@luckystack/login 0.7.3 → 0.7.5

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -7,6 +7,26 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
 
 ## [Unreleased]
 
+## [0.7.4] - 2026-07-22
+
+### Fixed
+
+- Relative `postLoginRedirect` results are now resolved against the trusted
+  absolute frontend fallback URL. In split frontend/backend deployments,
+  `/dashboard` no longer lands on the OAuth callback's backend origin.
+- Concurrent TOTP enrollment confirmation is serialized per user, so at most
+  one caller receives the recovery-code set that was actually persisted.
+
+### Security
+
+- TOTP ciphertext now carries a non-secret key id (`enc:v2`) and supports a
+  JSON decrypt-only legacy keyring through `TOTP_ENCRYPTION_LEGACY_KEYS`.
+  Successful TOTP proofs lazily migrate plaintext, legacy `gcm:` and old-key
+  rows to the current primary, enabling rotation without locking users out.
+- Email-code issue and verification are now complete Redis Lua transactions.
+  A stale verifier can no longer authenticate with the previous generation,
+  consume the replacement's attempt budget, or delete a newly reissued code.
+
 ## [0.7.3] - 2026-07-20
 
 ### Fixed

package/CLAUDE.md

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
 - **Lifecycle hooks**: `preLogin` / `postLogin`, `preRegister` / `postRegister`, `preLogout` / `postLogout`, `preSessionCreate` / `postSessionCreate`, `preSessionDelete` / `postSessionDelete`, `passwordResetRequested`, `passwordResetCompleted`, `passwordChanged`. All `pre*` hooks support stop-signals (abort the side-effect with a reason key).
 - **Pluggable user store** via `UserAdapter` — decouples auth from a specific Prisma `User` schema.
 - **Password-reset primitives** (`createPasswordResetToken`, `consumePasswordResetToken`, `updatePasswordHash`, `verifyPassword`) plus the framework-mode `sendPasswordResetEmail` orchestrator (requires the optional `@luckystack/email` peer).
-- **Dynamic post-login redirect** resolver registry (per-user / per-tenant / per-provider OAuth landing pages).
+- **Dynamic post-login redirect** resolver registry (per-user / per-tenant / per-provider OAuth landing pages). Relative resolver results inherit the trusted frontend `defaultUrl` origin, not the backend callback origin.
 
 OAuth state is stored in Redis under `${projectName}-oauth-state:<provider>:<state>` with TTL `auth.oauthStateTtlSeconds`. Sessions live at `${projectName}-session:<token>`. Active-tokens-per-user set lives at `${projectName}-activeUsers:<userId>`. Password-reset and email-change tokens are **hashed at rest** (0.2.0): only `sha256(token)` is stored as the Redis key (`${projectName}-pwreset:<sha256(token)>` / `${projectName}-email-change:<sha256(token)>`) via the `@luckystack/core` one-time-token primitive (`issueOneTimeToken` / `consumeOneTimeToken`). The raw token is returned to the caller exactly once for the emailed URL, so a leaked Redis keyspace can't be replayed to mint a reset or confirm an email change.
 
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ Do NOT use this package for:
 
 - `registerPostLoginRedirect(resolver)` — Register a `({ userId, provider, isNewUser, defaultUrl }) => string | Promise<string>` resolver.
 - `getPostLoginRedirect()` — Read the active resolver (or `null`).
-- The resolver's returned URL is validated against `http.cors.allowedOrigins` before use; invalid URLs fall back to `defaultUrl`.
+- The resolver's returned URL is validated against `http.cors.allowedOrigins` before use; invalid URLs fall back to `defaultUrl`. A valid relative result is then resolved against an absolute `defaultUrl`, so split frontend/backend callback deployments return to the frontend origin.
 
 ### Password reset (`./src/passwordReset.ts`, `./src/forgotPassword.ts`, `./src/passwordPolicy.ts`)
 
@@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ Do NOT use this package for:
 - `PasswordPolicyError` — Thrown by `updatePasswordHash`; carries `errorCode` matching the i18n reason keys used by the rest of the login flow.
 - `validatePassword(plaintext)` — Returns `null` when the policy passes, or a reason key when it fails (length, complexity, common-list, custom validator).
 - `sendPasswordResetEmail({ email, brand? })` — Framework-mode orchestrator. Looks up the user (credentials provider only), mints a token, lazy-imports `@luckystack/email`, and sends a transactional reset email. Always resolves "ok" when the email is not found (anti-enumeration). No-op when `auth.forgotPassword !== 'framework'`.
+- Email-code issue/verify (`emailOtp.ts`) — passwordless login + 2FA fallback primitive. Issue (`SET code hash + reset attempts`) and verify (`read current hash + increment attempts + compare + consume`) each run as one Redis Lua transaction, so reissue and verification are generation-linearizable; a stale code cannot delete or spend the replacement.
 - `createEmailChangeToken(userId, newEmail)` — Mint a one-shot token bound to `userId` + `newEmail`. Stored in Redis at `${projectName}-email-change:<sha256(token)>` (hashed at rest, via `@luckystack/core`'s `issueOneTimeToken`) with TTL from `auth.emailChangeTtlSeconds`. Returns the RAW token.
 - `consumeEmailChangeToken(token)` — Atomic get + del redemption. Returns `{ userId, newEmail }` on success, `null` on miss / malformed payload / expired entry.
 - `sendEmailChangeConfirmation({ userId, newEmail, userName?, brand? })` — Lazy-imports `@luckystack/email`, renders the confirmation template via `renderEmailLayout`, and sends to the NEW address with `adapterHint: 'transactional'`. Returns `{ ok, reason?, token }` — `token` is the minted email-change token so the caller can build the confirmation URL.
@@ -140,6 +141,8 @@ All config keys live on `ProjectConfig` (from `@luckystack/core`). Resolved at c
 | `MICROSOFT_TENANT_ID` | `microsoftProvider` (optional) | Single-tenant Azure AD. Defaults to `'common'`. |
 | (callback origin) | All OAuth `callbackUrl` builders | The `callbackUrl` is the BACKEND origin + `/auth/callback/<provider>`. The scaffold derives it in `config.ts` (`oauthCallbackBase`: dev `http://localhost:80`, prod the public domain). No `DNS` env var — that was removed in 0.1.5. |
 | `BCRYPT_ROUNDS` | `auth.bcryptRounds` | Surfaced through project config; salt rounds for credentials hashing. |
+| `TOTP_ENCRYPTION_KEY` | TOTP at-rest encryption | Current primary write key; new rows are `enc:v2:<key-id>:...`. |
+| `TOTP_ENCRYPTION_LEGACY_KEYS` | TOTP key rotation | JSON array of decrypt-only previous keys. Successful TOTP proofs lazily rewrite legacy/plaintext rows under the primary. |
 
 > Env-key set without the matching package installed = hard boot crash (see peer-dep guard policy). `@luckystack/email` is the optional case — login lazy-imports it and gracefully fails when `forgotPassword !== 'framework'`.
 

package/dist/{chunk-L5MHCPNN.js → chunk-CLYMWF3A.js}

@@ -301,4 +301,4 @@ export {
   defaultPrismaUserAdapter,
   getUserAdapter
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-L5MHCPNN.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-CLYMWF3A.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-L5MHCPNN.js.map → chunk-CLYMWF3A.js.map}

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/oauthProviders.ts","../src/userAdapter.ts"],"sourcesContent":["//? OAuth provider registry. Replaces the previously hardcoded provider list\n//? in `loginConfig.ts`. Consumers register providers from their\n//? `luckystack/login/oauthProviders.ts` overlay file at boot.\n//?\n//? Two-layer surface:\n//?   1. `registerOAuthProviders([...])` — accept an array of provider definitions.\n//?   2. Built-in helpers (`googleProvider`, `githubProvider`, ...) so the common\n//?      case is one function call per provider with only the secrets + callback.\n//?\n//? Custom providers (Okta, Apple, X, etc.) plug in as raw `OAuthProvider`\n//? objects alongside the helpers.\n\nimport { tryCatch } from '@luckystack/core';\n\nexport type OAuthUserData = Record<string, unknown>;\n\nexport const asOAuthUserData = (value: unknown): OAuthUserData => {\n  if (value && typeof value === 'object') {\n    return value as OAuthUserData;\n  }\n  return {};\n};\n\nexport interface CredentialsProvider {\n  name: 'credentials';\n}\n\nexport interface FullOAuthProvider {\n  name: string;\n  clientID: string;\n  clientSecret: string;\n  callbackURL: string;\n  authorizationURL: string;\n  tokenExchangeURL: string;\n  tokenExchangeMethod: 'json' | 'form';\n  userInfoURL: string;\n  /**\n   * OAuth scopes requested at the authorization step. Consumers can extend\n   * a built-in provider's defaults to request additional permissions:\n   *\n   *   ```ts\n   *   const customGoogle = googleProvider({...});\n   *   customGoogle.scope.push('https://www.googleapis.com/auth/calendar.readonly');\n   *   ```\n   *\n   * Or pass `extraScopes` to the built-in factory (see `OAuthHelperInput`).\n   */\n  scope: string[];\n  nameKey: string;\n  emailKey: string;\n  /**\n   * Optional key on the userInfo response holding a provider \"email verified\"\n   * boolean. When set AND the field is present-and-falsy, the framework rejects\n   * the profile rather than trusting an unverified address — defense-in-depth\n   * against account-linking takeover under the `'unified'` strategy (SEC-21).\n   * A missing field (provider doesn't report it) is treated as \"trusted\",\n   * preserving behaviour for providers that don't expose the flag.\n   */\n  emailVerifiedKey?: string;\n  /**\n   * Set `true` for a provider whose userinfo ONLY returns an email once the\n   * address is confirmed with the provider (e.g. Facebook Graph `/me` omits\n   * unconfirmed emails). Such a provider exposes no separate verified flag, so\n   * the mere PRESENCE of the email is the verified signal — this opts it in so\n   * both first-login CREATION and cross-provider LINK treat it as verified.\n   * Mutually exclusive in practice with `emailVerifiedKey`.\n   */\n  emailImpliesVerified?: boolean;\n  avatarKey?: string;\n  avatarCodeKey: string;\n  getEmail?: (accessToken: string) => Promise<string | false | undefined>;\n  getAvatar?: (params: { userData: OAuthUserData; avatarId?: string; accessToken: string }) => string | undefined | Promise<string | undefined>;\n  /**\n   * Optional per-provider hook to attach extra runtime-only data to the\n   * session (NOT to the User row). Return key/value pairs that get merged\n   * into `BaseSessionLayout` before `saveSession`. To get strict typing\n   * downstream, extend `BaseSessionLayout` via module augmentation:\n   *\n   *   ```ts\n   *   declare module '@luckystack/core' {\n   *     interface BaseSessionLayout {\n   *       googleCalendarToken?: string;\n   *     }\n   *   }\n   *   ```\n   *\n   * Data lives on the session in Redis and disappears on logout — no Prisma\n   * schema change required. Don't store secrets you wouldn't want surfaced\n   * to a user inspecting their own session.\n   */\n  extraSessionFields?: (params: {\n    userData: OAuthUserData;\n    accessToken: string;\n  }) => Promise<Record<string, unknown>> | Record<string, unknown>;\n  /**\n   * Extra query params appended to the authorization-redirect URL (CFG-21).\n   * Lets a provider request e.g. `access_type=offline`, `login_hint=...`, or\n   * override the framework's default `prompt=select_account`. The server's\n   * authorize route merges these over the built-in params (a key present here\n   * wins). Reserved OAuth params (`client_id`, `redirect_uri`, `scope`,\n   * `response_type`, `state`, `code_challenge`, `code_challenge_method`) should\n   * NOT be set here — they are framework-owned. Default unset.\n   */\n  extraAuthorizationParams?: Record<string, string>;\n  /**\n   * Opt this provider into PKCE (RFC 7636, S256) (F11). When `true`, the\n   * framework generates a `code_verifier` at flow start, stores it server-side\n   * with the OAuth state, sends `code_challenge`/`code_challenge_method=S256` on\n   * the authorize redirect, and replays the verifier at token exchange. Required\n   * by OAuth 2.1 / PKCE-mandating providers (X/Twitter, some Okta/Auth0\n   * policies). Default `false` (no PKCE — existing flows are byte-identical).\n   */\n  usePkce?: boolean;\n}\n\nexport type OAuthProvider = CredentialsProvider | FullOAuthProvider;\n\nexport const isFullOAuthProvider = (provider: OAuthProvider): provider is FullOAuthProvider =>\n  provider.name !== 'credentials';\n\nexport interface OAuthEndpointOverrides {\n  /** Override the provider's authorization URL (e.g. GitHub Enterprise host, Microsoft custom tenant). */\n  authorizationURL?: string;\n  /** Override the token exchange URL. */\n  tokenExchangeURL?: string;\n  /** Override the userInfo URL. */\n  userInfoURL?: string;\n}\n\ninterface OAuthHelperInput {\n  clientId: string | undefined;\n  clientSecret: string | undefined;\n  callbackUrl: string;\n  /** Optional URL overrides for self-hosted / custom-tenant deployments. */\n  endpoints?: OAuthEndpointOverrides;\n  /**\n   * Additional OAuth scopes to request alongside the built-in defaults. Use\n   * for \"give me access to the user's calendar / drive / repos\" flows.\n   * Merged with the helper's default scopes; duplicates are deduplicated.\n   */\n  extraScopes?: string[];\n  /**\n   * Per-provider hook for attaching runtime-only fields to the session.\n   * See `FullOAuthProvider.extraSessionFields` for usage + module-augmentation\n   * pattern.\n   */\n  extraSessionFields?: FullOAuthProvider['extraSessionFields'];\n  /**\n   * Extra query params for the authorize redirect (CFG-21). See\n   * `FullOAuthProvider.extraAuthorizationParams`.\n   */\n  extraAuthorizationParams?: Record<string, string>;\n  /** Opt this provider into PKCE (S256) (F11). See `FullOAuthProvider.usePkce`. */\n  usePkce?: boolean;\n}\n\nconst mergeScopes = (defaults: string[], extra: string[] | undefined): string[] => {\n  if (!extra || extra.length === 0) return defaults;\n  return [...new Set([...defaults, ...extra])];\n};\n\nconst requireString = (value: string | undefined, label: string): string => {\n  if (!value || value.length === 0) {\n    throw new Error(`OAuth provider configuration error: ${label} is empty.`);\n  }\n  return value;\n};\n\nexport const credentialsProvider = (): CredentialsProvider => ({ name: 'credentials' });\n\nexport const googleProvider = (input: OAuthHelperInput): FullOAuthProvider => ({\n  name: 'google',\n  clientID: requireString(input.clientId, 'google clientId'),\n  clientSecret: requireString(input.clientSecret, 'google clientSecret'),\n  callbackURL: input.callbackUrl,\n  authorizationURL: input.endpoints?.authorizationURL ?? 'https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/v2/auth',\n  tokenExchangeURL: input.endpoints?.tokenExchangeURL ?? 'https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token',\n  tokenExchangeMethod: 'json',\n  //? OIDC userinfo (v3) — the legacy `oauth2/v1/userinfo` is deprecated and\n  //? reports verification as `verified_email`; v3 reports the OIDC-standard\n  //? `email_verified`. Use v3 so `emailVerifiedKey` below lines up (SEC-21/QUA-24).\n  userInfoURL: input.endpoints?.userInfoURL ?? 'https://www.googleapis.com/oauth2/v3/userinfo',\n  scope: mergeScopes([\n    'https://www.googleapis.com/auth/userinfo.profile',\n    'https://www.googleapis.com/auth/userinfo.email',\n  ], input.extraScopes),\n  nameKey: 'name',\n  emailKey: 'email',\n  //? Google's OIDC userinfo returns `email_verified`; reject an unverified\n  //? address so a Google account with an unverified email can't link to a\n  //? victim's existing account under the `'unified'` strategy (SEC-21).\n  emailVerifiedKey: 'email_verified',\n  avatarKey: 'picture',\n  avatarCodeKey: '',\n  extraSessionFields: input.extraSessionFields,\n  extraAuthorizationParams: input.extraAuthorizationParams,\n  usePkce: input.usePkce,\n});\n\nexport const githubProvider = (input: OAuthHelperInput): FullOAuthProvider => ({\n  name: 'github',\n  clientID: requireString(input.clientId, 'github clientId'),\n  clientSecret: requireString(input.clientSecret, 'github clientSecret'),\n  callbackURL: input.callbackUrl,\n  authorizationURL: input.endpoints?.authorizationURL ?? 'https://github.com/login/oauth/authorize',\n  tokenExchangeURL: input.endpoints?.tokenExchangeURL ?? 'https://github.com/login/oauth/access_token',\n  tokenExchangeMethod: 'json',\n  userInfoURL: input.endpoints?.userInfoURL ?? 'https://api.github.com/user',\n  scope: mergeScopes(['read:user', 'user:email'], input.extraScopes),\n  nameKey: 'login',\n  emailKey: 'email',\n  avatarKey: 'avatar_url',\n  avatarCodeKey: '',\n  extraSessionFields: input.extraSessionFields,\n  extraAuthorizationParams: input.extraAuthorizationParams,\n  usePkce: input.usePkce,\n  getEmail: async (accessToken) => {\n    const fetchEmails = async () => {\n      const response = await fetch('https://api.github.com/user/emails', {\n        method: 'GET',\n        headers: {\n          'Content-Type': 'application/json',\n          Accept: 'application/json',\n          Authorization: `Bearer ${accessToken}`,\n        },\n      });\n      if (!response.ok) return false;\n      const emails: unknown = await response.json();\n      if (!Array.isArray(emails)) return false;\n      return emails as { primary?: boolean; verified?: boolean; email?: string }[];\n    };\n\n    const [error, emails] = await tryCatch(fetchEmails);\n    if (error || !emails) return false;\n\n    //? Defense-in-depth: only ever select a `verified === true` address. GitHub\n    //? forbids an unverified email from being `primary`, so in the normal case\n    //? this is a no-op — but the `emails[0]` fallback (when no primary exists)\n    //? could otherwise pick an UNVERIFIED address an attacker added to their\n    //? GitHub account, which under the `'unified'` account strategy would link\n    //? to a victim's existing account by that email (SEC-21). Filtering on\n    //? `verified` first closes that fallback path.\n    const verified = emails.filter((entry) => entry.verified === true);\n    let mainEmail: string | undefined;\n    for (const entry of verified) {\n      if (entry.primary && typeof entry.email === 'string') mainEmail = entry.email;\n    }\n    mainEmail ??= verified[0]?.email;\n    return mainEmail;\n  },\n});\n\nexport const discordProvider = (input: OAuthHelperInput): FullOAuthProvider => ({\n  name: 'discord',\n  clientID: requireString(input.clientId, 'discord clientId'),\n  clientSecret: requireString(input.clientSecret, 'discord clientSecret'),\n  callbackURL: input.callbackUrl,\n  authorizationURL: input.endpoints?.authorizationURL ?? 'https://discord.com/oauth2/authorize',\n  tokenExchangeURL: input.endpoints?.tokenExchangeURL ?? 'https://discord.com/api/oauth2/token',\n  tokenExchangeMethod: 'form',\n  userInfoURL: input.endpoints?.userInfoURL ?? 'https://discord.com/api/users/@me',\n  scope: mergeScopes(['identify', 'email'], input.extraScopes),\n  nameKey: 'username',\n  emailKey: 'email',\n  //? Discord's /users/@me returns a `verified` boolean for the account email;\n  //? reject the address when it is explicitly unverified (SEC-21).\n  emailVerifiedKey: 'verified',\n  avatarCodeKey: 'avatar',\n  extraSessionFields: input.extraSessionFields,\n  extraAuthorizationParams: input.extraAuthorizationParams,\n  usePkce: input.usePkce,\n  getAvatar: ({ userData, avatarId }) => {\n    if (!avatarId) return;\n    const userId = typeof userData.id === 'string' ? userData.id : '';\n    if (!userId) return;\n    const format = avatarId.startsWith('a_') ? 'gif' : 'png';\n    //? Encode the provider-supplied id + avatar hash before interpolation so a\n    //? malformed value can't inject `../` path segments into the CDN URL (SEC-23).\n    return `https://cdn.discordapp.com/avatars/${encodeURIComponent(userId)}/${encodeURIComponent(avatarId)}.${format}`;\n  },\n});\n\nexport interface FacebookProviderInput extends OAuthHelperInput {\n  /** Graph API version segment used in the URLs. Default `'v18.0'` (current as of 2026 — bump as Meta deprecates older versions). */\n  apiVersion?: string;\n}\n\nexport const facebookProvider = (input: FacebookProviderInput): FullOAuthProvider => {\n  const v = input.apiVersion ?? 'v18.0';\n  return {\n  name: 'facebook',\n  clientID: requireString(input.clientId, 'facebook clientId'),\n  clientSecret: requireString(input.clientSecret, 'facebook clientSecret'),\n  callbackURL: input.callbackUrl,\n  authorizationURL: input.endpoints?.authorizationURL ?? `https://www.facebook.com/${v}/dialog/oauth`,\n  tokenExchangeURL: input.endpoints?.tokenExchangeURL ?? `https://graph.facebook.com/${v}/oauth/access_token`,\n  tokenExchangeMethod: 'form',\n  userInfoURL: input.endpoints?.userInfoURL ?? 'https://graph.facebook.com/me?fields=id,name,email,picture.type(large)',\n  scope: mergeScopes(['public_profile', 'email'], input.extraScopes),\n  nameKey: 'name',\n  emailKey: 'email',\n  //? Facebook's Graph `/me` only returns `email` for an address the user has\n  //? CONFIRMED with Facebook (unconfirmed emails are omitted), so there is no\n  //? separate verified flag to gate on — the presence of `email` IS the verified\n  //? signal. `emailImpliesVerified` encodes that so a Facebook sign-in counts as\n  //? verified for BOTH first-login creation and cross-provider linking (SEC-21 /\n  //? M2 creation guard). If a consumer opts into receiving unverified emails via\n  //? a future Graph field, set `emailVerifiedKey` on the returned provider instead.\n  emailImpliesVerified: true,\n  avatarCodeKey: '',\n  extraSessionFields: input.extraSessionFields,\n  extraAuthorizationParams: input.extraAuthorizationParams,\n  usePkce: input.usePkce,\n  getAvatar: ({ userData }) => {\n    const picture = asOAuthUserData(userData.picture);\n    const pictureData = asOAuthUserData(picture.data);\n    const url = pictureData.url;\n    return typeof url === 'string' ? url : undefined;\n  },\n  };\n};\n\nexport interface MicrosoftProviderInput extends OAuthHelperInput {\n  /** Tenant id segment in the authorize/token URLs. Default `'common'`. */\n  tenant?: string;\n  /** OAuth API version segment. Default `'v2.0'`. */\n  apiVersion?: string;\n  /** Graph API version segment for /me. Default `'v1.0'`. */\n  graphApiVersion?: string;\n  /**\n   * Allow falling back to `userPrincipalName` as the account email when Graph\n   * `/me.mail` is empty (SEC-11). A UPN is NOT guaranteed routable or verified;\n   * under the `'unified'` account strategy a UPN equal to a victim's email would\n   * link accounts, and it commonly mis-keys an account on a non-deliverable\n   * address (reset emails never arrive). Default `false` — only enable when the\n   * tenant guarantees UPN == primary SMTP. When `false` and `.mail` is empty the\n   * provider reports \"no email\" and the login is rejected rather than linked.\n   */\n  allowUpnFallback?: boolean;\n}\n\n//? NOTE: Microsoft flow is implemented but has not been end-to-end verified\n//? against an Azure AD tenant as of 2026-05-14. The token-exchange URL, the\n//? Graph /me shape, and the photo data-URL pipeline are based on Microsoft\n//? docs and pattern-matching against Google/GitHub. First consumer to wire a\n//? real Azure tenant should report back so this note can be dropped.\nexport const microsoftProvider = (input: MicrosoftProviderInput): FullOAuthProvider => {\n  const tenant = input.tenant ?? 'common';\n  const oauthVersion = input.apiVersion ?? 'v2.0';\n  const graphVersion = input.graphApiVersion ?? 'v1.0';\n  const allowUpnFallback = input.allowUpnFallback ?? false;\n  return {\n  name: 'microsoft',\n  clientID: requireString(input.clientId, 'microsoft clientId'),\n  clientSecret: requireString(input.clientSecret, 'microsoft clientSecret'),\n  callbackURL: input.callbackUrl,\n  authorizationURL: input.endpoints?.authorizationURL ?? `https://login.microsoftonline.com/${tenant}/oauth2/${oauthVersion}/authorize`,\n  tokenExchangeURL: input.endpoints?.tokenExchangeURL ?? `https://login.microsoftonline.com/${tenant}/oauth2/${oauthVersion}/token`,\n  tokenExchangeMethod: 'form',\n  userInfoURL: input.endpoints?.userInfoURL ?? `https://graph.microsoft.com/${graphVersion}/me`,\n  scope: mergeScopes(['openid', 'profile', 'email', 'User.Read'], input.extraScopes),\n  nameKey: 'displayName',\n  emailKey: 'mail',\n  avatarCodeKey: 'id',\n  extraSessionFields: input.extraSessionFields,\n  extraAuthorizationParams: input.extraAuthorizationParams,\n  usePkce: input.usePkce,\n  //? Graph's /photo/$value requires bearer auth, so we can't store the URL —\n  //? a browser <img> would 401. Fetch the bytes and inline as a data URL.\n  getAvatar: async ({ avatarId, accessToken }) => {\n    if (!avatarId) return;\n    // 200 KB base64 cap: a data-URI is inlined into the Redis session record.\n    // An unbounded photo (multi-MB) would bloat every session read and could\n    // exhaust memory or hit Redis value-size limits on large tenants.\n    const MAX_PHOTO_BYTES = 200 * 1024;\n    const fetchPhoto = async () => {\n      //? `encodeURIComponent` the provider-supplied id before interpolating it\n      //? into the path: a malicious / malformed id could otherwise inject `../`\n      //? segments and redirect the bearer-authenticated fetch to another Graph\n      //? resource (SEC-23). The host is fixed, so this is not full SSRF, but the\n      //? result is inlined into the session, so still worth closing.\n      const response = await fetch(\n        `https://graph.microsoft.com/${graphVersion}/users/${encodeURIComponent(avatarId)}/photo/$value`,\n        { method: 'GET', headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${accessToken}` } },\n      );\n      if (!response.ok) return;\n      const rawContentType = response.headers.get('content-type') ?? 'image/jpeg';\n      //? SEC: allowlist content-type to safe image MIME types before embedding in\n      //? a data-URI that is stored in Redis and later served to the browser.\n      const SAFE_IMAGE_TYPES = new Set(['image/jpeg', 'image/png', 'image/gif', 'image/webp']);\n      const contentType = SAFE_IMAGE_TYPES.has(rawContentType) ? rawContentType : 'image/jpeg';\n      const buffer = Buffer.from(await response.arrayBuffer());\n      if (buffer.byteLength > MAX_PHOTO_BYTES) return;\n      return `data:${contentType};base64,${buffer.toString('base64')}`;\n    };\n    const [error, dataUrl] = await tryCatch(fetchPhoto);\n    if (error) return;\n    return dataUrl ?? undefined;\n  },\n  getEmail: async (accessToken) => {\n    const fetchProfile = async () => {\n      const response = await fetch(`https://graph.microsoft.com/${graphVersion}/me`, {\n        method: 'GET',\n        headers: {\n          Authorization: `Bearer ${accessToken}`,\n          'Content-Type': 'application/json',\n        },\n      });\n      if (!response.ok) return false;\n      const data: unknown = await response.json();\n      if (!data || typeof data !== 'object') return false;\n      return data as Record<string, unknown>;\n    };\n\n    const [error, profile] = await tryCatch(fetchProfile);\n    if (error || !profile) return false;\n\n    const record = asOAuthUserData(profile);\n    const mail = typeof record.mail === 'string' ? record.mail : '';\n    if (mail) return mail;\n    //? 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Required only when\n   * `auth.providerAccountStrategy === 'unified'` — the framework resolves\n   * accounts by email alone so the same address maps to one User across\n   * providers. Optional so existing custom adapters keep compiling; when a\n   * project sets `'unified'` but its adapter omits this method, the framework\n   * logs a one-time warning and falls back to provider-scoped lookup.\n   */\n  findByEmailAnyProvider?: (params: { email: string }) => Promise<UserRecord | null>;\n  findById: (id: string) => Promise<UserRecord | null>;\n  create: (input: UserAdapterCreateInput) => Promise<UserRecord>;\n  update: (id: string, patch: Partial<UserRecord>) => Promise<UserRecord>;\n  /**\n   * Hard-delete a user. Account-deletion flows (`deleteAccount_v1`) call this\n   * instead of reaching past the adapter to `prisma.user.delete`, so a custom\n   * adapter / non-Prisma store / soft-delete strategy stays in control. To\n   * implement a soft delete, ignore the hard delete here and instead expose it\n   * through `update({ deletedAt: new Date() })` from your route.\n   *\n   * Optional so existing custom adapters keep compiling; the default Prisma\n   * adapter implements it. Consumers calling account deletion against a custom\n   * adapter that omits `delete` get a clear \"adapter does not support delete\"\n   * failure rather than a silent Prisma bypass.\n   */\n  delete?: (id: string) => Promise<void>;\n}\n\nlet registeredAdapter: UserAdapter | null = null;\n\nexport const registerUserAdapter = (adapter: UserAdapter): UserAdapter => {\n  registeredAdapter = adapter;\n  return registeredAdapter;\n};\n\nexport const isUserAdapterRegistered = (): boolean => registeredAdapter !== null;\n\n//? Default adapter: backed by the Prisma client exposed from `@luckystack/core`.\n//?\n//? The single `as unknown as PrismaUserDelegate` below is intentional and\n//? load-bearing — it is the abstraction boundary between the framework's\n//? loose `UserAdapterCreateInput` (string-typed fields) and the consumer's\n//? strict Prisma model (which may declare enums for `provider`, `language`,\n//? etc.). The framework cannot know those enum types statically, so it\n//? type-erases once at this seam and assumes the runtime `prisma.user`\n//? satisfies the documented `PrismaUserDelegate` shape. Consumers whose User\n//? schema diverges (different column names, mandatory extra fields) should\n//? register their own `UserAdapter` via `registerUserAdapter(...)` rather\n//? than relying on this default.\ninterface PrismaUserDelegate {\n  findFirst: (args: { where: { email: string; provider?: string }; orderBy?: { createdAt?: 'asc' | 'desc' } }) => Promise<UserRecord | null>;\n  findUnique: (args: { where: { id: string } }) => Promise<UserRecord | null>;\n  create: (args: { data: Record<string, unknown> }) => Promise<UserRecord>;\n  update: (args: { where: { id: string }; data: Record<string, unknown> }) => Promise<UserRecord>;\n  delete: (args: { where: { id: string } }) => Promise<UserRecord>;\n}\n\n//? Bridge between Prisma's generated client surface and the adapter contract.\n//? 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Without orderBy the row returned is\n    //? engine-defined — two concurrent logins for the same email can resolve to\n    //? different User rows AND the cross-provider link guard flips non-deterministically.\n    findByEmailAnyProvider: async ({ email }) =>\n      getPrismaUser().findFirst({ where: { email }, orderBy: { createdAt: 'asc' } }),\n    findById: async (id) =>\n      getPrismaUser().findUnique({ where: { id } }),\n    create: async (input) =>\n      getPrismaUser().create({\n        data: {\n          email: input.email,\n          provider: input.provider,\n          name: input.name,\n          password: input.password ?? null,\n          avatar: input.avatar ?? 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+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/oauthProviders.ts","../src/userAdapter.ts"],"sourcesContent":["//? OAuth provider registry. Replaces the previously hardcoded provider list\n//? in `loginConfig.ts`. Consumers register providers from their\n//? `luckystack/login/oauthProviders.ts` overlay file at boot.\n//?\n//? Two-layer surface:\n//?   1. `registerOAuthProviders([...])` — accept an array of provider definitions.\n//?   2. Built-in helpers (`googleProvider`, `githubProvider`, ...) so the common\n//?      case is one function call per provider with only the secrets + callback.\n//?\n//? Custom providers (Okta, Apple, X, etc.) plug in as raw `OAuthProvider`\n//? objects alongside the helpers.\n\nimport { tryCatch } from '@luckystack/core';\n\nexport type OAuthUserData = Record<string, unknown>;\n\nexport const asOAuthUserData = (value: unknown): OAuthUserData => {\n  if (value && typeof value === 'object') {\n    return value as OAuthUserData;\n  }\n  return {};\n};\n\nexport interface CredentialsProvider {\n  name: 'credentials';\n}\n\nexport interface FullOAuthProvider {\n  name: string;\n  clientID: string;\n  clientSecret: string;\n  callbackURL: string;\n  authorizationURL: string;\n  tokenExchangeURL: string;\n  tokenExchangeMethod: 'json' | 'form';\n  userInfoURL: string;\n  /**\n   * OAuth scopes requested at the authorization step. Consumers can extend\n   * a built-in provider's defaults to request additional permissions:\n   *\n   *   ```ts\n   *   const customGoogle = googleProvider({...});\n   *   customGoogle.scope.push('https://www.googleapis.com/auth/calendar.readonly');\n   *   ```\n   *\n   * Or pass `extraScopes` to the built-in factory (see `OAuthHelperInput`).\n   */\n  scope: string[];\n  nameKey: string;\n  emailKey: string;\n  /**\n   * Optional key on the userInfo response holding a provider \"email verified\"\n   * boolean. When set AND the field is present-and-falsy, the framework rejects\n   * the profile rather than trusting an unverified address — defense-in-depth\n   * against account-linking takeover under the `'unified'` strategy (SEC-21).\n   * A missing field (provider doesn't report it) is treated as \"trusted\",\n   * preserving behaviour for providers that don't expose the flag.\n   */\n  emailVerifiedKey?: string;\n  /**\n   * Set `true` for a provider whose userinfo ONLY returns an email once the\n   * address is confirmed with the provider (e.g. Facebook Graph `/me` omits\n   * unconfirmed emails). Such a provider exposes no separate verified flag, so\n   * the mere PRESENCE of the email is the verified signal — this opts it in so\n   * both first-login CREATION and cross-provider LINK treat it as verified.\n   * Mutually exclusive in practice with `emailVerifiedKey`.\n   */\n  emailImpliesVerified?: boolean;\n  avatarKey?: string;\n  avatarCodeKey: string;\n  getEmail?: (accessToken: string) => Promise<string | false | undefined>;\n  getAvatar?: (params: { userData: OAuthUserData; avatarId?: string; accessToken: string }) => string | undefined | Promise<string | undefined>;\n  /**\n   * Optional per-provider hook to attach extra runtime-only data to the\n   * session (NOT to the User row). Return key/value pairs that get merged\n   * into `BaseSessionLayout` before `saveSession`. To get strict typing\n   * downstream, extend `BaseSessionLayout` via module augmentation:\n   *\n   *   ```ts\n   *   declare module '@luckystack/core' {\n   *     interface BaseSessionLayout {\n   *       googleCalendarToken?: string;\n   *     }\n   *   }\n   *   ```\n   *\n   * Data lives on the session in Redis and disappears on logout — no Prisma\n   * schema change required. Don't store secrets you wouldn't want surfaced\n   * to a user inspecting their own session.\n   */\n  extraSessionFields?: (params: {\n    userData: OAuthUserData;\n    accessToken: string;\n  }) => Promise<Record<string, unknown>> | Record<string, unknown>;\n  /**\n   * Extra query params appended to the authorization-redirect URL (CFG-21).\n   * Lets a provider request e.g. `access_type=offline`, `login_hint=...`, or\n   * override the framework's default `prompt=select_account`. The server's\n   * authorize route merges these over the built-in params (a key present here\n   * wins). Reserved OAuth params (`client_id`, `redirect_uri`, `scope`,\n   * `response_type`, `state`, `code_challenge`, `code_challenge_method`) should\n   * NOT be set here — they are framework-owned. Default unset.\n   */\n  extraAuthorizationParams?: Record<string, string>;\n  /**\n   * Opt this provider into PKCE (RFC 7636, S256) (F11). When `true`, the\n   * framework generates a `code_verifier` at flow start, stores it server-side\n   * with the OAuth state, sends `code_challenge`/`code_challenge_method=S256` on\n   * the authorize redirect, and replays the verifier at token exchange. Required\n   * by OAuth 2.1 / PKCE-mandating providers (X/Twitter, some Okta/Auth0\n   * policies). Default `false` (no PKCE — existing flows are byte-identical).\n   */\n  usePkce?: boolean;\n}\n\nexport type OAuthProvider = CredentialsProvider | FullOAuthProvider;\n\nexport const isFullOAuthProvider = (provider: OAuthProvider): provider is FullOAuthProvider =>\n  provider.name !== 'credentials';\n\nexport interface OAuthEndpointOverrides {\n  /** Override the provider's authorization URL (e.g. GitHub Enterprise host, Microsoft custom tenant). */\n  authorizationURL?: string;\n  /** Override the token exchange URL. */\n  tokenExchangeURL?: string;\n  /** Override the userInfo URL. */\n  userInfoURL?: string;\n}\n\ninterface OAuthHelperInput {\n  clientId: string | undefined;\n  clientSecret: string | undefined;\n  callbackUrl: string;\n  /** Optional URL overrides for self-hosted / custom-tenant deployments. */\n  endpoints?: OAuthEndpointOverrides;\n  /**\n   * Additional OAuth scopes to request alongside the built-in defaults. Use\n   * for \"give me access to the user's calendar / drive / repos\" flows.\n   * Merged with the helper's default scopes; duplicates are deduplicated.\n   */\n  extraScopes?: string[];\n  /**\n   * Per-provider hook for attaching runtime-only fields to the session.\n   * See `FullOAuthProvider.extraSessionFields` for usage + module-augmentation\n   * pattern.\n   */\n  extraSessionFields?: FullOAuthProvider['extraSessionFields'];\n  /**\n   * Extra query params for the authorize redirect (CFG-21). See\n   * `FullOAuthProvider.extraAuthorizationParams`.\n   */\n  extraAuthorizationParams?: Record<string, string>;\n  /** Opt this provider into PKCE (S256) (F11). See `FullOAuthProvider.usePkce`. */\n  usePkce?: boolean;\n}\n\nconst mergeScopes = (defaults: string[], extra: string[] | undefined): string[] => {\n  if (!extra || extra.length === 0) return defaults;\n  return [...new Set([...defaults, ...extra])];\n};\n\nconst requireString = (value: string | undefined, label: string): string => {\n  if (!value || value.length === 0) {\n    throw new Error(`OAuth provider configuration error: ${label} is empty.`);\n  }\n  return value;\n};\n\nexport const credentialsProvider = (): CredentialsProvider => ({ name: 'credentials' });\n\nexport const googleProvider = (input: OAuthHelperInput): FullOAuthProvider => ({\n  name: 'google',\n  clientID: requireString(input.clientId, 'google clientId'),\n  clientSecret: requireString(input.clientSecret, 'google clientSecret'),\n  callbackURL: input.callbackUrl,\n  authorizationURL: input.endpoints?.authorizationURL ?? 'https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/v2/auth',\n  tokenExchangeURL: input.endpoints?.tokenExchangeURL ?? 'https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token',\n  tokenExchangeMethod: 'json',\n  //? OIDC userinfo (v3) — the legacy `oauth2/v1/userinfo` is deprecated and\n  //? reports verification as `verified_email`; v3 reports the OIDC-standard\n  //? `email_verified`. Use v3 so `emailVerifiedKey` below lines up (SEC-21/QUA-24).\n  userInfoURL: input.endpoints?.userInfoURL ?? 'https://www.googleapis.com/oauth2/v3/userinfo',\n  scope: mergeScopes([\n    'https://www.googleapis.com/auth/userinfo.profile',\n    'https://www.googleapis.com/auth/userinfo.email',\n  ], input.extraScopes),\n  nameKey: 'name',\n  emailKey: 'email',\n  //? Google's OIDC userinfo returns `email_verified`; reject an unverified\n  //? address so a Google account with an unverified email can't link to a\n  //? victim's existing account under the `'unified'` strategy (SEC-21).\n  emailVerifiedKey: 'email_verified',\n  avatarKey: 'picture',\n  avatarCodeKey: '',\n  extraSessionFields: input.extraSessionFields,\n  extraAuthorizationParams: input.extraAuthorizationParams,\n  usePkce: input.usePkce,\n});\n\nexport const githubProvider = (input: OAuthHelperInput): FullOAuthProvider => ({\n  name: 'github',\n  clientID: requireString(input.clientId, 'github clientId'),\n  clientSecret: requireString(input.clientSecret, 'github clientSecret'),\n  callbackURL: input.callbackUrl,\n  authorizationURL: input.endpoints?.authorizationURL ?? 'https://github.com/login/oauth/authorize',\n  tokenExchangeURL: input.endpoints?.tokenExchangeURL ?? 'https://github.com/login/oauth/access_token',\n  tokenExchangeMethod: 'json',\n  userInfoURL: input.endpoints?.userInfoURL ?? 'https://api.github.com/user',\n  scope: mergeScopes(['read:user', 'user:email'], input.extraScopes),\n  nameKey: 'login',\n  emailKey: 'email',\n  avatarKey: 'avatar_url',\n  avatarCodeKey: '',\n  extraSessionFields: input.extraSessionFields,\n  extraAuthorizationParams: input.extraAuthorizationParams,\n  usePkce: input.usePkce,\n  getEmail: async (accessToken) => {\n    const fetchEmails = async () => {\n      const response = await fetch('https://api.github.com/user/emails', {\n        method: 'GET',\n        headers: {\n          'Content-Type': 'application/json',\n          Accept: 'application/json',\n          Authorization: `Bearer ${accessToken}`,\n        },\n      });\n      if (!response.ok) return false;\n      const emails: unknown = await response.json();\n      if (!Array.isArray(emails)) return false;\n      return emails as { primary?: boolean; verified?: boolean; email?: string }[];\n    };\n\n    const [error, emails] = await tryCatch(fetchEmails);\n    if (error || !emails) return false;\n\n    //? Defense-in-depth: only ever select a `verified === true` address. GitHub\n    //? forbids an unverified email from being `primary`, so in the normal case\n    //? this is a no-op — but the `emails[0]` fallback (when no primary exists)\n    //? could otherwise pick an UNVERIFIED address an attacker added to their\n    //? GitHub account, which under the `'unified'` account strategy would link\n    //? to a victim's existing account by that email (SEC-21). Filtering on\n    //? `verified` first closes that fallback path.\n    const verified = emails.filter((entry) => entry.verified === true);\n    let mainEmail: string | undefined;\n    for (const entry of verified) {\n      if (entry.primary && typeof entry.email === 'string') mainEmail = entry.email;\n    }\n    mainEmail ??= verified[0]?.email;\n    return mainEmail;\n  },\n});\n\nexport const discordProvider = (input: OAuthHelperInput): FullOAuthProvider => ({\n  name: 'discord',\n  clientID: requireString(input.clientId, 'discord clientId'),\n  clientSecret: requireString(input.clientSecret, 'discord clientSecret'),\n  callbackURL: input.callbackUrl,\n  authorizationURL: input.endpoints?.authorizationURL ?? 'https://discord.com/oauth2/authorize',\n  tokenExchangeURL: input.endpoints?.tokenExchangeURL ?? 'https://discord.com/api/oauth2/token',\n  tokenExchangeMethod: 'form',\n  userInfoURL: input.endpoints?.userInfoURL ?? 'https://discord.com/api/users/@me',\n  scope: mergeScopes(['identify', 'email'], input.extraScopes),\n  nameKey: 'username',\n  emailKey: 'email',\n  //? Discord's /users/@me returns a `verified` boolean for the account email;\n  //? reject the address when it is explicitly unverified (SEC-21).\n  emailVerifiedKey: 'verified',\n  avatarCodeKey: 'avatar',\n  extraSessionFields: input.extraSessionFields,\n  extraAuthorizationParams: input.extraAuthorizationParams,\n  usePkce: input.usePkce,\n  getAvatar: ({ userData, avatarId }) => {\n    if (!avatarId) return;\n    const userId = typeof userData.id === 'string' ? userData.id : '';\n    if (!userId) return;\n    const format = avatarId.startsWith('a_') ? 'gif' : 'png';\n    //? Encode the provider-supplied id + avatar hash before interpolation so a\n    //? malformed value can't inject `../` path segments into the CDN URL (SEC-23).\n    return `https://cdn.discordapp.com/avatars/${encodeURIComponent(userId)}/${encodeURIComponent(avatarId)}.${format}`;\n  },\n});\n\nexport interface FacebookProviderInput extends OAuthHelperInput {\n  /** Graph API version segment used in the URLs. Default `'v18.0'` (current as of 2026 — bump as Meta deprecates older versions). */\n  apiVersion?: string;\n}\n\nexport const facebookProvider = (input: FacebookProviderInput): FullOAuthProvider => {\n  const v = input.apiVersion ?? 'v18.0';\n  return {\n  name: 'facebook',\n  clientID: requireString(input.clientId, 'facebook clientId'),\n  clientSecret: requireString(input.clientSecret, 'facebook clientSecret'),\n  callbackURL: input.callbackUrl,\n  authorizationURL: input.endpoints?.authorizationURL ?? `https://www.facebook.com/${v}/dialog/oauth`,\n  tokenExchangeURL: input.endpoints?.tokenExchangeURL ?? `https://graph.facebook.com/${v}/oauth/access_token`,\n  tokenExchangeMethod: 'form',\n  userInfoURL: input.endpoints?.userInfoURL ?? 'https://graph.facebook.com/me?fields=id,name,email,picture.type(large)',\n  scope: mergeScopes(['public_profile', 'email'], input.extraScopes),\n  nameKey: 'name',\n  emailKey: 'email',\n  //? Facebook's Graph `/me` only returns `email` for an address the user has\n  //? CONFIRMED with Facebook (unconfirmed emails are omitted), so there is no\n  //? separate verified flag to gate on — the presence of `email` IS the verified\n  //? signal. `emailImpliesVerified` encodes that so a Facebook sign-in counts as\n  //? verified for BOTH first-login creation and cross-provider linking (SEC-21 /\n  //? M2 creation guard). If a consumer opts into receiving unverified emails via\n  //? a future Graph field, set `emailVerifiedKey` on the returned provider instead.\n  emailImpliesVerified: true,\n  avatarCodeKey: '',\n  extraSessionFields: input.extraSessionFields,\n  extraAuthorizationParams: input.extraAuthorizationParams,\n  usePkce: input.usePkce,\n  getAvatar: ({ userData }) => {\n    const picture = asOAuthUserData(userData.picture);\n    const pictureData = asOAuthUserData(picture.data);\n    const url = pictureData.url;\n    return typeof url === 'string' ? url : undefined;\n  },\n  };\n};\n\nexport interface MicrosoftProviderInput extends OAuthHelperInput {\n  /** Tenant id segment in the authorize/token URLs. Default `'common'`. */\n  tenant?: string;\n  /** OAuth API version segment. Default `'v2.0'`. */\n  apiVersion?: string;\n  /** Graph API version segment for /me. Default `'v1.0'`. */\n  graphApiVersion?: string;\n  /**\n   * Allow falling back to `userPrincipalName` as the account email when Graph\n   * `/me.mail` is empty (SEC-11). A UPN is NOT guaranteed routable or verified;\n   * under the `'unified'` account strategy a UPN equal to a victim's email would\n   * link accounts, and it commonly mis-keys an account on a non-deliverable\n   * address (reset emails never arrive). Default `false` — only enable when the\n   * tenant guarantees UPN == primary SMTP. When `false` and `.mail` is empty the\n   * provider reports \"no email\" and the login is rejected rather than linked.\n   */\n  allowUpnFallback?: boolean;\n}\n\n//? NOTE: Microsoft flow is implemented but has not been end-to-end verified\n//? against an Azure AD tenant as of 2026-05-14. The token-exchange URL, the\n//? Graph /me shape, and the photo data-URL pipeline are based on Microsoft\n//? docs and pattern-matching against Google/GitHub. First consumer to wire a\n//? real Azure tenant should report back so this note can be dropped.\nexport const microsoftProvider = (input: MicrosoftProviderInput): FullOAuthProvider => {\n  const tenant = input.tenant ?? 'common';\n  const oauthVersion = input.apiVersion ?? 'v2.0';\n  const graphVersion = input.graphApiVersion ?? 'v1.0';\n  const allowUpnFallback = input.allowUpnFallback ?? false;\n  return {\n  name: 'microsoft',\n  clientID: requireString(input.clientId, 'microsoft clientId'),\n  clientSecret: requireString(input.clientSecret, 'microsoft clientSecret'),\n  callbackURL: input.callbackUrl,\n  authorizationURL: input.endpoints?.authorizationURL ?? `https://login.microsoftonline.com/${tenant}/oauth2/${oauthVersion}/authorize`,\n  tokenExchangeURL: input.endpoints?.tokenExchangeURL ?? `https://login.microsoftonline.com/${tenant}/oauth2/${oauthVersion}/token`,\n  tokenExchangeMethod: 'form',\n  userInfoURL: input.endpoints?.userInfoURL ?? `https://graph.microsoft.com/${graphVersion}/me`,\n  scope: mergeScopes(['openid', 'profile', 'email', 'User.Read'], input.extraScopes),\n  nameKey: 'displayName',\n  emailKey: 'mail',\n  avatarCodeKey: 'id',\n  extraSessionFields: input.extraSessionFields,\n  extraAuthorizationParams: input.extraAuthorizationParams,\n  usePkce: input.usePkce,\n  //? Graph's /photo/$value requires bearer auth, so we can't store the URL —\n  //? a browser <img> would 401. Fetch the bytes and inline as a data URL.\n  getAvatar: async ({ avatarId, accessToken }) => {\n    if (!avatarId) return;\n    // 200 KB base64 cap: a data-URI is inlined into the Redis session record.\n    // An unbounded photo (multi-MB) would bloat every session read and could\n    // exhaust memory or hit Redis value-size limits on large tenants.\n    const MAX_PHOTO_BYTES = 200 * 1024;\n    const fetchPhoto = async () => {\n      //? `encodeURIComponent` the provider-supplied id before interpolating it\n      //? into the path: a malicious / malformed id could otherwise inject `../`\n      //? segments and redirect the bearer-authenticated fetch to another Graph\n      //? resource (SEC-23). The host is fixed, so this is not full SSRF, but the\n      //? result is inlined into the session, so still worth closing.\n      const response = await fetch(\n        `https://graph.microsoft.com/${graphVersion}/users/${encodeURIComponent(avatarId)}/photo/$value`,\n        { method: 'GET', headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${accessToken}` } },\n      );\n      if (!response.ok) return;\n      const rawContentType = response.headers.get('content-type') ?? 'image/jpeg';\n      //? SEC: allowlist content-type to safe image MIME types before embedding in\n      //? a data-URI that is stored in Redis and later served to the browser.\n      const SAFE_IMAGE_TYPES = new Set(['image/jpeg', 'image/png', 'image/gif', 'image/webp']);\n      const contentType = SAFE_IMAGE_TYPES.has(rawContentType) ? rawContentType : 'image/jpeg';\n      const buffer = Buffer.from(await response.arrayBuffer());\n      if (buffer.byteLength > MAX_PHOTO_BYTES) return;\n      return `data:${contentType};base64,${buffer.toString('base64')}`;\n    };\n    const [error, dataUrl] = await tryCatch(fetchPhoto);\n    if (error) return;\n    return dataUrl ?? undefined;\n  },\n  getEmail: async (accessToken) => {\n    const fetchProfile = async () => {\n      const response = await fetch(`https://graph.microsoft.com/${graphVersion}/me`, {\n        method: 'GET',\n        headers: {\n          Authorization: `Bearer ${accessToken}`,\n          'Content-Type': 'application/json',\n        },\n      });\n      if (!response.ok) return false;\n      const data: unknown = await response.json();\n      if (!data || typeof data !== 'object') return false;\n      return data as Record<string, unknown>;\n    };\n\n    const [error, profile] = await tryCatch(fetchProfile);\n    if (error || !profile) return false;\n\n    const record = asOAuthUserData(profile);\n    const mail = typeof record.mail === 'string' ? record.mail : '';\n    if (mail) return mail;\n    //? Only fall back to `userPrincipalName` when the consumer explicitly opted\n    //? in (SEC-11). A UPN is not guaranteed routable/verified; using it as the\n    //? account email under `'unified'` enables account-linking takeover and\n    //? mis-keys accounts on non-deliverable addresses.\n    if (allowUpnFallback) {\n      const userPrincipalName = typeof record.userPrincipalName === 'string' ? record.userPrincipalName : '';\n      return userPrincipalName || false;\n    }\n    return false;\n  },\n  };\n};\n\nlet registeredProviders: OAuthProvider[] = [{ name: 'credentials' }];\n//? LOGIN-01: optional factory that builds the provider list lazily on first\n//? `getOAuthProviders()` call. This lets `register.ts` (the package auto-wire\n//? side-effect) defer all config/env reads to request time rather than baking\n//? them at module-load time. Once resolved the factory is discarded and the\n//? static list is used on every subsequent call (same performance as before).\nlet providerFactory: (() => OAuthProvider[]) | null = null;\n\n//? Always returns the active list. The default value contains only the\n//? `credentials` entry so calls into `loginWithCredentials` keep working in\n//? environments that never register OAuth providers (tests, CLI, etc.).\nexport const getOAuthProviders = (): OAuthProvider[] => {\n  if (providerFactory) {\n    registeredProviders = providerFactory();\n    providerFactory = null;\n  }\n  return registeredProviders;\n};\n\nexport const registerOAuthProviders = (providers: OAuthProvider[]): OAuthProvider[] => {\n  providerFactory = null;\n  registeredProviders = providers;\n  return registeredProviders;\n};\n\n/**\n * Register a factory function that builds the provider list on first use.\n * Prefer this over `registerOAuthProviders` from the package `register` side-\n * effect so config/env reads are deferred to request time and survive any\n * `registerProjectConfig` call that happens after package import.\n * A subsequent `registerOAuthProviders` call replaces the factory.\n */\nexport const registerOAuthProviderFactory = (factory: () => OAuthProvider[]): void => {\n  providerFactory = factory;\n};\n","//? User adapter registry. Decouples auth flows from a specific Prisma User\n//? schema so consumers with different column names, additional fields, or a\n//? non-Prisma data layer can plug their own implementation.\n//?\n//? `defaultPrismaUserAdapter()` implements the framework's recommended schema\n//? (id, email, password?, provider, name, avatar, avatarFallback, admin,\n//? language) and is used automatically when no adapter has been registered.\n\nimport { prisma, type BaseSessionLayout } from '@luckystack/core';\n\nexport interface UserAdapterCreateInput {\n  email: string;\n  provider: string;\n  name?: string | null;\n  password?: string | null;\n  avatar?: string | null;\n  avatarFallback?: string | null;\n  language?: string | null;\n}\n\nexport interface UserRecord extends BaseSessionLayout {\n  password?: string | null;\n  provider?: string | null;\n  /** Most recent successful login. Mirrors the optional `lastLogin` column on User. */\n  lastLogin?: Date | null;\n  /**\n   * 2FA (ADR 0024): whether this user enrolled a second factor. All three 2FA\n   * fields are OPTIONAL so pre-0.6 schemas/adapters keep working unchanged —\n   * an adapter that never returns them simply has no 2FA-capable users.\n   */\n  twoFactorEnabled?: boolean | null;\n  /**\n   * 2FA: the TOTP shared secret (base32; new encrypted rows use\n   * `enc:v2:<key-id>:...`, while legacy `gcm:` rows remain readable through\n   * TOTP_ENCRYPTION_LEGACY_KEYS). NEVER reaches the client — stripped by\n   * `sanitizeUserForSession` before any session persist/broadcast.\n   */\n  totpSecret?: string | null;\n  /** 2FA: sha256 hashes of the UNUSED one-time recovery codes (also stripped). */\n  recoveryCodes?: string[] | null;\n}\n\nexport interface UserAdapter {\n  findByEmail: (params: { email: string; provider: string }) => Promise<UserRecord | null>;\n  /**\n   * Look up a user by email IRRESPECTIVE of provider. Required only when\n   * `auth.providerAccountStrategy === 'unified'` — the framework resolves\n   * accounts by email alone so the same address maps to one User across\n   * providers. Optional so existing custom adapters keep compiling; when a\n   * project sets `'unified'` but its adapter omits this method, the framework\n   * logs a one-time warning and falls back to provider-scoped lookup.\n   */\n  findByEmailAnyProvider?: (params: { email: string }) => Promise<UserRecord | null>;\n  findById: (id: string) => Promise<UserRecord | null>;\n  create: (input: UserAdapterCreateInput) => Promise<UserRecord>;\n  update: (id: string, patch: Partial<UserRecord>) => Promise<UserRecord>;\n  /**\n   * Hard-delete a user. Account-deletion flows (`deleteAccount_v1`) call this\n   * instead of reaching past the adapter to `prisma.user.delete`, so a custom\n   * adapter / non-Prisma store / soft-delete strategy stays in control. To\n   * implement a soft delete, ignore the hard delete here and instead expose it\n   * through `update({ deletedAt: new Date() })` from your route.\n   *\n   * Optional so existing custom adapters keep compiling; the default Prisma\n   * adapter implements it. Consumers calling account deletion against a custom\n   * adapter that omits `delete` get a clear \"adapter does not support delete\"\n   * failure rather than a silent Prisma bypass.\n   */\n  delete?: (id: string) => Promise<void>;\n}\n\nlet registeredAdapter: UserAdapter | null = null;\n\nexport const registerUserAdapter = (adapter: UserAdapter): UserAdapter => {\n  registeredAdapter = adapter;\n  return registeredAdapter;\n};\n\nexport const isUserAdapterRegistered = (): boolean => registeredAdapter !== null;\n\n//? Default adapter: backed by the Prisma client exposed from `@luckystack/core`.\n//?\n//? The single `as unknown as PrismaUserDelegate` below is intentional and\n//? load-bearing — it is the abstraction boundary between the framework's\n//? loose `UserAdapterCreateInput` (string-typed fields) and the consumer's\n//? strict Prisma model (which may declare enums for `provider`, `language`,\n//? etc.). The framework cannot know those enum types statically, so it\n//? type-erases once at this seam and assumes the runtime `prisma.user`\n//? satisfies the documented `PrismaUserDelegate` shape. Consumers whose User\n//? schema diverges (different column names, mandatory extra fields) should\n//? register their own `UserAdapter` via `registerUserAdapter(...)` rather\n//? than relying on this default.\ninterface PrismaUserDelegate {\n  findFirst: (args: { where: { email: string; provider?: string }; orderBy?: { createdAt?: 'asc' | 'desc' } }) => Promise<UserRecord | null>;\n  findUnique: (args: { where: { id: string } }) => Promise<UserRecord | null>;\n  create: (args: { data: Record<string, unknown> }) => Promise<UserRecord>;\n  update: (args: { where: { id: string }; data: Record<string, unknown> }) => Promise<UserRecord>;\n  delete: (args: { where: { id: string } }) => Promise<UserRecord>;\n}\n\n//? Bridge between Prisma's generated client surface and the adapter contract.\n//? Structural cast required because Prisma's auto-generated delegate types\n//? don't structurally match our trimmed `PrismaUserDelegate` shape; this is a\n//? known framework boundary (see /docs/ARCHITECTURE_AUTH.md).\nconst getPrismaUser = (): PrismaUserDelegate =>\n  // eslint-disable-next-line no-restricted-syntax -- structural Prisma boundary\n  prisma.user as unknown as PrismaUserDelegate;\n\nexport const defaultPrismaUserAdapter = (): UserAdapter => {\n  return {\n    findByEmail: async ({ email, provider }) =>\n      getPrismaUser().findFirst({ where: { email, provider } }),\n    //? LOGIN-04: add a deterministic tiebreak so duplicate-email rows (possible\n    //? under the 'unified' strategy before `email @unique` is enforced) always\n    //? resolve to the OLDEST account. 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'',\n          avatarFallback: input.avatarFallback,\n          language: input.language,\n        },\n      }),\n    update: async (id, patch) =>\n      getPrismaUser().update({ where: { id }, data: patch }),\n    delete: async (id) => {\n      await getPrismaUser().delete({ where: { id } });\n    },\n  };\n};\n\nlet cachedDefaultAdapter: UserAdapter | null = null;\n\nexport const getUserAdapter = (): UserAdapter => {\n  if (registeredAdapter) return registeredAdapter;\n  cachedDefaultAdapter ??= defaultPrismaUserAdapter();\n  return 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package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -326,8 +326,9 @@ interface UserRecord extends BaseSessionLayout {
      */
     twoFactorEnabled?: boolean | null;
     /**
-     * 2FA: the TOTP shared secret (base32; `gcm:`-prefixed when encrypted at
-     * rest via TOTP_ENCRYPTION_KEY). NEVER reaches the client — stripped by
+     * 2FA: the TOTP shared secret (base32; new encrypted rows use
+     * `enc:v2:<key-id>:...`, while legacy `gcm:` rows remain readable through
+     * TOTP_ENCRYPTION_LEGACY_KEYS). NEVER reaches the client — stripped by
      * `sanitizeUserForSession` before any session persist/broadcast.
      */
     totpSecret?: string | null;

package/dist/index.js

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ import {
   registerOAuthProviderFactory,
   registerOAuthProviders,
   registerUserAdapter
-} from "./chunk-L5MHCPNN.js";
+} from "./chunk-CLYMWF3A.js";
 import {
   activeUsersKeyFor,
   deleteSession,
@@ -139,6 +139,16 @@ var registerPostLoginRedirect = (resolver) => {
   return resolver;
 };
 var getPostLoginRedirect = () => activeResolver;
+var RELATIVE_BASE = "http://luckystack-relative.invalid";
+var resolvePostLoginRedirectAgainstDefault = (candidate, defaultUrl) => {
+  if (!URL.canParse(candidate, RELATIVE_BASE)) return candidate;
+  const parsed = new URL(candidate, RELATIVE_BASE);
+  if (parsed.origin !== RELATIVE_BASE) return candidate;
+  if (!URL.canParse(defaultUrl)) return candidate;
+  const fallback = new URL(defaultUrl);
+  if (fallback.protocol !== "http:" && fallback.protocol !== "https:") return candidate;
+  return new URL(candidate, fallback).toString();
+};
 
 // src/login.ts
 import { URLSearchParams as URLSearchParams2 } from "url";
@@ -987,7 +997,9 @@ var resolvePostLoginRedirect = async ({
     getLogger3().warn(`[oauth] postLoginRedirect resolver threw`, { message: resolverError.message });
     return fallbackUrl;
   }
-  if (resolved && isAllowedRedirectUrl(resolved)) return resolved;
+  if (resolved && isAllowedRedirectUrl(resolved)) {
+    return resolvePostLoginRedirectAgainstDefault(resolved, fallbackUrl);
+  }
   if (resolved) {
     getLogger3().warn(
       `[oauth] postLoginRedirect returned a URL not in allowed origins \u2014 falling back`,
@@ -1267,33 +1279,53 @@ var normalizeIdentity = (identity) => identity.trim().toLowerCase();
 var codeKey = (purpose, identity) => formatKey4("-emailcode", `${purpose}:${normalizeIdentity(identity)}`);
 var attemptsKey = (purpose, identity) => formatKey4("-emailcode-attempts", `${purpose}:${normalizeIdentity(identity)}`);
 var hashCode = (code) => crypto.createHash("sha256").update(code).digest("hex");
+var ISSUE_CODE_SCRIPT = `
+redis.call('set', KEYS[1], ARGV[1], 'EX', ARGV[2])
+redis.call('del', KEYS[2])
+return 1
+`;
+var VERIFY_CODE_SCRIPT = `
+local stored = redis.call('get', KEYS[1])
+if not stored then return 0 end
+local attempts = redis.call('incr', KEYS[2])
+local remaining = redis.call('ttl', KEYS[1])
+redis.call('expire', KEYS[2], remaining > 0 and remaining or 600)
+if attempts > tonumber(ARGV[2]) then
+  redis.call('del', KEYS[1])
+  redis.call('del', KEYS[2])
+  return 3
+end
+if stored ~= ARGV[1] then return 1 end
+redis.call('del', KEYS[1])
+redis.call('del', KEYS[2])
+return 2
+`;
 var generateNumericCode = (digits) => String(crypto.randomInt(0, 10 ** digits)).padStart(digits, "0");
 var issueEmailCode = async ({ purpose, identity, ttlSeconds, digits }) => {
   const code = generateNumericCode(digits);
-  await redis3.set(codeKey(purpose, identity), hashCode(code), "EX", ttlSeconds);
-  await redis3.del(attemptsKey(purpose, identity));
+  await redis3.eval(
+    ISSUE_CODE_SCRIPT,
+    2,
+    codeKey(purpose, identity),
+    attemptsKey(purpose, identity),
+    hashCode(code),
+    String(ttlSeconds)
+  );
   return code;
 };
 var verifyEmailCode = async ({ purpose, identity, code, maxAttempts }) => {
-  const key = codeKey(purpose, identity);
-  const storedHash = await redis3.get(key);
-  if (!storedHash) return "expired";
-  const counter = attemptsKey(purpose, identity);
-  const attempts = await redis3.incr(counter);
-  const remaining = await redis3.ttl(key);
-  await redis3.expire(counter, remaining > 0 ? remaining : 600);
-  if (attempts > maxAttempts) {
-    await redis3.del(key);
-    await redis3.del(counter);
-    return "locked";
-  }
-  const submitted = Buffer.from(hashCode(code.trim()));
-  const expected = Buffer.from(storedHash);
-  const matches = submitted.length === expected.length && crypto.timingSafeEqual(submitted, expected);
-  if (!matches) return "invalid";
-  const deleted = await redis3.del(key);
-  await redis3.del(counter);
-  return deleted > 0 ? "valid" : "expired";
+  const result = Number(await redis3.eval(
+    VERIFY_CODE_SCRIPT,
+    2,
+    codeKey(purpose, identity),
+    attemptsKey(purpose, identity),
+    hashCode(code.trim()),
+    String(maxAttempts)
+  ));
+  if (result === 2) return "valid";
+  if (result === 1) return "invalid";
+  if (result === 3) return "locked";
+  return "expired";
 };
 var clearEmailCode = async (purpose, identity) => {
   await redis3.del(codeKey(purpose, identity));
@@ -1378,16 +1410,65 @@ var buildOtpauthUri = ({ secret, accountName, issuer }) => {
 
 // src/twoFactor.ts
 var sha256 = (value) => crypto3.createHash("sha256").update(value).digest("hex");
-var ENCRYPTED_PREFIX = "gcm:";
+var LEGACY_ENCRYPTED_PREFIX = "gcm:";
+var VERSIONED_ENCRYPTED_PREFIX = "enc:v2:";
+var KEY_ID_LENGTH = 24;
 var warnedPlaintextSecret = false;
-var encryptionKey = () => {
-  const raw = process.env.TOTP_ENCRYPTION_KEY;
-  if (!raw) return null;
-  return crypto3.createHash("sha256").update(raw).digest();
+var warnedInvalidLegacyKeyRing = false;
+var toEncryptionKey = (raw) => ({
+  id: crypto3.createHash("sha256").update(`luckystack-totp-key-id:${raw}`).digest("hex").slice(0, KEY_ID_LENGTH),
+  key: crypto3.createHash("sha256").update(raw).digest()
+});
+var readLegacyEncryptionKeys = () => {
+  const raw = process.env.TOTP_ENCRYPTION_LEGACY_KEYS;
+  if (!raw) return [];
+  try {
+    const parsed = JSON.parse(raw);
+    if (!Array.isArray(parsed)) {
+      throw new TypeError("expected a JSON array of non-empty strings");
+    }
+    const keys = [];
+    for (const value of parsed) {
+      if (typeof value !== "string" || value.length === 0) {
+        throw new TypeError("expected a JSON array of non-empty strings");
+      }
+      keys.push(value);
+    }
+    return keys;
+  } catch {
+    if (!warnedInvalidLegacyKeyRing) {
+      warnedInvalidLegacyKeyRing = true;
+      getLogger5().error("[2fa] TOTP_ENCRYPTION_LEGACY_KEYS must be a JSON array of non-empty strings; legacy TOTP rows cannot be decrypted until it is fixed.");
+    }
+    return [];
+  }
+};
+var encryptionKeyRing = () => {
+  const primaryRaw = process.env.TOTP_ENCRYPTION_KEY;
+  const primary = primaryRaw ? toEncryptionKey(primaryRaw) : null;
+  const seen = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+  const all = [];
+  for (const raw of [primaryRaw, ...readLegacyEncryptionKeys()]) {
+    if (!raw) continue;
+    const entry = toEncryptionKey(raw);
+    if (seen.has(entry.id)) continue;
+    seen.add(entry.id);
+    all.push(entry);
+  }
+  return { primary, all };
+};
+var decryptWithKey = (key, ivPart, tagPart, dataPart) => {
+  try {
+    const decipher = crypto3.createDecipheriv("aes-256-gcm", key, Buffer.from(ivPart, "base64"));
+    decipher.setAuthTag(Buffer.from(tagPart, "base64"));
+    return Buffer.concat([decipher.update(Buffer.from(dataPart, "base64")), decipher.final()]).toString("utf8");
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
 };
 var encryptTotpSecret = (secret) => {
-  const key = encryptionKey();
-  if (!key) {
+  const { primary } = encryptionKeyRing();
+  if (!primary) {
     if (!warnedPlaintextSecret) {
       warnedPlaintextSecret = true;
       getLogger5().warn("[2fa] TOTP_ENCRYPTION_KEY is not set \u2014 TOTP secrets are stored unencrypted. Set it in .env.local to encrypt new enrollments at rest.");
@@ -1395,34 +1476,58 @@ var encryptTotpSecret = (secret) => {
     return secret;
   }
   const iv = crypto3.randomBytes(12);
-  const cipher = crypto3.createCipheriv("aes-256-gcm", key, iv);
+  const cipher = crypto3.createCipheriv("aes-256-gcm", primary.key, iv);
   const ciphertext = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(secret, "utf8"), cipher.final()]);
-  return `${ENCRYPTED_PREFIX}${iv.toString("base64")}:${cipher.getAuthTag().toString("base64")}:${ciphertext.toString("base64")}`;
-};
-var decryptTotpSecret = (stored) => {
-  if (!stored.startsWith(ENCRYPTED_PREFIX)) return stored;
-  const key = encryptionKey();
-  if (!key) {
-    getLogger5().error("[2fa] found an encrypted TOTP secret but TOTP_ENCRYPTION_KEY is not set \u2014 cannot verify TOTP codes.");
+  return `${VERSIONED_ENCRYPTED_PREFIX}${primary.id}:${iv.toString("base64")}:${cipher.getAuthTag().toString("base64")}:${ciphertext.toString("base64")}`;
+};
+var decryptTotpSecretWithMetadata = (stored) => {
+  const ring = encryptionKeyRing();
+  if (!stored.startsWith(LEGACY_ENCRYPTED_PREFIX) && !stored.startsWith("enc:")) {
+    return { secret: stored, needsReencrypt: ring.primary !== null };
+  }
+  if (stored.startsWith(VERSIONED_ENCRYPTED_PREFIX)) {
+    const [keyId, ivPart2, tagPart2, dataPart2] = stored.slice(VERSIONED_ENCRYPTED_PREFIX.length).split(":");
+    if (!keyId || !ivPart2 || !tagPart2 || !dataPart2) return null;
+    const entry = ring.all.find((candidate) => candidate.id === keyId);
+    if (!entry) {
+      getLogger5().error("[2fa] TOTP secret references an unavailable encryption key id. Add the previous key to TOTP_ENCRYPTION_LEGACY_KEYS.");
+      return null;
+    }
+    const secret = decryptWithKey(entry.key, ivPart2, tagPart2, dataPart2);
+    if (!secret) {
+      getLogger5().error("[2fa] TOTP secret decryption failed (ciphertext is invalid or the configured key is wrong).");
+      return null;
+    }
+    return {
+      secret,
+      needsReencrypt: ring.primary !== null && entry.id !== ring.primary.id
+    };
+  }
+  if (!stored.startsWith(LEGACY_ENCRYPTED_PREFIX)) {
+    getLogger5().error("[2fa] unsupported TOTP ciphertext version.");
     return null;
   }
-  const [ivPart, tagPart, dataPart] = stored.slice(ENCRYPTED_PREFIX.length).split(":");
-  if (!ivPart || !tagPart || !dataPart) return null;
-  try {
-    const decipher = crypto3.createDecipheriv("aes-256-gcm", key, Buffer.from(ivPart, "base64"));
-    decipher.setAuthTag(Buffer.from(tagPart, "base64"));
-    return Buffer.concat([decipher.update(Buffer.from(dataPart, "base64")), decipher.final()]).toString("utf8");
-  } catch {
-    getLogger5().error("[2fa] TOTP secret decryption failed (wrong TOTP_ENCRYPTION_KEY?).");
+  const [ivPart, tagPart, dataPart] = stored.slice(LEGACY_ENCRYPTED_PREFIX.length).split(":");
+  if (!ivPart || !tagPart || !dataPart || ring.all.length === 0) {
+    getLogger5().error("[2fa] found a legacy encrypted TOTP secret but no matching primary/legacy key is configured.");
     return null;
   }
+  for (const entry of ring.all) {
+    const secret = decryptWithKey(entry.key, ivPart, tagPart, dataPart);
+    if (secret) return { secret, needsReencrypt: ring.primary !== null };
+  }
+  getLogger5().error("[2fa] legacy TOTP secret decryption failed with every configured key.");
+  return null;
 };
+var decryptTotpSecret = (stored) => decryptTotpSecretWithMetadata(stored)?.secret ?? null;
 var challengeKey = (token) => formatKey5("-2fa-challenge", sha256(token));
 var challengeAttemptsKey = (token) => formatKey5("-2fa-challenge-attempts", sha256(token));
 var usedTimestepKey = (userId, timestep) => formatKey5("-2fa-usedstep", `${userId}:${String(timestep)}`);
 var accountFailureKey = (userId) => formatKey5("-2fa-accountfail", userId);
 var RECOVERY_LEASE_MS = 5e3;
 var recoveryLeaseName = (userId) => `2fa-recovery:${userId}`;
+var ENROLLMENT_LEASE_MS = 3e4;
+var enrollmentLeaseName = (userId) => `2fa-enrollment:${userId}`;
 var pendingSecretKey = (userId) => formatKey5("-2fa-pending", userId);
 var ACCOUNT_FAIL_LIMIT = 10;
 var ACCOUNT_FAIL_WINDOW_SECONDS = 15 * 60;
@@ -1476,13 +1581,23 @@ var burnChallenge = async (token) => {
 var verifyTotpForUser = async (user, code, enforceSingleUse) => {
   if (!user.totpSecret) return false;
   if (!/^\d{6}$/.test(code.trim())) return false;
-  const secret = decryptTotpSecret(user.totpSecret);
-  if (!secret) return false;
-  const result = verifyTotp({ secret, code });
+  const decrypted = decryptTotpSecretWithMetadata(user.totpSecret);
+  if (!decrypted) return false;
+  const result = verifyTotp({ secret: decrypted.secret, code });
   if (!result.valid || result.timestep === null) return false;
-  if (!enforceSingleUse) return true;
-  const claimed = await redis4.set(usedTimestepKey(user.id, result.timestep), "1", "EX", 60 * 2, "NX");
-  return claimed !== null;
+  if (enforceSingleUse) {
+    const claimed = await redis4.set(usedTimestepKey(user.id, result.timestep), "1", "EX", 60 * 2, "NX");
+    if (claimed === null) return false;
+  }
+  if (decrypted.needsReencrypt) {
+    const [migrationError] = await tryCatch3(() => getUserAdapter().update(user.id, {
+      totpSecret: encryptTotpSecret(decrypted.secret)
+    }));
+    if (migrationError) {
+      getLogger5().error("[2fa] TOTP encryption-key lazy migration failed; verification succeeded but the existing ciphertext was kept.", migrationError);
+    }
+  }
+  return true;
 };
 var matchRecoveryHash = (hashes, code) => {
   const submitted = Buffer.from(sha256(code.trim().toLowerCase()));
@@ -1629,24 +1744,30 @@ var generateRecoveryCodes = () => {
 var confirmTotpEnrollment = async (user, code) => {
   const blocked = enrollmentBlockedReason(user);
   if (blocked) return { ok: false, reason: blocked };
-  const pendingStored = await redis4.get(pendingSecretKey(user.id));
-  if (!pendingStored) return { ok: false, reason: "login.twoFactorEnrollmentExpired" };
-  const secret = decryptTotpSecret(pendingStored);
-  if (!secret) return { ok: false, reason: "login.twoFactorEnrollmentExpired" };
-  const result = verifyTotp({ secret, code });
-  if (!result.valid) return { ok: false, reason: "login.twoFactorInvalidCode" };
-  const { raw, hashes } = generateRecoveryCodes();
-  const [updateError] = await tryCatch3(() => getUserAdapter().update(user.id, {
-    totpSecret: encryptTotpSecret(secret),
-    twoFactorEnabled: true,
-    recoveryCodes: hashes
-  }));
-  if (updateError) {
-    getLogger5().error("[2fa] enrollment persist failed \u2014 is your UserAdapter/schema missing the 2FA fields? (twoFactorEnabled, totpSecret, recoveryCodes)", updateError);
-    return { ok: false, reason: "login.twoFactorPersistFailed" };
+  const leaseToken = await acquireLease(enrollmentLeaseName(user.id), ENROLLMENT_LEASE_MS);
+  if (!leaseToken) return { ok: false, reason: "login.twoFactorEnrollmentExpired" };
+  try {
+    const pendingStored = await redis4.get(pendingSecretKey(user.id));
+    if (!pendingStored) return { ok: false, reason: "login.twoFactorEnrollmentExpired" };
+    const secret = decryptTotpSecret(pendingStored);
+    if (!secret) return { ok: false, reason: "login.twoFactorEnrollmentExpired" };
+    const result = verifyTotp({ secret, code });
+    if (!result.valid) return { ok: false, reason: "login.twoFactorInvalidCode" };
+    const { raw, hashes } = generateRecoveryCodes();
+    const [updateError] = await tryCatch3(() => getUserAdapter().update(user.id, {
+      totpSecret: encryptTotpSecret(secret),
+      twoFactorEnabled: true,
+      recoveryCodes: hashes
+    }));
+    if (updateError) {
+      getLogger5().error("[2fa] enrollment persist failed \u2014 is your UserAdapter/schema missing the 2FA fields? (twoFactorEnabled, totpSecret, recoveryCodes)", updateError);
+      return { ok: false, reason: "login.twoFactorPersistFailed" };
+    }
+    await redis4.del(pendingSecretKey(user.id));
+    return { ok: true, recoveryCodes: raw };
+  } finally {
+    await releaseLease(enrollmentLeaseName(user.id), leaseToken);
   }
-  await redis4.del(pendingSecretKey(user.id));
-  return { ok: true, recoveryCodes: raw };
 };
 var disableTwoFactor = async (user, code) => {
   const viaTotp = await verifyTotpForUser(user, code, false);