@lodestar/beacon-node 1.47.0-dev.ee197a8d7f → 1.47.0-dev.f0f26cd2b6

package/src/chain/validation/executionPayloadBid.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
-import {PublicKey} from "@chainsafe/blst";
-import {IForkChoice, ProtoBlock} from "@lodestar/fork-choice";
+import {ProtoBlock} from "@lodestar/fork-choice";
 import {PAYLOAD_BUILDER_VERSION} from "@lodestar/params";
 import {
   computeEpochAtSlot,
@@ -47,11 +46,12 @@ function getMinBidValue(currentHighestBid: number): number {
 /**
  * Check whether a bid builds on one of the paths compatible with the local head branch.
  *
- * Building directly on the parent is allowed for proposer-boost reorgs outside epoch boundaries.
+ * Building directly on the parent is allowed for proposer-boost reorgs, including at epoch
+ * boundaries when the head is weak enough that a reorg onto the strong parent is predicted.
  * Otherwise the bid must build on the local head's full or empty payload variant, as selected for its slot.
  */
 function isBidCompatibleWithHead(
-  forkChoice: IForkChoice,
+  chain: IBeaconChain,
   head: ProtoBlock,
   bidSlot: Slot,
   bidParentBlockRoot: RootHex,
@@ -61,9 +61,13 @@ function isBidCompatibleWithHead(
   const buildsOnParentPayload = bidParentBlockHash === head.parentBlockHash;
 
   if (buildsOnParentBlock && buildsOnParentPayload) {
-    // The spec allows this at epoch boundaries, but Lodestar does not propagate these bids because validating
-    // them requires an epoch transition for a parent state that cannot be used for proposer-boost reorgs.
-    return !isStartSlotOfEpoch(bidSlot);
+    if (!isStartSlotOfEpoch(bidSlot)) {
+      return true;
+    }
+    // Epoch-boundary reorgs are allowed, but only propagate the bid if its parent matches the block
+    // we predict a proposer would reorg onto — predictProposerHead returns the strong parent only
+    // when the head is weak.
+    return chain.predictProposerHead().blockRoot === bidParentBlockRoot;
   }
 
   if (bidParentBlockRoot !== head.blockRoot) {
@@ -72,18 +76,168 @@ function isBidCompatibleWithHead(
 
   const buildsOnHeadPayload = bidParentBlockHash === head.executionPayloadBlockHash;
 
-  if (forkChoice.shouldBuildOnFull(head, bidSlot)) {
+  if (chain.forkChoice.shouldBuildOnFull(head, bidSlot)) {
     return buildsOnHeadPayload;
   }
 
   return buildsOnParentPayload;
 }
 
+/**
+ * Validation for bids submitted via the API by the operator's own builder.
+ *
+ * Only non-transient checks are applied: slot later than parent, zero execution payment, blob
+ * commitment count, builder eligibility, version and balance coverage, prev_randao, and signature.
+ * Transient gossip rules (head compatibility, first bid per tuple, value increment, proposer
+ * preferences) are not applied, since those only limit forwarding of peers' messages and the
+ * builder may legitimately bid on a branch this node does not consider head.
+ *
+ * Throws on any failed check. Also throws if the bid's parent block is unknown or its state is
+ * unavailable, since the checks cannot be evaluated against the parent branch.
+ */
 export async function validateApiExecutionPayloadBid(
   chain: IBeaconChain,
   signedExecutionPayloadBid: gloas.SignedExecutionPayloadBid
-): Promise<{proposerIndex: ValidatorIndex}> {
-  return validateExecutionPayloadBid(chain, signedExecutionPayloadBid);
+): Promise<void> {
+  const bid = signedExecutionPayloadBid.message;
+  const bidParentBlockRoot = toRootHex(bid.parentBlockRoot);
+
+  // [IGNORE] `bid.slot` is the current slot, or the next slot (`bid.slot - 1` is current), allowing for `MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY`.
+  if (
+    !chain.clock.isCurrentSlotGivenGossipDisparity(bid.slot) &&
+    !chain.clock.isCurrentSlotGivenGossipDisparity(bid.slot - 1)
+  ) {
+    throw new ExecutionPayloadBidError(GossipAction.IGNORE, {
+      code: ExecutionPayloadBidErrorCode.INVALID_SLOT,
+      builderIndex: bid.builderIndex,
+      slot: bid.slot,
+    });
+  }
+
+  // [IGNORE] `bid.parent_block_root` is the hash tree root of a known beacon block in fork choice.
+  // Moved earlier than the spec ordering so we can derive the proposer dependent root for the
+  // proposer-preferences lookup below from a known fork-choice block.
+  const parentBlock = chain.forkChoice.getBlockHexDefaultStatus(bidParentBlockRoot);
+  if (parentBlock === null) {
+    throw new ExecutionPayloadBidError(GossipAction.IGNORE, {
+      code: ExecutionPayloadBidErrorCode.UNKNOWN_BLOCK_ROOT,
+      parentBlockRoot: bidParentBlockRoot,
+    });
+  }
+
+  // [REJECT] The bid is for a higher slot than its parent block -- i.e.
+  // validate that `bid.slot` is greater than the slot of the block with root
+  // `bid.parent_block_root`.
+  if (bid.slot <= parentBlock.slot) {
+    throw new ExecutionPayloadBidError(GossipAction.REJECT, {
+      code: ExecutionPayloadBidErrorCode.NOT_LATER_THAN_PARENT,
+      parentSlot: parentBlock.slot,
+      slot: bid.slot,
+    });
+  }
+
+  // [REJECT] `bid.execution_payment` is zero.
+  if (bid.executionPayment !== 0n) {
+    throw new ExecutionPayloadBidError(GossipAction.REJECT, {
+      code: ExecutionPayloadBidErrorCode.NON_ZERO_EXECUTION_PAYMENT,
+      builderIndex: bid.builderIndex,
+      executionPayment: bid.executionPayment,
+    });
+  }
+
+  // [REJECT] The length of KZG commitments is less than or equal to the limitation defined in the
+  // consensus layer -- i.e. validate that
+  // `len(bid.blob_kzg_commitments) <= get_blob_parameters(compute_epoch_at_slot(bid.slot)).max_blobs_per_block`.
+  const blobKzgCommitmentsLen = bid.blobKzgCommitments.length;
+  const maxBlobsPerBlock = chain.config.getMaxBlobsPerBlock(computeEpochAtSlot(bid.slot));
+  if (blobKzgCommitmentsLen > maxBlobsPerBlock) {
+    throw new ExecutionPayloadBidError(GossipAction.REJECT, {
+      code: ExecutionPayloadBidErrorCode.TOO_MANY_KZG_COMMITMENTS,
+      blobKzgCommitmentsLen,
+      commitmentLimit: maxBlobsPerBlock,
+    });
+  }
+
+  const state = await chain.regen
+    .getBlockSlotState(parentBlock, bid.slot, {dontTransferCache: true}, RegenCaller.validateApiExecutionPayloadBid)
+    .catch(() => {
+      throw new ExecutionPayloadBidError(GossipAction.IGNORE, {
+        code: ExecutionPayloadBidErrorCode.UNKNOWN_BLOCK_ROOT,
+        parentBlockRoot: bidParentBlockRoot,
+      });
+    });
+
+  if (!isStatePostGloas(state)) {
+    throw new Error(`Expected gloas+ state for execution payload bid validation, got fork=${state.forkName}`);
+  }
+
+  // [REJECT] `bid.builder_index` is within bounds -- i.e. `bid.builder_index < len(state.builders)`.
+  // `state.getBuilder` returns a lazy SSZ `getReadonly` view that is not bounds-checked eagerly; an
+  // out-of-range index only throws (`LeafNode has no right node`) on deferred field access (e.g. inside
+  // `isActiveBuilder`), escaping a try/catch around `getBuilder`. Check the length explicitly instead.
+  if (bid.builderIndex >= state.getBuildersLength()) {
+    throw new ExecutionPayloadBidError(GossipAction.REJECT, {
+      code: ExecutionPayloadBidErrorCode.BUILDER_NOT_ELIGIBLE,
+      builderIndex: bid.builderIndex,
+    });
+  }
+
+  // [REJECT] `bid.builder_index` is a valid/active builder index -- i.e.
+  // `is_active_builder(state, bid.builder_index)` returns `True`.
+  const builder = state.getBuilder(bid.builderIndex);
+  if (!isActiveBuilder(builder, state.finalizedCheckpoint.epoch)) {
+    throw new ExecutionPayloadBidError(GossipAction.REJECT, {
+      code: ExecutionPayloadBidErrorCode.BUILDER_NOT_ELIGIBLE,
+      builderIndex: bid.builderIndex,
+    });
+  }
+
+  // [REJECT] The builder version is `PAYLOAD_BUILDER_VERSION` -- i.e.
+  // `state.builders[bid.builder_index].version == PAYLOAD_BUILDER_VERSION`.
+  if (builder.version !== PAYLOAD_BUILDER_VERSION) {
+    throw new ExecutionPayloadBidError(GossipAction.REJECT, {
+      code: ExecutionPayloadBidErrorCode.INVALID_BUILDER_VERSION,
+      builderIndex: bid.builderIndex,
+      version: builder.version,
+      expectedVersion: PAYLOAD_BUILDER_VERSION,
+    });
+  }
+
+  // [IGNORE] `bid.value` is less or equal than the builder's excess balance --
+  // i.e. `can_builder_cover_bid(state, builder_index, amount)` returns `True`.
+  if (!state.canBuilderCoverBid(bid.builderIndex, bid.value)) {
+    throw new ExecutionPayloadBidError(GossipAction.IGNORE, {
+      code: ExecutionPayloadBidErrorCode.BID_TOO_HIGH,
+      bidValue: bid.value,
+      builderBalance: builder.balance,
+    });
+  }
+
+  // [REJECT] `bid.prev_randao` is the correct RANDAO mix -- i.e. validate that
+  // `bid.prev_randao == get_randao_mix(parent_state, get_current_epoch(parent_state))`.
+  const randaoMix = state.getRandaoMix(computeEpochAtSlot(state.slot));
+  if (!byteArrayEquals(bid.prevRandao, randaoMix)) {
+    throw new ExecutionPayloadBidError(GossipAction.REJECT, {
+      code: ExecutionPayloadBidErrorCode.INVALID_PREV_RANDAO,
+      builderIndex: bid.builderIndex,
+      bidPrevRandao: toHex(bid.prevRandao),
+      expectedPrevRandao: toHex(randaoMix),
+    });
+  }
+
+  // [REJECT] `signed_execution_payload_bid.signature` is valid with respect to the `bid.builder_index`.
+  const signatureSet = createSingleSignatureSetFromComponents(
+    builder.pubkey,
+    getExecutionPayloadBidSigningRoot(chain.config, bid),
+    signedExecutionPayloadBid.signature
+  );
+  if (!(await chain.bls.verifySignatureSets([signatureSet]))) {
+    throw new ExecutionPayloadBidError(GossipAction.REJECT, {
+      code: ExecutionPayloadBidErrorCode.INVALID_SIGNATURE,
+      builderIndex: bid.builderIndex,
+      slot: bid.slot,
+    });
+  }
 }
 
 export async function validateGossipExecutionPayloadBid(
@@ -115,7 +269,7 @@ async function validateExecutionPayloadBid(
 
   // [IGNORE] The bid is compatible with the current head branch.
   const head = chain.forkChoice.getHead();
-  if (!isBidCompatibleWithHead(chain.forkChoice, head, bid.slot, bidParentBlockRoot, bidParentBlockHash)) {
+  if (!isBidCompatibleWithHead(chain, head, bid.slot, bidParentBlockRoot, bidParentBlockHash)) {
     throw new ExecutionPayloadBidError(GossipAction.IGNORE, {
       code: ExecutionPayloadBidErrorCode.INCOMPATIBLE_WITH_HEAD,
       slot: bid.slot,
@@ -314,11 +468,11 @@ async function validateExecutionPayloadBid(
   // increment, see https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/pull/4831. This prevents spam
   // from builders submitting numerous bids with minimal value increments.
   const bestBid = chain.executionPayloadBidPool.getBestBid(bid.slot, bidParentBlockHash, bidParentBlockRoot);
-  if (bestBid !== null && bid.value < getMinBidValue(bestBid.message.value)) {
+  if (bestBid !== null && bid.value < getMinBidValue(bestBid.signedBid.message.value)) {
     throw new ExecutionPayloadBidError(GossipAction.IGNORE, {
       code: ExecutionPayloadBidErrorCode.BID_TOO_LOW,
       bidValue: bid.value,
-      currentHighestBid: bestBid.message.value,
+      currentHighestBid: bestBid.signedBid.message.value,
     });
   }
   // [IGNORE] `bid.value` is less or equal than the builder's excess balance --
@@ -345,7 +499,7 @@ async function validateExecutionPayloadBid(
 
   // [REJECT] `signed_execution_payload_bid.signature` is valid with respect to the `bid.builder_index`.
   const signatureSet = createSingleSignatureSetFromComponents(
-    PublicKey.fromBytes(builder.pubkey),
+    builder.pubkey,
     getExecutionPayloadBidSigningRoot(chain.config, bid),
     signedExecutionPayloadBid.signature
   );

package/src/chain/validation/executionPayloadEnvelope.ts

@@ -170,7 +170,6 @@ async function validateExecutionPayloadEnvelope(
   // by `verify_execution_payload_envelope_signature`.
   const signatureSet = getExecutionPayloadEnvelopeSignatureSet(
     chain.config,
-    chain.pubkeyCache,
     blockState,
     executionPayloadEnvelope,
     payloadInput.proposerIndex

package/src/chain/validation/payloadAttestationMessage.ts

@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
 import {
-  computeEpochAtSlot,
-  createSingleSignatureSetFromComponents,
+  createIndexedSignatureSetFromComponents,
   getPayloadAttestationDataSigningRoot,
   isStatePostGloas,
 } from "@lodestar/state-transition";
@@ -36,7 +35,6 @@ async function validatePayloadAttestationMessage(
   prioritizeBls = false
 ): Promise<PayloadAttestationValidationResult> {
   const {data, validatorIndex} = payloadAttestationMessage;
-  const epoch = computeEpochAtSlot(data.slot);
 
   // [IGNORE] The message's slot is for the current slot (with a `MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY` allowance), i.e. `data.slot == current_slot`.
   if (!chain.clock.isCurrentSlotGivenGossipDisparity(data.slot)) {
@@ -48,9 +46,8 @@ async function validatePayloadAttestationMessage(
   }
 
   // [IGNORE] The `payload_attestation_message` is the first valid message received
-  // from the validator with index `payload_attestation_message.validator_index`.
-  // A single validator can participate PTC at most once per epoch
-  if (chain.seenPayloadAttesters.isKnown(epoch, validatorIndex)) {
+  // for the slot from the validator with index `payload_attestation_message.validator_index`.
+  if (chain.seenPayloadAttesters.isKnown(data.slot, validatorIndex)) {
     throw new PayloadAttestationError(GossipAction.IGNORE, {
       code: PayloadAttestationErrorCode.PAYLOAD_ATTESTATION_ALREADY_KNOWN,
       validatorIndex,
@@ -114,16 +111,8 @@ async function validatePayloadAttestationMessage(
   }
 
   // [REJECT] `payload_attestation_message.signature` is valid with respect to the validator's public key.
-  const validatorPubkey = chain.pubkeyCache.get(validatorIndex);
-  if (!validatorPubkey) {
-    throw new PayloadAttestationError(GossipAction.REJECT, {
-      code: PayloadAttestationErrorCode.INVALID_ATTESTER,
-      attesterIndex: validatorIndex,
-    });
-  }
-
-  const signatureSet = createSingleSignatureSetFromComponents(
-    validatorPubkey,
+  const signatureSet = createIndexedSignatureSetFromComponents(
+    validatorIndex,
     getPayloadAttestationDataSigningRoot(chain.config, data),
     payloadAttestationMessage.signature
   );
@@ -135,7 +124,7 @@ async function validatePayloadAttestationMessage(
   }
 
   // Valid
-  chain.seenPayloadAttesters.add(epoch, validatorIndex);
+  chain.seenPayloadAttesters.add(data.slot, validatorIndex);
 
   return {
     attDataRootHex: toRootHex(ssz.gloas.PayloadAttestationData.hashTreeRoot(data)),

package/src/chain/validation/proposerPreferences.ts

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 import {IForkChoice, ProtoBlock} from "@lodestar/fork-choice";
-import {GENESIS_EPOCH, GENESIS_SLOT, MIN_SEED_LOOKAHEAD, SLOTS_PER_EPOCH} from "@lodestar/params";
+import {GENESIS_EPOCH, GENESIS_SLOT, MIN_SEED_LOOKAHEAD, SLOTS_PER_EPOCH, isForkPostGloas} from "@lodestar/params";
 import {
   computeEpochAtSlot,
   computeStartSlotAtEpoch,
-  createSingleSignatureSetFromComponents,
+  createIndexedSignatureSetFromComponents,
   getProposerPreferencesSigningRoot,
 } from "@lodestar/state-transition";
 import {Epoch, Slot, ValidatorIndex, gloas} from "@lodestar/types";
@@ -24,6 +24,16 @@ export async function validateGossipProposerPreferences(
   const dependentRootHex = toRootHex(dependentRoot);
   const proposalEpoch = computeEpochAtSlot(proposalSlot);
 
+  // [IGNORE] The proposal epoch is after the Gloas upgrade
+  const proposalFork = chain.config.getForkName(proposalSlot);
+  if (!isForkPostGloas(proposalFork)) {
+    throw new ProposerPreferencesError(GossipAction.IGNORE, {
+      code: ProposerPreferencesErrorCode.PRE_GLOAS_PROPOSAL_SLOT,
+      proposalSlot,
+      proposalFork,
+    });
+  }
+
   // [IGNORE] `preferences.proposal_slot` is within the proposer lookahead,
   // allowing for `MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY`.
   const currentEpoch = computeEpochAtSlot(chain.clock.currentSlotWithGossipDisparity);
@@ -129,8 +139,8 @@ export async function validateGossipProposerPreferences(
   }
 
   // [REJECT] `signed_proposer_preferences.signature` is valid with respect to the validator's public key.
-  const signatureSet = createSingleSignatureSetFromComponents(
-    chain.pubkeyCache.getOrThrow(validatorIndex),
+  const signatureSet = createIndexedSignatureSetFromComponents(
+    validatorIndex,
     getProposerPreferencesSigningRoot(chain.config, preferences),
     signedProposerPreferences.signature
   );

package/src/chain/validation/proposerSlashing.ts

@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ async function validateProposerSlashing(
   try {
     const proposer = state.getValidator(proposerSlashing.signedHeader1.message.proposerIndex);
     // verifySignature = false, verified in batch below
-    assertValidProposerSlashing(chain.config, chain.pubkeyCache, state.slot, proposerSlashing, proposer, false);
+    assertValidProposerSlashing(chain.config, state.slot, proposerSlashing, proposer, false);
   } catch (e) {
     throw new ProposerSlashingError(GossipAction.REJECT, {
       code: ProposerSlashingErrorCode.INVALID,

package/src/chain/validation/voluntaryExit.ts

@@ -9,12 +9,69 @@ import {
 import {IBeaconChain} from "../index.js";
 import {RegenCaller} from "../regen/index.js";
 
+export type ApiVoluntaryExitResult = {status: "published"} | {status: "deferred"; validity: VoluntaryExitValidity};
+
+// Variants that can become valid in a future epoch without user action.
+// - earlyEpoch: exit.message.epoch is in the future; valid once current epoch catches up
+// - shortTimeActive: validator active < SHARD_COMMITTEE_PERIOD; valid once enough time passes
+// - pendingWithdrawals: Electra; valid once pending partial withdrawals drain
+// Note: VoluntaryExitValidity.inactive is intentionally excluded. It conflates
+// "validator does not exist" (permanent) with "validator not yet activated"
+// (transient), and cleanly classifying it requires splitting the enum variant
+// upstream. Left for a future follow-up.
+
+export function isTransientExitValidity(v: VoluntaryExitValidity): boolean {
+  switch (v) {
+    case VoluntaryExitValidity.earlyEpoch:
+    case VoluntaryExitValidity.shortTimeActive:
+    case VoluntaryExitValidity.pendingWithdrawals:
+      return true;
+    case VoluntaryExitValidity.valid:
+    case VoluntaryExitValidity.inactive:
+    case VoluntaryExitValidity.alreadyExited:
+    case VoluntaryExitValidity.invalidSignature:
+      return false;
+  }
+}
+
+// Comments for each call are present inside `validateVoluntaryExit`.
 export async function validateApiVoluntaryExit(
   chain: IBeaconChain,
   voluntaryExit: phase0.SignedVoluntaryExit
-): Promise<void> {
+): Promise<ApiVoluntaryExitResult> {
   const prioritizeBls = true;
-  return validateVoluntaryExit(chain, voluntaryExit, prioritizeBls);
+
+  if (
+    chain.opPool.hasSeenVoluntaryExit(voluntaryExit.message.validatorIndex) ||
+    chain.deferredVoluntaryExitPool.has(voluntaryExit.message.validatorIndex)
+  ) {
+    throw new VoluntaryExitError(GossipAction.IGNORE, {
+      code: VoluntaryExitErrorCode.ALREADY_EXISTS,
+    });
+  }
+
+  const state = await chain.getHeadStateAtCurrentEpoch(RegenCaller.validateApiVoluntaryExit);
+  const validity = state.getVoluntaryExitValidity(voluntaryExit, false);
+
+  if (validity !== VoluntaryExitValidity.valid && !isTransientExitValidity(validity)) {
+    throw new VoluntaryExitError(GossipAction.REJECT, {
+      code: voluntaryExitValidityToErrorCode(validity),
+    });
+  }
+
+  const signatureSet = getVoluntaryExitSignatureSet(chain.config, state, voluntaryExit);
+  if (!(await chain.bls.verifySignatureSets([signatureSet], {batchable: true, priority: prioritizeBls}))) {
+    throw new VoluntaryExitError(GossipAction.REJECT, {
+      code: VoluntaryExitErrorCode.INVALID_SIGNATURE,
+    });
+  }
+
+  if (validity !== VoluntaryExitValidity.valid) {
+    // Transient failure — signature is good, defer
+    return {status: "deferred", validity};
+  }
+
+  return {status: "published"};
 }
 
 export async function validateGossipVoluntaryExit(