@luanpdd/kit-mcp 1.20.0 → 1.21.0

package/kit/skills/crm-lead-pipeline-patterns/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,326 @@
+---
+name: crm-lead-pipeline-patterns
+description: Use ao implementar CRM lead pipeline em B2B SaaS Supabase — 6 stages canônicos lead→qualified→proposal→negotiation→won|lost, trigger PG BEFORE UPDATE valida transições (CHECK constraint não basta), ownership transfer com notification+audit, lead dedup via unique(org_id, phone)+(org_id, email), integração WhatsApp lookup contact_phone.
+---
+
+# CRM Lead Pipeline — Patterns Canônicos
+
+## Quando usar
+
+LLM carrega esta skill ao implementar CRM lead pipeline em B2B multi-tenant. Trigger phrases:
+
+- "CRM lead pipeline", "sales pipeline stages"
+- "lead state machine Postgres", "transition validation"
+- "ownership transfer lead", "lead assignment"
+- "lead dedup phone email"
+- "integração WhatsApp CRM lead"
+
+## Regras absolutas
+
+**REGRA #1 (6 stages canônicos):** Pipeline tem 6 stages: `lead → qualified → proposal → negotiation → won | lost`. Custom stages permitidos via prefix `custom_*` mas estes 6 são obrigatórios.
+
+**REGRA #2 (trigger PG > CHECK constraint):** Validar transições via **trigger BEFORE UPDATE** com `RAISE EXCEPTION`, não apenas CHECK constraint. CHECK valida valor, mas não valida **transição** (lead → won direto = bug, deve passar por qualified+proposal+negotiation).
+
+**REGRA #3 (ownership transfer com audit):** Mudança em `leads.owner_id` SEMPRE dispara: (a) notificação ao novo owner, (b) entry em audit_logs com `previous_owner_id, new_owner_id, reason`. Trigger AFTER UPDATE.
+
+**REGRA #4 (dedup unique constraints):** `unique(org_id, contact_phone)` + `unique(org_id, contact_email)` em `leads`. Insert duplicado falha — app code precisa fazer lookup ANTES.
+
+**REGRA #5 (lookup ANTES de criar via WhatsApp):** Webhook handler WhatsApp inbound: `SELECT id FROM leads WHERE org_id=$1 AND contact_phone=$2`. Se existe, append message à conversa do lead. Se não existe, criar lead novo com `source='whatsapp_inbound'`.
+
+## Patterns canônicos
+
+### Tabela `leads`
+
+```sql
+create table public.leads (
+  id uuid primary key default gen_random_uuid(),
+  org_id uuid not null references public.organizations(id) on delete cascade,
+  dept_id uuid references public.departments(id) on delete set null,
+
+  -- Contato
+  contact_name text not null,
+  contact_email text,
+  contact_phone text,
+  contact_company text,
+
+  -- Pipeline
+  stage text not null default 'lead'
+    check (stage in ('lead', 'qualified', 'proposal', 'negotiation', 'won', 'lost')
+           or stage like 'custom\_%'),
+  source text,  -- 'whatsapp_inbound', 'website_form', 'manual', etc.
+
+  -- Ownership
+  owner_id uuid references auth.users(id) on delete set null,
+
+  -- Dados financeiros
+  expected_value numeric(12, 2),
+  expected_close_date date,
+  closed_at timestamptz,
+  closed_reason text,
+
+  -- Metadata
+  metadata jsonb not null default '{}'::jsonb,
+  created_at timestamptz not null default now(),
+  updated_at timestamptz not null default now(),
+
+  -- REGRA #4: dedup
+  unique (org_id, contact_phone),
+  unique (org_id, contact_email)
+);
+
+create index leads_org_stage_idx on public.leads (org_id, stage);
+create index leads_org_owner_idx on public.leads (org_id, owner_id) where owner_id is not null;
+create index leads_org_dept_idx on public.leads (org_id, dept_id) where dept_id is not null;
+
+-- RLS: aplicar pattern multi-tenant-rls-hierarchy
+alter table public.leads enable row level security;
+
+create policy "leads_select_member" on public.leads
+  for select to authenticated
+  using (private.is_member_of(org_id));
+
+create policy "leads_insert_with_permission" on public.leads
+  for insert to authenticated
+  with check (private.has_permission('create', 'leads', org_id));
+
+create policy "leads_update_with_permission_or_owner" on public.leads
+  for update to authenticated
+  using (
+    private.has_permission('update', 'leads', org_id)
+    or owner_id = (select auth.uid())
+  )
+  with check (
+    private.has_permission('update', 'leads', org_id)
+    or owner_id = (select auth.uid())
+  );
+
+create policy "leads_delete_admin" on public.leads
+  for delete to authenticated
+  using (private.has_role(org_id, 'admin') or private.has_role(org_id, 'owner'));
+
+create policy "leads_super_admin_bypass" on public.leads
+  as permissive for all to authenticated
+  using (private.is_super_admin())
+  with check (private.is_super_admin());
+```
+
+### Trigger validação de transição (REGRA #2)
+
+```sql
+-- Tabela de transições permitidas (data-driven)
+create table public.lead_stage_transitions (
+  from_stage text not null,
+  to_stage text not null,
+  primary key (from_stage, to_stage)
+);
+
+-- Insert transições canônicas
+insert into public.lead_stage_transitions (from_stage, to_stage) values
+  ('lead', 'qualified'),
+  ('lead', 'lost'),
+  ('qualified', 'proposal'),
+  ('qualified', 'lost'),
+  ('proposal', 'negotiation'),
+  ('proposal', 'lost'),
+  ('negotiation', 'won'),
+  ('negotiation', 'lost'),
+  ('negotiation', 'proposal'),  -- back-step permitido
+  ('won', 'closed'),
+  ('lost', 'lead'),  -- reativar lost
+  -- self-transition (no-op) sempre permitida
+  ('lead', 'lead'), ('qualified', 'qualified'), ('proposal', 'proposal'),
+  ('negotiation', 'negotiation'), ('won', 'won'), ('lost', 'lost')
+on conflict do nothing;
+
+-- Trigger BEFORE UPDATE valida transição
+create or replace function private.validate_lead_stage_transition()
+returns trigger
+language plpgsql
+security invoker
+set search_path = ''
+as $$
+begin
+  if new.stage = old.stage then
+    return new;  -- no-op
+  end if;
+
+  -- Custom stages: aceitar qualquer transição (admin responsibility)
+  if new.stage like 'custom\_%' or old.stage like 'custom\_%' then
+    return new;
+  end if;
+
+  -- Validar transição na tabela
+  if not exists (
+    select 1 from public.lead_stage_transitions
+    where from_stage = old.stage and to_stage = new.stage
+  ) then
+    raise exception 'invalid_lead_transition: % → % not allowed', old.stage, new.stage;
+  end if;
+
+  -- Auto-popular closed_at em won/lost
+  if new.stage in ('won', 'lost') and new.closed_at is null then
+    new.closed_at := now();
+  end if;
+
+  return new;
+end;
+$$;
+
+create trigger validate_lead_stage_transition_trigger
+  before update of stage on public.leads
+  for each row execute function private.validate_lead_stage_transition();
+```
+
+### Trigger ownership transfer (REGRA #3)
+
+```sql
+create or replace function private.audit_lead_ownership_change()
+returns trigger
+language plpgsql
+security definer  -- precisa escrever em audit_logs mesmo sem permission do user
+set search_path = ''
+as $$
+begin
+  if old.owner_id is distinct from new.owner_id then
+    -- Audit log
+    perform private.audit_log(
+      'custom_lead_ownership_transfer',
+      new.org_id,
+      new.id, 'lead', null,
+      jsonb_build_object(
+        'previous_owner_id', old.owner_id,
+        'new_owner_id', new.owner_id,
+        'lead_stage', new.stage,
+        'lead_value', new.expected_value
+      )
+    );
+
+    -- TODO: notificar novo owner (delegar para Edge Function de notification)
+    -- perform net.http_post('<edge_fn_url>', ...);
+  end if;
+  return new;
+end;
+$$;
+
+create trigger audit_lead_ownership_change_trigger
+  after update of owner_id on public.leads
+  for each row execute function private.audit_lead_ownership_change();
+```
+
+### Lookup contact → lead (integração WhatsApp — REGRA #5)
+
+```typescript
+// supabase/functions/whatsapp-webhook/index.ts (cross-ref Phase 112)
+import { createClient } from 'jsr:@supabase/supabase-js@2'
+
+async function handleInboundWhatsApp(orgId: string, contactPhone: string, contactName: string, content: string) {
+  const admin = createClient(
+    Deno.env.get('SUPABASE_URL')!,
+    Deno.env.get('SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY')!
+  )
+
+  // REGRA #5: lookup ANTES de criar
+  const { data: existingLead } = await admin
+    .from('leads')
+    .select('id, owner_id, stage')
+    .eq('org_id', orgId)
+    .eq('contact_phone', contactPhone)
+    .maybeSingle()
+
+  if (existingLead) {
+    // Append message à conversa existente do lead (não criar novo)
+    return existingLead
+  }
+
+  // Criar lead novo
+  const { data: newLead } = await admin
+    .from('leads')
+    .insert({
+      org_id: orgId,
+      contact_phone: contactPhone,
+      contact_name: contactName,
+      source: 'whatsapp_inbound',
+      stage: 'lead',
+      metadata: { first_message: content, channel: 'whatsapp' }
+    })
+    .select()
+    .single()
+
+  return newLead
+}
+```
+
+### Frontend kanban — drag&drop entre stages
+
+```typescript
+// LeadsKanban.tsx (sketch para Phase 115)
+async function moveLead(leadId: string, toStage: string) {
+  const { error } = await supabase
+    .from('leads')
+    .update({ stage: toStage })
+    .eq('id', leadId)
+
+  if (error?.message.includes('invalid_lead_transition')) {
+    toast.error('Transição inválida — siga ordem do funil')
+  }
+}
+```
+
+## Anti-patterns
+
+### Anti-pattern 1: Apenas CHECK constraint (sem trigger)
+
+**Errado:**
+```sql
+stage text check (stage in ('lead', 'qualified', 'proposal', 'negotiation', 'won', 'lost'))
+-- Update lead diretamente lead → won (sem passar pelos intermediários)
+```
+
+**Por quê:** CHECK valida valor final, não transição. Lead pula etapas → métricas erradas (conversion rate por stage), forecasting quebrado.
+
+**Certo:** REGRA #2 — trigger BEFORE UPDATE valida `lead_stage_transitions`.
+
+### Anti-pattern 2: Ownership transfer sem notification
+
+**Errado:**
+```sql
+update leads set owner_id = '<new_owner>' where id = '<lead>';
+-- Owner antigo não sabe que perdeu lead, novo não sabe que ganhou
+```
+
+**Por quê:** transferência silenciosa = lead "esquecido", ninguém follow up, SLA perdido.
+
+**Certo:** REGRA #3 — trigger AFTER UPDATE dispara notification (Slack, email, in-app) via Edge Function.
+
+### Anti-pattern 3: Lead duplicate sem dedup
+
+**Errado:**
+```sql
+-- Sem unique constraints
+-- WhatsApp inbound + website form mesmo phone = 2 leads
+```
+
+**Por quê:** vendedor liga 2× mesmo contato, dashboard com count errado, embaraçoso para client.
+
+**Certo:** REGRA #4 — `unique(org_id, contact_phone)` + lookup before insert (REGRA #5).
+
+### Anti-pattern 4: Hard delete lead com pipeline activities órfãs
+
+**Errado:**
+```sql
+delete from public.leads where id = '<lead_id>';
+-- pipeline_activities (FK lead_id) ficam órfãs ou cascade deleta histórico
+```
+
+**Por quê:** atividades históricas perdidas = audit trail compromised + analytics afetada.
+
+**Certo:** soft delete (`status = 'archived'`) ou FK CASCADE com cuidado + audit log antes.
+
+## Ver também
+
+- [b2b-saas-architecture](../b2b-saas-architecture/SKILL.md) — schema base
+- [multi-tenant-rls-hierarchy](../multi-tenant-rls-hierarchy/SKILL.md) — RLS policies
+- [evolution-go-whatsapp-integration](../evolution-go-whatsapp-integration/SKILL.md) — Phase 112, integração inbound
+- [whatsapp-conversation-state-machine](../whatsapp-conversation-state-machine/SKILL.md) — Phase 112, conversa.action_taken → lead
+- [audit-log-multi-tenant](../audit-log-multi-tenant/SKILL.md) — Phase 109, eventos `custom_lead_*`
+- [_shared-multi-tenant/glossary.md](../_shared-multi-tenant/glossary.md) — `lead`, `stages canônicos`, `ownership transfer`, `lead dedup`

package/kit/skills/evolution-go-whatsapp-integration/SKILL.md

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+---
+name: evolution-go-whatsapp-integration
+description: Use ao integrar Evolution Go (whatsmeow) ou Meta Cloud API com Supabase B2B multi-tenant — webhook handler com tenant_id no URL path, HMAC-SHA256 (Meta) ou API key + IP whitelist (Evolution Go), idempotência via unique(org_id, message_id), rate limit Meta 80 msg/s, throttle Evolution Go 1 msg/s.
+---
+
+# Evolution Go + WhatsApp — Integração Multi-Tenant Supabase
+
+## Quando usar
+
+LLM carrega esta skill ao integrar WhatsApp em B2B SaaS multi-tenant. Trigger phrases:
+
+- "Evolution Go integration", "evolution-api whatsmeow"
+- "WhatsApp Cloud API Meta", "WhatsApp Business API"
+- "webhook signature HMAC SHA256"
+- "tenant identification webhook"
+- "whatsapp idempotency message_id"
+- "rate limit Meta 80 msg/s", "Evolution Go throttle"
+
+## Regras absolutas
+
+**REGRA #1 (HMAC validation antes de JSON.parse — Meta):** Meta envia `X-Hub-Signature-256: sha256=<hmac>` header. Validar HMAC sobre **raw body** **ANTES** de parse JSON. Middleware que parseia primeiro = signature inválida (body mutado).
+
+**REGRA #2 (timing-safe comparison):** HMAC validation usa `crypto.timingSafeEqual` (Node) ou `crypto.subtle.timingSafeEqual` (Deno). Comparação `===` direta = timing attack — atacante deduz HMAC byte-a-byte por timing.
+
+**REGRA #3 (tenant identification):** Webhook URL contém `org_id`: `/functions/v1/whatsapp/{org_id}/webhook`. Edge Function valida UUID format ANTES de qualquer processamento. Para Evolution Go, alternativa é `instance_name` no payload → lookup `org_id` em tabela `org_whatsapp_configs`.
+
+**REGRA #4 (idempotência via unique constraint):** Tabela `whatsapp_messages` tem `unique(org_id, message_id)`. INSERT usa `ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING`. Meta entrega at-least-once com retry 7 dias — duplicatas SÃO normais, não excessões.
+
+**REGRA #5 (rate limit Meta — 80 msg/s):** Meta Cloud API: 80 msg/s default por número. Erro 131056 quando exceder, escala para 24h ban se persistir. Throttle server-side via `pgmq` queue ou rate limiter Edge.
+
+**REGRA #6 (throttle Evolution Go — 1 msg/s):** Evolution Go usa whatsmeow (protocolo WhatsApp Web não-oficial). WhatsApp Web bane número se enviar massivamente. Default conservador: 1 msg/s manual no app code (biblioteca não enforce).
+
+**REGRA #7 (HMAC secret per-org):** Cada org tem `hmac_secret` próprio (gerado no setup, armazenado em `org_whatsapp_configs`). Vazamento de secret de uma org não compromete outras.
+
+## Patterns canônicos
+
+### Tabela `org_whatsapp_configs`
+
+```sql
+create table public.org_whatsapp_configs (
+  org_id uuid primary key references public.organizations(id) on delete cascade,
+  provider text not null check (provider in ('meta_cloud', 'evolution_go')),
+  phone_number_id text,                  -- Meta Cloud API phone_number_id
+  evolution_instance_name text,          -- Evolution Go instance name (alternative)
+  hmac_secret text,                       -- per-org webhook HMAC (Meta) — REGRA #7
+  api_key_vault_ref text,                -- Vault secret reference (não armazenar key direto)
+  enabled boolean not null default true,
+  created_at timestamptz not null default now()
+);
+
+alter table public.org_whatsapp_configs enable row level security;
+
+-- RLS: members com permission update:org_settings
+create policy "org_whatsapp_configs_select" on public.org_whatsapp_configs
+  for select to authenticated
+  using (private.is_member_of(org_id));
+
+create policy "org_whatsapp_configs_update" on public.org_whatsapp_configs
+  for update to authenticated
+  using (private.has_permission('update', 'org_settings', org_id))
+  with check (private.has_permission('update', 'org_settings', org_id));
+```
+
+### Tabela `whatsapp_messages` — idempotency built-in
+
+```sql
+create table public.whatsapp_messages (
+  id uuid primary key default gen_random_uuid(),
+  org_id uuid not null references public.organizations(id) on delete cascade,
+  message_id text not null,              -- ID do WhatsApp (provider)
+  direction text not null check (direction in ('inbound', 'outbound')),
+  contact_phone text not null,
+  contact_name text,
+  content text,
+  message_type text check (message_type in ('text', 'image', 'audio', 'document', 'location', 'contact', 'reaction')),
+  payload jsonb,                          -- raw payload do provider
+  status text default 'received' check (status in ('received', 'sent', 'delivered', 'read', 'failed')),
+  conversation_id uuid,                   -- FK para conversations (state machine)
+  received_at timestamptz not null default now(),
+  unique (org_id, message_id)            -- REGRA #4: idempotency
+);
+
+create index whatsapp_messages_org_phone_idx on public.whatsapp_messages (org_id, contact_phone, received_at desc);
+create index whatsapp_messages_conversation_idx on public.whatsapp_messages (conversation_id) where conversation_id is not null;
+
+alter table public.whatsapp_messages enable row level security;
+-- RLS standard multi-tenant (members lê todas, super_admin bypass)
+```
+
+### Webhook handler — Edge Function (Meta Cloud)
+
+```typescript
+// supabase/functions/whatsapp-webhook/index.ts
+import { createClient } from 'jsr:@supabase/supabase-js@2'
+import { encodeHex } from 'jsr:@std/encoding@1/hex'
+
+// REGRA #2: timing-safe comparison nativo Deno
+async function verifyHmac(rawBody: string, signature: string, secret: string): Promise<boolean> {
+  const key = await crypto.subtle.importKey(
+    'raw',
+    new TextEncoder().encode(secret),
+    { name: 'HMAC', hash: 'SHA-256' },
+    false,
+    ['sign']
+  )
+
+  const computedSig = await crypto.subtle.sign('HMAC', key, new TextEncoder().encode(rawBody))
+  const expected = encodeHex(new Uint8Array(computedSig))
+
+  // Timing-safe comparison
+  if (signature.length !== expected.length) return false
+  let result = 0
+  for (let i = 0; i < signature.length; i++) {
+    result |= signature.charCodeAt(i) ^ expected.charCodeAt(i)
+  }
+  return result === 0
+}
+
+Deno.serve(async (req) => {
+  // REGRA #3: extract org_id from URL path
+  const url = new URL(req.url)
+  const pathParts = url.pathname.split('/')
+  const orgId = pathParts[pathParts.length - 2]  // /whatsapp/<org_id>/webhook
+  if (!orgId.match(/^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}$/)) {
+    return new Response('invalid_org_id', { status: 400 })
+  }
+
+  // REGRA #1: read raw body BEFORE parse
+  const rawBody = await req.text()
+
+  // service_role para acessar org_whatsapp_configs (webhook não tem JWT user)
+  const admin = createClient(
+    Deno.env.get('SUPABASE_URL')!,
+    Deno.env.get('SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY')!
+  )
+
+  // Buscar HMAC secret da org
+  const { data: config } = await admin
+    .from('org_whatsapp_configs')
+    .select('hmac_secret, provider, enabled')
+    .eq('org_id', orgId)
+    .single()
+
+  if (!config || !config.enabled) {
+    return new Response('config_not_found_or_disabled', { status: 404 })
+  }
+
+  // Validar HMAC (Meta) — REGRA #1 + #2
+  if (config.provider === 'meta_cloud') {
+    const sigHeader = req.headers.get('x-hub-signature-256') || ''
+    const sig = sigHeader.replace('sha256=', '')
+    if (!await verifyHmac(rawBody, sig, config.hmac_secret)) {
+      return new Response('invalid_signature', { status: 403 })
+    }
+  } else if (config.provider === 'evolution_go') {
+    // Evolution Go usa API key + IP whitelist (HMAC não documentada)
+    const apiKey = req.headers.get('apikey')
+    if (apiKey !== Deno.env.get('EVOLUTION_GO_API_KEY')) {
+      return new Response('invalid_api_key', { status: 403 })
+    }
+    // Optional: validar IP origem em allowlist
+  }
+
+  // Agora parse JSON (signature já validada)
+  const payload = JSON.parse(rawBody)
+
+  // Extrair message do payload (formato varia por provider)
+  const messages = config.provider === 'meta_cloud'
+    ? payload.entry?.[0]?.changes?.[0]?.value?.messages || []
+    : payload.data?.messages || [payload.data]
+
+  // REGRA #4: idempotent insert
+  for (const msg of messages) {
+    const { error } = await admin.from('whatsapp_messages').insert({
+      org_id: orgId,
+      message_id: msg.id,
+      direction: 'inbound',
+      contact_phone: msg.from,
+      contact_name: msg.profile?.name,
+      content: msg.text?.body || null,
+      message_type: msg.type,
+      payload: msg
+    })
+    // ON CONFLICT (org_id, message_id) DO NOTHING — duplicate ignored silently
+    // (Postgres returns 0 rows affected, no error)
+  }
+
+  // Audit log inbound
+  await admin.rpc('audit_log', {
+    p_event_type: 'custom_whatsapp_webhook_received',
+    p_tenant_id: orgId,
+    p_payload: { message_count: messages.length, provider: config.provider }
+  })
+
+  // Meta espera 200 OK rapidamente (timeout 20s — processamento longo deve ser async)
+  return new Response('ok', { status: 200 })
+})
+```
+
+### Send message com rate limit (Meta Cloud)
+
+```typescript
+// supabase/functions/whatsapp-send/index.ts
+// PT-BR: rate limiter via pgmq (queue + worker) para respeitar 80 msg/s Meta
+// REGRA #5
+
+Deno.serve(async (req) => {
+  const auth = req.headers.get('Authorization')
+  // ... validate JWT, extract org_id ...
+
+  const { to, message } = await req.json()
+
+  // Em vez de enviar direto, enfilera em pgmq (rate limit no consumer)
+  await admin.rpc('pgmq_send', {
+    queue_name: `whatsapp_outbound_${orgId.replace(/-/g, '_')}`,
+    msg: { to, message, sent_by: caller.id, timestamp: new Date() }
+  })
+
+  return new Response(JSON.stringify({ queued: true }), { status: 202 })
+})
+
+// Worker separado (cron 1s) consome queue e chama Meta API respeitando 80 msg/s
+// (Edge Function `whatsapp-send-worker` invocada por pg_cron a cada 1s)
+```
+
+### Lookup contact → lead (integração CRM)
+
+```typescript
+// Em handler webhook, após inserir whatsapp_messages, criar/lookup lead
+const { data: existingLead } = await admin
+  .from('leads')
+  .select('id, owner_id')
+  .eq('org_id', orgId)
+  .eq('contact_phone', msg.from)
+  .maybeSingle()
+
+if (!existingLead) {
+  // Auto-create lead (Phase 113)
+  await admin.from('leads').insert({
+    org_id: orgId,
+    contact_phone: msg.from,
+    contact_name: msg.profile?.name,
+    stage: 'lead',
+    source: 'whatsapp_inbound'
+  })
+}
+```
+
+## Anti-patterns
+
+### Anti-pattern 1: HMAC validation depois de JSON.parse
+
+**Errado:**
+```typescript
+const payload = await req.json()  // body já parsed e mutado
+if (!verifyHmac(JSON.stringify(payload), sig, secret)) { ... }  // signature inválida!
+```
+
+**Por quê:** `JSON.stringify(JSON.parse(body))` não retorna bytes idênticos ao original (espaço, ordem keys, números). Hash diferente. Validação sempre falha (ou nunca falha, dependendo do bug).
+
+**Certo:** `req.text()` para raw body, validar HMAC, depois `JSON.parse(rawBody)`.
+
+### Anti-pattern 2: Comparação `===` em HMAC
+
+**Errado:**
+```typescript
+if (computedSig === providedSig) { ... }
+```
+
+**Por quê:** comparação JS faz short-circuit no primeiro byte diferente. Atacante mede tempo de resposta, deduz HMAC byte-a-byte ao longo de horas.
+
+**Certo:** REGRA #2 — `crypto.subtle.timingSafeEqual` ou loop XOR-only.
+
+### Anti-pattern 3: Webhook sem idempotency
+
+**Errado:**
+```typescript
+await admin.from('whatsapp_messages').insert({ ..., message_id: msg.id })
+// Sem ON CONFLICT — segundo retry duplica
+```
+
+**Por quê:** Meta retry behavior at-least-once por 7 dias. Sem dedup, mesma mensagem entra N vezes na DB → CRM com leads duplicadas, contagens erradas, cobrança errada.
+
+**Certo:** REGRA #4 — `unique(org_id, message_id)` + `ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING`.
+
+### Anti-pattern 4: Send direto sem rate limit
+
+**Errado:**
+```typescript
+// Loop enviando 1000 mensagens
+for (const lead of leads) {
+  await fetch('https://graph.facebook.com/.../messages', { body: ... })
+}
+// → 80 msg/s exceeded → erro 131056 → 24h ban do número
+```
+
+**Por quê:** Meta enforce rigoroso. Penalty é severa (24h sem usar o número = perda de cliente real ligando).
+
+**Certo:** REGRA #5 — pgmq queue + worker com rate limit 80 msg/s. Para Evolution Go, REGRA #6 — 1 msg/s manual.
+
+### Anti-pattern 5: HMAC secret compartilhado entre orgs
+
+**Errado:**
+```typescript
+const secret = Deno.env.get('META_HMAC_SECRET')  // global, mesmo para todas orgs
+```
+
+**Por quê:** vazamento via uma org = comprometimento de todas. Compliance multi-tenant exige isolation.
+
+**Certo:** REGRA #7 — `hmac_secret` em `org_whatsapp_configs` per-org. Generate no setup do Meta App per-org.
+
+## Ver também
+
+- [whatsapp-conversation-state-machine](../whatsapp-conversation-state-machine/SKILL.md) — Phase 112 sibling, modelagem de conversas
+- [crm-lead-pipeline-patterns](../crm-lead-pipeline-patterns/SKILL.md) — Phase 113, lookup contact→lead
+- [audit-log-multi-tenant](../audit-log-multi-tenant/SKILL.md) — Phase 109, eventos `custom_whatsapp_*`
+- [supabase-cron-queues](../supabase-cron-queues/SKILL.md) — pgmq queue + worker pattern para rate limit
+- [supabase-edge-fn-writer](../../agents/supabase-edge-fn-writer.md) — agent que escreve Edge Functions
+- [_shared-multi-tenant/glossary.md](../_shared-multi-tenant/glossary.md) — `Evolution Go`, `Meta Cloud API`, `HMAC-SHA256`, `idempotency key`, `rate limit Meta`
+- [Meta Developers — WhatsApp Webhooks](https://developers.facebook.com/docs/whatsapp/cloud-api/guides/set-up-webhooks/)
+- [Meta Developers — Messaging Limits](https://developers.facebook.com/docs/whatsapp/messaging-limits/)
+- [Evolution API Documentation](https://doc.evolution-api.com/v2/en/configuration/webhooks)