@loopops/mcp-server 2.0.1 → 2.0.2

package/dist/api-client.js

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
  *     updater helper, and also keep the latest rotated token in memory
  *     in case Claude Desktop doesn't restart before next use.
  */
-import { homedir } from "node:os";
+import { homedir, platform } from "node:os";
 import { join } from "node:path";
 import { chmodSync, existsSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
 const apiUrl = process.env.API_URL;
@@ -152,11 +152,37 @@ function isRetryable(err) {
         return true;
     return false;
 }
+/**
+ * OS-specific location Claude Desktop reads its config from. We have
+ * to write here in addition to ~/.mcp.json, because Claude Desktop
+ * does NOT read ~/.mcp.json on macOS (it reads Application Support
+ * instead). If we only update ~/.mcp.json + ~/.claude/settings.json,
+ * Claude Desktop falls behind after every rotation and breaks with
+ * "invalid_grant" on its next cold start.
+ */
+function claudeDesktopConfigPath() {
+    const home = homedir();
+    switch (platform()) {
+        case "darwin":
+            return join(home, "Library", "Application Support", "Claude", "claude_desktop_config.json");
+        case "win32": {
+            const appdata = process.env.APPDATA;
+            return appdata
+                ? join(appdata, "Claude", "claude_desktop_config.json")
+                : null;
+        }
+        case "linux":
+            return join(home, ".config", "Claude", "claude_desktop_config.json");
+        default:
+            return null;
+    }
+}
 /**
  * Persist a rotated refresh token across every config location we know
  * users store MCP settings in:
- *   - ~/.mcp.json (Claude Desktop)
+ *   - ~/.mcp.json (CLI canonical, also legacy Claude Desktop path)
  *   - ~/.claude/settings.json (Claude Code)
+ *   - OS-specific Claude Desktop config (macOS/Windows/Linux)
  *
  * We update whichever files have the loop-operations stanza. Missing
  * files are skipped silently. This mirrors @loopops/mcp-cli's
@@ -171,6 +197,9 @@ function persistRotatedRefreshToken(newToken) {
         join(homedir(), ".mcp.json"),
         join(homedir(), ".claude", "settings.json"),
     ];
+    const desktop = claudeDesktopConfigPath();
+    if (desktop)
+        paths.push(desktop);
     for (const path of paths) {
         try {
             if (!existsSync(path))

package/dist/tools/eng.js

@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
 import { execSync } from "node:child_process";
-import { z } from "zod";
-import { trpcMutation, trpcQuery } from "../api-client.js";
+import { trpcQuery } from "../api-client.js";
 import { safeTool } from "./_helpers.js";
 import { rangeSchema } from "./_schemas.js";
 export function registerEngTools(server, allowed) {
@@ -11,25 +10,8 @@ export function registerEngTools(server, allowed) {
                 .describe("Time window. Short ranges (1h, 6h, 24h, 7d) are most useful. Default: 24h."),
         }, safeTool(async ({ range }) => trpcQuery("mcp.systemDiagnostics", { range })));
     }
-    if (allowed.has("revoke_api_key")) {
-        server.tool("revoke_api_key", "Immediately revoke every active MCP API key for a user. The user's loop_sk_* tokens in Claude Desktop stop working on the next tRPC call (401). Use for urgent access cutoff (suspected compromise, termination not yet processed in Okta). Routine offboarding should just deactivate the user in Okta — the 5-min reconciler picks that up.", {
-            email: z
-                .string()
-                .email()
-                .describe("Email of the Loop user to revoke."),
-            reason: z
-                .string()
-                .min(8)
-                .describe("Why you're revoking. Required — recorded in audit_log."),
-        }, safeTool(async ({ email, reason }) => trpcMutation("mcp.revokeApiKey", { email, reason })));
-    }
     if (allowed.has("access_review")) {
-        server.tool("access_review", "Produce a user-access snapshot for SOC/security review. Lists every Loop user with role, status, SF linkage, active/revoked key counts, and last-active date. The review itself is audited — auditors can see who produced it and when. Intended for quarterly access reviews.", {
-            includeRevoked: z
-                .boolean()
-                .optional()
-                .describe("If true, also include users whose API keys have been revoked (for full historical picture). Default: false (active access only)."),
-        }, safeTool(async ({ includeRevoked }) => trpcQuery("mcp.accessReview", { includeRevoked })));
+        server.tool("access_review", "Produce a user-access snapshot for SOC/security review. Lists every active Loop user with role, status, SF linkage, and last-active date. The review itself is audited. Intended for quarterly access reviews. For token-level detail (issued/rotated/revoked), query the Okta system log directly.", {}, safeTool(async () => trpcQuery("mcp.accessReview")));
     }
     if (allowed.has("sync_local")) {
         server.tool("sync_local", "Pull the latest changes from the remote repo into your local working tree. Runs `git pull --ff-only` in the repo at $LOOP_REPO_PATH. Use this after update_config / deploy_config writes commits directly to the remote branch so your local clone catches up.", {}, safeTool(async () => {

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@loopops/mcp-server",
-  "version": "2.0.1",
+  "version": "2.0.2",
   "description": "Loop Operations MCP Server — AI skills for RevOps",
   "license": "UNLICENSED",
   "type": "module",