@lunora/advisor 1.0.0-alpha.3 → 1.0.0-alpha.31

package/dist/packem_shared/privilegedFanoutFromPublicProcedure-D3dL01B8.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+import { e as emit } from './finding-Dm_zvzS1.mjs';
+
+const privilegedFanoutFromPublicProcedure = {
+  categories: ["SECURITY"],
+  description: "A public procedure fans work out to a privileged dispatch surface (`ctx.scheduler.runAfter`/`runAt`, a `ctx.queues.<name>` send, or `ctx.workflows.<name>.create`) with no rate-limit guard. Each dispatch runs later under the system identity and bills the account, so an anonymous caller can amplify cost and flood the async surface in a loop.",
+  facing: "EXTERNAL",
+  level: "WARN",
+  name: "privileged_fanout_from_public_procedure",
+  remediation: "Gate the public entry point with a rate limit (`.use(rateLimit(...))` or a `protectPublic({ rateLimit })` bundle), or make the fan-out procedure internal and trigger it only from an authenticated, guarded path. Never expose an unbounded scheduler/queue/workflow dispatch to anonymous callers.",
+  run: (context) => {
+    if (context.procedureProtections === void 0) {
+      return [];
+    }
+    return context.procedureProtections.filter((procedure) => procedure.fanOut && procedure.visibility === "public" && !procedure.usesRateLimit).map(
+      (procedure) => emit(privilegedFanoutFromPublicProcedure, {
+        cacheKey: `privileged_fanout_from_public_procedure:${procedure.file}:${procedure.exportName}`,
+        detail: `\`${procedure.exportName}\` (${procedure.file}) is public and fans work out to a privileged dispatch surface (scheduler/queue/workflow) with no rate limit — an anonymous caller can drive that billable, system-identity dispatch in a loop. Add a rate-limit guard, or make it internal and trigger it from an authenticated path.`,
+        metadata: { exportName: procedure.exportName, file: procedure.file, kind: procedure.kind }
+      })
+    );
+  },
+  source: "static",
+  title: "Public procedure fans out to a privileged dispatch surface"
+};
+
+export { privilegedFanoutFromPublicProcedure as default };

package/dist/packem_shared/{publicMutationWithoutRatelimit-xBpJ6GWK.mjs → publicMutationWithoutRatelimit-DbIhgi7j.mjs}

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 import { e as emit } from './finding-Dm_zvzS1.mjs';
+import { i as isPublicWrite } from './helpers-BySnKhVB.mjs';
 
 const SENSITIVE_NAME_RE = /contact|forgot|login|magic|otp|register|reset|signin|signup|subscribe|verify/iu;
 const publicMutationWithoutRatelimit = {
@@ -14,8 +15,7 @@ const publicMutationWithoutRatelimit = {
     }
     const findings = [];
     for (const procedure of context.procedureProtections) {
-      const isPublicWrite = procedure.visibility === "public" && (procedure.kind === "mutation" || procedure.kind === "action");
-      if (!isPublicWrite || procedure.usesRateLimit) {
+      if (!isPublicWrite(procedure) || procedure.usesRateLimit) {
         continue;
       }
       const sensitive = SENSITIVE_NAME_RE.test(procedure.exportName);

package/dist/packem_shared/publicTableRlsOptoutConfusion-Bn71yoD4.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+import { e as emit } from './finding-Dm_zvzS1.mjs';
+import { o as ownershipOrPiiColumns } from './helpers-BySnKhVB.mjs';
+
+const publicTableRlsOptoutConfusion = {
+  categories: ["SECURITY"],
+  description: '`.public()` opts a table OUT of the schema\'s `.rls("required")` enforcement — it does not mean the table holds public data. A `.public()` table whose columns look ownership- or PII-shaped (`userId`, `email`, `ssn`, …) is exempt from the row-security guard, not "safe to expose".',
+  facing: "EXTERNAL",
+  level: "WARN",
+  name: "public_table_rls_optout_confusion",
+  remediation: 'Double-check this table actually needs the RLS opt-out. If it does not, remove `.public()` so `.rls("required")` covers it like every other table. If it genuinely must stay open (a shared lookup table, for instance), rename or comment it so the exemption is intentional rather than a name-implies-safety mistake, and make sure no procedure trusts `.public()` as an authorization boundary.',
+  run: (context) => {
+    if (context.schema.rlsMode !== "required") {
+      return [];
+    }
+    const findings = [];
+    for (const table of context.schema.tables) {
+      if (!table.isPublic) {
+        continue;
+      }
+      const flaggedColumns = ownershipOrPiiColumns(table);
+      if (flaggedColumns.length === 0) {
+        continue;
+      }
+      findings.push(
+        emit(publicTableRlsOptoutConfusion, {
+          cacheKey: `public_table_rls_optout_confusion:${table.name}`,
+          detail: `Table "${table.name}" is \`.public()\` (opted OUT of the schema's \`.rls("required")\` enforcement) but carries ownership/PII-shaped column(s): ${flaggedColumns.join(", ")}. \`.public()\` means "exempt from RLS", not "safe to expose" — confirm this table really needs the opt-out.`,
+          metadata: { columns: flaggedColumns, table: table.name }
+        })
+      );
+    }
+    return findings;
+  },
+  source: "static",
+  title: "Public table opts out of RLS but carries sensitive columns"
+};
+
+export { publicTableRlsOptoutConfusion as default };

package/dist/packem_shared/queueWithoutDlq-CSkGNb_0.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+import { e as emit } from './finding-Dm_zvzS1.mjs';
+
+const queueWithoutDlq = {
+  categories: ["SCHEMA"],
+  description: "A queue consumer drops a message once it exhausts `maxRetries` (default 3) delivery attempts. Without a `deadLetterQueue`, that message is deleted permanently with no record — route exhausted messages to a DLQ so you can inspect, alert on, and replay them.",
+  facing: "INTERNAL",
+  level: "WARN",
+  name: "queue_without_dlq",
+  remediation: 'Add `deadLetterQueue: "<name>-dlq"` to the `defineQueue({...})` options and declare a consumer for that queue so exhausted messages are inspectable (an unconsumed DLQ still expires at the retention window). `vis generate lunora-queue` with the best-practice setup scaffolds both. If the queue is fire-and-forget and message loss is acceptable, this advisory can be ignored.',
+  run: (context) => {
+    if (context.queues === void 0) {
+      return [];
+    }
+    const dlqTargets = new Set(
+      context.queues.map((queue) => queue.tuning.deadLetterQueue).filter((name) => name !== void 0 && name !== "")
+    );
+    const findings = [];
+    for (const queue of context.queues) {
+      const dlq = queue.tuning.deadLetterQueue;
+      if (dlq !== void 0 && dlq !== "") {
+        continue;
+      }
+      if (dlqTargets.has(queue.name)) {
+        continue;
+      }
+      const maxRetries = typeof queue.tuning.maxRetries === "number" ? queue.tuning.maxRetries : 3;
+      findings.push(
+        emit(queueWithoutDlq, {
+          cacheKey: `queue_without_dlq:${queue.exportName}`,
+          detail: `Queue "${queue.exportName}" declares no \`deadLetterQueue\`, so a message that exhausts its retries (\`maxRetries\` = ${String(maxRetries)}, ~${String(maxRetries + 1)} delivery attempts) is dropped and permanently lost.`,
+          metadata: { maxRetries, mode: queue.mode, queue: queue.exportName }
+        })
+      );
+    }
+    return findings;
+  },
+  source: "static",
+  title: "Queue has no dead-letter queue"
+};
+
+export { queueWithoutDlq as default };

package/dist/packem_shared/ratelimitDefaultMemoryStore-BISChG5C.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+import { e as emit } from './finding-Dm_zvzS1.mjs';
+
+const ratelimitDefaultMemoryStore = {
+  categories: ["SECURITY"],
+  description: "`new RateLimiter({...})` has no `store`, so it falls back to a per-instance in-memory store. On Workers each request may hit a different isolate, so the counter never sums across them — the limit silently under-counts and is effectively a no-op under load, giving false protection against brute-force and cost abuse.",
+  facing: "EXTERNAL",
+  level: "WARN",
+  name: "ratelimit_default_memory_store",
+  remediation: "Pass a shared, durable `store` to `new RateLimiter({...})` (a Durable-Object- or KV-backed store) so every Worker isolate reads and writes the same bucket. The default in-memory store is per-isolate and does not enforce a global limit.",
+  run: (context) => {
+    if (context.configCalls === void 0) {
+      return [];
+    }
+    return context.configCalls.filter((call) => call.callee === "RateLimiter" && call.analyzable && !call.presentKeys.includes("store")).map(
+      (call) => emit(ratelimitDefaultMemoryStore, {
+        cacheKey: `ratelimit_default_memory_store:${call.file}:${call.line.toString()}`,
+        detail: `\`new RateLimiter({...})\` in ${call.file}:${call.line.toString()} has no \`store\` — it uses the per-instance in-memory store, which never sums across Worker isolates, so the limit silently under-counts under load. Pass a Durable-Object- or KV-backed \`store\` so the limit is enforced globally.`,
+        metadata: { callee: call.callee, file: call.file, line: call.line }
+      })
+    );
+  },
+  source: "static",
+  title: "RateLimiter using the default in-memory store"
+};
+
+export { ratelimitDefaultMemoryStore as default };

package/dist/packem_shared/ratelimitKeySpoofableOrGlobal-DqlHYQQ3.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+import { e as emit } from './finding-Dm_zvzS1.mjs';
+
+const ratelimitKeySpoofableOrGlobal = {
+  categories: ["SECURITY"],
+  description: "A `rateLimit`/`dbRateLimit` middleware call's `key` selector is derived from the handler's `args` with no server-side scoping, so an attacker can rotate the key on every request (e.g. by resubmitting a different email/id) and never share a bucket with themselves — the limit never actually limits them.",
+  facing: "EXTERNAL",
+  level: "WARN",
+  name: "ratelimit_key_spoofable_or_global",
+  remediation: 'Derive the rate-limit `key` from a server-trusted value — `ctx.auth.userId` for authenticated callers, `ctx.ip` for anonymous ones (e.g. `key: (ctx) => ctx.auth.userId ?? ctx.ip ?? "anon"`) — instead of an `args` field the caller controls.',
+  run: (context) => {
+    if (context.ratelimitKeySelectors === void 0) {
+      return [];
+    }
+    return context.ratelimitKeySelectors.map(
+      (selector) => emit(ratelimitKeySpoofableOrGlobal, {
+        cacheKey: `ratelimit_key_spoofable_or_global:${selector.file}:${selector.line.toString()}`,
+        detail: `\`${selector.callee}(…, "${selector.limitName}", { key })\` in \`${selector.exportName}\` (${selector.file}:${selector.line.toString()}) derives its \`key\` from \`args\` with no server-side scoping — an attacker can rotate the key per request and bypass the limit. Derive \`key\` from \`ctx.auth.userId\` / \`ctx.ip\` instead.`,
+        metadata: { callee: selector.callee, exportName: selector.exportName, file: selector.file, limitName: selector.limitName, line: selector.line }
+      })
+    );
+  },
+  source: "static",
+  title: "Rate-limit key derived from spoofable user input"
+};
+
+export { ratelimitKeySpoofableOrGlobal as default };

package/dist/packem_shared/ratelimitMiddlewareFailOpen-CJgDCaUw.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+import { e as emit } from './finding-Dm_zvzS1.mjs';
+
+const SENSITIVE_TOKENS = ["signin", "signup", "login", "register", "reset", "password", "otp", "verify", "payment", "checkout"];
+const normalize = (value) => value.toLowerCase().replaceAll(/[^a-z0-9]+/gu, "");
+const matchesSensitiveToken = (value) => {
+  const normalized = normalize(value);
+  return SENSITIVE_TOKENS.some((token) => normalized.includes(token));
+};
+const guardsSensitiveFlow = (row) => matchesSensitiveToken(row.exportName) || matchesSensitiveToken(row.limitName);
+const ratelimitMiddlewareFailOpen = {
+  categories: ["SECURITY"],
+  description: "A rate-limit or Turnstile middleware guarding a sensitive auth/payment procedure is configured `failOpen: true`, so a limiter store outage or a failed Turnstile siteverify silently admits every request — turning a transient failure into an unthrottled brute-force / abuse window.",
+  facing: "EXTERNAL",
+  level: "WARN",
+  name: "ratelimit_middleware_fail_open",
+  remediation: "Drop `failOpen: true` (the default is fail-closed) on the rate-limit / Turnstile guard for auth and payment flows, or move the escape hatch to a non-sensitive procedure. Prefer rejecting traffic with a 503 over admitting unlimited unauthenticated attempts when the limiter or siteverify is unavailable.",
+  run: (context) => {
+    if (context.failOpenGuards === void 0) {
+      return [];
+    }
+    return context.failOpenGuards.filter((row) => row.failOpen && guardsSensitiveFlow(row)).map(
+      (row) => emit(ratelimitMiddlewareFailOpen, {
+        cacheKey: `ratelimit_middleware_fail_open:${row.file}:${row.line.toString()}`,
+        detail: `\`${row.callee}(...)\` in \`${row.exportName}\` (${row.file}:${row.line.toString()}) sets \`failOpen: true\` while guarding a sensitive flow — a limiter/siteverify outage then admits every request instead of rejecting it.`,
+        metadata: { callee: row.callee, exportName: row.exportName, file: row.file, limitName: row.limitName, line: row.line }
+      })
+    );
+  },
+  source: "static",
+  title: "Fail-open rate-limit / CAPTCHA guard on a sensitive procedure"
+};
+
+export { ratelimitMiddlewareFailOpen as default };

package/dist/packem_shared/{relationReferencesUnknownField-YznyXt_7.mjs → relationReferencesUnknownField-CjbLScJ1.mjs}

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 import { e as emit } from './finding-Dm_zvzS1.mjs';
-import { t as tableColumnSet } from './helpers-DNCkMWZQ.mjs';
+import { t as tableColumnSet } from './helpers-BySnKhVB.mjs';
 
 const missingColumns = (byName, columnsOf, holder, relation) => {
   const target = byName.get(relation.table);

package/dist/packem_shared/shapeTargetsGlobalTable-DHrf4Koi.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+import { e as emit } from './finding-Dm_zvzS1.mjs';
+
+const shapeTargetsGlobalTable = {
+  categories: ["PERFORMANCE"],
+  description: "A `defineShape` replicates from a `.global()` table. Global tables live outside the shard DO's SQLite op-log, so the shape is served through the cross-shard tier — coordinator/poll-refreshed and latency-tiered, not poke-live like a sharded shape.",
+  facing: "EXTERNAL",
+  level: "WARN",
+  name: "shape_targets_global_table",
+  remediation: "Expected if you want the cross-shard tier — just don't assume poke-live freshness; global shapes refresh on a poll. For live updates, replicate from a sharded table instead (denormalize the columns you need into the shard).",
+  run: (context) => {
+    if (context.shapes === void 0) {
+      return [];
+    }
+    const globalTables = new Set(context.schema.tables.filter((table) => table.shardKind === "global").map((table) => table.name));
+    const findings = [];
+    for (const shape of context.shapes) {
+      if (shape.table === void 0 || !globalTables.has(shape.table)) {
+        continue;
+      }
+      findings.push(
+        emit(shapeTargetsGlobalTable, {
+          cacheKey: `shape_targets_global_table:${shape.exportName}`,
+          detail: `Shape \`${shape.exportName}\` (${shape.file}) replicates from the \`.global()\` table \`${shape.table}\`. It is served through the cross-shard global tier — poll-refreshed and latency-tiered, not poke-live.`,
+          metadata: { exportName: shape.exportName, file: shape.file, table: shape.table }
+        })
+      );
+    }
+    return findings;
+  },
+  source: "static",
+  title: "Shape replicates from a global (cross-shard) table"
+};
+
+export { shapeTargetsGlobalTable as default };

package/dist/packem_shared/shapeUnknownTable-C8aDWFoe.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+import { e as emit } from './finding-Dm_zvzS1.mjs';
+
+const shapeUnknownTable = {
+  categories: ["SCHEMA"],
+  description: "A `defineShape` is bound to a `table` name that does not exist in the schema. The shape can never resolve a rowset — its subscription seeds empty and errors at the first flush.",
+  facing: "INTERNAL",
+  level: "ERROR",
+  name: "shape_unknown_table",
+  remediation: "Fix the shape's `table` to a real table name (check for a typo or a table that was renamed/removed).",
+  run: (context) => {
+    if (context.shapes === void 0) {
+      return [];
+    }
+    const knownTables = new Set(context.schema.tables.map((table) => table.name));
+    const findings = [];
+    for (const shape of context.shapes) {
+      if (shape.table === void 0 || knownTables.has(shape.table)) {
+        continue;
+      }
+      findings.push(
+        emit(shapeUnknownTable, {
+          cacheKey: `shape_unknown_table:${shape.exportName}`,
+          detail: `Shape \`${shape.exportName}\` (${shape.file}) replicates from table \`${shape.table}\`, which is not declared in the schema. The shape can never resolve a rowset.`,
+          metadata: { exportName: shape.exportName, file: shape.file, table: shape.table }
+        })
+      );
+    }
+    return findings;
+  },
+  source: "static",
+  title: "Shape bound to an unknown table"
+};
+
+export { shapeUnknownTable as default };

package/dist/packem_shared/softDeleteIncludeDeletedFromArgs-BLqDKrkM.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+import { e as emit } from './finding-Dm_zvzS1.mjs';
+
+const softDeleteIncludeDeletedFromArgs = {
+  categories: ["SECURITY"],
+  description: "A `.public()` read passes `includeDeleted` (hardcoded `true` or derived from `args`) on a `.softDelete()` table, resurfacing soft-deleted rows to callers that should never see them.",
+  facing: "EXTERNAL",
+  level: "INFO",
+  name: "soft_delete_include_deleted_from_args",
+  remediation: "Drop `includeDeleted` from the public read so soft-deleted rows stay hidden, or move the trash/restore view behind an internal (or RLS/role-gated) procedure. Never wire `includeDeleted` from `args` on a public read — an attacker can set it to see rows the app treats as deleted.",
+  run: (context) => {
+    if (context.softDeleteReads === void 0) {
+      return [];
+    }
+    const softDeleteTables = new Set(context.schema.tables.filter((table) => table.softDelete !== void 0).map((table) => table.name));
+    if (softDeleteTables.size === 0) {
+      return [];
+    }
+    return context.softDeleteReads.filter((row) => row.visibility === "public" && row.table !== "" && softDeleteTables.has(row.table) && (row.hardcodedTrue || row.fromArgs)).map((row) => {
+      const location = `\`${row.exportName}\` (${row.file}:${row.line.toString()})`;
+      const detail = row.fromArgs ? `The public read in ${location} wires \`includeDeleted\` from request \`args\` on soft-delete table \`${row.table}\`, letting any caller resurface soft-deleted rows the app treats as gone.` : `The public read in ${location} hardcodes \`includeDeleted: true\` on soft-delete table \`${row.table}\`, returning soft-deleted rows to every caller.`;
+      return emit(softDeleteIncludeDeletedFromArgs, {
+        cacheKey: `soft_delete_include_deleted_from_args:${row.file}:${row.line.toString()}:${row.table}`,
+        detail,
+        metadata: {
+          exportName: row.exportName,
+          file: row.file,
+          line: row.line,
+          source: row.fromArgs ? "args" : "literal",
+          table: row.table
+        }
+      });
+    });
+  },
+  source: "static",
+  title: "Soft-deleted rows resurfaced via includeDeleted on a public read"
+};
+
+export { softDeleteIncludeDeletedFromArgs as default };

package/dist/packem_shared/storageGenerateUploadUrlNoContentTypePin-Da4L9Ge8.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+import { e as emit } from './finding-Dm_zvzS1.mjs';
+
+const storageGenerateUploadUrlNoContentTypePin = {
+  categories: ["SECURITY"],
+  description: "A `ctx.storage.generateUploadUrl(key, …)` call has no `contentType` pin, so the signed PUT URL it mints authorizes any content-type/size the client chooses — `upload()`'s `allowedContentTypes`/`maxSize` guards never run for a client-side PUT against this URL.",
+  facing: "EXTERNAL",
+  level: "WARN",
+  name: "storage_generate_upload_url_no_content_type_pin",
+  remediation: "Pass `contentType` to `ctx.storage.generateUploadUrl(key, { contentType })` so the signature only authorizes a PUT with that exact content-type. If the client's upload size/type also needs bounding, prefer `upload()`/`store()` (with `allowedContentTypes`/`maxSize`) over a client-side signed PUT.",
+  run: (context) => {
+    if (context.storageUploads === void 0) {
+      return [];
+    }
+    return context.storageUploads.filter((row) => row.method === "generateUploadUrl" && row.analyzable && !row.presentKeys.includes("contentType")).map(
+      (row) => emit(storageGenerateUploadUrlNoContentTypePin, {
+        cacheKey: `storage_generate_upload_url_no_content_type_pin:${row.file}:${row.line.toString()}`,
+        detail: `\`ctx.storage.generateUploadUrl\` in \`${row.exportName}\` (${row.file}:${row.line.toString()}) has no \`contentType\` pin — the signed PUT it mints accepts any type/size, minted client-side and bypassing \`upload()\`'s guards.`,
+        metadata: { exportName: row.exportName, file: row.file, line: row.line }
+      })
+    );
+  },
+  source: "static",
+  title: "generateUploadUrl signed PUT with no content-type pin"
+};
+
+export { storageGenerateUploadUrlNoContentTypePin as default };

package/dist/packem_shared/storageKeyFromUserArgs-B86elJgS.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+import { m as makeArgumentDerivedSinkLint } from './argument-derived-sink-C1xTTqAt.mjs';
+
+const storageKeyFromUserArgs = makeArgumentDerivedSinkLint({
+  cacheKey: (access) => `storage_key_from_user_args:${access.file}:${access.line.toString()}`,
+  categories: ["SECURITY"],
+  description: "A `ctx.storage.*` call uses an R2 object key taken directly from the handler's `args` with no server-side scoping. The bucket methods key by the caller-supplied string, so any caller can read, overwrite, or delete another user's object — object-level IDOR.",
+  detail: (access) => `\`ctx.storage.*.${access.method}\` in \`${access.exportName}\` (${access.file}:${access.line.toString()}) uses an object key derived from \`args\` with no server-side scoping — any caller can read/overwrite/delete another user's object (IDOR). Prefix the key with a server-trusted identity (e.g. \`\${ctx.auth.userId}/…\`) or resolve the object through an owned record.`,
+  facing: "EXTERNAL",
+  getAccesses: (context) => context.storageKeyAccesses,
+  level: "ERROR",
+  metadata: (access) => {
+    return { exportName: access.exportName, file: access.file, line: access.line, method: access.method };
+  },
+  name: "storage_key_from_user_args",
+  remediation: `Prefix the object key with a server-trusted identity (e.g. \`\${ctx.auth.userId}/…\`) or resolve the object through a record the caller is known to own. Never pass request input straight through as an R2 object key.`,
+  title: "R2 object key taken directly from user args (IDOR)"
+});
+
+export { storageKeyFromUserArgs as default };

package/dist/packem_shared/storagePresignedUrlForPrivateContent-yGmb8uqz.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+import { e as emit } from './finding-Dm_zvzS1.mjs';
+
+const SIGNER_METHODS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["getPresignedUrl", "getSignedUrl"]);
+const NEAR_MAX_EXPIRES_THRESHOLD_SECONDS = 6 * 24 * 60 * 60;
+const isNativePresignedCall = (row) => row.method === "getPresignedUrl";
+const isNearExpiryCeiling = (row) => SIGNER_METHODS.has(row.method) && row.expiresInSeconds !== void 0 && row.expiresInSeconds >= NEAR_MAX_EXPIRES_THRESHOLD_SECONDS;
+const storagePresignedUrlForPrivateContent = {
+  categories: ["SECURITY"],
+  description: "`ctx.storage.getPresignedUrl(...)` mints a native S3 SigV4 URL that resolves directly against R2, bypassing the Worker's auth/RLS/rate-limit entirely — the wrong choice for private or policy-gated content. Either signer minting an `expiresInSeconds` near the shared 7-day ceiling also hands out a long-lived bearer credential.",
+  facing: "EXTERNAL",
+  level: "WARN",
+  name: "storage_presigned_url_for_private_content",
+  remediation: "For private/per-user/policy-gated content, use `getSignedUrl` (resolves back through the Worker, so your auth/RLS/rate-limit gates still run) instead of `getPresignedUrl`. Reserve `getPresignedUrl` for genuinely public or bulk content. On either signer, keep `expiresInSeconds` as short as the use case allows — well under the 7-day ceiling — rather than minting a near-maximum-lifetime URL.",
+  run: (context) => {
+    if (context.storageUploads === void 0) {
+      return [];
+    }
+    return context.storageUploads.filter((row) => isNativePresignedCall(row) || isNearExpiryCeiling(row)).map((row) => {
+      const native = isNativePresignedCall(row);
+      const nearCeiling = isNearExpiryCeiling(row);
+      const location = `\`${row.exportName}\` (${row.file}:${row.line.toString()})`;
+      let detail;
+      if (native && nearCeiling) {
+        detail = `\`ctx.storage.getPresignedUrl\` in ${location} mints a native S3 SigV4 URL — bypasses the Worker's auth/RLS/rate-limit entirely — with an \`expiresInSeconds\` of ${(row.expiresInSeconds ?? 0).toString()}s, near the 7-day signing ceiling.`;
+      } else if (native) {
+        detail = `\`ctx.storage.getPresignedUrl\` in ${location} mints a native S3 SigV4 URL that resolves directly against R2, bypassing the Worker's auth/RLS/rate-limit entirely. Use \`getSignedUrl\` for app-gated access to private content.`;
+      } else {
+        detail = `\`ctx.storage.${row.method}\` in ${location} requests an \`expiresInSeconds\` of ${(row.expiresInSeconds ?? 0).toString()}s, near the 7-day signing ceiling — a leaked link stays valid for almost a week.`;
+      }
+      return emit(storagePresignedUrlForPrivateContent, {
+        cacheKey: `storage_presigned_url_for_private_content:${row.file}:${row.line.toString()}`,
+        detail,
+        metadata: {
+          expiresInSeconds: row.expiresInSeconds,
+          exportName: row.exportName,
+          file: row.file,
+          line: row.line,
+          method: row.method
+        }
+      });
+    });
+  },
+  source: "static",
+  title: "Native presigned URL or near-max-TTL signed URL for private content"
+};
+
+export { storagePresignedUrlForPrivateContent as default };

package/dist/packem_shared/storageUploadWithoutContentTypeAllowlist-BV-gF1lT.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+import { e as emit } from './finding-Dm_zvzS1.mjs';
+
+const UPLOAD_METHODS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["store", "upload"]);
+const storageUploadWithoutContentTypeAllowlist = {
+  categories: ["SECURITY"],
+  description: "A `ctx.storage.upload`/`store` call has no `allowedContentTypes` allowlist, so an uploader can store any content-type — including `text/html` or `image/svg+xml` — which, served back from `publicBaseUrl`, is a stored-XSS vector against your own origin.",
+  facing: "EXTERNAL",
+  level: "WARN",
+  name: "storage_upload_without_content_type_allowlist",
+  remediation: 'Pass `allowedContentTypes: ["image/png", "image/jpeg", …]` to `ctx.storage.upload`/`store` so an uploaded object\'s `contentType` must match an approved list. Reject anything HTML/SVG/script-executable unless the app genuinely needs to serve it.',
+  run: (context) => {
+    if (context.storageUploads === void 0) {
+      return [];
+    }
+    return context.storageUploads.filter((row) => UPLOAD_METHODS.has(row.method) && row.analyzable && !row.presentKeys.includes("allowedContentTypes")).map(
+      (row) => emit(storageUploadWithoutContentTypeAllowlist, {
+        cacheKey: `storage_upload_without_content_type_allowlist:${row.file}:${row.line.toString()}`,
+        detail: `\`ctx.storage.${row.method}\` in \`${row.exportName}\` (${row.file}:${row.line.toString()}) has no \`allowedContentTypes\` allowlist — any content-type is accepted, including \`text/html\`/\`image/svg+xml\`, a stored-XSS risk if the object is served from \`publicBaseUrl\`.`,
+        metadata: { exportName: row.exportName, file: row.file, line: row.line, method: row.method }
+      })
+    );
+  },
+  source: "static",
+  title: "Storage upload with no content-type allowlist"
+};
+
+export { storageUploadWithoutContentTypeAllowlist as default };

package/dist/packem_shared/storageUploadWithoutMaxSize-DpxO59wU.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+import { e as emit } from './finding-Dm_zvzS1.mjs';
+
+const UPLOAD_METHODS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["store", "upload"]);
+const storageUploadWithoutMaxSize = {
+  categories: ["SECURITY"],
+  description: "A `ctx.storage.upload`/`store` call has no `maxSize` cap, so a caller can push an unbounded body straight into R2 through the Worker — unbounded storage/billing exhaustion, and for a streamed body, unbounded worker time.",
+  facing: "EXTERNAL",
+  level: "WARN",
+  name: "storage_upload_without_max_size",
+  remediation: "Pass a `maxSize` (bytes) to `ctx.storage.upload`/`store` sized to the largest legitimate object the app accepts. `ArrayBuffer`/`Blob` bodies are rejected up front when oversized; a `ReadableStream` body is aborted mid-transfer once the limit is exceeded.",
+  run: (context) => {
+    if (context.storageUploads === void 0) {
+      return [];
+    }
+    return context.storageUploads.filter((row) => UPLOAD_METHODS.has(row.method) && row.analyzable && !row.presentKeys.includes("maxSize")).map(
+      (row) => emit(storageUploadWithoutMaxSize, {
+        cacheKey: `storage_upload_without_max_size:${row.file}:${row.line.toString()}`,
+        detail: `\`ctx.storage.${row.method}\` in \`${row.exportName}\` (${row.file}:${row.line.toString()}) has no \`maxSize\` cap — a caller can push an unbounded body into R2, exhausting storage/billing.`,
+        metadata: { exportName: row.exportName, file: row.file, line: row.line, method: row.method }
+      })
+    );
+  },
+  source: "static",
+  title: "Storage upload with no size cap"
+};
+
+export { storageUploadWithoutMaxSize as default };

package/dist/packem_shared/{userCreatingMutationWithoutCaptcha-CH31YsUZ.mjs → userCreatingMutationWithoutCaptcha-2DZtWIPb.mjs}

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 import { e as emit } from './finding-Dm_zvzS1.mjs';
+import { i as isPublicWrite } from './helpers-BySnKhVB.mjs';
 
 const userCreatingMutationWithoutCaptcha = {
   categories: ["SECURITY"],
@@ -13,9 +14,8 @@ const userCreatingMutationWithoutCaptcha = {
     }
     const findings = [];
     for (const procedure of context.procedureProtections) {
-      const isPublicWrite = procedure.visibility === "public" && (procedure.kind === "mutation" || procedure.kind === "action");
       const sensitive = procedure.writesUserTable || procedure.callsMail;
-      if (!isPublicWrite || !sensitive || procedure.usesCaptcha) {
+      if (!isPublicWrite(procedure) || !sensitive || procedure.usesCaptcha) {
         continue;
       }
       const reason = procedure.writesUserTable ? "writes a user/session table" : "sends mail";

package/dist/packem_shared/vectorsNamespaceFromUserInput-CQhr5bVn.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+import { m as makeArgumentDerivedSinkLint } from './argument-derived-sink-C1xTTqAt.mjs';
+
+const vectorsNamespaceFromUserInput = makeArgumentDerivedSinkLint({
+  cacheKey: (access) => `vectors_namespace_from_user_input:${access.file}:${access.line.toString()}`,
+  categories: ["SECURITY"],
+  description: "A `ctx.vectors.query`/`upsert`/`upsertMany` call uses a `namespace` derived from the handler's `args` with no server-side scoping. A Vectorize namespace partitions one index into isolated sub-collections, so an unscoped namespace lets any caller read or poison another tenant's vectors.",
+  detail: (access) => `\`ctx.vectors.${access.method}\` in \`${access.exportName}\` (${access.file}:${access.line.toString()}) uses a Vectorize namespace derived from \`args\` with no server-side scoping — any caller can read or poison another tenant's vectors. Derive the namespace from a server-trusted identity (e.g. \`\${ctx.auth.orgId}\`), never from \`args\`.`,
+  facing: "EXTERNAL",
+  getAccesses: (context) => context.vectorNamespaceAccesses,
+  level: "WARN",
+  metadata: (access) => {
+    return { exportName: access.exportName, file: access.file, line: access.line, method: access.method };
+  },
+  name: "vectors_namespace_from_user_input",
+  remediation: `Derive the \`namespace\` from a server-trusted identity (e.g. \`\${ctx.auth.orgId}\`), never from \`args\`.`,
+  title: "Vectorize namespace derived from unscoped user input"
+});
+
+export { vectorsNamespaceFromUserInput as default };

package/dist/packem_shared/workflowDuplicateStepName-ioBxPBCy.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+import { e as emit } from './finding-Dm_zvzS1.mjs';
+
+const workflowDuplicateStepName = {
+  categories: ["SCHEMA"],
+  description: "Two durable steps in this workflow share a name. Cloudflare memoizes a step by its name, so on replay the second call returns the first step's cached result instead of running its body — silently skipping the work without an error.",
+  facing: "INTERNAL",
+  level: "ERROR",
+  // eslint-disable-next-line no-secrets/no-secrets -- the lint's rule id, not a credential
+  name: "workflow_duplicate_step_name",
+  remediation: "Give every `step.do` / `step.sleep` / `step.sleepUntil` / `step.waitForEvent` call in the workflow a unique name. If a step legitimately repeats (e.g. a loop), make the name distinct per iteration by interpolating the item id into the step name.",
+  run: (context) => {
+    if (context.workflows === void 0) {
+      return [];
+    }
+    const findings = [];
+    for (const workflow of context.workflows) {
+      const { steps } = workflow;
+      if (steps === void 0 || steps.length === 0) {
+        continue;
+      }
+      const firstLineByName = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+      const reported = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+      for (const step of steps) {
+        const firstLine = firstLineByName.get(step.name);
+        if (firstLine === void 0) {
+          firstLineByName.set(step.name, step.line);
+          continue;
+        }
+        if (reported.has(step.name)) {
+          continue;
+        }
+        reported.add(step.name);
+        findings.push(
+          emit(workflowDuplicateStepName, {
+            cacheKey: `workflow_duplicate_step_name:${workflow.exportName}:${step.name}`,
+            detail: `Workflow "${workflow.exportName}" reuses the durable step name "${step.name}" (first at line ${String(firstLine)}, again at line ${String(step.line)}). The second call returns the first's cached result instead of running.`,
+            metadata: { firstLine, line: step.line, stepName: step.name, workflow: workflow.exportName }
+          })
+        );
+      }
+    }
+    return findings;
+  },
+  source: "static",
+  title: "Duplicate durable step name in workflow"
+};
+
+export { workflowDuplicateStepName as default };

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@lunora/advisor",
-  "version": "1.0.0-alpha.3",
+  "version": "1.0.0-alpha.31",
   "description": "Schema & query lints (splinter-style advisors) for Lunora, feeding the Studio Advisors view",
   "keywords": [
     "advisor",
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
     "directory": "packages/advisor"
   },
   "files": [
-    "dist",
+    "./dist",
     "README.md",
     "LICENSE.md",
     "__assets__"
@@ -46,7 +46,8 @@
     "access": "public"
   },
   "dependencies": {
-    "@lunora/server": "1.0.0-alpha.2"
+    "@lunora/errors": "1.0.0-alpha.6",
+    "@lunora/server": "1.0.0-alpha.28"
   },
   "engines": {
     "node": "^22.15.0 || >=24.11.0"