\`. An injected instruction can steer the model into firing that side effect.`,metadata:{exportName:e.exportName,file:e.file,line:e.line,method:e.method,sideEffect:e.sideEffect}})}),source:"static",title:"AI tool side effect reachable via prompt injection"};export{n as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/aiUnboundedGenerationPublic-D3HZrh5_.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as n}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const o={categories:["SECURITY"],description:"A public procedure runs an AI generation (`generateText`/`streamText`/`generateObject`/`streamObject`) with no `maxOutputTokens` bound. Generation bills per output token, so an anonymous caller can request arbitrarily long completions in a loop — a denial-of-wallet vector that also ties up worker time on long streams.",facing:"EXTERNAL",level:"WARN",name:"ai_unbounded_generation_public",remediation:"Cap the completion with `maxOutputTokens` in the generation config, and rate-limit the public entry point (`.use(rateLimit(...))`). For expensive models, prefer running generation from an internal, authenticated path rather than exposing it directly to anonymous callers.",run:t=>t.procedureProtections===void 0?[]:t.procedureProtections.filter(e=>e.unboundedAiGeneration&&e.visibility==="public").map(e=>n(o,{cacheKey:`ai_unbounded_generation_public:${e.file}:${e.exportName}`,detail:`\`${e.exportName}\` (${e.file}) is public and runs an AI generation with no \`maxOutputTokens\` bound — an anonymous caller can drive unbounded, billable completions in a loop. Add a \`maxOutputTokens\` cap and rate-limit the entry point.`,metadata:{exportName:e.exportName,file:e.file,kind:e.kind}})),source:"static",title:"Public procedure runs unbounded AI generation (no maxOutputTokens)"};export{o as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/allowUnauthenticatedShardAccessEnabled-D4aMNBb0.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as t}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const n={categories:["SECURITY"],description:"`.extend(() => ({ allowUnauthenticatedShardAccess: true }))` disables the fail-closed default that denies an unauthenticated shard lookup. Combined with a schema that doesn't enforce `.rls(\"required\")` everywhere (or that leaves a table `.public()`), an unauthenticated caller can shard-hop into another tenant's rows with no row-security guard behind the door.",facing:"EXTERNAL",level:"WARN",name:"allow_unauthenticated_shard_access_enabled",remediation:"Prefer `authorizeShard` / `authorizeFanOut` (which take precedence over `allowUnauthenticatedShardAccess` and let you allow specific unauthenticated cases) over the blanket opt-out. If the app genuinely needs open shard access, enforce `.rls(\"required\")` on the schema with no `.public()` tables so a missing identity still can't read another tenant's rows.",run:a=>a.configCalls===void 0?[]:a.schema.rlsMode!=="required"||a.schema.tables.some(e=>e.isPublic)?a.configCalls.filter(e=>e.callee==="extend"&&e.trueKeys.includes("allowUnauthenticatedShardAccess")).map(e=>t(n,{cacheKey:`allow_unauthenticated_shard_access_enabled:${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}`,detail:`\`.extend(...)\` in ${e.file}:${e.line.toString()} sets \`allowUnauthenticatedShardAccess: true\`, and the schema has an RLS gap (no \`.rls("required")\`, or a \`.public()\` table) — an unauthenticated caller can shard-hop into another tenant's rows with no row-security guard behind the door.`,metadata:{callee:e.callee,file:e.file,line:e.line}})):[],source:"static",title:"Unauthenticated shard access enabled on an RLS-gapped schema"};export{n as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/argument-derived-sink-BpO3NPPM.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as r}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const s=e=>{const a={categories:e.categories,description:e.description,facing:e.facing,level:e.level,name:e.name,remediation:e.remediation,run:i=>{const n=e.getAccesses(i);return n===void 0||e.suppressWhen?.(i)===!0?[]:n.map(t=>r(a,{cacheKey:e.cacheKey(t),detail:e.detail(t),metadata:e.metadata(t)}))},source:"static",title:e.title};return a};export{s as m};

package/dist/packem_shared/authApiCallWithoutHeaders-BItMMdZP.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as h}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const l={categories:["SECURITY"],description:"A `ctx.authApi.<method>(...)` call omits `headers` — better-auth skips session authorization and runs the call with full server-to-server privileges, regardless of the caller's identity.",facing:"EXTERNAL",level:"WARN",name:"auth_api_call_without_headers",remediation:"Pass the inbound `headers` from the incoming request into every `ctx.authApi.*` call: `ctx.authApi.<method>({ body, headers: request.headers })`. See the `withAuthPlugins` middleware doc for details.",run:a=>{if(a.authApiCalls===void 0)return[];const s=[],r=new Map;for(const e of a.authApiCalls){if(e.hasHeaders)continue;const t=`${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}:${e.method}`,i=(r.get(t)??0)+1;r.set(t,i);const o=i>1?`:${i.toString()}`:"";s.push(h(l,{cacheKey:`auth_api_call_without_headers:${t}${o}`,detail:`\`ctx.authApi.${e.method||"<method>"}(…)\` in ${e.exportName} (${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}) is called without \`headers\` — better-auth skips session authorization, so this runs with full privileges. Pass the inbound \`headers\`.`,metadata:{exportName:e.exportName,file:e.file,line:e.line,method:e.method}}))}return s},source:"static",title:"Privileged ctx.authApi call missing headers"};export{l as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/authCsrfCheckDisabled-De9ammtV.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as a}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const i={categories:["SECURITY"],description:"A `createAuth({...})` call sets `advanced.disableCSRFCheck: true`, turning off better-auth's origin validation for state-changing auth requests — a cross-site request riding the ambient auth cookie is processed like a same-origin one.",facing:"EXTERNAL",level:"ERROR",name:"auth_csrf_check_disabled",remediation:"Remove `advanced.disableCSRFCheck: true` from `createAuth({...})` and rely on `trustedOrigins` for origin validation instead of disabling the check.",run:t=>t.authConfigs===void 0?[]:t.authConfigs.filter(e=>e.analyzable&&e.disableCsrfCheck).map(e=>a(i,{cacheKey:`auth_csrf_check_disabled:${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}`,detail:`\`createAuth\` in \`${e.exportName}\` (${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}) sets \`advanced.disableCSRFCheck: true\`, turning off origin validation for state-changing auth requests. Remove the flag and rely on \`trustedOrigins\` instead.`,metadata:{exportName:e.exportName,file:e.file,line:e.line}})),source:"static",title:"createAuth CSRF check disabled"};export{i as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/authEmailVerificationDisabled-BFKdJcx4.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as a}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const t={categories:["SECURITY"],description:"A `createAuth({...})` call enables `emailAndPassword` with no `requireEmailVerification: true`. better-auth defaults email verification off, so an account is usable before the caller has proven ownership of the email address.",facing:"EXTERNAL",level:"WARN",name:"auth_email_verification_disabled",remediation:"Set `emailAndPassword.requireEmailVerification: true` on `createAuth({...})` so a new account can't act until its email address is verified.",run:i=>i.authConfigs===void 0?[]:i.authConfigs.filter(e=>e.analyzable&&e.emailPasswordEnabled&&!e.requireEmailVerification).map(e=>a(t,{cacheKey:`auth_email_verification_disabled:${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}`,detail:`\`createAuth\` in \`${e.exportName}\` (${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}) enables \`emailAndPassword\` with no \`requireEmailVerification: true\`, so an account is usable before its email is proven. Set \`emailAndPassword.requireEmailVerification: true\`.`,metadata:{exportName:e.exportName,file:e.file,line:e.line}})),source:"static",title:"createAuth email verification disabled"};export{t as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/authSecureCookiesDisabled-B4WIzvMm.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as o}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const s={categories:["SECURITY"],description:"A `createAuth({...})` call sets `advanced.useSecureCookies: false`, overriding Lunora's secure-by-default posture — the session cookie ships without `Secure` even on an HTTPS deployment, so it can be sent over a plaintext connection.",facing:"EXTERNAL",level:"ERROR",name:"auth_secure_cookies_disabled",remediation:"Remove `advanced.useSecureCookies: false` from `createAuth({...})` — let Lunora's secure-by-default posture set the `Secure` cookie attribute for an HTTPS deployment.",run:t=>t.authConfigs===void 0?[]:t.authConfigs.filter(e=>e.analyzable&&e.secureCookiesDisabled).map(e=>o(s,{cacheKey:`auth_secure_cookies_disabled:${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}`,detail:`\`createAuth\` in \`${e.exportName}\` (${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}) sets \`advanced.useSecureCookies: false\`, so the session cookie ships without \`Secure\` even on an HTTPS deployment. Remove the override and let Lunora's secure-by-default posture apply.`,metadata:{exportName:e.exportName,file:e.file,line:e.line}})),source:"static",title:"createAuth secure cookies disabled"};export{s as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/authSessionFreshageZero-Bpcaf_Pe.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as s}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const i={categories:["SECURITY"],description:"A `createAuth({...})` call sets `session.freshAge: 0`, disabling better-auth's recent-reauth check for sensitive operations — a long-lived stolen session can perform them without proving the caller still controls the credentials.",facing:"EXTERNAL",level:"WARN",name:"auth_session_freshage_zero",remediation:"Remove `session.freshAge: 0` from `createAuth({...})` (or set it to a real window) so sensitive operations require a recently re-authenticated session.",run:t=>t.authConfigs===void 0?[]:t.authConfigs.filter(e=>e.analyzable&&e.sessionFreshAgeZero).map(e=>s(i,{cacheKey:`auth_session_freshage_zero:${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}`,detail:`\`createAuth\` in \`${e.exportName}\` (${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}) sets \`session.freshAge: 0\`, disabling the recent-reauth check for sensitive operations. Remove the override or set a real window.`,metadata:{exportName:e.exportName,file:e.file,line:e.line}})),source:"static",title:"createAuth session freshAge zero"};export{i as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/authTrustedOriginsWildcard-DjU9NXEm.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as e}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const r={categories:["SECURITY"],description:"A `createAuth({...})` call's `trustedOrigins` array contains a `\"*\"` entry, disabling better-auth's CSRF/origin validation entirely — any origin is accepted for state-changing auth requests.",facing:"EXTERNAL",level:"ERROR",name:"auth_trusted_origins_wildcard",remediation:'List the specific origins your deployment serves in `trustedOrigins` instead of `"*"` — a wildcard disables origin validation for every caller.',run:t=>t.authConfigs===void 0?[]:t.authConfigs.filter(i=>i.analyzable&&i.trustedOriginsWildcard).map(i=>e(r,{cacheKey:`auth_trusted_origins_wildcard:${i.file}:${i.line.toString()}`,detail:`\`createAuth\` in \`${i.exportName}\` (${i.file}:${i.line.toString()}) sets \`trustedOrigins\` to include \`"*"\`, disabling CSRF/origin validation for every request. List the specific origins your deployment serves instead.`,metadata:{exportName:i.exportName,file:i.file,line:i.line}})),source:"static",title:"createAuth trustedOrigins wildcard"};export{r as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/browserAllowPrivateTargets-Dxyeh6lg.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as t}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const r={categories:["SECURITY"],description:"`createBrowser({ allowPrivateTargets: true })` disables the private/internal-IP SSRF guard, letting a navigated URL reach cloud metadata endpoints, internal services, or loopback. Combined with a request-supplied URL this is a server-side request forgery path.",facing:"EXTERNAL",level:"ERROR",name:"browser_allow_private_targets",remediation:"Remove `allowPrivateTargets: true` from `createBrowser({...})` so the private/internal-address guard stays on. If a specific internal host is genuinely required, pin it with an `allowedHosts` allowlist instead of opening all private targets.",run:a=>a.configCalls===void 0?[]:a.configCalls.filter(e=>e.callee==="createBrowser"&&e.trueKeys.includes("allowPrivateTargets")).map(e=>t(r,{cacheKey:`browser_allow_private_targets:${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}`,detail:`\`createBrowser({ allowPrivateTargets: true })\` in ${e.file}:${e.line.toString()} disables the private/internal-address SSRF guard — a navigated URL can then reach cloud metadata, internal services, or loopback. Remove the override, or pin the specific host with \`allowedHosts\` instead.`,metadata:{callee:e.callee,file:e.file,line:e.line}})),source:"static",title:"Browser with private-target SSRF guard disabled"};export{r as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/browserUserUrlWithoutAllowlist-BHBS6b0N.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{m as t}from"./argument-derived-sink-BpO3NPPM.mjs";const a=t({cacheKey:e=>`browser_user_url_without_allowlist:${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}`,categories:["SECURITY"],description:"A `ctx.browser.<method>(url, …)` call navigates to a URL derived from the handler's `args` with no server-side scoping, and no `createBrowser` allowlist contains it. The default guard blocks private targets but not arbitrary public URLs, so any caller can make the headless browser an open-proxy / SSRF tool (fetch arbitrary third-party URLs, DNS-rebind to internal hosts).",detail:e=>`\`ctx.browser.${e.method}\` in \`${e.exportName}\` (${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}) navigates to a URL derived from \`args\` with no server-side scoping, and no \`createBrowser\` allowlist contains it — the default guard blocks private targets but not arbitrary public URLs, so any caller can turn the headless browser into an open-proxy / SSRF tool. Pin \`allowedHosts\` (and/or \`resolveDns\`) on \`createBrowser({...})\`, and derive the URL from server-trusted state where possible.`,facing:"EXTERNAL",getAccesses:e=>e.browserUrlAccesses,level:"WARN",metadata:e=>({exportName:e.exportName,file:e.file,line:e.line,method:e.method}),name:"browser_user_url_without_allowlist",remediation:"Pin the browser with an `allowedHosts` allowlist (and/or `resolveDns`) on `createBrowser({...})`, and derive the navigation URL from server-trusted state where possible rather than passing `args` straight to `ctx.browser`.",suppressWhen:e=>(e.configCalls??[]).some(r=>r.callee==="createBrowser"&&r.analyzable&&(r.presentKeys.includes("allowedHosts")||r.presentKeys.includes("resolveDns"))),title:"Browser navigates to arg-derived URL with no allowlist"});export{a as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/circularFk-BMuJKmuZ.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as w}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const E=100,k={categories:["SCHEMA"],description:"A chain of foreign-key relations forms a cycle (e.g. A → B → C → A). Circular FK dependencies can cause unexpected behavior during DELETE operations — a CASCADE chain may loop indefinitely, and even a RESTRICT cycle prevents deletion of any row in the loop without temporarily disabling constraints.",facing:"INTERNAL",level:"WARN",name:"circular_fk",remediation:"Remove or break the cycle by dropping at least one FK relation from the loop. Consider replacing the circular dependency with a nullable FK and explicit application logic, or restructure the schema using a junction table.",run:h=>{const g=[],c=[...new Set(h.schema.tables.map(e=>e.name))].sort(),d=new Map(c.map((e,n)=>[e,n])),l=new Map;for(const e of h.schema.tables)for(const n of e.relations){if(n.kind!=="one"||!d.has(n.table))continue;let t=l.get(e.name);t===void 0&&(t=new Set,l.set(e.name,t)),t.add(n.table)}const r=new Set,s=new Map,f=[],u=new Set;let p=!1;const m=e=>{r.delete(e);const n=s.get(e);if(n!==void 0)for(const t of n)n.delete(t),r.has(t)&&m(t)},b=()=>{const e=[...f];if(e.length<2)return;let n=0;for(let o=1;o<e.length;o+=1)e[o]<e[n]&&(n=o);const t=[...e.slice(n),...e.slice(0,n)],i=t.join("→");if(u.has(i))return;u.add(i);const a=[...t,t[0]].join(" → ");g.push(w(k,{cacheKey:`circular_fk:${i}`,detail:`Circular foreign-key dependency detected: ${a}. This cycle can cause unexpected behavior during DELETE operations.`,metadata:{cycle:t,path:a,tables:t}})),u.size>=E&&(p=!0)},y=(e,n,t)=>{let i=!1;f.push(e),r.add(e);for(const a of l.get(e)??[]){if(p)break;d.get(a)<t||(a===n?(b(),i=!0):!r.has(a)&&y(a,n,t)&&(i=!0))}if(i)m(e);else for(const a of l.get(e)??[]){if(d.get(a)<t)continue;let o=s.get(a);o===void 0&&(o=new Set,s.set(a,o)),o.add(e)}return f.pop(),i};for(let e=0;e<c.length&&!p;e+=1)r.clear(),s.clear(),y(c[e],c[e],e);return g},source:"static",title:"Circular foreign-key dependency"};export{k as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/constraintValidator-N339mfyx.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as u}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const d=5,f=a=>typeof a._id=="string"?a._id:"?",m=(a,t,e)=>a?` (sample capped at ${t.toString()} rows — ${e})`:"",p=(a,t)=>{const e=a.slice(0,d),o=t-e.length,n=e.map(i=>`"${i}"`).join(", ");return o>0?`${n} (+${o.toString()} more)`:n},v=(a,t)=>{if(a==="_id")return t.existingIds;const e=new Set;for(const o of t.rows){const n=o[a];n!=null&&e.add(String(n))}return e},x=(a,t,e,o)=>{if(e.kind!=="one"||o.truncated)return;const n=e.references,i=v(n,o),s=e.field,r=[];for(const g of t.rows){const h=g[s];if(h==null)continue;const $=String(h);i.has($)||r.push(f(g))}if(r.length===0)return;const l=t.truncated,{cap:c}=t,b=n==="_id"?`"${e.table}"`:`"${e.table}"."${n}"`,w=`Table "${t.table}": ${r.length.toString()} sampled row(s) have a dangling FK value in column "${s}" — the referenced ${b} row does not exist. Row ids: ${p(r,r.length)}${m(l,c,"more rows may exist beyond the window")}.`;return u(a,{cacheKey:`constraint_validator:fk:${t.table}:${s}`,detail:w,metadata:{cap:c,column:s,count:r.length,examples:r.slice(0,d),kind:"fk",references:n,referencesTable:e.table,table:t.table,truncated:l}})},S=(a,t,e,o)=>{if(!o)return;const n=[];for(const s of t.rows)s[e]==null&&n.push(f(s));if(n.length===0)return;const i=`Table "${t.table}": ${n.length.toString()} sampled row(s) have a null/missing value in column "${e}", which is declared as non-optional. Row ids: ${p(n,n.length)}${m(t.truncated,t.cap,"more rows may exist beyond the window")}.`;return u(a,{cacheKey:`constraint_validator:null:${t.table}:${e}`,detail:i,metadata:{cap:t.cap,column:e,count:n.length,examples:n.slice(0,d),kind:"null",table:t.table,truncated:t.truncated}})},y=(a,t)=>{const e=[];for(const o of t){const n=a[o];if(n==null)return;e.push(JSON.stringify(n))}return e.join("|")},k=(a,t,e)=>{e.includes(t)||e.push(t),e.push(a)},_=(a,t,e)=>{if(e.kind!=="index"||e.unique!==!0)return;const o=new Map,n=[];for(const s of t.rows){const r=f(s),l=y(s,e.fields);if(l===void 0)continue;const c=o.get(l);c===void 0?o.set(l,r):k(r,c,n)}if(n.length===0)return;const i=`Table "${t.table}": ${n.length.toString()} sampled row(s) share duplicate values on unique index "${e.name}" (${e.fields.join(", ")}). Row ids: ${p(n,n.length)}${m(t.truncated,t.cap,"duplicates beyond the window may exist")}.`;return u(a,{cacheKey:`constraint_validator:unique:${t.table}:${e.name}`,detail:i,metadata:{cap:t.cap,count:n.length,examples:n.slice(0,d),fields:e.fields,index:e.name,kind:"unique",table:t.table,truncated:t.truncated}})},R=(a,t,e,o)=>{const n=o.get(t.table);if(!n)return[];const i=[];for(const s of n.relations){const r=e.get(s.table);if(!r)continue;const l=x(a,t,s,r);l&&i.push(l)}for(const s of n.fields){const r=!n.optionalFields?.has(s),l=S(a,t,s,r);l&&i.push(l)}for(const s of n.indexes){const r=_(a,t,s);r&&i.push(r)}return i},T={categories:["SCHEMA"],description:"Sampled rows violate one or more declared constraints: a foreign-key column references a non-existent row, a non-optional column contains null, or a unique-indexed column has duplicate values. These violations indicate data inserted before a constraint was enforced (e.g. a schema migration, a raw import, or a bug in a past data-migration transform).",facing:"INTERNAL",level:"WARN",name:"constraint_validator",remediation:"Inspect the listed rows and correct or remove the violating values. Run a data migration to backfill nulls, dedup unique violations, or re-link dangling FK references. For FK violations, confirm the target table rows exist before fixing the referencing rows.",run:a=>{if(!a.tableSamples||a.tableSamples.length===0)return[];const t=new Map;for(const o of a.tableSamples)t.set(o.table,o);const e=new Map(a.schema.tables.map(o=>[o.name,o]));return a.tableSamples.flatMap(o=>R(T,o,t,e))},source:"runtime",title:"Constraint violation"};export{T as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/containerInstanceKeyFromUserInput-C8S4T3ty.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{m as t}from"./argument-derived-sink-BpO3NPPM.mjs";const r=t({cacheKey:e=>`container_instance_key_from_user_input:${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}`,categories:["SECURITY"],description:"A `ctx.containers.<name>.get` call routes to a container instance using a key derived from the handler's `args` with no server-side scoping. Any caller can supply another tenant's key and reach that tenant's container instance — a cross-tenant insecure direct object reference (IDOR).",detail:e=>`\`ctx.containers.*.${e.method}\` in \`${e.exportName}\` (${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}) routes to a container instance using a key derived from \`args\` with no server-side scoping — any caller can reach another tenant's container (IDOR). Derive the key from a server-trusted identity (e.g. \`\${ctx.auth.userId}\`).`,facing:"EXTERNAL",getAccesses:e=>e.containerKeyAccesses,level:"WARN",metadata:e=>({exportName:e.exportName,file:e.file,line:e.line,method:e.method}),name:"container_instance_key_from_user_input",remediation:"Derive the container instance key from a server-trusted identity (e.g. `${ctx.auth.userId}`) or a record the caller owns — never pass request input straight to `ctx.containers.<name>.get`.",title:"Possible cross-tenant IDOR from arg-derived unscoped container key"});export{r as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/containerOversizedInstance-B9wW_sU5.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as s}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const r=new Set(["standard-3","standard-4"]),o=2,c=4096,d=e=>typeof e=="string"?r.has(e):(e.vcpu??0)>o||(e.memoryMib??0)>c,l={categories:["PERFORMANCE"],description:"A container is declared on a large instance type, whose provisioned memory and disk are billed for the lifetime of every running instance.",facing:"INTERNAL",level:"INFO",name:"container_oversized_instance",remediation:"Confirm the workload needs this size; a smaller instanceType (lite/basic/standard-1) costs less while idle-but-running.",run:e=>{const t=[];for(const i of e.containers??[]){const{instanceType:n}=i;if(n===void 0||!d(n))continue;const a=typeof n=="string"?n:JSON.stringify(n);t.push(s(l,{cacheKey:`container_oversized_instance:${i.exportName}`,detail:`Container "${i.exportName}" uses a large instance type (${a}); its memory + disk are billed while any instance runs.`,metadata:{container:i.exportName,instanceType:n}}))}return t},source:"static",title:"Oversized container instance"};export{l as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/containerPublicInternet-Bx2J7tha.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as a}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const r={categories:["SECURITY"],description:"A container leaves outbound internet access at the default (enabled), which is billed per GB of egress and widens the attack surface.",facing:"INTERNAL",level:"INFO",name:"container_public_internet",remediation:"Set `enableInternet: false` on the container if it doesn't call external services, or `true` to opt in deliberately.",run:n=>{const t=[];for(const e of n.containers??[])e.enableInternet===void 0&&t.push(a(r,{cacheKey:`container_public_internet:${e.exportName}`,detail:`Container "${e.exportName}" doesn't set enableInternet, so outbound internet is on by default (egress is billed).`,metadata:{container:e.exportName}}));return t},source:"static",title:"Container egress enabled by default"};export{r as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/containerRuntimeEgressRelaxation-BQ2ZD1aV.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as t}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const i={categories:["SECURITY"],description:"A runtime `.egress.allow(...)` / `.egress.deny(...)` / `.egress.setAllowed(...)` call mutates the container's egress firewall at runtime, re-opening a network surface the static analysis assumes is locked to the `defineContainer` declaration.",facing:"EXTERNAL",level:"WARN",name:"container_runtime_egress_relaxation",remediation:"Prefer declaring the egress policy statically in `lunora/containers.ts` where it is auditable. When a runtime mutation is unavoidable, scope it behind a server-trusted check and keep the change narrow (a specific host, not a broad allow) rather than an unconditional relaxation.",run:a=>a.containerOverrides===void 0?[]:a.containerOverrides.filter(e=>e.kind==="egress_relaxation").map(e=>t(i,{cacheKey:`container_runtime_egress_relaxation:${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}`,detail:`\`${e.exportName}\` calls \`.egress.${e.detail}(...)\` at runtime, mutating the container's egress firewall.`,metadata:{exportName:e.exportName,file:e.file,line:e.line,method:e.detail}})),source:"static",title:"Runtime egress mutation relaxes the container firewall"};export{i as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/containerStartEnableInternetOverride-B62WUura.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as n}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const i={categories:["SECURITY"],description:"A runtime `.start({ enableInternet: true, … })` call overrides the static `defineContainer` declaration and re-opens public internet egress for that container instance, defeating the `container_public_internet` lint's assumption that the declaration is authoritative.",facing:"EXTERNAL",level:"WARN",name:"container_start_enable_internet_override",remediation:"Avoid overriding `enableInternet` at `.start()` time. Set it once on the `defineContainer` declaration in `lunora/containers.ts` so the static advisors can reason about it, and gate any runtime opt-in behind a server-trusted check rather than an unconditional literal.",run:t=>t.containerOverrides===void 0?[]:t.containerOverrides.filter(e=>e.kind==="enable_internet").map(e=>n(i,{cacheKey:`container_start_enable_internet_override:${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}`,detail:`\`${e.exportName}\` calls \`.start({ enableInternet: true })\`, overriding the container's static egress posture.`,metadata:{exportName:e.exportName,file:e.file,line:e.line}})),source:"static",title:"Runtime .start() override re-enables container internet access"};export{i as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/dedupeCacheKeys-7JgxaQWV.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+const n=a=>{const t=new Map;return a.map(e=>{const c=(t.get(e.cacheKey)??0)+1;return t.set(e.cacheKey,c),c===1?e:{...e,cacheKey:`${e.cacheKey}:${c.toString()}`}})};export{n as dedupeCacheKeys};

package/dist/packem_shared/duplicateIndex-DFT7qLQD.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as o}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const r=(a,i)=>a.length>i.length?!1:a.every((n,d)=>n===i[d]),l={categories:["PERFORMANCE"],description:"A secondary index is redundant because another index already covers every lookup it serves (its columns are a leading prefix of the other's). The redundant index costs storage and is maintained on every write for no read benefit.",facing:"INTERNAL",level:"INFO",name:"duplicate_index",remediation:"Drop the redundant index; the covering index already serves its lookups.",run:a=>{const i=[];for(const n of a.schema.tables){const d=n.indexes.filter(e=>e.kind==="index");for(const e of d){if(e.unique===!0)continue;const t=d.find(s=>s===e||!r(e.fields,s.fields)?!1:e.fields.length===s.fields.length?e.name>s.name:!0);t&&i.push(o(l,{cacheKey:`duplicate_index:${n.name}:${e.name}`,detail:`Index "${e.name}" on table "${n.name}" (${e.fields.join(", ")}) is redundant — index "${t.name}" (${t.fields.join(", ")}) already covers its lookups.`,metadata:{coveredBy:{fields:t.fields,name:t.name},fields:e.fields,index:e.name,table:n.name}}))}}return i},source:"static",title:"Duplicate / redundant index"};export{l as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/emptyIndex-BiXEfyfN.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const o={categories:["SCHEMA"],description:"An index declares no columns, so it indexes nothing and can never narrow a read.",facing:"INTERNAL",level:"WARN",name:"empty_index",remediation:"Give the index its columns, or remove it.",run:a=>{const t=[];for(const n of a.schema.tables)for(const e of n.indexes)e.kind!=="index"||e.fields.length>0||t.push(i(o,{cacheKey:`empty_index:${n.name}:${e.name}`,detail:`Index "${e.name}" on table "${n.name}" declares no columns.`,metadata:{index:e.name,table:n.name}}));return t},source:"static",title:"Empty index"};export{o as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/exportSinkMisconfigured-DvpAaa6j.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as a}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const c={defineExportSink:["name","deliver"],r2Sink:["bucket","name"],webhookExportSink:["name","url"]},f={categories:["SCHEMA"],description:"A CDC export sink (`defineExportSink` / `webhookExportSink` / `r2Sink`) is missing a required config field (a webhook with no `url`, an R2 sink with no `bucket`, or a sink with no `name`/`deliver`). The sink can never deliver a change batch, so the export tap silently drains nothing.",facing:"INTERNAL",level:"ERROR",name:"export_sink_misconfigured",remediation:"Supply the missing field: a non-empty `url` for `webhookExportSink`, a `bucket` R2 binding for `r2Sink`, or `name` + `deliver` for `defineExportSink`.",run:n=>{if(n.exportSinks===void 0)return[];const t=[];for(const e of n.exportSinks){if(!e.analyzable)continue;const r=new Set(e.presentKeys),o=new Set(e.emptyKeys);for(const i of c[e.factory]??[]){if(r.has(i)&&!o.has(i))continue;const s=o.has(i)?"is set to an empty string":"is missing";t.push(a(f,{cacheKey:`export_sink_misconfigured:${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}:${i}`,detail:`\`${e.factory}({ … })\` in ${e.file}:${e.line.toString()} ${s} its required \`${i}\` field — the sink can never deliver a change batch, so the export tap drains nothing.`,metadata:{factory:e.factory,field:i,file:e.file,line:e.line}}))}}return t},source:"static",title:"Export sink is misconfigured"};export{f as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/externalSourceIncrementalNoDeletePath-DnoL64YY.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as n}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const l={categories:["SCHEMA"],description:"A `.source({ mode: 'incremental' })` table declares no delete-visibility path (`reconcileEveryMs` or `softDeleteColumn`), so upstream deletes are never applied and the materialized table accumulates phantom rows.",facing:"EXTERNAL",level:"ERROR",name:"external_source_incremental_no_delete_path",remediation:"Add `reconcileEveryMs` (a periodic full-pull sweep that GCs vanished rows) or `softDeleteColumn` (an upstream tombstone column the incremental pull returns). Incremental ingest can't see a delete otherwise.",run:o=>{const a=[];for(const e of o.schema.tables){const t=e.externalSource;if(t!==void 0){if(t.unanalyzable){a.push(n(l,{cacheKey:`external_source_incremental_no_delete_path:${e.name}`,detail:`Table \`${e.name}\`'s \`.source(...)\` config is not a static object literal, so its \`mode\`/delete-visibility can't be verified. If it is \`mode: "incremental"\`, confirm it declares \`reconcileEveryMs\` or \`softDeleteColumn\` — an incremental source without one accumulates phantom rows on every upstream delete.`,level:"WARN",metadata:{table:e.name}}));continue}t.mode!=="incremental"||t.hasReconcile||t.hasSoftDelete||a.push(n(l,{cacheKey:`external_source_incremental_no_delete_path:${e.name}`,detail:`Table \`${e.name}\` is \`.source({ mode: "incremental" })\` but declares neither \`reconcileEveryMs\` nor \`softDeleteColumn\` — an incremental pull never sees upstream deletes, so the materialized table would accumulate phantom rows. Add one of the two delete-visibility paths.`,metadata:{table:e.name}}))}}return a},source:"static",title:"Incremental sourced table has no delete-visibility path"};export{l as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/externalSourceOnGlobal-DNPLoNUg.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as l}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const o={categories:["SCHEMA"],description:"A table is both `.source(...)` and `.global()`. A global table lives in the external/global tier; a sourced table is materialized into a shard DO's SQLite — the two are mutually exclusive.",facing:"INTERNAL",level:"ERROR",name:"external_source_on_global",remediation:'Drop either `.source(...)` or `.global()`. To ingest an external database into per-tenant DOs, use `.source(...)` with `.shardBy(...)`; to read it in place as a global table, use `.global({ backend: "hyperdrive" })`.',run:t=>{const a=[];for(const e of t.schema.tables)e.externalSource===void 0||e.shardKind!=="global"||a.push(l(o,{cacheKey:`external_source_on_global:${e.name}`,detail:`Table \`${e.name}\` is both \`.source(...)\` and \`.global()\` — contradictory. A sourced table materializes into a shard DO's SQLite; a global table lives in the external tier.`,metadata:{table:e.name}}));return a},source:"static",title:"Sourced table cannot also be global"};export{o as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/externalSourceUnscoped-DqBp5jYr.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as a}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const n={categories:["SECURITY"],description:"A `.source(...)` table that is also `.shardBy(...)` has no `tenantBy` mapper, so every tenant's Durable Object runs the same unscoped query and replicates the whole multitenant table — a cross-tenant data leak.",facing:"EXTERNAL",level:"ERROR",name:"external_source_unscoped",remediation:"Add `tenantBy: (shardKey) => [shardKey]` (matching the query's bound parameters) so each shard DO pulls only its own tenant's rows. The shard key MUST bind into the source `WHERE`.",run:s=>{const t=[];for(const e of s.schema.tables)if(!(e.externalSource===void 0||e.shardKind!=="shardBy")){if(e.externalSource.unanalyzable){t.push(a(n,{cacheKey:`external_source_unscoped:${e.name}`,detail:`Table \`${e.name}\` is \`.source(...)\` + \`.shardBy(...)\` but its source config is not a static object literal, so \`tenantBy\` can't be verified. Confirm \`tenantBy\` binds the shard key into the query, or inline the config so the linter can check it — an unscoped query leaks every tenant's rows into each DO.`,level:"WARN",metadata:{table:e.name}}));continue}e.externalSource.hasTenantBy||t.push(a(n,{cacheKey:`external_source_unscoped:${e.name}`,detail:`Table \`${e.name}\` is \`.source(...)\` + \`.shardBy(...)\` but declares no \`tenantBy\` — every tenant DO would pull the whole table. Add a \`tenantBy\` that binds the shard key into the query.`,metadata:{table:e.name}}))}return t},source:"static",title:"Sourced + sharded table is not tenant-scoped"};export{n as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/filterWithoutIndex-ht2GZQWV.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as a}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const n={categories:["PERFORMANCE"],description:"A query calls `.filter()` without a `.withIndex()` / `.withSearchIndex()`, so it loads every row in the table and filters in memory — a full table scan that gets linearly slower as the table grows.",facing:"EXTERNAL",level:"WARN",name:"filter_without_index",remediation:'Narrow the read with `.withIndex("name", (q) => q.eq(...))` first, then `.filter()` only for what the index cannot express.',run:i=>{const t=[];for(const e of i.queries??[]){if(!e.hasFilter||e.hasIndex||e.table==="")continue;const l=e.line>0?`${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}`:e.file;t.push(a(n,{cacheKey:`filter_without_index:${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}:${e.table}`,detail:`Query on "${e.table}" at ${l} calls .filter() without an index — it loads every row of "${e.table}" and filters in memory.`,metadata:{file:e.file,line:e.line,table:e.table}}))}return t},source:"static",title:"Filter without index"};export{n as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+const t=(e,i)=>({cacheKey:i.cacheKey,categories:i.categories??e.categories,description:e.description,detail:i.detail,facing:i.facing??e.facing,level:i.level??e.level,metadata:i.metadata,name:e.name,remediation:e.remediation,title:e.title});export{t as i};

package/dist/packem_shared/fk-index-Bmk19RvQ.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+const d="_id",i=s=>`by${s.charAt(0).toUpperCase()}${s.slice(1)}`,n=s=>new Set(s.indexes.filter(e=>e.kind==="index").map(e=>e.fields[0]).filter(e=>e!==void 0));export{d as P,n as l,i as s};

package/dist/packem_shared/flagGatesSecurityWithUnsafeDefault-DPGFEHTt.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as s}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const i=new Set(["enforce","gate","lockdown","rls"]),o=new Set(["allow","bypass","permit"]),n=/(?<=[A-Z])(?=[A-Z][a-z])/gu,u=/(?<=[a-z0-9])(?=[A-Z])/gu,f=/[^a-z0-9]+/u,d=a=>a.replaceAll(n," ").replaceAll(u," ").toLowerCase().split(f).filter(e=>e.length>0),c=a=>{const e=d(a.key),l=e.some(t=>i.has(t)),r=e.some(t=>o.has(t));return l===r?!1:l?!a.defaultValue:a.defaultValue},p={categories:["SECURITY"],description:"A `ctx.flags.boolean(key, default)` read on a security-shaped key has a fail-open default that selects the permissive branch. OpenFeature returns the default when the provider errors, so an outage silently disables a protection (a `false` default on an `enforce`/`rls`/`gate`/`lockdown` key) or grants a permission (a `true` default on an `allow`/`permit`/`bypass` key).",facing:"EXTERNAL",level:"WARN",name:"flag_gates_security_with_unsafe_default",remediation:"Flip the default so a provider outage fails closed: default a protection flag (`enforce*`/`rls*`/`gate*`/`lockdown*`) to `true`, and a permission/bypass flag (`allow*`/`permit*`/`bypass*`) to `false`. The safe default is always the restrictive branch — never let an unreachable flag backend open access.",run:a=>a.flagSecurityDefaults===void 0?[]:a.flagSecurityDefaults.filter(e=>c(e)).map(e=>s(p,{cacheKey:`flag_gates_security_with_unsafe_default:${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}`,detail:`\`ctx.flags.boolean("${e.key}", ${String(e.defaultValue)})\` in \`${e.exportName}\` (${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}) fails open to the permissive branch — a provider outage returns \`${String(e.defaultValue)}\`, ${e.defaultValue?"granting the guarded permission":"disabling the guarded protection"}.`,metadata:{defaultValue:e.defaultValue,exportName:e.exportName,file:e.file,key:e.key,line:e.line}})),source:"static",title:"Security flag fails open to the permissive branch"};export{p as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/fromServerSchema-CJ-AQ2kw.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+const r=t=>({rlsMode:t.rlsMode,tables:Object.entries(t.tables).map(([o,a])=>{const s=[...a.indexes.map(e=>({fields:e.fields,kind:"index",name:e.name,unique:e.unique})),...a.searchIndexes.map(e=>({fields:[e.field,...e.filterFields??[]],kind:"search",name:e.name})),...a.rankIndexes.map(e=>({fields:[...e.sortBy.map(n=>n.field),...e.partitionBy??[]],kind:"rank",name:e.name})),...a.vectorIndexes.map(e=>({fields:[e.field],kind:"vector",name:e.name})),...a.geoIndexes.map(e=>({fields:[e.field],kind:"geo",name:e.name}))],i={};for(const[e,n]of Object.entries(a.shape)){const d=n.kind==="optional"?n._meta?.inner:n;i[e]=d?.kind??n.kind}const l=new Set;for(const[e,n]of Object.entries(a.shape))(n.kind==="optional"||n._meta?.column?.notNull===!1)&&l.add(e);return{externallyManaged:a.isExternallyManaged??!1,externalSource:a.externalSource?{hasReconcile:a.externalSource.reconcileEveryMs!==void 0,hasSoftDelete:a.externalSource.softDeleteColumn!==void 0,hasTenantBy:a.externalSource.tenantBy!==void 0,mode:a.externalSource.mode}:void 0,columnKinds:i,fields:Object.keys(a.shape),indexes:s,isPublic:a.isPublic??!1,name:o,optionalFields:l,shardKind:a.shardMode.kind,softDelete:a.softDeleteMode,ttl:a.ttlPolicy,relations:Object.entries(a.relationMap).map(([e,n])=>({field:n.field,kind:n.kind,name:e,onDelete:n.onDelete,references:n.references,table:n.table}))}})});export{r as fromServerSchema};

package/dist/packem_shared/geoIndexFieldNotGeopoint-DAGLZtaH.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as c}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const d={categories:["SCHEMA"],description:"A `.geoIndex(name, { field })` points at a column that is not a `v.geoPoint()`, so its geohash companion can't be built and `withGeoIndex(...)` can never match.",facing:"INTERNAL",level:"ERROR",name:"geo_index_field_not_geopoint",remediation:"Point the geo index at a `v.geoPoint()` column, or change the column's type to `v.geoPoint()`.",run:a=>{const i=[];for(const e of a.schema.tables)for(const n of e.indexes){if(n.kind!=="geo")continue;const o=n.fields[0];if(o===void 0)continue;const t=e.columnKinds?.[o];t===void 0||t==="geoPoint"||i.push(c(d,{cacheKey:`geo_index_field_not_geopoint:${e.name}:${n.name}:${o}`,detail:`Geo index "${n.name}" on table "${e.name}" indexes column "${o}", which is a ${t}, not a v.geoPoint().`,metadata:{field:o,index:n.name,kind:t,table:e.name}}))}return i},source:"static",title:"Geo index field is not a geoPoint"};export{d as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/geoIndexUnused-BgDE6_AR.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as t}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const r={categories:["SCHEMA"],description:"A `.geoIndex(name, { field })` is declared but no handler reads it via `withGeoIndex(name, …)`. The geohash companion column is maintained on every write and read by nothing — dead overhead, the geo analogue of a dead index.",facing:"INTERNAL",level:"INFO",name:"geo_index_unused",remediation:'Query the index from a handler with `ctx.db.query("<table>").withGeoIndex("<name>", q => q.near(point, radius))`, or drop the `.geoIndex(...)` declaration so writes stop maintaining its geohash companion.',run:a=>{if(a.geoIndexUsages===void 0)return[];const i=a.geoIndexUsages;if(i.some(e=>e.indexName===""))return[];const d=new Set(i.map(e=>e.indexName)),o=[];for(const e of a.schema.tables)for(const n of e.indexes)n.kind!=="geo"||d.has(n.name)||o.push(t(r,{cacheKey:`geo_index_unused:${e.name}:${n.name}`,detail:`No handler reads geo index "${n.name}" on table "${e.name}" via \`withGeoIndex("${n.name}", …)\` — it's declared but never queried, so its geohash companion is maintained on every write for nothing.`,metadata:{index:n.name,table:e.name}}));return o},source:"static",title:"Geo index is declared but never queried"};export{r as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/hardcodedSecret-rIRc3aNk.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{dedupeCacheKeys as i}from"./dedupeCacheKeys-7JgxaQWV.mjs";import{i as o}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const a={categories:["SECURITY"],description:"A secret-shaped string literal (live API key, access key, private key, or high-entropy token) is hard-coded in the source. Committed secrets leak via clone/fork/history and force a redeploy to rotate.",facing:"INTERNAL",level:"ERROR",name:"hardcoded_secret",remediation:'Move the secret out of source: set it locally in `.dev.vars` (`lunora env set <NAME> "<value>"`) and in production with `wrangler secret put <NAME>`, then read it at runtime from `env.<NAME>`. Rotate the exposed value — assume it is already compromised.',run:t=>{if(t.secretLiterals===void 0)return[];const r=[];for(const e of t.secretLiterals)r.push(o(a,{cacheKey:`hardcoded_secret:${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}:${e.kind}`,detail:`A ${e.kind.replaceAll("_"," ")} (${e.preview}) is hard-coded at ${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}. Move it to \`.dev.vars\` / \`wrangler secret put\` and read it from \`env\`. Rotate the exposed value.`,metadata:{file:e.file,kind:e.kind,line:e.line,preview:e.preview}}));return i(r)},source:"static",title:"Hard-coded secret in source"};export{a as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/helpers-DwlvEUCh.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+const t=new Set(["accountId","authorId","createdBy","createdById","organizationId","orgId","ownerId","tenantId","updatedBy","userId","workspaceId"]),a=new Set(["address","dateOfBirth","dob","email","firstName","lastName","phone","phoneNumber","socialSecurityNumber","ssn"]),d=new Set(["_creationTime","_id"]),n=e=>e.fields.filter(i=>t.has(i)||a.has(i)),s=e=>new Set([...d,...e.fields]),o=e=>e.visibility==="public"&&(e.kind==="mutation"||e.kind==="action");export{a as P,o as i,n as o,s as t};

package/dist/packem_shared/hotShard-DVs_U17R.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as g}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const l=.5,f=50,p={categories:["PERFORMANCE"],description:"One shard is taking a disproportionate share of a sharded function's traffic, so the busy shard becomes a single-DO bottleneck while its siblings sit idle — the hot-key skew sharding is meant to avoid.",facing:"EXTERNAL",level:"WARN",name:"hot_shard",remediation:"Re-shard on a higher-cardinality / more evenly-distributed key, or split the hot entity's state, so request volume spreads across shards instead of concentrating on one.",run:i=>{const h=(i.shardTraffic??[]).filter(t=>t.requests>0),a=new Map;for(const t of h){const s=t.group??"",r=a.get(s);r===void 0?a.set(s,[t]):r.push(t)}const n=[];for(const[t,s]of a){const r=s.reduce((e,o)=>e+o.requests,0);if(!(s.length<2||r<f))for(const e of s){const o=e.requests/r;if(o<l)continue;const d=e.group!==void 0&&e.group!==""?`"${e.group}" `:"",u=e.shardKey===""?"the root shard":`shard "${e.shardKey}"`,c=Math.round(o*100);n.push(g(p,{cacheKey:`hot_shard:${t}:${e.shardKey}`,detail:`${d}${u} handled ${e.requests.toString()} of ${r.toString()} requests (${c.toString()}%) across ${s.length.toString()} shards — a hot-key skew. Re-shard on a more evenly-distributed key.`,metadata:{group:e.group,requests:e.requests,shardCount:s.length,shardKey:e.shardKey,share:o,totalRequests:r}}))}}return n},source:"runtime",title:"Hot shard"};export{p as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/httpActionMissingAuthGuard-BZDdeW_D.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as a}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const n=(t,e)=>t==="httpRoute"&&e?`\`httpRoute\` ${e} handler`:"`httpAction` handler",r={categories:["SECURITY"],description:"An `httpAction`/`httpRoute` handler performs a side effect (`ctx.runMutation`/`ctx.runAction`/a `ctx.db` write) but never reads `ctx.auth` — an unauthenticated HTTP endpoint driving a state change, bypassing the identity/RLS checks that guard the rest of the app.",facing:"EXTERNAL",level:"WARN",name:"http_action_missing_auth_guard",remediation:"Read `ctx.auth` in the handler before the side effect — call `await ctx.auth.getIdentity()` (or check `ctx.auth.userId`) and reject unauthenticated/unauthorized requests, or forward through a `mutation`/`action` whose RLS policies enforce access. If the endpoint is intentionally public (e.g. a signed webhook), verify the provider signature before the write.",run:t=>t.httpActionGuards===void 0?[]:t.httpActionGuards.filter(e=>!e.readsAuth).map(e=>{const i=n(e.kind,e.method);return a(r,{cacheKey:`http_action_missing_auth_guard:${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}`,detail:`${i} \`${e.exportName}\` (${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}) calls \`ctx.${e.sideEffect}\` but never reads \`ctx.auth\` — an anonymous caller can drive this write. Authenticate the request before the side effect.`,metadata:{exportName:e.exportName,file:e.file,kind:e.kind,line:e.line,sideEffect:e.sideEffect,...e.method?{method:e.method}:{}}})}),source:"static",title:"Unauthenticated HTTP handler performs a side effect"};export{r as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/httpActionResponseHeaderInjection-D063rB7U.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as a}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const i={"headers-append":"a `headers.append(...)` call","headers-ctor":"a `new Headers({...})` initializer","headers-set":"a `headers.set(...)` call","response-init":"a `Response` init `headers` object"},n={categories:["SECURITY"],description:"An `httpAction` handler writes a response-header value derived from raw request input (`request.headers`/URL/query/body) with no CR/LF sanitizer. A `Request`-derived string placed verbatim into a response header lets a caller smuggle `\\r\\n` and inject extra headers or split the response (HTTP response splitting / header injection).",facing:"EXTERNAL",level:"WARN",name:"http_action_response_header_injection",remediation:"Never place a raw request value into a response header. Route it through a CR/LF guard (`isSafeHeaderValue` from `@lunora/server`, rejecting values containing `\\r`/`\\n`/`\\0`), URL-encode it (`encodeURIComponent`), or coerce it to a number — before writing the header. `String(...)` / `.toString()` do NOT strip CR/LF and are not sufficient.",run:r=>r.httpHeaderWrites===void 0?[]:r.httpHeaderWrites.map(e=>{const t=e.headerName===""?"a response header":`the \`${e.headerName}\` response header`;return a(n,{cacheKey:`http_action_response_header_injection:${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}`,detail:`\`${e.exportName}\` (${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}) writes ${t} from raw request input via ${i[e.via]} with no CR/LF guard — a caller can smuggle \`\\r\\n\` to inject headers or split the response. Route the value through \`isSafeHeaderValue\` or \`encodeURIComponent\` first.`,metadata:{exportName:e.exportName,file:e.file,headerName:e.headerName,line:e.line,via:e.via}})}),source:"static",title:"Response header written from unsanitized request input"};export{n as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/hyperdriveOutsideAction-CRmOQz67.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as a}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const n={categories:["SCHEMA"],description:"A `query`/`mutation` handler accesses Hyperdrive via `ctx.sql`. Hyperdrive hits an external database Lunora does not own: queries are non-deterministic (like `fetch`) and external writes are invisible to live queries. `ctx.sql` is available on `ActionCtx` only and must be confined to `action` handlers.",facing:"EXTERNAL",level:"WARN",name:"hyperdrive_outside_action",remediation:"Move the `ctx.sql` access into an `action(...)` (the only context where it is typed), where external I/O is allowed. If a query/mutation needs the data, have the action read it via `ctx.sql` and write a projection into a `defineSchema` DO/D1 table — that write is tracked by live queries, whereas the external DB is not.",run:t=>{if(t.hyperdriveCalls===void 0)return[];const i=[];for(const e of t.hyperdriveCalls)i.push(a(n,{cacheKey:`hyperdrive_outside_action:${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}:${e.callee}`,detail:`\`${e.callee}(…)\` in ${e.exportName} (${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}) runs inside a ${e.kind} handler — Hyperdrive's \`ctx.sql\` is non-deterministic and non-reactive, so it is available only in actions. Move the external SQL into an \`action\` and project the result into a Lunora table if a query/mutation needs it.`,metadata:{callee:e.callee,exportName:e.exportName,file:e.file,kind:e.kind,line:e.line}}));return i},source:"static",title:"Hyperdrive `ctx.sql` used outside an action"};export{n as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/identityUndeclaredClaimTrusted-BYRYGQ74.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as a}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const d={categories:["SECURITY"],description:"An authorization read of `auth.identity.<key>` for a claim outside the declared `defineIdentity({ ... })` contract. `defineIdentity` validates only declared claims and forwards undeclared ones verbatim, so the value the policy trusts was never validated — an attacker's token can forge it.",facing:"EXTERNAL",level:"WARN",name:"identity_undeclared_claim_trusted",remediation:"Declare the claim in `defineIdentity({ ... })` (e.g. `role: v.optional(v.string())`) so the worker validates it at the trust boundary before a policy reads it, or stop trusting it for authorization. Declared claims (and `userId`) are validated; undeclared claims are forwarded unchecked.",run:t=>t.identityClaimReads===void 0?[]:t.identityClaimReads.filter(e=>!e.declared).map(e=>{const i=`\`${e.exportName}\` (${e.file}:${e.line.toString()})`;return a(d,{cacheKey:`identity_undeclared_claim_trusted:${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}:${e.key}`,detail:`\`${e.key}\` in ${i} is read off \`identity\` but is not declared in \`defineIdentity({ ... })\`. Undeclared claims are forwarded unvalidated, so this authorization decision trusts a forgeable value.`,metadata:{exportName:e.exportName,file:e.file,key:e.key,line:e.line}})}),source:"static",title:"Authorization trusts an undeclared identity claim"};export{d as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/imagesUrlSourceFromUserInput-Cy5pc_dA.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{m as r}from"./argument-derived-sink-BpO3NPPM.mjs";const a=r({cacheKey:e=>`images_url_source_from_user_input:${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}`,categories:["SECURITY"],description:"A `buildImageDeliveryUrl({ key, … })` call's `key` — the CDN transform's source image, an absolute URL or an origin-relative key — is derived from the handler's `args` with no server-side scoping, so any caller can point the CDN's on-the-fly transform at an attacker-chosen origin (SSRF / open proxy) or an arbitrary key under the account's own store.",detail:e=>`\`buildImageDeliveryUrl\` in \`${e.exportName}\` (${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}) builds its delivery URL from a \`key\` derived from \`args\` with no server-side scoping — any caller can point the CDN's on-the-fly transform at an attacker-chosen origin or store key. Validate \`key\` against an allowlist, or derive it from server-trusted state.`,facing:"EXTERNAL",getAccesses:e=>e.imageDeliveryUrlAccesses,level:"WARN",metadata:e=>({exportName:e.exportName,file:e.file,line:e.line}),name:"images_url_source_from_user_input",remediation:"Validate `key` against an allowlist of known origins/prefixes before calling `buildImageDeliveryUrl`, or derive it from server-trusted state (a stored record's own image key) rather than passing `args` straight through.",title:"Image delivery URL built from unscoped user input"});export{a as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/indexReferencesUnknownField-r3QHlaz6.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as r}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";import{t as d}from"./helpers-DwlvEUCh.mjs";const c={categories:["SCHEMA"],description:"An index references a column that is not declared on its table. The index can never match, and the typo would otherwise surface only at runtime.",facing:"INTERNAL",level:"ERROR",name:"index_references_unknown_field",remediation:"Fix the column name in the index declaration, or add the column to the table.",run:a=>{const o=[];for(const e of a.schema.tables){const i=d(e);for(const n of e.indexes)for(const t of n.fields)i.has(t)||o.push(r(c,{cacheKey:`index_references_unknown_field:${e.name}:${n.name}:${t}`,detail:`Index "${n.name}" on table "${e.name}" references column "${t}", which is not declared on the table.`,metadata:{field:t,index:n.name,indexKind:n.kind,table:e.name}}))}return o},source:"static",title:"Index references unknown field"};export{c as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/indexUtilization-QfbIH_w4.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as d}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const i=25,n={categories:["PERFORMANCE"],description:"Recorded reads show an index the workload doesn't pay for: either a declared index no read ever used (dead overhead on every write) or a table read hot with no index at all (a repeated full scan that degrades as it grows).",facing:"INTERNAL",level:"INFO",name:"index_utilization",remediation:"Drop a dead index so writes stop maintaining it; add an index covering the hot full-scanned table's read predicate so the read stops scanning every row.",run:t=>{const a=[];for(const e of t.indexHits??[])e.reads>0||a.push(d(n,{cacheKey:`index_utilization:dead_index:${e.table}:${e.index}`,detail:`Index "${e.index}" on table "${e.table}" has recorded no reads since its counter was created — it's dead overhead: every write maintains it and nothing reads through it.`,metadata:{index:e.index,kind:"dead_index",reads:e.reads,table:e.table}}));for(const e of t.tableScans??[])e.scans<i||a.push(d(n,{cacheKey:`index_utilization:hot_scan:${e.table}`,detail:`Table "${e.table}" has been full-scanned ${e.scans.toString()} times (cumulative) with no index — a repeated full scan that degrades linearly as "${e.table}" grows. Add an index covering the read predicate.`,facing:"EXTERNAL",level:"WARN",metadata:{kind:"hot_scan",scans:e.scans,table:e.table}}));return a},source:"runtime",title:"Index utilization"};export{n as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/insertManyUnsafeUserData-DrH7PdRs.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as r}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const s={categories:["SECURITY"],description:"A public procedure calls `ctx.db.insertManyUnsafe(...)`, which writes rows straight to storage and bypasses both the per-row validators and the schema's insert triggers (server-trusted columns, ownership stamping, RLS write checks). On a public entry point the rows are request-shaped, so a caller can write columns they shouldn't control and skip every trigger-enforced invariant.",facing:"EXTERNAL",level:"WARN",name:"insert_many_unsafe_user_data",remediation:"Use the validated `ctx.db.insert(...)` path in public procedures so validators and insert triggers run. If you need the unsafe bulk write, move it into an internal function (`internalMutation`/`internalAction`) that is fed only server-constructed rows, never request input.",run:t=>t.procedureProtections===void 0?[]:t.procedureProtections.filter(e=>e.usesInsertManyUnsafe&&e.visibility==="public").map(e=>r(s,{cacheKey:`insert_many_unsafe_user_data:${e.file}:${e.exportName}`,detail:`\`${e.exportName}\` (${e.file}) is public and calls \`ctx.db.insertManyUnsafe(...)\`, bypassing validators and insert triggers on request-shaped rows. Switch to \`ctx.db.insert(...)\`, or move the bulk write into an internal function fed server-built rows.`,metadata:{exportName:e.exportName,file:e.file,kind:e.kind}})),source:"static",title:"Public procedure uses insertManyUnsafe (bypasses validators and triggers)"};export{s as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/kvUnscopedUserKeyIdor-B4lGxRxh.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{m as r}from"./argument-derived-sink-BpO3NPPM.mjs";const s=r({cacheKey:e=>`kv_unscoped_user_key_idor:${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}`,categories:["SECURITY"],description:"A `ctx.kv` read/write uses a namespace key derived from the handler's `args` with no server-side scoping. Workers KV is a flat namespace, so an unscoped key lets any caller read, overwrite, or delete another user's entry — an insecure direct object reference (IDOR).",detail:e=>`\`ctx.kv.${e.method}\` in \`${e.exportName}\` (${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}) uses a KV key derived from \`args\` with no server-side scoping — any caller can read/overwrite/delete another user's entry (IDOR). Prefix the key with a server-trusted identity (e.g. \`\${ctx.auth.userId}:…\`).`,facing:"EXTERNAL",getAccesses:e=>e.kvKeyAccesses,level:"ERROR",metadata:e=>({exportName:e.exportName,file:e.file,line:e.line,method:e.method}),name:"kv_unscoped_user_key_idor",remediation:"Prefix every `ctx.kv` key with a server-trusted identity (e.g. `${ctx.auth.userId}:${args.id}`) so a caller can only address their own entries. Never pass request input straight to `ctx.kv.get`/`put`/`delete`.",title:"Possible IDOR from arg-derived unscoped KV key"});export{s as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/mailInboundDispatchWithoutVerify-BivYJ5F9.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const t={categories:["SECURITY"],description:"`createInboundEmailHandler({...})` has no `verify` hook, so it trusts every inbound message — the `from` address is spoofable and DKIM/SPF/DMARC verdicts go unchecked. If the handler dispatches into a Lunora function (admin bearer, RLS disabled), a forged sender can drive privileged writes (a confused-deputy escalation).",facing:"EXTERNAL",level:"ERROR",name:"mail_inbound_dispatch_without_verify",remediation:"Pass a `verify` hook to `createInboundEmailHandler({...})` that rejects the message unless its DKIM/SPF/DMARC authentication verdicts pass and the sender is expected — before any dispatch into a Lunora function. Never trust the `from` header alone.",run:a=>a.configCalls===void 0?[]:a.configCalls.filter(e=>e.callee==="createInboundEmailHandler"&&e.analyzable&&!e.presentKeys.includes("verify")).map(e=>i(t,{cacheKey:`mail_inbound_dispatch_without_verify:${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}`,detail:`\`createInboundEmailHandler({...})\` in ${e.file}:${e.line.toString()} has no \`verify\` hook — it trusts the spoofable \`from\` address and unchecked DKIM/SPF/DMARC verdicts. A forged sender can then reach whatever the handler dispatches to (a Lunora function runs with the admin bearer and RLS disabled). Add a \`verify\` gate that enforces the authentication verdicts before dispatch.`,metadata:{callee:e.callee,file:e.file,line:e.line}})),source:"static",title:"Inbound email handler without a verify hook"};export{t as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/mailRecipientFromRequestInput-BR_oSh65.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as t}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const r={categories:["SECURITY"],description:"A `ctx.mail`/`ctx.email` `send`/`queue` call sets a recipient field (to/cc/bcc) from the handler's `args` with no server-side scoping. Sending to an address taken straight from request input turns the deployment into an open relay / spam amplifier.",facing:"EXTERNAL",level:"WARN",name:"mail_recipient_from_request_input",remediation:"Derive recipients from server-trusted state (e.g. the authenticated user's own record via `ctx.auth`), never straight from `args`. If user-chosen recipients are intended, gate the path behind authentication and rate limiting.",run:i=>i.mailRecipientAccesses===void 0?[]:i.mailRecipientAccesses.map(e=>t(r,{cacheKey:`mail_recipient_from_request_input:${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}`,detail:`\`ctx.mail.${e.method}\` in \`${e.exportName}\` (${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}) sets a recipient field (to/cc/bcc) derived from \`args\` with no server-side scoping — any caller can direct mail to an arbitrary address (open relay / spam amplifier). Derive the recipient from server-trusted state instead (e.g. \`ctx.auth.user.email\`).`,metadata:{exportName:e.exportName,file:e.file,line:e.line,method:e.method}})),source:"static",title:"Mail recipient derived from request input"};export{r as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/maskUncoveredPiiColumn-DqPfZM2O.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as u}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const d={categories:["SECURITY"],description:"A public procedure reads a table whose columns are masked by `.use(mask(...))` elsewhere in the app, but this procedure's builder chain does not include `.use(mask(...))`. It returns those columns in the clear while a sibling procedure redacts them.",facing:"EXTERNAL",level:"WARN",name:"mask_uncovered_pii_column",remediation:"Add `.use(mask(policies))` to the procedure's builder chain — e.g. `c.use(mask(myMasks)).query(...)` — so its returned rows redact the same columns as the rest of the app. If this procedure is intentionally privileged (e.g. an admin export), declare it with `internalQuery` / `internalMutation` / `internalAction` instead of the public builder so the intent is explicit.",run:a=>{if(a.maskProcedures===void 0)return[];const i=new Map;for(const t of a.maskProcedures)for(const{column:o,table:e}of t.maskColumns){if(e===""||o==="")continue;const s=i.get(e)??new Set;s.add(o),i.set(e,s)}if(i.size===0)return[];const r=[];for(const t of a.maskProcedures){if(t.usesMask||t.visibility==="internal")continue;const o=new Set;for(const e of t.tablesRead)e!==""&&i.has(e)&&o.add(e);for(const e of o){const s=[...i.get(e)??new Set].toSorted((n,l)=>n.localeCompare(l)),c=s.map(n=>`\`${n}\``).join(", ");r.push(u(d,{cacheKey:`mask_uncovered_pii_column:${t.file}:${t.exportName}:${e}`,detail:`\`${t.exportName}\` in ${t.file} reads table \`${e}\` without \`.use(mask(...))\` — its column${s.length===1?"":"s"} ${c} ${s.length===1?"is":"are"} masked elsewhere in the app but returned in the clear here.`,metadata:{columns:s,exportName:t.exportName,file:t.file,table:e}}))}}return r},source:"static",title:"Maskable column returned without mask() middleware"};export{d as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/maskWeakHashStrategyOnPii-CEiiGgT7.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as s}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const i=/address|birthdate|creditcard|dateofbirth|dob|driverslicense|email|firstname|fullname|lastname|nationalid|passport|phone|socialsecurity|ssn|taxid/u,o=a=>i.test(a.replaceAll(/[^a-z0-9]/giu,"").toLowerCase()),r={categories:["SECURITY"],description:'A `mask(policies)` column named like PII (email, SSN, phone, …) uses the `"hash"` strategy. `"hash"` is an unsalted 32-bit FNV-1a digest — brute-force-recoverable and cross-row-correlatable — not a confidentiality control, so it does not actually hide the value.',facing:"EXTERNAL",level:"WARN",name:"mask_weak_hash_strategy_on_pii",remediation:'Use `"redact"` instead of `"hash"` for this column — e.g. `mask({ <table>: { <column>: "redact" } })`. Reserve `"hash"` for columns where a stable, joinable pseudonym is the goal and the value itself is not sensitive.',run:a=>{if(a.maskStrategies===void 0)return[];const t=[];for(const e of a.maskStrategies)e.strategy!=="hash"||!o(e.column)||t.push(s(r,{cacheKey:`mask_weak_hash_strategy_on_pii:${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}`,detail:`\`${e.exportName}\` in ${e.file} masks \`${e.table===""?e.column:`${e.table}.${e.column}`}\` with \`"hash"\` — its name suggests PII, and \`"hash"\` is brute-force-recoverable and leaks cross-row equality. Use \`"redact"\` instead.`,metadata:{column:e.column,exportName:e.exportName,file:e.file,table:e.table}}));return t},source:"static",title:'Weak "hash" mask strategy on a PII column'};export{r as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/maskedRelationLeakViaWith-CxYk0MDW.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as s}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const l=a=>{const t=new Set;for(const o of a.maskProcedures??[])for(const{table:n}of o.maskColumns)n!==""&&t.add(n);for(const o of a.maskStrategies??[])o.table!==""&&t.add(o.table);return t},d=a=>{const t=new Map;for(const o of a.schema.tables)for(const n of o.relations)t.set(`${o.name} ${n.name}`,n.table);return t},c={categories:["SECURITY"],description:"A public read hydrates a masked table through a `with` relation. Column masking does not descend into `with`-hydrated relations, so the related table's masked columns are returned in the clear.",facing:"EXTERNAL",level:"INFO",name:"masked_relation_leak_via_with",remediation:"Don't hydrate a masked table through `with` on an unprotected read: drop the relation, project only non-sensitive columns, or route the parent read through a procedure that re-applies masking to the joined table. Masking is per-procedure and top-level only — it never reaches `with`-loaded relations.",run:a=>{if(a.relationLoads===void 0)return[];const t=l(a);if(t.size===0)return[];const o=d(a),n=[];for(const e of a.relationLoads)if(!(e.visibility!=="public"||e.parentTable===""))for(const i of e.relations){const r=o.get(`${e.parentTable} ${i}`);r===void 0||!t.has(r)||n.push(s(c,{cacheKey:`masked_relation_leak_via_with:${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}:${e.parentTable}:${i}`,detail:`The public read in \`${e.exportName}\` (${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}) hydrates relation \`${i}\` (masked table \`${r}\`) via \`with\` on \`${e.parentTable}\`. Masking is top-level only and does not descend into \`with\`, so \`${r}\`'s masked columns are returned in the clear.`,metadata:{exportName:e.exportName,file:e.file,line:e.line,parentTable:e.parentTable,relation:i,relationTable:r}}))}return n},source:"static",title:"Masked table surfaced unmasked through a with-relation on a public read"};export{c as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/mutatorFullRowReplace-CEgecSGm.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as r}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const o={categories:["SCHEMA"],description:"A custom mutator's `server` impl writes with `ctx.db.replace(id, document)` — a whole-row overwrite. On a synced table this clobbers a concurrent edit to a different column; `ctx.db.patch(id, { field })` merges at the column level so independent field edits coexist.",facing:"EXTERNAL",level:"WARN",name:"mutator_full_row_replace",remediation:"Prefer `ctx.db.patch(id, { onlyTheChangedField })` so a concurrent edit to another column isn't lost. Keep `replace` only when the mutator genuinely owns the entire row (e.g. a full-form save).",run:t=>t.mutatorWrites===void 0?[]:t.mutatorWrites.map(e=>r(o,{cacheKey:`mutator_full_row_replace:${e.exportName}:${String(e.line)}`,detail:`Mutator \`${e.exportName}\` (${e.file}:${String(e.line)}) writes with \`ctx.db.replace(...)\`, overwriting the whole row. A concurrent edit to a different column is clobbered — use \`ctx.db.patch(id, { field })\` to merge at the column level.`,metadata:{exportName:e.exportName,file:e.file,line:e.line}})),source:"static",title:"Mutator overwrites the whole row (clobbers concurrent column edits)"};export{o as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/nondeterministicQueryMutation-BaMfbAk_.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as s}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const l={categories:["SCHEMA"],description:"A `query`/`mutation` handler calls a non-deterministic API (`Date.now`, `Math.random`, `crypto.randomUUID`, `crypto.getRandomValues`, or `fetch`). These handlers may be re-run on OCC retry / subscription re-evaluation, so they must be deterministic — time, randomness, and network belong in an `action`.",facing:"EXTERNAL",level:"WARN",name:"nondeterministic_query_mutation",remediation:"Move the non-deterministic call into an `action(...)` (which runs once and may use ambient APIs), then pass the computed value into the mutation as an argument — e.g. compute `Date.now()` in the action and call `ctx.runMutation(api.…, { now })`. Take generated ids/timestamps as args instead of producing them in the handler.",run:i=>{if(i.nondeterministicCalls===void 0)return[];const a=[],o=new Map;for(const e of i.nondeterministicCalls){const t=`${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}:${e.callee}`,n=(o.get(t)??0)+1;o.set(t,n);const r=n>1?`:${n.toString()}`:"";a.push(s(l,{cacheKey:`nondeterministic_query_mutation:${t}${r}`,detail:`\`${e.callee}(…)\` in ${e.exportName} (${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}) runs inside a ${e.kind} handler — query/mutation handlers must be deterministic. Compute it in an \`action\` and pass the value into the mutation as an argument.`,metadata:{callee:e.callee,exportName:e.exportName,file:e.file,kind:e.kind,line:e.line}}))}return a},source:"static",title:"Non-deterministic call in query/mutation handler"};export{l as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/normalizeIdUsedAsAuthorization-FjISSXJm.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as s}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const n={delete:"deletes the row",get:"reads the row",patch:"patches the row"},l={categories:["SECURITY"],description:"A `.public()` `query`/`mutation` gates a `ctx.db.get`/`patch`/`delete` on a null-checked `ctx.db.normalizeId(table, id)` result with no ownership predicate and no RLS. `normalizeId` validates id *shape* only — it never reads the database — so a non-null result proves the id is well-formed, never that the caller owns the row (an IDOR).",facing:"EXTERNAL",level:"INFO",name:"normalize_id_used_as_authorization",remediation:'Don\'t treat a non-null `normalizeId` result as authorization — it only validates id shape. After loading the row, compare its ownership column (`userId`/`ownerId`/…) against the server-trusted identity (`ctx.auth.userId`), or protect the procedure with `.use(rls(...))` / put the schema in `.rls("required")` mode so the row policy runs on every access.',run:t=>{if(t.normalizeIdAuthorizations===void 0)return[];const i=t.schema.rlsMode==="required",r=new Set(t.schema.tables.filter(e=>e.isPublic).map(e=>e.name)),a=[];for(const e of t.normalizeIdAuthorizations){if(e.visibility!=="public"||e.usesRls||e.mentionsOwnership||i&&(e.table===""||!r.has(e.table)))continue;const o=e.table===""?"the row":`the \`${e.table}\` row`;a.push(s(l,{cacheKey:`normalize_id_used_as_authorization:${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}`,detail:`Public procedure \`${e.exportName}\` (${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}) gates access on \`ctx.db.normalizeId(...)\` and then ${n[e.sinkMethod]} — but \`normalizeId\` only validates id shape, it never reads the database or checks ownership. Any caller supplying a well-formed id of ${o} reaches it (IDOR). Compare the loaded row's ownership column against \`ctx.auth\`, or cover the procedure with \`.use(rls(...))\`.`,metadata:{exportName:e.exportName,file:e.file,line:e.line,sinkMethod:e.sinkMethod,table:e.table}}))}return a},source:"static",title:"normalizeId result used as authorization (validates id shape, not ownership)"};export{l as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/notifyMissingPushConfig-C_GbVw3S.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as n}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const i={categories:["SCHEMA"],description:"The app sends push notifications via `ctx.push` but `defineNotify(...)` configures neither a Web Push nor an FCM channel, so every send fails at runtime. Wire at least one push channel (`webPush` and/or `fcm`) and provide its secrets (`VAPID_*` / `FCM_*`).",facing:"INTERNAL",level:"WARN",name:"notify_missing_push_config",remediation:"In `lunora/notify.ts`, wire a push channel: `defineNotify({ webPush: (env) => webPushFromEnv(env) })` and set `VAPID_PUBLIC_KEY` / `VAPID_PRIVATE_KEY` / `VAPID_SUBJECT` in `.dev.vars` (or configure `fcm` with `FCM_PROJECT_ID`). Generate a VAPID keypair with `npx web-push generate-vapid-keys`.",run:s=>{const e=s.notifyConfig;return e===void 0||!e.usesPush||e.hasWebPush||e.hasFcm?[]:[n(i,{cacheKey:"notify_missing_push_config",detail:"`ctx.push` is used to send notifications, but `defineNotify(...)` wires neither `webPush` nor `fcm` — every push send will fail at runtime. Configure at least one push channel and its secrets.",metadata:{hasFcm:e.hasFcm,hasWebPush:e.hasWebPush,usesPush:e.usesPush}})]},source:"static",title:"Push used with no Web Push / FCM channel configured"};export{i as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/notifySendOutsideAction-B0jZuUP3.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const a={categories:["SCHEMA"],description:"A `query`/`mutation` handler sends a notification via `ctx.notify`/`ctx.push`. A send is external I/O (a `fetch` to a push service / FCM): it is non-deterministic like `fetch`, and a mutation re-run on OCC retry would re-send it (duplicate pushes). These facades are available on `ActionCtx` only and must be confined to `action` handlers.",facing:"EXTERNAL",level:"WARN",name:"notify_send_outside_action",remediation:"Move the `ctx.notify`/`ctx.push` send into an `action(...)`, where external I/O is allowed. If a query/mutation must trigger a notification, have it enqueue the send (`enqueuePushBroadcast` via `@lunora/queue`) or schedule an action — the queue/scheduler runs the send exactly once, off the transactional path.",run:n=>{if(n.notifyCalls===void 0)return[];const t=[];for(const e of n.notifyCalls)t.push(i(a,{cacheKey:`notify_send_outside_action:${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}:${e.callee}`,detail:`\`${e.callee}(…)\` in ${e.exportName} (${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}) runs inside a ${e.kind} handler — a notification send is non-deterministic external I/O and a retried ${e.kind} would re-send it. Move it into an \`action\`, or enqueue/schedule the send.`,metadata:{callee:e.callee,exportName:e.exportName,file:e.file,kind:e.kind,line:e.line}}));return t},source:"static",title:"Notification send used outside an action"};export{a as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/outputProjectionMissingOnPublicRead-9Pm9766s.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as r}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";import{P as l}from"./helpers-DwlvEUCh.mjs";const s={categories:["SECURITY"],description:"A `.public()` `query` returns raw table rows (no `.output(...)` projection, no `.use(mask(...))`) from a table carrying PII-named columns (`email`, `phone`, `ssn`, …). Every column ships to the caller, and a column added to the table later leaks by default.",facing:"EXTERNAL",level:"INFO",name:"output_projection_missing_on_public_read",remediation:"Add an explicit return projection to the public query — `.output(v.object({ … }))` listing only the fields a client needs — or apply a `.use(mask(...))` policy to the PII columns. This makes the exposed shape intentional and stops a newly-added column from leaking through this query by default.",run:o=>{if(o.rawRowReturns===void 0)return[];const n=new Map;for(const e of o.schema.tables){const t=e.fields.filter(i=>l.has(i));t.length>0&&n.set(e.name,t)}const a=[];for(const e of o.rawRowReturns){if(e.visibility!=="public"||e.usesOutput||e.usesMask||e.table==="")continue;const t=n.get(e.table);t!==void 0&&a.push(r(s,{cacheKey:`output_projection_missing_on_public_read:${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}`,detail:`Public query \`${e.exportName}\` (${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}) returns raw \`${e.table}\` rows with no \`.output(...)\` projection — shipping PII column(s) ${t.join(", ")} to every caller, and any column added to \`${e.table}\` later leaks by default. Project the return with \`.output(v.object({ … }))\` or mask the PII columns.`,metadata:{columns:t,exportName:e.exportName,file:e.file,line:e.line,table:e.table}}))}return a},source:"static",title:"Public query returns raw rows with PII and no output projection"};export{s as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/ownerFieldFromArgsNotAuth-BoR9vvst.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as r}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const n={categories:["SECURITY"],description:"A `ctx.db` write sets an ownership/identity column (`userId`, `ownerId`, `tenantId`, …) from the handler's `args`. The caller controls who the row belongs to, so any caller can write rows owned by another user or tenant — an act-as-any-user / cross-tenant IDOR.",facing:"EXTERNAL",level:"ERROR",name:"owner_field_from_args_not_auth",remediation:"Stamp the ownership column from the server-trusted identity (`ctx.auth.userId` / `ctx.identity`), never from request input. Drop the field from the accepted `args` so a caller cannot supply it.",run:t=>t.ownerFieldWrites===void 0?[]:t.ownerFieldWrites.map(e=>r(n,{cacheKey:`owner_field_from_args_not_auth:${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}:${e.field}`,detail:`\`${e.method}\` in \`${e.exportName}\` (${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}) sets the ownership field \`${e.field}\` from \`args\` instead of the server-trusted identity — any caller can write rows owned by another user/tenant (IDOR). Stamp \`${e.field}\` from \`ctx.auth\`/\`ctx.identity\`, never from request input.`,metadata:{exportName:e.exportName,field:e.field,file:e.file,line:e.line,method:e.method}})),source:"static",title:"Ownership field written from args, not server identity"};export{n as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/paymentCreateWithoutAuthorize-CurtqN8K.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as t}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const r={categories:["SECURITY"],description:"`createPayment({...})` was constructed without an `authorize` callback, so its access-control gate never runs — any caller that reaches a payment reference id can drive a charge, refund, or subscription change against it (a broken-access-control / IDOR risk on money movement).",facing:"EXTERNAL",level:"ERROR",name:"payment_create_without_authorize",remediation:"Pass an `authorize(referenceId)` callback to `createPayment({...})` that verifies the current caller (via `ctx.auth`) owns the payment/subscription reference before the operation runs. Prefer the `ctx.payments` accessor, which is authorization-scoped by default.",run:a=>a.configCalls===void 0?[]:a.configCalls.filter(e=>e.callee==="createPayment"&&e.analyzable&&!e.presentKeys.includes("authorize")).map(e=>t(r,{cacheKey:`payment_create_without_authorize:${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}`,detail:`\`createPayment({...})\` in ${e.file}:${e.line.toString()} has no \`authorize\` callback — its access-control gate never runs, so any caller reaching the payment reference can move money against it. Add an \`authorize(referenceId)\` gate that checks \`ctx.auth\` ownership before the operation.`,metadata:{callee:e.callee,file:e.file,line:e.line}})),source:"static",title:"createPayment without an authorize gate"};export{r as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/paymentWebhookWideTolerance-I7ingfR8.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as n}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const i=3600,r={categories:["SECURITY"],description:"A payment webhook adapter configured with an implausibly wide `webhookToleranceSeconds` (over an hour). The timestamp tolerance is the webhook replay window; widening it far past the 300s default keeps captured signed events replayable long after capture, defeating the replay check.",facing:"EXTERNAL",level:"WARN",name:"payment_webhook_wide_tolerance",remediation:"Keep `webhookToleranceSeconds` at or near the 300s default — just enough for clock skew. If a wide window was set to work around retries or backfills, handle those with idempotency on the event id instead, not by loosening the replay-window guard.",run:o=>{if(o.paymentWebhooks===void 0)return[];const t=e=>e.toleranceSeconds!==void 0&&e.toleranceSeconds>=i;return o.paymentWebhooks.filter(e=>t(e)).map(e=>{const a=`\`${e.exportName}\` (${e.file}:${e.line.toString()})`;return n(r,{cacheKey:`payment_webhook_wide_tolerance:${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}`,detail:`\`${e.callee}\` in ${a} sets \`webhookToleranceSeconds\` to ${(e.toleranceSeconds??0).toString()}s (default 300s). That replay window keeps captured signed events valid long after capture.`,metadata:{callee:e.callee,exportName:e.exportName,file:e.file,line:e.line,toleranceSeconds:e.toleranceSeconds}})})},source:"static",title:"Payment webhook replay-tolerance window is implausibly wide"};export{r as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/plaintextSecretInWranglerVariables-DXjKIm8H.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as s}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const l={categories:["SECURITY"],description:"A plaintext secret is committed to `wrangler.jsonc`'s `vars` block. `vars` are cleartext — baked into the deployed Worker and checked into source control — so the secret leaks via the repo and the bundle, and rotating it needs a config edit plus a redeploy.",facing:"INTERNAL",level:"ERROR",name:"plaintext_secret_in_wrangler_vars",remediation:"Move the value out of `vars`: bind it through a Secrets Store (`ctx.secrets.get(<NAME>)`) or set it with `wrangler secret put <NAME>` and read it from `env.<NAME>`. Delete the `vars` entry and rotate the exposed value — assume it is already compromised. Public/publishable keys (name them `*_PUBLIC` / `*_PUBLISHABLE`) are exempt.",run:a=>{if(a.wranglerVariables===void 0)return[];const i=[],n=new Map;for(const e of a.wranglerVariables){const t=`${e.file}:${e.key}`,r=(n.get(t)??0)+1;n.set(t,r);const o=r>1?`:${r.toString()}`:"";i.push(s(l,{cacheKey:`plaintext_secret_in_wrangler_vars:${t}${o}`,detail:`The \`vars\` entry \`${e.key}\` in ${e.file} holds a plaintext ${e.kind.replaceAll("_"," ")} (${e.preview}). \`vars\` ship in cleartext to the deployed Worker and are committed to source control — move it to a Secrets Store binding or \`wrangler secret put\` and rotate the exposed value.`,metadata:{file:e.file,key:e.key,kind:e.kind,preview:e.preview}}))}return i},source:"static",title:"Plaintext secret in wrangler vars"};export{l as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/policyReferencesUnknownTable-D3WelAQa.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as s}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const i={categories:["SECURITY"],description:"An RLS policy is bound to a `table` name that does not exist in the schema. The `rls()` middleware never matches it, so the table the policy was meant to protect is left ungated — reads return unrestricted rows and writes are allowed.",facing:"EXTERNAL",level:"WARN",name:"policy_references_unknown_table",remediation:"Fix the policy's `table` to a real table name (check for a typo or a table that was renamed/removed). If the table is gone, delete the dead policy.",run:a=>{if(a.rlsProcedures===void 0)return[];const n=new Set(a.schema.tables.map(t=>t.name)),o=new Set,r=[];for(const t of a.rlsProcedures)for(const e of t.rlsTables)e===""||n.has(e)||o.has(e)||(o.add(e),r.push(s(i,{cacheKey:`policy_references_unknown_table:${e}`,detail:`An RLS policy in \`${t.exportName}\` (${t.file}) is bound to table \`${e}\`, which is not declared in the schema. The policy never matches, so \`${e}\` — if it exists under another name — is left ungated.`,metadata:{exportName:t.exportName,file:t.file,table:e}})));return r},source:"static",title:"RLS policy bound to an unknown table"};export{i as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/privilegedDispatchUnvalidatedPayload-74GuGye1.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as n}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const o={categories:["SECURITY"],description:"A `defineQueue`/`defineWorkflow` handler forwards its untrusted payload (queue body / workflow params) straight into a `ctx.run` dispatch whose target is RLS-gated. The handler runs under the system identity with RLS disabled, so the target's row policy — the only thing guarding it — is bypassed, letting a caller act as any user / write across tenants.",facing:"EXTERNAL",level:"ERROR",name:"privileged_dispatch_unvalidated_payload",remediation:"Don't forward an unchecked queue body / workflow param into an RLS-gated function. Re-derive the ownership/identity keys from server-trusted state (or an argument you validate against it) before dispatching, or route the work through a function that re-checks the caller's identity rather than relying on the row policy the privileged handler skips.",run:r=>{if(r.privilegedDispatches===void 0)return[];const i=r.rlsProcedures??[],s=(e,a)=>i.some(t=>t.usesRls&&t.file===e&&t.exportName===a);return r.privilegedDispatches.filter(e=>s(e.targetFile,e.targetExport)).map(e=>{const a=e.dispatchKind==="queue"?"queue":"workflow",t=e.dispatchKind==="queue"?"queue message body":"workflow params";return n(o,{cacheKey:`privileged_dispatch_unvalidated_payload:${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}`,detail:`The ${a} handler \`${e.handlerExport}\` (${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}) forwards its untrusted ${t} straight into \`${e.targetFile}.${e.targetExport}\`, which is guarded by \`.use(rls(...))\`. The handler runs under the system identity with RLS disabled, so the target's row policy is bypassed — any ownership/identity field the payload controls lets a caller act as another user or write across tenants. Re-derive the identity keys from server-trusted state before dispatching, or route through a function that re-checks the caller.`,metadata:{dispatchKind:e.dispatchKind,file:e.file,handlerExport:e.handlerExport,line:e.line,targetExport:e.targetExport,targetFile:e.targetFile}})})},source:"static",title:"Privileged handler forwards untrusted payload into an RLS-gated function"};export{o as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/privilegedFanoutFromPublicProcedure-C2j2GSUN.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as a}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const i={categories:["SECURITY"],description:"A public procedure fans work out to a privileged dispatch surface (`ctx.scheduler.runAfter`/`runAt`, a `ctx.queues.<name>` send, or `ctx.workflows.<name>.create`) with no rate-limit guard. Each dispatch runs later under the system identity and bills the account, so an anonymous caller can amplify cost and flood the async surface in a loop.",facing:"EXTERNAL",level:"WARN",name:"privileged_fanout_from_public_procedure",remediation:"Gate the public entry point with a rate limit (`.use(rateLimit(...))` or a `protectPublic({ rateLimit })` bundle), or make the fan-out procedure internal and trigger it only from an authenticated, guarded path. Never expose an unbounded scheduler/queue/workflow dispatch to anonymous callers.",run:t=>t.procedureProtections===void 0?[]:t.procedureProtections.filter(e=>e.fanOut&&e.visibility==="public"&&!e.usesRateLimit).map(e=>a(i,{cacheKey:`privileged_fanout_from_public_procedure:${e.file}:${e.exportName}`,detail:`\`${e.exportName}\` (${e.file}) is public and fans work out to a privileged dispatch surface (scheduler/queue/workflow) with no rate limit — an anonymous caller can drive that billable, system-identity dispatch in a loop. Add a rate-limit guard, or make it internal and trigger it from an authenticated path.`,metadata:{exportName:e.exportName,file:e.file,kind:e.kind}})),source:"static",title:"Public procedure fans out to a privileged dispatch surface"};export{i as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/publicArgumentUsesAny-BJb4cTqL.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as n}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const r={categories:["SECURITY"],description:"A public procedure declares a `v.any()` argument. `v.any()` accepts arbitrary untyped input from an untrusted client — defeating validation and opening injection / oversized-payload abuse.",facing:"EXTERNAL",level:"WARN",name:"public_arg_uses_any",remediation:"Replace `v.any()` with a precise validator — `v.object({...})`, `v.string()`, `v.union(...)`, etc. If the shape is genuinely dynamic, model the known variants with `v.union` rather than accepting anything.",run:i=>{if(i.argValidators===void 0)return[];const t=[];for(const e of i.argValidators)for(const a of e.anyArgs)t.push(n(r,{cacheKey:`public_arg_uses_any:${e.file}:${e.exportName}:${a}`,detail:`Arg \`${a}\` of public procedure \`${e.exportName}\` (${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}) is \`v.any()\` — untrusted input with no validation. Give it a precise validator.`,metadata:{argument:a,exportName:e.exportName,file:e.file,line:e.line}}));return t},source:"static",title:"Public argument uses v.any()"};export{r as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/publicMutationWithoutRatelimit-D9phluHW.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as a}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";import{i as o}from"./helpers-DwlvEUCh.mjs";const s=/contact|forgot|login|magic|otp|register|reset|signin|signup|subscribe|verify/iu,n={categories:["SECURITY"],description:"A public `mutation`/`action` has no `rateLimit` middleware. Publicly-callable writes are flood and brute-force targets — an attacker can exhaust writes, mail quota, or credits, or guess credentials on auth-shaped endpoints.",facing:"EXTERNAL",level:"WARN",name:"public_mutation_without_ratelimit",remediation:'Attach a rate limit: `.use(rateLimit(limiter, "<bucket>"))` from `@lunora/ratelimit`, or wrap the recommended public-procedure guards with `.use(protectPublic({ rateLimit, captcha }))` from `@lunora/server`. Genuinely-open writes can be acknowledged by adding a permissive limiter.',run:t=>{if(t.procedureProtections===void 0)return[];const i=[];for(const e of t.procedureProtections){if(!o(e)||e.usesRateLimit)continue;const r=s.test(e.exportName);i.push(a(n,{cacheKey:`public_mutation_without_ratelimit:${e.file}:${e.exportName}`,detail:`Public ${e.kind} \`${e.exportName}\` (${e.file}) has no rate limit${r?" — its name suggests an auth/abuse-sensitive endpoint, so this is high-risk":""}. Add \`.use(rateLimit(...))\` or \`.use(protectPublic({ rateLimit }))\`.`,metadata:{exportName:e.exportName,file:e.file,kind:e.kind,sensitive:r}}))}return i},source:"static",title:"Public write without a rate limit"};export{n as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/publicTableRlsOptoutConfusion-CaWtPGAn.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as a}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";import{o as i}from"./helpers-DwlvEUCh.mjs";const r={categories:["SECURITY"],description:'`.public()` opts a table OUT of the schema\'s `.rls("required")` enforcement — it does not mean the table holds public data. A `.public()` table whose columns look ownership- or PII-shaped (`userId`, `email`, `ssn`, …) is exempt from the row-security guard, not "safe to expose".',facing:"EXTERNAL",level:"WARN",name:"public_table_rls_optout_confusion",remediation:'Double-check this table actually needs the RLS opt-out. If it does not, remove `.public()` so `.rls("required")` covers it like every other table. If it genuinely must stay open (a shared lookup table, for instance), rename or comment it so the exemption is intentional rather than a name-implies-safety mistake, and make sure no procedure trusts `.public()` as an authorization boundary.',run:o=>{if(o.schema.rlsMode!=="required")return[];const s=[];for(const e of o.schema.tables){if(!e.isPublic)continue;const t=i(e);t.length!==0&&s.push(a(r,{cacheKey:`public_table_rls_optout_confusion:${e.name}`,detail:`Table "${e.name}" is \`.public()\` (opted OUT of the schema's \`.rls("required")\` enforcement) but carries ownership/PII-shaped column(s): ${t.join(", ")}. \`.public()\` means "exempt from RLS", not "safe to expose" — confirm this table really needs the opt-out.`,metadata:{columns:t,table:e.name}}))}return s},source:"static",title:"Public table opts out of RLS but carries sensitive columns"};export{r as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/queueWithoutDlq-BLY3iy9Q.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as r}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const i={categories:["SCHEMA"],description:"A queue consumer drops a message once it exhausts `maxRetries` (default 3) delivery attempts. Without a `deadLetterQueue`, that message is deleted permanently with no record — route exhausted messages to a DLQ so you can inspect, alert on, and replay them.",facing:"INTERNAL",level:"WARN",name:"queue_without_dlq",remediation:'Add `deadLetterQueue: "<name>-dlq"` to the `defineQueue({...})` options and declare a consumer for that queue so exhausted messages are inspectable (an unconsumed DLQ still expires at the retention window). `vis generate lunora-queue` with the best-practice setup scaffolds both. If the queue is fire-and-forget and message loss is acceptable, this advisory can be ignored.',run:t=>{if(t.queues===void 0)return[];const n=new Set(t.queues.map(e=>e.tuning.deadLetterQueue).filter(e=>e!==void 0&&e!=="")),s=[];for(const e of t.queues){const u=e.tuning.deadLetterQueue;if(u!==void 0&&u!==""||n.has(e.name))continue;const a=typeof e.tuning.maxRetries=="number"?e.tuning.maxRetries:3;s.push(r(i,{cacheKey:`queue_without_dlq:${e.exportName}`,detail:`Queue "${e.exportName}" declares no \`deadLetterQueue\`, so a message that exhausts its retries (\`maxRetries\` = ${String(a)}, ~${String(a+1)} delivery attempts) is dropped and permanently lost.`,metadata:{maxRetries:a,mode:e.mode,queue:e.exportName}}))}return s},source:"static",title:"Queue has no dead-letter queue"};export{i as default};

package/dist/packem_shared/r2sqlOutsideAction-CKK_I1Ms.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+import{i as a}from"./finding-BAVgqnCF.mjs";const n={categories:["SCHEMA"],description:"A `query`/`mutation` handler accesses R2 SQL via `ctx.r2sql`. R2 SQL queries external Apache Iceberg tables over REST (no Workers binding): queries are non-deterministic (like `fetch`) and the reads are invisible to live queries. `ctx.r2sql` is available on `ActionCtx` only and must be confined to `action` handlers.",facing:"EXTERNAL",level:"WARN",name:"r2sql_outside_action",remediation:"Move the `ctx.r2sql` access into an `action(...)` (the only context where it is typed), where external I/O is allowed. If a query/mutation needs the data, have the action read it via `ctx.r2sql` and write a projection into a `defineSchema` DO/D1 table — that write is tracked by live queries, whereas R2 SQL is not.",run:t=>{if(t.r2sqlCalls===void 0)return[];const i=[];for(const e of t.r2sqlCalls)i.push(a(n,{cacheKey:`r2sql_outside_action:${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}:${e.callee}`,detail:`\`${e.callee}(…)\` in ${e.exportName} (${e.file}:${e.line.toString()}) runs inside a ${e.kind} handler — R2 SQL's \`ctx.r2sql\` is non-deterministic and non-reactive, so it is available only in actions. Move the external query into an \`action\` and project the result into a Lunora table if a query/mutation needs it.`,metadata:{callee:e.callee,exportName:e.exportName,file:e.file,kind:e.kind,line:e.line}}));return i},source:"static",title:"R2 SQL `ctx.r2sql` used outside an action"};export{n as default};