@lumoauth/api-client 1.1.0 → 1.3.0

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
Files changed (147) hide show
  1. package/.openapi-generator/FILES +16 -0
  2. package/README.md +14 -4
  3. package/api/aauth-api.ts +5 -5
  4. package/api/admin-email-api.ts +67 -15
  5. package/api/admin-mcp-api.ts +5 -5
  6. package/api/admin-oauth-clients-api.ts +370 -0
  7. package/api/agents-api.ts +5 -5
  8. package/api/mcp-api.ts +130 -0
  9. package/api/oauth-api.ts +0 -186
  10. package/api/well-known-api.ts +10 -10
  11. package/dist/api/aauth-api.d.ts +5 -5
  12. package/dist/api/aauth-api.js +4 -4
  13. package/dist/api/admin-email-api.d.ts +41 -9
  14. package/dist/api/admin-email-api.js +34 -14
  15. package/dist/api/admin-mcp-api.d.ts +5 -5
  16. package/dist/api/admin-mcp-api.js +4 -4
  17. package/dist/api/admin-oauth-clients-api.d.ts +210 -0
  18. package/dist/api/admin-oauth-clients-api.js +236 -0
  19. package/dist/api/agents-api.d.ts +5 -5
  20. package/dist/api/agents-api.js +4 -4
  21. package/dist/api/mcp-api.d.ts +73 -0
  22. package/dist/api/mcp-api.js +82 -0
  23. package/dist/api/oauth-api.d.ts +0 -110
  24. package/dist/api/oauth-api.js +0 -132
  25. package/dist/api/well-known-api.d.ts +10 -10
  26. package/dist/api/well-known-api.js +8 -8
  27. package/dist/esm/api/aauth-api.d.ts +5 -5
  28. package/dist/esm/api/aauth-api.js +4 -4
  29. package/dist/esm/api/admin-email-api.d.ts +41 -9
  30. package/dist/esm/api/admin-email-api.js +34 -14
  31. package/dist/esm/api/admin-mcp-api.d.ts +5 -5
  32. package/dist/esm/api/admin-mcp-api.js +4 -4
  33. package/dist/esm/api/admin-oauth-clients-api.d.ts +210 -0
  34. package/dist/esm/api/admin-oauth-clients-api.js +236 -0
  35. package/dist/esm/api/agents-api.d.ts +5 -5
  36. package/dist/esm/api/agents-api.js +4 -4
  37. package/dist/esm/api/mcp-api.d.ts +73 -0
  38. package/dist/esm/api/mcp-api.js +83 -1
  39. package/dist/esm/api/oauth-api.d.ts +0 -110
  40. package/dist/esm/api/oauth-api.js +0 -132
  41. package/dist/esm/api/well-known-api.d.ts +10 -10
  42. package/dist/esm/api/well-known-api.js +8 -8
  43. package/dist/esm/models/admin-agents-generate-token-request.d.ts +7 -1
  44. package/dist/esm/models/admin-agents-generate-token-response-data.d.ts +12 -0
  45. package/dist/esm/models/admin-clients-get-branding-response-data.d.ts +34 -0
  46. package/dist/esm/models/admin-clients-get-branding-response-data.js +14 -0
  47. package/dist/esm/models/admin-clients-get-branding-response.d.ts +25 -0
  48. package/dist/esm/models/admin-clients-get-branding-response.js +14 -0
  49. package/dist/esm/models/attest-response.d.ts +2 -1
  50. package/dist/esm/models/attest-response.js +1 -0
  51. package/dist/esm/models/authorization-server-metadata.d.ts +0 -6
  52. package/dist/esm/models/authorize-mcp-request.d.ts +1 -1
  53. package/dist/esm/models/get-protected-resource-metadata-root-response1-resources-item.d.ts +1 -1
  54. package/dist/esm/models/index.d.ts +8 -0
  55. package/dist/esm/models/index.js +8 -0
  56. package/dist/esm/models/mcp-server-tool-authorize-request-subject.d.ts +38 -0
  57. package/dist/esm/models/mcp-server-tool-authorize-request-subject.js +22 -0
  58. package/dist/esm/models/mcp-server-tool-authorize-request.d.ts +31 -0
  59. package/dist/esm/models/mcp-server-tool-authorize-request.js +14 -0
  60. package/dist/esm/models/mcp-server-tool-authorize-response.d.ts +36 -0
  61. package/dist/esm/models/mcp-server-tool-authorize-response.js +14 -0
  62. package/dist/esm/models/mcp-server.d.ts +18 -0
  63. package/dist/esm/models/open-id-configuration.d.ts +7 -7
  64. package/dist/esm/models/patch-admin-clients-update-branding-response.d.ts +32 -0
  65. package/dist/esm/models/patch-admin-clients-update-branding-response.js +14 -0
  66. package/dist/esm/models/protected-resource-metadata.d.ts +1 -1
  67. package/dist/esm/models/put-admin-clients-update-branding-request.d.ts +34 -0
  68. package/dist/esm/models/put-admin-clients-update-branding-request.js +14 -0
  69. package/dist/esm/models/put-admin-clients-update-branding-response.d.ts +32 -0
  70. package/dist/esm/models/put-admin-clients-update-branding-response.js +14 -0
  71. package/dist/esm/models/single-server-metadata.d.ts +1 -1
  72. package/dist/models/admin-agents-generate-token-request.d.ts +7 -1
  73. package/dist/models/admin-agents-generate-token-response-data.d.ts +12 -0
  74. package/dist/models/admin-clients-get-branding-response-data.d.ts +34 -0
  75. package/dist/models/admin-clients-get-branding-response-data.js +15 -0
  76. package/dist/models/admin-clients-get-branding-response.d.ts +25 -0
  77. package/dist/models/admin-clients-get-branding-response.js +15 -0
  78. package/dist/models/attest-response.d.ts +2 -1
  79. package/dist/models/attest-response.js +1 -0
  80. package/dist/models/authorization-server-metadata.d.ts +0 -6
  81. package/dist/models/authorize-mcp-request.d.ts +1 -1
  82. package/dist/models/get-protected-resource-metadata-root-response1-resources-item.d.ts +1 -1
  83. package/dist/models/index.d.ts +8 -0
  84. package/dist/models/index.js +8 -0
  85. package/dist/models/mcp-server-tool-authorize-request-subject.d.ts +38 -0
  86. package/dist/models/mcp-server-tool-authorize-request-subject.js +25 -0
  87. package/dist/models/mcp-server-tool-authorize-request.d.ts +31 -0
  88. package/dist/models/mcp-server-tool-authorize-request.js +15 -0
  89. package/dist/models/mcp-server-tool-authorize-response.d.ts +36 -0
  90. package/dist/models/mcp-server-tool-authorize-response.js +15 -0
  91. package/dist/models/mcp-server.d.ts +18 -0
  92. package/dist/models/open-id-configuration.d.ts +7 -7
  93. package/dist/models/patch-admin-clients-update-branding-response.d.ts +32 -0
  94. package/dist/models/patch-admin-clients-update-branding-response.js +15 -0
  95. package/dist/models/protected-resource-metadata.d.ts +1 -1
  96. package/dist/models/put-admin-clients-update-branding-request.d.ts +34 -0
  97. package/dist/models/put-admin-clients-update-branding-request.js +15 -0
  98. package/dist/models/put-admin-clients-update-branding-response.d.ts +32 -0
  99. package/dist/models/put-admin-clients-update-branding-response.js +15 -0
  100. package/dist/models/single-server-metadata.d.ts +1 -1
  101. package/docs/AAuthApi.md +1 -1
  102. package/docs/AdminAgentsApi.md +1 -1
  103. package/docs/AdminAgentsGenerateTokenRequest.md +3 -1
  104. package/docs/AdminAgentsGenerateTokenResponseData.md +4 -0
  105. package/docs/AdminClientsGetBrandingResponse.md +20 -0
  106. package/docs/AdminClientsGetBrandingResponseData.md +22 -0
  107. package/docs/AdminEmailApi.md +15 -2
  108. package/docs/AdminMcpApi.md +1 -1
  109. package/docs/AdminOAuthClientsApi.md +174 -0
  110. package/docs/AgentsApi.md +4 -3
  111. package/docs/AuthorizationServerMetadata.md +0 -2
  112. package/docs/AuthorizeMcpRequest.md +1 -1
  113. package/docs/GetProtectedResourceMetadataRoot200Response.md +1 -1
  114. package/docs/GetProtectedResourceMetadataRootResponse1ResourcesItem.md +1 -1
  115. package/docs/McpApi.md +64 -0
  116. package/docs/McpServer.md +6 -0
  117. package/docs/McpServerToolAuthorizeRequest.md +22 -0
  118. package/docs/McpServerToolAuthorizeRequestSubject.md +22 -0
  119. package/docs/McpServerToolAuthorizeResponse.md +24 -0
  120. package/docs/OAuthApi.md +0 -105
  121. package/docs/OpenIdConfiguration.md +3 -3
  122. package/docs/PatchAdminClientsUpdateBrandingResponse.md +22 -0
  123. package/docs/ProtectedResourceMetadata.md +1 -1
  124. package/docs/PutAdminClientsUpdateBrandingRequest.md +22 -0
  125. package/docs/PutAdminClientsUpdateBrandingResponse.md +22 -0
  126. package/docs/SingleServerMetadata.md +1 -1
  127. package/docs/WellKnownApi.md +2 -2
  128. package/models/admin-agents-generate-token-request.ts +7 -1
  129. package/models/admin-agents-generate-token-response-data.ts +12 -0
  130. package/models/admin-clients-get-branding-response-data.ts +36 -0
  131. package/models/admin-clients-get-branding-response.ts +33 -0
  132. package/models/attest-response.ts +2 -1
  133. package/models/authorization-server-metadata.ts +0 -6
  134. package/models/authorize-mcp-request.ts +1 -1
  135. package/models/get-protected-resource-metadata-root-response1-resources-item.ts +1 -1
  136. package/models/index.ts +8 -0
  137. package/models/mcp-server-tool-authorize-request-subject.ts +46 -0
  138. package/models/mcp-server-tool-authorize-request.ts +39 -0
  139. package/models/mcp-server-tool-authorize-response.ts +42 -0
  140. package/models/mcp-server.ts +18 -0
  141. package/models/open-id-configuration.ts +7 -7
  142. package/models/patch-admin-clients-update-branding-response.ts +36 -0
  143. package/models/protected-resource-metadata.ts +1 -1
  144. package/models/put-admin-clients-update-branding-request.ts +36 -0
  145. package/models/put-admin-clients-update-branding-response.ts +36 -0
  146. package/models/single-server-metadata.ts +1 -1
  147. package/package.json +1 -1
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ export declare const AgentsApiAxiosParamCreator: (configuration?: Configuration)
50
50
  */
51
51
  attest: (orgId: string, agentId: string, attestRequest: AttestRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig) => Promise<RequestArgs>;
52
52
  /**
53
- * The real request-path caller of {@see \\McpToolAuthorizationService::canInvoke()} — the piece that connects MCP authorization to agent identity. An MCP gateway/server asks \"may THIS agent invoke <server>/<tool>?\" and gets a Zanzibar-backed allow/deny (tool-level or server-wide grant). Denials and grants are both audited, closing the MCP-authorization audit blind spot. POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/agents/me/mcp/authorize Body: { \"server_id\": \"invoices\", \"tool\": \"send_payment_reminder\" }
53
+ * An AGENT asks about itself: \"may I invoke <server>/<tool>?\" — with its own credential, before it calls the tool. Zanzibar-backed allow/deny (tool-level or server-wide grant), audited either way. An MCP SERVER must not use this endpoint: it would have to forward the agent\'s token (MCP 2026-07-28 forbids token passthrough). Servers call POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/mcp/servers/{serverId}/tools/authorize with their own client-credentials token instead ({@see \\McpAuthorizationController::authorizeTool()}). POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/agents/me/mcp/authorize Body: { \"server_id\": \"mcp_0123…\", \"tool\": \"send_payment_reminder\" }
54
54
  * @summary Per-MCP-tool authorization for the authenticated agent (dx B3).
55
55
  * @param {string} orgId
56
56
  * @param {AuthorizeMcpRequest} authorizeMcpRequest
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ export declare const AgentsApiFp: (configuration?: Configuration) => {
136
136
  */
137
137
  attest(orgId: string, agentId: string, attestRequest: AttestRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): Promise<(axios?: AxiosInstance, basePath?: string) => AxiosPromise<AttestResponse>>;
138
138
  /**
139
- * The real request-path caller of {@see \\McpToolAuthorizationService::canInvoke()} — the piece that connects MCP authorization to agent identity. An MCP gateway/server asks \"may THIS agent invoke <server>/<tool>?\" and gets a Zanzibar-backed allow/deny (tool-level or server-wide grant). Denials and grants are both audited, closing the MCP-authorization audit blind spot. POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/agents/me/mcp/authorize Body: { \"server_id\": \"invoices\", \"tool\": \"send_payment_reminder\" }
139
+ * An AGENT asks about itself: \"may I invoke <server>/<tool>?\" — with its own credential, before it calls the tool. Zanzibar-backed allow/deny (tool-level or server-wide grant), audited either way. An MCP SERVER must not use this endpoint: it would have to forward the agent\'s token (MCP 2026-07-28 forbids token passthrough). Servers call POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/mcp/servers/{serverId}/tools/authorize with their own client-credentials token instead ({@see \\McpAuthorizationController::authorizeTool()}). POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/agents/me/mcp/authorize Body: { \"server_id\": \"mcp_0123…\", \"tool\": \"send_payment_reminder\" }
140
140
  * @summary Per-MCP-tool authorization for the authenticated agent (dx B3).
141
141
  * @param {string} orgId
142
142
  * @param {AuthorizeMcpRequest} authorizeMcpRequest
@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ export declare const AgentsApiFactory: (configuration?: Configuration, basePath?
219
219
  */
220
220
  attest(requestParameters: AgentsApiAttestRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): AxiosPromise<AttestResponse>;
221
221
  /**
222
- * The real request-path caller of {@see \\McpToolAuthorizationService::canInvoke()} — the piece that connects MCP authorization to agent identity. An MCP gateway/server asks \"may THIS agent invoke <server>/<tool>?\" and gets a Zanzibar-backed allow/deny (tool-level or server-wide grant). Denials and grants are both audited, closing the MCP-authorization audit blind spot. POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/agents/me/mcp/authorize Body: { \"server_id\": \"invoices\", \"tool\": \"send_payment_reminder\" }
222
+ * An AGENT asks about itself: \"may I invoke <server>/<tool>?\" — with its own credential, before it calls the tool. Zanzibar-backed allow/deny (tool-level or server-wide grant), audited either way. An MCP SERVER must not use this endpoint: it would have to forward the agent\'s token (MCP 2026-07-28 forbids token passthrough). Servers call POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/mcp/servers/{serverId}/tools/authorize with their own client-credentials token instead ({@see \\McpAuthorizationController::authorizeTool()}). POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/agents/me/mcp/authorize Body: { \"server_id\": \"mcp_0123…\", \"tool\": \"send_payment_reminder\" }
223
223
  * @summary Per-MCP-tool authorization for the authenticated agent (dx B3).
224
224
  * @param {AgentsApiAuthorizeMcpRequest} requestParameters Request parameters.
225
225
  * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
@@ -298,7 +298,7 @@ export interface AgentsApiInterface {
298
298
  */
299
299
  attest(requestParameters: AgentsApiAttestRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): AxiosPromise<AttestResponse>;
300
300
  /**
301
- * The real request-path caller of {@see \\McpToolAuthorizationService::canInvoke()} — the piece that connects MCP authorization to agent identity. An MCP gateway/server asks \"may THIS agent invoke <server>/<tool>?\" and gets a Zanzibar-backed allow/deny (tool-level or server-wide grant). Denials and grants are both audited, closing the MCP-authorization audit blind spot. POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/agents/me/mcp/authorize Body: { \"server_id\": \"invoices\", \"tool\": \"send_payment_reminder\" }
301
+ * An AGENT asks about itself: \"may I invoke <server>/<tool>?\" — with its own credential, before it calls the tool. Zanzibar-backed allow/deny (tool-level or server-wide grant), audited either way. An MCP SERVER must not use this endpoint: it would have to forward the agent\'s token (MCP 2026-07-28 forbids token passthrough). Servers call POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/mcp/servers/{serverId}/tools/authorize with their own client-credentials token instead ({@see \\McpAuthorizationController::authorizeTool()}). POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/agents/me/mcp/authorize Body: { \"server_id\": \"mcp_0123…\", \"tool\": \"send_payment_reminder\" }
302
302
  * @summary Per-MCP-tool authorization for the authenticated agent (dx B3).
303
303
  * @param {AgentsApiAuthorizeMcpRequest} requestParameters Request parameters.
304
304
  * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
@@ -552,7 +552,7 @@ export declare class AgentsApi extends BaseAPI implements AgentsApiInterface {
552
552
  */
553
553
  attest(requestParameters: AgentsApiAttestRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): Promise<import("axios").AxiosResponse<AttestResponse, any, {}>>;
554
554
  /**
555
- * The real request-path caller of {@see \\McpToolAuthorizationService::canInvoke()} — the piece that connects MCP authorization to agent identity. An MCP gateway/server asks \"may THIS agent invoke <server>/<tool>?\" and gets a Zanzibar-backed allow/deny (tool-level or server-wide grant). Denials and grants are both audited, closing the MCP-authorization audit blind spot. POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/agents/me/mcp/authorize Body: { \"server_id\": \"invoices\", \"tool\": \"send_payment_reminder\" }
555
+ * An AGENT asks about itself: \"may I invoke <server>/<tool>?\" — with its own credential, before it calls the tool. Zanzibar-backed allow/deny (tool-level or server-wide grant), audited either way. An MCP SERVER must not use this endpoint: it would have to forward the agent\'s token (MCP 2026-07-28 forbids token passthrough). Servers call POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/mcp/servers/{serverId}/tools/authorize with their own client-credentials token instead ({@see \\McpAuthorizationController::authorizeTool()}). POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/agents/me/mcp/authorize Body: { \"server_id\": \"mcp_0123…\", \"tool\": \"send_payment_reminder\" }
556
556
  * @summary Per-MCP-tool authorization for the authenticated agent (dx B3).
557
557
  * @param {AgentsApiAuthorizeMcpRequest} requestParameters Request parameters.
558
558
  * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ const AgentsApiAxiosParamCreator = function (configuration) {
118
118
  };
119
119
  }),
120
120
  /**
121
- * The real request-path caller of {@see \\McpToolAuthorizationService::canInvoke()} — the piece that connects MCP authorization to agent identity. An MCP gateway/server asks \"may THIS agent invoke <server>/<tool>?\" and gets a Zanzibar-backed allow/deny (tool-level or server-wide grant). Denials and grants are both audited, closing the MCP-authorization audit blind spot. POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/agents/me/mcp/authorize Body: { \"server_id\": \"invoices\", \"tool\": \"send_payment_reminder\" }
121
+ * An AGENT asks about itself: \"may I invoke <server>/<tool>?\" — with its own credential, before it calls the tool. Zanzibar-backed allow/deny (tool-level or server-wide grant), audited either way. An MCP SERVER must not use this endpoint: it would have to forward the agent\'s token (MCP 2026-07-28 forbids token passthrough). Servers call POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/mcp/servers/{serverId}/tools/authorize with their own client-credentials token instead ({@see \\McpAuthorizationController::authorizeTool()}). POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/agents/me/mcp/authorize Body: { \"server_id\": \"mcp_0123…\", \"tool\": \"send_payment_reminder\" }
122
122
  * @summary Per-MCP-tool authorization for the authenticated agent (dx B3).
123
123
  * @param {string} orgId
124
124
  * @param {AuthorizeMcpRequest} authorizeMcpRequest
@@ -417,7 +417,7 @@ const AgentsApiFp = function (configuration) {
417
417
  });
418
418
  },
419
419
  /**
420
- * The real request-path caller of {@see \\McpToolAuthorizationService::canInvoke()} — the piece that connects MCP authorization to agent identity. An MCP gateway/server asks \"may THIS agent invoke <server>/<tool>?\" and gets a Zanzibar-backed allow/deny (tool-level or server-wide grant). Denials and grants are both audited, closing the MCP-authorization audit blind spot. POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/agents/me/mcp/authorize Body: { \"server_id\": \"invoices\", \"tool\": \"send_payment_reminder\" }
420
+ * An AGENT asks about itself: \"may I invoke <server>/<tool>?\" — with its own credential, before it calls the tool. Zanzibar-backed allow/deny (tool-level or server-wide grant), audited either way. An MCP SERVER must not use this endpoint: it would have to forward the agent\'s token (MCP 2026-07-28 forbids token passthrough). Servers call POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/mcp/servers/{serverId}/tools/authorize with their own client-credentials token instead ({@see \\McpAuthorizationController::authorizeTool()}). POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/agents/me/mcp/authorize Body: { \"server_id\": \"mcp_0123…\", \"tool\": \"send_payment_reminder\" }
421
421
  * @summary Per-MCP-tool authorization for the authenticated agent (dx B3).
422
422
  * @param {string} orgId
423
423
  * @param {AuthorizeMcpRequest} authorizeMcpRequest
@@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ const AgentsApiFactory = function (configuration, basePath, axios) {
562
562
  return localVarFp.attest(requestParameters.orgId, requestParameters.agentId, requestParameters.attestRequest, options).then((request) => request(axios, basePath));
563
563
  },
564
564
  /**
565
- * The real request-path caller of {@see \\McpToolAuthorizationService::canInvoke()} — the piece that connects MCP authorization to agent identity. An MCP gateway/server asks \"may THIS agent invoke <server>/<tool>?\" and gets a Zanzibar-backed allow/deny (tool-level or server-wide grant). Denials and grants are both audited, closing the MCP-authorization audit blind spot. POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/agents/me/mcp/authorize Body: { \"server_id\": \"invoices\", \"tool\": \"send_payment_reminder\" }
565
+ * An AGENT asks about itself: \"may I invoke <server>/<tool>?\" — with its own credential, before it calls the tool. Zanzibar-backed allow/deny (tool-level or server-wide grant), audited either way. An MCP SERVER must not use this endpoint: it would have to forward the agent\'s token (MCP 2026-07-28 forbids token passthrough). Servers call POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/mcp/servers/{serverId}/tools/authorize with their own client-credentials token instead ({@see \\McpAuthorizationController::authorizeTool()}). POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/agents/me/mcp/authorize Body: { \"server_id\": \"mcp_0123…\", \"tool\": \"send_payment_reminder\" }
566
566
  * @summary Per-MCP-tool authorization for the authenticated agent (dx B3).
567
567
  * @param {AgentsApiAuthorizeMcpRequest} requestParameters Request parameters.
568
568
  * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
@@ -662,7 +662,7 @@ class AgentsApi extends base_1.BaseAPI {
662
662
  return (0, exports.AgentsApiFp)(this.configuration).attest(requestParameters.orgId, requestParameters.agentId, requestParameters.attestRequest, options).then((request) => request(this.axios, this.basePath));
663
663
  }
664
664
  /**
665
- * The real request-path caller of {@see \\McpToolAuthorizationService::canInvoke()} — the piece that connects MCP authorization to agent identity. An MCP gateway/server asks \"may THIS agent invoke <server>/<tool>?\" and gets a Zanzibar-backed allow/deny (tool-level or server-wide grant). Denials and grants are both audited, closing the MCP-authorization audit blind spot. POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/agents/me/mcp/authorize Body: { \"server_id\": \"invoices\", \"tool\": \"send_payment_reminder\" }
665
+ * An AGENT asks about itself: \"may I invoke <server>/<tool>?\" — with its own credential, before it calls the tool. Zanzibar-backed allow/deny (tool-level or server-wide grant), audited either way. An MCP SERVER must not use this endpoint: it would have to forward the agent\'s token (MCP 2026-07-28 forbids token passthrough). Servers call POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/mcp/servers/{serverId}/tools/authorize with their own client-credentials token instead ({@see \\McpAuthorizationController::authorizeTool()}). POST /orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/agents/me/mcp/authorize Body: { \"server_id\": \"mcp_0123…\", \"tool\": \"send_payment_reminder\" }
666
666
  * @summary Per-MCP-tool authorization for the authenticated agent (dx B3).
667
667
  * @param {AgentsApiAuthorizeMcpRequest} requestParameters Request parameters.
668
668
  * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ import type { GetProtectedResourceMetadataRoot200Response } from '../models';
16
16
  import type { GetServerChallengeResponse } from '../models';
17
17
  import type { GetServerResponse } from '../models';
18
18
  import type { ListServersResponse } from '../models';
19
+ import type { McpServerToolAuthorizeRequest } from '../models';
20
+ import type { McpServerToolAuthorizeResponse } from '../models';
19
21
  import type { ProtectedResourceMetadata } from '../models';
20
22
  /**
21
23
  * McpApi - axios parameter creator
@@ -65,6 +67,16 @@ export declare const McpApiAxiosParamCreator: (configuration?: Configuration) =>
65
67
  * @throws {RequiredError}
66
68
  */
67
69
  listServers: (orgId: string, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig) => Promise<RequestArgs>;
70
+ /**
71
+ * Called by the MCP server with its own client-credentials access token (scope mcp:authorize; the client must be listed in the server\'s tool_authorizer_client_ids). The body names the caller the server already verified. The server never forwards the caller\'s token.
72
+ * @summary Per-tool authorization for an MCP server (server credential)
73
+ * @param {string} orgId
74
+ * @param {string} serverId
75
+ * @param {McpServerToolAuthorizeRequest} mcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest
76
+ * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
77
+ * @throws {RequiredError}
78
+ */
79
+ mcpServerToolAuthorize: (orgId: string, serverId: string, mcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest: McpServerToolAuthorizeRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig) => Promise<RequestArgs>;
68
80
  /**
69
81
  * Identical to GET; the HTTP method is only recorded in the audit trail.
70
82
  * @summary Simulated MCP server authorization challenge (POST)
@@ -123,6 +135,16 @@ export declare const McpApiFp: (configuration?: Configuration) => {
123
135
  * @throws {RequiredError}
124
136
  */
125
137
  listServers(orgId: string, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): Promise<(axios?: AxiosInstance, basePath?: string) => AxiosPromise<ListServersResponse>>;
138
+ /**
139
+ * Called by the MCP server with its own client-credentials access token (scope mcp:authorize; the client must be listed in the server\'s tool_authorizer_client_ids). The body names the caller the server already verified. The server never forwards the caller\'s token.
140
+ * @summary Per-tool authorization for an MCP server (server credential)
141
+ * @param {string} orgId
142
+ * @param {string} serverId
143
+ * @param {McpServerToolAuthorizeRequest} mcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest
144
+ * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
145
+ * @throws {RequiredError}
146
+ */
147
+ mcpServerToolAuthorize(orgId: string, serverId: string, mcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest: McpServerToolAuthorizeRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): Promise<(axios?: AxiosInstance, basePath?: string) => AxiosPromise<McpServerToolAuthorizeResponse>>;
126
148
  /**
127
149
  * Identical to GET; the HTTP method is only recorded in the audit trail.
128
150
  * @summary Simulated MCP server authorization challenge (POST)
@@ -178,6 +200,14 @@ export declare const McpApiFactory: (configuration?: Configuration, basePath?: s
178
200
  * @throws {RequiredError}
179
201
  */
180
202
  listServers(requestParameters: McpApiListServersRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): AxiosPromise<ListServersResponse>;
203
+ /**
204
+ * Called by the MCP server with its own client-credentials access token (scope mcp:authorize; the client must be listed in the server\'s tool_authorizer_client_ids). The body names the caller the server already verified. The server never forwards the caller\'s token.
205
+ * @summary Per-tool authorization for an MCP server (server credential)
206
+ * @param {McpApiMcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest} requestParameters Request parameters.
207
+ * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
208
+ * @throws {RequiredError}
209
+ */
210
+ mcpServerToolAuthorize(requestParameters: McpApiMcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): AxiosPromise<McpServerToolAuthorizeResponse>;
181
211
  /**
182
212
  * Identical to GET; the HTTP method is only recorded in the audit trail.
183
213
  * @summary Simulated MCP server authorization challenge (POST)
@@ -238,6 +268,15 @@ export interface McpApiInterface {
238
268
  * @memberof McpApiInterface
239
269
  */
240
270
  listServers(requestParameters: McpApiListServersRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): AxiosPromise<ListServersResponse>;
271
+ /**
272
+ * Called by the MCP server with its own client-credentials access token (scope mcp:authorize; the client must be listed in the server\'s tool_authorizer_client_ids). The body names the caller the server already verified. The server never forwards the caller\'s token.
273
+ * @summary Per-tool authorization for an MCP server (server credential)
274
+ * @param {McpApiMcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest} requestParameters Request parameters.
275
+ * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
276
+ * @throws {RequiredError}
277
+ * @memberof McpApiInterface
278
+ */
279
+ mcpServerToolAuthorize(requestParameters: McpApiMcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): AxiosPromise<McpServerToolAuthorizeResponse>;
241
280
  /**
242
281
  * Identical to GET; the HTTP method is only recorded in the audit trail.
243
282
  * @summary Simulated MCP server authorization challenge (POST)
@@ -331,6 +370,31 @@ export interface McpApiListServersRequest {
331
370
  */
332
371
  readonly orgId: string;
333
372
  }
373
+ /**
374
+ * Request parameters for mcpServerToolAuthorize operation in McpApi.
375
+ * @export
376
+ * @interface McpApiMcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest
377
+ */
378
+ export interface McpApiMcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest {
379
+ /**
380
+ *
381
+ * @type {string}
382
+ * @memberof McpApiMcpServerToolAuthorize
383
+ */
384
+ readonly orgId: string;
385
+ /**
386
+ *
387
+ * @type {string}
388
+ * @memberof McpApiMcpServerToolAuthorize
389
+ */
390
+ readonly serverId: string;
391
+ /**
392
+ *
393
+ * @type {McpServerToolAuthorizeRequest}
394
+ * @memberof McpApiMcpServerToolAuthorize
395
+ */
396
+ readonly mcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest: McpServerToolAuthorizeRequest;
397
+ }
334
398
  /**
335
399
  * Request parameters for postServerChallenge operation in McpApi.
336
400
  * @export
@@ -402,6 +466,15 @@ export declare class McpApi extends BaseAPI implements McpApiInterface {
402
466
  * @memberof McpApi
403
467
  */
404
468
  listServers(requestParameters: McpApiListServersRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): Promise<import("axios").AxiosResponse<ListServersResponse, any, {}>>;
469
+ /**
470
+ * Called by the MCP server with its own client-credentials access token (scope mcp:authorize; the client must be listed in the server\'s tool_authorizer_client_ids). The body names the caller the server already verified. The server never forwards the caller\'s token.
471
+ * @summary Per-tool authorization for an MCP server (server credential)
472
+ * @param {McpApiMcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest} requestParameters Request parameters.
473
+ * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
474
+ * @throws {RequiredError}
475
+ * @memberof McpApi
476
+ */
477
+ mcpServerToolAuthorize(requestParameters: McpApiMcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): Promise<import("axios").AxiosResponse<McpServerToolAuthorizeResponse, any, {}>>;
405
478
  /**
406
479
  * Identical to GET; the HTTP method is only recorded in the audit trail.
407
480
  * @summary Simulated MCP server authorization challenge (POST)
@@ -205,6 +205,49 @@ const McpApiAxiosParamCreator = function (configuration) {
205
205
  options: localVarRequestOptions,
206
206
  };
207
207
  }),
208
+ /**
209
+ * Called by the MCP server with its own client-credentials access token (scope mcp:authorize; the client must be listed in the server\'s tool_authorizer_client_ids). The body names the caller the server already verified. The server never forwards the caller\'s token.
210
+ * @summary Per-tool authorization for an MCP server (server credential)
211
+ * @param {string} orgId
212
+ * @param {string} serverId
213
+ * @param {McpServerToolAuthorizeRequest} mcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest
214
+ * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
215
+ * @throws {RequiredError}
216
+ */
217
+ mcpServerToolAuthorize: (orgId_1, serverId_1, mcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest_1, ...args_1) => __awaiter(this, [orgId_1, serverId_1, mcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest_1, ...args_1], void 0, function* (orgId, serverId, mcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest, options = {}) {
218
+ // verify required parameter 'orgId' is not null or undefined
219
+ (0, common_1.assertParamExists)('mcpServerToolAuthorize', 'orgId', orgId);
220
+ // verify required parameter 'serverId' is not null or undefined
221
+ (0, common_1.assertParamExists)('mcpServerToolAuthorize', 'serverId', serverId);
222
+ // verify required parameter 'mcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest' is not null or undefined
223
+ (0, common_1.assertParamExists)('mcpServerToolAuthorize', 'mcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest', mcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest);
224
+ const localVarPath = `/orgs/{orgId}/api/v1/mcp/servers/{serverId}/tools/authorize`
225
+ .replace(`{${"orgId"}}`, encodeURIComponent(String(orgId)))
226
+ .replace(`{${"serverId"}}`, encodeURIComponent(String(serverId)));
227
+ // use dummy base URL string because the URL constructor only accepts absolute URLs.
228
+ const localVarUrlObj = new URL(localVarPath, common_1.DUMMY_BASE_URL);
229
+ let baseOptions;
230
+ if (configuration) {
231
+ baseOptions = configuration.baseOptions;
232
+ }
233
+ const localVarRequestOptions = Object.assign(Object.assign({ method: 'POST' }, baseOptions), options);
234
+ const localVarHeaderParameter = {};
235
+ const localVarQueryParameter = {};
236
+ // authentication ApiKeyAuth required
237
+ yield (0, common_1.setApiKeyToObject)(localVarHeaderParameter, "X-API-Key", configuration);
238
+ // authentication BearerAuth required
239
+ // http bearer authentication required
240
+ yield (0, common_1.setBearerAuthToObject)(localVarHeaderParameter, configuration);
241
+ localVarHeaderParameter['Content-Type'] = 'application/json';
242
+ (0, common_1.setSearchParams)(localVarUrlObj, localVarQueryParameter);
243
+ let headersFromBaseOptions = baseOptions && baseOptions.headers ? baseOptions.headers : {};
244
+ localVarRequestOptions.headers = Object.assign(Object.assign(Object.assign({}, localVarHeaderParameter), headersFromBaseOptions), options.headers);
245
+ localVarRequestOptions.data = (0, common_1.serializeDataIfNeeded)(mcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest, localVarRequestOptions, configuration);
246
+ return {
247
+ url: (0, common_1.toPathString)(localVarUrlObj),
248
+ options: localVarRequestOptions,
249
+ };
250
+ }),
208
251
  /**
209
252
  * Identical to GET; the HTTP method is only recorded in the audit trail.
210
253
  * @summary Simulated MCP server authorization challenge (POST)
@@ -334,6 +377,24 @@ const McpApiFp = function (configuration) {
334
377
  return (axios, basePath) => (0, common_1.createRequestFunction)(localVarAxiosArgs, axios_1.default, base_1.BASE_PATH, configuration)(axios, localVarOperationServerBasePath || basePath);
335
378
  });
336
379
  },
380
+ /**
381
+ * Called by the MCP server with its own client-credentials access token (scope mcp:authorize; the client must be listed in the server\'s tool_authorizer_client_ids). The body names the caller the server already verified. The server never forwards the caller\'s token.
382
+ * @summary Per-tool authorization for an MCP server (server credential)
383
+ * @param {string} orgId
384
+ * @param {string} serverId
385
+ * @param {McpServerToolAuthorizeRequest} mcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest
386
+ * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
387
+ * @throws {RequiredError}
388
+ */
389
+ mcpServerToolAuthorize(orgId, serverId, mcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest, options) {
390
+ return __awaiter(this, void 0, void 0, function* () {
391
+ var _a, _b, _c;
392
+ const localVarAxiosArgs = yield localVarAxiosParamCreator.mcpServerToolAuthorize(orgId, serverId, mcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest, options);
393
+ const localVarOperationServerIndex = (_a = configuration === null || configuration === void 0 ? void 0 : configuration.serverIndex) !== null && _a !== void 0 ? _a : 0;
394
+ const localVarOperationServerBasePath = (_c = (_b = base_1.operationServerMap['McpApi.mcpServerToolAuthorize']) === null || _b === void 0 ? void 0 : _b[localVarOperationServerIndex]) === null || _c === void 0 ? void 0 : _c.url;
395
+ return (axios, basePath) => (0, common_1.createRequestFunction)(localVarAxiosArgs, axios_1.default, base_1.BASE_PATH, configuration)(axios, localVarOperationServerBasePath || basePath);
396
+ });
397
+ },
337
398
  /**
338
399
  * Identical to GET; the HTTP method is only recorded in the audit trail.
339
400
  * @summary Simulated MCP server authorization challenge (POST)
@@ -411,6 +472,16 @@ const McpApiFactory = function (configuration, basePath, axios) {
411
472
  listServers(requestParameters, options) {
412
473
  return localVarFp.listServers(requestParameters.orgId, options).then((request) => request(axios, basePath));
413
474
  },
475
+ /**
476
+ * Called by the MCP server with its own client-credentials access token (scope mcp:authorize; the client must be listed in the server\'s tool_authorizer_client_ids). The body names the caller the server already verified. The server never forwards the caller\'s token.
477
+ * @summary Per-tool authorization for an MCP server (server credential)
478
+ * @param {McpApiMcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest} requestParameters Request parameters.
479
+ * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
480
+ * @throws {RequiredError}
481
+ */
482
+ mcpServerToolAuthorize(requestParameters, options) {
483
+ return localVarFp.mcpServerToolAuthorize(requestParameters.orgId, requestParameters.serverId, requestParameters.mcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest, options).then((request) => request(axios, basePath));
484
+ },
414
485
  /**
415
486
  * Identical to GET; the HTTP method is only recorded in the audit trail.
416
487
  * @summary Simulated MCP server authorization challenge (POST)
@@ -486,6 +557,17 @@ class McpApi extends base_1.BaseAPI {
486
557
  listServers(requestParameters, options) {
487
558
  return (0, exports.McpApiFp)(this.configuration).listServers(requestParameters.orgId, options).then((request) => request(this.axios, this.basePath));
488
559
  }
560
+ /**
561
+ * Called by the MCP server with its own client-credentials access token (scope mcp:authorize; the client must be listed in the server\'s tool_authorizer_client_ids). The body names the caller the server already verified. The server never forwards the caller\'s token.
562
+ * @summary Per-tool authorization for an MCP server (server credential)
563
+ * @param {McpApiMcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest} requestParameters Request parameters.
564
+ * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
565
+ * @throws {RequiredError}
566
+ * @memberof McpApi
567
+ */
568
+ mcpServerToolAuthorize(requestParameters, options) {
569
+ return (0, exports.McpApiFp)(this.configuration).mcpServerToolAuthorize(requestParameters.orgId, requestParameters.serverId, requestParameters.mcpServerToolAuthorizeRequest, options).then((request) => request(this.axios, this.basePath));
570
+ }
489
571
  /**
490
572
  * Identical to GET; the HTTP method is only recorded in the audit trail.
491
573
  * @summary Simulated MCP server authorization challenge (POST)
@@ -90,14 +90,6 @@ export declare const OAuthApiAxiosParamCreator: (configuration?: Configuration)
90
90
  * @throws {RequiredError}
91
91
  */
92
92
  par: (orgId: string, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig) => Promise<RequestArgs>;
93
- /**
94
- * Placeholder: flashes an informational message and redirects to the hosted login page. Not a JSON API.
95
- * @summary Passkey login entry point
96
- * @param {string} orgId
97
- * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
98
- * @throws {RequiredError}
99
- */
100
- passkeyLogin: (orgId: string, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig) => Promise<RequestArgs>;
101
93
  /**
102
94
  * Registers an OAuth client from a JSON metadata document. Authenticated with an initial access token (Authorization: Bearer) or an API key holding admin:clients:register; open registration applies when the organization allows it.
103
95
  * @summary Dynamic client registration (RFC 7591 / OIDC DCR)
@@ -157,14 +149,6 @@ export declare const OAuthApiAxiosParamCreator: (configuration?: Configuration)
157
149
  * @throws {RequiredError}
158
150
  */
159
151
  submitDeviceVerification: (orgId: string, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig) => Promise<RequestArgs>;
160
- /**
161
- * Receives the hosted OAuth login page\'s form (email, password, csrf token and the authorization request parameters). Every outcome — success, invalid credentials, locked account, captcha or CSRF failure — answers with the same redirect back to /oauth/authorize, which re-renders the login page or continues the flow. Not a JSON API.
162
- * @summary Hosted login form submission
163
- * @param {string} orgId
164
- * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
165
- * @throws {RequiredError}
166
- */
167
- submitLogin: (orgId: string, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig) => Promise<RequestArgs>;
168
152
  /**
169
153
  * Establishes the end-user browser session from JSON credentials so a following /oauth/authorize request issues a code without showing the hosted login page. Deliberately mints no tokens. Only accepted from trusted origins.
170
154
  * @summary Programmatic (JSON) login for the authorization flow
@@ -260,14 +244,6 @@ export declare const OAuthApiFp: (configuration?: Configuration) => {
260
244
  * @throws {RequiredError}
261
245
  */
262
246
  par(orgId: string, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): Promise<(axios?: AxiosInstance, basePath?: string) => AxiosPromise<ParResponse>>;
263
- /**
264
- * Placeholder: flashes an informational message and redirects to the hosted login page. Not a JSON API.
265
- * @summary Passkey login entry point
266
- * @param {string} orgId
267
- * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
268
- * @throws {RequiredError}
269
- */
270
- passkeyLogin(orgId: string, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): Promise<(axios?: AxiosInstance, basePath?: string) => AxiosPromise<void>>;
271
247
  /**
272
248
  * Registers an OAuth client from a JSON metadata document. Authenticated with an initial access token (Authorization: Bearer) or an API key holding admin:clients:register; open registration applies when the organization allows it.
273
249
  * @summary Dynamic client registration (RFC 7591 / OIDC DCR)
@@ -327,14 +303,6 @@ export declare const OAuthApiFp: (configuration?: Configuration) => {
327
303
  * @throws {RequiredError}
328
304
  */
329
305
  submitDeviceVerification(orgId: string, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): Promise<(axios?: AxiosInstance, basePath?: string) => AxiosPromise<string>>;
330
- /**
331
- * Receives the hosted OAuth login page\'s form (email, password, csrf token and the authorization request parameters). Every outcome — success, invalid credentials, locked account, captcha or CSRF failure — answers with the same redirect back to /oauth/authorize, which re-renders the login page or continues the flow. Not a JSON API.
332
- * @summary Hosted login form submission
333
- * @param {string} orgId
334
- * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
335
- * @throws {RequiredError}
336
- */
337
- submitLogin(orgId: string, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): Promise<(axios?: AxiosInstance, basePath?: string) => AxiosPromise<void>>;
338
306
  /**
339
307
  * Establishes the end-user browser session from JSON credentials so a following /oauth/authorize request issues a code without showing the hosted login page. Deliberately mints no tokens. Only accepted from trusted origins.
340
308
  * @summary Programmatic (JSON) login for the authorization flow
@@ -429,14 +397,6 @@ export declare const OAuthApiFactory: (configuration?: Configuration, basePath?:
429
397
  * @throws {RequiredError}
430
398
  */
431
399
  par(requestParameters: OAuthApiParRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): AxiosPromise<ParResponse>;
432
- /**
433
- * Placeholder: flashes an informational message and redirects to the hosted login page. Not a JSON API.
434
- * @summary Passkey login entry point
435
- * @param {OAuthApiPasskeyLoginRequest} requestParameters Request parameters.
436
- * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
437
- * @throws {RequiredError}
438
- */
439
- passkeyLogin(requestParameters: OAuthApiPasskeyLoginRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): AxiosPromise<void>;
440
400
  /**
441
401
  * Registers an OAuth client from a JSON metadata document. Authenticated with an initial access token (Authorization: Bearer) or an API key holding admin:clients:register; open registration applies when the organization allows it.
442
402
  * @summary Dynamic client registration (RFC 7591 / OIDC DCR)
@@ -493,14 +453,6 @@ export declare const OAuthApiFactory: (configuration?: Configuration, basePath?:
493
453
  * @throws {RequiredError}
494
454
  */
495
455
  submitDeviceVerification(requestParameters: OAuthApiSubmitDeviceVerificationRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): AxiosPromise<string>;
496
- /**
497
- * Receives the hosted OAuth login page\'s form (email, password, csrf token and the authorization request parameters). Every outcome — success, invalid credentials, locked account, captcha or CSRF failure — answers with the same redirect back to /oauth/authorize, which re-renders the login page or continues the flow. Not a JSON API.
498
- * @summary Hosted login form submission
499
- * @param {OAuthApiSubmitLoginRequest} requestParameters Request parameters.
500
- * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
501
- * @throws {RequiredError}
502
- */
503
- submitLogin(requestParameters: OAuthApiSubmitLoginRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): AxiosPromise<void>;
504
456
  /**
505
457
  * Establishes the end-user browser session from JSON credentials so a following /oauth/authorize request issues a code without showing the hosted login page. Deliberately mints no tokens. Only accepted from trusted origins.
506
458
  * @summary Programmatic (JSON) login for the authorization flow
@@ -604,15 +556,6 @@ export interface OAuthApiInterface {
604
556
  * @memberof OAuthApiInterface
605
557
  */
606
558
  par(requestParameters: OAuthApiParRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): AxiosPromise<ParResponse>;
607
- /**
608
- * Placeholder: flashes an informational message and redirects to the hosted login page. Not a JSON API.
609
- * @summary Passkey login entry point
610
- * @param {OAuthApiPasskeyLoginRequest} requestParameters Request parameters.
611
- * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
612
- * @throws {RequiredError}
613
- * @memberof OAuthApiInterface
614
- */
615
- passkeyLogin(requestParameters: OAuthApiPasskeyLoginRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): AxiosPromise<void>;
616
559
  /**
617
560
  * Registers an OAuth client from a JSON metadata document. Authenticated with an initial access token (Authorization: Bearer) or an API key holding admin:clients:register; open registration applies when the organization allows it.
618
561
  * @summary Dynamic client registration (RFC 7591 / OIDC DCR)
@@ -676,15 +619,6 @@ export interface OAuthApiInterface {
676
619
  * @memberof OAuthApiInterface
677
620
  */
678
621
  submitDeviceVerification(requestParameters: OAuthApiSubmitDeviceVerificationRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): AxiosPromise<string>;
679
- /**
680
- * Receives the hosted OAuth login page\'s form (email, password, csrf token and the authorization request parameters). Every outcome — success, invalid credentials, locked account, captcha or CSRF failure — answers with the same redirect back to /oauth/authorize, which re-renders the login page or continues the flow. Not a JSON API.
681
- * @summary Hosted login form submission
682
- * @param {OAuthApiSubmitLoginRequest} requestParameters Request parameters.
683
- * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
684
- * @throws {RequiredError}
685
- * @memberof OAuthApiInterface
686
- */
687
- submitLogin(requestParameters: OAuthApiSubmitLoginRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): AxiosPromise<void>;
688
622
  /**
689
623
  * Establishes the end-user browser session from JSON credentials so a following /oauth/authorize request issues a code without showing the hosted login page. Deliberately mints no tokens. Only accepted from trusted origins.
690
624
  * @summary Programmatic (JSON) login for the authorization flow
@@ -823,19 +757,6 @@ export interface OAuthApiParRequest {
823
757
  */
824
758
  readonly orgId: string;
825
759
  }
826
- /**
827
- * Request parameters for passkeyLogin operation in OAuthApi.
828
- * @export
829
- * @interface OAuthApiPasskeyLoginRequest
830
- */
831
- export interface OAuthApiPasskeyLoginRequest {
832
- /**
833
- *
834
- * @type {string}
835
- * @memberof OAuthApiPasskeyLogin
836
- */
837
- readonly orgId: string;
838
- }
839
760
  /**
840
761
  * Request parameters for registerClient operation in OAuthApi.
841
762
  * @export
@@ -945,19 +866,6 @@ export interface OAuthApiSubmitDeviceVerificationRequest {
945
866
  */
946
867
  readonly orgId: string;
947
868
  }
948
- /**
949
- * Request parameters for submitLogin operation in OAuthApi.
950
- * @export
951
- * @interface OAuthApiSubmitLoginRequest
952
- */
953
- export interface OAuthApiSubmitLoginRequest {
954
- /**
955
- *
956
- * @type {string}
957
- * @memberof OAuthApiSubmitLogin
958
- */
959
- readonly orgId: string;
960
- }
961
869
  /**
962
870
  * Request parameters for submitLoginJson operation in OAuthApi.
963
871
  * @export
@@ -1076,15 +984,6 @@ export declare class OAuthApi extends BaseAPI implements OAuthApiInterface {
1076
984
  * @memberof OAuthApi
1077
985
  */
1078
986
  par(requestParameters: OAuthApiParRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): Promise<import("axios").AxiosResponse<ParResponse, any, {}>>;
1079
- /**
1080
- * Placeholder: flashes an informational message and redirects to the hosted login page. Not a JSON API.
1081
- * @summary Passkey login entry point
1082
- * @param {OAuthApiPasskeyLoginRequest} requestParameters Request parameters.
1083
- * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
1084
- * @throws {RequiredError}
1085
- * @memberof OAuthApi
1086
- */
1087
- passkeyLogin(requestParameters: OAuthApiPasskeyLoginRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): Promise<import("axios").AxiosResponse<void, any, {}>>;
1088
987
  /**
1089
988
  * Registers an OAuth client from a JSON metadata document. Authenticated with an initial access token (Authorization: Bearer) or an API key holding admin:clients:register; open registration applies when the organization allows it.
1090
989
  * @summary Dynamic client registration (RFC 7591 / OIDC DCR)
@@ -1148,15 +1047,6 @@ export declare class OAuthApi extends BaseAPI implements OAuthApiInterface {
1148
1047
  * @memberof OAuthApi
1149
1048
  */
1150
1049
  submitDeviceVerification(requestParameters: OAuthApiSubmitDeviceVerificationRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): Promise<import("axios").AxiosResponse<string, any, {}>>;
1151
- /**
1152
- * Receives the hosted OAuth login page\'s form (email, password, csrf token and the authorization request parameters). Every outcome — success, invalid credentials, locked account, captcha or CSRF failure — answers with the same redirect back to /oauth/authorize, which re-renders the login page or continues the flow. Not a JSON API.
1153
- * @summary Hosted login form submission
1154
- * @param {OAuthApiSubmitLoginRequest} requestParameters Request parameters.
1155
- * @param {*} [options] Override http request option.
1156
- * @throws {RequiredError}
1157
- * @memberof OAuthApi
1158
- */
1159
- submitLogin(requestParameters: OAuthApiSubmitLoginRequest, options?: RawAxiosRequestConfig): Promise<import("axios").AxiosResponse<void, any, {}>>;
1160
1050
  /**
1161
1051
  * Establishes the end-user browser session from JSON credentials so a following /oauth/authorize request issues a code without showing the hosted login page. Deliberately mints no tokens. Only accepted from trusted origins.
1162
1052
  * @summary Programmatic (JSON) login for the authorization flow