@lornatang/dsh-codex-security 0.1.9 → 0.1.11
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +21 -0
- package/README.md +196 -196
- package/README.zh.md +196 -196
- package/docs/ARCHITECTURE.md +59 -59
- package/docs/ARTIFACTS.md +49 -49
- package/docs/CODEX-COMPATIBILITY.md +17 -17
- package/docs/SPEC.md +43 -43
- package/docs/TOOLS.md +364 -364
- package/docs/VALIDATION.md +33 -33
- package/docs/superpowers/plans/2026-11-16-deep-scan.md +71 -71
- package/docs/superpowers/specs/2026-11-16-deep-scan-design.md +31 -31
- package/lib/constants.js +1 -2
- package/lib/contracts.js +12 -2
- package/lib/deep-coordinator.js +23 -12
- package/lib/deep-worker.js +26 -2
- package/lib/git.js +0 -21
- package/lib/index.js +0 -1
- package/lib/routes.js +28 -5
- package/lib/service.js +45 -28
- package/lib/store.js +17 -3
- package/lib/target.js +30 -7
- package/lib/tools.js +4 -12
- package/lib/types/constants.d.ts +1 -2
- package/lib/types/deep-coordinator.d.ts +3 -1
- package/lib/types/deep-worker.d.ts +4 -0
- package/lib/types/git.d.ts +0 -3
- package/lib/types/index.d.ts +1 -2
- package/lib/types/routes.d.ts +0 -2
- package/lib/types/service.d.ts +0 -1
- package/lib/types/util.d.ts +0 -5
- package/lib/util.js +1 -45
- package/package.json +2 -2
- package/references/core-scan.md +1 -1
- package/references/final-report.md +1 -1
- package/references/scan-contract.md +1 -1
- package/schemas/coverage.schema.json +136 -136
- package/skills/README.md +122 -122
- package/skills/assess-patch-risk/SKILL.md +10 -10
- package/skills/attack-path-analysis/SKILL.md +10 -10
- package/skills/deep-security-scan/SKILL.md +15 -15
- package/skills/define-security-policy/SKILL.md +10 -10
- package/skills/finding-discovery/SKILL.md +10 -10
- package/skills/fix-finding/SKILL.md +14 -14
- package/skills/propose-security-hardening/SKILL.md +10 -10
- package/skills/track-findings/SKILL.md +12 -12
- package/skills/validation/SKILL.md +10 -10
- package/skills/verify-fix/SKILL.md +14 -14
- package/schemas/tools/scan-draft.schema.json +0 -766
package/lib/service.js
CHANGED
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@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ import { FINDING_STATUSES, SEVERITIES } from './types.js';
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8
8
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import { ScanStore, defaultStateDir } from './store.js';
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import { readEvidenceLine, resolveTarget } from './target.js';
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import { assertArtifactContract } from './schema.js';
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-
import { canonicalProspectivePath, ensureDir, joinWithin, newId, normalizeLine, nowIso, readFullText, readJson, sanitizeRelative, sha256, truncate, writeFileAtomic, writeJsonAtomic } from './util.js';
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import { canonicalProspectivePath, ensureDir, isWithin, joinWithin, newId, normalizeLine, nowIso, readFullText, readJson, sanitizeRelative, sha256, truncate, writeFileAtomic, writeJsonAtomic } from './util.js';
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import { createExportValidator, writeSecureExport } from './secure-export.js';
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import { acquireStateLock } from './state-lock.js';
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import { WorkerRegistry } from './deep-worker.js';
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@@ -93,18 +93,24 @@ function manifestThreatModel(value) {
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return { format: 'markdown', content: renderThreatModel(value) };
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}
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function validateThreatModel(value) {
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if (
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if (typeof value === 'string') {
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if (value.trim())
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return;
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throw new Error('codex-security: threatModel must be a non-empty string or an object');
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}
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const object = asObject(value);
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if (!object)
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throw new Error('codex-security: threatModel must be a non-empty string or an object');
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if (object['format'] === 'markdown' && (typeof object['content'] !== 'string' || object['content'].trim().length === 0)) {
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throw new Error('codex-security: threatModel markdown content must be a non-empty string');
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}
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}
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export class SecurityService {
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store;
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config;
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ctx;
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scanLocks = new Map();
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managedInvocations = new WeakSet();
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constructor(ctx, options = {}) {
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this.ctx = ctx;
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this.config = { ...DEFAULT_CONFIG, ...(options.config ?? {}) };
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const profile = ctx.get?.('profileContext') ?? (Object.hasOwn(ctx, 'profileContext') ? ctx.profileContext : undefined);
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const patchPath = options.patchPath ?? profile?.patchPath;
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@@ -555,9 +561,16 @@ export class SecurityService {
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const location = finding.locations?.[0];
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if (!location)
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continue;
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-
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let path;
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try {
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path = sanitizeRelative(location.path);
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}
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catch {
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continue;
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}
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const key = path + ':' + location.startLine;
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if (!keys.has(key))
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keys.set(key, { path
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keys.set(key, { path, line: location.startLine });
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if (keys.size >= 500)
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break;
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}
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@@ -965,6 +978,8 @@ export class SecurityService {
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}
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}
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const threatModel = draft.input.threatModel ?? record.threatModel;
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if (threatModel !== undefined)
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validateThreatModel(threatModel);
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const sealedAt = nowIso();
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const findingsDocument = buildFindingsDocument(scanId, findings);
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const sarif = toSarif(record, findings);
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@@ -972,28 +987,20 @@ export class SecurityService {
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validateFindingEvidence(findings);
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assertArtifactContract('findings', findingsDocument);
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assertArtifactContract('coverage', coverage);
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const sealFiles = [
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{ path: 'findings.json', mediaType: 'application/json' },
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{ path: 'coverage.json', mediaType: 'application/json' },
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{ path: 'sarif.json', mediaType: 'application/sarif+json' },
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{ path: 'report.md', mediaType: 'text/markdown' },
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// Build every sealed document in memory and validate the manifest before
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// publishing any file, so a schema failure can never leave sealed artifacts
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// behind on a scan that is still running.
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const sealedFiles = [
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{ path: 'findings.json', mediaType: 'application/json', content: JSON.stringify(findingsDocument, null, 2) + '\n' },
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{ path: 'coverage.json', mediaType: 'application/json', content: JSON.stringify(coverage, null, 2) + '\n' },
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{ path: 'sarif.json', mediaType: 'application/sarif+json', content: JSON.stringify(sarif, null, 2) + '\n' },
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{ path: 'report.md', mediaType: 'text/markdown', content: report },
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];
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if (threatModel !== undefined)
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-
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for (const file of sealFiles) {
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options?.signal?.throwIfAborted();
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const data = await readFile(joinWithin(dir, file.path));
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-
artifacts.push({ path: file.path, sha256: sha256(data), mediaType: file.mediaType });
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if (threatModel !== undefined) {
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const rendered = renderThreatModel(threatModel);
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sealedFiles.push({ path: 'threat-model.md', mediaType: 'text/markdown', content: rendered }, { path: 'threatmodel.md', mediaType: 'text/markdown', content: rendered });
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}
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+
const artifacts = sealedFiles.map((file) => ({ path: file.path, sha256: sha256(file.content), mediaType: file.mediaType }));
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for (const artifact of record.artifacts) {
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options?.signal?.throwIfAborted();
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const data = await readFile(joinWithin(dir, artifact.path));
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@@ -1041,6 +1048,10 @@ export class SecurityService {
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},
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};
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assertArtifactContract('scan-manifest', manifest);
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+
for (const file of sealedFiles) {
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options?.signal?.throwIfAborted();
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await writeFileAtomic(joinWithin(dir, file.path), file.content);
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}
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await writeJsonAtomic(join(dir, 'scan-manifest.json'), manifest);
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const counts = severityCounts(findings);
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options?.signal?.throwIfAborted();
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@@ -1262,6 +1273,12 @@ export class SecurityService {
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const requestedOutput = requested
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1263
1274
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? resolvePath(requested)
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: join(this.store.stateDir, 'exports', scanId + '.' + extension);
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const stateRoot = await canonicalProspectivePath(this.store.stateDir);
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const exportsRoot = await canonicalProspectivePath(join(this.store.stateDir, 'exports'));
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const canonicalOutput = await canonicalProspectivePath(requestedOutput);
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if (isWithin(stateRoot, canonicalOutput) && !isWithin(exportsRoot, canonicalOutput)) {
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throw new Error('codex-security: refusing to export into scan storage outside the exports directory: ' + requestedOutput);
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}
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const allowedRoots = await Promise.all([this.store.stateDir, process.cwd(), record.target.rootPath].map(canonicalProspectivePath));
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const scanRoot = join(this.store.stateDir, 'repositories');
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let requireGit = record.target.kind !== 'directory_snapshot';
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package/lib/store.js
CHANGED
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@@ -5,6 +5,19 @@ import { acquireStateLock } from './state-lock.js';
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5
5
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/** Files owned by the seal step; agents cannot overwrite them through save_artifact. */
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6
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const SEALED_FILES = new Set(['scan.json', 'findings.json', 'coverage.json', 'scan-manifest.json', 'sarif.json', 'report.md', 'threat-model.md', 'threatmodel.md']);
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7
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const INTERNAL_FILES = new Set([...SEALED_FILES, 'candidates.json', 'validations.json', 'attack-paths.json', 'review-items.json', 'triage.json']);
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+
/**
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9
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* Fold an artifact path into the form Win32 uses when resolving it. Windows
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* filesystems are case-insensitive and silently drop trailing dots and spaces,
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+
* so 'SCAN.JSON', 'Scan.json.' and 'checkpoints\scan-draft.json' all address
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* the same file as their lowercase spelling. Compare guard names in this folded
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* form while keeping the original spelling on disk.
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+
*/
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function guardName(relativePath) {
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return relativePath
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.split('/')
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.map((segment) => segment.replace(/[ .]+$/, '').toLowerCase())
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+
.join('/');
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+
}
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8
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export function defaultStateDir(patchPath, configured) {
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9
22
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if (configured.length > 0)
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10
23
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return configured;
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@@ -211,7 +224,8 @@ export class ScanStore {
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211
224
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if (found.record.status !== 'running')
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212
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throw new Error('codex-security: cannot change artifacts after scan is ' + found.record.status);
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const clean = sanitizeRelative(relativePath);
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214
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-
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+
const guarded = guardName(clean);
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+
if (INTERNAL_FILES.has(guarded) || guarded === 'checkpoints' || guarded.startsWith('checkpoints/'))
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throw new Error('codex-security: cannot overwrite internal scan path: ' + clean);
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const target = joinWithin(found.dir, clean);
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const data = Buffer.from(content, 'utf8');
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@@ -249,7 +263,7 @@ export class ScanStore {
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249
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for (const entry of entries) {
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const rel = relBase.length > 0 ? relBase + '/' + entry.name : entry.name;
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265
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if (entry.isDirectory()) {
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252
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-
if (relBase.length === 0 && entry.name === 'checkpoints')
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266
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+
if (relBase.length === 0 && guardName(entry.name) === 'checkpoints')
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253
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|
continue;
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await walk(join(dir, entry.name), rel);
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continue;
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@@ -258,7 +272,7 @@ export class ScanStore {
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continue;
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259
273
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if (/^\.\d+\.(?:\d+\.[a-f0-9]{8}|[a-f0-9]{24})\.tmp$/.test(entry.name))
|
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260
274
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continue;
|
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261
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-
if (relBase.length === 0 && SEALED_FILES.has(entry.name))
|
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275
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+
if (relBase.length === 0 && SEALED_FILES.has(guardName(entry.name)))
|
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262
276
|
continue;
|
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263
277
|
const { stat } = await import('node:fs/promises');
|
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264
278
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const info = await stat(join(dir, entry.name)).catch((error) => {
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package/lib/target.js
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
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1
1
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import { lstat, realpath, stat } from 'node:fs/promises';
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2
2
|
import { basename, dirname, join, relative, resolve, sep } from 'node:path';
|
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3
3
|
import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';
|
|
4
|
-
import { isProbablyBinary, isWithin, languageOf, listFiles, matchesAny, matchesScopePath, normalizeLine,
|
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4
|
+
import { isProbablyBinary, isWithin, joinWithin, languageOf, listFiles, matchesAny, matchesScopePath, normalizeLine, stableTargetId, truncate } from './util.js';
|
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5
5
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import { changedFiles, currentBranch, fileDigest, headRevision, remoteUrl, repoRoot, resolveRevision, statusEntries, trackedFiles } from './git.js';
|
|
6
6
|
const DEFAULT_EXCLUDES = ['.git/**', 'node_modules/**', 'dist/**', 'build/**', 'out/**', 'coverage/**', '.next/**', '.nuxt/**', 'vendor/**', 'target/**', '.venv/**', '__pycache__/**', '*.min.js', '*.min.css', '*.map', '*.lock', 'package-lock.json', 'pnpm-lock.yaml', 'yarn.lock', 'Cargo.lock', 'poetry.lock', 'uv.lock', 'composer.lock', 'go.sum'];
|
|
7
7
|
export async function resolveTarget(options) {
|
|
@@ -179,18 +179,41 @@ export async function resolveDiff(rootPath, options) {
|
|
|
179
179
|
/** Read one source line for anchor derivation without trusting it as instructions. */
|
|
180
180
|
export async function readEvidenceLine(rootPath, path, line, maxBytes) {
|
|
181
181
|
const { open } = await import('node:fs/promises');
|
|
182
|
+
const { constants } = await import('node:fs');
|
|
182
183
|
if (!Number.isFinite(line) || line < 1)
|
|
183
184
|
return undefined;
|
|
185
|
+
if (typeof path !== 'string' || path.length === 0)
|
|
186
|
+
return undefined;
|
|
187
|
+
let absolute;
|
|
188
|
+
try {
|
|
189
|
+
absolute = joinWithin(rootPath, path);
|
|
190
|
+
}
|
|
191
|
+
catch {
|
|
192
|
+
return undefined;
|
|
193
|
+
}
|
|
194
|
+
const realRoot = await realpath(rootPath).catch(() => undefined);
|
|
195
|
+
if (!realRoot)
|
|
196
|
+
return undefined;
|
|
184
197
|
let handle;
|
|
185
198
|
try {
|
|
186
|
-
const
|
|
187
|
-
if (!
|
|
199
|
+
const before = await lstat(absolute).catch(() => undefined);
|
|
200
|
+
if (!before || !before.isFile())
|
|
201
|
+
return undefined;
|
|
202
|
+
const flags = constants.O_RDONLY | (constants.O_NOFOLLOW ?? 0) | (constants.O_NONBLOCK ?? 0);
|
|
203
|
+
handle = await open(absolute, flags);
|
|
204
|
+
const opened = await handle.stat();
|
|
205
|
+
if (!opened.isFile() || opened.dev !== before.dev || opened.ino !== before.ino || opened.size !== before.size)
|
|
206
|
+
return undefined;
|
|
207
|
+
// Parent directories are not covered by O_NOFOLLOW, so a symlinked parent
|
|
208
|
+
// could still redirect the read outside the target. Resolve the opened
|
|
209
|
+
// path and require it to stay inside the real target root and to still
|
|
210
|
+
// name the inode we actually opened.
|
|
211
|
+
const canonical = await realpath(absolute).catch(() => undefined);
|
|
212
|
+
if (!canonical || !isWithin(realRoot, canonical))
|
|
188
213
|
return undefined;
|
|
189
|
-
const
|
|
190
|
-
|
|
191
|
-
if (real && !isWithin(realRoot, real))
|
|
214
|
+
const current = await lstat(canonical).catch(() => undefined);
|
|
215
|
+
if (!current || !current.isFile() || current.dev !== opened.dev || current.ino !== opened.ino || current.size !== opened.size)
|
|
192
216
|
return undefined;
|
|
193
|
-
handle = await open(absolute, 'r');
|
|
194
217
|
const buffer = Buffer.alloc(Math.min(maxBytes, 256 * 1024));
|
|
195
218
|
const { bytesRead } = await handle.read(buffer, 0, buffer.length, 0);
|
|
196
219
|
const text = buffer.subarray(0, bytesRead).toString('utf8');
|
package/lib/tools.js
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
import { compileToolArguments } from './schema.js';
|
|
2
|
-
import { readDeepStatus } from './deep-coordinator.js';
|
|
2
|
+
import { hasDeepJournal, readDeepStatus } from './deep-coordinator.js';
|
|
3
3
|
const OUTPUT_SCHEMA = { type: 'object', additionalProperties: true };
|
|
4
4
|
const STRING = { type: 'string' };
|
|
5
5
|
const STRING_ARRAY = { type: 'array', items: { type: 'string' } };
|
|
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ export function createSecurityTools(service, getCoordinator = () => undefined) {
|
|
|
84
84
|
}, ['scanId'], (args, exec) => coordinator().resume(args, exec), 60000),
|
|
85
85
|
tool('codex_security_get_deep_scan_status', 'Read durable Deep orchestration status and budget usage without exposing the recovery claim.', {
|
|
86
86
|
scanId: SCAN_ID,
|
|
87
|
-
}, ['scanId'], (args) => readDeepStatus(service, String(args['scanId'])), 60000),
|
|
87
|
+
}, ['scanId'], (args, exec) => readDeepStatus(service, String(args['scanId']), exec), 60000),
|
|
88
88
|
tool('codex_security_get_scan_context', 'Read the current state of a scan: record, progress, draft presence, candidate/validation/attack-path counts, review items and saved artifacts. Call this when resuming work or after a context loss.', { scanId: SCAN_ID }, ['scanId'], (args) => service.getScanContext(args), 60000),
|
|
89
89
|
tool('codex_security_update_scan_context', 'Append notes or store a threat model. The bound include/exclude scope cannot be changed.', {
|
|
90
90
|
scanId: SCAN_ID, notes: STRING, threatModel: JSON_OBJECT, includePaths: INCLUDE_PATHS, excludePaths: EXCLUDE_PATHS,
|
|
@@ -136,16 +136,8 @@ export function createSecurityTools(service, getCoordinator = () => undefined) {
|
|
|
136
136
|
}, ['scanId'], async (args, exec) => {
|
|
137
137
|
const record = await service.store.get(String(args['scanId']));
|
|
138
138
|
let managed = record?.record.managedParent === args['scanId'];
|
|
139
|
-
if (!record)
|
|
140
|
-
|
|
141
|
-
await readDeepStatus(service, String(args['scanId']));
|
|
142
|
-
managed = true;
|
|
143
|
-
}
|
|
144
|
-
catch (error) {
|
|
145
|
-
if (!(error instanceof Error) || !error.message.includes('Deep scan journal not found'))
|
|
146
|
-
throw error;
|
|
147
|
-
}
|
|
148
|
-
}
|
|
139
|
+
if (!record && await hasDeepJournal(service, String(args['scanId'])))
|
|
140
|
+
managed = true;
|
|
149
141
|
return managed ? coordinator().cancel(args, exec) : service.cancelScan(args);
|
|
150
142
|
}, 60000),
|
|
151
143
|
tool('codex_security_list_scans', 'List saved scans with status, mode, target, finding counts and severity counts. Filter by status/mode/target substring. Use it to find previous scans for comparison or triage.', {
|
package/lib/types/constants.d.ts
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,11 +1,10 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
export declare const PACKAGE_NAME = "@lornatang/dsh-codex-security";
|
|
2
2
|
export declare const PLUGIN_NAME = "codex-security";
|
|
3
|
-
export declare const VERSION = "0.1.
|
|
3
|
+
export declare const VERSION = "0.1.11";
|
|
4
4
|
export declare const ROUTE_PREFIX = "/plugins/codex-security";
|
|
5
5
|
export declare const PRODUCER: {
|
|
6
6
|
name: string;
|
|
7
7
|
version: string;
|
|
8
8
|
};
|
|
9
|
-
export declare const DEFAULT_EXCLUDES: string[];
|
|
10
9
|
export declare const SKILL_NAMES: string[];
|
|
11
10
|
export declare const TOOL_NAMES: string[];
|
|
@@ -26,7 +26,9 @@ export interface DeepHost {
|
|
|
26
26
|
}): Promise<DeepActivation>;
|
|
27
27
|
}
|
|
28
28
|
/** Public status omits the recovery-claim digest, source snapshots and worker output. */
|
|
29
|
-
export declare function readDeepStatus(service: SecurityService, scanId: string): Promise<Json>;
|
|
29
|
+
export declare function readDeepStatus(service: SecurityService, scanId: string, actor: DeepActor): Promise<Json>;
|
|
30
|
+
/** Whether a Deep journal exists for a scan id, without disclosing its contents. */
|
|
31
|
+
export declare function hasDeepJournal(service: SecurityService, scanId: string): Promise<boolean>;
|
|
30
32
|
/** Owns a Deep campaign until it seals or is interrupted. State lives on disk, not in this instance. */
|
|
31
33
|
export declare class DeepCoordinator {
|
|
32
34
|
private readonly service;
|
|
@@ -44,6 +44,10 @@ export declare class WorkerRegistry {
|
|
|
44
44
|
acceptFinalStep(childId: string, position: StepPosition): void;
|
|
45
45
|
read(childId: string, path: string): Promise<string>;
|
|
46
46
|
private readText;
|
|
47
|
+
/** Reuse the bytes verified by the preceding read; fall back to a fresh verified read. */
|
|
48
|
+
private cachedText;
|
|
49
|
+
/** Cache the verified text so chunk acceptance does not re-read whole files. */
|
|
50
|
+
private cacheText;
|
|
47
51
|
readChunk(childId: string, path: string, offset: number): Promise<{
|
|
48
52
|
path: string;
|
|
49
53
|
content: string;
|
package/lib/types/git.d.ts
CHANGED
|
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ export interface GitResult {
|
|
|
5
5
|
}
|
|
6
6
|
export declare function git(root: string, args: string[], timeoutMs?: number, signal?: AbortSignal): Promise<GitResult>;
|
|
7
7
|
export declare function gitString(root: string, args: string[], timeoutMs?: number, signal?: AbortSignal): Promise<string | undefined>;
|
|
8
|
-
export declare function isGitRepo(root: string): Promise<boolean>;
|
|
9
8
|
export declare function repoRoot(path: string, signal?: AbortSignal): Promise<string | undefined>;
|
|
10
9
|
export declare function headRevision(root: string, signal?: AbortSignal): Promise<string | undefined>;
|
|
11
10
|
export declare function currentBranch(root: string, signal?: AbortSignal): Promise<string | undefined>;
|
|
@@ -27,6 +26,4 @@ export declare function changedFiles(root: string, options: {
|
|
|
27
26
|
staged?: boolean;
|
|
28
27
|
workingTree?: boolean;
|
|
29
28
|
}): Promise<ChangedFile[]>;
|
|
30
|
-
/** Digest of the working tree diff including untracked files, used for snapshot identity. */
|
|
31
|
-
export declare function worktreeDigest(root: string): Promise<string>;
|
|
32
29
|
export declare function fileDigest(path: string, signal?: AbortSignal): Promise<string | undefined>;
|
package/lib/types/index.d.ts
CHANGED
|
@@ -6,8 +6,7 @@ import type { PluginContext } from './types.js';
|
|
|
6
6
|
export declare const name = "codex-security";
|
|
7
7
|
export declare const inject: string[];
|
|
8
8
|
export { Config };
|
|
9
|
-
export declare const version = "0.1.
|
|
10
|
-
export declare const packageName = "@lornatang/dsh-codex-security";
|
|
9
|
+
export declare const version = "0.1.11";
|
|
11
10
|
export { SecurityService };
|
|
12
11
|
export type { ConfigType };
|
|
13
12
|
export declare function loadBundledSkills(packageRoot: string): SkillRegistration[];
|
package/lib/types/routes.d.ts
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,7 +1,5 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
import type { IncomingMessage, ServerResponse } from 'node:http';
|
|
2
2
|
import type { SecurityService } from './service.js';
|
|
3
3
|
import type { PluginContext } from './types.js';
|
|
4
|
-
declare function scanIdFromPath(pathname: string): string | undefined;
|
|
5
4
|
export declare function handleRequest(service: SecurityService, req: IncomingMessage, res: ServerResponse): Promise<void>;
|
|
6
5
|
export declare function bindRoutes(ctx: PluginContext, service: SecurityService): () => void;
|
|
7
|
-
export { scanIdFromPath };
|
package/lib/types/service.d.ts
CHANGED
|
@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ export interface SecurityServiceOptions {
|
|
|
12
12
|
export declare class SecurityService {
|
|
13
13
|
readonly store: ScanStore;
|
|
14
14
|
readonly config: Config;
|
|
15
|
-
private readonly ctx;
|
|
16
15
|
private readonly scanLocks;
|
|
17
16
|
private readonly managedInvocations;
|
|
18
17
|
constructor(ctx: PluginContext, options?: SecurityServiceOptions);
|
package/lib/types/util.d.ts
CHANGED
|
@@ -3,18 +3,14 @@ export declare function sha256(value: string | Uint8Array): string;
|
|
|
3
3
|
export declare function stableTargetId(rootPath: string): string;
|
|
4
4
|
export declare function nowIso(): string;
|
|
5
5
|
export declare function newId(prefix: string, hexChars?: number): string;
|
|
6
|
-
export declare function shortId(value: string, length?: number): string;
|
|
7
6
|
export declare function ensureDir(path: string): Promise<void>;
|
|
8
7
|
export declare function writeFileAtomic(path: string, data: string | Uint8Array): Promise<void>;
|
|
9
|
-
/** Publish a complete file without ever replacing an existing destination. */
|
|
10
|
-
export declare function writeFileExclusive(path: string, data: string | Uint8Array): Promise<void>;
|
|
11
8
|
/** Resolve symlinked ancestors even when the final path does not yet exist. */
|
|
12
9
|
export declare function canonicalProspectivePath(path: string): Promise<string>;
|
|
13
10
|
export declare function writeJsonAtomic(path: string, value: unknown): Promise<void>;
|
|
14
11
|
export declare function readJson<T>(path: string): Promise<T | undefined>;
|
|
15
12
|
export declare function readText(path: string, limit?: number): Promise<string | undefined>;
|
|
16
13
|
export declare function readFullText(path: string): Promise<string | undefined>;
|
|
17
|
-
export declare function posixRelative(root: string, path: string): string;
|
|
18
14
|
/** Reject absolute paths, drive letters and .. segments; return a normalized posix relative path. */
|
|
19
15
|
export declare function sanitizeRelative(input: string): string;
|
|
20
16
|
export declare function isWithin(parent: string, child: string): boolean;
|
|
@@ -29,7 +25,6 @@ export declare function languageOf(path: string): string;
|
|
|
29
25
|
export declare function slugify(value: string, max?: number): string;
|
|
30
26
|
export declare function compareSeverity(a: string, b: string): number;
|
|
31
27
|
export declare function truncate(value: string, max: number): string;
|
|
32
|
-
export declare function formatBytes(value: number): string;
|
|
33
28
|
export declare function listFiles(root: string, options: {
|
|
34
29
|
maxFiles: number;
|
|
35
30
|
exclude: string[];
|
package/lib/util.js
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
import { createHash, randomBytes } from 'node:crypto';
|
|
2
|
-
import {
|
|
2
|
+
import { mkdir, open, readFile, readdir, realpath, rename, rm } from 'node:fs/promises';
|
|
3
3
|
import { basename, dirname, isAbsolute, join, normalize, relative, resolve, sep } from 'node:path';
|
|
4
4
|
import { setTimeout as delay } from 'node:timers/promises';
|
|
5
5
|
export function sha256(value) {
|
|
@@ -15,9 +15,6 @@ export function nowIso() {
|
|
|
15
15
|
export function newId(prefix, hexChars = 24) {
|
|
16
16
|
return prefix + randomBytes(Math.ceil(hexChars / 2)).toString('hex').slice(0, hexChars);
|
|
17
17
|
}
|
|
18
|
-
export function shortId(value, length = 8) {
|
|
19
|
-
return value.slice(0, length);
|
|
20
|
-
}
|
|
21
18
|
export async function ensureDir(path) {
|
|
22
19
|
await mkdir(path, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
|
|
23
20
|
}
|
|
@@ -53,37 +50,6 @@ export async function writeFileAtomic(path, data) {
|
|
|
53
50
|
throw error;
|
|
54
51
|
}
|
|
55
52
|
}
|
|
56
|
-
/** Publish a complete file without ever replacing an existing destination. */
|
|
57
|
-
export async function writeFileExclusive(path, data) {
|
|
58
|
-
const tmp = join(dirname(path), '.' + process.pid + '.' + randomBytes(12).toString('hex') + '.tmp');
|
|
59
|
-
const handle = await open(tmp, 'wx', 0o600);
|
|
60
|
-
try {
|
|
61
|
-
try {
|
|
62
|
-
await handle.writeFile(data);
|
|
63
|
-
}
|
|
64
|
-
finally {
|
|
65
|
-
await handle.close();
|
|
66
|
-
}
|
|
67
|
-
try {
|
|
68
|
-
await link(tmp, path);
|
|
69
|
-
}
|
|
70
|
-
catch (error) {
|
|
71
|
-
// Some writable filesystems do not support hard links.
|
|
72
|
-
if (!['EPERM', 'ENOTSUP', 'EOPNOTSUPP', 'ENOSYS'].includes(error.code ?? ''))
|
|
73
|
-
throw error;
|
|
74
|
-
const destination = await open(path, 'wx', 0o600);
|
|
75
|
-
try {
|
|
76
|
-
await destination.writeFile(data);
|
|
77
|
-
}
|
|
78
|
-
finally {
|
|
79
|
-
await destination.close();
|
|
80
|
-
}
|
|
81
|
-
}
|
|
82
|
-
}
|
|
83
|
-
finally {
|
|
84
|
-
await rm(tmp, { force: true });
|
|
85
|
-
}
|
|
86
|
-
}
|
|
87
53
|
/** Resolve symlinked ancestors even when the final path does not yet exist. */
|
|
88
54
|
export async function canonicalProspectivePath(path) {
|
|
89
55
|
let current = resolve(path);
|
|
@@ -146,9 +112,6 @@ export async function readFullText(path) {
|
|
|
146
112
|
throw error;
|
|
147
113
|
}
|
|
148
114
|
}
|
|
149
|
-
export function posixRelative(root, path) {
|
|
150
|
-
return relative(root, path).split(sep).join('/');
|
|
151
|
-
}
|
|
152
115
|
/** Reject absolute paths, drive letters and .. segments; return a normalized posix relative path. */
|
|
153
116
|
export function sanitizeRelative(input) {
|
|
154
117
|
if (typeof input !== 'string' || input.length === 0)
|
|
@@ -373,13 +336,6 @@ export function compareSeverity(a, b) {
|
|
|
373
336
|
export function truncate(value, max) {
|
|
374
337
|
return value.length <= max ? value : value.slice(0, Math.max(0, max - 1)) + '\u2026';
|
|
375
338
|
}
|
|
376
|
-
export function formatBytes(value) {
|
|
377
|
-
if (value < 1024)
|
|
378
|
-
return value + ' B';
|
|
379
|
-
if (value < 1024 * 1024)
|
|
380
|
-
return (value / 1024).toFixed(1) + ' KB';
|
|
381
|
-
return (value / (1024 * 1024)).toFixed(1) + ' MB';
|
|
382
|
-
}
|
|
383
339
|
export async function listFiles(root, options) {
|
|
384
340
|
const files = [];
|
|
385
341
|
const excluded = [];
|
package/package.json
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
{
|
|
2
2
|
"name": "@lornatang/dsh-codex-security",
|
|
3
|
-
"version": "0.1.
|
|
3
|
+
"version": "0.1.11",
|
|
4
4
|
"description": "Agent-native security review workbench for DeepSeek Harness, modeled on OpenAI codex-security: sealed scans, findings contract, deep-scan orchestration and SARIF/JSON export.",
|
|
5
5
|
"type": "module",
|
|
6
6
|
"license": "Apache-2.0",
|
|
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@
|
|
|
91
91
|
"@deepseek-ai/dsh-subagent-spawn-in-process": "0.2.2-rc.2",
|
|
92
92
|
"@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-executor-native": "0.2.2-rc.2",
|
|
93
93
|
"@deepseek-ai/dsh-tools": "0.2.2-rc.2",
|
|
94
|
-
"@types/node": "^
|
|
94
|
+
"@types/node": "^26.6.6",
|
|
95
95
|
"@types/react": "^18.3.31",
|
|
96
96
|
"typescript": "^5.9.0"
|
|
97
97
|
},
|
package/references/core-scan.md
CHANGED
|
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ Include any caller-supplied rendered investigation time allowance unchanged amon
|
|
|
13
13
|
5. Delegate independent packet groups when parallel review is useful, within the caller's worker allowance. Point each worker to its readable copy of [the investigator brief](focused-investigator.md) and send its packets with the same authorized source and security context. For packets you handle in the parent, read the investigator brief and follow its investigation instructions yourself. Choose assignments by complexity and shared code rather than a fixed worker or file count. Supporting code may explain an in-scope finding, but its affected entry point, control, or operation must remain in scope.
|
|
14
14
|
6. Preserve returned candidates and counterevidence through the bound `record_codex_security_scan_draft` tool when available, before combining or validating them. Use `complete: false`, stable `candidateId` values, and `reviewState.deferred` entries with a reason and the original payload under `candidate`. Checkpoint validation decisions: accepted findings retain `provenance.candidateId`; rejections retain the candidate identity, original evidence, and source-backed counterevidence on a `rejected` coverage surface. Record reviewed surfaces, exclusions, and unresolved questions without creating extra receipts or claiming exhaustive coverage. Group observations only when they share the broken control and effective remediation, preserving affected routes, operations, and locations; a shared CWE alone is not a reason to merge.
|
|
15
15
|
7. Follow the caller’s validation handoff if supplied. Otherwise [validate each distinct candidate](validate-scan-findings.md) against the source.
|
|
16
|
-
8. Assemble `scope`, `threatModel`, `findings`, and `reviewState` following `final-report.md
|
|
16
|
+
8. Assemble `scope`, `threatModel`, `findings`, and `reviewState` following `final-report.md`. Follow `finding-detail-fields.md` for rich evidence and narrative fields. Preserve genuine findings, source provenance, supplied assumptions, exclusions, pending work, and uncertainty. Examples under `examples/completed-scan/` illustrate shape, not values to copy.
|
|
17
17
|
|
|
18
18
|
Keep discovery, validation, and attack-path reasoning within this one self-contained audit; do not invoke separate phase skills or add ranking phases, per-file ledgers, separate phase worker pools, or receipt files.
|
|
19
19
|
|
|
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ Completion validates existing artifacts; it does not perform missing phases or c
|
|
|
17
17
|
|
|
18
18
|
## Finding Semantics
|
|
19
19
|
|
|
20
|
-
Use `
|
|
20
|
+
Use `finding-detail-fields.md` for rich fields. Supply:
|
|
21
21
|
|
|
22
22
|
- An evidence-supported lowercase vulnerability-family `ruleId`, `taxonomy.category`, known `taxonomy.cwe` values (or `[]`), and genuine `provenance.source`. Use `local_plugin` only for findings this plugin discovered; preserve worker/source provenance and candidate identity.
|
|
23
23
|
- Verified source locations, including the broken control or sink and materially affected entry points or concrete implementations. Preserve independently vulnerable instances. Group observations only when they share the broken control and remediation, not merely a CWE.
|
|
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ These fields are optional for compatibility with existing v1 canonical artifacts
|
|
|
183
183
|
|
|
184
184
|
## Schemas
|
|
185
185
|
|
|
186
|
-
New completed findings must match the [
|
|
186
|
+
New completed findings must match the [findings schema](../schemas/findings.schema.json). Finalization rejects legacy field aliases, malformed optional details, and invalid semantic slugs instead of repairing them. Historical sealed reports are validated through an in-memory compatibility adapter; their saved bytes remain unchanged. Stopped-scan recovery still salvages saved evidence.
|
|
187
187
|
|
|
188
188
|
- [Scan manifest schema](../schemas/scan-manifest.schema.json)
|
|
189
189
|
- [Findings schema](../schemas/findings.schema.json)
|