@lunora/advisor 1.0.0-alpha.21 → 1.0.0-alpha.211

package/dist/packem_shared/mutatorFullRowReplace-BJnNDaIV.mjs

@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-import { e as emit } from './finding-Dm_zvzS1.mjs';
-
-const mutatorFullRowReplace = {
-  categories: ["SCHEMA"],
-  description: "A custom mutator's `server` impl writes with `ctx.db.replace(id, document)` — a whole-row overwrite. On a synced table this clobbers a concurrent edit to a different column; `ctx.db.patch(id, { field })` merges at the column level so independent field edits coexist.",
-  facing: "EXTERNAL",
-  level: "WARN",
-  name: "mutator_full_row_replace",
-  remediation: "Prefer `ctx.db.patch(id, { onlyTheChangedField })` so a concurrent edit to another column isn't lost. Keep `replace` only when the mutator genuinely owns the entire row (e.g. a full-form save).",
-  run: (context) => {
-    if (context.mutatorWrites === void 0) {
-      return [];
-    }
-    return context.mutatorWrites.map(
-      (write) => emit(mutatorFullRowReplace, {
-        cacheKey: `mutator_full_row_replace:${write.exportName}:${String(write.line)}`,
-        detail: `Mutator \`${write.exportName}\` (${write.file}:${String(write.line)}) writes with \`ctx.db.replace(...)\`, overwriting the whole row. A concurrent edit to a different column is clobbered — use \`ctx.db.patch(id, { field })\` to merge at the column level.`,
-        metadata: { exportName: write.exportName, file: write.file, line: write.line }
-      })
-    );
-  },
-  source: "static",
-  title: "Mutator overwrites the whole row (clobbers concurrent column edits)"
-};
-
-export { mutatorFullRowReplace as default };

package/dist/packem_shared/nondeterministicQueryMutation-GXES1fLp.mjs

@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-import { e as emit } from './finding-Dm_zvzS1.mjs';
-
-const nondeterministicQueryMutation = {
-  categories: ["SCHEMA"],
-  description: "A `query`/`mutation` handler calls a non-deterministic API (`Date.now`, `Math.random`, `crypto.randomUUID`, `crypto.getRandomValues`, or `fetch`). These handlers may be re-run on OCC retry / subscription re-evaluation, so they must be deterministic — time, randomness, and network belong in an `action`.",
-  facing: "EXTERNAL",
-  level: "WARN",
-  name: "nondeterministic_query_mutation",
-  remediation: "Move the non-deterministic call into an `action(...)` (which runs once and may use ambient APIs), then pass the computed value into the mutation as an argument — e.g. compute `Date.now()` in the action and call `ctx.runMutation(api.…, { now })`. Take generated ids/timestamps as args instead of producing them in the handler.",
-  run: (context) => {
-    if (context.nondeterministicCalls === void 0) {
-      return [];
-    }
-    const findings = [];
-    const occurrenceCount = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
-    for (const call of context.nondeterministicCalls) {
-      const baseKey = `${call.file}:${call.line.toString()}:${call.callee}`;
-      const occurrence = (occurrenceCount.get(baseKey) ?? 0) + 1;
-      occurrenceCount.set(baseKey, occurrence);
-      const occurrenceSuffix = occurrence > 1 ? `:${occurrence.toString()}` : "";
-      findings.push(
-        emit(nondeterministicQueryMutation, {
-          cacheKey: `nondeterministic_query_mutation:${baseKey}${occurrenceSuffix}`,
-          detail: `\`${call.callee}(…)\` in ${call.exportName} (${call.file}:${call.line.toString()}) runs inside a ${call.kind} handler — query/mutation handlers must be deterministic. Compute it in an \`action\` and pass the value into the mutation as an argument.`,
-          metadata: { callee: call.callee, exportName: call.exportName, file: call.file, kind: call.kind, line: call.line }
-        })
-      );
-    }
-    return findings;
-  },
-  source: "static",
-  title: "Non-deterministic call in query/mutation handler"
-};
-
-export { nondeterministicQueryMutation as default };

package/dist/packem_shared/normalizeIdUsedAsAuthorization-BVPtCpzT.mjs

@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
-import { e as emit } from './finding-Dm_zvzS1.mjs';
-
-const SINK_LABELS = {
-  delete: "deletes the row",
-  get: "reads the row",
-  patch: "patches the row"
-};
-const normalizeIdUsedAsAuthorization = {
-  categories: ["SECURITY"],
-  description: "A `.public()` `query`/`mutation` gates a `ctx.db.get`/`patch`/`delete` on a null-checked `ctx.db.normalizeId(table, id)` result with no ownership predicate and no RLS. `normalizeId` validates id *shape* only — it never reads the database — so a non-null result proves the id is well-formed, never that the caller owns the row (an IDOR).",
-  facing: "EXTERNAL",
-  level: "INFO",
-  name: "normalize_id_used_as_authorization",
-  remediation: 'Don\'t treat a non-null `normalizeId` result as authorization — it only validates id shape. After loading the row, compare its ownership column (`userId`/`ownerId`/…) against the server-trusted identity (`ctx.auth.userId`), or protect the procedure with `.use(rls(...))` / put the schema in `.rls("required")` mode so the row policy runs on every access.',
-  run: (context) => {
-    if (context.normalizeIdAuthorizations === void 0) {
-      return [];
-    }
-    const rlsRequired = context.schema.rlsMode === "required";
-    const rlsOptOutTables = new Set(context.schema.tables.filter((table) => table.isPublic).map((table) => table.name));
-    const findings = [];
-    for (const row of context.normalizeIdAuthorizations) {
-      if (row.visibility !== "public" || row.usesRls || row.mentionsOwnership) {
-        continue;
-      }
-      if (rlsRequired && (row.table === "" || !rlsOptOutTables.has(row.table))) {
-        continue;
-      }
-      const target = row.table === "" ? "the row" : `the \`${row.table}\` row`;
-      findings.push(
-        emit(normalizeIdUsedAsAuthorization, {
-          cacheKey: `normalize_id_used_as_authorization:${row.file}:${row.line.toString()}`,
-          detail: `Public procedure \`${row.exportName}\` (${row.file}:${row.line.toString()}) gates access on \`ctx.db.normalizeId(...)\` and then ${SINK_LABELS[row.sinkMethod]} — but \`normalizeId\` only validates id shape, it never reads the database or checks ownership. Any caller supplying a well-formed id of ${target} reaches it (IDOR). Compare the loaded row's ownership column against \`ctx.auth\`, or cover the procedure with \`.use(rls(...))\`.`,
-          metadata: {
-            exportName: row.exportName,
-            file: row.file,
-            line: row.line,
-            sinkMethod: row.sinkMethod,
-            table: row.table
-          }
-        })
-      );
-    }
-    return findings;
-  },
-  source: "static",
-  title: "normalizeId result used as authorization (validates id shape, not ownership)"
-};
-
-export { normalizeIdUsedAsAuthorization as default };

package/dist/packem_shared/outputProjectionMissingOnPublicRead-Bl5IMx0k.mjs

@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-import { e as emit } from './finding-Dm_zvzS1.mjs';
-import { P as PII_FIELD_NAMES } from './helpers-BySnKhVB.mjs';
-
-const outputProjectionMissingOnPublicRead = {
-  categories: ["SECURITY"],
-  description: "A `.public()` `query` returns raw table rows (no `.output(...)` projection, no `.use(mask(...))`) from a table carrying PII-named columns (`email`, `phone`, `ssn`, …). Every column ships to the caller, and a column added to the table later leaks by default.",
-  facing: "EXTERNAL",
-  level: "INFO",
-  name: "output_projection_missing_on_public_read",
-  remediation: "Add an explicit return projection to the public query — `.output(v.object({ … }))` listing only the fields a client needs — or apply a `.use(mask(...))` policy to the PII columns. This makes the exposed shape intentional and stops a newly-added column from leaking through this query by default.",
-  run: (context) => {
-    if (context.rawRowReturns === void 0) {
-      return [];
-    }
-    const piiColumnsByTable = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
-    for (const table of context.schema.tables) {
-      const piiColumns = table.fields.filter((field) => PII_FIELD_NAMES.has(field));
-      if (piiColumns.length > 0) {
-        piiColumnsByTable.set(table.name, piiColumns);
-      }
-    }
-    const findings = [];
-    for (const row of context.rawRowReturns) {
-      if (row.visibility !== "public" || row.usesOutput || row.usesMask || row.table === "") {
-        continue;
-      }
-      const piiColumns = piiColumnsByTable.get(row.table);
-      if (piiColumns === void 0) {
-        continue;
-      }
-      findings.push(
-        emit(outputProjectionMissingOnPublicRead, {
-          cacheKey: `output_projection_missing_on_public_read:${row.file}:${row.line.toString()}`,
-          detail: `Public query \`${row.exportName}\` (${row.file}:${row.line.toString()}) returns raw \`${row.table}\` rows with no \`.output(...)\` projection — shipping PII column(s) ${piiColumns.join(", ")} to every caller, and any column added to \`${row.table}\` later leaks by default. Project the return with \`.output(v.object({ … }))\` or mask the PII columns.`,
-          metadata: {
-            columns: piiColumns,
-            exportName: row.exportName,
-            file: row.file,
-            line: row.line,
-            table: row.table
-          }
-        })
-      );
-    }
-    return findings;
-  },
-  source: "static",
-  title: "Public query returns raw rows with PII and no output projection"
-};
-
-export { outputProjectionMissingOnPublicRead as default };

package/dist/packem_shared/ownerFieldFromArgsNotAuth-mOw3hE5z.mjs

@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-import { e as emit } from './finding-Dm_zvzS1.mjs';
-
-const ownerFieldFromArgsNotAuth = {
-  categories: ["SECURITY"],
-  description: "A `ctx.db` write sets an ownership/identity column (`userId`, `ownerId`, `tenantId`, …) from the handler's `args`. The caller controls who the row belongs to, so any caller can write rows owned by another user or tenant — an act-as-any-user / cross-tenant IDOR.",
-  facing: "EXTERNAL",
-  level: "ERROR",
-  name: "owner_field_from_args_not_auth",
-  remediation: "Stamp the ownership column from the server-trusted identity (`ctx.auth.userId` / `ctx.identity`), never from request input. Drop the field from the accepted `args` so a caller cannot supply it.",
-  run: (context) => {
-    if (context.ownerFieldWrites === void 0) {
-      return [];
-    }
-    return context.ownerFieldWrites.map(
-      (write) => emit(ownerFieldFromArgsNotAuth, {
-        cacheKey: `owner_field_from_args_not_auth:${write.file}:${write.line.toString()}:${write.field}`,
-        detail: `\`${write.method}\` in \`${write.exportName}\` (${write.file}:${write.line.toString()}) sets the ownership field \`${write.field}\` from \`args\` instead of the server-trusted identity — any caller can write rows owned by another user/tenant (IDOR). Stamp \`${write.field}\` from \`ctx.auth\`/\`ctx.identity\`, never from request input.`,
-        metadata: { exportName: write.exportName, field: write.field, file: write.file, line: write.line, method: write.method }
-      })
-    );
-  },
-  source: "static",
-  title: "Ownership field written from args, not server identity"
-};
-
-export { ownerFieldFromArgsNotAuth as default };

package/dist/packem_shared/paymentCreateWithoutAuthorize-BYm4JLxo.mjs

@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-import { e as emit } from './finding-Dm_zvzS1.mjs';
-
-const paymentCreateWithoutAuthorize = {
-  categories: ["SECURITY"],
-  description: "`createPayment({...})` was constructed without an `authorize` callback, so its access-control gate never runs — any caller that reaches a payment reference id can drive a charge, refund, or subscription change against it (a broken-access-control / IDOR risk on money movement).",
-  facing: "EXTERNAL",
-  level: "ERROR",
-  name: "payment_create_without_authorize",
-  remediation: "Pass an `authorize(referenceId)` callback to `createPayment({...})` that verifies the current caller (via `ctx.auth`) owns the payment/subscription reference before the operation runs. Prefer the `ctx.payments` accessor, which is authorization-scoped by default.",
-  run: (context) => {
-    if (context.configCalls === void 0) {
-      return [];
-    }
-    return context.configCalls.filter((call) => call.callee === "createPayment" && call.analyzable && !call.presentKeys.includes("authorize")).map(
-      (call) => emit(paymentCreateWithoutAuthorize, {
-        cacheKey: `payment_create_without_authorize:${call.file}:${call.line.toString()}`,
-        detail: `\`createPayment({...})\` in ${call.file}:${call.line.toString()} has no \`authorize\` callback — its access-control gate never runs, so any caller reaching the payment reference can move money against it. Add an \`authorize(referenceId)\` gate that checks \`ctx.auth\` ownership before the operation.`,
-        metadata: { callee: call.callee, file: call.file, line: call.line }
-      })
-    );
-  },
-  source: "static",
-  title: "createPayment without an authorize gate"
-};
-
-export { paymentCreateWithoutAuthorize as default };

package/dist/packem_shared/paymentWebhookWideTolerance-D9QQJMJq.mjs

@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-import { e as emit } from './finding-Dm_zvzS1.mjs';
-
-const WIDE_TOLERANCE_THRESHOLD_SECONDS = 60 * 60;
-const paymentWebhookWideTolerance = {
-  categories: ["SECURITY"],
-  description: "A payment webhook adapter configured with an implausibly wide `webhookToleranceSeconds` (over an hour). The timestamp tolerance is the webhook replay window; widening it far past the 300s default keeps captured signed events replayable long after capture, defeating the replay check.",
-  facing: "EXTERNAL",
-  level: "WARN",
-  name: "payment_webhook_wide_tolerance",
-  remediation: "Keep `webhookToleranceSeconds` at or near the 300s default — just enough for clock skew. If a wide window was set to work around retries or backfills, handle those with idempotency on the event id instead, not by loosening the replay-window guard.",
-  run: (context) => {
-    if (context.paymentWebhooks === void 0) {
-      return [];
-    }
-    const isWide = (row) => row.toleranceSeconds !== void 0 && row.toleranceSeconds >= WIDE_TOLERANCE_THRESHOLD_SECONDS;
-    return context.paymentWebhooks.filter((row) => isWide(row)).map((row) => {
-      const location = `\`${row.exportName}\` (${row.file}:${row.line.toString()})`;
-      return emit(paymentWebhookWideTolerance, {
-        cacheKey: `payment_webhook_wide_tolerance:${row.file}:${row.line.toString()}`,
-        detail: `\`${row.callee}\` in ${location} sets \`webhookToleranceSeconds\` to ${(row.toleranceSeconds ?? 0).toString()}s (default 300s). That replay window keeps captured signed events valid long after capture.`,
-        metadata: {
-          callee: row.callee,
-          exportName: row.exportName,
-          file: row.file,
-          line: row.line,
-          toleranceSeconds: row.toleranceSeconds
-        }
-      });
-    });
-  },
-  source: "static",
-  title: "Payment webhook replay-tolerance window is implausibly wide"
-};
-
-export { paymentWebhookWideTolerance as default };

package/dist/packem_shared/plaintextSecretInWranglerVariables-NKO4YkKf.mjs

@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-import { e as emit } from './finding-Dm_zvzS1.mjs';
-
-const plaintextSecretInWranglerVariables = {
-  categories: ["SECURITY"],
-  description: "A plaintext secret is committed to `wrangler.jsonc`'s `vars` block. `vars` are cleartext — baked into the deployed Worker and checked into source control — so the secret leaks via the repo and the bundle, and rotating it needs a config edit plus a redeploy.",
-  facing: "INTERNAL",
-  level: "ERROR",
-  name: "plaintext_secret_in_wrangler_vars",
-  remediation: "Move the value out of `vars`: bind it through a Secrets Store (`ctx.secrets.get(<NAME>)`) or set it with `wrangler secret put <NAME>` and read it from `env.<NAME>`. Delete the `vars` entry and rotate the exposed value — assume it is already compromised. Public/publishable keys (name them `*_PUBLIC` / `*_PUBLISHABLE`) are exempt.",
-  run: (context) => {
-    if (context.wranglerVariables === void 0) {
-      return [];
-    }
-    const findings = [];
-    const occurrenceCount = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
-    for (const wranglerVariable of context.wranglerVariables) {
-      const baseKey = `${wranglerVariable.file}:${wranglerVariable.key}`;
-      const occurrence = (occurrenceCount.get(baseKey) ?? 0) + 1;
-      occurrenceCount.set(baseKey, occurrence);
-      const occurrenceSuffix = occurrence > 1 ? `:${occurrence.toString()}` : "";
-      findings.push(
-        emit(plaintextSecretInWranglerVariables, {
-          cacheKey: `plaintext_secret_in_wrangler_vars:${baseKey}${occurrenceSuffix}`,
-          detail: `The \`vars\` entry \`${wranglerVariable.key}\` in ${wranglerVariable.file} holds a plaintext ${wranglerVariable.kind.replaceAll("_", " ")} (${wranglerVariable.preview}). \`vars\` ship in cleartext to the deployed Worker and are committed to source control — move it to a Secrets Store binding or \`wrangler secret put\` and rotate the exposed value.`,
-          metadata: { file: wranglerVariable.file, key: wranglerVariable.key, kind: wranglerVariable.kind, preview: wranglerVariable.preview }
-        })
-      );
-    }
-    return findings;
-  },
-  source: "static",
-  title: "Plaintext secret in wrangler vars"
-};
-
-export { plaintextSecretInWranglerVariables as default };

package/dist/packem_shared/policyReferencesUnknownTable-DtaIEovd.mjs

@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-import { e as emit } from './finding-Dm_zvzS1.mjs';
-
-const policyReferencesUnknownTable = {
-  categories: ["SECURITY"],
-  description: "An RLS policy is bound to a `table` name that does not exist in the schema. The `rls()` middleware never matches it, so the table the policy was meant to protect is left ungated — reads return unrestricted rows and writes are allowed.",
-  facing: "EXTERNAL",
-  level: "WARN",
-  name: "policy_references_unknown_table",
-  remediation: "Fix the policy's `table` to a real table name (check for a typo or a table that was renamed/removed). If the table is gone, delete the dead policy.",
-  run: (context) => {
-    if (context.rlsProcedures === void 0) {
-      return [];
-    }
-    const knownTables = new Set(context.schema.tables.map((table) => table.name));
-    const reported = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
-    const findings = [];
-    for (const procedure of context.rlsProcedures) {
-      for (const table of procedure.rlsTables) {
-        if (table === "" || knownTables.has(table) || reported.has(table)) {
-          continue;
-        }
-        reported.add(table);
-        findings.push(
-          emit(policyReferencesUnknownTable, {
-            cacheKey: `policy_references_unknown_table:${table}`,
-            detail: `An RLS policy in \`${procedure.exportName}\` (${procedure.file}) is bound to table \`${table}\`, which is not declared in the schema. The policy never matches, so \`${table}\` — if it exists under another name — is left ungated.`,
-            metadata: { exportName: procedure.exportName, file: procedure.file, table }
-          })
-        );
-      }
-    }
-    return findings;
-  },
-  source: "static",
-  title: "RLS policy bound to an unknown table"
-};
-
-export { policyReferencesUnknownTable as default };

package/dist/packem_shared/privilegedDispatchUnvalidatedPayload-5Forjckt.mjs

@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-import { e as emit } from './finding-Dm_zvzS1.mjs';
-
-const privilegedDispatchUnvalidatedPayload = {
-  categories: ["SECURITY"],
-  description: "A `defineQueue`/`defineWorkflow` handler forwards its untrusted payload (queue body / workflow params) straight into a `ctx.run` dispatch whose target is RLS-gated. The handler runs under the system identity with RLS disabled, so the target's row policy — the only thing guarding it — is bypassed, letting a caller act as any user / write across tenants.",
-  facing: "EXTERNAL",
-  level: "ERROR",
-  name: "privileged_dispatch_unvalidated_payload",
-  remediation: "Don't forward an unchecked queue body / workflow param into an RLS-gated function. Re-derive the ownership/identity keys from server-trusted state (or an argument you validate against it) before dispatching, or route the work through a function that re-checks the caller's identity rather than relying on the row policy the privileged handler skips.",
-  run: (context) => {
-    if (context.privilegedDispatches === void 0) {
-      return [];
-    }
-    const rlsProcedures = context.rlsProcedures ?? [];
-    const targetUsesRls = (targetFile, targetExport) => rlsProcedures.some((procedure) => procedure.usesRls && procedure.file === targetFile && procedure.exportName === targetExport);
-    return context.privilegedDispatches.filter((dispatch) => targetUsesRls(dispatch.targetFile, dispatch.targetExport)).map((dispatch) => {
-      const handlerKind = dispatch.dispatchKind === "queue" ? "queue" : "workflow";
-      const payloadSource = dispatch.dispatchKind === "queue" ? "queue message body" : "workflow params";
-      return emit(privilegedDispatchUnvalidatedPayload, {
-        cacheKey: `privileged_dispatch_unvalidated_payload:${dispatch.file}:${dispatch.line.toString()}`,
-        detail: `The ${handlerKind} handler \`${dispatch.handlerExport}\` (${dispatch.file}:${dispatch.line.toString()}) forwards its untrusted ${payloadSource} straight into \`${dispatch.targetFile}.${dispatch.targetExport}\`, which is guarded by \`.use(rls(...))\`. The handler runs under the system identity with RLS disabled, so the target's row policy is bypassed — any ownership/identity field the payload controls lets a caller act as another user or write across tenants. Re-derive the identity keys from server-trusted state before dispatching, or route through a function that re-checks the caller.`,
-        metadata: {
-          dispatchKind: dispatch.dispatchKind,
-          file: dispatch.file,
-          handlerExport: dispatch.handlerExport,
-          line: dispatch.line,
-          targetExport: dispatch.targetExport,
-          targetFile: dispatch.targetFile
-        }
-      });
-    });
-  },
-  source: "static",
-  title: "Privileged handler forwards untrusted payload into an RLS-gated function"
-};
-
-export { privilegedDispatchUnvalidatedPayload as default };

package/dist/packem_shared/privilegedFanoutFromPublicProcedure-D3dL01B8.mjs

@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-import { e as emit } from './finding-Dm_zvzS1.mjs';
-
-const privilegedFanoutFromPublicProcedure = {
-  categories: ["SECURITY"],
-  description: "A public procedure fans work out to a privileged dispatch surface (`ctx.scheduler.runAfter`/`runAt`, a `ctx.queues.<name>` send, or `ctx.workflows.<name>.create`) with no rate-limit guard. Each dispatch runs later under the system identity and bills the account, so an anonymous caller can amplify cost and flood the async surface in a loop.",
-  facing: "EXTERNAL",
-  level: "WARN",
-  name: "privileged_fanout_from_public_procedure",
-  remediation: "Gate the public entry point with a rate limit (`.use(rateLimit(...))` or a `protectPublic({ rateLimit })` bundle), or make the fan-out procedure internal and trigger it only from an authenticated, guarded path. Never expose an unbounded scheduler/queue/workflow dispatch to anonymous callers.",
-  run: (context) => {
-    if (context.procedureProtections === void 0) {
-      return [];
-    }
-    return context.procedureProtections.filter((procedure) => procedure.fanOut && procedure.visibility === "public" && !procedure.usesRateLimit).map(
-      (procedure) => emit(privilegedFanoutFromPublicProcedure, {
-        cacheKey: `privileged_fanout_from_public_procedure:${procedure.file}:${procedure.exportName}`,
-        detail: `\`${procedure.exportName}\` (${procedure.file}) is public and fans work out to a privileged dispatch surface (scheduler/queue/workflow) with no rate limit — an anonymous caller can drive that billable, system-identity dispatch in a loop. Add a rate-limit guard, or make it internal and trigger it from an authenticated path.`,
-        metadata: { exportName: procedure.exportName, file: procedure.file, kind: procedure.kind }
-      })
-    );
-  },
-  source: "static",
-  title: "Public procedure fans out to a privileged dispatch surface"
-};
-
-export { privilegedFanoutFromPublicProcedure as default };

package/dist/packem_shared/publicArgumentUsesAny-C71b2NCf.mjs

@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-import { e as emit } from './finding-Dm_zvzS1.mjs';
-
-const publicArgumentUsesAny = {
-  categories: ["SECURITY"],
-  description: "A public procedure declares a `v.any()` argument. `v.any()` accepts arbitrary untyped input from an untrusted client — defeating validation and opening injection / oversized-payload abuse.",
-  facing: "EXTERNAL",
-  level: "WARN",
-  name: "public_arg_uses_any",
-  remediation: "Replace `v.any()` with a precise validator — `v.object({...})`, `v.string()`, `v.union(...)`, etc. If the shape is genuinely dynamic, model the known variants with `v.union` rather than accepting anything.",
-  run: (context) => {
-    if (context.argValidators === void 0) {
-      return [];
-    }
-    const findings = [];
-    for (const procedure of context.argValidators) {
-      for (const argument of procedure.anyArgs) {
-        findings.push(
-          emit(publicArgumentUsesAny, {
-            cacheKey: `public_arg_uses_any:${procedure.file}:${procedure.exportName}:${argument}`,
-            detail: `Arg \`${argument}\` of public procedure \`${procedure.exportName}\` (${procedure.file}:${procedure.line.toString()}) is \`v.any()\` — untrusted input with no validation. Give it a precise validator.`,
-            metadata: { argument, exportName: procedure.exportName, file: procedure.file, line: procedure.line }
-          })
-        );
-      }
-    }
-    return findings;
-  },
-  source: "static",
-  title: "Public argument uses v.any()"
-};
-
-export { publicArgumentUsesAny as default };

package/dist/packem_shared/publicMutationWithoutRatelimit-DbIhgi7j.mjs

@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-import { e as emit } from './finding-Dm_zvzS1.mjs';
-import { i as isPublicWrite } from './helpers-BySnKhVB.mjs';
-
-const SENSITIVE_NAME_RE = /contact|forgot|login|magic|otp|register|reset|signin|signup|subscribe|verify/iu;
-const publicMutationWithoutRatelimit = {
-  categories: ["SECURITY"],
-  description: "A public `mutation`/`action` has no `rateLimit` middleware. Publicly-callable writes are flood and brute-force targets — an attacker can exhaust writes, mail quota, or credits, or guess credentials on auth-shaped endpoints.",
-  facing: "EXTERNAL",
-  level: "WARN",
-  name: "public_mutation_without_ratelimit",
-  remediation: 'Attach a rate limit: `.use(rateLimit(limiter, "<bucket>"))` from `@lunora/ratelimit`, or wrap the recommended public-procedure guards with `.use(protectPublic({ rateLimit, captcha }))` from `@lunora/server`. Genuinely-open writes can be acknowledged by adding a permissive limiter.',
-  run: (context) => {
-    if (context.procedureProtections === void 0) {
-      return [];
-    }
-    const findings = [];
-    for (const procedure of context.procedureProtections) {
-      if (!isPublicWrite(procedure) || procedure.usesRateLimit) {
-        continue;
-      }
-      const sensitive = SENSITIVE_NAME_RE.test(procedure.exportName);
-      findings.push(
-        emit(publicMutationWithoutRatelimit, {
-          cacheKey: `public_mutation_without_ratelimit:${procedure.file}:${procedure.exportName}`,
-          detail: `Public ${procedure.kind} \`${procedure.exportName}\` (${procedure.file}) has no rate limit${sensitive ? " — its name suggests an auth/abuse-sensitive endpoint, so this is high-risk" : ""}. Add \`.use(rateLimit(...))\` or \`.use(protectPublic({ rateLimit }))\`.`,
-          metadata: { exportName: procedure.exportName, file: procedure.file, kind: procedure.kind, sensitive }
-        })
-      );
-    }
-    return findings;
-  },
-  source: "static",
-  title: "Public write without a rate limit"
-};
-
-export { publicMutationWithoutRatelimit as default };

package/dist/packem_shared/publicTableRlsOptoutConfusion-Bn71yoD4.mjs

@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-import { e as emit } from './finding-Dm_zvzS1.mjs';
-import { o as ownershipOrPiiColumns } from './helpers-BySnKhVB.mjs';
-
-const publicTableRlsOptoutConfusion = {
-  categories: ["SECURITY"],
-  description: '`.public()` opts a table OUT of the schema\'s `.rls("required")` enforcement — it does not mean the table holds public data. A `.public()` table whose columns look ownership- or PII-shaped (`userId`, `email`, `ssn`, …) is exempt from the row-security guard, not "safe to expose".',
-  facing: "EXTERNAL",
-  level: "WARN",
-  name: "public_table_rls_optout_confusion",
-  remediation: 'Double-check this table actually needs the RLS opt-out. If it does not, remove `.public()` so `.rls("required")` covers it like every other table. If it genuinely must stay open (a shared lookup table, for instance), rename or comment it so the exemption is intentional rather than a name-implies-safety mistake, and make sure no procedure trusts `.public()` as an authorization boundary.',
-  run: (context) => {
-    if (context.schema.rlsMode !== "required") {
-      return [];
-    }
-    const findings = [];
-    for (const table of context.schema.tables) {
-      if (!table.isPublic) {
-        continue;
-      }
-      const flaggedColumns = ownershipOrPiiColumns(table);
-      if (flaggedColumns.length === 0) {
-        continue;
-      }
-      findings.push(
-        emit(publicTableRlsOptoutConfusion, {
-          cacheKey: `public_table_rls_optout_confusion:${table.name}`,
-          detail: `Table "${table.name}" is \`.public()\` (opted OUT of the schema's \`.rls("required")\` enforcement) but carries ownership/PII-shaped column(s): ${flaggedColumns.join(", ")}. \`.public()\` means "exempt from RLS", not "safe to expose" — confirm this table really needs the opt-out.`,
-          metadata: { columns: flaggedColumns, table: table.name }
-        })
-      );
-    }
-    return findings;
-  },
-  source: "static",
-  title: "Public table opts out of RLS but carries sensitive columns"
-};
-
-export { publicTableRlsOptoutConfusion as default };

package/dist/packem_shared/queueWithoutDlq-CSkGNb_0.mjs

@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-import { e as emit } from './finding-Dm_zvzS1.mjs';
-
-const queueWithoutDlq = {
-  categories: ["SCHEMA"],
-  description: "A queue consumer drops a message once it exhausts `maxRetries` (default 3) delivery attempts. Without a `deadLetterQueue`, that message is deleted permanently with no record — route exhausted messages to a DLQ so you can inspect, alert on, and replay them.",
-  facing: "INTERNAL",
-  level: "WARN",
-  name: "queue_without_dlq",
-  remediation: 'Add `deadLetterQueue: "<name>-dlq"` to the `defineQueue({...})` options and declare a consumer for that queue so exhausted messages are inspectable (an unconsumed DLQ still expires at the retention window). `vis generate lunora-queue` with the best-practice setup scaffolds both. If the queue is fire-and-forget and message loss is acceptable, this advisory can be ignored.',
-  run: (context) => {
-    if (context.queues === void 0) {
-      return [];
-    }
-    const dlqTargets = new Set(
-      context.queues.map((queue) => queue.tuning.deadLetterQueue).filter((name) => name !== void 0 && name !== "")
-    );
-    const findings = [];
-    for (const queue of context.queues) {
-      const dlq = queue.tuning.deadLetterQueue;
-      if (dlq !== void 0 && dlq !== "") {
-        continue;
-      }
-      if (dlqTargets.has(queue.name)) {
-        continue;
-      }
-      const maxRetries = typeof queue.tuning.maxRetries === "number" ? queue.tuning.maxRetries : 3;
-      findings.push(
-        emit(queueWithoutDlq, {
-          cacheKey: `queue_without_dlq:${queue.exportName}`,
-          detail: `Queue "${queue.exportName}" declares no \`deadLetterQueue\`, so a message that exhausts its retries (\`maxRetries\` = ${String(maxRetries)}, ~${String(maxRetries + 1)} delivery attempts) is dropped and permanently lost.`,
-          metadata: { maxRetries, mode: queue.mode, queue: queue.exportName }
-        })
-      );
-    }
-    return findings;
-  },
-  source: "static",
-  title: "Queue has no dead-letter queue"
-};
-
-export { queueWithoutDlq as default };

package/dist/packem_shared/r2sqlOutsideAction-CtqxvMuV.mjs

@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-import { e as emit } from './finding-Dm_zvzS1.mjs';
-
-const r2sqlOutsideAction = {
-  categories: ["SCHEMA"],
-  description: "A `query`/`mutation` handler accesses R2 SQL via `ctx.r2sql`. R2 SQL queries external Apache Iceberg tables over REST (no Workers binding): queries are non-deterministic (like `fetch`) and the reads are invisible to live queries. `ctx.r2sql` is available on `ActionCtx` only and must be confined to `action` handlers.",
-  facing: "EXTERNAL",
-  level: "WARN",
-  name: "r2sql_outside_action",
-  remediation: "Move the `ctx.r2sql` access into an `action(...)` (the only context where it is typed), where external I/O is allowed. If a query/mutation needs the data, have the action read it via `ctx.r2sql` and write a projection into a `defineSchema` DO/D1 table — that write is tracked by live queries, whereas R2 SQL is not.",
-  run: (context) => {
-    if (context.r2sqlCalls === void 0) {
-      return [];
-    }
-    const findings = [];
-    for (const call of context.r2sqlCalls) {
-      findings.push(
-        emit(r2sqlOutsideAction, {
-          cacheKey: `r2sql_outside_action:${call.file}:${call.line.toString()}:${call.callee}`,
-          detail: `\`${call.callee}(…)\` in ${call.exportName} (${call.file}:${call.line.toString()}) runs inside a ${call.kind} handler — R2 SQL's \`ctx.r2sql\` is non-deterministic and non-reactive, so it is available only in actions. Move the external query into an \`action\` and project the result into a Lunora table if a query/mutation needs it.`,
-          metadata: { callee: call.callee, exportName: call.exportName, file: call.file, kind: call.kind, line: call.line }
-        })
-      );
-    }
-    return findings;
-  },
-  source: "static",
-  title: "R2 SQL `ctx.r2sql` used outside an action"
-};
-
-export { r2sqlOutsideAction as default };

package/dist/packem_shared/ratelimitDefaultMemoryStore-BISChG5C.mjs

@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-import { e as emit } from './finding-Dm_zvzS1.mjs';
-
-const ratelimitDefaultMemoryStore = {
-  categories: ["SECURITY"],
-  description: "`new RateLimiter({...})` has no `store`, so it falls back to a per-instance in-memory store. On Workers each request may hit a different isolate, so the counter never sums across them — the limit silently under-counts and is effectively a no-op under load, giving false protection against brute-force and cost abuse.",
-  facing: "EXTERNAL",
-  level: "WARN",
-  name: "ratelimit_default_memory_store",
-  remediation: "Pass a shared, durable `store` to `new RateLimiter({...})` (a Durable-Object- or KV-backed store) so every Worker isolate reads and writes the same bucket. The default in-memory store is per-isolate and does not enforce a global limit.",
-  run: (context) => {
-    if (context.configCalls === void 0) {
-      return [];
-    }
-    return context.configCalls.filter((call) => call.callee === "RateLimiter" && call.analyzable && !call.presentKeys.includes("store")).map(
-      (call) => emit(ratelimitDefaultMemoryStore, {
-        cacheKey: `ratelimit_default_memory_store:${call.file}:${call.line.toString()}`,
-        detail: `\`new RateLimiter({...})\` in ${call.file}:${call.line.toString()} has no \`store\` — it uses the per-instance in-memory store, which never sums across Worker isolates, so the limit silently under-counts under load. Pass a Durable-Object- or KV-backed \`store\` so the limit is enforced globally.`,
-        metadata: { callee: call.callee, file: call.file, line: call.line }
-      })
-    );
-  },
-  source: "static",
-  title: "RateLimiter using the default in-memory store"
-};
-
-export { ratelimitDefaultMemoryStore as default };

package/dist/packem_shared/ratelimitKeySpoofableOrGlobal-DqlHYQQ3.mjs

@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-import { e as emit } from './finding-Dm_zvzS1.mjs';
-
-const ratelimitKeySpoofableOrGlobal = {
-  categories: ["SECURITY"],
-  description: "A `rateLimit`/`dbRateLimit` middleware call's `key` selector is derived from the handler's `args` with no server-side scoping, so an attacker can rotate the key on every request (e.g. by resubmitting a different email/id) and never share a bucket with themselves — the limit never actually limits them.",
-  facing: "EXTERNAL",
-  level: "WARN",
-  name: "ratelimit_key_spoofable_or_global",
-  remediation: 'Derive the rate-limit `key` from a server-trusted value — `ctx.auth.userId` for authenticated callers, `ctx.ip` for anonymous ones (e.g. `key: (ctx) => ctx.auth.userId ?? ctx.ip ?? "anon"`) — instead of an `args` field the caller controls.',
-  run: (context) => {
-    if (context.ratelimitKeySelectors === void 0) {
-      return [];
-    }
-    return context.ratelimitKeySelectors.map(
-      (selector) => emit(ratelimitKeySpoofableOrGlobal, {
-        cacheKey: `ratelimit_key_spoofable_or_global:${selector.file}:${selector.line.toString()}`,
-        detail: `\`${selector.callee}(…, "${selector.limitName}", { key })\` in \`${selector.exportName}\` (${selector.file}:${selector.line.toString()}) derives its \`key\` from \`args\` with no server-side scoping — an attacker can rotate the key per request and bypass the limit. Derive \`key\` from \`ctx.auth.userId\` / \`ctx.ip\` instead.`,
-        metadata: { callee: selector.callee, exportName: selector.exportName, file: selector.file, limitName: selector.limitName, line: selector.line }
-      })
-    );
-  },
-  source: "static",
-  title: "Rate-limit key derived from spoofable user input"
-};
-
-export { ratelimitKeySpoofableOrGlobal as default };