@loomwork/replay-vm 0.0.0-stage → 0.1.1

package/src/eventHandlers.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,1760 @@
+import type { EventEnvelope } from "@loomwork/core";
+import type { ExecutionFrame, ExecutionState, SuspendWait } from "@loomwork/core";
+
+type Handler = (state: ExecutionState, event: EventEnvelope) => ExecutionState;
+
+// Copy-on-write a single frame into the frames container, with per-fold ownership
+// (mirrors `appendAudit` below). The first step event of a fold pass spreads the
+// caller's input container once — O(S) key refs, untouched frames shared — and marks
+// the result fold-owned; every later step event in the same pass writes in place onto
+// that owned container (O(1)). `foldEvents` resets ownership at the start of each call,
+// and the input state (snapshot / prior state) is never mutated, so copy-on-write —
+// and the async snapshot saves that hold prior states — are preserved. Byte-identical
+// output; per-replay frame allocations drop from O(S²) to O(S). Handlers never mutate a
+// frame in place; they always write a new frame object, so sharing untouched frames is safe.
+//
+// Uses the assignment form (`frames[stepId] = frame`), so reserved keys must be rejected
+// (see assertSafeKey) — unlike a computed-key object literal, `frames["__proto__"] = …`
+// would invoke the prototype setter and corrupt this execution's own fold.
+function setFrame(
+  frames: Record<string, ExecutionFrame>,
+  stepId: string,
+  frame: ExecutionFrame
+): Record<string, ExecutionFrame> {
+  assertSafeKey(stepId);
+  if (foldOwned.has(frames)) {
+    frames[stepId] = frame;
+    return frames;
+  }
+  const next = { ...frames, [stepId]: frame };
+  foldOwned.add(next);
+  return next;
+}
+
+// Defense-in-depth: reject prototype-related keys as fold container keys. They are never
+// valid stepIds/decisionIds, and the assignment form (`frames[key] = …`) would otherwise
+// invoke the prototype setter / shadow `constructor` and corrupt that execution's own fold.
+// (No global pollution is reachable — see the audit — but fail-closed on a reserved key is
+// cheap and clear.)
+const RESERVED_FOLD_KEYS = new Set(["__proto__", "constructor", "prototype"]);
+function assertSafeKey(key: string): void {
+  if (RESERVED_FOLD_KEYS.has(key)) {
+    throw new Error(`fold: reserved key "${key}" is not a valid identifier`);
+  }
+}
+
+// ── O(1)-amortized audit-list append (per-fold ownership) ────────────────────
+//
+// The audit handlers below append to durable lists (`_outcomes`, `_timers`, …). A naive
+// `[...existing, item]` per event makes a full-log fold O(k²) for k events of one type.
+// Instead we track the arrays THIS fold pass created in `foldOwned` and push in place onto
+// those, copying only when the array came from the caller's input state (snapshot / prior
+// state) — which we must never mutate. `foldEvents` resets the set at the start of every
+// call; folding is synchronous and non-reentrant, so a module-level set is safe, and the
+// returned state's arrays are always fold-owned (never aliased into the input). Output is
+// byte-identical; only intermediate allocations drop from O(k²) to O(k).
+let foldOwned = new WeakSet<object>();
+
+export function resetFoldOwnership(): void {
+  foldOwned = new WeakSet<object>();
+}
+
+/**
+ * R1a — install the ownership set a fold pass writes against. A one-shot fold (`foldEvents`
+ * with no set) starts empty every call. A LIVE fold (`ReplayVM.applyEvent`) hands in the set
+ * its VM keeps between commits, so containers the VM itself created stay writable in place
+ * across commits (O(1) per event) instead of being re-copied by every single-event fold
+ * (O(size) per event — quadratic over a run). The VM must drop the set the moment it lets a
+ * state escape to a caller (`ReplayVM.getState`), so an escaped state is never written to.
+ * Folding is synchronous and non-reentrant, so swapping the module-level reference is safe.
+ */
+export function useFoldOwnership(owned: WeakSet<object>): void {
+  foldOwned = owned;
+}
+
+function appendAudit<T>(existing: T[] | undefined, item: T): T[] {
+  if (existing !== undefined && foldOwned.has(existing)) {
+    existing.push(item);
+    return existing;
+  }
+  const next = existing === undefined ? [item] : [...existing, item];
+  foldOwned.add(next);
+  return next;
+}
+
+// ── 1.19.0 (ADR 0102) — `_flowEmits`: stamped flow-level emits counted per digest ──
+//
+// Shape: a fixed-depth, 16-way trie over the digest's LAST three hex digits (FNV-1a's
+// best-mixed bits). Inner nodes are 16-slot arrays (`null` = empty), leaves are
+// `{ [digest]: count }`:
+//
+//   _flowEmits[hex(d[15])][hex(d[14])][hex(d[13])][d] = count
+//
+// Why a trie and not a flat `{ [digest]: count }`: a live commit is its own fold pass, so
+// copy-on-write must copy what it touches, and a flat map costs O(k) per emit (worse in
+// practice: a many-key object is a dictionary, and its spread is slow). The trie copies
+// the root-to-leaf path — three 16-slot arrays (`slice`, no hidden-class churn) plus one
+// leaf of ~k/4096 entries — O(1) for any realistic k, still plain JSON (it rides snapshots
+// and survives `truncatePrefix` compaction), and O(1) amortized within a multi-event
+// replay pass, where fold-owned nodes are updated in place (`appendAudit`'s ownership
+// rule). Size is one leaf entry per DISTINCT stamped emit plus the touched inner arrays.
+export const FLOW_EMIT_DIGEST = /^[0-9a-f]{16}$/;
+export type FlowEmitLeaf = Record<string, number>;
+/** A 16-slot inner node of the `_flowEmits` trie; the third level holds leaves. */
+export type FlowEmitCounts = Array<FlowEmitCounts | FlowEmitLeaf | null>;
+const TRIE_PATH = [15, 14, 13] as const;
+
+function ownedNode(existing: FlowEmitCounts | null | undefined): FlowEmitCounts {
+  if (existing != null && foldOwned.has(existing)) return existing;
+  const next: FlowEmitCounts = existing == null ? new Array(16).fill(null) : existing.slice();
+  foldOwned.add(next);
+  return next;
+}
+
+function ownedLeaf(existing: FlowEmitLeaf | null | undefined): FlowEmitLeaf {
+  if (existing != null && foldOwned.has(existing)) return existing;
+  const next: FlowEmitLeaf = existing == null ? {} : { ...existing };
+  foldOwned.add(next);
+  return next;
+}
+
+export function countFlowEmit(
+  variables: Record<string, unknown>,
+  digest: string
+): Record<string, unknown> {
+  const root = variables._flowEmits as FlowEmitCounts | undefined;
+  const nextRoot = ownedNode(root);
+  const a = Number.parseInt(digest[15] as string, 16);
+  const b = Number.parseInt(digest[14] as string, 16);
+  const c = Number.parseInt(digest[13] as string, 16);
+  const mid = ownedNode(nextRoot[a] as FlowEmitCounts | null);
+  nextRoot[a] = mid;
+  const low = ownedNode(mid[b] as FlowEmitCounts | null);
+  mid[b] = low;
+  const leaf = ownedLeaf(low[c] as FlowEmitLeaf | null);
+  low[c] = leaf;
+  leaf[digest] = (leaf[digest] ?? 0) + 1;
+  // A fold-owned root is already inside a fold-created `variables`; only a fresh root
+  // needs a new `variables` object (never mutate the caller's).
+  return nextRoot === root ? variables : { ...variables, _flowEmits: nextRoot };
+}
+
+/** How many stamped flow-level emits with this digest the folded log holds. */
+export function flowEmitCount(variables: Record<string, unknown>, digest: string): number {
+  let node: unknown = variables._flowEmits;
+  for (const i of TRIE_PATH) {
+    if (!Array.isArray(node)) return 0;
+    node = node[Number.parseInt(digest[i] as string, 16)];
+  }
+  if (node == null || typeof node !== "object" || !Object.hasOwn(node, digest)) return 0;
+  const count = (node as FlowEmitLeaf)[digest];
+  return typeof count === "number" ? count : 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * 1.20.0 (ADR 0104) — a `null` EXECUTION_RESUMED that answers no suspend point re-opens the
+ * execution and records NO gate passthrough. The kernel writes one on `resumeAs` onto a
+ * terminal execution and on an in-doubt verdict (whose answer is recorded as a decision):
+ * `null` because every store round-trips it (SQLite's payload column is NOT NULL, so an
+ * absent payload cannot be written). Keyed on the state being answered, not on `null` alone,
+ * so a caller's `null` approval of a real gate is still that gate's answer. The one pre-0104 log
+ * this changes is one where a caller resumed `null` into either position: that entry answered
+ * no suspend point and would have been served to the NEXT gate as `null` — the stray this fixes.
+ */
+const IN_DOUBT_GATE = "EffectInDoubtResolved";
+/**
+ * ADR 0113 (R7 fix round 1) — the reserved gate a REFUSED re-run parks on. Like the in-doubt gate it
+ * is answered by the kernel's own status-only `null` resume (a re-drive after the code is fixed):
+ * the answer must NOT enter `_resumePayloads`, or the body's next gate would take it as its approval.
+ */
+export const FLOW_DIVERGED_GATE = "__loom_diverged__";
+
+/**
+ * 1.21.0 (ADR 0105) — reserved fold key: `true` while the execution is PARKED and a
+ * `STEP_FAILED` has landed since it parked (a parallel sibling failing after the flow reached
+ * its gate). Set only by that event in that state; removed by whatever ends the park — the next
+ * `EXECUTION_SUSPENDED` or `EXECUTION_RESUMED`, or a terminal `EXECUTION_COMPLETED` /
+ * `_FAILED` / `_CANCELLED`; absent otherwise, so a log without such a failure never gains it.
+ *
+ * It exists to keep one rule the 1.20.0 fold had implicitly. 1.20.0 folded that failure to
+ * "failed", so a following `null` resume was status-only (it answered no gate, and a 1.20.0
+ * `resumeAs` wrote exactly that). Since 1.21.0 the execution stays `suspended`; without this
+ * key the same `null` would become the gate's answer, and a replay's outcome would depend on
+ * whether it was seeded from a 1.20.0 snapshot — breaking snapshot + tail ≡ full log. So a
+ * `null` resume in this position stays status-only (fail-closed: the gate re-parks rather than
+ * passing without an approval). The cost: a caller's explicit `null` answer to such a gate is
+ * not recorded as its answer; the gate re-parks and takes the next non-null one.
+ */
+export const FAILED_WHILE_PARKED = "_failedWhileParked";
+
+function isStatusOnlyResume(state: ExecutionState, payload: unknown): boolean {
+  return (
+    payload === null &&
+    (state.status !== "suspended" ||
+      state.suspendedOn?.on === IN_DOUBT_GATE ||
+      state.suspendedOn?.on === FLOW_DIVERGED_GATE ||
+      state.variables[FAILED_WHILE_PARKED] === true)
+  );
+}
+
+/** `variables` without the {@link FAILED_WHILE_PARKED} key (the same object when absent). */
+function withoutFailedWhileParked(variables: Record<string, unknown>): Record<string, unknown> {
+  if (!Object.hasOwn(variables, FAILED_WHILE_PARKED)) return variables;
+  const { [FAILED_WHILE_PARKED]: _cleared, ...rest } = variables;
+  return rest;
+}
+
+// ── 1.23.0 (Wave 2, W2-0) — reserved shapes, folded only from what the kernel wrote ──────────
+//
+// The new kinds (`EXECUTION_CONTINUED`, `MESSAGE_CONSUMED`) and the PARALLEL_COMPLETED payload
+// fold ONLY an envelope carrying `metadata.kernel === true`. An application event that already
+// carries one of those names in an existing log therefore folds as the no-op it always was
+// (byte-identically), even though a handler now exists and no kernel writer does yet (ADR 0110
+// "Marker"; design §3). The journal stamps the marker for {@link KERNEL_STAMPED_EVENT_TYPES}.
+// Four more shapes ride the same stamp but are stamped by their WRITER through commit
+// `opts.metadata` (the kind also has an unstamped, userspace form, so the journal cannot stamp by
+// type): a wait-addressed EXECUTION_RESUMED (ADR 0110 D3), an EXECUTION_SUSPENDED carrying
+// `condition.waits` (D4 — the R2 writer adds `waits` AFTER the commit site's strip and stamps
+// the event; an unstamped park's `waits` is dropped by the fold), and an OUTCOME_RECORDED
+// carrying `recordedBy` / `late` (ADR 0116; the `recordOutcome` writer).
+
+/** Kinds whose fold requires the kernel stamp, and which the journal stamps when it writes one. */
+export const KERNEL_STAMPED_EVENT_TYPES: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([
+  "EXECUTION_CONTINUED",
+  "MESSAGE_CONSUMED",
+  "PARALLEL_COMPLETED",
+  // 1.25.0 (ADR 0130 residuals D9): written by quarantineInbox / releaseInbox / auto-release (slice S5).
+  "INBOX_QUARANTINED",
+  "INBOX_RELEASED",
+]);
+
+function isKernelWritten(event: EventEnvelope): boolean {
+  return event.metadata?.kernel === true;
+}
+
+function isPlain(v: unknown): v is Record<string, unknown> {
+  return v !== null && typeof v === "object" && !Array.isArray(v);
+}
+
+/** Every inbox dedupe window the fold keeps is capped here; the runtime may apply a smaller one. */
+export const INBOX_DEDUPE_CAP = 1024;
+/**
+ * 1.25.0 (ADR 0130 residuals D9) — the fold keeps at most this many quarantined entries in total
+ * (`_quarantined`, across topics). A fold cannot read a runtime setting (the lesson of ADR 0110 D6),
+ * so the ceiling is a fold constant; the runtime's own `quarantineMax` (default 256) may be raised
+ * to it, never above. A fact that would exceed it is ignored.
+ */
+export const QUARANTINE_FOLD_CAP = 1024;
+/** ADR 0115 D2 — custom metering dimension names, count and per-value ceiling. */
+export const CUSTOM_DIMENSION_PATTERN = /^[a-z][a-z0-9._-]{0,63}$/;
+export const CUSTOM_DIMENSION_MAX = 32;
+export const CUSTOM_DIMENSION_CEILING = 1e15;
+
+/** A fold-owned copy-on-write record (the same ownership rule as `_decisions`). */
+function ownedRecord<T>(prior: Record<string, T> | undefined): Record<string, T> {
+  if (prior !== undefined && foldOwned.has(prior)) return prior;
+  const next: Record<string, T> = prior === undefined ? {} : { ...prior };
+  foldOwned.add(next);
+  return next;
+}
+
+function safeMapKey(key: unknown): key is string {
+  return typeof key === "string" && key.length > 0 && !RESERVED_FOLD_KEYS.has(key);
+}
+
+/**
+ * ADR 0115 D2 — add the valid entries of a `custom` metering map onto the running one. Never
+ * throws: a bad name, a prototype name, a non-finite / negative / over-ceiling value, or the
+ * 33rd distinct name is skipped deterministically and the rest folds, so every replica folds the
+ * same state from a log it did not write the guard for. Returns `prior` when nothing changed.
+ */
+function addCustomDimensions(
+  prior: Record<string, number> | undefined,
+  raw: unknown
+): Record<string, number> | undefined {
+  if (!isPlain(raw)) return prior;
+  let next: Record<string, number> | undefined;
+  let names = prior === undefined ? 0 : Object.keys(prior).length;
+  for (const [name, v] of Object.entries(raw)) {
+    if (!CUSTOM_DIMENSION_PATTERN.test(name) || RESERVED_FOLD_KEYS.has(name)) continue;
+    if (typeof v !== "number" || !Number.isFinite(v) || v < 0 || v > CUSTOM_DIMENSION_CEILING) {
+      continue;
+    }
+    const known = (next ?? prior) !== undefined && Object.hasOwn((next ?? prior) as object, name);
+    if (!known) {
+      if (names >= CUSTOM_DIMENSION_MAX) continue;
+      names++;
+    }
+    next ??= { ...prior };
+    next[name] = (Object.hasOwn(next, name) ? (next[name] as number) : 0) + v;
+  }
+  return next ?? prior;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ADR 0115 D3 — the valid entries of a decision's descriptive `estimatedCost` map (a name
+ * matching the dimension pattern or a built-in, a finite non-negative value, at most 32), or
+ * `undefined` when none survive. Never throws, so a log written without the guard folds the same
+ * on every replica; null-prototype so a caller-chosen name cannot reach a prototype member.
+ */
+function sanitizeEstimatedCost(raw: unknown): Record<string, number> | undefined {
+  if (!isPlain(raw)) return undefined;
+  let out: Record<string, number> | undefined;
+  let names = 0;
+  for (const [name, v] of Object.entries(raw)) {
+    if (names >= CUSTOM_DIMENSION_MAX) break;
+    if (!BUILTIN_DIMENSION_NAMES.has(name)) {
+      if (!CUSTOM_DIMENSION_PATTERN.test(name) || RESERVED_FOLD_KEYS.has(name)) continue;
+    }
+    if (typeof v !== "number" || !Number.isFinite(v) || v < 0) continue;
+    out ??= {};
+    out[name] = v;
+    names++;
+  }
+  return out;
+}
+
+export const BUILTIN_DIMENSION_NAMES: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([
+  "tokens",
+  "costUsd",
+  "ms",
+  "memBytes",
+  "wallMs",
+  "netBytes",
+]);
+
+/** A validated `_resources` seed from `continuedFrom.carried.resources`; invalid parts are ignored. */
+function seedResources(raw: unknown): Record<string, unknown> | undefined {
+  if (!isPlain(raw)) return undefined;
+  const num = (v: unknown): number =>
+    typeof v === "number" && Number.isFinite(v) && v >= 0 ? v : 0;
+  const custom = addCustomDimensions(undefined, raw.custom);
+  const memBytes = num(raw.memBytes);
+  const wallMs = num(raw.wallMs);
+  const netBytes = num(raw.netBytes);
+  // A quota denial survives a rotation: the successor of an execution that exceeded its budget
+  // starts exceeded, with the reason it was given (a continue-as-new cannot reset a quota).
+  const exceeded = raw.exceeded === true;
+  const reason = exceeded && typeof raw.reason === "string" ? raw.reason : undefined;
+  return {
+    tokens: num(raw.tokens),
+    costUsd: num(raw.costUsd),
+    ms: num(raw.ms),
+    count: num(raw.count),
+    ...(memBytes > 0 && { memBytes }),
+    ...(wallMs > 0 && { wallMs }),
+    ...(netBytes > 0 && { netBytes }),
+    ...(custom !== undefined && { custom }),
+    ...(exceeded && { exceeded: true }),
+    ...(reason !== undefined && { reason }),
+  };
+}
+
+/** A validated `_inbox` seed from `continuedFrom.carried.inbox`; invalid parts are ignored. */
+function seedInbox(
+  raw: unknown
+): { cursors: Record<string, number>; dedupe: string[] } | undefined {
+  if (!isPlain(raw)) return undefined;
+  const cursors: Record<string, number> = {};
+  if (isPlain(raw.cursors)) {
+    for (const [topic, seq] of Object.entries(raw.cursors)) {
+      if (safeMapKey(topic) && Number.isSafeInteger(seq) && (seq as number) >= 0) {
+        cursors[topic] = seq as number;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  const dedupe = Array.isArray(raw.dedupe)
+    ? raw.dedupe.filter((id): id is string => typeof id === "string").slice(-INBOX_DEDUPE_CAP)
+    : [];
+  return { cursors, dedupe };
+}
+
+/** One held (or released, not yet delivered) inbox message of a topic's quarantine queue (1.25.0). */
+interface QuarantineEntry {
+  key: string;
+  inboxSeq: number;
+  heldAt: number;
+  state: "held" | "released";
+}
+type Quarantined = Record<string, QuarantineEntry[]>;
+
+function quarantinedOf(state: ExecutionState): Quarantined | undefined {
+  const q = state.variables._quarantined;
+  return isPlain(q) ? (q as Quarantined) : undefined;
+}
+
+/** `variables` with `_quarantined` set to `q`, or ABSENT when `q` is empty (never-quarantined shape). */
+function withQuarantined(
+  variables: Record<string, unknown>,
+  q: Quarantined
+): Record<string, unknown> {
+  const { _quarantined: _dropped, ...rest } = variables;
+  return Object.keys(q).length === 0 ? rest : { ...rest, _quarantined: q };
+}
+
+function quarantineTotal(q: Quarantined | undefined): number {
+  let n = 0;
+  if (q !== undefined) for (const queue of Object.values(q)) n += queue.length;
+  return n;
+}
+
+/**
+ * A validated `_quarantined` seed from `continuedFrom.carried.quarantined` (1.25.0); invalid parts
+ * are ignored, never thrown. A topic's queue must read `released? held*` (at most ONE released entry: the fold can only produce one) (the shape release
+ * preserves); a queue that does not is dropped whole. The total is capped at {@link QUARANTINE_FOLD_CAP}.
+ */
+function seedQuarantined(raw: unknown): Quarantined | undefined {
+  if (!isPlain(raw)) return undefined;
+  const out: Quarantined = {};
+  let total = 0;
+  for (const [topic, queue] of Object.entries(raw)) {
+    if (!safeMapKey(topic) || !Array.isArray(queue)) continue;
+    const entries: QuarantineEntry[] = [];
+    let sawHeld = false;
+    let sawReleased = false;
+    let ok = true;
+    for (const e of queue as unknown[]) {
+      if (
+        !isPlain(e) ||
+        typeof e.key !== "string" ||
+        e.key.length === 0 ||
+        !Number.isSafeInteger(e.inboxSeq) ||
+        (e.inboxSeq as number) < 0 ||
+        !Number.isSafeInteger(e.heldAt) ||
+        (e.heldAt as number) < 0 ||
+        (e.state !== "held" && e.state !== "released") ||
+        (sawHeld && e.state === "released") ||
+        (sawReleased && e.state === "released")
+      ) {
+        ok = false;
+        break;
+      }
+      if (e.state === "held") sawHeld = true;
+      else sawReleased = true;
+      entries.push({
+        key: e.key,
+        inboxSeq: e.inboxSeq as number,
+        heldAt: e.heldAt as number,
+        state: e.state,
+      });
+    }
+    if (!ok || entries.length === 0 || total + entries.length > QUARANTINE_FOLD_CAP) continue;
+    total += entries.length;
+    out[topic] = entries;
+  }
+  return total > 0 ? out : undefined;
+}
+
+/** The chain identity a `forkChain` stamp or the start payload names; `undefined` if malformed. */
+function chainIdentity(v: unknown): { chainId: string; generation: number } | undefined {
+  if (!isPlain(v)) return undefined;
+  const { chainId, generation } = v;
+  if (typeof chainId !== "string" || chainId.length === 0) return undefined;
+  if (!Number.isSafeInteger(generation) || (generation as number) < 0) return undefined;
+  return { chainId, generation: generation as number };
+}
+
+/** ADR 0110 D3 — a wait-addressed resume: kernel-stamped, payload `{ waitId, payload }`. */
+type WaitResume =
+  | { answer: true; waitId: string; wait: SuspendWait; inner: unknown }
+  | { answer: false };
+function parseWaitResume(state: ExecutionState, event: EventEnvelope): WaitResume | undefined {
+  if (!isKernelWritten(event)) return undefined;
+  const p = event.payload;
+  if (!isPlain(p) || typeof p.waitId !== "string" || !Object.hasOwn(p, "payload")) {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  // The table is the fold-owned `suspendedOn.waits`: it exists ONLY when the park was a
+  // kernel-stamped EXECUTION_SUSPENDED (the handler drops `waits` from an unstamped one), and
+  // holds only well-formed entries, so a userspace park can never be answered as a multi-wait.
+  // Total: a non-array or malformed entry is skipped, never thrown.
+  const table: unknown = state.status === "suspended" ? state.suspendedOn?.waits : undefined;
+  const wait = Array.isArray(table)
+    ? (table as unknown[]).find((w): w is SuspendWait => isPlain(w) && w.waitId === p.waitId)
+    : undefined;
+  if (wait === undefined || !safeMapKey(p.waitId)) return { answer: false };
+  return { answer: true, waitId: p.waitId, wait, inner: p.payload };
+}
+
+const handlers: Record<string, Handler> = {
+  EXECUTION_STARTED: (state, event) => {
+    // `flowHash` (K11.1, additive — absent on legacy logs) is the content hash
+    // of the flow code this execution started under; resume/recovery compares
+    // it against the registered flow so changed code never silently folds an
+    // in-flight log. Reserved fold key: `variables._flowHash`.
+    //
+    // 1.23.0 (Wave 2) — further additive fields, each folded to a reserved key and each absent
+    // from every older log: `principal` → `_principal` (ADR 0111; a fork's `forkedBy` stamp
+    // wins), `parent` → `_parent`, `chainId` + `generation` (+ `continuedFrom`) → `_chain`
+    // (ADR 0109; a fork's `forkChain` stamp wins and drops `continuedFrom`), `codeHash` →
+    // `_codeHash` (ADR 0113). A successor's validated `continuedFrom.carried` seeds `_resources`
+    // and `_inbox` (never for a fork, which starts a fresh chain); an invalid carry is ignored,
+    // never thrown.
+    const payload = event.payload as {
+      input?: unknown;
+      flowHash?: string;
+      principal?: unknown;
+      parent?: unknown;
+      chainId?: unknown;
+      generation?: unknown;
+      continuedFrom?: unknown;
+      codeHash?: unknown;
+    };
+    const meta = event.metadata;
+    const vars: Record<string, unknown> = {};
+    if (payload.input !== undefined) vars._input = payload.input;
+    if (payload.flowHash !== undefined) vars._flowHash = payload.flowHash;
+    const principal = isPlain(meta?.forkedBy) ? meta.forkedBy : payload.principal;
+    if (isPlain(principal)) vars._principal = principal;
+    if (typeof payload.parent === "string" && payload.parent.length > 0) {
+      vars._parent = payload.parent;
+    }
+    const forkChain = chainIdentity(meta?.forkChain);
+    let carriedFrom: Record<string, unknown> | undefined;
+    let forkResources: unknown;
+    const own = forkChain ?? chainIdentity(payload);
+    if (own !== undefined) {
+      const from = payload.continuedFrom;
+      const continuedFrom =
+        forkChain === undefined &&
+        isPlain(from) &&
+        typeof from.executionId === "string" &&
+        (from.carried === undefined || isPlain(from.carried))
+          ? {
+              executionId: from.executionId,
+              ...(from.carried !== undefined && { carried: from.carried }),
+            }
+          : undefined;
+      vars._chain = { ...own, ...(continuedFrom !== undefined && { continuedFrom }) };
+      carriedFrom = continuedFrom?.carried as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;
+      // A fork of a chain member leaves the chain (no `continuedFrom`, no carried inbox cursors or
+      // deadline), but it keeps what is the execution's OWN history rather than the chain's
+      // membership: the running resource totals, so a carried `exceeded` quota is not shed by
+      // forking (a fork of an ordinary execution keeps it through its copied prefix).
+      if (forkChain !== undefined && isPlain(payload.continuedFrom)) {
+        const carried = (payload.continuedFrom as { carried?: unknown }).carried;
+        if (isPlain(carried)) forkResources = carried.resources;
+      }
+    }
+    if (typeof payload.codeHash === "string") vars._codeHash = payload.codeHash;
+    const resources = seedResources(carriedFrom?.resources ?? forkResources);
+    if (resources !== undefined) vars._resources = resources;
+    const inbox = seedInbox(carriedFrom?.inbox);
+    if (inbox !== undefined) vars._inbox = inbox;
+    // 1.25.0 (ADR 0130 residuals D9) — the quarantine queues ride the same carry as the inbox.
+    const quarantined = seedQuarantined(carriedFrom?.quarantined);
+    if (quarantined !== undefined) vars._quarantined = quarantined;
+    return {
+      ...state,
+      status: "running",
+      startedAt: event.timestamp,
+      updatedAt: event.timestamp,
+      ...(Object.keys(vars).length > 0 && { variables: { ...state.variables, ...vars } }),
+    };
+  },
+
+  STEP_STARTED: (state, event) => {
+    const payload = event.payload as { stepId: string; input?: unknown; scope?: unknown };
+    const existing = state.frames[payload.stepId];
+    // ADR 0113 D3 — the log's first-start order, and (kernel-stamped only) the scope it started in.
+    const scope =
+      existing?.scope ??
+      (isKernelWritten(event) && typeof payload.scope === "string" ? payload.scope : undefined);
+    const firstSeq = existing === undefined ? event.sequence : existing.firstSeq;
+    const frame: ExecutionFrame = {
+      stepId: payload.stepId,
+      // Set ONLY when the frame is new: a frame folded before `firstSeq` existed (an old snapshot)
+      // that is re-started in the tail must not be stamped with the LATER sequence, or it would
+      // rank last and an unchanged body would be refused. It stays unranked (sorts first).
+      ...(firstSeq !== undefined && { firstSeq }),
+      ...(scope !== undefined && { scope }),
+      status: "running",
+      attempts: (existing?.attempts ?? 0) + 1,
+      startedAt: event.timestamp,
+      // K8.3 — the first attempt's logged start survives re-runs, so deadlines
+      // anchored here are never reset by crash recovery.
+      firstStartedAt: existing?.firstStartedAt ?? existing?.startedAt ?? event.timestamp,
+      ...(payload.input !== undefined && { input: payload.input }),
+    };
+    return {
+      ...state,
+      frames: setFrame(state.frames, payload.stepId, frame),
+      updatedAt: event.timestamp,
+    };
+  },
+
+  STEP_COMPLETED: (state, event) => {
+    const payload = event.payload as { stepId: string; output?: unknown };
+    const existing = state.frames[payload.stepId];
+    const frame: ExecutionFrame = {
+      stepId: payload.stepId,
+      status: "completed",
+      attempts: existing?.attempts ?? 1,
+      ...(existing?.firstSeq !== undefined && { firstSeq: existing.firstSeq }),
+      ...(existing?.scope !== undefined && { scope: existing.scope }),
+      completedAt: event.timestamp,
+      ...(existing?.startedAt !== undefined && { startedAt: existing.startedAt }),
+      ...(existing?.firstStartedAt !== undefined && { firstStartedAt: existing.firstStartedAt }),
+      ...(payload.output !== undefined && { output: payload.output }),
+    };
+    return {
+      ...state,
+      frames: setFrame(state.frames, payload.stepId, frame),
+      updatedAt: event.timestamp,
+    };
+  },
+
+  STEP_FAILED: (state, event) => {
+    const payload = event.payload as {
+      stepId: string;
+      error?: unknown;
+      // DE-4 (1.17.0) — present only for typed failures on a DECLARED channel;
+      // absence folds byte-identically to pre-1.17 logs (K5 payload-extension rule).
+      channel?: string;
+      payload?: unknown;
+    };
+    const existing = state.frames[payload.stepId];
+    const frame: ExecutionFrame = {
+      stepId: payload.stepId,
+      status: "failed",
+      attempts: existing?.attempts ?? 1,
+      ...(existing?.firstSeq !== undefined && { firstSeq: existing.firstSeq }),
+      ...(existing?.scope !== undefined && { scope: existing.scope }),
+      ...(existing?.startedAt !== undefined && { startedAt: existing.startedAt }),
+      ...(existing?.firstStartedAt !== undefined && { firstStartedAt: existing.firstStartedAt }),
+      ...(payload.error !== undefined && { error: payload.error }),
+      ...(payload.channel !== undefined && {
+        errorChannel: payload.channel,
+        errorPayload: payload.payload,
+      }),
+    };
+    // ADR 0105 — the STEP failed, not the execution: leave execution `status` alone. A flow
+    // may catch the throw (try/catch, a saga compensation, a typed-failure fallback) and carry
+    // on; folding "failed" here made a live execution read terminal, so a crash after the
+    // catch was never re-driven and `cancel` refused it. A failure that escapes the runner is
+    // recorded by the EXECUTION_FAILED the kernel commits after it, which owns the terminal
+    // status (as EXECUTION_CANCELLED does for STEP_CANCELLED below). A failure that lands while
+    // the execution is parked (a parallel sibling) marks FAILED_WHILE_PARKED — see there.
+    const parked = state.status === "suspended" && state.variables[FAILED_WHILE_PARKED] !== true;
+    return {
+      ...state,
+      frames: setFrame(state.frames, payload.stepId, frame),
+      ...(parked && { variables: { ...state.variables, [FAILED_WHILE_PARKED]: true } }),
+      updatedAt: event.timestamp,
+    };
+  },
+
+  STEP_CANCELLED: (state, event) => {
+    // Marks the in-flight step as cancelled WITHOUT touching execution status —
+    // the surrounding EXECUTION_CANCELLED event owns the execution-level status,
+    // and this must not overwrite it back to a failure/other state.
+    const payload = event.payload as { stepId: string };
+    const existing = state.frames[payload.stepId];
+    const frame: ExecutionFrame = {
+      stepId: payload.stepId,
+      status: "cancelled",
+      attempts: existing?.attempts ?? 1,
+      ...(existing?.firstSeq !== undefined && { firstSeq: existing.firstSeq }),
+      ...(existing?.scope !== undefined && { scope: existing.scope }),
+      ...(existing?.startedAt !== undefined && { startedAt: existing.startedAt }),
+      ...(existing?.firstStartedAt !== undefined && { firstStartedAt: existing.firstStartedAt }),
+    };
+    return {
+      ...state,
+      frames: setFrame(state.frames, payload.stepId, frame),
+      updatedAt: event.timestamp,
+    };
+  },
+
+  STEP_RETRYING: (state, event) => {
+    const payload = event.payload as { stepId: string; attempt: number };
+    const existing = state.frames[payload.stepId];
+    const frame: ExecutionFrame = {
+      stepId: payload.stepId,
+      status: "pending",
+      attempts: payload.attempt,
+      ...(existing?.firstSeq !== undefined && { firstSeq: existing.firstSeq }),
+      ...(existing?.scope !== undefined && { scope: existing.scope }),
+      ...(existing?.input !== undefined && { input: existing.input }),
+    };
+    return {
+      ...state,
+      frames: setFrame(state.frames, payload.stepId, frame),
+      updatedAt: event.timestamp,
+    };
+  },
+
+  PARALLEL_STARTED: (state, event) => {
+    const payload = event.payload as { stepIds: string[] };
+    // One fresh container, then write each new frame into it (the container is
+    // not shared, so in-place writes are safe). Mark it fold-owned so subsequent
+    // step events in the same fold pass mutate it in place instead of re-spreading.
+    const frames = { ...state.frames };
+    foldOwned.add(frames);
+    for (const stepId of payload.stepIds) {
+      assertSafeKey(stepId);
+      frames[stepId] = {
+        stepId,
+        status: "pending",
+        attempts: 0,
+        startedAt: event.timestamp,
+      };
+    }
+    return { ...state, frames, updatedAt: event.timestamp };
+  },
+
+  // 1.23.0 (ADR 0112 D2) — the journaled fail-fast scope outcome. Folds `_scopes[scopePath]` ONLY
+  // from a kernel-stamped envelope; an unstamped one keeps the pre-1.23.0 behaviour (no variable
+  // change, `updatedAt` only), so a log that already holds such an event replays identically.
+  PARALLEL_COMPLETED: (state, event) => {
+    if (!isKernelWritten(event)) return { ...state, updatedAt: event.timestamp };
+    const p = event.payload as {
+      scopePath?: unknown;
+      failedBranch?: unknown;
+      error?: unknown;
+      cancelled?: unknown;
+      errorName?: unknown;
+      errorChannel?: unknown;
+      errorPayload?: unknown;
+      launched?: unknown;
+      consumed?: unknown;
+      cursor?: unknown;
+    };
+    if (!isPlain(p) || !safeMapKey(p.scopePath)) return { ...state, updatedAt: event.timestamp };
+    const scopes = ownedRecord(state.variables._scopes as Record<string, unknown> | undefined);
+    // Amended 2026-10-06 (R6 review, user decision) — ADDITIVE optional fields, each folded only
+    // when well-formed; a record without them folds exactly as before (and a re-run serves it
+    // as before: it launches every branch and takes gate answers by position).
+    const nonNegInt = (v: unknown): v is number => Number.isSafeInteger(v) && (v as number) >= 0;
+    const consumed = Array.isArray(p.consumed)
+      ? p.consumed.filter(
+          (e): e is [string, number, number] =>
+            Array.isArray(e) &&
+            e.length === 3 &&
+            typeof e[0] === "string" &&
+            nonNegInt(e[1]) &&
+            nonNegInt(e[2]) &&
+            e[2] >= 1
+        )
+      : undefined;
+    scopes[p.scopePath] = {
+      ...(typeof p.failedBranch === "number" && { failedBranch: p.failedBranch }),
+      ...(p.error !== undefined && { error: p.error }),
+      ...(typeof p.errorName === "string" && { errorName: p.errorName }),
+      ...(typeof p.errorChannel === "string" && { errorChannel: p.errorChannel }),
+      ...(p.errorPayload !== undefined && { errorPayload: p.errorPayload }),
+      cancelled: Array.isArray(p.cancelled)
+        ? p.cancelled.filter((id): id is string => typeof id === "string")
+        : [],
+      ...(nonNegInt(p.launched) && { launched: p.launched }),
+      ...(consumed !== undefined && { consumed }),
+      ...(nonNegInt(p.cursor) && { cursor: p.cursor }),
+    };
+    return {
+      ...state,
+      variables: { ...state.variables, _scopes: scopes },
+      updatedAt: event.timestamp,
+    };
+  },
+
+  // 1.23.0 (ADR 0109 D2) — the predecessor of a continue-as-new ends, naming its successor. A NEW
+  // terminal status, `continued` (never `completed`: there is no output), and `_continuedTo`.
+  // Kernel-stamped envelopes only; an unstamped one is the no-op an unknown kind always was.
+  EXECUTION_CONTINUED: (state, event) => {
+    if (!isKernelWritten(event)) return state;
+    const p = event.payload as { successorId?: unknown };
+    if (!isPlain(p) || typeof p.successorId !== "string" || p.successorId.length === 0) {
+      return state;
+    }
+    return {
+      ...state,
+      status: "continued",
+      variables: { ...withoutFailedWhileParked(state.variables), _continuedTo: p.successorId },
+      updatedAt: event.timestamp,
+    };
+  },
+
+  // 1.23.0 (ADR 0110 D5/D6) — the owner consumed an inbox message: the per-topic cursor advances,
+  // the bounded dedupe window remembers the id, and the delivered payload answers its wait
+  // (`_waitAnswers[waitId]`, first answer wins). A `messageId` already in the window is a
+  // duplicate: the cursor advances, nothing is delivered. Kernel-stamped envelopes only.
+  MESSAGE_CONSUMED: (state, event) => {
+    if (!isKernelWritten(event)) return state;
+    const p = event.payload as {
+      waitId?: unknown;
+      topic?: unknown;
+      messageId?: unknown;
+      inboxSeq?: unknown;
+      payload?: unknown;
+    };
+    if (
+      !isPlain(p) ||
+      !safeMapKey(p.waitId) ||
+      !safeMapKey(p.topic) ||
+      typeof p.messageId !== "string" ||
+      !Number.isSafeInteger(p.inboxSeq) ||
+      (p.inboxSeq as number) < 0
+    ) {
+      return state;
+    }
+    const prior = state.variables._inbox as
+      | { cursors?: Record<string, number>; dedupe?: string[] }
+      | undefined;
+    const cursors = ownedRecord(prior?.cursors);
+    // Own-property read: a topic named `toString` / `valueOf` must not read a prototype member.
+    const was = Object.hasOwn(cursors, p.topic) ? (cursors[p.topic] as number) : -1;
+    cursors[p.topic] = Math.max(was, p.inboxSeq as number);
+    const window = prior?.dedupe;
+    const duplicate = window?.includes(p.messageId) === true;
+    let dedupe = window;
+    if (!duplicate) {
+      dedupe = appendAudit(window, p.messageId);
+      if (dedupe.length > INBOX_DEDUPE_CAP) dedupe.splice(0, dedupe.length - INBOX_DEDUPE_CAP);
+    }
+    const variables: Record<string, unknown> = {
+      ...state.variables,
+      _inbox: { cursors, dedupe: dedupe ?? [] },
+    };
+    if (!duplicate) {
+      const answers = ownedRecord(
+        state.variables._waitAnswers as Record<string, unknown> | undefined
+      );
+      if (!Object.hasOwn(answers, p.waitId)) {
+        answers[p.waitId] = { kind: "inbox", name: p.topic, payload: p.payload };
+      }
+      variables._waitAnswers = answers;
+    }
+    // 1.25.0 (ADR 0130 residuals D9) — gated on `_quarantined`: a log that never quarantines folds
+    // byte-identically. Delivering the topic's first RELEASED entry (matched by its dedupe key, which
+    // is this fact's `messageId`) drops it from the queue; the cursor already sits at or above its
+    // original `inboxSeq`, so it does not move.
+    const held = quarantinedOf(state);
+    if (held !== undefined && Object.hasOwn(held, p.topic)) {
+      const queue = held[p.topic] as QuarantineEntry[];
+      const first = queue[0];
+      if (first !== undefined && first.state === "released" && first.key === p.messageId) {
+        const next = ownedRecord(held);
+        if (queue.length === 1) delete next[p.topic];
+        else next[p.topic] = queue.slice(1);
+        // An emptied record is deleted, so a full hold/release/consume cycle folds to the
+        // never-quarantined shape.
+        return {
+          ...state,
+          variables: withQuarantined(variables, next),
+          updatedAt: event.timestamp,
+        };
+      }
+    }
+    return { ...state, variables, updatedAt: event.timestamp };
+  },
+
+  // 1.25.0 (ADR 0130 residuals D9; written by `quarantineInbox`) — the topic's head message is HELD: the
+  // cursor advances past the original entry (so it no longer pins the stream), the entry joins the
+  // topic's FIFO queue `_quarantined[topic]`, and the dedupe window is NOT touched (the release
+  // delivery must not read as a duplicate). Kernel-stamped envelopes only; a malformed fact, or one
+  // that would take the total past QUARANTINE_FOLD_CAP, is ignored.
+  INBOX_QUARANTINED: (state, event) => {
+    if (!isKernelWritten(event)) return state;
+    const p = event.payload as Record<string, unknown> | null;
+    if (
+      !isPlain(p) ||
+      !safeMapKey(p.topic) ||
+      !Number.isSafeInteger(p.inboxSeq) ||
+      (p.inboxSeq as number) < 0 ||
+      typeof p.key !== "string" ||
+      p.key.length === 0 ||
+      typeof p.messageId !== "string" ||
+      !Number.isSafeInteger(p.heldAt) ||
+      (p.heldAt as number) < 0 ||
+      !isPlain(p.operator)
+    ) {
+      return state;
+    }
+    const prior = quarantinedOf(state);
+    if (quarantineTotal(prior) + 1 > QUARANTINE_FOLD_CAP) return state;
+    const inbox = state.variables._inbox as
+      | { cursors?: Record<string, number>; dedupe?: string[] }
+      | undefined;
+    const cursors = ownedRecord(inbox?.cursors);
+    const was = Object.hasOwn(cursors, p.topic) ? (cursors[p.topic] as number) : -1;
+    cursors[p.topic] = Math.max(was, p.inboxSeq as number);
+    const quarantined = ownedRecord(prior);
+    const queue = Object.hasOwn(quarantined, p.topic)
+      ? (quarantined[p.topic] as QuarantineEntry[])
+      : [];
+    quarantined[p.topic] = [
+      ...queue,
+      {
+        key: p.key,
+        inboxSeq: p.inboxSeq as number,
+        heldAt: p.heldAt as number,
+        state: "held",
+      },
+    ];
+    return {
+      ...state,
+      variables: {
+        ...state.variables,
+        _inbox: { cursors, dedupe: inbox?.dedupe ?? [] },
+        _quarantined: quarantined,
+      },
+      updatedAt: event.timestamp,
+    };
+  },
+
+  // 1.25.0 (ADR 0130 residuals D9; written by `releaseInbox` and the capable-node auto-release) — the topic's OLDEST held entry is
+  // released or dropped. EXACTLY ONE of `operator` (a manual release) / `auto` (an automatic one,
+  // only with `deliver`) is present; a fact with both or neither is ignored, as is one that does not
+  // name the topic's first entry while it is `held`. "deliver" marks it `released`; "discard" removes
+  // it and adds its key to the dedupe window (a sender's retry of that id is then a duplicate).
+  INBOX_RELEASED: (state, event) => {
+    if (!isKernelWritten(event)) return state;
+    const p = event.payload as Record<string, unknown> | null;
+    if (
+      !isPlain(p) ||
+      !safeMapKey(p.topic) ||
+      typeof p.key !== "string" ||
+      p.key.length === 0 ||
+      typeof p.messageId !== "string" ||
+      (p.disposition !== "deliver" && p.disposition !== "discard")
+    ) {
+      return state;
+    }
+    const hasOperator = p.operator !== undefined;
+    const hasAuto = p.auto !== undefined;
+    if (hasOperator === hasAuto) return state; // both, or neither
+    if (hasOperator && !isPlain(p.operator)) return state;
+    if (hasAuto && (p.auto !== true || p.disposition !== "deliver")) return state;
+    const prior = quarantinedOf(state);
+    if (prior === undefined || !Object.hasOwn(prior, p.topic)) return state;
+    const queue = prior[p.topic] as QuarantineEntry[];
+    const first = queue[0];
+    if (first === undefined || first.state !== "held" || first.key !== p.key) return state;
+    const quarantined = ownedRecord(prior);
+    if (p.disposition === "deliver") {
+      quarantined[p.topic] = [{ ...first, state: "released" }, ...queue.slice(1)];
+      return {
+        ...state,
+        variables: { ...state.variables, _quarantined: quarantined },
+        updatedAt: event.timestamp,
+      };
+    }
+    if (queue.length === 1) delete quarantined[p.topic];
+    else quarantined[p.topic] = queue.slice(1);
+    const inbox = state.variables._inbox as
+      | { cursors?: Record<string, number>; dedupe?: string[] }
+      | undefined;
+    const window = inbox?.dedupe;
+    let dedupe = window;
+    if (window?.includes(first.key) !== true) {
+      dedupe = appendAudit(window, first.key);
+      if (dedupe.length > INBOX_DEDUPE_CAP) dedupe.splice(0, dedupe.length - INBOX_DEDUPE_CAP);
+    }
+    const variables = withQuarantined(
+      { ...state.variables, _inbox: { cursors: inbox?.cursors ?? {}, dedupe: dedupe ?? [] } },
+      quarantined
+    );
+    return { ...state, variables, updatedAt: event.timestamp };
+  },
+
+  EXECUTION_SUSPENDED: (state, event) => {
+    const payload = event.payload as {
+      condition: {
+        on: string;
+        timeout?: number;
+        correlationKey?: string;
+        waits?: SuspendWait[];
+      };
+    };
+    let variables = withoutFailedWhileParked(state.variables);
+    // 1.23.0 (ADR 0110 D4) — `condition.waits` is honoured ONLY on a kernel-stamped park (the R2
+    // writer stamps `metadata.kernel` on every EXECUTION_SUSPENDED that carries waits; the
+    // runtime's commit site strips `waits` from every userspace park, so no unstamped event
+    // carries them — this is the fold's own guard for a log it did not write). An unstamped
+    // park's `waits` is dropped from `suspendedOn` too, so nothing downstream (the wait-addressed
+    // resume's lookup, `loom` introspection) can read a table userspace wrote.
+    let condition: unknown = payload.condition;
+    if (isPlain(condition) && Object.hasOwn(condition, "waits")) {
+      const { waits: raw, ...rest } = condition;
+      condition = rest;
+      if (isKernelWritten(event) && Array.isArray(raw)) {
+        const clean = (raw as unknown[]).filter(
+          (w): w is SuspendWait =>
+            isPlain(w) &&
+            safeMapKey(w.waitId) &&
+            (w.kind === "gate" || w.kind === "inbox" || w.kind === "timer")
+        );
+        condition = { ...rest, waits: clean };
+        // A timer arm's `wakeAt` is recorded at its FIRST registration and served on every
+        // later one, so sibling traffic cannot push a deadline out.
+        let recorded: Record<string, unknown> | undefined;
+        for (const w of clean) {
+          if (w.kind !== "timer") continue;
+          if (typeof w.wakeAt !== "number" || !Number.isFinite(w.wakeAt)) continue;
+          recorded ??= ownedRecord(variables._waits as Record<string, unknown> | undefined);
+          if (!Object.hasOwn(recorded, w.waitId)) {
+            recorded[w.waitId] = { kind: "timer", wakeAt: w.wakeAt };
+          }
+        }
+        if (recorded !== undefined) variables = { ...variables, _waits: recorded };
+        // A park lists EVERY unanswered arm of every pending select, so a recorded timer whose
+        // waitId this park does not list belongs to a select another arm already settled: drop
+        // it, or a loop of `select([inbox, timer])` grows `_waits` (state and every snapshot)
+        // by one entry per iteration, forever.
+        const priorWaits = variables._waits;
+        if (isPlain(priorWaits)) {
+          const listed = new Set(clean.map((w) => w.waitId));
+          const stale = Object.keys(priorWaits).filter((id) => !listed.has(id));
+          if (stale.length > 0) {
+            const kept = ownedRecord(priorWaits as Record<string, unknown>);
+            for (const id of stale) delete kept[id];
+            variables = { ...variables, _waits: kept };
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    }
+    return {
+      ...state,
+      status: "suspended",
+      suspendedOn: condition as typeof payload.condition,
+      ...(variables !== state.variables && { variables }),
+      updatedAt: event.timestamp,
+    };
+  },
+
+  EXECUTION_RESUMED: (state, event) => {
+    const { suspendedOn: _removed, ...rest } = state;
+    // 1.23.0 (ADR 0110 D3) — a wait-addressed resume answers ONE wait of a multi-wait park: its
+    // payload is `{ waitId, payload }` and the fold unwraps it into `_waitAnswers[waitId]`
+    // (kind and name from the park's wait; first answer wins) and drops the wait's pinned
+    // `_waits` entry. It never enters the positional `_resumePayloads` (the two mechanisms do
+    // not share entries). One naming no wait of the current park is a status-only re-open.
+    const addressed = parseWaitResume(state, event);
+    if (addressed !== undefined) {
+      const variables = { ...withoutFailedWhileParked(state.variables) };
+      if (addressed.answer) {
+        const { waitId, wait, inner } = addressed;
+        const answers = ownedRecord(variables._waitAnswers as Record<string, unknown> | undefined);
+        if (!Object.hasOwn(answers, waitId)) {
+          answers[waitId] = {
+            kind: wait.kind,
+            name: wait.on ?? wait.topic ?? wait.kind,
+            payload: inner,
+          };
+        }
+        variables._waitAnswers = answers;
+        if (isPlain(variables._waits) && Object.hasOwn(variables._waits, waitId)) {
+          const waits = ownedRecord(variables._waits as Record<string, unknown>);
+          delete waits[waitId];
+          variables._waits = waits;
+        }
+      }
+      return { ...rest, status: "running", variables, updatedAt: event.timestamp };
+    }
+    return {
+      ...rest,
+      status: "running",
+      variables: {
+        ...withoutFailedWhileParked(state.variables),
+        ...(event.payload !== undefined &&
+          !isStatusOnlyResume(state, event.payload) && {
+            // Latest payload (legacy key, kept for compat with pre-1.16 snapshots)…
+            _resumePayload: event.payload,
+            // …and the ORDERED list of every resume payload (1.16.0): a flow with
+            // N suspend gates passes gate i through with payload i on replay —
+            // the single-latest key silently fed gate 1 the LAST gate's payload.
+            _resumePayloads: appendAudit(
+              state.variables._resumePayloads as unknown[] | undefined,
+              event.payload
+            ),
+          }),
+      },
+      updatedAt: event.timestamp,
+    };
+  },
+
+  // Loom 2.0 (P9) — a durable record of an advisory/optimizer choice. Stored in a
+  // reserved `_decisions` map keyed by decisionId so replay serves the recorded
+  // choice instead of re-consulting the optimizer, keeping the fold pure (P2).
+  DECISION_RECORDED: (state, event) => {
+    const payload = event.payload as {
+      decisionId: string;
+      choice: unknown;
+      rationale?: unknown;
+      source?: string;
+      // D1 (ADR 0030) — descriptive materialization fields; folded verbatim but NEVER
+      // read by getDecision, so `choice` remains the sole replay input (P9). Absence = legacy.
+      alternatives?: unknown;
+      estimatedCostUsd?: number;
+      // ADR 0115 D3 — the open spelling of `estimatedCostUsd`: descriptive, never a replay input.
+      estimatedCost?: unknown;
+      estimatedLatencyMs?: number;
+      confidence?: number;
+      // ADR 0079 — the observation the policy saw and which policy saw it. Same
+      // descriptive contract as the fields above: folded verbatim, never a replay
+      // input. Absence = legacy (or a decision no policy produced).
+      context?: Record<string, unknown>;
+      policy?: { id: string; version: string; propensity?: number };
+      // ADR 0113 D3 (fix round 1) — the step ids the decider's own logic ran. Kernel-stamped only
+      // (an app event naming it folds as before); a served decision exempts exactly these from the
+      // replay-divergence detector. Descriptive: never a replay input.
+      innerSteps?: unknown;
+      // Past the inner-step cap: the cap's worth of ids plus the journal sequence the decider began at
+      // (a served overflow decision also exempts the frames first started between it and this record).
+      innerStepsOverflow?: unknown;
+      innerFrom?: unknown;
+    };
+    assertSafeKey(payload.decisionId);
+    // R1a — the decision map is a per-fold-owned container, written in place (the same rule
+    // as `setFrame`/`appendAudit`): spreading it per event made a fold of D decisions O(D²)
+    // (20k decisions = 42 s). The caller's map (snapshot / prior state / an escaped state) is
+    // copied once, then owned. Insertion order is unchanged: a new id appends, a repeated id
+    // keeps its slot — exactly what `{ ...existing, [id]: v }` did.
+    const prior = state.variables._decisions as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;
+    let decisions: Record<string, unknown>;
+    if (prior !== undefined && foldOwned.has(prior)) {
+      decisions = prior;
+    } else {
+      decisions = prior === undefined ? {} : { ...prior };
+      foldOwned.add(decisions);
+    }
+    const estimatedCost = sanitizeEstimatedCost(payload.estimatedCost);
+    // 1.24.0 (ADR 0128) — the record's own envelope sequence, so the ORDER decisions were made in
+    // survives a checkpoint (the map's key order does not: array-index-like ids sort first, and a
+    // normalising snapshot store such as Postgres `jsonb` reorders keys). From the ENVELOPE, never
+    // the payload; a repeated id keeps its FIRST `seq` (as it keeps its slot). A repeat of a legacy
+    // entry (folded before 1.24.0, no `seq`) stays without one: its first sequence is unknowable.
+    const had = Object.hasOwn(decisions, payload.decisionId)
+      ? (decisions[payload.decisionId] as { seq?: unknown } | undefined)
+      : undefined;
+    const seq = had === undefined ? event.sequence : had.seq;
+    decisions[payload.decisionId] = {
+      choice: payload.choice,
+      ...(payload.rationale !== undefined && { rationale: payload.rationale }),
+      ...(payload.source !== undefined && { source: payload.source }),
+      ...(payload.alternatives !== undefined && { alternatives: payload.alternatives }),
+      ...(payload.estimatedCostUsd !== undefined && {
+        estimatedCostUsd: payload.estimatedCostUsd,
+      }),
+      ...(estimatedCost !== undefined && { estimatedCost }),
+      ...(payload.estimatedLatencyMs !== undefined && {
+        estimatedLatencyMs: payload.estimatedLatencyMs,
+      }),
+      ...(payload.confidence !== undefined && { confidence: payload.confidence }),
+      ...(payload.context !== undefined && { context: payload.context }),
+      ...(payload.policy !== undefined && { policy: payload.policy }),
+      ...(isKernelWritten(event) &&
+        Array.isArray(payload.innerSteps) && {
+          innerSteps: payload.innerSteps.filter((id): id is string => typeof id === "string"),
+          ...(payload.innerStepsOverflow === true &&
+            Number.isSafeInteger(payload.innerFrom) && {
+              innerStepsOverflow: true,
+              innerFrom: payload.innerFrom as number,
+              recordedAtSeq: event.sequence,
+            }),
+        }),
+      ...(Number.isSafeInteger(seq) && { seq: seq as number }),
+    };
+    return {
+      ...state,
+      variables: { ...state.variables, _decisions: decisions },
+      updatedAt: event.timestamp,
+    };
+  },
+
+  // Loom 2.0 (K2) — a capability denial: the EffectRuntime refused an ungranted
+  // effect. Recorded as a durable audit fact in a reserved `_denials` list (the
+  // step itself still fails via the STEP_FAILED that follows). Pure audit — it does
+  // not change frame/execution status.
+  EFFECT_DENIED: (state, event) => {
+    const payload = event.payload as { toolId: string; stepId?: string; reason?: string };
+    return {
+      ...state,
+      variables: {
+        ...state.variables,
+        _denials: appendAudit(state.variables._denials as unknown[] | undefined, {
+          toolId: payload.toolId,
+          ...(payload.stepId !== undefined && { stepId: payload.stepId }),
+          ...(payload.reason !== undefined && { reason: payload.reason }),
+        }),
+      },
+      updatedAt: event.timestamp,
+    };
+  },
+
+  // C.1 (execution-lifecycle authz) — an EXECUTION_DENIED fact: an ExecutionAuthorizer
+  // refused a lifecycle operation (resume/cancel) on an existing execution. Recorded as
+  // a durable audit fact in a reserved `_executionDenials` list, symmetric to
+  // EFFECT_DENIED (which gates effects). Pure audit — the op is refused by a thrown
+  // error; this fold does not change frame/execution status.
+  EXECUTION_DENIED: (state, event) => {
+    const payload = event.payload as { op: string; reason?: string; actor?: string };
+    return {
+      ...state,
+      variables: {
+        ...state.variables,
+        _executionDenials: appendAudit(state.variables._executionDenials as unknown[] | undefined, {
+          op: payload.op,
+          ...(payload.reason !== undefined && { reason: payload.reason }),
+          ...(payload.actor !== undefined && { actor: payload.actor }),
+        }),
+      },
+      updatedAt: event.timestamp,
+    };
+  },
+
+  // K10.1 (R5) — retention control facts on a dedicated lifecycle stream. When
+  // `applyRetention` archives or deletes a terminal execution it journals the action
+  // so the audit trail records its own pruning (P9): the values are gone but the FACT
+  // that they were pruned survives. Pure audit into `_lifecycle`; replay is byte-identical
+  // for any log that never prunes.
+  EXECUTION_ARCHIVED: (state, event) => {
+    const p = event.payload as { executionId: string };
+    return {
+      ...state,
+      variables: {
+        ...state.variables,
+        _lifecycle: appendAudit(state.variables._lifecycle as unknown[] | undefined, {
+          op: "archived",
+          executionId: p.executionId,
+          at: event.timestamp,
+        }),
+      },
+      updatedAt: event.timestamp,
+    };
+  },
+  EXECUTION_DELETED: (state, event) => {
+    const p = event.payload as { executionId: string };
+    return {
+      ...state,
+      variables: {
+        ...state.variables,
+        _lifecycle: appendAudit(state.variables._lifecycle as unknown[] | undefined, {
+          op: "deleted",
+          executionId: p.executionId,
+          at: event.timestamp,
+        }),
+      },
+      updatedAt: event.timestamp,
+    };
+  },
+  // ADR 0107 — an operator repair re-homed events the pre-0106 compaction bug had written to
+  // the blank execution `""` into the execution they belong to. Journaled on the lifecycle
+  // stream beside the retention facts (P9): the log records its own repair. Pure audit into
+  // `_lifecycle`; a log that is never repaired replays byte-identically.
+  EVENTS_REHOMED: (state, event) => {
+    const p = event.payload as {
+      executionId: string;
+      fromSequence: number;
+      throughSequence: number;
+      proof: string;
+    };
+    return {
+      ...state,
+      variables: {
+        ...state.variables,
+        _lifecycle: appendAudit(state.variables._lifecycle as unknown[] | undefined, {
+          op: "rehomed",
+          executionId: p.executionId,
+          fromSequence: p.fromSequence,
+          throughSequence: p.throughSequence,
+          proof: p.proof,
+          at: event.timestamp,
+        }),
+      },
+      updatedAt: event.timestamp,
+    };
+  },
+  // T3-R4.5 — an erasure was requested but deferred because an execution of the subject was
+  // still live (never shred a fold in flight). Folding the erasure control stream recovers the
+  // set of subjects awaiting completion, so a parked erasure survives a restart.
+  ERASURE_PENDING: (state, event) => {
+    const p = event.payload as { subjectId: string };
+    return {
+      ...state,
+      variables: {
+        ...state.variables,
+        _erasure: appendAudit(state.variables._erasure as unknown[] | undefined, {
+          op: "pending",
+          subjectId: p.subjectId,
+          at: event.timestamp,
+        }),
+      },
+      updatedAt: event.timestamp,
+    };
+  },
+
+  // Loom 2.0 (learning seam) — an OUTCOME_RECORDED fact: how a prior choice (a
+  // route/capability/tool, by `key`) actually turned out. The symmetric counterpart
+  // to DECISION_RECORDED ("what was chosen"): this records "how it went", so
+  // @loomwork/analytics can mine it into a ranking fed back to the router — closing the
+  // loop while keeping every future route a logged decision (P9). Folded into a
+  // reserved `_outcomes` audit list; pure audit, does not change status.
+  OUTCOME_RECORDED: (state, event) => {
+    const kernel = isKernelWritten(event);
+    const p = event.payload as {
+      key: string;
+      success?: boolean;
+      score?: number;
+      decisionId?: string;
+      // 1.23.0 (ADR 0116) — written only by `recordOutcome`, which stamps `metadata.kernel`;
+      // the fold reads them ONLY from a stamped envelope (a userspace emit is refused by
+      // `guardUserspaceEmit`, and a log it did not write is not trusted either). Absent = a
+      // live, in-run outcome.
+      recordedBy?: string;
+      late?: boolean;
+    };
+    return {
+      ...state,
+      variables: {
+        ...state.variables,
+        _outcomes: appendAudit(state.variables._outcomes as unknown[] | undefined, {
+          key: p.key,
+          ...(p.success !== undefined && { success: p.success }),
+          ...(p.score !== undefined && { score: p.score }),
+          ...(p.decisionId !== undefined && { decisionId: p.decisionId }),
+          ...(kernel && typeof p.recordedBy === "string" && { recordedBy: p.recordedBy }),
+          ...(kernel && p.late === true && { late: true }),
+        }),
+      },
+      updatedAt: event.timestamp,
+    };
+  },
+
+  // Loom 2.0 (K6) — a behavioral-safety block: a safety validator refused an
+  // effect's input or output. Recorded as a durable audit fact in a reserved
+  // `_safety` list (the step itself still fails via the STEP_FAILED that follows).
+  // Pure audit — it does not change frame/execution status, so a blocked run
+  // reconstructs its safety verdict exactly on replay.
+  SAFETY_BLOCKED: (state, event) => {
+    const p = event.payload as {
+      validatorId: string;
+      stepId?: string;
+      phase?: string;
+      reason?: string;
+      category?: string;
+    };
+    return {
+      ...state,
+      variables: {
+        ...state.variables,
+        _safety: appendAudit(state.variables._safety as unknown[] | undefined, {
+          validatorId: p.validatorId,
+          ...(p.stepId !== undefined && { stepId: p.stepId }),
+          ...(p.phase !== undefined && { phase: p.phase }),
+          ...(p.reason !== undefined && { reason: p.reason }),
+          ...(p.category !== undefined && { category: p.category }),
+        }),
+      },
+      updatedAt: event.timestamp,
+    };
+  },
+
+  // Loom 2.1 (K9) — an in-doubt effect: recovery found a tool declared
+  // `idempotent: false` whose prior attempt is in an UNKNOWN state (STEP_STARTED
+  // with no terminal step event) and refused to silently re-run it. Recorded in a
+  // reserved `_indoubt` audit list; the EXECUTION_SUSPENDED that follows owns the
+  // status change. Pure audit — replay reconstructs the parking exactly, and the
+  // list length per step is the durable epoch for fresh idempotency keys after a
+  // "retry-fresh" verdict.
+  EFFECT_INDOUBT: (state, event) => {
+    const p = event.payload as {
+      stepId: string;
+      toolId?: string;
+      attempts?: number;
+      idempotencyKey?: string;
+    };
+    return {
+      ...state,
+      variables: {
+        ...state.variables,
+        _indoubt: appendAudit(state.variables._indoubt as unknown[] | undefined, {
+          stepId: p.stepId,
+          ...(p.toolId !== undefined && { toolId: p.toolId }),
+          ...(p.attempts !== undefined && { attempts: p.attempts }),
+          ...(p.idempotencyKey !== undefined && { idempotencyKey: p.idempotencyKey }),
+        }),
+      },
+      updatedAt: event.timestamp,
+    };
+  },
+
+  // Loom 2.1 (K11.3) — a durable migration verdict: the execution was explicitly
+  // resumed on DIFFERENT flow code (resumeAs, replay-check or operator-ack).
+  // Re-points the recorded flow-code fingerprint (`_flowHash`) and the flow
+  // resolution pointer (`_migratedTo` — the flow id this execution now resolves
+  // to; unconditional so the fold never depends on seed identity), and appends
+  // an audit entry to the reserved `_migrations` list. Replay re-applies the
+  // same verdict at the same sequence (G1).
+  EXECUTION_MIGRATED: (state, event) => {
+    const p = event.payload as {
+      toFlowId: string;
+      toHash?: string;
+      fromHash?: string;
+      strategy?: string;
+      migratedInput?: unknown;
+      // ADR 0113 D2 (fix round 1) — the target flow's body fingerprint ("" = it has none): re-arms
+      // the `_codeHash` comparison against the code the execution now runs.
+      toCodeHash?: unknown;
+    };
+    return {
+      ...state,
+      variables: {
+        ...state.variables,
+        ...(p.toHash !== undefined && { _flowHash: p.toHash }),
+        ...(typeof p.toCodeHash === "string" && { _codeHash: p.toCodeHash }),
+        // K11.5 — contract-versioned state migration: the recorded TRANSFORMED
+        // input replaces `_input`, so every later resume/restore/replay folds
+        // the same migrated value (the outcome is durable, not the function).
+        ...(p.migratedInput !== undefined && { _input: p.migratedInput }),
+        _migratedTo: p.toFlowId,
+        _migrations: appendAudit(state.variables._migrations as unknown[] | undefined, {
+          toFlowId: p.toFlowId,
+          ...(p.toHash !== undefined && { toHash: p.toHash }),
+          ...(p.fromHash !== undefined && { fromHash: p.fromHash }),
+          ...(p.strategy !== undefined && { strategy: p.strategy }),
+          ...(p.migratedInput !== undefined && { stateMigrated: true }),
+        }),
+      },
+      updatedAt: event.timestamp,
+    };
+  },
+
+  // Loom 2.1 (K12) — a VERIFIED approval: a ResumeAuthenticator confirmed the
+  // identity behind an authority-gating resume, so "who approved" is durable
+  // evidence, not an unverified claim. Folded into a reserved `_approvals`
+  // audit list. Pure audit — the accompanying EXECUTION_RESUMED owns the
+  // lifecycle; a REJECTED approval never reaches the log (the resume is refused
+  // before any event is committed).
+  APPROVAL_GRANTED: (state, event) => {
+    const p = event.payload as { actor?: string; verifiedBy?: string; on?: string };
+    return {
+      ...state,
+      variables: {
+        ...state.variables,
+        _approvals: appendAudit(state.variables._approvals as unknown[] | undefined, {
+          ...(p.actor !== undefined && { actor: p.actor }),
+          ...(p.verifiedBy !== undefined && { verifiedBy: p.verifiedBy }),
+          ...(p.on !== undefined && { on: p.on }),
+          at: event.timestamp,
+        }),
+      },
+      updatedAt: event.timestamp,
+    };
+  },
+
+  // Loom 2.1 (K10) — a crypto-shred tombstone: the subject's encryption key was
+  // destroyed, so this execution's sensitive payload fields are permanently
+  // unrecoverable (GDPR erasure of an append-only log). Written AT SHRED TIME by
+  // the lifecycle service (never at replay). Marks `variables._shredded` so the
+  // folded state records the erasure; a decrypting store read of the affected
+  // fields fails loudly with PayloadShreddedError (the erasure is not silent).
+  PAYLOAD_SHREDDED: (state, event) => {
+    const p = event.payload as { subjectId?: string; reason?: string };
+    return {
+      ...state,
+      variables: {
+        ...state.variables,
+        _shredded: {
+          ...(p.subjectId !== undefined && { subjectId: p.subjectId }),
+          ...(p.reason !== undefined && { reason: p.reason }),
+          at: event.timestamp,
+        },
+      },
+      updatedAt: event.timestamp,
+    };
+  },
+
+  // Loom 2.1 (K7) — an egress denial: the kernel-side broker refused an
+  // isolated tool's network target (not in its static allowlist), BEFORE any
+  // connection was opened. Folded into a reserved `_egress` audit list,
+  // mirroring EFFECT_DENIED's `_denials`. Pure audit — whether the step fails
+  // is the tool's error path (an uncaught denial fails via STEP_FAILED).
+  EGRESS_DENIED: (state, event) => {
+    const p = event.payload as {
+      toolId?: string;
+      stepId?: string;
+      target?: string;
+      reason?: string;
+    };
+    return {
+      ...state,
+      variables: {
+        ...state.variables,
+        _egress: appendAudit(state.variables._egress as unknown[] | undefined, {
+          ...(p.toolId !== undefined && { toolId: p.toolId }),
+          ...(p.stepId !== undefined && { stepId: p.stepId }),
+          ...(p.target !== undefined && { target: p.target }),
+          ...(p.reason !== undefined && { reason: p.reason }),
+        }),
+      },
+      updatedAt: event.timestamp,
+    };
+  },
+
+  // Loom 2.1 (T1) — a durable timer fired: the wake that ends a
+  // `ctx.sleep`/`sleepUntil` (or a timer-service-backed `suspend({ timeout })`).
+  // Pure audit into the reserved `_timers` list — the EXECUTION_RESUMED that
+  // accompanies it owns the status change. `wakeAt` is the SCHEDULED time (from
+  // the log); `firedAt` (event timestamp) records actual delivery, so drift is
+  // observable but never enters control flow.
+  TIMER_FIRED: (state, event) => {
+    const p = event.payload as { wakeAt?: number; scheduleId?: string; occurrence?: number };
+    return {
+      ...state,
+      variables: {
+        ...state.variables,
+        _timers: appendAudit(state.variables._timers as unknown[] | undefined, {
+          firedAt: event.timestamp,
+          ...(p.wakeAt !== undefined && { wakeAt: p.wakeAt }),
+          ...(p.scheduleId !== undefined && { scheduleId: p.scheduleId }),
+          ...(p.occurrence !== undefined && { occurrence: p.occurrence }),
+        }),
+      },
+      updatedAt: event.timestamp,
+    };
+  },
+
+  // Loom 2.0 (K3) — accumulate metered resource usage (tokens / cost / wall-time)
+  // into a reserved `_resources` running total. Emitted by accounting middleware
+  // when an effect actually runs, so the total is deterministic on replay.
+  RESOURCE_METERED: (state, event) => {
+    const p = event.payload as {
+      tokens?: number;
+      costUsd?: number;
+      ms?: number;
+      // ADR 0032 (R1) — additional dimensions, folded additively.
+      memBytes?: number;
+      wallMs?: number;
+      netBytes?: number;
+      // 1.23.0 (ADR 0115) — open metering dimensions, folded into `_resources.custom`.
+      custom?: unknown;
+    };
+    const r = (state.variables._resources as
+      | {
+          tokens: number;
+          costUsd: number;
+          ms: number;
+          count: number;
+          memBytes?: number;
+          wallMs?: number;
+          netBytes?: number;
+          custom?: Record<string, number>;
+          exceeded?: boolean;
+        }
+      | undefined) ?? { tokens: 0, costUsd: 0, ms: 0, count: 0 };
+    // The new dimensions are included only when non-zero, so a log that never meters
+    // them folds to exactly the pre-0032 `_resources` shape (byte-identical replay).
+    const memBytes = (r.memBytes ?? 0) + (p.memBytes ?? 0);
+    const wallMs = (r.wallMs ?? 0) + (p.wallMs ?? 0);
+    const netBytes = (r.netBytes ?? 0) + (p.netBytes ?? 0);
+    const custom = addCustomDimensions(r.custom, p.custom);
+    return {
+      ...state,
+      variables: {
+        ...state.variables,
+        _resources: {
+          tokens: r.tokens + (p.tokens ?? 0),
+          costUsd: r.costUsd + (p.costUsd ?? 0),
+          ms: r.ms + (p.ms ?? 0),
+          count: r.count + 1,
+          ...(memBytes > 0 && { memBytes }),
+          ...(wallMs > 0 && { wallMs }),
+          ...(netBytes > 0 && { netBytes }),
+          ...(custom !== undefined && { custom }),
+          ...(r.exceeded === true && { exceeded: true }),
+        },
+      },
+      updatedAt: event.timestamp,
+    };
+  },
+
+  // A quota admission-control denial: the execution exceeded its budget, so the
+  // effect was refused. Marks `_resources.exceeded` (the STEP_FAILED that follows
+  // fails the step). Pure audit.
+  QUOTA_EXCEEDED: (state, event) => {
+    const p = event.payload as { reason?: string };
+    const r = (state.variables._resources as
+      | { tokens: number; costUsd: number; ms: number; count: number; exceeded?: boolean }
+      | undefined) ?? { tokens: 0, costUsd: 0, ms: 0, count: 0 };
+    return {
+      ...state,
+      variables: {
+        ...state.variables,
+        _resources: { ...r, exceeded: true, ...(p.reason !== undefined && { reason: p.reason }) },
+      },
+      updatedAt: event.timestamp,
+    };
+  },
+
+  // The three terminal handlers also end any open park, so they drop FAILED_WHILE_PARKED
+  // (ADR 0105): the mark describes a park, and must not outlive it into a terminal state (where
+  // a 1.20.0 snapshot, repaired, would not carry it — snapshot + tail ≡ full log).
+  EXECUTION_COMPLETED: (state, event) => {
+    const payload = event.payload as { output?: unknown };
+    const variables = withoutFailedWhileParked(state.variables);
+    return {
+      ...state,
+      status: "completed",
+      ...(payload.output !== undefined
+        ? { variables: { ...variables, _output: payload.output } }
+        : variables !== state.variables && { variables }),
+      updatedAt: event.timestamp,
+    };
+  },
+
+  EXECUTION_FAILED: (state, event) => {
+    const payload = event.payload as { error?: unknown };
+    const variables = withoutFailedWhileParked(state.variables);
+    return {
+      ...state,
+      status: "failed",
+      ...(payload.error !== undefined
+        ? { variables: { ...variables, _error: payload.error } }
+        : variables !== state.variables && { variables }),
+      updatedAt: event.timestamp,
+    };
+  },
+
+  EXECUTION_CANCELLED: (state, event) => {
+    const payload = event.payload as { reason?: unknown };
+    const variables = withoutFailedWhileParked(state.variables);
+    return {
+      ...state,
+      status: "cancelled",
+      ...(payload.reason !== undefined
+        ? { variables: { ...variables, _cancelReason: payload.reason } }
+        : variables !== state.variables && { variables }),
+      updatedAt: event.timestamp,
+    };
+  },
+};
+
+export function getHandler(eventType: string): Handler | undefined {
+  // `Object.hasOwn`, not plain indexing: `eventType` is caller-controlled all the way from an
+  // ingress adapter (`runtime.resume`, and A2A `provideInput` passes a network-supplied
+  // ResumeEvent straight through), and `handlers["__proto__"]` resolves up the prototype chain
+  // to `Object.prototype` — TRUTHY, so `foldEvents`' `if (handler)` guard admits it and then
+  // calls a non-function. An unknown event type must fold to a no-op, whatever it is named.
+  if (!Object.hasOwn(handlers, eventType)) return undefined;
+  return handlers[eventType];
+}
+
+// ── Event-schema ABI governance (Loom 2.0 K5) ────────────────────────────────
+//
+// The event log is the kernel's on-disk ABI: state is `fold(events)`, and stored
+// logs must replay across deploys (this is what `@loomwork/deploy-sim` guards at the
+// flow level). This names and versions the *set of event types the fold understands*.
+// Governance: adding an event type is additive (bump MINOR, update the pinned list);
+// removing or repurposing one changes how historical logs fold and is a MAJOR break
+// that must be deliberate — the conformance test pins `knownEventTypes()`.
+// 1.4.0: additive optional `flowHash` payload field on EXECUTION_STARTED (K11.1) —
+// per the K5 payload-extension rule, folds treat absence as legacy.
+// 1.5.0: added EXECUTION_MIGRATED (K11.3).
+// 1.6.0: added TIMER_FIRED (T1 — durable timers).
+// 1.7.0: added EGRESS_DENIED (K7 — data-plane isolation & egress control).
+// 1.8.0: added PAYLOAD_SHREDDED (K10 — crypto-shredding).
+// 1.9.0: added APPROVAL_GRANTED (K12 — verified approvals).
+// 1.10.0: additive optional DECISION_RECORDED payload fields `alternatives`,
+//   `estimatedCostUsd`, `estimatedLatencyMs`, `confidence` (ADR 0030 D1 — decision
+//   materialization). Descriptive only; `getDecision` still returns just `choice`, so
+//   folds treat absence as legacy and replay is byte-identical.
+// 1.11.0: additive optional RESOURCE_METERED payload fields `memBytes`, `wallMs`,
+//   `netBytes` (ADR 0032 R1 — resource dimensions). Folded into `_resources` only when
+//   non-zero, so a log that never meters them replays byte-identically.
+// 1.12.0: added EXECUTION_DENIED (C.1 — execution-lifecycle authz). Pure audit into
+//   `_executionDenials`; a log that never denies replays byte-identically.
+// 1.13.0: added EXECUTION_ARCHIVED / EXECUTION_DELETED (K10.1 R5 — retention control
+//   facts). Pure audit into `_lifecycle` on a dedicated stream; a log that never prunes
+//   replays byte-identically.
+// 1.14.0: added ERASURE_PENDING (T3-R4.5 — deferred-erasure control fact). Pure audit into
+//   `_erasure` on a dedicated stream; a log that never defers an erasure replays identically.
+// 1.15.0: additive optional EXECUTION_MIGRATED payload field `migratedInput` (K11.5,
+//   ADR 0056 — contract-versioned state migration on resumeAs). When present it replaces
+//   `_input` in the fold and stamps `stateMigrated: true` on the `_migrations` audit
+//   entry; a log that never migrates state replays byte-identically.
+// 1.16.0: EXECUTION_RESUMED additionally folds `_resumePayloads` — the ORDERED list of
+//   every resume payload (ADR 0057). Fixes the multi-gate suspend bug: the single-latest
+//   `_resumePayload` (kept for compat) fed gate 1 the LAST gate's payload on replay.
+//   Additive fold key from existing events; no payload or kind changes.
+// 1.17.0: additive optional STEP_FAILED payload fields `channel`, `payload` (DE-4,
+//   ADR 0060 — typed failure channels). Folded into frame `errorChannel`/`errorPayload`;
+//   presence makes the execute seam SUBSTITUTE the recorded failure on replay instead of
+//   re-executing the step. A log that never fails typed replays byte-identically.
+// 1.18.0: additive optional DECISION_RECORDED payload fields `context`, `policy` (T2,
+//   ADR 0079 — the observation a policy saw and the policy that saw it, incl. the
+//   propensity that makes unbiased off-policy evaluation possible). Same descriptive
+//   contract as the 1.10.0 D1 fields: folded verbatim into `_decisions`, NEVER read by
+//   getDecision, so `choice` stays the sole replay input. A log whose decisions carry
+//   neither field replays byte-identically.
+// 1.19.0: additive fold key `_flowEmits` from an additive envelope stamp (ADR 0102 —
+//   flow-level emits append once per execution). A flow-level `ctx.emit` / `ctx.stream` /
+//   `ctx.ui` envelope may carry `metadata.flowEmit = <16-hex content digest>`; the fold
+//   counts stamped emits per digest for ANY event type (a generic step in `foldEvents`,
+//   not a handler), so a re-run serves the emits the log already holds. No new kind, no
+//   payload change; a log that never stamps replays byte-identically.
+// 1.20.0: EXECUTION_RESUMED with a `null` payload that answers no suspend point (the execution
+//   was not parked, or was parked in doubt on "EffectInDoubtResolved") re-opens the execution
+//   WITHOUT adding a gate passthrough (ADR 0104). Every other resume folds as before, so a log
+//   that never carries such a resume replays byte-identically. Also additive: a human step's
+//   EXECUTION_SUSPENDED condition carries the kernel-set `stepId` (folded verbatim into
+//   `suspendedOn`, as the condition always was). No new event kind.
+// 1.21.0: STEP_FAILED no longer folds the EXECUTION status to "failed" (ADR 0105) — the flow may
+//   catch it, and EXECUTION_FAILED is the execution's failure. No new kind or payload field; the
+//   kernel writes the same events. A STEP_FAILED landing while the execution is parked sets the
+//   reserved fold key `_failedWhileParked` (cleared by whatever ends the park), and a `null`
+//   EXECUTION_RESUMED in that position stays status-only, exactly as 1.20.0 folded it — so every
+//   gate passthrough (`_resumePayloads`) is identical under both. What differs from 1.20.0: the
+//   derived `status` after a STEP_FAILED no lifecycle event has followed (`running`/`suspended`,
+//   not `failed`), and the new key while such a park is open. Snapshots saved by an older fold
+//   are read through `normalizeSnapshotState`.
+// 1.22.0: added EVENTS_REHOMED (ADR 0107 — the operator repair of the pre-0106 blank-stream
+//   events). Pure audit into `_lifecycle` on the lifecycle stream; a log that is never repaired
+//   replays byte-identically. The re-homed events themselves are the kinds they always were.
+// 1.23.0: Wave 2 (W2-0, ADRs 0109–0116) — every new fold handler and reserved shape, with no
+//   writer yet. New kinds `EXECUTION_CONTINUED` (→ status `continued`, `_continuedTo`) and
+//   `MESSAGE_CONSUMED` (→ `_inbox`, `_waitAnswers`); a payload and handler for the existing
+//   `PARALLEL_COMPLETED` (→ `_scopes`); additive `EXECUTION_STARTED.{principal, parent, chainId,
+//   generation, continuedFrom, codeHash}` (→ `_principal`, `_parent`, `_chain`, `_codeHash`; the
+//   carry seeds `_resources` / `_inbox`), `EXECUTION_SUSPENDED.condition.waits[]` (→ `_waits`),
+//   a wait-addressed `EXECUTION_RESUMED` `{ waitId, payload }` (→ `_waitAnswers`),
+//   `RESOURCE_METERED.custom` (→ `_resources.custom`), `DECISION_RECORDED.estimatedCost` (the
+//   descriptive open spelling of `estimatedCostUsd`, never a replay input),
+//   `OUTCOME_RECORDED.{recordedBy, late}`.
+//   The envelope metadata the fold now reads: `kernel` (the new kinds, `PARALLEL_COMPLETED` and a
+//   wait-addressed resume fold ONLY a kernel-stamped envelope), `forkChain`, `forkedBy`. A log
+//   carrying none of these replays byte-identically.
+// 1.24.0: ADR 0128 — each folded `_decisions` entry carries `seq`, the envelope sequence of the
+//   FIRST `DECISION_RECORDED` for that id, so decision ORDER survives a checkpoint (key order does
+//   not survive array-index-like ids or a normalising snapshot store such as Postgres `jsonb`).
+//   Descriptive only: `getDecision` still returns just `choice`. A snapshot written by a 1.23 fold
+//   has no `seq` on its absorbed entries; those are LEGACY and read in map order (no migration, the
+//   same documented exception to snapshot+tail == full fold as 1.21.0). Log bytes are unchanged.
+// 1.25.0: ADR 0130 residuals (D7-D9), RESERVED - shapes frozen, handlers present, NO writer yet, so
+//   a log written before this version replays byte-identically. (1) The envelope key
+//   `metadata.seal` (`{ v: 1, cipher, covers }`, D7: a sealing decorator's marker): the fold
+//   IGNORES it, so state equals the same log without it. (2) New kinds `INBOX_QUARANTINED`
+//   (`{ topic, inboxSeq, key, messageId, heldAt, operator, reason? }` -> cursor advance by `max`,
+//   an entry pushed onto `_quarantined[topic]`, the dedupe window untouched) and `INBOX_RELEASED`
+//   (`{ topic, key, messageId, disposition: "deliver" | "discard", operator? | auto?, reason? }`:
+//   exactly one of `operator` / `auto`, `auto` only with `deliver`; a fact with both or neither is
+//   ignored; acts only on the topic's FIRST entry while `held`), BOTH folded only from a
+//   kernel-stamped envelope (`metadata.kernel === true`) and both `ignorable` for the park fence.
+//   (3) The fold variable `_quarantined` (`{ [topic]: Array<{ key, inboxSeq, heldAt, state }> }`,
+//   queue shape `released? held*`, at most QUARANTINE_FOLD_CAP = 1024 entries in total). (4)
+//   `MESSAGE_CONSUMED` additionally drops the topic's first `released` entry whose `key` equals the
+//   fact's `messageId`, gated on `_quarantined` existing. (5) `EXECUTION_STARTED.continuedFrom.
+//   carried.quarantined`, a validated seed (invalid parts ignored). Byte-identity: a log carrying
+//   none of these shapes folds exactly as under 1.24.0.
+// 1.26.0: ADR 0138 D8, NO new kind and NO payload change. The fold stops copying `input` into a frame
+// when it SETTLES (STEP_COMPLETED / STEP_FAILED / STEP_CANCELLED); STEP_STARTED and STEP_RETRYING keep it,
+// so an in-flight frame still shows what is running. The folded BYTES change (state is linear in turns, not
+// quadratic); `normalizeSnapshotState` strips `input` from the settled frames of an older snapshot in one
+// O(frames) pass, so `fold(snapshot, tail) == fold(events)` holds. Nothing reads a settled frame's input
+// from the fold; the log (or the compaction archive, ADR 0138) holds it. A pre-1.26 node re-adds an input
+// to a frame it settles (harmless; stripped by the next normalize) - the documented mixed-fleet exception.
+export const EVENT_SCHEMA_VERSION = "1.26.0";
+
+export function knownEventTypes(): string[] {
+  return Object.keys(handlers).sort();
+}