@locker/cli 0.29.0 → 0.29.2

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
@@ -59,6 +59,14 @@
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  function ObjectLookupOwnGetter$LWS$1(object$LWS, key$LWS) {
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  return object$LWS === null || object$LWS === undefined || !ObjectHasOwn$LWS$1(object$LWS, key$LWS) ? undefined : ReflectApply$LWS$1(ObjectProtoLookupGetter$LWS$1, object$LWS, [key$LWS]);
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  }
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+ // Like ObjectLookupOwnGetter but without the own-property guard, so it resolves
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+ // a getter defined anywhere on the prototype chain (__lookupGetter__ walks up).
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+ // Use this when an accessor may live on a base interface's prototype rather than
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+ // on `object` itself, e.g. an accessor the platform relocates between interface
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+ // prototypes across browser versions.
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+ function ObjectLookupGetter$LWS(object$LWS, key$LWS) {
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+ return object$LWS === null || object$LWS === undefined ? undefined : ReflectApply$LWS$1(ObjectProtoLookupGetter$LWS$1, object$LWS, [key$LWS]);
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+ }
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  function ObjectLookupOwnSetter$LWS(object$LWS, key$LWS) {
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  return object$LWS === null || object$LWS === undefined || !ObjectHasOwn$LWS$1(object$LWS, key$LWS) ? undefined : ReflectApply$LWS$1(ObjectProtoLookupSetter$LWS$1, object$LWS, [key$LWS]);
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  }
@@ -1018,6 +1026,10 @@
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  const {
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  parse: JSONParse$LWS
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  } = JSON;
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+ // Used by '@locker/near-membrane-dom'.
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+ const {
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+ stringify: JSONStringify$LWS$1
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+ } = JSON;
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  function getNearMembraneProxySerializedValue$LWS$1(object$LWS) {
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  if (typeof object$LWS === 'object' && object$LWS !== null || typeof object$LWS === 'function') {
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  // To extract the serialized value of a blue near-membrane proxy we must
@@ -1370,7 +1382,7 @@
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  // reads identically to what isGaterEnabledFeature stores (register and
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  // deregister also accept the short form via fullName above). Frozen so a
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  // consumer cannot mutate the shared array.
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- Object.freeze([`${FEATURE_NAME_PREFIX$LWS}changesSince.260`, `${FEATURE_NAME_PREFIX$LWS}changesSince.262`, `${FEATURE_NAME_PREFIX$LWS}changesSince.264`, `${FEATURE_NAME_PREFIX$LWS}changesSince.266`, `${FEATURE_NAME_PREFIX$LWS}htmlAnchorElementHrefValidation`, `${FEATURE_NAME_PREFIX$LWS}enableSandboxedSameOriginIframe`, `${FEATURE_NAME_PREFIX$LWS}xmlEntityAttackPrologScan`]);
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+ Object.freeze([`${FEATURE_NAME_PREFIX$LWS}changesSince.260`, `${FEATURE_NAME_PREFIX$LWS}changesSince.262`, `${FEATURE_NAME_PREFIX$LWS}changesSince.264`, `${FEATURE_NAME_PREFIX$LWS}changesSince.266`, `${FEATURE_NAME_PREFIX$LWS}htmlAnchorElementHrefValidation`, `${FEATURE_NAME_PREFIX$LWS}enableSandboxedSameOriginIframe`, `${FEATURE_NAME_PREFIX$LWS}iframeSrcSameOriginPreflightCheck`, `${FEATURE_NAME_PREFIX$LWS}xmlEntityAttackPrologScan`, `${FEATURE_NAME_PREFIX$LWS}blockWindowOpenSameOriginSameContext`, `${FEATURE_NAME_PREFIX$LWS}walkRangeProtoChainForMethods`]);
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  function registerGaterEnabledFeatures$LWS(lockerGaterEnabledFeatures$LWS) {
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  if (ArrayIsArray$LWS$1(lockerGaterEnabledFeatures$LWS)) {
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  lockerGaterEnabledFeatures$LWS.forEach(feature$LWS => gaterEnabledFeatures$LWS.add(fullName$LWS(feature$LWS)));
@@ -1379,6 +1391,7 @@
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  function isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS(featureName$LWS) {
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  return gaterEnabledFeatures$LWS.has(fullName$LWS(featureName$LWS));
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  }
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+ const COUNT_DISPATCH_EVENT_DETAIL_REFERENCES_GATE$LWS = 'countDispatchEventDetailReferences';
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  const ENABLE_MAX_PERF_MODE_GATE$LWS = 'enableMaxPerfMode';
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  const ENABLE_SANDBOX_CREATED_INSTRUMENTATION_GATE$LWS = 'enableSandboxCreatedInstrumentation';
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  const ENABLE_SANDBOXED_SAMEORIGIN_IFRAME_GATE$LWS = 'enableSandboxedSameOriginIframe';
@@ -1555,7 +1568,7 @@
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  const PromiseResolve$LWS = PromiseCtor$LWS.resolve.bind(PromiseCtor$LWS);
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  const PromiseReject$LWS = PromiseCtor$LWS.reject.bind(PromiseCtor$LWS);
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  toSafeSet$LWS(new SetCtor$LWS$1());
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- /*! version: 0.29.0 */
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+ /*! version: 0.29.2 */
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  /*!
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  * Copyright (C) 2019 salesforce.com, inc.
@@ -2125,9 +2138,19 @@
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  }
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  const NodeProtoOwnerDocumentGetter$LWS = ObjectLookupOwnGetter$LWS$1(NodeProto$LWS$1, 'ownerDocument');
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  ObjectLookupOwnGetter$LWS$1(NodeProto$LWS$1, 'parentNode');
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- ReflectGetOwnPropertyDescriptor$LWS(NodeProto$LWS$1, 'textContent');
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+ const {
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+ get: NodeProtoTextContentGetter$LWS,
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+ set: NodeProtoTextContentSetter$LWS
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+ } = ReflectGetOwnPropertyDescriptor$LWS(NodeProto$LWS$1, 'textContent');
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  const rootDocumentDetachedFragment$LWS = ReflectApply$LWS$1(DocumentProtoCreateDocumentFragment$LWS, rootDocument$LWS, []);
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  const rootDocumentDetachedContainer$LWS = ReflectApply$LWS$1(DocumentProtoCreateElement$LWS$1, rootDocument$LWS, ['div']);
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+ // Inert parse surface for the hidden-<script> heuristic (changesSince.266,
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+ // W-23595929). Template contents are parsed into an inert template-owner
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+ // document: custom elements are never upgraded, scripts never execute, and
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+ // resource-loading attributes never fire — so setting innerHTML here decodes
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+ // entities/obfuscation exactly like a live parse but has no observable side
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+ // effects in the shared realm.
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+ const rootDocumentDetachedTemplate$LWS = ReflectApply$LWS$1(DocumentProtoCreateElement$LWS$1, rootDocument$LWS, ['template']);
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  // Regex to match null bytes and zero-width characters that browsers may strip or ignore
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  // \x00 - Null byte
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  // \u00AD - Soft Hyphen
@@ -2171,11 +2194,49 @@
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  // bounded the token but left the regex free to roam the whole 30 KB–2 MB slice.)
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  const PROLOG_DOCTYPE_INTERNAL_SUBSET_REGEX$LWS = /^<!doctype\s+[^>\s]+\s*\[/;
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  const PROLOG_DOCTYPE_EXTERNAL_ENTITY_REGEX$LWS = /^<!doctype\s+[^>\s]+\s+(?:system|public)\s/;
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+ // Two regexes together detect a namespaced <script> that an HTML parser leaves
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+ // inert but an XML parser makes executable once its namespace resolves.
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+ //
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+ // (1) NAMESPACED_SCRIPT_XMLNS_REGEX — the xmlns declaration sits INSIDE the
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+ // script start tag. Matches <script or <prefix:script (the leading [<:]), then a
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+ // whitespace or `/` separator so decoy tags like <scripting> or <scriptx> are
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+ // not matched, then scans the start tag up to xmlns. The gap alternation treats
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+ // quoted attribute values as opaque ("[^"]*" and '[^']*') so a `>` inside an
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+ // attribute value (e.g. title=">") cannot prematurely end the start tag and let
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+ // the real xmlns escape the scan. This is the self-declared shape:
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+ // <script xmlns="..."> or <prefix:script ... xmlns:prefix="...">.
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+ //
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+ // (2) PREFIXED_SCRIPT_TAG_REGEX — a namespace-PREFIXED <prefix:script> tag,
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+ // whatever its attributes. XML namespaces are inherited down the tree, so the
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+ // xmlns:prefix binding can sit on an ANCESTOR — the idiomatic
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+ // <svg xmlns:a="..."><a:script/></svg> shape — rather than on the script tag
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+ // itself, where regex (1) would never see it (the declaration precedes the
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+ // script in document order). isXMLNamespacedScriptAttack pairs a match here with
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+ // a body-wide "xmlns" lookup: a prefixed script whose prefix is bound anywhere
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+ // in scope can execute. The prefixed form does not occur in benign HTML (an HTML
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+ // parser treats <a:script> as an unknown, inert element), so this reintroduces
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+ // the ancestor-inheritance vector without reviving the "plain <script> + an
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+ // unrelated 'xmlns' string" false positives that motivated narrowing regex (1) —
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+ // those bodies carry no prefixed script tag. The [^\s/>]+ prefix requires at
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+ // least one non-whitespace, non-`/`, non-`>` character before `:script`, which
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+ // is what keeps a plain <script> (no prefix) from matching.
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+ const NAMESPACED_SCRIPT_XMLNS_REGEX$LWS = /[<:]script[\s/](?:[^>"']|"[^"]*"|'[^']*')*xmlns/;
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+ const PREFIXED_SCRIPT_TAG_REGEX$LWS = /<[^\s/>]+:script[\s/>]/;
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  const DOCTYPE_OPENER$LWS = '<!doctype';
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  const PI_OPENER$LWS = '<?';
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  const PI_CLOSER$LWS = '?>';
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  const COMMENT_OPENER$LWS = '<!--';
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  const COMMENT_CLOSER$LWS = '-->';
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+ const CDATA_OPENER$LWS = '<![cdata[';
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+ const CDATA_CLOSER$LWS = ']]>';
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+ // A processing instruction whose target is exactly `xml-stylesheet`. Written as
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+ // the PI opener plus the target so the whole-input walk below can match it in one
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+ // StartsWith and then confirm the target boundary.
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+ const XML_STYLESHEET_PI_TARGET$LWS = `${PI_OPENER$LWS}xml-stylesheet`;
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+ // The `type` pseudo-attribute values Chromium's XSLT engine recognizes on an
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+ // `xml-stylesheet` PI. A stylesheet PI declaring any other type (e.g. text/css)
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+ // is a styling directive, not a script-execution vector, so it is left alone.
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+ const XSL_TYPE_TOKENS$LWS = ['text/xsl', 'application/xslt+xml'];
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  // Locate a DOCTYPE that sits in the document prolog — the only position where a
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  // DTD is actually parsed and where entity definitions can take effect. A DTD is
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  // only meaningful before the root element's start tag; anything after the root
@@ -2234,6 +2295,77 @@
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  }
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  return null;
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  }
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+ // Locate an `xml-stylesheet` processing instruction that declares an XSLT
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+ // stylesheet (W-23657156). Unlike a DTD, such a PI is dangerous wherever the XML
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+ // parser materializes it as a node — the prolog, element content, or the epilog
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+ // — because the attacker does not use it in place: they read the parsed PI node
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+ // out of the (context-less, inert) DOMParser document and append it to the LIVE
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+ // document, where Chromium's native XSLT engine fetches the stylesheet and
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+ // commits a transform whose output script runs in the host realm. So this scans
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+ // the WHOLE input, not just the prolog, skipping only comment (`<!-- -->`) and
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+ // CDATA (`<![CDATA[ ]]>`) spans — the two regions where `<?xml-stylesheet` is
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+ // inert character data the parser never turns into a PI node.
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+ //
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+ // Only a PI whose target is exactly `xml-stylesheet` and whose data carries an
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+ // XSL `type` token matches Chromium's XSLT trigger. PI data is NOT
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+ // entity-decoded by the XML parser, so a literal substring test on the PI's own
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+ // `<? ... ?>` span is faithful — an obfuscated `&#x74;ext/xsl` is read verbatim
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+ // and never fires. A text/css stylesheet PI has no XSL type token and is left
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+ // alone.
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+ function hasXSLStylesheetProcessingInstruction$LWS(normalizedInput$LWS) {
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+ const {
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+ length: length$LWS
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+ } = normalizedInput$LWS;
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+ let index$LWS = 0;
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+ while (index$LWS < length$LWS) {
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+ // Skip comment spans: <!-- ... --> is inert text, never a PI node.
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+ if (ReflectApply$LWS$1(StringProtoStartsWith$LWS, normalizedInput$LWS, [COMMENT_OPENER$LWS, index$LWS])) {
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+ const closerOffset$LWS = ReflectApply$LWS$1(StringProtoIndexOf$LWS, normalizedInput$LWS, [COMMENT_CLOSER$LWS, index$LWS + COMMENT_OPENER$LWS.length]);
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+ // Unterminated comment: everything after it is inert; no live PI follows.
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+ if (closerOffset$LWS === -1) {
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+ return false;
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+ }
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+ index$LWS = closerOffset$LWS + COMMENT_CLOSER$LWS.length;
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+ continue;
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+ }
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+ // Skip CDATA spans: <![CDATA[ ... ]]> is inert text, never a PI node.
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+ if (ReflectApply$LWS$1(StringProtoStartsWith$LWS, normalizedInput$LWS, [CDATA_OPENER$LWS, index$LWS])) {
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+ const closerOffset$LWS = ReflectApply$LWS$1(StringProtoIndexOf$LWS, normalizedInput$LWS, [CDATA_CLOSER$LWS, index$LWS + CDATA_OPENER$LWS.length]);
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+ if (closerOffset$LWS === -1) {
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+ return false;
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+ }
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+ index$LWS = closerOffset$LWS + CDATA_CLOSER$LWS.length;
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+ continue;
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+ }
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+ // A processing instruction: <? ... ?>. Classify it, then advance past it.
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+ if (ReflectApply$LWS$1(StringProtoStartsWith$LWS, normalizedInput$LWS, [PI_OPENER$LWS, index$LWS])) {
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+ const closerOffset$LWS = ReflectApply$LWS$1(StringProtoIndexOf$LWS, normalizedInput$LWS, [PI_CLOSER$LWS, index$LWS + PI_OPENER$LWS.length]);
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+ // Unterminated PI: the parser produces no node from it.
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+ if (closerOffset$LWS === -1) {
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+ return false;
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+ }
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+ if (ReflectApply$LWS$1(StringProtoStartsWith$LWS, normalizedInput$LWS, [XML_STYLESHEET_PI_TARGET$LWS, index$LWS])) {
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+ // Confirm the target ends exactly at `xml-stylesheet`; the next
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+ // character must be PI whitespace or the closing `?`, so a longer
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+ // target such as `xml-stylesheetfoo` (which Chromium would not fire)
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+ // is not misread as the stylesheet PI.
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+ const boundaryChar$LWS = ReflectApply$LWS$1(StringProtoCharAt$LWS, normalizedInput$LWS, [index$LWS + XML_STYLESHEET_PI_TARGET$LWS.length]);
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+ if (boundaryChar$LWS === ' ' || boundaryChar$LWS === '\t' || boundaryChar$LWS === '\n' || boundaryChar$LWS === '\r' || boundaryChar$LWS === '?') {
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+ const piData$LWS = ReflectApply$LWS$1(StringProtoSlice$LWS$1, normalizedInput$LWS, [index$LWS, closerOffset$LWS]);
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+ for (let i$LWS = 0; i$LWS < XSL_TYPE_TOKENS$LWS.length; i$LWS += 1) {
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+ if (ReflectApply$LWS$1(StringProtoIncludes$LWS, piData$LWS, [XSL_TYPE_TOKENS$LWS[i$LWS]])) {
2357
+ return true;
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+ }
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+ }
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+ }
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+ }
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+ index$LWS = closerOffset$LWS + PI_CLOSER$LWS.length;
2363
+ continue;
2364
+ }
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+ index$LWS += 1;
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+ }
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+ return false;
2368
+ }
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  /* eslint-disable no-underscore-dangle */
2238
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  class Validator$LWS {
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  constructor(document$LWS, {
@@ -2280,11 +2412,50 @@
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  // when the namespace is XHTML or SVG. The namespace URL itself can be
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  // obfuscated with XML character entities in attribute values, but the
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2414
  // xmlns attribute name cannot, so checking for "xmlns" is reliable.
2415
+ //
2416
+ // With the iframeSrcSameOriginPreflightCheck gate on, a plain <script> plus
2417
+ // the substring "xmlns" elsewhere in the body is no longer enough; the xmlns
2418
+ // must actually be able to namespace a script. Two shapes qualify:
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+ // (1) the xmlns declaration sits inside the script start tag itself
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+ // (<script xmlns="..."> / <prefix:script ... xmlns:prefix="...">), or
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+ // (2) a namespace-PREFIXED <prefix:script> whose xmlns:prefix binding sits
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+ // on an ancestor — XML inherits namespaces down the tree, so the
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+ // declaration need not be on the script tag (the idiomatic
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+ // <svg xmlns:a="..."><a:script/></svg> shape). This pairs the prefixed
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+ // form (never emitted by benign HTML) with a body-wide "xmlns" lookup.
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+ // The legacy form (gate off) only checked for a <script> tag and the
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+ // substring "xmlns" anywhere in the body; that false-positived on benign
2428
+ // HTML that carries a plain <script> and also mentions "xmlns" in an
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+ // unrelated place (a sanitizer's attribute allowlist, an SVG child element,
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+ // a string literal). Shape (1) alone would miss ancestor-declared namespace
2431
+ // inheritance (W-23924612 review, verified in Deno and Bun); shape (2)
2432
+ // restores it without reviving the plain-<script> false positives. This is
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+ // the 264-patch narrowing (W-23591510, #2218) forward-ported to 266 under
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+ // the same gate that gates the iframe.src pre-flight feature, so the two
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+ // trains agree on both the check and the gate that controls it.
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2436
  // eslint-disable-next-line class-methods-use-this
2284
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  this.isXMLNamespacedScriptAttack = input$LWS => {
2438
+ if (isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS('iframeSrcSameOriginPreflightCheck')) {
2439
+ const normalizedInput$LWS = ReflectApply$LWS$1(StringProtoReplace$LWS, normalizeInput$LWS(input$LWS), [/\s+/g, ' ']);
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+ // (1) Self-declared: xmlns inside the script start tag.
2441
+ if (ReflectApply$LWS$1(RegExpProtoTest$LWS$1, NAMESPACED_SCRIPT_XMLNS_REGEX$LWS, [normalizedInput$LWS])) {
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+ return true;
2443
+ }
2444
+ // (2) Inherited: a prefixed <prefix:script> plus an xmlns declaration
2445
+ // anywhere in the body, which can bind the prefix from an ancestor.
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+ return ReflectApply$LWS$1(RegExpProtoTest$LWS$1, PREFIXED_SCRIPT_TAG_REGEX$LWS, [normalizedInput$LWS]) && ReflectApply$LWS$1(StringProtoIncludes$LWS, normalizedInput$LWS, ['xmlns']);
2447
+ }
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  const normalizedInput$LWS = normalizeInput$LWS(input$LWS);
2286
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  return hasTag$LWS(normalizedInput$LWS, 'script') && ReflectApply$LWS$1(StringProtoIncludes$LWS, normalizedInput$LWS, ['xmlns']);
2287
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  };
2451
+ // Detect an `xml-stylesheet` processing instruction that declares an XSLT
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+ // stylesheet (W-23657156). See hasXSLStylesheetProcessingInstruction for the
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+ // full attack chain. Applied to the XML/XHTML/SVG parse paths of
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+ // DOMParser.parseFromString, which hand their input to the native parser
2455
+ // unsanitized and would otherwise mint a live, relocatable PI node that
2456
+ // sandboxed code can append to the live document to fire native XSLT.
2457
+ // eslint-disable-next-line class-methods-use-this
2458
+ this.isXMLStylesheetProcessingInstructionAttack = input$LWS => hasXSLStylesheetProcessingInstruction$LWS(normalizeInput$LWS(input$LWS));
2288
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  // Detects the iframe+srcdoc substring combination in raw input.
2289
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  // Any HTML or XML containing both <iframe> and the substring
2290
2461
  // 'srcdoc' is considered hostile, regardless of where the
@@ -2329,23 +2500,55 @@
2329
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  if (!hasScript$LWS) {
2330
2501
  return false;
2331
2502
  }
2503
+ // changesSince.266 (W-23595929): decide the hidden-<script> verdict by
2504
+ // parsing into an inert <template>, never a live <div> owned by the shared
2505
+ // root document. Setting innerHTML on a rootDocument-owned element runs the
2506
+ // HTML fragment parser in the shared realm, and that parse upgrades any
2507
+ // custom element it encounters — running the element's constructor
2508
+ // SYNCHRONOUSLY, before this inspection returns the verdict that would
2509
+ // reject the input. An attacker who replays a leaked `lskey` registry token
2510
+ // can route that upgrade to a sandbox-defined constructor and have it run in
2511
+ // the host realm as a side effect of this supposedly-inert text check (the
2512
+ // clone-a-live-<script> escape). Template contents are inert, so the parse
2513
+ // still decodes entities/obfuscation for an accurate innerHTML-vs-text
2514
+ // comparison but cannot upgrade custom elements, execute scripts, or fire
2515
+ // resource-loading attributes. Mirrors the ContentType.SVG template fix in
2516
+ // @locker/internal-policy.
2517
+ if (isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS('changesSince.266')) {
2518
+ ReflectApply$LWS$1(ElementProtoInnerHTMLSetter$LWS, rootDocumentDetachedTemplate$LWS, [normalizedInput$LWS]);
2519
+ // Element.prototype.innerHTML on a <template> reflects the serialized
2520
+ // template contents, but textContent must be read off the content
2521
+ // fragment: the parsed nodes live there, not as children of the
2522
+ // <template> element itself (template.textContent would be '').
2523
+ const innerHTML$LWS = ReflectApply$LWS$1(ElementProtoInnerHTMLGetter$LWS, rootDocumentDetachedTemplate$LWS, []);
2524
+ const content$LWS = ReflectApply$LWS$1(HTMLTemplateElementProtoContentGetter$LWS, rootDocumentDetachedTemplate$LWS, []);
2525
+ const textContent$LWS = toSafeStringValue$LWS(ReflectApply$LWS$1(NodeProtoTextContentGetter$LWS, content$LWS, []));
2526
+ // Release the parsed nodes so nothing lingers on the shared template
2527
+ // between calls.
2528
+ ReflectApply$LWS$1(ElementProtoInnerHTMLSetter$LWS, rootDocumentDetachedTemplate$LWS, ['']);
2529
+ // The legacy detached-<div> path reads innerText from an unrendered
2530
+ // element, which per spec is that element's textContent — the same value
2531
+ // read above. Strip < > : so a decoded entity such as &lt;script&gt; in
2532
+ // visible text cannot mask a genuinely hidden <script> (same rationale as
2533
+ // the changesSince.262 strip in the legacy path below).
2534
+ const checkableText$LWS = ReflectApply$LWS$1(StringProtoReplace$LWS, textContent$LWS, [/[<>:]/g, '']);
2535
+ return hasTag$LWS(innerHTML$LWS, 'script') && !hasTag$LWS(checkableText$LWS, 'script');
2536
+ }
2332
2537
  // This is obnoxious... jsdom doesn't implement HTMLElement.prototype.innerText
2333
2538
  if (!HTMLElementProtoInnerTextGetter$LWS) {
2334
2539
  return true;
2335
2540
  }
2336
- // If the input contained the word "script", then we need to confirm that the string
2337
- // that was seen is actually markup.
2338
- //
2339
- // IMPORTANT: We CANNOT reuse this.template.left/right for this check. Template elements
2340
- // do not return innerText or textContent, which makes the following innerHTML/innerText
2341
- // check useless.
2342
- ReflectApply$LWS$1(DocumentFragmentProtoAppend$LWS, rootDocumentDetachedFragment$LWS, [rootDocumentDetachedContainer$LWS]);
2343
- ReflectApply$LWS$1(ElementProtoInnerHTMLSetter$LWS, rootDocumentDetachedContainer$LWS, [normalizedInput$LWS]);
2344
- // This MUST BE CHECKED AFTER IT IS RENDERED. The nature of these attacks requires
2345
- // the actual source to be set to the innerHTML to allow the browser to render
2346
- const innerHTML$LWS = ReflectApply$LWS$1(ElementProtoInnerHTMLGetter$LWS, rootDocumentDetachedContainer$LWS, []);
2347
- const innerText$LWS = ReflectApply$LWS$1(HTMLElementProtoInnerTextGetter$LWS, rootDocumentDetachedContainer$LWS, []);
2348
- ReflectApply$LWS$1(ElementProtoRemove$LWS$1, rootDocumentDetachedContainer$LWS, []);
2541
+ // The input contains the word "script"; confirm it is actually markup by
2542
+ // rendering it on the shared detached container and comparing the parsed
2543
+ // innerHTML against the visible innerText. IMPORTANT: We CANNOT reuse
2544
+ // this._templates.left/right here — template elements return neither
2545
+ // innerText nor textContent, which would make the comparison useless. The
2546
+ // values MUST be read after rendering: the browser has to parse the source
2547
+ // for the hidden-script shape to surface.
2548
+ const {
2549
+ innerHTML: innerHTML$LWS,
2550
+ innerText: innerText$LWS
2551
+ } = htmlParserRoundTrip$LWS(normalizedInput$LWS);
2349
2552
  // If innerHTML contains "script", but innerText does not, then the string
2350
2553
  // was hiding a script element through some kind of obfuscation, and is unsecure.
2351
2554
  let checkableInnerText$LWS = innerText$LWS;
@@ -2357,6 +2560,65 @@
2357
2560
  }
2358
2561
  return hasTag$LWS(innerHTML$LWS, 'script') && !hasTag$LWS(checkableInnerText$LWS, 'script');
2359
2562
  };
2563
+ // Detect a <script> that the HTML parser hides inside a raw-text / RCDATA
2564
+ // element (textarea, title, style, xmp, ...) but the XML parser exposes as
2565
+ // a live element. XMLDocument-owned elements are parsed with the XML parser,
2566
+ // which has NO raw-text elements: <textarea><script>...</script></textarea>
2567
+ // is inert escaped text under HTML, but a live, clonable HTMLScriptElement
2568
+ // under XML. cloneNode + adoption into the HTML document then promotes it to
2569
+ // an executing script (W-23486666).
2570
+ //
2571
+ // isIframeSrcdocScriptAttack cannot see this: it renders through the HTML
2572
+ // parser, where the swallowed <script> becomes `&lt;script&gt;` text and no
2573
+ // live tag survives, so its `hasTag(innerHTML, 'script')` clause is false.
2574
+ // We instead flag the HTML-vs-XML divergence directly: the source text
2575
+ // contains a <script> tag, yet an HTML round-trip does NOT preserve it as a
2576
+ // live <script>. A bare or foster-parented <script> survives the round-trip
2577
+ // (and is already rejected by isIframeSrcdocScriptAttack); only one absorbed
2578
+ // into raw text disappears — the XML-only exploit. Intended for the
2579
+ // XMLDocument-owned branch of the HTML-injection sinks; HTML-owned elements
2580
+ // genuinely treat that content as inert text and must not reach this check.
2581
+ // eslint-disable-next-line class-methods-use-this
2582
+ this.isXMLScriptInRawTextElementAttack = input$LWS => {
2583
+ const normalizedInput$LWS = normalizeInput$LWS(input$LWS);
2584
+ // No <script> in the source text: nothing an XML parser could make live.
2585
+ if (!hasTag$LWS(normalizedInput$LWS, 'script')) {
2586
+ return false;
2587
+ }
2588
+ // changesSince.266 (W-23657409): decide the HTML-vs-XML divergence by
2589
+ // parsing into the inert <template>, never the live shared <div>. This is
2590
+ // the same shared-realm-upgrade hazard the changesSince.266 fix above
2591
+ // closed for isIframeSrcdocScriptAttack (W-23595929): setting innerHTML on
2592
+ // the rootDocument-owned <div> runs the HTML fragment parser in the shared
2593
+ // realm and upgrades any registered custom element the markup contains,
2594
+ // running a sandbox-defined constructor SYNCHRONOUSLY against a host-realm
2595
+ // element (its this.parentNode is the shared container, whose ownerDocument
2596
+ // and defaultView are the host document and window) — a full membrane
2597
+ // breach, and before this check even returns its verdict. This path is
2598
+ // reachable at the gate whenever the <script> is hidden in a raw-text /
2599
+ // RCDATA element (<textarea><script>...), because that shape makes
2600
+ // isIframeSrcdocScriptAttack return false and fall through to here. Template
2601
+ // contents are inert (no upgrade, no script execution, no resource loads)
2602
+ // and the HTML fragment parser's raw-text/RCDATA handling is identical, so
2603
+ // the <script>-survival verdict is unchanged. With the gate off the legacy
2604
+ // shared-container round-trip is preserved.
2605
+ if (isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS('changesSince.266')) {
2606
+ ReflectApply$LWS$1(ElementProtoInnerHTMLSetter$LWS, rootDocumentDetachedTemplate$LWS, [normalizedInput$LWS]);
2607
+ const templateInnerHTML$LWS = ReflectApply$LWS$1(ElementProtoInnerHTMLGetter$LWS, rootDocumentDetachedTemplate$LWS, []);
2608
+ // Release the parsed nodes so nothing lingers on the shared template
2609
+ // between calls.
2610
+ ReflectApply$LWS$1(ElementProtoInnerHTMLSetter$LWS, rootDocumentDetachedTemplate$LWS, ['']);
2611
+ return !hasTag$LWS(templateInnerHTML$LWS, 'script');
2612
+ }
2613
+ // Legacy (gate off): round-trip through the shared live container. If the
2614
+ // <script> survives as a live tag it is caught by isIframeSrcdocScriptAttack;
2615
+ // if it vanished, the HTML parser absorbed it into a raw-text / RCDATA
2616
+ // element where the XML parser would not.
2617
+ const {
2618
+ innerHTML: innerHTML$LWS
2619
+ } = htmlParserRoundTrip$LWS(normalizedInput$LWS);
2620
+ return !hasTag$LWS(innerHTML$LWS, 'script');
2621
+ };
2360
2622
  this.isSharedElement = element$LWS => element$LWS === ReflectApply$LWS$1(DocumentProtoHeadGetter$LWS, this._document, []) || element$LWS === ReflectApply$LWS$1(DocumentProtoBodyGetter$LWS$1, this._document, []) || element$LWS === ReflectApply$LWS$1(DocumentProtoDocumentElementGetter$LWS, this._document, []);
2361
2623
  // Detects whether `node` belongs to a document that an attacker
2362
2624
  // could have populated with content bypassing LWS distortions.
@@ -2447,6 +2709,25 @@
2447
2709
  }
2448
2710
  return false;
2449
2711
  }
2712
+ // Render `normalizedInput` once through the HTML parser on the shared detached
2713
+ // container and return both its serialized innerHTML and its rendered innerText.
2714
+ // isIframeSrcdocScriptAttack (hidden-script: innerHTML has a script, innerText
2715
+ // does not) and isXMLScriptInRawTextElementAttack (HTML-vs-XML divergence: source
2716
+ // has a script, the round-tripped innerHTML does not) both derive their answer
2717
+ // from this single parse, so they share one setter invocation instead of two.
2718
+ // innerText is '' when the engine lacks the getter (jsdom); the only consumer of
2719
+ // innerText already short-circuits before reaching here in that case.
2720
+ function htmlParserRoundTrip$LWS(normalizedInput$LWS) {
2721
+ ReflectApply$LWS$1(DocumentFragmentProtoAppend$LWS, rootDocumentDetachedFragment$LWS, [rootDocumentDetachedContainer$LWS]);
2722
+ ReflectApply$LWS$1(ElementProtoInnerHTMLSetter$LWS, rootDocumentDetachedContainer$LWS, [normalizedInput$LWS]);
2723
+ const innerHTML$LWS = ReflectApply$LWS$1(ElementProtoInnerHTMLGetter$LWS, rootDocumentDetachedContainer$LWS, []);
2724
+ const innerText$LWS = HTMLElementProtoInnerTextGetter$LWS ? ReflectApply$LWS$1(HTMLElementProtoInnerTextGetter$LWS, rootDocumentDetachedContainer$LWS, []) : '';
2725
+ ReflectApply$LWS$1(ElementProtoRemove$LWS$1, rootDocumentDetachedContainer$LWS, []);
2726
+ return {
2727
+ innerHTML: innerHTML$LWS,
2728
+ innerText: innerText$LWS
2729
+ };
2730
+ }
2450
2731
  function hasTag$LWS(input$LWS, tag$LWS) {
2451
2732
  // Input is already lowercased and invisible chars stripped by caller
2452
2733
  const checkableInput$LWS = ReflectApply$LWS$1(StringProtoReplace$LWS, input$LWS, [/\s+/g, ' ']);
@@ -2505,13 +2786,18 @@
2505
2786
  const DOMTokenListProtoLengthGetter$LWS = ObjectLookupOwnGetter$LWS$1(DOMTokenListProto$LWS, 'length');
2506
2787
  const DOMTokenListProtoValueGetter$LWS = ObjectLookupOwnGetter$LWS$1(DOMTokenListProto$LWS, 'value');
2507
2788
  const DOMTokenListProtoValueSetter$LWS = ObjectLookupOwnSetter$LWS(DOMTokenListProto$LWS, 'value');
2789
+ const CustomEventCtor$LWS = CustomEvent;
2508
2790
  const EventCtor$LWS = Event;
2791
+ const {
2792
+ prototype: CustomEventProto$LWS
2793
+ } = CustomEventCtor$LWS;
2509
2794
  const {
2510
2795
  prototype: EventProto$LWS
2511
2796
  } = EventCtor$LWS;
2512
2797
  const {
2513
2798
  stopPropagation: EventProtoStopPropagation$LWS
2514
2799
  } = EventProto$LWS;
2800
+ const CustomEventProtoDetailGetter$LWS = ObjectLookupOwnGetter$LWS$1(CustomEventProto$LWS, 'detail');
2515
2801
  const EventProtoCurrentTargetGetter$LWS = ObjectLookupOwnGetter$LWS$1(EventProto$LWS, 'currentTarget');
2516
2802
  const EventProtoTypeGetter$LWS = ObjectLookupOwnGetter$LWS$1(EventProto$LWS, 'type');
2517
2803
  const {
@@ -2833,7 +3119,7 @@
2833
3119
  const XhrProtoResponseTextGetter$LWS = ObjectLookupOwnGetter$LWS$1(XhrProto$LWS, 'responseText');
2834
3120
  const XhrProtoStatusGetter$LWS = ObjectLookupOwnGetter$LWS$1(XhrProto$LWS, 'status');
2835
3121
  ObjectLookupOwnSetter$LWS(XhrProto$LWS, 'withCredentials');
2836
- /*! version: 0.29.0 */
3122
+ /*! version: 0.29.2 */
2837
3123
 
2838
3124
  /*!
2839
3125
  * Copyright (C) 2019 salesforce.com, inc.
@@ -3049,7 +3335,7 @@
3049
3335
  }
3050
3336
  return sanitized$LWS;
3051
3337
  }
3052
- /*! version: 0.29.0 */
3338
+ /*! version: 0.29.2 */
3053
3339
 
3054
3340
  /*!
3055
3341
  * Copyright (C) 2023 salesforce.com, inc.
@@ -3125,7 +3411,7 @@
3125
3411
  // swallow
3126
3412
  }
3127
3413
  const trusted = createPolicy('trusted', policyOptions);
3128
- /*! version: 0.29.0 */
3414
+ /*! version: 0.29.2 */
3129
3415
 
3130
3416
  /*!
3131
3417
  * Copyright (C) 2019 salesforce.com, inc.
@@ -3434,7 +3720,7 @@
3434
3720
  }
3435
3721
  return getSanitizerForConfig$LWS(sandboxKey$LWS, 'STRING_BLOB_HTML');
3436
3722
  }
3437
- /*! version: 0.29.0 */
3723
+ /*! version: 0.29.2 */
3438
3724
 
3439
3725
  /*!
3440
3726
  * Copyright (C) 2023 salesforce.com, inc.
@@ -3648,13 +3934,39 @@
3648
3934
  // signed value and we are ok or we don't and the browser throws an error. We
3649
3935
  // want our 404 URL to be set and trigger the event handlers, hence we have to sign.
3650
3936
  setScriptURL$LWS('blob:http://localhost/not-found');
3651
- // This error event handler will get triggered after we set our 404 blob URL.
3652
- const errorEventHandler$LWS = () => {
3653
- // Similar to our wrappedEvaluator, we leave no traces.
3654
- setScriptURL$LWS(cachedURL$LWS);
3655
- ReflectApply$LWS$1(EventTargetProtoRemoveEventListener$LWS, targetElement$LWS, ['error', errorEventHandler$LWS]);
3656
- };
3657
- ReflectApply$LWS$1(EventTargetProtoAddEventListener$LWS, targetElement$LWS, ['error', errorEventHandler$LWS]);
3937
+ // changesSince.266 (W-23596014, Bug Bounty / H1): on the reject path we
3938
+ // no longer restore the developer's raw url to the NATIVE src content
3939
+ // attribute. That restoration was purely cosmetic ("leave no traces"),
3940
+ // but the browser's native "prepare a script element" algorithm reads
3941
+ // the src *content attribute* directly — it never routes through any
3942
+ // JS-level getter/setter, so no LWS distortion observes it. Unlike the
3943
+ // onFulfill path (which restores the raw url only AFTER the browser has
3944
+ // already run our injected safe blob, i.e. the script has "already
3945
+ // started" and can never re-run), a rejected fetch means the script was
3946
+ // NEVER sandbox-evaluated. Restoring a raw, never-evaluated url is thus
3947
+ // a native-execution primitive: an attacker aborts the first async
3948
+ // fetch with a second `.src=` write, then dispatches a synthetic `error`
3949
+ // while the script is still disconnected — firing this handler, writing
3950
+ // the raw attacker url into the native attribute — and appends the
3951
+ // element, so the browser's own loader fetches and executes it in the
3952
+ // MAIN realm with an undistorted document.cookie. (The sibling
3953
+ // SVGScriptElement/href path shares this code and the same fix.) The 404
3954
+ // placeholder set above still fires genuine developer `error` handlers;
3955
+ // only the raw-url restoration is dropped, since cosmetic DOM parity is
3956
+ // never worth an executable raw url.
3957
+ //
3958
+ // Gated OFF so a mechanical gate-cleanup removes the hole, not the
3959
+ // guard: DELETE THIS ENTIRE `if (!isGaterEnabledFeature(...))` BLOCK
3960
+ // when changesSince.266 graduates.
3961
+ if (!isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS('changesSince.266')) {
3962
+ // This error event handler will get triggered after we set our 404 blob URL.
3963
+ const errorEventHandler$LWS = () => {
3964
+ // Similar to our wrappedEvaluator, we leave no traces.
3965
+ setScriptURL$LWS(cachedURL$LWS);
3966
+ ReflectApply$LWS$1(EventTargetProtoRemoveEventListener$LWS, targetElement$LWS, ['error', errorEventHandler$LWS]);
3967
+ };
3968
+ ReflectApply$LWS$1(EventTargetProtoAddEventListener$LWS, targetElement$LWS, ['error', errorEventHandler$LWS]);
3969
+ }
3658
3970
  };
3659
3971
  ReflectApply$LWS$1(PromiseProtoThen$LWS, asyncRequest$LWS, [onFulfill$LWS, onReject$LWS]);
3660
3972
  return '';
@@ -3685,7 +3997,7 @@
3685
3997
  ReflectApply$LWS$1(ElementProtoSetAttributeNS$LWS, targetElement$LWS, [attributeNamespaceURI$LWS, attributeName$LWS, src$LWS]);
3686
3998
  };
3687
3999
  }
3688
- /*! version: 0.29.0 */
4000
+ /*! version: 0.29.2 */
3689
4001
 
3690
4002
  /*!
3691
4003
  * Copyright (C) 2019 salesforce.com, inc.
@@ -4448,6 +4760,24 @@
4448
4760
  const DataTransferProtoBlockedProperties$LWS = ['mozCursor', 'mozSourceNode', 'mozUserCancelled'];
4449
4761
  const attributeDistortionFactoriesCache$LWS = toSafeMap$LWS$1(new MapCtor$LWS$1());
4450
4762
  const sandboxAttributeDistortionRegistryCache$LWS = toSafeWeakMap$LWS$1(new WeakMapCtor$LWS$1());
4763
+ const blockedTagInfoByCtor$LWS = toSafeWeakMap$LWS$1(new WeakMapCtor$LWS$1());
4764
+ // Associate a blocked attribute on `Ctor` with the HTML tag name a foreign
4765
+ // generic node would carry when it specializes into `Ctor`'s interface on HTML
4766
+ // reparse. Called from the block-list wiring for the interfaces that have a
4767
+ // single canonical tag (iframe, embed, script). Idempotent across sandboxes.
4768
+ function registerBlockedAttributeTagName$LWS(Ctor$LWS, tagName$LWS, attributeName$LWS) {
4769
+ const loweredTagName$LWS = ReflectApply$LWS$1(StringProtoToLowerCase$LWS, tagName$LWS, []);
4770
+ const loweredAttributeName$LWS = ReflectApply$LWS$1(StringProtoToLowerCase$LWS, attributeName$LWS, []);
4771
+ let info$LWS = blockedTagInfoByCtor$LWS.get(Ctor$LWS);
4772
+ if (info$LWS === undefined) {
4773
+ info$LWS = {
4774
+ tagName: loweredTagName$LWS,
4775
+ attributeNames: toSafeSet$LWS(new SetCtor$LWS$1())
4776
+ };
4777
+ blockedTagInfoByCtor$LWS.set(Ctor$LWS, info$LWS);
4778
+ }
4779
+ info$LWS.attributeNames.add(loweredAttributeName$LWS);
4780
+ }
4451
4781
  // =============================================================================
4452
4782
  // Prototype-independent, realm-generic element-kind matching
4453
4783
  // (W-23729707 + W-23768065)
@@ -4490,7 +4820,7 @@
4490
4820
  // Gated changesSince.266; when the gate is off the fallback is inert and
4491
4821
  // selection is byte-identical to the pre-fix instanceof-only behavior.
4492
4822
  // =============================================================================
4493
- function elementMatchesCtor$LWS(element$LWS, Ctor$LWS, allowBrandCheck$LWS) {
4823
+ function elementMatchesCtor$LWS(element$LWS, Ctor$LWS, attributeName$LWS, allowBrandCheck$LWS) {
4494
4824
  // Fast path (all gates): an intact prototype chain answers definitively and
4495
4825
  // matches the pre-fix behavior exactly.
4496
4826
  if (element$LWS instanceof Ctor$LWS) {
@@ -4508,7 +4838,27 @@
4508
4838
  if (!allowBrandCheck$LWS || !isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS('changesSince.266')) {
4509
4839
  return false;
4510
4840
  }
4511
- return isElementOfInterface$LWS(element$LWS, Ctor$LWS);
4841
+ if (isElementOfInterface$LWS(element$LWS, Ctor$LWS)) {
4842
+ return true;
4843
+ }
4844
+ // Tag-name fallback (W-23590867): `element` is not (yet) an instance of
4845
+ // Ctor's interface and carries none of its slots, but if its tag name
4846
+ // matches Ctor's blocked HTML tag name — for one of the attributes recorded
4847
+ // as blocked on that tag — an HTML reparse would specialize it into the real
4848
+ // interface, inheriting the attribute value set on the generic node. Match
4849
+ // by tag name so the block fires before that promotion can occur.
4850
+ const blockedTagInfo$LWS = blockedTagInfoByCtor$LWS.get(Ctor$LWS);
4851
+ if (blockedTagInfo$LWS === undefined || !blockedTagInfo$LWS.attributeNames.has(attributeName$LWS)) {
4852
+ return false;
4853
+ }
4854
+ let tagName$LWS;
4855
+ try {
4856
+ tagName$LWS = ReflectApply$LWS$1(ElementProtoTagNameGetter$LWS, element$LWS, []);
4857
+ } catch (_unused2$LWS) {
4858
+ // Not a genuine Element (e.g. a forged receiver) — no reparse risk.
4859
+ return false;
4860
+ }
4861
+ return ReflectApply$LWS$1(StringProtoToLowerCase$LWS, tagName$LWS, []) === blockedTagInfo$LWS.tagName;
4512
4862
  }
4513
4863
  function finalizeAttributeSetterDistortions$LWS(record$LWS) {
4514
4864
  const attributeFactories$LWS = attributeDistortionFactoriesCache$LWS.get(record$LWS);
@@ -4549,7 +4899,8 @@
4549
4899
  if (attributeDistortionRegistry$LWS === undefined) {
4550
4900
  return undefined;
4551
4901
  }
4552
- const elementCtorMapByAttributeNamespaceRegistry$LWS = attributeDistortionRegistry$LWS[ReflectApply$LWS$1(StringProtoToLowerCase$LWS, attrName$LWS, [])];
4902
+ const loweredAttrName$LWS = ReflectApply$LWS$1(StringProtoToLowerCase$LWS, attrName$LWS, []);
4903
+ const elementCtorMapByAttributeNamespaceRegistry$LWS = attributeDistortionRegistry$LWS[loweredAttrName$LWS];
4553
4904
  if (elementCtorMapByAttributeNamespaceRegistry$LWS === undefined) {
4554
4905
  return undefined;
4555
4906
  }
@@ -4567,8 +4918,10 @@
4567
4918
  // elementMatchesCtor uses instanceof as the fast path and, when
4568
4919
  // allowBrandCheck is set (same-document element, changesSince.266), a
4569
4920
  // tamper-resistant brand-check fallback so a repointed [[Prototype]]
4570
- // cannot deselect this distortion.
4571
- if (elementMatchesCtor$LWS(element$LWS, Ctor$LWS, allowBrandCheck$LWS)) {
4921
+ // cannot deselect this distortion, plus a tag-name fallback so a foreign
4922
+ // generic node that would reparse into this interface (W-23590867) is
4923
+ // still matched for its blocked attributes.
4924
+ if (elementMatchesCtor$LWS(element$LWS, Ctor$LWS, loweredAttrName$LWS, allowBrandCheck$LWS)) {
4572
4925
  return distortion$LWS;
4573
4926
  }
4574
4927
  }
@@ -4637,6 +4990,23 @@
4637
4990
  function normalizeNamespace$LWS(ns$LWS) {
4638
4991
  return ns$LWS === null || ns$LWS === undefined || ns$LWS === '' ? NAMESPACE_DEFAULT$LWS : ns$LWS;
4639
4992
  }
4993
+ // W-23486664: An Attr minted via createAttributeNS carries a *qualified* name
4994
+ // (e.g. 'foo:href') whose localName the browser still resolves as 'href'. The
4995
+ // attribute-distortion registry keys on the canonical name, so a qualified
4996
+ // name has to be normalized before lookup or getAttributeSetterDistortion
4997
+ // misses the registered 'href' entry and the raw value reaches the native
4998
+ // slot unsanitized. The setAttribute* family already normalizes inline; this
4999
+ // helper gives the remaining Attr-value sinks (Attr.value, Node.nodeValue,
5000
+ // Node.textContent, NamedNodeMap.setNamedItem) the same normalization. It is
5001
+ // deliberately scoped to those sinks rather than folded into
5002
+ // getAttributeSetterDistortion because that function is also reached by
5003
+ // toggleAttribute and the SVG attributeName distortions, which must keep
5004
+ // their raw-name behavior. Gated on the active train so pre-266 sandboxes
5005
+ // preserve their existing lookup behavior; the read side already normalizes
5006
+ // unconditionally inside getAttributeGetterDistortion.
5007
+ function normalizeAttributeName$LWS(attrName$LWS) {
5008
+ return isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS('changesSince.266') ? normalizeNamespacedAttributeName$LWS(attrName$LWS) : attrName$LWS;
5009
+ }
4640
5010
  function registerAttributeSetterDistortion$LWS(record$LWS, ElementCtor$LWS, attributeName$LWS, attributeNamespace$LWS, distortion$LWS) {
4641
5011
  let attributeFactories$LWS = attributeDistortionFactoriesCache$LWS.get(record$LWS);
4642
5012
  if (attributeFactories$LWS === undefined) {
@@ -4698,7 +5068,8 @@
4698
5068
  if (registry$LWS === undefined) {
4699
5069
  return undefined;
4700
5070
  }
4701
- const byNamespace$LWS = registry$LWS[ReflectApply$LWS$1(StringProtoToLowerCase$LWS, attrName$LWS, [])];
5071
+ const loweredAttrName$LWS = ReflectApply$LWS$1(StringProtoToLowerCase$LWS, attrName$LWS, []);
5072
+ const byNamespace$LWS = registry$LWS[loweredAttrName$LWS];
4702
5073
  if (byNamespace$LWS === undefined) {
4703
5074
  return undefined;
4704
5075
  }
@@ -4713,9 +5084,11 @@
4713
5084
  } of it$LWS) {
4714
5085
  // Prototype-independent selection, mirroring the setter registry: a
4715
5086
  // repointed [[Prototype]] must not deselect a read-side (e.g. nonce)
4716
- // getter distortion either. allowBrandCheck is scoped to same-document
5087
+ // getter distortion either, and a foreign generic node whose tag name
5088
+ // would reparse into this interface (W-23590867) is matched for its
5089
+ // blocked attributes. allowBrandCheck is scoped to same-document
4717
5090
  // elements by the caller. See elementMatchesCtor.
4718
- if (elementMatchesCtor$LWS(element$LWS, Ctor$LWS, allowBrandCheck$LWS)) {
5091
+ if (elementMatchesCtor$LWS(element$LWS, Ctor$LWS, loweredAttrName$LWS, allowBrandCheck$LWS)) {
4719
5092
  return getter$LWS;
4720
5093
  }
4721
5094
  }
@@ -4826,20 +5199,35 @@
4826
5199
  const originalAttrValueSetter$LWS = ObjectLookupOwnSetter$LWS(Attr$LWS.prototype, 'value');
4827
5200
  return function distortionAttrValueSetter$LWS(record$LWS) {
4828
5201
  return [originalAttrValueSetter$LWS, function value$LWS(val$LWS) {
5202
+ // W-23596015: coerce `val` to a string EXACTLY ONCE, up front —
5203
+ // before reading `ownerElement` — to close a reentrant TOCTOU.
5204
+ // A `{ toString() {...} }` argument would otherwise reach the
5205
+ // native setter unconverted, and native WebIDL DOMString
5206
+ // coercion runs the attacker's `toString()` AFTER LWS has
5207
+ // committed to its routing decision. That reentrant call can
5208
+ // attach this (until now detached) Attr to a <script> via
5209
+ // `setAttributeNode`, so when the native setter finally writes
5210
+ // the real URL the Attr is connected — yet LWS is never
5211
+ // re-entered, and the URL lands through a raw native write that
5212
+ // skips the script-`src` distortion. Coercing first makes any
5213
+ // such reentrant attach visible to the `ownerElement` read
5214
+ // below, so the resolved string is routed through the
5215
+ // registered distortion instead of a raw native write.
5216
+ const coercedVal$LWS = isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS('changesSince.266') ? toSafeStringValue$LWS(val$LWS) : val$LWS;
4829
5217
  const ownerElement$LWS = ReflectApply$LWS$1(AttrProtoOwnerElementGetter$LWS, this, []);
4830
5218
  // istanbul ignore else: needs default platform behavior test
4831
5219
  if (ownerElement$LWS) {
4832
- const attrName$LWS = ReflectApply$LWS$1(AttrProtoNameGetter$LWS, this, []);
5220
+ const attrName$LWS = normalizeAttributeName$LWS(ReflectApply$LWS$1(AttrProtoNameGetter$LWS, this, []));
4833
5221
  const attrNamespace$LWS = ReflectApply$LWS$1(AttrProtoNamespaceURIGetter$LWS, this, []);
4834
5222
  const normalizedNamespace$LWS = normalizeNamespace$LWS(attrNamespace$LWS);
4835
5223
  const distortion$LWS = getAttributeSetterDistortion$LWS(record$LWS, ownerElement$LWS, attrName$LWS, normalizedNamespace$LWS);
4836
5224
  // istanbul ignore if: coverage missing, needs investigation
4837
5225
  if (distortion$LWS) {
4838
- ReflectApply$LWS$1(distortion$LWS, ownerElement$LWS, [val$LWS]);
5226
+ ReflectApply$LWS$1(distortion$LWS, ownerElement$LWS, [coercedVal$LWS]);
4839
5227
  return;
4840
5228
  }
4841
5229
  }
4842
- ReflectApply$LWS$1(originalAttrValueSetter$LWS, this, [val$LWS]);
5230
+ ReflectApply$LWS$1(originalAttrValueSetter$LWS, this, [coercedVal$LWS]);
4843
5231
  }];
4844
5232
  };
4845
5233
  }
@@ -5997,7 +6385,8 @@
5997
6385
  const {
5998
6386
  isIframeSrcdocScriptAttack: isIframeSrcdocScriptAttack$LWS,
5999
6387
  isXMLEntityAttack: isXMLEntityAttack$LWS,
6000
- isXMLNamespacedScriptAttack: isXMLNamespacedScriptAttack$LWS
6388
+ isXMLNamespacedScriptAttack: isXMLNamespacedScriptAttack$LWS,
6389
+ isXMLStylesheetProcessingInstructionAttack: isXMLStylesheetProcessingInstructionAttack$LWS
6001
6390
  } = getValidator$LWS(document$LWS, globalObject$LWS);
6002
6391
  // DOMParser.prototype.parseFromString can only be called with
6003
6392
  // exactly two arguments. If it receives one argument, it will fail.
@@ -6034,6 +6423,22 @@
6034
6423
  throw new LockerSecurityError$LWS(`Cannot 'parseFromString' using an unsecure ${toSafeTemplateStringValue$LWS(string$LWS)}.`);
6035
6424
  }
6036
6425
  }
6426
+ // changesSince.266 (W-23657156): reject an XSLT `xml-stylesheet`
6427
+ // processing instruction in any XML-family input. Generic XML is
6428
+ // handed to the native parser unsanitized, so the PI survives as a
6429
+ // live ProcessingInstruction node; sandboxed code reads it out of
6430
+ // this (context-less, inert) document and appends it to the LIVE
6431
+ // document. Node.prototype.appendChild is not distorted and the PI
6432
+ // lands on the Document node — which isSharedElement does not cover
6433
+ // — so the insertion is unguarded, and Chromium then fires native
6434
+ // XSLT: it fetches the attacker stylesheet and commits a transform
6435
+ // whose output script runs in the host realm, outside the sandbox.
6436
+ // SVG is included alongside XML/XHTML because it is XML-parsed and
6437
+ // can carry the same document-level PI. Rejecting at the parse
6438
+ // source prevents the PI node from ever existing.
6439
+ if (isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS('changesSince.266') && (contentType$LWS === ContentType$LWS.XML || contentType$LWS === ContentType$LWS.XHTML || contentType$LWS === ContentType$LWS.SVG) && isXMLStylesheetProcessingInstructionAttack$LWS(string$LWS)) {
6440
+ throw new LockerSecurityError$LWS(`Cannot 'parseFromString' using an unsecure ${toSafeTemplateStringValue$LWS(string$LWS)}.`);
6441
+ }
6037
6442
  // This must be called to signal to the virtual
6038
6443
  // CustomElementRegistry that the next thing created
6039
6444
  // MAY CONTAIN a custom element, which must be marked for
@@ -6282,7 +6687,7 @@
6282
6687
  const element$LWS = namedNodeMapToElementCache$LWS.get(nodeNameMap$LWS);
6283
6688
  // istanbul ignore else: nothing to do if there's no element
6284
6689
  if (element$LWS) {
6285
- const attrName$LWS = ReflectApply$LWS$1(AttrProtoNameGetter$LWS, attr$LWS, []);
6690
+ const attrName$LWS = normalizeAttributeName$LWS(ReflectApply$LWS$1(AttrProtoNameGetter$LWS, attr$LWS, []));
6286
6691
  const attrNamespace$LWS = ReflectApply$LWS$1(AttrProtoNamespaceURIGetter$LWS, attr$LWS, []);
6287
6692
  const normalizedNamespace$LWS = normalizeNamespace$LWS(attrNamespace$LWS);
6288
6693
  const distortion$LWS = getAttributeSetterDistortion$LWS(record$LWS, element$LWS, attrName$LWS, normalizedNamespace$LWS);
@@ -6618,7 +7023,8 @@
6618
7023
  }
6619
7024
  const {
6620
7025
  isIframeSrcdocScriptAttack: isIframeSrcdocScriptAttack$7$LWS,
6621
- isSharedElement: isSharedElement$y$LWS
7026
+ isSharedElement: isSharedElement$y$LWS,
7027
+ isXMLScriptInRawTextElementAttack: isXMLScriptInRawTextElementAttack$1$LWS
6622
7028
  } = rootValidator$LWS;
6623
7029
  function initDistortionElementInnerHTMLSetter$LWS({
6624
7030
  document: document$LWS,
@@ -6672,7 +7078,13 @@
6672
7078
  // malicious markup on a later engine coercion (see toSafeStringValue() docs).
6673
7079
  value$LWS = toSafeStringValue$LWS(value$LWS);
6674
7080
  }
6675
- if (isIframeSrcdocScriptAttack$7$LWS(value$LWS)) {
7081
+ // isOwnerXMLDocument && !isSVGElement is exactly the permissive branch above: it
7082
+ // skips createHTML and is parsed by the XML parser, which has no raw-text / RCDATA
7083
+ // elements. A <script> nested in <textarea>/<title>/etc. is inert text under the
7084
+ // HTML parser (so isIframeSrcdocScriptAttack alone misses it) but a live, clonable
7085
+ // script under XML — cloneNode + adoption into the HTML document then executes it
7086
+ // (W-23486666).
7087
+ if (isIframeSrcdocScriptAttack$7$LWS(value$LWS) || isOwnerXMLDocument$LWS && !isSVGElement$LWS && isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS('changesSince.266') && isXMLScriptInRawTextElementAttack$1$LWS(value$LWS)) {
6676
7088
  throw new LockerSecurityError$LWS(`Cannot set 'innerHTML' using an unsecure ${toSafeTemplateStringValue$LWS(value$LWS)}.`);
6677
7089
  }
6678
7090
  ReflectApply$LWS$1(originalInnerHTMLSetter$LWS, this, [value$LWS]);
@@ -7260,7 +7672,8 @@
7260
7672
  }
7261
7673
  const {
7262
7674
  isIframeSrcdocScriptAttack: isIframeSrcdocScriptAttack$3$LWS,
7263
- isSharedElement: isSharedElement$p$LWS
7675
+ isSharedElement: isSharedElement$p$LWS,
7676
+ isXMLScriptInRawTextElementAttack: isXMLScriptInRawTextElementAttack$LWS
7264
7677
  } = rootValidator$LWS;
7265
7678
  function initDistortionElementSetHTMLUnsafe$LWS({
7266
7679
  document: document$LWS,
@@ -7320,7 +7733,13 @@
7320
7733
  const contentType$LWS = isSVGElement$LWS ? ContentType$LWS.SVG : ContentType$LWS.HTML;
7321
7734
  normalizedValue$LWS = lwsInternalPolicy$LWS.createHTML(normalizedValue$LWS, key$LWS, contentType$LWS);
7322
7735
  }
7323
- if (isIframeSrcdocScriptAttack$3$LWS(normalizedValue$LWS)) {
7736
+ // isOwnerXMLDocument && !isSVGElement is exactly the permissive branch above: it
7737
+ // skips createHTML and is parsed by the XML parser, which has no raw-text / RCDATA
7738
+ // elements. A <script> nested in <textarea>/<title>/etc. is inert text under the
7739
+ // HTML parser (so isIframeSrcdocScriptAttack alone misses it) but a live, clonable
7740
+ // script under XML — cloneNode + adoption into the HTML document then executes it
7741
+ // (W-23486666).
7742
+ if (isIframeSrcdocScriptAttack$3$LWS(normalizedValue$LWS) || isOwnerXMLDocument$LWS && !isSVGElement$LWS && isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS('changesSince.266') && isXMLScriptInRawTextElementAttack$LWS(normalizedValue$LWS)) {
7324
7743
  throw new LockerSecurityError$LWS(`Cannot 'setHTMLUnsafe' using an unsecure ${toSafeTemplateStringValue$LWS(normalizedValue$LWS)}.`);
7325
7744
  }
7326
7745
  ReflectApply$LWS$1(originalSetHTMLUnsafe$LWS, this, [normalizedValue$LWS]);
@@ -7497,11 +7916,48 @@
7497
7916
  return [originalAddEventListener$LWS, addEventListener$LWS];
7498
7917
  };
7499
7918
  }
7500
-
7919
+ const DISPATCH_DETAIL_REFERENCE_METRIC$LWS = 'lws.dispatchEvent.detailReference';
7920
+ const DISPATCH_TOTAL_METRIC$LWS = 'lws.dispatchEvent.total';
7501
7921
  // @W-18977628 — Reserved event types that sandboxed code must never dispatch.
7502
7922
  // These are internal Aura framework events whose listeners run outside the
7503
7923
  // sandbox and pass privileged unsandboxed references to the caller.
7504
7924
  const BLOCKED_DISPATCH_EVENT_TYPES$LWS = toSafeSet$LWS(new SetCtor$LWS$1(['aurainteropfindowner']));
7925
+ function isDomElementOrFunction$LWS(value$LWS) {
7926
+ return typeof value$LWS === 'function' || isElement$LWS(value$LWS);
7927
+ }
7928
+ function detailContainsReference$LWS(detail$LWS) {
7929
+ if (isDomElementOrFunction$LWS(detail$LWS)) {
7930
+ return true;
7931
+ }
7932
+ if (isObject$LWS$1(detail$LWS)) {
7933
+ const keys$LWS = ObjectKeys$LWS$1(detail$LWS);
7934
+ for (let i$LWS = 0, {
7935
+ length: length$LWS
7936
+ } = keys$LWS; i$LWS < length$LWS; i$LWS += 1) {
7937
+ if (isDomElementOrFunction$LWS(detail$LWS[keys$LWS[i$LWS]])) {
7938
+ return true;
7939
+ }
7940
+ }
7941
+ }
7942
+ return false;
7943
+ }
7944
+ function recordDispatchEventMetrics$LWS(instrumentation$LWS, event$LWS) {
7945
+ if (typeof (instrumentation$LWS == null ? void 0 : instrumentation$LWS.incrementCounter) !== 'function') {
7946
+ return;
7947
+ }
7948
+ // Denominator: every gated dispatch, so detailReference can be read as a rate.
7949
+ instrumentation$LWS.incrementCounter(DISPATCH_TOTAL_METRIC$LWS, 1, false);
7950
+ let hasReference$LWS = false;
7951
+ try {
7952
+ // The detail getter throws on a non-CustomEvent event; hostile detail can too.
7953
+ hasReference$LWS = detailContainsReference$LWS(ReflectApply$LWS$1(CustomEventProtoDetailGetter$LWS, event$LWS, []));
7954
+ } catch (_unused3$LWS) {
7955
+ return;
7956
+ }
7957
+ if (hasReference$LWS) {
7958
+ instrumentation$LWS.incrementCounter(DISPATCH_DETAIL_REFERENCE_METRIC$LWS, 1, false);
7959
+ }
7960
+ }
7505
7961
  function initDistortionEventTargetDispatchEvent$LWS({
7506
7962
  globalObject: {
7507
7963
  EventTarget: {
@@ -7511,7 +7967,12 @@
7511
7967
  }
7512
7968
  }
7513
7969
  }) {
7514
- return function distortionEventTargetDispatchEvent$LWS() {
7970
+ // Read `instrumentation` from the inner factory's record, not this
7971
+ // initializer's: the initializer result is memoized per document and shared
7972
+ // across sandboxes, so capturing it here would freeze to the first sandbox.
7973
+ return function distortionEventTargetDispatchEvent$LWS({
7974
+ instrumentation: instrumentation$LWS
7975
+ }) {
7515
7976
  function dispatchEvent$LWS(...args$LWS) {
7516
7977
  const {
7517
7978
  length: length$LWS
@@ -7525,12 +7986,41 @@
7525
7986
  throw new LockerSecurityError$LWS(`Cannot dispatch '${eventType$LWS}' event.`);
7526
7987
  }
7527
7988
  }
7989
+ if (length$LWS > 0 && isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS(COUNT_DISPATCH_EVENT_DETAIL_REFERENCES_GATE$LWS)) {
7990
+ recordDispatchEventMetrics$LWS(instrumentation$LWS, args$LWS[0]);
7991
+ }
7528
7992
  return ReflectApply$LWS$1(originalDispatchEvent$LWS, this, args$LWS);
7529
7993
  }
7530
7994
  return [originalDispatchEvent$LWS, dispatchEvent$LWS];
7531
7995
  };
7532
7996
  }
7533
7997
 
7998
+ // W-23969898: caches the structural "is this a distortable iframe contentWindow
7999
+ // realm" determination per globalObject. The globalObject key here is the
8000
+ // frame's WindowProxy, whose object identity is STABLE across a same-origin
8001
+ // navigation (createSecondaryWindowSandboxRecord runs once for the initial
8002
+ // about:blank realm and again, with the SAME globalObject reference, from the
8003
+ // frame's `load` listener after a navigation). See the caching rationale on
8004
+ // getDistortableFrameElement below.
8005
+ //
8006
+ // This cache is ONE of TWO co-dependent halves of the W-23969898 fix; neither
8007
+ // closes the leak alone (empirically: reverting either half reopens it):
8008
+ // 1. Record-build resilience on a torn-down realm (@locker/sandbox
8009
+ // util/distortion.ts, getDistortionFactories / createDistortionEntries).
8010
+ // A frame the component has already detached leaves its child window with
8011
+ // JS intrinsics intact but DOM globals stripped; a full distortion build
8012
+ // touches an absent DOM interface and throws, collapsing the whole record
8013
+ // to a containment-free opaque one — so the cross-realm family is never
8014
+ // even REACHED. That fix builds only the intrinsic-only distortions on
8015
+ // such a realm, so the family factories below actually run.
8016
+ // 2. This cache. Once the family factory runs, its getDistortableFrameElement
8017
+ // gate still does a LIVE frameElement read (below) that a detached frame
8018
+ // answers null — so without the cached first-sight verdict the factory
8019
+ // installs no entry and the realm's raw Reflect.get still leaks. The cache
8020
+ // supplies the truthy structural verdict recorded while the frame was
8021
+ // still attached.
8022
+ // Half 1 lets the family be reached; half 2 lets it install. Both are required.
8023
+ const distortableFrameElementByGlobalObject$LWS = toSafeWeakMap$LWS$1(new WeakMapCtor$LWS$1());
7534
8024
  // W-22602807: shared helper for distorting an iframe contentWindow realm's
7535
8025
  // function-invocation primitives (Function.prototype.call/apply/bind,
7536
8026
  // Reflect.apply/construct) and, as of W-23748562, its CAPTURE primitives
@@ -7562,18 +8052,60 @@
7562
8052
  // changesSince.264: when the gate is off, no entry is installed and the
7563
8053
  // primitive keeps its native behavior. One check here covers every
7564
8054
  // invocation- and capture-primitive distortion in this family.
8055
+ //
8056
+ // CALLERS MUST capture their native primitive AFTER this returns truthy, inside
8057
+ // the distortion factory — never in the outer initializer's parameter
8058
+ // destructure. The initializer runs for every record built, including a
8059
+ // transitional secondary-window realm (e.g. a still-materializing
8060
+ // window.open()'d same-origin window) whose intrinsics are momentarily
8061
+ // undefined; an eager outer read dereferences them before this gate can bail
8062
+ // and throws (W-24222894).
8063
+ //
8064
+ // W-23969898 (changesSince.266): the "is a distortable iframe realm" verdict is
8065
+ // a PERMANENT structural fact, but this used to re-derive it from a LIVE
8066
+ // `frameElement` read on every call. Each cross-realm distortion factory runs
8067
+ // this at record-build time and installs no entry when it returns falsy, and
8068
+ // the post-navigation record is cached per document — so a single falsy read at
8069
+ // rebuild time skips the family PERMANENTLY for that realm. A component can
8070
+ // force exactly that: it registers its own capture-phase `load` listener BEFORE
8071
+ // reading `contentWindow` (LWS only attaches its own listener at that read, so
8072
+ // it runs SECOND) and detaches the frame from its listener; when LWS's listener
8073
+ // then rebuilds the record, the live `frameElement` read is null, the family is
8074
+ // skipped, and the realm's undistorted `Reflect.get` leaks the host
8075
+ // `document.cookie`. Caching the determination the first time the realm is seen
8076
+ // ATTACHED removes THIS half of the timing dependency: once a factory runs, a
8077
+ // later detach can no longer erase a truthy verdict already recorded. A
8078
+ // window.open() popup never reads a truthy frameElement even on first sight, so
8079
+ // first-sight truthiness still discriminates iframe realms from popup realms.
8080
+ //
8081
+ // The cache only matters AFTER a factory actually runs, though. On a
8082
+ // component-detached frame the record build itself throws before reaching this
8083
+ // family unless the build is made resilient to a torn-down realm — see the
8084
+ // two-halves note on the WeakMap declaration above. This half installs the
8085
+ // entry; the resilience half lets this half be reached.
7565
8086
  function getDistortableFrameElement$LWS(globalObject$LWS) {
7566
8087
  if (!isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS('changesSince.264')) {
7567
8088
  return undefined;
7568
8089
  }
8090
+ const cacheStructuralDetermination$LWS = isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS('changesSince.266');
8091
+ if (cacheStructuralDetermination$LWS) {
8092
+ const cached$LWS = distortableFrameElementByGlobalObject$LWS.get(globalObject$LWS);
8093
+ if (cached$LWS !== undefined) {
8094
+ return cached$LWS;
8095
+ }
8096
+ }
7569
8097
  let frameElement$LWS;
7570
8098
  try {
7571
8099
  frameElement$LWS = ReflectApply$LWS$1(WindowFrameElementGetter$LWS, globalObject$LWS, []);
7572
- } catch (_unused2$LWS) {
8100
+ } catch (_unused4$LWS) {
7573
8101
  // Cross-origin / non-window realm: not our target.
7574
8102
  return undefined;
7575
8103
  }
7576
- return frameElement$LWS || undefined;
8104
+ const distortableFrameElement$LWS = frameElement$LWS || undefined;
8105
+ if (cacheStructuralDetermination$LWS && distortableFrameElement$LWS !== undefined) {
8106
+ distortableFrameElementByGlobalObject$LWS.set(globalObject$LWS, distortableFrameElement$LWS);
8107
+ }
8108
+ return distortableFrameElement$LWS;
7577
8109
  }
7578
8110
  // Re-resolve `callee` to its distorted counterpart from the root distortion
7579
8111
  // map, if one exists; otherwise return it unchanged.
@@ -7603,18 +8135,61 @@
7603
8135
  }
7604
8136
  return callee$LWS;
7605
8137
  }
8138
+ // The exotic-object internal-method (trap) names a Proxy handler may carry, per
8139
+ // ECMAScript 9.5. The foreign engine invokes these directly when an operation
8140
+ // is performed on the resulting proxy.
8141
+ const PROXY_TRAP_NAMES$LWS = ['apply', 'construct', 'defineProperty', 'deleteProperty', 'get', 'getOwnPropertyDescriptor', 'getPrototypeOf', 'has', 'isExtensible', 'ownKeys', 'preventExtensions', 'set', 'setPrototypeOf'];
8142
+ // W-24124284: substitute the trap functions on a Proxy handler the same way
8143
+ // substituteDistortedCallee substitutes the target. A capture primitive
8144
+ // (Proxy / Proxy.revocable) re-resolves only its TARGET; the handler crosses
8145
+ // into the native primitive untouched, so a raw cross-realm callable smuggled
8146
+ // as a trap (e.g. `{ getPrototypeOf: Function }`) is later invoked by the
8147
+ // foreign engine UNDISTORTED — it compiles `document.cookie` against the
8148
+ // undistorted document and leaks the top-level jar, exactly the raw-callee
8149
+ // leak substituteDistortedCallee closes for the target. Re-resolving each trap
8150
+ // at capture time re-attaches the distortion the engine's internal trap
8151
+ // dispatch would otherwise bypass (there is no JS-observable interception point
8152
+ // for a native [[Call]] on a handler trap).
8153
+ //
8154
+ // Only an OWN trap the handler actually carries is mirrored onto the fresh
8155
+ // handler. ObjectHasOwn is a frozen intrinsic own-property check: unlike
8156
+ // handler.hasOwnProperty(...) it cannot be spoofed by an attacker-controlled
8157
+ // handler (e.g. `{ hasOwnProperty: () => false, getPrototypeOf: rawFn }`), and
8158
+ // unlike a bare `in` it does not walk the prototype. Prototype-walking would be
8159
+ // actively wrong here: a FUNCTION is a valid Proxy handler and inherits
8160
+ // apply/call/bind from Function.prototype, so `'apply' in handler` would be
8161
+ // true and Function.prototype.apply would be mis-captured as an apply trap. A
8162
+ // trap the caller never defined stays absent, so the proxy keeps its default
8163
+ // forward-to-target behavior for that operation rather than being handed a
8164
+ // spurious `undefined` own property. An inherited trap is likewise not copied:
8165
+ // the proxy then default-forwards that operation instead of invoking a possibly
8166
+ // raw inherited callable -- a fail-closed divergence from the engine's
8167
+ // prototype-inclusive GetMethod dispatch, never a leak.
8168
+ //
8169
+ // Each present trap is read ONCE and snapshotted; besides closing the
8170
+ // substitution gap this removes any get-trap TOCTOU where a handler could hand
8171
+ // the substitution a benign trap and the engine a raw one on a later read. A
8172
+ // non-object/non-function handler is returned unchanged so the native primitive
8173
+ // throws its own TypeError for an invalid handler.
8174
+ function substituteDistortedHandler$LWS(root$LWS, handler$LWS) {
8175
+ if (handler$LWS === null || typeof handler$LWS !== 'object' && typeof handler$LWS !== 'function') {
8176
+ return handler$LWS;
8177
+ }
8178
+ const substituted$LWS = {};
8179
+ for (let i$LWS = 0, {
8180
+ length: length$LWS
8181
+ } = PROXY_TRAP_NAMES$LWS; i$LWS < length$LWS; i$LWS += 1) {
8182
+ const name$LWS = PROXY_TRAP_NAMES$LWS[i$LWS];
8183
+ if (ObjectHasOwn$LWS$1(handler$LWS, name$LWS)) {
8184
+ substituted$LWS[name$LWS] = substituteDistortedCallee$LWS(root$LWS, handler$LWS[name$LWS]);
8185
+ }
8186
+ }
8187
+ return substituted$LWS;
8188
+ }
7606
8189
 
7607
8190
  // W-22602807: distort an iframe contentWindow realm's Function.prototype.apply.
7608
8191
  // See cross-realm-invocation.ts for the threat model.
7609
- function initDistortionFunctionApply$LWS({
7610
- globalObject: {
7611
- Function: {
7612
- prototype: {
7613
- apply: originalApply$LWS
7614
- }
7615
- }
7616
- }
7617
- }) {
8192
+ function initDistortionFunctionApply$LWS() {
7618
8193
  return function distortionFunctionApply$LWS({
7619
8194
  globalObject: globalObject$LWS,
7620
8195
  root: root$LWS
@@ -7622,6 +8197,14 @@
7622
8197
  if (!getDistortableFrameElement$LWS(globalObject$LWS)) {
7623
8198
  return undefined;
7624
8199
  }
8200
+ // W-24222894: read the primitive AFTER the gate — never in the outer
8201
+ // initializer's parameter. The initializer runs for EVERY record built,
8202
+ // including a transitional secondary-window realm (e.g. a freshly
8203
+ // window.open()'d same-origin window still materializing) whose
8204
+ // Function.prototype is momentarily undefined; an eager outer read
8205
+ // dereferences it before this gate can bail and throws. See
8206
+ // cross-realm-invocation.ts.
8207
+ const originalApply$LWS = globalObject$LWS.Function.prototype.apply;
7625
8208
  return [originalApply$LWS,
7626
8209
  // `this` is the callee; (thisArg, argsArray) its binding and args.
7627
8210
  // `apply` accepts a null/undefined argsArray, which ReflectApply
@@ -7638,15 +8221,7 @@
7638
8221
  // bind defers invocation: it returns a bound function invoked later. We
7639
8222
  // substitute the callee for its distorted counterpart FIRST, then bind that,
7640
8223
  // so the returned bound function wraps the sandbox-distorted callee.
7641
- function initDistortionFunctionBind$LWS({
7642
- globalObject: {
7643
- Function: {
7644
- prototype: {
7645
- bind: originalBind$LWS
7646
- }
7647
- }
7648
- }
7649
- }) {
8224
+ function initDistortionFunctionBind$LWS() {
7650
8225
  return function distortionFunctionBind$LWS({
7651
8226
  globalObject: globalObject$LWS,
7652
8227
  root: root$LWS
@@ -7654,6 +8229,10 @@
7654
8229
  if (!getDistortableFrameElement$LWS(globalObject$LWS)) {
7655
8230
  return undefined;
7656
8231
  }
8232
+ // W-24222894: read the primitive AFTER the gate. See apply-value.ts and
8233
+ // cross-realm-invocation.ts for why an eager outer-parameter read
8234
+ // crashes on a transitional secondary-window realm.
8235
+ const originalBind$LWS = globalObject$LWS.Function.prototype.bind;
7657
8236
  return [originalBind$LWS,
7658
8237
  // `this` is the callee; (thisArg, ...boundArgs) the binding and
7659
8238
  // partially-applied args. Bind the substituted callee with the
@@ -7666,15 +8245,7 @@
7666
8245
 
7667
8246
  // W-22602807: distort an iframe contentWindow realm's Function.prototype.call.
7668
8247
  // See cross-realm-invocation.ts for the threat model.
7669
- function initDistortionFunctionCall$LWS({
7670
- globalObject: {
7671
- Function: {
7672
- prototype: {
7673
- call: originalCall$LWS
7674
- }
7675
- }
7676
- }
7677
- }) {
8248
+ function initDistortionFunctionCall$LWS() {
7678
8249
  return function distortionFunctionCall$LWS({
7679
8250
  globalObject: globalObject$LWS,
7680
8251
  root: root$LWS
@@ -7682,6 +8253,10 @@
7682
8253
  if (!getDistortableFrameElement$LWS(globalObject$LWS)) {
7683
8254
  return undefined;
7684
8255
  }
8256
+ // W-24222894: read the primitive AFTER the gate. See apply-value.ts and
8257
+ // cross-realm-invocation.ts for why an eager outer-parameter read
8258
+ // crashes on a transitional secondary-window realm.
8259
+ const originalCall$LWS = globalObject$LWS.Function.prototype.call;
7685
8260
  return [originalCall$LWS,
7686
8261
  // `this` is the callee; (thisArg, ...args) its binding and arguments.
7687
8262
  function call$LWS(thisArg$LWS, ...args$LWS) {
@@ -7732,6 +8307,46 @@
7732
8307
  }];
7733
8308
  };
7734
8309
  }
8310
+
8311
+ // Shared endpoint enforcement for the History URL-mutating methods
8312
+ // (`pushState` / `replaceState`). Their optional third argument is the new
8313
+ // history URL; when present and non-empty, validate its resolved destination
8314
+ // against the endpoint denylist so sandboxed code cannot repoint the shared
8315
+ // main-window document at a platform-internal endpoint. An omitted, `null` /
8316
+ // `undefined`, or empty URL leaves the document address unchanged, so it is
8317
+ // delegated untouched and the common state-only usage is preserved.
8318
+ function assertHistoryURLAllowed$LWS(args$LWS) {
8319
+ if (args$LWS.length > 2) {
8320
+ const {
8321
+ 2: url$LWS
8322
+ } = args$LWS;
8323
+ // An explicit `null` / `undefined` third argument is the spec's "leave the
8324
+ // document address unchanged" signal (equivalent to omitting it). Delegate
8325
+ // it untouched: coercing it would yield the literal string `"null"` /
8326
+ // `"undefined"`, pin that back below, and dispatch an unintended
8327
+ // same-origin navigation to `/null` or `/undefined`. Mirrors
8328
+ // `Window/fetch-value.ts`'s null/undefined guard. This branches on the raw
8329
+ // argument identity (never a coercion), so a shape-shifting object — which
8330
+ // is neither `null` nor `undefined` — still flows through the pinning path.
8331
+ if (url$LWS !== null && url$LWS !== undefined) {
8332
+ const urlString$LWS = toSafeStringValue$LWS(url$LWS);
8333
+ // Pin the coerced primitive back into the argument list before the
8334
+ // native `pushState` / `replaceState` runs. Otherwise the browser's own
8335
+ // WebIDL coercion re-invokes a shape-shifting argument's `toString`,
8336
+ // letting it hand the guard an allowed URL and the platform a denylisted
8337
+ // one (TOCTOU). Writing unconditionally also closes the empty-string
8338
+ // variant, where the first coercion yields '' (skipping validation) and
8339
+ // the second yields a denylisted URL.
8340
+ args$LWS[2] = urlString$LWS;
8341
+ if (urlString$LWS !== '') {
8342
+ const parsedURL$LWS = parseURL$LWS(urlString$LWS);
8343
+ if (!isAllowedEndpointURL$LWS(parsedURL$LWS)) {
8344
+ throw new LockerSecurityError$LWS(`Cannot set history URL to disallowed endpoint: ${toSafeTemplateStringValue$LWS(parsedURL$LWS.normalizedURL)}`);
8345
+ }
8346
+ }
8347
+ }
8348
+ }
8349
+ }
7735
8350
  function initDistortionHistoryPushState$LWS({
7736
8351
  globalObject: {
7737
8352
  DOMException: DOMException$LWS,
@@ -7743,6 +8358,9 @@
7743
8358
  }
7744
8359
  }) {
7745
8360
  const distortionEntry$LWS = [originalPushState$LWS, function pushState$LWS(...args$LWS) {
8361
+ if (isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS('changesSince.266')) {
8362
+ assertHistoryURLAllowed$LWS(args$LWS);
8363
+ }
7746
8364
  try {
7747
8365
  return ReflectApply$LWS$1(originalPushState$LWS, this, args$LWS);
7748
8366
  } catch (error) {
@@ -7771,6 +8389,9 @@
7771
8389
  }
7772
8390
  }) {
7773
8391
  const distortionEntry$LWS = [originalReplaceState$LWS, function replaceState$LWS(...args$LWS) {
8392
+ if (isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS('changesSince.266')) {
8393
+ assertHistoryURLAllowed$LWS(args$LWS);
8394
+ }
7774
8395
  try {
7775
8396
  return ReflectApply$LWS$1(originalReplaceState$LWS, this, args$LWS);
7776
8397
  } catch (error) {
@@ -8114,6 +8735,405 @@
8114
8735
  return [originalActionSetter$LWS, originalActionSetter$LWS];
8115
8736
  };
8116
8737
  }
8738
+
8739
+ // Shared validation for programmatic form submission (submit / requestSubmit).
8740
+ //
8741
+ // The `action` IDL getter resolves the form's effective submission destination:
8742
+ // per the HTML standard, when the `action` content attribute is missing or its
8743
+ // value is the empty string, the getter returns the element's node-document URL
8744
+ // rather than the empty string. Reading the resolved value through the native
8745
+ // getter therefore captures the actionless-form case (the current document URL)
8746
+ // that the `action` setter's empty-string passthrough leaves unvalidated.
8747
+ //
8748
+ // `requestSubmit(submitter)` can override the form's action: when the submitter
8749
+ // is a submit button carrying a `formaction` content attribute, the native
8750
+ // submission algorithm dispatches to *that* target instead of the form's
8751
+ // `action`. A submitter can acquire a denylisted `formaction` through a path the
8752
+ // `formAction` setter / `setAttribute` guards do not cover (e.g. HTML parsed via
8753
+ // `innerHTML`), so the submitter's effective target is resolved and validated
8754
+ // here whenever it supplies one, falling back to the form's action otherwise.
8755
+ // The `formaction` content attribute is read (rather than the `formAction` IDL
8756
+ // getter) so a missing attribute — meaning "no override" — is distinguishable
8757
+ // from an empty one; `parseURL` resolves a relative or empty value against the
8758
+ // document base, mirroring the native empty-`formaction`-to-document-URL rule.
8759
+ function assertFormSubmissionAllowed$LWS(form$LWS, submitter$LWS) {
8760
+ const submitterFormAction$LWS = submitter$LWS === undefined || submitter$LWS === null ? null : ReflectApply$LWS$1(ElementProtoGetAttribute$LWS, submitter$LWS, ['formaction']);
8761
+ const effectiveAction$LWS = submitterFormAction$LWS === null ? toSafeStringValue$LWS(ReflectApply$LWS$1(HTMLFormElementProtoActionGetter$LWS, form$LWS, [])) : toSafeStringValue$LWS(submitterFormAction$LWS);
8762
+ const parsedURL$LWS = parseURL$LWS(effectiveAction$LWS);
8763
+ if (!isAllowedEndpointURL$LWS(parsedURL$LWS)) {
8764
+ throw new LockerSecurityError$LWS(`Cannot submit form to disallowed endpoint: ${toSafeTemplateStringValue$LWS(parsedURL$LWS.normalizedURL)}`);
8765
+ }
8766
+ }
8767
+ function initDistortionHTMLFormElementRequestSubmit$LWS({
8768
+ globalObject: {
8769
+ HTMLFormElement: {
8770
+ prototype: {
8771
+ requestSubmit: originalRequestSubmit$LWS
8772
+ }
8773
+ }
8774
+ }
8775
+ }) {
8776
+ const distortionEntry$LWS = [originalRequestSubmit$LWS, function requestSubmit$LWS(...args$LWS) {
8777
+ if (isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS('changesSince.266')) {
8778
+ // The optional submitter's `formaction` overrides the form's
8779
+ // action at submission time, so validate the submitter's
8780
+ // effective target rather than only the form's `action`.
8781
+ assertFormSubmissionAllowed$LWS(this, args$LWS[0]);
8782
+ }
8783
+ return ReflectApply$LWS$1(originalRequestSubmit$LWS, this, args$LWS);
8784
+ }];
8785
+ return function distortionHTMLFormElementRequestSubmit$LWS() {
8786
+ return distortionEntry$LWS;
8787
+ };
8788
+ }
8789
+ function initDistortionHTMLFormElementSubmit$LWS({
8790
+ globalObject: {
8791
+ HTMLFormElement: {
8792
+ prototype: {
8793
+ submit: originalSubmit$LWS
8794
+ }
8795
+ }
8796
+ }
8797
+ }) {
8798
+ const distortionEntry$LWS = [originalSubmit$LWS, function submit$LWS(...args$LWS) {
8799
+ if (isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS('changesSince.266')) {
8800
+ assertFormSubmissionAllowed$LWS(this);
8801
+ }
8802
+ return ReflectApply$LWS$1(originalSubmit$LWS, this, args$LWS);
8803
+ }];
8804
+ return function distortionHTMLFormElementSubmit$LWS() {
8805
+ return distortionEntry$LWS;
8806
+ };
8807
+ }
8808
+
8809
+ // Per-frame bookkeeping for the HTMLFrameElement.src async pre-flight
8810
+ const pendingURLs$1$LWS = toSafeWeakMap$LWS$1(new WeakMapCtor$LWS$1());
8811
+ const inflightControllers$1$LWS = toSafeWeakMap$LWS$1(new WeakMapCtor$LWS$1());
8812
+ // Frames whose pre-flight detected an attack pattern in the fetched
8813
+ // response body. The setter checks this set at entry and throws
8814
+ // synchronously on any subsequent write attempt, so the violation is
8815
+ // observable from sandboxed code on the *next* sync touchpoint after
8816
+ // the async pre-flight resolved hostile.
8817
+ const poisonedFrames$LWS = toSafeWeakSet$LWS$1(new WeakSetCtor$LWS$1());
8818
+ // Cross-frame URL rejection cache. When a pre-flight detects hostile,
8819
+ // the URL's pathname is added here. Any subsequent frame.src assignment
8820
+ // to a URL with the same pathname (regardless of the frame instance,
8821
+ // query string, or fragment) throws synchronously without re-fetching.
8822
+ // Pathname-keyed (not full URL) so query-string rotation can't evade
8823
+ // the cache.
8824
+ //
8825
+ // Like the iframe pipeline's equivalent cache, this Set is module-scoped
8826
+ // (shared across every sandbox) and entries are never evicted for the
8827
+ // process lifetime. The accepted tradeoff, shared with the iframe
8828
+ // pipeline: a validator false positive would keep every sandbox
8829
+ // rejecting that pathname until the page reloads. This is deemed
8830
+ // acceptable because a resource classified as carrying an attack pattern
8831
+ // is not expected to become benign within a session, and the fail-closed
8832
+ // direction favors security over availability.
8833
+ const rejectedPathnames$1$LWS = toSafeSet$LWS(new SetCtor$LWS$1());
8834
+ function getPendingURL$1$LWS(frame$LWS) {
8835
+ return pendingURLs$1$LWS.get(frame$LWS);
8836
+ }
8837
+ function setPendingURL$1$LWS(frame$LWS, url$LWS) {
8838
+ pendingURLs$1$LWS.set(frame$LWS, url$LWS);
8839
+ }
8840
+ function clearPendingURL$1$LWS(frame$LWS) {
8841
+ pendingURLs$1$LWS.delete(frame$LWS);
8842
+ }
8843
+ function abortInflightPreflight$1$LWS(frame$LWS) {
8844
+ const controller$LWS = inflightControllers$1$LWS.get(frame$LWS);
8845
+ if (controller$LWS !== undefined) {
8846
+ ReflectApply$LWS$1(AbortControllerProtoAbort$LWS, controller$LWS, []);
8847
+ inflightControllers$1$LWS.delete(frame$LWS);
8848
+ }
8849
+ }
8850
+ function trackInflightPreflight$1$LWS(frame$LWS, controller$LWS) {
8851
+ inflightControllers$1$LWS.set(frame$LWS, controller$LWS);
8852
+ }
8853
+ function clearInflightPreflight$1$LWS(frame$LWS) {
8854
+ inflightControllers$1$LWS.delete(frame$LWS);
8855
+ }
8856
+ // Compare-and-delete: drop the tracked controller only when it is still
8857
+ // the one this request installed. A superseded request's fetch settles
8858
+ // (or rejects from its own abort) AFTER a replacement request has already
8859
+ // stored its controller here; an unconditional delete from that stale
8860
+ // handler would evict the replacement's controller, leaving the newer
8861
+ // pre-flight untracked. An untracked pre-flight can no longer be aborted
8862
+ // by a subsequent assignment, so it could commit a superseded (stale)
8863
+ // URL. Deleting only on identity match keeps every clear scoped to the
8864
+ // request that owns it.
8865
+ function clearInflightPreflightIfCurrent$LWS(frame$LWS, controller$LWS) {
8866
+ if (inflightControllers$1$LWS.get(frame$LWS) === controller$LWS) {
8867
+ inflightControllers$1$LWS.delete(frame$LWS);
8868
+ }
8869
+ }
8870
+ function poisonFrame$LWS(frame$LWS) {
8871
+ poisonedFrames$LWS.add(frame$LWS);
8872
+ }
8873
+ function isPoisonedFrame$LWS(frame$LWS) {
8874
+ return poisonedFrames$LWS.has(frame$LWS);
8875
+ }
8876
+ function rejectPathname$1$LWS(pathname$LWS) {
8877
+ rejectedPathnames$1$LWS.add(pathname$LWS);
8878
+ }
8879
+ function isRejectedPathname$1$LWS(pathname$LWS) {
8880
+ return rejectedPathnames$1$LWS.has(pathname$LWS);
8881
+ }
8882
+
8883
+ // HTMLFrameElement.src getter distortion. Returns the pending URL
8884
+ // recorded by the src setter's same-origin pre-flight pipeline (see
8885
+ // src-setter.ts) when one exists, otherwise falls through to the native
8886
+ // getter.
8887
+ //
8888
+ // The same getter is registered into the read-side attribute getter
8889
+ // registry under (HTMLFrameElement, 'src'), so frame.getAttribute('src'),
8890
+ // frame.getAttributeNS, frame.attributes['src'].value, etc. all surface
8891
+ // the pending URL during the pre-flight inspection window.
8892
+ function initDistortionHTMLFrameElementSrcGetter$LWS({
8893
+ globalObject: {
8894
+ HTMLFrameElement: HTMLFrameElement$LWS
8895
+ }
8896
+ }) {
8897
+ const originalSrcGetter$LWS = ObjectLookupOwnGetter$LWS$1(HTMLFrameElement$LWS.prototype, 'src');
8898
+ return function distortionHTMLFrameElementSrcGetter$LWS(record$LWS) {
8899
+ function src$LWS() {
8900
+ if (isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS('changesSince.266')) {
8901
+ const pending$LWS = getPendingURL$1$LWS(this);
8902
+ if (pending$LWS !== undefined) {
8903
+ return pending$LWS;
8904
+ }
8905
+ }
8906
+ return ReflectApply$LWS$1(originalSrcGetter$LWS, this, []);
8907
+ }
8908
+ // The pending-URL pipeline that backs this getter is gate-266
8909
+ // work; only register into the read-side attribute getter registry
8910
+ // when the gate is on, otherwise ungated sandboxes pay the
8911
+ // registry-consultation cost on every frame.src read with no
8912
+ // behavior change to show for it.
8913
+ if (isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS('changesSince.266')) {
8914
+ registerAttributeGetterDistortion$LWS(record$LWS, HTMLFrameElement$LWS, 'src', NAMESPACE_DEFAULT$LWS, src$LWS);
8915
+ }
8916
+ return [originalSrcGetter$LWS, src$LWS];
8917
+ };
8918
+ }
8919
+
8920
+ // HTMLFrameElement.src coverage (W-23475830). Before this distortion,
8921
+ const {
8922
+ isIframeSrcdocAttack: isIframeSrcdocAttack$1$LWS,
8923
+ isXMLEntityAttack: isXMLEntityAttack$1$LWS,
8924
+ isXMLNamespacedScriptAttack: isXMLNamespacedScriptAttack$1$LWS
8925
+ } = rootValidator$LWS;
8926
+ const ABOUT_BLANK_TOKEN$1$LWS = 'about:blank';
8927
+ function initDistortionHTMLFrameElementSrcSetter$LWS({
8928
+ globalObject: {
8929
+ HTMLFrameElement: HTMLFrameElement$LWS,
8930
+ fetch: originalFetch$LWS
8931
+ }
8932
+ }) {
8933
+ const originalSrcSetter$LWS = ObjectLookupOwnSetter$LWS(HTMLFrameElement$LWS.prototype, 'src');
8934
+ return function distortionHTMLFrameElementSrcSetter$LWS(record$LWS) {
8935
+ function src$LWS(value$LWS) {
8936
+ // Brand-new distortion: the entire distorted behavior is
8937
+ // gated on the active train. When the gate is off, fall
8938
+ // through to the pristine native setter so ungated orgs see
8939
+ // the pre-existing (native) behavior.
8940
+ if (!isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS('changesSince.266')) {
8941
+ ReflectApply$LWS$1(originalSrcSetter$LWS, this, [value$LWS]);
8942
+ return;
8943
+ }
8944
+ // If a prior async pre-flight on this frame detected an
8945
+ // attack pattern in the fetched body, the frame is
8946
+ // permanently poisoned: any subsequent synchronous write
8947
+ // throws, so the security violation surfaces at the call
8948
+ // site of the FOLLOWING `frame.src = ...` (or
8949
+ // setAttribute('src', ...)) even though we cannot
8950
+ // synchronously propagate the original hostile detection
8951
+ // back to its triggering setter call.
8952
+ if (isPoisonedFrame$LWS(this)) {
8953
+ throw new LockerSecurityError$LWS('HTMLFrameElement is poisoned: a prior src assignment fetched a body containing an attack pattern. The frame cannot be reused.');
8954
+ }
8955
+ const normalizedSrcValue$LWS = toSafeStringValue$LWS(value$LWS);
8956
+ // This must run on the raw value before sanitization, because
8957
+ // sanitization can remove the exploit pattern.
8958
+ if (isAttemptingToExploitURL$LWS(normalizedSrcValue$LWS)) {
8959
+ throw new LockerSecurityError$LWS(`Cannot set src to "${toSafeTemplateStringValue$LWS(normalizedSrcValue$LWS)}"`);
8960
+ }
8961
+ // Sanitize non-empty values for assignment; leave the empty
8962
+ // string as-is.
8963
+ const urlString$LWS = normalizedSrcValue$LWS !== '' ? sanitizeURLForElement$LWS(normalizedSrcValue$LWS) : '';
8964
+ // Scheme allowlist. This is the gate that closes the reported
8965
+ // vector: `blob:` and `javascript:` are not valid schemes, so
8966
+ // a self-closing-root XML blob (or a javascript: URL) is
8967
+ // refused here before it can ever load.
8968
+ if (urlString$LWS && !isValidURLScheme$LWS(urlString$LWS)) {
8969
+ throw new LockerSecurityError$LWS('HTMLFrameElement.src supports http://, https:// schemes, relative urls and about:blank.');
8970
+ }
8971
+ const parsedURL$LWS = parseURL$LWS(urlString$LWS);
8972
+ if (!isAllowedEndpointURL$LWS(parsedURL$LWS)) {
8973
+ const {
8974
+ normalizedURL: normalizedURL$LWS
8975
+ } = parsedURL$LWS;
8976
+ throw new LockerSecurityError$LWS(`Cannot request disallowed endpoint: ${toSafeTemplateStringValue$LWS(normalizedURL$LWS)}`);
8977
+ }
8978
+ // Same-origin URLs go through an async pre-flight that fetches
8979
+ // the resource and runs its body through the rootValidator
8980
+ // attack-pattern checks (XML entity smuggling, iframe+srcdoc
8981
+ // combos, and XML-namespaced script payloads). Same-origin
8982
+ // guarantees the pre-flight body is byte-identical to what the
8983
+ // frame load would receive (attacker-controllable content
8984
+ // surfaces in this threat model are deployable static
8985
+ // resources, which serve identical bytes for every request).
8986
+ // Cross-origin URLs proceed through the synchronous path
8987
+ // unchanged because the JS layer cannot inspect cross-origin
8988
+ // response bodies and SOP already contains the cross-origin
8989
+ // contentDocument.
8990
+ //
8991
+ // isSameOriginURL parses the URL and can throw on
8992
+ // pathological inputs. A parse failure means we cannot prove
8993
+ // the URL is same-origin, so we fall through to the
8994
+ // non-pre-flight write path (the same path a cross-origin
8995
+ // URL takes) rather than surfacing a raw parser error to
8996
+ // sandboxed code. Mirrors the try/catch guard the iframe
8997
+ // pipeline puts around its own isSameOriginURL call.
8998
+ let isSameOrigin$LWS = false;
8999
+ try {
9000
+ isSameOrigin$LWS = isSameOriginURL$LWS(urlString$LWS);
9001
+ } catch (_unused5$LWS) {
9002
+ isSameOrigin$LWS = false;
9003
+ }
9004
+ if (urlString$LWS !== '' && urlString$LWS !== ABOUT_BLANK_TOKEN$1$LWS && isSameOrigin$LWS) {
9005
+ // Cross-frame rejection cache: if any prior pre-flight
9006
+ // detected an attack pattern at this URL's pathname,
9007
+ // refuse synchronously without re-fetching. Pathname-keyed
9008
+ // so query-string rotation can't evade it.
9009
+ if (isRejectedPathname$1$LWS(parsedURL$LWS.pathname)) {
9010
+ throw new LockerSecurityError$LWS(`Cannot set src to "${toSafeTemplateStringValue$LWS(urlString$LWS)}": pathname previously rejected as containing an attack pattern.`);
9011
+ }
9012
+ preflightSameOriginAndCommit$LWS(this, urlString$LWS, parsedURL$LWS.pathname);
9013
+ return;
9014
+ }
9015
+ // Any non-pre-flight write (cross-origin, empty, about:blank)
9016
+ // supersedes a pending pre-flight: abort it, clear pending
9017
+ // state, then write native.
9018
+ abortInflightPreflight$1$LWS(this);
9019
+ clearPendingURL$1$LWS(this);
9020
+ clearInflightPreflight$1$LWS(this);
9021
+ ReflectApply$LWS$1(originalSrcSetter$LWS, this, [urlString$LWS]);
9022
+ }
9023
+ // Same-origin async pre-flight. The setter stays synchronous from
9024
+ // sandboxed code's perspective: it returns after recording the
9025
+ // pending URL and kicking off the fetch. The native attribute is
9026
+ // NOT written until the pre-flight approves the body, so the
9027
+ // browser does not begin navigating until then. Read-after-write
9028
+ // surfaces (frame.src, getAttribute('src')) see the pending URL
9029
+ // during the inspection window via the src getter distortion +
9030
+ // read-side attribute getter registry.
9031
+ function preflightSameOriginAndCommit$LWS(frame$LWS, urlString$LWS, pathname$LWS) {
9032
+ // Re-assignment cancels any prior pre-flight in flight on this
9033
+ // frame and replaces it with the new URL.
9034
+ abortInflightPreflight$1$LWS(frame$LWS);
9035
+ setPendingURL$1$LWS(frame$LWS, urlString$LWS);
9036
+ const controller$LWS = new AbortControllerCtor$LWS();
9037
+ const signal$LWS = ReflectApply$LWS$1(AbortControllerProtoSignalGetter$LWS, controller$LWS, []);
9038
+ trackInflightPreflight$1$LWS(frame$LWS, controller$LWS);
9039
+ const isSupersededOrAborted$LWS = () => signal$LWS.aborted;
9040
+ const onSafe$LWS = () => {
9041
+ if (isSupersededOrAborted$LWS()) {
9042
+ return;
9043
+ }
9044
+ clearPendingURL$1$LWS(frame$LWS);
9045
+ clearInflightPreflightIfCurrent$LWS(frame$LWS, controller$LWS);
9046
+ ReflectApply$LWS$1(originalSrcSetter$LWS, frame$LWS, [urlString$LWS]);
9047
+ };
9048
+ const onHostile$LWS = () => {
9049
+ if (isSupersededOrAborted$LWS()) {
9050
+ return;
9051
+ }
9052
+ clearPendingURL$1$LWS(frame$LWS);
9053
+ clearInflightPreflightIfCurrent$LWS(frame$LWS, controller$LWS);
9054
+ // Native src is intentionally left unwritten; the frame
9055
+ // never navigates to the hostile URL. Mark it poisoned so
9056
+ // the next synchronous write throws, and add the pathname
9057
+ // to the cross-frame rejection cache so any future frame
9058
+ // whose src lands at the same pathname throws synchronously
9059
+ // without re-fetching.
9060
+ poisonFrame$LWS(frame$LWS);
9061
+ rejectPathname$1$LWS(pathname$LWS);
9062
+ };
9063
+ const onAborted$LWS = () => {
9064
+ // This handler runs for a request that was superseded, so
9065
+ // by the time it fires a replacement request has typically
9066
+ // already stored ITS controller. Clear on identity match
9067
+ // only: an unconditional delete here would evict the
9068
+ // replacement's controller, leaving the newer pre-flight
9069
+ // untracked (and therefore un-abortable by a later
9070
+ // assignment, which could then let a stale URL commit).
9071
+ clearInflightPreflightIfCurrent$LWS(frame$LWS, controller$LWS);
9072
+ };
9073
+ // Fail-closed handler for a pre-flight fetch that rejected
9074
+ // (network error, or — the security-critical case — a CSP
9075
+ // `connect-src` block). A same-origin `fetch` is governed by
9076
+ // `connect-src`, while a `<frame>` navigation is governed by
9077
+ // `frame-src` / `child-src`: a deployment can block the fetch
9078
+ // yet still permit the frame to navigate. Committing here would
9079
+ // hand the frame an UNVALIDATED same-origin body — the exact
9080
+ // escape this pipeline exists to close. Because the frame
9081
+ // setter never writes native `src` eagerly, failing closed is
9082
+ // simply "do not write": clear the pending/in-flight
9083
+ // bookkeeping and leave the frame un-navigated. We do NOT
9084
+ // poison — a transport failure is not proof of an attack
9085
+ // pattern, so a later assignment of the same URL may re-attempt
9086
+ // the pre-flight. (Deliberate divergence from the iframe
9087
+ // pipeline, which commits on fetch failure because it writes
9088
+ // native eagerly for detached iframes and cannot cleanly
9089
+ // withhold the write; `<frame>` never writes eagerly, so it
9090
+ // can.)
9091
+ const onUninspectable$LWS = () => {
9092
+ clearPendingURL$1$LWS(frame$LWS);
9093
+ clearInflightPreflightIfCurrent$LWS(frame$LWS, controller$LWS);
9094
+ };
9095
+ ReflectApply$LWS$1(originalFetch$LWS, undefined, [urlString$LWS, {
9096
+ __proto__: null,
9097
+ credentials: 'same-origin',
9098
+ signal: signal$LWS
9099
+ }])
9100
+ // Read the body regardless of HTTP status: a same-origin
9101
+ // 4xx/5xx whose error-page body carries a hostile pattern
9102
+ // must still poison the frame, because the browser would
9103
+ // render that error-page body into the frame too. (Only a
9104
+ // rejected fetch — network error, CSP `connect-src` block,
9105
+ // or abort — reaches .catch below; a non-abort rejection
9106
+ // fails closed there, leaving `src` unwritten rather than
9107
+ // committing an un-inspected body.)
9108
+ .then(response$LWS => response$LWS.text()).then(body$LWS => {
9109
+ if (isSupersededOrAborted$LWS()) {
9110
+ onAborted$LWS();
9111
+ return;
9112
+ }
9113
+ if (isIframeSrcdocAttack$1$LWS(body$LWS) || isXMLEntityAttack$1$LWS(body$LWS) || isXMLNamespacedScriptAttack$1$LWS(body$LWS)) {
9114
+ onHostile$LWS();
9115
+ } else {
9116
+ onSafe$LWS();
9117
+ }
9118
+ }).catch(() => {
9119
+ if (isSupersededOrAborted$LWS()) {
9120
+ onAborted$LWS();
9121
+ return;
9122
+ }
9123
+ // The pre-flight fetch rejected, so the body was never
9124
+ // inspected. Fail closed: leave native `src` unwritten
9125
+ // (see onUninspectable). We must NOT commit here — a CSP
9126
+ // `connect-src` block can reject the fetch while
9127
+ // `frame-src` still permits the navigation, so
9128
+ // committing would navigate the frame to an unvalidated
9129
+ // body and reopen the escape path.
9130
+ onUninspectable$LWS();
9131
+ });
9132
+ }
9133
+ registerAttributeSetterDistortion$LWS(record$LWS, HTMLFrameElement$LWS, 'src', NAMESPACE_DEFAULT$LWS, src$LWS);
9134
+ return [originalSrcSetter$LWS, src$LWS];
9135
+ };
9136
+ }
8117
9137
  function initDistortionHTMLFrameSetElementOnrejectionhandled$LWS({
8118
9138
  globalObject: {
8119
9139
  HTMLFrameSetElement: HTMLFrameSetElement$LWS
@@ -8343,7 +9363,7 @@
8343
9363
  if (!isSameOriginURL$LWS(srcValue$LWS)) {
8344
9364
  return;
8345
9365
  }
8346
- } catch (_unused3$LWS) {
9366
+ } catch (_unused6$LWS) {
8347
9367
  /* empty */
8348
9368
  }
8349
9369
  if (!ReflectApply$LWS$1(DOMTokenListProtoContains$LWS, sandboxTokenList$LWS, [ALLOW_SCRIPTS_TOKEN$LWS])) {
@@ -8382,7 +9402,7 @@
8382
9402
  // FOLLOWING `iframe.src = ...` (or setAttribute('src',...) etc.)
8383
9403
  // even though we cannot synchronously propagate the original
8384
9404
  // hostile-detection back to its triggering setter call.
8385
- if (isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS('changesSince.264') && isPoisonedIframe$LWS(this)) {
9405
+ if (isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS('iframeSrcSameOriginPreflightCheck') && isPoisonedIframe$LWS(this)) {
8386
9406
  throw new LockerSecurityError$LWS('HTMLIFrameElement is poisoned: a prior src assignment fetched a body containing an attack pattern. The iframe cannot be reused.');
8387
9407
  }
8388
9408
  const normalizedSrcValue$LWS = toSafeStringValue$LWS(value$LWS);
@@ -8433,7 +9453,7 @@
8433
9453
  // resolves. Pending URL is recorded normally so read paths
8434
9454
  // (iframe.src, getAttribute('src'), attributes['src'].value)
8435
9455
  // surface what sandbox code wrote.
8436
- if (isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS('changesSince.264') && urlString$LWS !== '' && urlString$LWS !== ABOUT_BLANK_TOKEN$LWS && isSameOriginURL$LWS(urlString$LWS)) {
9456
+ if (isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS('iframeSrcSameOriginPreflightCheck') && urlString$LWS !== '' && urlString$LWS !== ABOUT_BLANK_TOKEN$LWS && isSameOriginURL$LWS(urlString$LWS)) {
8437
9457
  // Cross-iframe rejection cache: if any prior pre-flight
8438
9458
  // (on this iframe or any other) detected an attack
8439
9459
  // pattern at this URL's pathname, refuse the assignment
@@ -9034,7 +10054,14 @@
9034
10054
  };
9035
10055
  }
9036
10056
  const descriptorCaches$LWS = toSafeWeakMap$LWS$1(new WeakMapCtor$LWS$1());
9037
- function createBlockedAttributeSetterDistortionFactoryInitializer$LWS(Ctor$LWS, ctorName$LWS, attributeName$LWS) {
10057
+ function createBlockedAttributeSetterDistortionFactoryInitializer$LWS(Ctor$LWS, ctorName$LWS, attributeName$LWS, blockedTagName$LWS) {
10058
+ // When the interface has a single canonical HTML tag name (iframe, embed,
10059
+ // script), record it so a foreign generic node that would reparse into this
10060
+ // interface is still matched for this blocked attribute. See W-23590867 and
10061
+ // elementMatchesCtor's tag-name fallback.
10062
+ if (blockedTagName$LWS !== undefined) {
10063
+ registerBlockedAttributeTagName$LWS(Ctor$LWS, blockedTagName$LWS, attributeName$LWS);
10064
+ }
9038
10065
  return function initDistortionBlockedAttribute$LWS() {
9039
10066
  const enquotedAttributeName$LWS = enquote$LWS(attributeName$LWS);
9040
10067
  const distortionName$LWS = `blocked${capitalizeFirstChar$LWS(attributeName$LWS)}Attribute`;
@@ -9093,14 +10120,14 @@
9093
10120
  return valueThrowerDistortionFactory$LWS;
9094
10121
  };
9095
10122
  }
9096
- function addBlockedAttributeSetterDistortionFactoryInitializers$LWS(Ctor$LWS, ctorName$LWS, attributes$LWS, factoryInitializers$LWS) {
10123
+ function addBlockedAttributeSetterDistortionFactoryInitializers$LWS(Ctor$LWS, ctorName$LWS, attributes$LWS, factoryInitializers$LWS, blockedTagName$LWS) {
9097
10124
  let {
9098
10125
  length: factoryInitializersOffset$LWS
9099
10126
  } = factoryInitializers$LWS;
9100
10127
  for (let i$LWS = 0, {
9101
10128
  length: length$LWS
9102
10129
  } = attributes$LWS; i$LWS < length$LWS; i$LWS += 1) {
9103
- factoryInitializers$LWS[factoryInitializersOffset$LWS++] = createBlockedAttributeSetterDistortionFactoryInitializer$LWS(Ctor$LWS, ctorName$LWS, attributes$LWS[i$LWS]);
10130
+ factoryInitializers$LWS[factoryInitializersOffset$LWS++] = createBlockedAttributeSetterDistortionFactoryInitializer$LWS(Ctor$LWS, ctorName$LWS, attributes$LWS[i$LWS], blockedTagName$LWS);
9104
10131
  }
9105
10132
  }
9106
10133
  // Read-side counterpart of createBlockedAttributeSetterDistortionFactoryInitializer:
@@ -9925,6 +10952,49 @@
9925
10952
  }];
9926
10953
  };
9927
10954
  }
10955
+ function initDistortionNavigationNavigate$LWS({
10956
+ globalObject: globalObject$LWS
10957
+ }) {
10958
+ var _Navigation$prototype$LWS;
10959
+ // The Navigation API is not exposed in every browser LWS supports, so it is
10960
+ // read defensively rather than destructured (a missing `Navigation` global
10961
+ // would throw at factory-initialization time and break sandbox creation).
10962
+ const {
10963
+ Navigation: Navigation$LWS
10964
+ } = globalObject$LWS;
10965
+ const originalNavigate$LWS = Navigation$LWS == null || (_Navigation$prototype$LWS = Navigation$LWS.prototype) == null ? void 0 : _Navigation$prototype$LWS.navigate;
10966
+ return function distortionNavigationNavigate$LWS() {
10967
+ // Nothing to distort when the Navigation API is unavailable.
10968
+ if (originalNavigate$LWS === undefined) {
10969
+ return undefined;
10970
+ }
10971
+ const distortionEntry$LWS = [originalNavigate$LWS, function navigate$LWS(...args$LWS) {
10972
+ // `navigate(url)` has a required `url` argument. A zero-argument
10973
+ // call must reach the native method untouched so it throws its own
10974
+ // WebIDL "1 argument required" `TypeError`. Coercing the missing
10975
+ // argument would synthesize the string `"undefined"`, pin it into a
10976
+ // now-length-1 argument list below, and either navigate to a URL the
10977
+ // caller never supplied or throw the wrong error type. (A present
10978
+ // `null` / `undefined` *value* is left to native, which coerces it
10979
+ // to `"null"` / `"undefined"` and navigates — the required-argument
10980
+ // contract only concerns the missing case.)
10981
+ if (args$LWS.length > 0 && isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS('changesSince.266')) {
10982
+ const parsedURL$LWS = parseURL$LWS(toSafeStringValue$LWS(args$LWS[0]));
10983
+ if (!isAllowedEndpointURL$LWS(parsedURL$LWS)) {
10984
+ throw new LockerSecurityError$LWS(`Cannot navigate to disallowed endpoint: ${toSafeTemplateStringValue$LWS(parsedURL$LWS.normalizedURL)}`);
10985
+ }
10986
+ // Pin the validated primitive so the native `navigate` cannot
10987
+ // re-run a shape-shifting argument's `toString` /
10988
+ // `Symbol.toPrimitive` and dispatch to a different (denylisted)
10989
+ // URL after the guard passed (TOCTOU). Mirrors `fetch`'s
10990
+ // `args[0] = url` arg-reassignment before dispatch.
10991
+ args$LWS[0] = parsedURL$LWS.normalizedURL;
10992
+ }
10993
+ return ReflectApply$LWS$1(originalNavigate$LWS, this, args$LWS);
10994
+ }];
10995
+ return distortionEntry$LWS;
10996
+ };
10997
+ }
9928
10998
  function initDistortionNavigatorSendBeacon$LWS({
9929
10999
  globalObject: {
9930
11000
  Navigator: {
@@ -9963,6 +11033,95 @@
9963
11033
  return distortionEntry$LWS;
9964
11034
  };
9965
11035
  }
11036
+
11037
+ // A genuine `<script>` reports `nodeName` "SCRIPT" (HTML) or "script" (SVG). The
11038
+ // value is read straight from the native `nodeName` accessor, so it is
11039
+ // unforgeable and cheap — used as a pre-filter before the brand-checking nonce
11040
+ // setter runs.
11041
+ const HTML_SCRIPT_NODE_NAME$LWS = 'SCRIPT';
11042
+ const SVG_SCRIPT_NODE_NAME$LWS = 'script';
11043
+ function initDistortionNodeCloneNode$LWS({
11044
+ globalObject: {
11045
+ Node: {
11046
+ prototype: {
11047
+ cloneNode: originalCloneNode$LWS
11048
+ }
11049
+ },
11050
+ HTMLElement: HTMLElement$LWS,
11051
+ SVGElement: SVGElement$LWS
11052
+ }
11053
+ }) {
11054
+ // The CSP `nonce` is exposed through the `nonce` IDL attribute, which comes
11055
+ // from the `HTMLOrSVGElement` WebIDL mixin. That mixin installs the accessor
11056
+ // as an OWN property of `HTMLElement.prototype` and `SVGElement.prototype`,
11057
+ // NOT of `HTMLScriptElement.prototype` (where it is merely inherited).
11058
+ // Capturing from the subclass prototype would yield `undefined` and turn this
11059
+ // distortion into a silent no-op, so the native setter is captured from the
11060
+ // mixin hosts. Applying that setter with '' is the only way to clear the
11061
+ // element's internal `[[CryptographicNonce]]` slot: the sandbox-facing
11062
+ // `.nonce` accessor is blocked (it throws) and therefore cannot clear it.
11063
+ const htmlNonceSetter$LWS = ObjectLookupOwnSetter$LWS(HTMLElement$LWS.prototype, 'nonce');
11064
+ const svgNonceSetter$LWS = ObjectLookupOwnSetter$LWS(SVGElement$LWS.prototype, 'nonce');
11065
+ function clearScriptNonce$LWS(node$LWS) {
11066
+ // Try the HTML setter first (the common `<script>` case), then the SVG
11067
+ // setter. Each native setter brand-checks its receiver, so applying the
11068
+ // wrong one simply throws and is safely ignored.
11069
+ if (htmlNonceSetter$LWS !== undefined) {
11070
+ try {
11071
+ ReflectApply$LWS$1(htmlNonceSetter$LWS, node$LWS, ['']);
11072
+ return;
11073
+ } catch (_unused7$LWS) {
11074
+ // Not an HTMLElement; fall through to the SVG setter.
11075
+ }
11076
+ }
11077
+ if (svgNonceSetter$LWS !== undefined) {
11078
+ try {
11079
+ ReflectApply$LWS$1(svgNonceSetter$LWS, node$LWS, ['']);
11080
+ } catch (_unused8$LWS) {
11081
+ // Not an SVGElement either; there is no nonce slot to clear.
11082
+ }
11083
+ }
11084
+ }
11085
+ function stripClonedScriptNonces$LWS(root$LWS) {
11086
+ // Iterative depth-first walk of the freshly cloned subtree. A shallow
11087
+ // clone copies no children, so the stack drains after visiting the single
11088
+ // root — matching native `cloneNode(false)` cost. `getNodeName` is a cheap
11089
+ // native read used as a pre-filter so the brand-checking `try/catch` in
11090
+ // `clearScriptNonce` runs only for the rare `<script>` node, keeping the
11091
+ // LWC template-cloning hot path fast.
11092
+ const stack$LWS = [root$LWS];
11093
+ while (stack$LWS.length > 0) {
11094
+ const node$LWS = stack$LWS.pop();
11095
+ const nodeName$LWS = getNodeName$LWS(node$LWS);
11096
+ if (nodeName$LWS === HTML_SCRIPT_NODE_NAME$LWS || nodeName$LWS === SVG_SCRIPT_NODE_NAME$LWS) {
11097
+ clearScriptNonce$LWS(node$LWS);
11098
+ }
11099
+ const childNodes$LWS = ReflectApply$LWS$1(NodeProtoChildNodesGetter$LWS, node$LWS, []);
11100
+ for (let i$LWS = 0, {
11101
+ length: length$LWS
11102
+ } = childNodes$LWS; i$LWS < length$LWS; i$LWS += 1) {
11103
+ stack$LWS[stack$LWS.length] = childNodes$LWS[i$LWS];
11104
+ }
11105
+ }
11106
+ }
11107
+ const distortionEntry$LWS = [originalCloneNode$LWS, function cloneNode$LWS(...args$LWS) {
11108
+ const result$LWS = ReflectApply$LWS$1(originalCloneNode$LWS, this, args$LWS);
11109
+ // W-23859662: Chromium's node-cloning steps copy a script element's
11110
+ // internal `[[CryptographicNonce]]` slot to the clone. That slot is
11111
+ // NOT a content attribute, so the sandbox's `.nonce` property/attribute
11112
+ // block never touches it — the clone would otherwise carry a CSP-valid
11113
+ // nonce the sandbox could never have produced, letting it run a forged
11114
+ // inline script natively in the host realm. Strip the nonce from every
11115
+ // cloned script element to close that bypass.
11116
+ if (isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS('changesSince.266')) {
11117
+ stripClonedScriptNonces$LWS(result$LWS);
11118
+ }
11119
+ return result$LWS;
11120
+ }];
11121
+ return function distortionNodeCloneNode$LWS() {
11122
+ return distortionEntry$LWS;
11123
+ };
11124
+ }
9966
11125
  function initDistortionNodeGetRootNode$LWS({
9967
11126
  globalObject: {
9968
11127
  Node: Node$LWS,
@@ -10033,6 +11192,22 @@
10033
11192
  const originalNodeValueSetter$LWS = ObjectLookupOwnSetter$LWS(Node$LWS.prototype, 'nodeValue');
10034
11193
  return function distortionNodeValueSetter$LWS(record$LWS) {
10035
11194
  return [originalNodeValueSetter$LWS, function nodeValue$LWS(value$LWS) {
11195
+ // W-23596015: `nodeValue` aliases `Attr.prototype.value`, so it
11196
+ // shares the same reentrant Attr owner-state TOCTOU. Coerce
11197
+ // `value` to a string EXACTLY ONCE, up front — before reading
11198
+ // `ownerElement` — so the routing decision is made against the
11199
+ // resolved string. Otherwise a `{ toString() {...} }` value
11200
+ // reaches the native setter unconverted, and native WebIDL
11201
+ // DOMString coercion runs the attacker's `toString()` AFTER LWS
11202
+ // has committed to a route (native passthrough for a detached
11203
+ // Attr, or a no-distortion element); that reentrant call can
11204
+ // attach the Attr to a <script> so the final value lands via a
11205
+ // raw native write that skips the script-`src` distortion.
11206
+ // Coercing first makes any such reentrant attach visible to the
11207
+ // `ownerElement` read below. `null`/`undefined` pass through
11208
+ // untouched so the native setter keeps its nullable-`DOMString?`
11209
+ // "treat as the empty string" behavior.
11210
+ const coercedValue$LWS = isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS('changesSince.266') && value$LWS !== null && value$LWS !== undefined ? toSafeStringValue$LWS(value$LWS) : value$LWS;
10036
11211
  // W-10476944 Window access via nodeValue/textContent:
10037
11212
  // This distortion sanitizes the given text to prevent window
10038
11213
  // access from being achieved via the nodeValue property.
@@ -10040,21 +11215,21 @@
10040
11215
  if (this instanceof Attr$LWS) {
10041
11216
  const ownerEl$LWS = ReflectApply$LWS$1(AttrProtoOwnerElementGetter$LWS, this, []);
10042
11217
  if (ownerEl$LWS === null) {
10043
- ReflectApply$LWS$1(originalNodeValueSetter$LWS, this, [value$LWS]);
11218
+ ReflectApply$LWS$1(originalNodeValueSetter$LWS, this, [coercedValue$LWS]);
10044
11219
  return;
10045
11220
  }
10046
- const attrName$LWS = ReflectApply$LWS$1(AttrProtoNameGetter$LWS, this, []);
11221
+ const attrName$LWS = normalizeAttributeName$LWS(ReflectApply$LWS$1(AttrProtoNameGetter$LWS, this, []));
10047
11222
  const attrNamespace$LWS = ReflectApply$LWS$1(AttrProtoNamespaceURIGetter$LWS, this, []);
10048
11223
  const normalizedNamespace$LWS = normalizeNamespace$LWS(attrNamespace$LWS);
10049
11224
  const distortion$LWS = getAttributeSetterDistortion$LWS(record$LWS, ownerEl$LWS, attrName$LWS, normalizedNamespace$LWS);
10050
11225
  // istanbul ignore next: needs default platform behavior test
10051
11226
  if (distortion$LWS) {
10052
- ReflectApply$LWS$1(distortion$LWS, ownerEl$LWS, [value$LWS]);
11227
+ ReflectApply$LWS$1(distortion$LWS, ownerEl$LWS, [coercedValue$LWS]);
10053
11228
  return;
10054
11229
  }
10055
11230
  }
10056
11231
  // istanbul ignore next: needs default platform behavior test
10057
- ReflectApply$LWS$1(originalNodeValueSetter$LWS, this, [value$LWS]);
11232
+ ReflectApply$LWS$1(originalNodeValueSetter$LWS, this, [coercedValue$LWS]);
10058
11233
  }];
10059
11234
  };
10060
11235
  }
@@ -10237,7 +11412,24 @@
10237
11412
  sandboxEvaluator: sandboxEvaluator$LWS
10238
11413
  } = record$LWS;
10239
11414
  return [originalTextContentSetter$LWS, function textContent$LWS(value$LWS) {
10240
- const valueAsString$LWS = trusted.createScript(value$LWS);
11415
+ // W-23596015: `textContent` aliases `Attr.prototype.value` on an
11416
+ // Attr, so it shares the same reentrant Attr owner-state TOCTOU.
11417
+ // `trusted.createScript` only performs a DOMString coercion on
11418
+ // engines that support Trusted Types; on a TT-less engine the
11419
+ // fallback policy returns its argument unchanged, so a
11420
+ // `{ toString() {...} }` value would reach the native setter
11421
+ // unconverted and native WebIDL DOMString coercion would run the
11422
+ // attacker's `toString()` AFTER LWS committed to a route,
11423
+ // letting it reentrantly attach the Attr to a <script> and land
11424
+ // the final value via a raw native write that skips the
11425
+ // script-`src` distortion. Coerce `value` to a string EXACTLY
11426
+ // ONCE, up front, so the coercion is DOMString-strength on every
11427
+ // engine and any reentrant attach is visible to the
11428
+ // `ownerElement` read below. `null`/`undefined` pass through
11429
+ // untouched so the native setter keeps its nullable-`DOMString?`
11430
+ // "treat as the empty string" behavior.
11431
+ const coercedValue$LWS = isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS('changesSince.266') && value$LWS !== null && value$LWS !== undefined ? toSafeStringValue$LWS(value$LWS) : value$LWS;
11432
+ const valueAsString$LWS = trusted.createScript(coercedValue$LWS);
10241
11433
  // There are two existence of the attribute textContent, one on
10242
11434
  // Attr and one on Node. This first if statement is checking to
10243
11435
  // figure out which distortion should be applied. The instanceof
@@ -10254,7 +11446,7 @@
10254
11446
  ReflectApply$LWS$1(originalTextContentSetter$LWS, this, [valueAsString$LWS]);
10255
11447
  return;
10256
11448
  }
10257
- const attrName$LWS = ReflectApply$LWS$1(AttrProtoNameGetter$LWS, this, []);
11449
+ const attrName$LWS = normalizeAttributeName$LWS(ReflectApply$LWS$1(AttrProtoNameGetter$LWS, this, []));
10258
11450
  const attrNamespace$LWS = ReflectApply$LWS$1(AttrProtoNamespaceURIGetter$LWS, this, []);
10259
11451
  const normalizedNamespace$LWS = normalizeNamespace$LWS(attrNamespace$LWS);
10260
11452
  const distortion$LWS = getAttributeSetterDistortion$LWS(record$LWS, ownerEl$LWS, attrName$LWS, normalizedNamespace$LWS);
@@ -11307,16 +12499,21 @@
11307
12499
  // substitutes the callee before binding it. Returning an object from a
11308
12500
  // constructor call short-circuits [[Construct]] (ECMAScript 10.2.2) so this
11309
12501
  // behaves identically whether reached via `new`, Reflect.construct, or a
11310
- // .call/.apply/.bind chain on the constructor itself.
12502
+ // .call/.apply/.bind chain on the constructor itself. (`new cw.Proxy(...)` is
12503
+ // separately contained by near-membrane's non-constructible arrow shadow; the
12504
+ // reachable doorway for this distortion is Reflect.construct(cw.Proxy, ...).)
12505
+ //
12506
+ // W-24124284: the HANDLER is substituted the same way (substituteDistorted
12507
+ // Handler). A raw callable smuggled as a handler trap (e.g.
12508
+ // `{ getPrototypeOf: Function }`) is otherwise invoked UNDISTORTED by the
12509
+ // engine's internal trap dispatch and leaks the raw document.cookie, exactly
12510
+ // as it does for Proxy.revocable (Proxy/revocable-value.ts) -- the target-only
12511
+ // substitution never covered it.
11311
12512
  //
11312
12513
  // Gated on changesSince.266: this is new distortion behavior, distinct from
11313
12514
  // getDistortableFrameElement's own changesSince.264 gate on the underlying
11314
12515
  // cross-realm scoping helper.
11315
- function initDistortionProxyCtor$LWS({
11316
- globalObject: {
11317
- Proxy: originalProxyCtor$LWS
11318
- }
11319
- }) {
12516
+ function initDistortionProxyCtor$LWS() {
11320
12517
  return function distortionProxyCtor$LWS({
11321
12518
  globalObject: globalObject$LWS,
11322
12519
  root: root$LWS
@@ -11324,8 +12521,15 @@
11324
12521
  if (!isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS('changesSince.266') || !getDistortableFrameElement$LWS(globalObject$LWS)) {
11325
12522
  return undefined;
11326
12523
  }
12524
+ // W-24222894: read the primitive AFTER the gate, per the capture-after-
12525
+ // gate invariant in Function/cross-realm-invocation.ts. Unlike its
12526
+ // Proxy.revocable sibling's deeper read, this shallow `globalObject.Proxy`
12527
+ // read would not itself throw on a transitional secondary-window realm,
12528
+ // but keeping the read inside the gated factory holds every capture
12529
+ // primitive to one rule.
12530
+ const originalProxyCtor$LWS = globalObject$LWS.Proxy;
11327
12531
  return [originalProxyCtor$LWS, function Proxy$LWS(target$LWS, handler$LWS) {
11328
- return new ProxyCtor$LWS(substituteDistortedCallee$LWS(root$LWS, target$LWS), handler$LWS);
12532
+ return new ProxyCtor$LWS(substituteDistortedCallee$LWS(root$LWS, target$LWS), substituteDistortedHandler$LWS(root$LWS, handler$LWS));
11329
12533
  }];
11330
12534
  };
11331
12535
  }
@@ -11345,13 +12549,7 @@
11345
12549
  // Gated on changesSince.266: this is new distortion behavior, distinct from
11346
12550
  // getDistortableFrameElement's own changesSince.264 gate on the underlying
11347
12551
  // cross-realm scoping helper.
11348
- function initDistortionProxyRevocable$LWS({
11349
- globalObject: {
11350
- Proxy: {
11351
- revocable: originalRevocable$LWS
11352
- }
11353
- }
11354
- }) {
12552
+ function initDistortionProxyRevocable$LWS() {
11355
12553
  return function distortionProxyRevocable$LWS({
11356
12554
  globalObject: globalObject$LWS,
11357
12555
  root: root$LWS
@@ -11359,8 +12557,17 @@
11359
12557
  if (!isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS('changesSince.266') || !getDistortableFrameElement$LWS(globalObject$LWS)) {
11360
12558
  return undefined;
11361
12559
  }
12560
+ // W-24222894: read the primitive AFTER the gate — never in the outer
12561
+ // initializer's parameter. The initializer runs for EVERY record built,
12562
+ // including a transitional secondary-window realm (e.g. a freshly
12563
+ // window.open()'d same-origin window still materializing) whose Proxy is
12564
+ // momentarily undefined; the deep `Proxy.revocable` outer read
12565
+ // dereferences that undefined before this gate can bail and throws,
12566
+ // exactly as it did for Function.prototype.apply. See
12567
+ // ../Function/cross-realm-invocation.ts.
12568
+ const originalRevocable$LWS = globalObject$LWS.Proxy.revocable;
11362
12569
  return [originalRevocable$LWS, function revocable$LWS(target$LWS, handler$LWS) {
11363
- return ReflectApply$LWS$1(originalRevocable$LWS, undefined, [substituteDistortedCallee$LWS(root$LWS, target$LWS), handler$LWS]);
12570
+ return ReflectApply$LWS$1(originalRevocable$LWS, undefined, [substituteDistortedCallee$LWS(root$LWS, target$LWS), substituteDistortedHandler$LWS(root$LWS, handler$LWS)]);
11364
12571
  }];
11365
12572
  };
11366
12573
  }
@@ -11370,19 +12577,32 @@
11370
12577
  function initDistortionRangeCloneContents$LWS({
11371
12578
  globalObject: {
11372
12579
  AbstractRange: AbstractRange$LWS,
11373
- Range: {
11374
- prototype: {
11375
- cloneContents: originalCloneContents$LWS
11376
- }
11377
- }
11378
- }
11379
- }) {
12580
+ Range: Range$LWS
12581
+ }
12582
+ }) {
12583
+ // endContainer/startContainer have migrated across the Range interface
12584
+ // hierarchy over time:
12585
+ // Chrome <= 89: defined on Range.prototype
12586
+ // Chrome 90-151: defined on AbstractRange.prototype
12587
+ // Chrome >= 152: defined on NodeRange.prototype (a new interface
12588
+ // inserted as Range -> NodeRange -> AbstractRange)
12589
+ // walkRangeProtoChainForMethods (default on) walks up from the realm's own
12590
+ // Range.prototype so the accessors resolve wherever the platform currently
12591
+ // defines them; disabling it restores the legacy own-property lookup on
12592
+ // AbstractRange.prototype (broken on Chrome >= 152).
12593
+ const walkRangeProtoChain$LWS = isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS('walkRangeProtoChainForMethods');
12594
+ const {
12595
+ prototype: RangeProto$LWS
12596
+ } = Range$LWS;
12597
+ const {
12598
+ cloneContents: originalCloneContents$LWS
12599
+ } = RangeProto$LWS;
11380
12600
  // istanbul ignore next: the null path and right side of the expression for this code is not reachable in the version of chrome used to measure coverage.
11381
12601
  const {
11382
12602
  prototype: AbstractRangeProto$LWS
11383
- } = AbstractRange$LWS != null ? AbstractRange$LWS : Range;
11384
- const originalEndContainerGetter$LWS = ObjectLookupOwnGetter$LWS$1(AbstractRangeProto$LWS, 'endContainer');
11385
- const originalStartContainerGetter$LWS = ObjectLookupOwnGetter$LWS$1(AbstractRangeProto$LWS, 'startContainer');
12603
+ } = AbstractRange$LWS != null ? AbstractRange$LWS : Range$LWS;
12604
+ const originalEndContainerGetter$LWS = walkRangeProtoChain$LWS ? ObjectLookupGetter$LWS(RangeProto$LWS, 'endContainer') : ObjectLookupOwnGetter$LWS$1(AbstractRangeProto$LWS, 'endContainer');
12605
+ const originalStartContainerGetter$LWS = walkRangeProtoChain$LWS ? ObjectLookupGetter$LWS(RangeProto$LWS, 'startContainer') : ObjectLookupOwnGetter$LWS$1(AbstractRangeProto$LWS, 'startContainer');
11386
12606
  const distortionEntry$LWS = [originalCloneContents$LWS, function cloneContents$LWS(...args$LWS) {
11387
12607
  if (isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS('changesSince.262')) {
11388
12608
  const containers$LWS = [ReflectApply$LWS$1(originalEndContainerGetter$LWS, this, []), ReflectApply$LWS$1(originalStartContainerGetter$LWS, this, [])];
@@ -11407,19 +12627,32 @@
11407
12627
  function initDistortionRangeCloneRange$LWS({
11408
12628
  globalObject: {
11409
12629
  AbstractRange: AbstractRange$LWS,
11410
- Range: {
11411
- prototype: {
11412
- cloneRange: originalCloneRange$LWS
11413
- }
11414
- }
11415
- }
11416
- }) {
12630
+ Range: Range$LWS
12631
+ }
12632
+ }) {
12633
+ // endContainer/startContainer have migrated across the Range interface
12634
+ // hierarchy over time:
12635
+ // Chrome <= 89: defined on Range.prototype
12636
+ // Chrome 90-151: defined on AbstractRange.prototype
12637
+ // Chrome >= 152: defined on NodeRange.prototype (a new interface
12638
+ // inserted as Range -> NodeRange -> AbstractRange)
12639
+ // walkRangeProtoChainForMethods (default on) walks up from the realm's own
12640
+ // Range.prototype so the accessors resolve wherever the platform currently
12641
+ // defines them; disabling it restores the legacy own-property lookup on
12642
+ // AbstractRange.prototype (broken on Chrome >= 152).
12643
+ const walkRangeProtoChain$LWS = isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS('walkRangeProtoChainForMethods');
12644
+ const {
12645
+ prototype: RangeProto$LWS
12646
+ } = Range$LWS;
12647
+ const {
12648
+ cloneRange: originalCloneRange$LWS
12649
+ } = RangeProto$LWS;
11417
12650
  // istanbul ignore next: the null path and right side of the expression for this code is not reachable in the version of chrome used to measure coverage.
11418
12651
  const {
11419
12652
  prototype: AbstractRangeProto$LWS
11420
- } = AbstractRange$LWS != null ? AbstractRange$LWS : Range;
11421
- const originalEndContainerGetter$LWS = ObjectLookupOwnGetter$LWS$1(AbstractRangeProto$LWS, 'endContainer');
11422
- const originalStartContainerGetter$LWS = ObjectLookupOwnGetter$LWS$1(AbstractRangeProto$LWS, 'startContainer');
12653
+ } = AbstractRange$LWS != null ? AbstractRange$LWS : Range$LWS;
12654
+ const originalEndContainerGetter$LWS = walkRangeProtoChain$LWS ? ObjectLookupGetter$LWS(RangeProto$LWS, 'endContainer') : ObjectLookupOwnGetter$LWS$1(AbstractRangeProto$LWS, 'endContainer');
12655
+ const originalStartContainerGetter$LWS = walkRangeProtoChain$LWS ? ObjectLookupGetter$LWS(RangeProto$LWS, 'startContainer') : ObjectLookupOwnGetter$LWS$1(AbstractRangeProto$LWS, 'startContainer');
11423
12656
  const distortionEntry$LWS = [originalCloneRange$LWS, function cloneRange$LWS(...args$LWS) {
11424
12657
  if (isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS('changesSince.262')) {
11425
12658
  const containers$LWS = [ReflectApply$LWS$1(originalEndContainerGetter$LWS, this, []), ReflectApply$LWS$1(originalStartContainerGetter$LWS, this, [])];
@@ -11481,24 +12714,32 @@
11481
12714
  function initDistortionRangeDeleteContents$LWS({
11482
12715
  globalObject: {
11483
12716
  AbstractRange: AbstractRange$LWS,
11484
- Range: {
11485
- prototype: {
11486
- deleteContents: originalDeleteContents$LWS
11487
- }
11488
- }
11489
- }
11490
- }) {
11491
- // Chrome <= 89, Edge <= 89, Safari <= 14, Firefox <= 68, Mobile Safari <= 14.4:
11492
- // endContainer/startContainer are defined on Range.prototype
11493
- //
11494
- // Chrome >= 90, Edge >= 90, Safari >= 14.1, Firefox >= 69, Mobile Safari >= 14.5:
11495
- // endContainer/startContainer are defined on AbstractRange.prototype
12717
+ Range: Range$LWS
12718
+ }
12719
+ }) {
12720
+ // endContainer/startContainer have migrated across the Range interface
12721
+ // hierarchy over time:
12722
+ // Chrome <= 89: defined on Range.prototype
12723
+ // Chrome 90-151: defined on AbstractRange.prototype
12724
+ // Chrome >= 152: defined on NodeRange.prototype (a new interface
12725
+ // inserted as Range -> NodeRange -> AbstractRange)
12726
+ // walkRangeProtoChainForMethods (default on) walks up from the realm's own
12727
+ // Range.prototype so the accessors resolve wherever the platform currently
12728
+ // defines them; disabling it restores the legacy own-property lookup on
12729
+ // AbstractRange.prototype (broken on Chrome >= 152).
12730
+ const walkRangeProtoChain$LWS = isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS('walkRangeProtoChainForMethods');
12731
+ const {
12732
+ prototype: RangeProto$LWS
12733
+ } = Range$LWS;
12734
+ const {
12735
+ deleteContents: originalDeleteContents$LWS
12736
+ } = RangeProto$LWS;
11496
12737
  // istanbul ignore next: the null path and right side of the expression for this code is not reachable in the version of chrome used to measure coverage.
11497
12738
  const {
11498
12739
  prototype: AbstractRangeProto$LWS
11499
- } = AbstractRange$LWS != null ? AbstractRange$LWS : Range;
11500
- const originalEndContainerGetter$LWS = ObjectLookupOwnGetter$LWS$1(AbstractRangeProto$LWS, 'endContainer');
11501
- const originalStartContainerGetter$LWS = ObjectLookupOwnGetter$LWS$1(AbstractRangeProto$LWS, 'startContainer');
12740
+ } = AbstractRange$LWS != null ? AbstractRange$LWS : Range$LWS;
12741
+ const originalEndContainerGetter$LWS = walkRangeProtoChain$LWS ? ObjectLookupGetter$LWS(RangeProto$LWS, 'endContainer') : ObjectLookupOwnGetter$LWS$1(AbstractRangeProto$LWS, 'endContainer');
12742
+ const originalStartContainerGetter$LWS = walkRangeProtoChain$LWS ? ObjectLookupGetter$LWS(RangeProto$LWS, 'startContainer') : ObjectLookupOwnGetter$LWS$1(AbstractRangeProto$LWS, 'startContainer');
11502
12743
  const distortionEntry$LWS = [originalDeleteContents$LWS, function deleteContents$LWS(...args$LWS) {
11503
12744
  const containers$LWS = [ReflectApply$LWS$1(originalEndContainerGetter$LWS, this, []), ReflectApply$LWS$1(originalStartContainerGetter$LWS, this, [])];
11504
12745
  for (let i$LWS = 0, {
@@ -11521,24 +12762,32 @@
11521
12762
  function initDistortionRangeExtractContents$LWS({
11522
12763
  globalObject: {
11523
12764
  AbstractRange: AbstractRange$LWS,
11524
- Range: {
11525
- prototype: {
11526
- extractContents: originalExtractContents$LWS
11527
- }
11528
- }
11529
- }
11530
- }) {
11531
- // Chrome <= 89, Edge <= 89, Safari <= 14, Firefox <= 68, Mobile Safari <= 14.4:
11532
- // endContainer/startContainer are defined on Range.prototype
11533
- //
11534
- // Chrome >= 90, Edge >= 90, Safari >= 14.1, Firefox >= 69, Mobile Safari >= 14.5:
11535
- // endContainer/startContainer are defined on AbstractRange.prototype
12765
+ Range: Range$LWS
12766
+ }
12767
+ }) {
12768
+ // endContainer/startContainer have migrated across the Range interface
12769
+ // hierarchy over time:
12770
+ // Chrome <= 89: defined on Range.prototype
12771
+ // Chrome 90-151: defined on AbstractRange.prototype
12772
+ // Chrome >= 152: defined on NodeRange.prototype (a new interface
12773
+ // inserted as Range -> NodeRange -> AbstractRange)
12774
+ // walkRangeProtoChainForMethods (default on) walks up from the realm's own
12775
+ // Range.prototype so the accessors resolve wherever the platform currently
12776
+ // defines them; disabling it restores the legacy own-property lookup on
12777
+ // AbstractRange.prototype (broken on Chrome >= 152).
12778
+ const walkRangeProtoChain$LWS = isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS('walkRangeProtoChainForMethods');
12779
+ const {
12780
+ prototype: RangeProto$LWS
12781
+ } = Range$LWS;
12782
+ const {
12783
+ extractContents: originalExtractContents$LWS
12784
+ } = RangeProto$LWS;
11536
12785
  // istanbul ignore next: the null path and right side of the expression for this code is not reachable in the version of chrome used to measure coverage.
11537
12786
  const {
11538
12787
  prototype: AbstractRangeProto$LWS
11539
- } = AbstractRange$LWS != null ? AbstractRange$LWS : Range;
11540
- const originalEndContainerGetter$LWS = ObjectLookupOwnGetter$LWS$1(AbstractRangeProto$LWS, 'endContainer');
11541
- const originalStartContainerGetter$LWS = ObjectLookupOwnGetter$LWS$1(AbstractRangeProto$LWS, 'startContainer');
12788
+ } = AbstractRange$LWS != null ? AbstractRange$LWS : Range$LWS;
12789
+ const originalEndContainerGetter$LWS = walkRangeProtoChain$LWS ? ObjectLookupGetter$LWS(RangeProto$LWS, 'endContainer') : ObjectLookupOwnGetter$LWS$1(AbstractRangeProto$LWS, 'endContainer');
12790
+ const originalStartContainerGetter$LWS = walkRangeProtoChain$LWS ? ObjectLookupGetter$LWS(RangeProto$LWS, 'startContainer') : ObjectLookupOwnGetter$LWS$1(AbstractRangeProto$LWS, 'startContainer');
11542
12791
  const distortionEntry$LWS = [originalExtractContents$LWS, function extractContents$LWS(...args$LWS) {
11543
12792
  const containers$LWS = [ReflectApply$LWS$1(originalEndContainerGetter$LWS, this, []), ReflectApply$LWS$1(originalStartContainerGetter$LWS, this, [])];
11544
12793
  for (let i$LWS = 0, {
@@ -11561,19 +12810,32 @@
11561
12810
  function initDistortionRangeGetBoundingClientRect$LWS({
11562
12811
  globalObject: {
11563
12812
  AbstractRange: AbstractRange$LWS,
11564
- Range: {
11565
- prototype: {
11566
- getBoundingClientRect: originalGetBoundingClientRect$LWS
11567
- }
11568
- }
11569
- }
11570
- }) {
12813
+ Range: Range$LWS
12814
+ }
12815
+ }) {
12816
+ // endContainer/startContainer have migrated across the Range interface
12817
+ // hierarchy over time:
12818
+ // Chrome <= 89: defined on Range.prototype
12819
+ // Chrome 90-151: defined on AbstractRange.prototype
12820
+ // Chrome >= 152: defined on NodeRange.prototype (a new interface
12821
+ // inserted as Range -> NodeRange -> AbstractRange)
12822
+ // walkRangeProtoChainForMethods (default on) walks up from the realm's own
12823
+ // Range.prototype so the accessors resolve wherever the platform currently
12824
+ // defines them; disabling it restores the legacy own-property lookup on
12825
+ // AbstractRange.prototype (broken on Chrome >= 152).
12826
+ const walkRangeProtoChain$LWS = isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS('walkRangeProtoChainForMethods');
12827
+ const {
12828
+ prototype: RangeProto$LWS
12829
+ } = Range$LWS;
12830
+ const {
12831
+ getBoundingClientRect: originalGetBoundingClientRect$LWS
12832
+ } = RangeProto$LWS;
11571
12833
  // istanbul ignore next: the null path and right side of the expression for this code is not reachable in the version of chrome used to measure coverage.
11572
12834
  const {
11573
12835
  prototype: AbstractRangeProto$LWS
11574
- } = AbstractRange$LWS != null ? AbstractRange$LWS : Range;
11575
- const originalEndContainerGetter$LWS = ObjectLookupOwnGetter$LWS$1(AbstractRangeProto$LWS, 'endContainer');
11576
- const originalStartContainerGetter$LWS = ObjectLookupOwnGetter$LWS$1(AbstractRangeProto$LWS, 'startContainer');
12836
+ } = AbstractRange$LWS != null ? AbstractRange$LWS : Range$LWS;
12837
+ const originalEndContainerGetter$LWS = walkRangeProtoChain$LWS ? ObjectLookupGetter$LWS(RangeProto$LWS, 'endContainer') : ObjectLookupOwnGetter$LWS$1(AbstractRangeProto$LWS, 'endContainer');
12838
+ const originalStartContainerGetter$LWS = walkRangeProtoChain$LWS ? ObjectLookupGetter$LWS(RangeProto$LWS, 'startContainer') : ObjectLookupOwnGetter$LWS$1(AbstractRangeProto$LWS, 'startContainer');
11577
12839
  const distortionEntry$LWS = [originalGetBoundingClientRect$LWS, function getBoundingClientRect$LWS(...args$LWS) {
11578
12840
  if (isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS('changesSince.262')) {
11579
12841
  const containers$LWS = [ReflectApply$LWS$1(originalEndContainerGetter$LWS, this, []), ReflectApply$LWS$1(originalStartContainerGetter$LWS, this, [])];
@@ -11677,19 +12939,32 @@
11677
12939
  function initDistortionRangeToString$LWS({
11678
12940
  globalObject: {
11679
12941
  AbstractRange: AbstractRange$LWS,
11680
- Range: {
11681
- prototype: {
11682
- toString: originalRangeToString$LWS
11683
- }
11684
- }
11685
- }
11686
- }) {
12942
+ Range: Range$LWS
12943
+ }
12944
+ }) {
12945
+ // endContainer/startContainer have migrated across the Range interface
12946
+ // hierarchy over time:
12947
+ // Chrome <= 89: defined on Range.prototype
12948
+ // Chrome 90-151: defined on AbstractRange.prototype
12949
+ // Chrome >= 152: defined on NodeRange.prototype (a new interface
12950
+ // inserted as Range -> NodeRange -> AbstractRange)
12951
+ // walkRangeProtoChainForMethods (default on) walks up from the realm's own
12952
+ // Range.prototype so the accessors resolve wherever the platform currently
12953
+ // defines them; disabling it restores the legacy own-property lookup on
12954
+ // AbstractRange.prototype (broken on Chrome >= 152).
12955
+ const walkRangeProtoChain$LWS = isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS('walkRangeProtoChainForMethods');
12956
+ const {
12957
+ prototype: RangeProto$LWS
12958
+ } = Range$LWS;
12959
+ const {
12960
+ toString: originalRangeToString$LWS
12961
+ } = RangeProto$LWS;
11687
12962
  // istanbul ignore next: the null path and right side of the expression for this code is not reachable in the version of chrome used to measure coverage.
11688
12963
  const {
11689
12964
  prototype: AbstractRangeProto$LWS
11690
- } = AbstractRange$LWS != null ? AbstractRange$LWS : Range;
11691
- const originalEndContainerGetter$LWS = ObjectLookupOwnGetter$LWS$1(AbstractRangeProto$LWS, 'endContainer');
11692
- const originalStartContainerGetter$LWS = ObjectLookupOwnGetter$LWS$1(AbstractRangeProto$LWS, 'startContainer');
12965
+ } = AbstractRange$LWS != null ? AbstractRange$LWS : Range$LWS;
12966
+ const originalEndContainerGetter$LWS = walkRangeProtoChain$LWS ? ObjectLookupGetter$LWS(RangeProto$LWS, 'endContainer') : ObjectLookupOwnGetter$LWS$1(AbstractRangeProto$LWS, 'endContainer');
12967
+ const originalStartContainerGetter$LWS = walkRangeProtoChain$LWS ? ObjectLookupGetter$LWS(RangeProto$LWS, 'startContainer') : ObjectLookupOwnGetter$LWS$1(AbstractRangeProto$LWS, 'startContainer');
11693
12968
  const distortionEntry$LWS = [originalRangeToString$LWS, function toString$LWS(...args$LWS) {
11694
12969
  if (isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS('changesSince.262')) {
11695
12970
  const containers$LWS = [ReflectApply$LWS$1(originalEndContainerGetter$LWS, this, []), ReflectApply$LWS$1(originalStartContainerGetter$LWS, this, [])];
@@ -11715,13 +12990,7 @@
11715
12990
  // Unlike Function.prototype.apply, the callee is the FIRST ARGUMENT (not
11716
12991
  // `this`) and the invocation never routes through Function.prototype.call, so
11717
12992
  // it is an independent doorway that must be distorted separately.
11718
- function initDistortionReflectApply$LWS({
11719
- globalObject: {
11720
- Reflect: {
11721
- apply: originalReflectApply$LWS
11722
- }
11723
- }
11724
- }) {
12993
+ function initDistortionReflectApply$LWS() {
11725
12994
  return function distortionReflectApply$LWS({
11726
12995
  globalObject: globalObject$LWS,
11727
12996
  root: root$LWS
@@ -11729,6 +12998,11 @@
11729
12998
  if (!getDistortableFrameElement$LWS(globalObject$LWS)) {
11730
12999
  return undefined;
11731
13000
  }
13001
+ // W-24222894: read the primitive AFTER the gate. See
13002
+ // ../Function/apply-value.ts and ../Function/cross-realm-invocation.ts
13003
+ // for why an eager outer-parameter read crashes on a transitional
13004
+ // secondary-window realm.
13005
+ const originalReflectApply$LWS = globalObject$LWS.Reflect.apply;
11732
13006
  return [originalReflectApply$LWS, function apply$LWS(target$LWS, thisArg$LWS, argsArray$LWS) {
11733
13007
  return ReflectApply$LWS$1(substituteDistortedCallee$LWS(root$LWS, target$LWS), thisArg$LWS, argsArray$LWS == null ? [] : argsArray$LWS);
11734
13008
  }];
@@ -11742,13 +13016,7 @@
11742
13016
  // invoked as a constructor. Substitute it for its distorted counterpart, then
11743
13017
  // construct with the sandbox-realm Reflect.construct, preserving the optional
11744
13018
  // newTarget argument.
11745
- function initDistortionReflectConstruct$LWS({
11746
- globalObject: {
11747
- Reflect: {
11748
- construct: originalReflectConstruct$LWS
11749
- }
11750
- }
11751
- }) {
13019
+ function initDistortionReflectConstruct$LWS() {
11752
13020
  return function distortionReflectConstruct$LWS({
11753
13021
  globalObject: globalObject$LWS,
11754
13022
  root: root$LWS
@@ -11756,6 +13024,11 @@
11756
13024
  if (!getDistortableFrameElement$LWS(globalObject$LWS)) {
11757
13025
  return undefined;
11758
13026
  }
13027
+ // W-24222894: read the primitive AFTER the gate. See
13028
+ // ../Function/apply-value.ts and ../Function/cross-realm-invocation.ts
13029
+ // for why an eager outer-parameter read crashes on a transitional
13030
+ // secondary-window realm.
13031
+ const originalReflectConstruct$LWS = globalObject$LWS.Reflect.construct;
11759
13032
  return [originalReflectConstruct$LWS, function construct$LWS(target$LWS, argsArray$LWS, newTarget$LWS) {
11760
13033
  const substituted$LWS = substituteDistortedCallee$LWS(root$LWS, target$LWS);
11761
13034
  if (arguments.length > 2) {
@@ -11891,7 +13164,7 @@
11891
13164
  }
11892
13165
  current$LWS = ReflectGetPrototypeOf$LWS$1(current$LWS);
11893
13166
  }
11894
- } catch (_unused4$LWS) {
13167
+ } catch (_unused9$LWS) {
11895
13168
  // Not the confused-deputy path: defer to native below.
11896
13169
  }
11897
13170
  if (distortedGetter$LWS !== undefined) {
@@ -11966,6 +13239,57 @@
11966
13239
  return distortionEntry$LWS;
11967
13240
  };
11968
13241
  }
13242
+
13243
+ // W-23526613. `Response.json(data)` is an un-distorted, blue-realm native that
13244
+ // serializes `data` to JSON using the engine's own value-to-JSON-bytes walk.
13245
+ // That walk enumerates the argument's real own properties in native code,
13246
+ // below the near-membrane's `get`/`ownKeys` traps, so handing it a raw host
13247
+ // object (e.g. `document`) lets HTML's named-element-access algorithm fall back
13248
+ // to `Document.prototype.cookie` and leak the raw, un-namespaced cookie -- a
13249
+ // bypass of the property-access filtering the sandbox applies to ordinary
13250
+ // sandboxed JS reads.
13251
+ //
13252
+ // A `JSON.stringify` replacer neutralizes the leak. Values the sandbox itself
13253
+ // created round-trip to the blue realm as near-membrane proxies, whose native
13254
+ // walk goes through the membrane's proxy traps and is therefore already
13255
+ // filtered; any other object reachable from `data` is a raw blue host
13256
+ // reference the sandbox merely holds, and is replaced with an empty object so
13257
+ // the native serializer never enumerates it. The replacer runs before native
13258
+ // enumeration of each node, so it closes both the reported top-level
13259
+ // `Response.json(document)` call and nested carriers such as
13260
+ // `Response.json({ leak: document })`.
13261
+ function neutralizeHostObjectReplacer$LWS(_key$LWS, value$LWS) {
13262
+ if (value$LWS !== null && typeof value$LWS === 'object' && !isNearMembraneProxy$LWS$1(value$LWS)) {
13263
+ return {};
13264
+ }
13265
+ return value$LWS;
13266
+ }
13267
+ function initDistortionResponseJson$LWS({
13268
+ globalObject: {
13269
+ Response: Response$LWS
13270
+ }
13271
+ }) {
13272
+ const originalJson$LWS = Response$LWS == null ? void 0 : Response$LWS.json;
13273
+ // istanbul ignore if: Response.json is unavailable in some coverage environments
13274
+ if (typeof originalJson$LWS !== 'function') {
13275
+ return noop$LWS$1;
13276
+ }
13277
+ const distortionEntry$LWS = [originalJson$LWS, function json$LWS(...args$LWS) {
13278
+ if (isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS('changesSince.266') && args$LWS.length) {
13279
+ const safeString$LWS = JSONStringify$LWS$1(args$LWS[0], neutralizeHostObjectReplacer$LWS);
13280
+ // A top-level value that JSON serialization drops (undefined, a
13281
+ // function, a symbol) produces no bytes. Delegate to the native
13282
+ // implementation with `undefined` -- never the raw argument --
13283
+ // so it throws its own TypeError without a raw host object ever
13284
+ // reaching the native serializer.
13285
+ args$LWS[0] = safeString$LWS === undefined ? undefined : JSONParse$LWS(safeString$LWS);
13286
+ }
13287
+ return ReflectApply$LWS$1(originalJson$LWS, this, args$LWS);
13288
+ }];
13289
+ return function distortionResponseJson$LWS() {
13290
+ return distortionEntry$LWS;
13291
+ };
13292
+ }
11969
13293
  const {
11970
13294
  isSharedElement: isSharedElement$7$LWS
11971
13295
  } = rootValidator$LWS;
@@ -12548,7 +13872,7 @@
12548
13872
  try {
12549
13873
  originalStorageObject$LWS = globalObject$LWS[storageName$LWS];
12550
13874
  // eslint-disable-next-line no-empty
12551
- } catch (_unused5$LWS) {}
13875
+ } catch (_unused0$LWS) {}
12552
13876
  // istanbul ignore if: currently unreachable via tests
12553
13877
  if (!isObject$LWS$1(originalStorageObject$LWS)) {
12554
13878
  return noop$LWS$1;
@@ -12776,6 +14100,63 @@
12776
14100
  registerAttributeSetterDistortion$LWS(record$LWS, SVGAnimateElement$LWS, 'values', NAMESPACE_DEFAULT$LWS, values$LWS);
12777
14101
  };
12778
14102
  }
14103
+
14104
+ // W-23525040: SMIL animation of a script element's `href`/`xlink:href` is a
14105
+ // script-execution primitive that bypasses LWS's script-URL gate. LWS routes
14106
+ // every JS-level script-href write (attribute setter, property setter,
14107
+ // `SVGAnimatedString.baseVal`) through `createScriptDistortion` ->
14108
+ // `lwsInternalPolicy.createScriptURL`. Starting a SMIL animation via
14109
+ // `beginElement()`/`beginElementAt()` makes the engine write the target's
14110
+ // animated `href` inside its own implementation, never surfacing as a
14111
+ // JS-observable attribute mutation, so none of those gates ever see it and the
14112
+ // resolved URL loads and executes outside the membrane.
14113
+ //
14114
+ // A `<script>` is the only SVG element whose `href` is executable, and there is
14115
+ // no legitimate reason to SMIL-animate a script element, so both programmatic
14116
+ // begin methods refuse to start when the resolved animation target is a script
14117
+ // element. This is scheme-agnostic: legitimate script loading (including
14118
+ // `blob:` URLs) continues to work through the normal, gated `href` setter.
14119
+ const CANNOT_ANIMATE_SCRIPT_ELEMENT$LWS = 'Cannot begin an SVG animation that targets a script element.';
14120
+ // `beginElement()` and `beginElementAt(offset)` are the two programmatic SMIL
14121
+ // begin methods, and both need the identical guard: refuse to start when the
14122
+ // resolved animation target is a script element. `makeGuard` builds the init
14123
+ // function for either one so the guard exists as a single audited code path --
14124
+ // keeping future extensions (e.g. `endElement`/`endElementAt`, or the
14125
+ // declarative-trigger surface called out in the commit message) in lockstep
14126
+ // instead of drifting across copy-pasted bodies.
14127
+ function makeGuard$LWS(methodName$LWS) {
14128
+ return function initDistortionSVGAnimationElementBegin$LWS({
14129
+ globalObject: {
14130
+ SVGAnimationElement: SVGAnimationElement$LWS
14131
+ }
14132
+ }) {
14133
+ const SVGAnimationElementProto$LWS = SVGAnimationElement$LWS == null ? void 0 : SVGAnimationElement$LWS.prototype;
14134
+ // Defensive: if a future engine drops the begin method or the
14135
+ // `targetElement` getter off the prototype, install no distortion
14136
+ // rather than capture `undefined` and later crash on invocation.
14137
+ // Consistent with the `typeof ... !== 'function'` init guards used by
14138
+ // the CookieStore / Notification / TrustedTypePolicy distortions.
14139
+ if (!SVGAnimationElementProto$LWS) {
14140
+ return noop$LWS$1;
14141
+ }
14142
+ const originalBegin$LWS = SVGAnimationElementProto$LWS[methodName$LWS];
14143
+ const originalTargetElementGetter$LWS = ObjectLookupOwnGetter$LWS$1(SVGAnimationElementProto$LWS, 'targetElement');
14144
+ if (typeof originalBegin$LWS !== 'function' || typeof originalTargetElementGetter$LWS !== 'function') {
14145
+ return noop$LWS$1;
14146
+ }
14147
+ const distortionEntry$LWS = [originalBegin$LWS, function begin$LWS(...args$LWS) {
14148
+ if (isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS('changesSince.266') && isScriptElement$LWS(ReflectApply$LWS$1(originalTargetElementGetter$LWS, this, []))) {
14149
+ throw new LockerSecurityError$LWS(CANNOT_ANIMATE_SCRIPT_ELEMENT$LWS);
14150
+ }
14151
+ ReflectApply$LWS$1(originalBegin$LWS, this, args$LWS);
14152
+ }];
14153
+ return function distortionSVGAnimationElementBegin$LWS() {
14154
+ return distortionEntry$LWS;
14155
+ };
14156
+ };
14157
+ }
14158
+ const initDistortionSVGAnimationElementBeginElement$LWS = makeGuard$LWS('beginElement');
14159
+ const initDistortionSVGAnimationElementBeginElementAt$LWS = makeGuard$LWS('beginElementAt');
12779
14160
  function initDistortionSVGElementDatasetGetter$LWS({
12780
14161
  globalObject: {
12781
14162
  SVGElement: SVGElement$LWS
@@ -12974,7 +14355,7 @@
12974
14355
  try {
12975
14356
  // istanbul ignore next: needs default platform behavior test
12976
14357
  return ReflectApply$LWS$1(originalCreatePolicy$LWS, this, args$LWS);
12977
- } catch (_unused6$LWS) {
14358
+ } catch (_unused1$LWS) {
12978
14359
  // istanbul ignore next: this is tested, but currently cannot be tested in the coverage environment
12979
14360
  consoleWarn$LWS(`${createTrustedTypesExceptionMessage$LWS(name$LWS)} Substituting with Lightning Web Security policy.`);
12980
14361
  }
@@ -13101,15 +14482,25 @@
13101
14482
  }
13102
14483
  const loweredBlobType$LWS = ReflectApply$LWS$1(StringProtoToLowerCase$LWS, blobType$LWS, []);
13103
14484
  if (HTML_MIME_TYPES_LIST$LWS.includes(loweredBlobType$LWS)) {
14485
+ // The `includes` gate above is an exact-string match against
14486
+ // HTML_MIME_TYPES_LIST, whose entries carry no parameters
14487
+ // (`text/html`, `image/svg+xml`, `text/xml`). A blob type that
14488
+ // arrived with a `;charset=` parameter (e.g.
14489
+ // `text/html;charset=utf-16`) fails that exact match and never
14490
+ // reaches this branch, so `loweredBlobType` here is always bare
14491
+ // and appending `;charset=utf-8` cannot produce a doubled
14492
+ // charset parameter. Both the validation slice and the
14493
+ // re-issued Blob reuse this one normalized content type.
14494
+ const normalizedContentType$LWS = `${loweredBlobType$LWS};charset=utf-8`;
13104
14495
  const blobSize$LWS = ReflectApply$LWS$1(BlobProtoSizeGetter$LWS, blobObject$LWS, []);
13105
- const normalizedBlob$LWS = ReflectApply$LWS$1(BlobProtoSlice$LWS, blobObject$LWS, [0, blobSize$LWS, `${loweredBlobType$LWS};charset=utf-8`]);
14496
+ const normalizedBlob$LWS = ReflectApply$LWS$1(BlobProtoSlice$LWS, blobObject$LWS, [0, blobSize$LWS, normalizedContentType$LWS]);
13106
14497
  URLRevokeObjectURL$LWS(outURL$LWS);
13107
14498
  outURL$LWS = ReflectApply$LWS$1(originalCreateObjectURL$LWS, this, [normalizedBlob$LWS]);
13108
14499
  const xhr$LWS = new XhrCtor$LWS();
13109
14500
  ReflectApply$LWS$1(XhrProtoOpen$LWS, xhr$LWS, ['GET', outURL$LWS, false]);
13110
14501
  try {
13111
14502
  ReflectApply$LWS$1(XhrProtoSend$LWS, xhr$LWS, []);
13112
- } catch (_unused7$LWS) {
14503
+ } catch (_unused10$LWS) {
13113
14504
  throw new LockerSecurityError$LWS(`Unable to verify ${toSafeTemplateStringValue$LWS(blobObject$LWS)} is secure.`);
13114
14505
  }
13115
14506
  const responseText$LWS = ReflectApply$LWS$1(XhrProtoResponseTextGetter$LWS, xhr$LWS, []);
@@ -13122,6 +14513,27 @@
13122
14513
  URLRevokeObjectURL$LWS(outURL$LWS);
13123
14514
  throw new LockerSecurityError$LWS(createInsecureBlobErrorMessage$LWS(blobObject$LWS));
13124
14515
  }
14516
+ // W-23558036: the validated bytes were read from a URL over
14517
+ // `normalizedBlob`, which is a `slice()` of the caller's
14518
+ // original Blob/File. For a filesystem-backed File (e.g. an
14519
+ // OPFS-derived File on WebKit) that slice can stay bound to
14520
+ // the live on-disk resource rather than an immutable snapshot,
14521
+ // so the bytes the URL resolves to can be swapped AFTER this
14522
+ // validation returns — the classic time-of-check/time-of-use
14523
+ // gap. Re-issue the URL over a fresh in-memory Blob built from
14524
+ // the exact `responseText` we just validated. An in-memory Blob
14525
+ // has no backing filesystem path to mutate, so the returned URL
14526
+ // is anchored to the validated bytes regardless of how the
14527
+ // input Blob/File was obtained (OPFS, <input type=file>,
14528
+ // drag-drop, etc.).
14529
+ if (isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS('changesSince.266')) {
14530
+ URLRevokeObjectURL$LWS(outURL$LWS);
14531
+ const validatedBlob$LWS = new BlobCtor$LWS([responseText$LWS], {
14532
+ __proto__: null,
14533
+ type: normalizedContentType$LWS
14534
+ });
14535
+ outURL$LWS = ReflectApply$LWS$1(originalCreateObjectURL$LWS, this, [validatedBlob$LWS]);
14536
+ }
13125
14537
  return outURL$LWS;
13126
14538
  }
13127
14539
  if (isMIMETypeAllowed$LWS(loweredBlobType$LWS)) {
@@ -13797,7 +15209,7 @@
13797
15209
  // Same-browsing-context targets (_self, _parent, _top) are excluded:
13798
15210
  // they navigate the current context (no new unsandboxed page), and the
13799
15211
  // existing URL validation (gate 262) already guards them.
13800
- if (isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS('changesSince.264') && !willOpenInSameBrowsingContext$LWS) {
15212
+ if (isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS('blockWindowOpenSameOriginSameContext') && !willOpenInSameBrowsingContext$LWS) {
13801
15213
  if (isSameOriginURL$LWS(resourceUrl$LWS)) {
13802
15214
  throw new LockerSecurityError$LWS('Cannot open same-origin URL in a new browsing context.');
13803
15215
  }
@@ -14019,6 +15431,53 @@
14019
15431
  return distortionEntry$LWS;
14020
15432
  };
14021
15433
  }
15434
+
15435
+ // A genuine `Document` (from any realm) carries the internal slot that backs
15436
+ // `Document.prototype.documentElement`, so reading it through the raw getter
15437
+ // succeeds; every other value (plain object, primitive, null, a foreign sink
15438
+ // object) throws and is treated as not-a-Document. This is also exactly the
15439
+ // set of objects for which the exploit is live: the Streams sink protocol
15440
+ // invokes the captured `write` algorithm with the sink as its `this`, so only
15441
+ // an object that actually owns the `Document` internal slot can drive the
15442
+ // native `Document.write`.
15443
+ function isDocument$LWS(value$LWS) {
15444
+ try {
15445
+ ReflectApply$LWS$1(DocumentProtoDocumentElementGetter$LWS, value$LWS, []);
15446
+ return true;
15447
+ } catch (_unused11$LWS) {
15448
+ return false;
15449
+ }
15450
+ }
15451
+ function initDistortionWritableStreamCtor$LWS({
15452
+ globalObject: {
15453
+ WritableStream: originalWritableStreamCtor$LWS
15454
+ }
15455
+ }) {
15456
+ // istanbul ignore if: WritableStream is always available in coverage environments
15457
+ if (typeof originalWritableStreamCtor$LWS !== 'function') {
15458
+ return noop$LWS$1;
15459
+ }
15460
+ function WritableStream$LWS(...args$LWS) {
15461
+ // A `WritableStream` extracts its `start`/`write`/`close`/`abort` sink
15462
+ // algorithms off the underlying sink object at construction time, via
15463
+ // WebIDL member reads on the raw host object that happen outside the
15464
+ // near-membrane's call-interception layer. Passing a `Document` as the
15465
+ // sink captures the native `Document.prototype.write` (which LWS blocks
15466
+ // with a value-thrower on the method itself) as the stream's write
15467
+ // algorithm; each later `writer.write(chunk)` then runs the raw
15468
+ // `Document.write` through the browser's internal stream machinery,
15469
+ // never re-entering the thrower. Refuse a `Document` sink so the blocked
15470
+ // method cannot be laundered into a live reference.
15471
+ if (isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS('changesSince.266') && args$LWS.length && isDocument$LWS(args$LWS[0])) {
15472
+ throw new LockerSecurityError$LWS('Cannot create WritableStream with a Document sink.');
15473
+ }
15474
+ return ReflectConstruct$LWS(originalWritableStreamCtor$LWS, args$LWS);
15475
+ }
15476
+ const distortionEntry$LWS = [originalWritableStreamCtor$LWS, WritableStream$LWS];
15477
+ return function distortionWritableStreamCtor$LWS() {
15478
+ return distortionEntry$LWS;
15479
+ };
15480
+ }
14022
15481
  function initDistortionXMLHttpRequestOpen$LWS({
14023
15482
  globalObject: {
14024
15483
  XMLHttpRequest: {
@@ -14094,7 +15553,7 @@
14094
15553
  try {
14095
15554
  docEl$LWS = ReflectApply$LWS$1(DocumentProtoDocumentElementGetter$LWS, rawResponse$LWS, []);
14096
15555
  isDocument$LWS = true;
14097
- } catch (_unused8$LWS) {
15556
+ } catch (_unused12$LWS) {
14098
15557
  isDocument$LWS = false;
14099
15558
  }
14100
15559
  }
@@ -14166,6 +15625,8 @@
14166
15625
  initDistortionHistoryPushState$LWS, initDistortionHistoryReplaceState$LWS,
14167
15626
  // HTMLElement
14168
15627
  initDistortionHTMLElementDatasetGetter$LWS, initDistortionHTMLElementInnerTextGetter$LWS, initDistortionHTMLElementInnerTextSetter$LWS, initDistortionHTMLElementOuterTextSetter$LWS, initDistortionHTMLElementStyleGetter$LWS,
15628
+ // HTMLFrameElement
15629
+ initDistortionHTMLFrameElementSrcGetter$LWS, initDistortionHTMLFrameElementSrcSetter$LWS,
14169
15630
  // HTMLIFrameElement
14170
15631
  initDistortionIFrameElementContentDocumentGetter$LWS, initDistortionIFrameElementContentWindowGetter$LWS, initDistortionHTMLIFrameElementSandboxGetter$LWS, initDistortionHTMLIFrameElementSandboxSetter$LWS, initDistortionHTMLIFrameElementSrcGetter$LWS, initDistortionHTMLIFrameElementSrcSetter$LWS,
14171
15632
  // HTMLImageElement
@@ -14198,12 +15659,14 @@
14198
15659
  initDistortionReportingObserverCtor$LWS, initDistortionReportingObserverProto$LWS,
14199
15660
  // ResizeObserver
14200
15661
  initDistortionResizeObserverObserve$LWS,
15662
+ // Navigation
15663
+ initDistortionNavigationNavigate$LWS,
14201
15664
  // Navigator
14202
15665
  initDistortionNavigatorSendBeacon$LWS, initDistortionNavigatorServiceWorkerGetter$LWS,
14203
15666
  // Observable
14204
15667
  initDistortionObservableCatch$LWS, initDistortionObservableEvery$LWS, initDistortionObservableFilter$LWS, initDistortionObservableFinally$LWS, initDistortionObservableFind$LWS, initDistortionObservableFlatMap$LWS, initDistortionObservableForEach$LWS, initDistortionObservableInspect$LWS, initDistortionObservableMap$LWS, initDistortionObservableReduce$LWS, initDistortionObservableSome$LWS, initDistortionObservableSubscribe$LWS, initDistortionObservableSwitchMap$LWS,
14205
15668
  // Node
14206
- initDistortionNodeGetRootNode$LWS, initDistortionNodeParentElementGetter$LWS, initDistortionNodeParentNodeGetter$LWS, initDistortionNodeRemoveChild$LWS, initDistortionNodeReplaceChild$LWS,
15669
+ initDistortionNodeCloneNode$LWS, initDistortionNodeGetRootNode$LWS, initDistortionNodeParentElementGetter$LWS, initDistortionNodeParentNodeGetter$LWS, initDistortionNodeRemoveChild$LWS, initDistortionNodeReplaceChild$LWS,
14207
15670
  // Performance
14208
15671
  initDistortionPerformanceMark$LWS, initDistortionPerformanceMeasure$LWS,
14209
15672
  // PerformanceMark
@@ -14220,6 +15683,8 @@
14220
15683
  initDistortionRangeCloneContents$LWS, initDistortionRangeCloneRange$LWS, initDistortionRangeDeleteContents$LWS, initDistortionRangeExtractContents$LWS, initDistortionRangeGetBoundingClientRect$LWS, initDistortionRangeInsertNode$LWS, initDistortionRangeSelectNode$LWS, initDistortionRangeSelectNodeContents$LWS, initDistortionRangeSetEnd$LWS, initDistortionRangeSetEndAfter$LWS, initDistortionRangeSetEndBefore$LWS, initDistortionRangeSetStart$LWS, initDistortionRangeSetStartAfter$LWS, initDistortionRangeSetStartBefore$LWS, initDistortionRangeSurroundContents$LWS, initDistortionRangeToString$LWS,
14221
15684
  // Reflect
14222
15685
  initDistortionReflectApply$LWS, initDistortionReflectConstruct$LWS, initDistortionReflectDefineProperty$LWS, initDistortionReflectGet$LWS,
15686
+ // Response
15687
+ initDistortionResponseJson$LWS,
14223
15688
  // Selection
14224
15689
  initDistortionSelectionAnchorNodeGetter$LWS, initDistortionSelectionCollapse$LWS, initDistortionSelectionExtend$LWS, initDistortionSelectionFocusNodeGetter$LWS, initDistortionSelectionSelectAllChildren$LWS, initDistortionSelectionSetBaseAndExtent$LWS, initDistortionSelectionSetPosition$LWS, initDistortionSelectionToString$LWS,
14225
15690
  // ServiceWorkerContainer
@@ -14232,6 +15697,8 @@
14232
15697
  initDistortionSVGAnimatedStringBaseValSetter$LWS,
14233
15698
  // SVGAnimateElement
14234
15699
  initDistortionSVGAnimateElementFromAttribute$LWS, initDistortionSVGAnimateElementToAttribute$LWS, initDistortionSVGAnimateElementValuesAttribute$LWS,
15700
+ // SVGAnimationElement
15701
+ initDistortionSVGAnimationElementBeginElement$LWS, initDistortionSVGAnimationElementBeginElementAt$LWS,
14235
15702
  // SVGElement
14236
15703
  initDistortionSVGElementDatasetGetter$LWS, initDistortionSVGElementStyleGetter$LWS,
14237
15704
  // SVGSetElement
@@ -14248,6 +15715,8 @@
14248
15715
  initDistortionWindowFetch$LWS, initDistortionWindowFetchLater$LWS, initDistortionWindowFramesGetter$LWS, initDistortionWindowGetComputedStyle$LWS, initDistortionWindowLengthGetter$LWS, initDistortionWindowNameGetter$LWS, initDistortionWindowNameSetter$LWS, initDistortionWindowOpen$LWS, initDistortionWindowPostMessage$LWS, initDistortionWindowStructuredClone$LWS,
14249
15716
  // Worker
14250
15717
  initDistortionWorkerCtor$LWS, initDistortionWorkerProto$LWS,
15718
+ // WritableStream
15719
+ initDistortionWritableStreamCtor$LWS,
14251
15720
  // XHR
14252
15721
  initDistortionXMLHttpRequestOpen$LWS];
14253
15722
  const internalKeyedDistortionFactoryInitializers$LWS = [
@@ -14286,7 +15755,7 @@
14286
15755
  // HTMLButtonElement
14287
15756
  initDistortionHTMLButtonElementFormActionSetter$LWS,
14288
15757
  // HTMLFormElement
14289
- initDistortionHTMLFormElementActionSetter$LWS,
15758
+ initDistortionHTMLFormElementActionSetter$LWS, initDistortionHTMLFormElementRequestSubmit$LWS, initDistortionHTMLFormElementSubmit$LWS,
14290
15759
  // HTMLInputElement
14291
15760
  initDistortionHTMLInputElementFormActionSetter$LWS,
14292
15761
  // HTMLFrameSetElement
@@ -14328,7 +15797,7 @@
14328
15797
  // initDistortionNodeAppendChild,
14329
15798
  initDistortionNodeInsertBefore$LWS]);
14330
15799
  const externalKeyedDistortionFactoryInitializers$LWS = internalKeyedDistortionFactoryInitializers$LWS;
14331
- const distortionFactoryInitializerToggleSwitches$LWS = toSafeMap$LWS$1(new MapCtor$LWS$1([[initDistortionBroadcastChannelCtor$LWS, 'broadcastChannel'], [initDistortionBroadcastChannelNameGetter$LWS, 'broadcastChannel'], [initDistortionCacheStorageDelete$LWS, 'caches'], [initDistortionCacheStorageHas$LWS, 'caches'], [initDistortionCacheStorageKeys$LWS, 'caches'], [initDistortionCacheStorageMatch$LWS, 'caches'], [initDistortionCacheStorageOpen$LWS, 'caches'], [initDistortionCookieStoreDelete$LWS, 'cookieStore'], [initDistortionCookieStoreGet$LWS, 'cookieStore'], [initDistortionCookieStoreGetAll$LWS, 'cookieStore'], [initDistortionCookieStoreOnChange$LWS, 'cookieStore'], [initDistortionCookieStoreSet$LWS, 'cookieStore'], [initDistortionCSSStyleRuleStyleGetter$LWS, 'style'], [initDistortionCustomElementRegistryDefine$LWS, 'customElements'], [initDistortionCustomElementRegistryGet$LWS, 'customElements'], [initDistortionCustomElementRegistryUpgrade$LWS, 'customElements'], [initDistortionCustomElementRegistryWhenDefined$LWS, 'customElements'], [initDistortionDocumentCookieGetter$LWS, 'documentCookie'], [initDistortionDocumentCookieSetter$LWS, 'documentCookie'], [initDistortionDocumentDomainSetter$LWS, 'documentDomain'], [initDistortionDocumentExecCommand$LWS, 'documentExecCommand'], [initDistortionDOMParserParseFromString$LWS, 'domParserParseFromString'], [initDistortionDOMTokenListAdd$LWS, 'domTokenList'], [initDistortionDOMTokenListReplace$LWS, 'domTokenList'], [initDistortionDOMTokenListToggle$LWS, 'domTokenList'], [initDistortionDOMTokenListValueSetter$LWS, 'domTokenList'], [initDistortionElementAfter$LWS, 'element'], [initDistortionElementAppend$LWS, 'element'], [initDistortionElementAttributesGetter$LWS, 'attributes'], [initDistortionElementBefore$LWS, 'element'], [initDistortionElementGetInnerHTML$LWS, 'innerHTML'], [initDistortionElementInnerHTMLSetter$LWS, 'innerHTML'], [initDistortionElementInsertAdjacentElement$LWS, 'element'], [initDistortionElementInsertAdjacentHTML$LWS, 'element'], [initDistortionElementOuterHTMLSetter$LWS, 'element'], [initDistortionElementPrepend$LWS, 'element'], [initDistortionElementRemove$LWS, 'element'], [initDistortionElementReplaceChildren$LWS, 'element'], [initDistortionElementReplaceWith$LWS, 'element'], [initDistortionElementGetAttribute$LWS, 'attributes'], [initDistortionElementGetAttributeNode$LWS, 'attributes'], [initDistortionElementGetAttributeNodeNS$LWS, 'attributes'], [initDistortionElementGetAttributeNS$LWS, 'attributes'], [initDistortionElementSetAttribute$LWS, 'attributes'], [initDistortionElementSetAttributeNode$LWS, 'attributes'], [initDistortionElementSetAttributeNodeNS$LWS, 'attributes'], [initDistortionElementSetAttributeNS$LWS, 'attributes'], [initDistortionElementRemoveAttribute$LWS, 'attributes'], [initDistortionElementRemoveAttributeNS$LWS, 'attributes'], [initDistortionElementRemoveAttributeNode$LWS, 'attributes'], [initDistortionElementSetHTML$LWS, 'element'], [initDistortionElementToggleAttribute$LWS, 'attributes'], [initDistortionHTMLButtonElementFormActionSetter$LWS, 'form'], [initDistortionHTMLFormElementActionSetter$LWS, 'form'], [initDistortionHTMLInputElementFormActionSetter$LWS, 'form'], [initDistortionHistoryPushState$LWS, 'history'], [initDistortionHistoryReplaceState$LWS, 'history'], [initDistortionHTMLElementDatasetGetter$LWS, 'dataset'], [initDistortionHTMLElementStyleGetter$LWS, 'style'], [initDistortionHTMLImageElementSrcSetter$LWS, 'networkSrc'], [initDistortionHTMLImageElementSrcsetSetter$LWS, 'networkSrc'], [initDistortionHTMLLinkElementHrefSetter$LWS, 'networkSrc'], [initDistortionHTMLMediaElementSrcSetter$LWS, 'networkSrc'], [initDistortionHTMLSourceElementSrcSetter$LWS, 'networkSrc'], [initDistortionHTMLSourceElementSrcsetSetter$LWS, 'networkSrc'], [initDistortionHTMLTrackElementSrcSetter$LWS, 'networkSrc'], [initDistortionHTMLScriptElementInnerTextGetter$LWS, 'script'], [initDistortionHTMLScriptElementInnerTextSetter$LWS, 'script'], [initDistortionHTMLScriptElementSrcGetter$LWS, 'script'], [initDistortionHTMLScriptElementSrcSetter$LWS, 'script'], [initDistortionHTMLScriptElementTextGetter$LWS, 'script'], [initDistortionHTMLScriptElementTextSetter$LWS, 'script'], [initDistortionIDBFactoryDatabases$LWS, 'indexedDB'], [initDistortionIDBFactoryDeleteDatabase$LWS, 'indexedDB'], [initDistortionIDBFactoryOpen$LWS, 'indexedDB'], [initDistortionIDBObjectStoreAdd$LWS, 'indexedDB'], [initDistortionIDBObjectStorePut$LWS, 'indexedDB'], [initDistortionLocalStorage$LWS, 'storage'], [initDistortionMessagePortPostMessage$LWS, 'postMessage'], [initDistortionIntersectionObserverObserve$LWS, 'observers'], [initDistortionMutationObserverObserve$LWS, 'mutationObserver'], [initDistortionPerformanceObserverObserve$LWS, 'observers'], [initDistortionResizeObserverObserve$LWS, 'observers'], [initDistortionAttrValueGetter$LWS, 'attributes'], [initDistortionAttrValueSetter$LWS, 'attributes'], [initDistortionNamedNodeMapGetNamedItem$LWS, 'attributes'], [initDistortionNamedNodeMapGetNamedItemNS$LWS, 'attributes'], [initDistortionNamedNodeMapRemoveNamedItem$LWS, 'attributes'], [initDistortionNamedNodeMapRemoveNamedItemNS$LWS, 'attributes'], [initDistortionNamedNodeMapSetNamedItem$LWS, 'attributes'], [initDistortionNamedNodeMapSetNamedItemNS$LWS, 'attributes'], [initDistortionNavigatorSendBeacon$LWS, 'navigatorSendBeacon'], [initDistortionObservableCatch$LWS, 'observable'], [initDistortionObservableEvery$LWS, 'observable'], [initDistortionObservableFilter$LWS, 'observable'], [initDistortionObservableFinally$LWS, 'observable'], [initDistortionObservableFind$LWS, 'observable'], [initDistortionObservableFlatMap$LWS, 'observable'], [initDistortionObservableForEach$LWS, 'observable'], [initDistortionObservableInspect$LWS, 'observable'], [initDistortionObservableMap$LWS, 'observable'], [initDistortionObservableReduce$LWS, 'observable'], [initDistortionObservableSome$LWS, 'observable'], [initDistortionObservableSubscribe$LWS, 'observable'], [initDistortionObservableSwitchMap$LWS, 'observable'], [initDistortionNodeGetRootNode$LWS, 'node'], [initDistortionNodeInsertBefore$LWS, 'node'], [initDistortionNodeParentElementGetter$LWS, 'node'], [initDistortionNodeParentNodeGetter$LWS, 'node'], [initDistortionNodeRemoveChild$LWS, 'node'], [initDistortionNodeReplaceChild$LWS, 'node'], [initDistortionNodeTextContentGetter$LWS, 'node'], [initDistortionNodeTextContentSetter$LWS, 'node'], [initDistortionNodeValueSetter$LWS, 'node'], [initDistortionNotificationCtor$LWS, 'notification'], [initDistortionPerformanceMark$LWS, 'performance'], [initDistortionPerformanceMarkCtor$LWS, 'performance'], [initDistortionPerformanceMeasure$LWS, 'performance'], [initDistortionRangeCloneContents$LWS, 'range'], [initDistortionRangeCloneRange$LWS, 'range'], [initDistortionRangeCreateContextualFragment$LWS, 'range'], [initDistortionRangeDeleteContents$LWS, 'range'], [initDistortionRangeExtractContents$LWS, 'range'], [initDistortionRangeGetBoundingClientRect$LWS, 'range'], [initDistortionRangeInsertNode$LWS, 'range'], [initDistortionRangeSelectNode$LWS, 'range'], [initDistortionRangeSelectNodeContents$LWS, 'range'], [initDistortionRangeSetEnd$LWS, 'range'], [initDistortionRangeSetEndAfter$LWS, 'range'], [initDistortionRangeSetEndBefore$LWS, 'range'], [initDistortionRangeSetStart$LWS, 'range'], [initDistortionRangeSetStartAfter$LWS, 'range'], [initDistortionRangeSetStartBefore$LWS, 'range'], [initDistortionRangeSurroundContents$LWS, 'range'], [initDistortionRangeToString$LWS, 'range'], [initDistortionSelectionAnchorNodeGetter$LWS, 'selection'], [initDistortionSelectionCollapse$LWS, 'selection'], [initDistortionSelectionExtend$LWS, 'selection'], [initDistortionSelectionFocusNodeGetter$LWS, 'selection'], [initDistortionSelectionSelectAllChildren$LWS, 'selection'], [initDistortionSelectionSetBaseAndExtent$LWS, 'selection'], [initDistortionSelectionSetPosition$LWS, 'selection'], [initDistortionSelectionToString$LWS, 'selection'], [initDistortionSessionStorage$LWS, 'storage'], [initDistortionShadowRootInnerHTMLSetter$LWS, 'innerHTML'], [initDistortionStorage$LWS, 'storage'], [initDistortionStorageClear$LWS, 'storage'], [initDistortionStorageGetItem$LWS, 'storage'], [initDistortionStorageKey$LWS, 'storage'], [initDistortionStorageLength$LWS, 'storage'], [initDistortionStorageRemoveItem$LWS, 'storage'], [initDistortionStorageSetItem$LWS, 'storage'], [initDistortionSVGElementDatasetGetter$LWS, 'dataset'], [initDistortionSVGElementStyleGetter$LWS, 'style'], [initDistortionSVGAnimatedStringBaseValSetter$LWS, 'script'], [initDistortionSVGScriptElementHrefGetter$LWS, 'script'], [initDistortionSVGScriptElementHrefSetter$LWS, 'script'], [initDistortionWindowFetch$LWS, 'windowFetch'], [initDistortionWindowFetchLater$LWS, 'windowFetchLater'], [initDistortionWindowFramesGetter$LWS, 'windowFrames'], [initDistortionWindowGetComputedStyle$LWS, 'style'], [initDistortionWindowLengthGetter$LWS, 'windowFrames'], [initDistortionWindowNameGetter$LWS, 'windowName'], [initDistortionWindowNameSetter$LWS, 'windowName'], [initDistortionWindowPostMessage$LWS, 'postMessage'], [initDistortionWindowSetInterval$LWS, 'setInterval'], [initDistortionWindowSetTimeout$LWS, 'setTimeout'], [initDistortionXMLHttpRequestResponseGetter$LWS, 'xhr'], [initDistortionXMLHttpRequestResponseXMLGetter$LWS, 'xhr']]));
15800
+ const distortionFactoryInitializerToggleSwitches$LWS = toSafeMap$LWS$1(new MapCtor$LWS$1([[initDistortionBroadcastChannelCtor$LWS, 'broadcastChannel'], [initDistortionBroadcastChannelNameGetter$LWS, 'broadcastChannel'], [initDistortionCacheStorageDelete$LWS, 'caches'], [initDistortionCacheStorageHas$LWS, 'caches'], [initDistortionCacheStorageKeys$LWS, 'caches'], [initDistortionCacheStorageMatch$LWS, 'caches'], [initDistortionCacheStorageOpen$LWS, 'caches'], [initDistortionCookieStoreDelete$LWS, 'cookieStore'], [initDistortionCookieStoreGet$LWS, 'cookieStore'], [initDistortionCookieStoreGetAll$LWS, 'cookieStore'], [initDistortionCookieStoreOnChange$LWS, 'cookieStore'], [initDistortionCookieStoreSet$LWS, 'cookieStore'], [initDistortionCSSStyleRuleStyleGetter$LWS, 'style'], [initDistortionCustomElementRegistryDefine$LWS, 'customElements'], [initDistortionCustomElementRegistryGet$LWS, 'customElements'], [initDistortionCustomElementRegistryUpgrade$LWS, 'customElements'], [initDistortionCustomElementRegistryWhenDefined$LWS, 'customElements'], [initDistortionDocumentCookieGetter$LWS, 'documentCookie'], [initDistortionDocumentCookieSetter$LWS, 'documentCookie'], [initDistortionDocumentDomainSetter$LWS, 'documentDomain'], [initDistortionDocumentExecCommand$LWS, 'documentExecCommand'], [initDistortionDOMParserParseFromString$LWS, 'domParserParseFromString'], [initDistortionDOMTokenListAdd$LWS, 'domTokenList'], [initDistortionDOMTokenListReplace$LWS, 'domTokenList'], [initDistortionDOMTokenListToggle$LWS, 'domTokenList'], [initDistortionDOMTokenListValueSetter$LWS, 'domTokenList'], [initDistortionElementAfter$LWS, 'element'], [initDistortionElementAppend$LWS, 'element'], [initDistortionElementAttributesGetter$LWS, 'attributes'], [initDistortionElementBefore$LWS, 'element'], [initDistortionElementGetInnerHTML$LWS, 'innerHTML'], [initDistortionElementInnerHTMLSetter$LWS, 'innerHTML'], [initDistortionElementInsertAdjacentElement$LWS, 'element'], [initDistortionElementInsertAdjacentHTML$LWS, 'element'], [initDistortionElementOuterHTMLSetter$LWS, 'element'], [initDistortionElementPrepend$LWS, 'element'], [initDistortionElementRemove$LWS, 'element'], [initDistortionElementReplaceChildren$LWS, 'element'], [initDistortionElementReplaceWith$LWS, 'element'], [initDistortionElementGetAttribute$LWS, 'attributes'], [initDistortionElementGetAttributeNode$LWS, 'attributes'], [initDistortionElementGetAttributeNodeNS$LWS, 'attributes'], [initDistortionElementGetAttributeNS$LWS, 'attributes'], [initDistortionElementSetAttribute$LWS, 'attributes'], [initDistortionElementSetAttributeNode$LWS, 'attributes'], [initDistortionElementSetAttributeNodeNS$LWS, 'attributes'], [initDistortionElementSetAttributeNS$LWS, 'attributes'], [initDistortionElementRemoveAttribute$LWS, 'attributes'], [initDistortionElementRemoveAttributeNS$LWS, 'attributes'], [initDistortionElementRemoveAttributeNode$LWS, 'attributes'], [initDistortionElementSetHTML$LWS, 'element'], [initDistortionElementToggleAttribute$LWS, 'attributes'], [initDistortionHTMLButtonElementFormActionSetter$LWS, 'form'], [initDistortionHTMLFormElementActionSetter$LWS, 'form'], [initDistortionHTMLFormElementRequestSubmit$LWS, 'form'], [initDistortionHTMLFormElementSubmit$LWS, 'form'], [initDistortionHTMLInputElementFormActionSetter$LWS, 'form'], [initDistortionHistoryPushState$LWS, 'history'], [initDistortionHistoryReplaceState$LWS, 'history'], [initDistortionHTMLElementDatasetGetter$LWS, 'dataset'], [initDistortionHTMLElementStyleGetter$LWS, 'style'], [initDistortionHTMLImageElementSrcSetter$LWS, 'networkSrc'], [initDistortionHTMLImageElementSrcsetSetter$LWS, 'networkSrc'], [initDistortionHTMLLinkElementHrefSetter$LWS, 'networkSrc'], [initDistortionHTMLMediaElementSrcSetter$LWS, 'networkSrc'], [initDistortionHTMLSourceElementSrcSetter$LWS, 'networkSrc'], [initDistortionHTMLSourceElementSrcsetSetter$LWS, 'networkSrc'], [initDistortionHTMLTrackElementSrcSetter$LWS, 'networkSrc'], [initDistortionHTMLScriptElementInnerTextGetter$LWS, 'script'], [initDistortionHTMLScriptElementInnerTextSetter$LWS, 'script'], [initDistortionHTMLScriptElementSrcGetter$LWS, 'script'], [initDistortionHTMLScriptElementSrcSetter$LWS, 'script'], [initDistortionHTMLScriptElementTextGetter$LWS, 'script'], [initDistortionHTMLScriptElementTextSetter$LWS, 'script'], [initDistortionIDBFactoryDatabases$LWS, 'indexedDB'], [initDistortionIDBFactoryDeleteDatabase$LWS, 'indexedDB'], [initDistortionIDBFactoryOpen$LWS, 'indexedDB'], [initDistortionIDBObjectStoreAdd$LWS, 'indexedDB'], [initDistortionIDBObjectStorePut$LWS, 'indexedDB'], [initDistortionLocalStorage$LWS, 'storage'], [initDistortionMessagePortPostMessage$LWS, 'postMessage'], [initDistortionIntersectionObserverObserve$LWS, 'observers'], [initDistortionMutationObserverObserve$LWS, 'mutationObserver'], [initDistortionPerformanceObserverObserve$LWS, 'observers'], [initDistortionResizeObserverObserve$LWS, 'observers'], [initDistortionAttrValueGetter$LWS, 'attributes'], [initDistortionAttrValueSetter$LWS, 'attributes'], [initDistortionNamedNodeMapGetNamedItem$LWS, 'attributes'], [initDistortionNamedNodeMapGetNamedItemNS$LWS, 'attributes'], [initDistortionNamedNodeMapRemoveNamedItem$LWS, 'attributes'], [initDistortionNamedNodeMapRemoveNamedItemNS$LWS, 'attributes'], [initDistortionNamedNodeMapSetNamedItem$LWS, 'attributes'], [initDistortionNamedNodeMapSetNamedItemNS$LWS, 'attributes'], [initDistortionNavigationNavigate$LWS, 'navigation'], [initDistortionNavigatorSendBeacon$LWS, 'navigatorSendBeacon'], [initDistortionObservableCatch$LWS, 'observable'], [initDistortionObservableEvery$LWS, 'observable'], [initDistortionObservableFilter$LWS, 'observable'], [initDistortionObservableFinally$LWS, 'observable'], [initDistortionObservableFind$LWS, 'observable'], [initDistortionObservableFlatMap$LWS, 'observable'], [initDistortionObservableForEach$LWS, 'observable'], [initDistortionObservableInspect$LWS, 'observable'], [initDistortionObservableMap$LWS, 'observable'], [initDistortionObservableReduce$LWS, 'observable'], [initDistortionObservableSome$LWS, 'observable'], [initDistortionObservableSubscribe$LWS, 'observable'], [initDistortionObservableSwitchMap$LWS, 'observable'], [initDistortionNodeCloneNode$LWS, 'node'], [initDistortionNodeGetRootNode$LWS, 'node'], [initDistortionNodeInsertBefore$LWS, 'node'], [initDistortionNodeParentElementGetter$LWS, 'node'], [initDistortionNodeParentNodeGetter$LWS, 'node'], [initDistortionNodeRemoveChild$LWS, 'node'], [initDistortionNodeReplaceChild$LWS, 'node'], [initDistortionNodeTextContentGetter$LWS, 'node'], [initDistortionNodeTextContentSetter$LWS, 'node'], [initDistortionNodeValueSetter$LWS, 'node'], [initDistortionNotificationCtor$LWS, 'notification'], [initDistortionPerformanceMark$LWS, 'performance'], [initDistortionPerformanceMarkCtor$LWS, 'performance'], [initDistortionPerformanceMeasure$LWS, 'performance'], [initDistortionRangeCloneContents$LWS, 'range'], [initDistortionRangeCloneRange$LWS, 'range'], [initDistortionRangeCreateContextualFragment$LWS, 'range'], [initDistortionRangeDeleteContents$LWS, 'range'], [initDistortionRangeExtractContents$LWS, 'range'], [initDistortionRangeGetBoundingClientRect$LWS, 'range'], [initDistortionRangeInsertNode$LWS, 'range'], [initDistortionRangeSelectNode$LWS, 'range'], [initDistortionRangeSelectNodeContents$LWS, 'range'], [initDistortionRangeSetEnd$LWS, 'range'], [initDistortionRangeSetEndAfter$LWS, 'range'], [initDistortionRangeSetEndBefore$LWS, 'range'], [initDistortionRangeSetStart$LWS, 'range'], [initDistortionRangeSetStartAfter$LWS, 'range'], [initDistortionRangeSetStartBefore$LWS, 'range'], [initDistortionRangeSurroundContents$LWS, 'range'], [initDistortionRangeToString$LWS, 'range'], [initDistortionSelectionAnchorNodeGetter$LWS, 'selection'], [initDistortionSelectionCollapse$LWS, 'selection'], [initDistortionSelectionExtend$LWS, 'selection'], [initDistortionSelectionFocusNodeGetter$LWS, 'selection'], [initDistortionSelectionSelectAllChildren$LWS, 'selection'], [initDistortionSelectionSetBaseAndExtent$LWS, 'selection'], [initDistortionSelectionSetPosition$LWS, 'selection'], [initDistortionSelectionToString$LWS, 'selection'], [initDistortionSessionStorage$LWS, 'storage'], [initDistortionShadowRootInnerHTMLSetter$LWS, 'innerHTML'], [initDistortionStorage$LWS, 'storage'], [initDistortionStorageClear$LWS, 'storage'], [initDistortionStorageGetItem$LWS, 'storage'], [initDistortionStorageKey$LWS, 'storage'], [initDistortionStorageLength$LWS, 'storage'], [initDistortionStorageRemoveItem$LWS, 'storage'], [initDistortionStorageSetItem$LWS, 'storage'], [initDistortionSVGElementDatasetGetter$LWS, 'dataset'], [initDistortionSVGElementStyleGetter$LWS, 'style'], [initDistortionSVGAnimatedStringBaseValSetter$LWS, 'script'], [initDistortionSVGScriptElementHrefGetter$LWS, 'script'], [initDistortionSVGScriptElementHrefSetter$LWS, 'script'], [initDistortionSVGAnimationElementBeginElement$LWS, 'script'], [initDistortionSVGAnimationElementBeginElementAt$LWS, 'script'], [initDistortionWindowFetch$LWS, 'windowFetch'], [initDistortionWindowFetchLater$LWS, 'windowFetchLater'], [initDistortionWindowFramesGetter$LWS, 'windowFrames'], [initDistortionWindowGetComputedStyle$LWS, 'style'], [initDistortionWindowLengthGetter$LWS, 'windowFrames'], [initDistortionWindowNameGetter$LWS, 'windowName'], [initDistortionWindowNameSetter$LWS, 'windowName'], [initDistortionWindowPostMessage$LWS, 'postMessage'], [initDistortionWindowSetInterval$LWS, 'setInterval'], [initDistortionWindowSetTimeout$LWS, 'setTimeout'], [initDistortionXMLHttpRequestResponseGetter$LWS, 'xhr'], [initDistortionXMLHttpRequestResponseXMLGetter$LWS, 'xhr']]));
14332
15801
  const DocumentBlockedProperties$LWS = ['parseHTMLUnsafe'];
14333
15802
  const DocumentProtoBlockedProperties$LWS = ['createProcessingInstruction', 'exitFullscreen', 'fullscreen', 'fullscreenElement', 'fullscreenEnabled', 'mozCancelFullScreen', 'mozFullScreen', 'mozFullScreenElement', 'mozFullScreenEnabled', 'onfullscreenchange', 'onfullscreenerror', 'onmozfullscreenchange', 'onmozfullscreenerror', 'onrejectionhandled', 'onunhandledrejection', 'parseHTMLUnsafe', 'releaseCapture', 'releaseEvents', 'requestStorageAccess', 'webkitFullScreenKeyboardInputAllowed', 'write', 'writeln'];
14334
15803
  const ElementProtoBlockedProperties$LWS = ['mozRequestFullScreen', 'onfullscreenchange', 'onfullscreenerror', 'requestFullscreen', 'webkitRequestFullScreen', 'webkitRequestFullscreen'];
@@ -14338,6 +15807,9 @@
14338
15807
  const HTMLEmbedElementBlockedAttributes$LWS = ['src'];
14339
15808
  const HTMLEmbedElementProtoBlockedProperties$LWS = ['getSVGDocument', 'src'];
14340
15809
 
15810
+ // https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTML/Element/frame
15811
+ const HTMLFrameElementBlockedAttributes$LWS = ['srcdoc'];
15812
+
14341
15813
  // https://www.w3schools.com/tags/tag_iframe.asp
14342
15814
  const HTMLIFrameElementBlockedAttributes$LWS = ['srcdoc'];
14343
15815
  const HTMLIFrameElementProtoBlockedProperties$LWS = ['getSVGDocument', 'srcdoc'];
@@ -14357,7 +15829,7 @@
14357
15829
  const UIEventProtoBlockedProperties$LWS = ['rangeParent'];
14358
15830
  const WindowBlockedProperties$LWS = ['find', 'requestFileSystem', 'webkitRequestFileSystem'];
14359
15831
  const XSLTProcessorProtoBlockedProperties$LWS = ['transformToDocument', 'transformToFragment'];
14360
- /*! version: 0.29.0 */
15832
+ /*! version: 0.29.2 */
14361
15833
 
14362
15834
  /*!
14363
15835
  * Copyright (C) 2021 salesforce.com, inc.
@@ -14366,7 +15838,7 @@
14366
15838
  function getPdpSchema$LWS() {
14367
15839
  return pdpSchema$LWS;
14368
15840
  }
14369
- /*! version: 0.29.0 */
15841
+ /*! version: 0.29.2 */
14370
15842
 
14371
15843
  /*!
14372
15844
  * Copyright (C) 2019 salesforce.com, inc.
@@ -14549,11 +16021,30 @@
14549
16021
  function createDistortionEntries$LWS(record$LWS, factories$LWS) {
14550
16022
  const distortionEntryToToggleSwitch$LWS = toSafeMap$LWS$1(new MapCtor$LWS$1());
14551
16023
  const entries$LWS = [];
16024
+ // W-23969898: on a torn-down same-origin iframe realm (DOM globals stripped
16025
+ // to `undefined`, JS intrinsics intact) getDistortionFactories returns only
16026
+ // the factories whose initializers survived, but a surviving factory can
16027
+ // still touch an absent DOM global when it BUILDS its entry here. Tolerate
16028
+ // such a failure so the intrinsic-only cross-realm family (Reflect.get et
16029
+ // al.) is still installed instead of the whole build throwing and dropping
16030
+ // the realm to a containment-free opaque record. Detected the same way as in
16031
+ // getDistortionFactories: a live window always exposes its Document.
16032
+ const tolerateFactoryBuildErrors$LWS = isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS('changesSince.266') && record$LWS.globalObject.Document === undefined;
14552
16033
  for (let i$LWS = 0, {
14553
16034
  length: length$LWS
14554
16035
  } = factories$LWS; i$LWS < length$LWS; i$LWS += 1) {
14555
16036
  const factory$LWS = factories$LWS[i$LWS];
14556
- const entry$LWS = factory$LWS(record$LWS);
16037
+ let entry$LWS;
16038
+ if (tolerateFactoryBuildErrors$LWS) {
16039
+ try {
16040
+ entry$LWS = factory$LWS(record$LWS);
16041
+ } catch (_unused0$LWS) {
16042
+ // Cannot build this distortion on the torn-down realm; skip it.
16043
+ continue;
16044
+ }
16045
+ } else {
16046
+ entry$LWS = factory$LWS(record$LWS);
16047
+ }
14557
16048
  if (entry$LWS) {
14558
16049
  const {
14559
16050
  0: originalValue$LWS,
@@ -14617,6 +16108,7 @@
14617
16108
  Element: Element$LWS,
14618
16109
  Event: Event$LWS,
14619
16110
  HTMLElement: HTMLElement$LWS,
16111
+ HTMLFrameElement: HTMLFrameElement$LWS,
14620
16112
  HTMLIFrameElement: HTMLIFrameElement$LWS,
14621
16113
  HTMLScriptElement: HTMLScriptElement$LWS,
14622
16114
  SVGElement: SVGElement$LWS,
@@ -14626,10 +16118,52 @@
14626
16118
  const initializers$LWS = type$LWS === 1 /* SandboxType.Internal */ ?
14627
16119
  // instanbul ignore next: coverage is collected on the external sandbox test run
14628
16120
  ArrayConcat$LWS(internalDistortionFactoryInitializers$LWS, internalKeyedDistortionFactoryInitializers$LWS) : ArrayConcat$LWS(externalDistortionFactoryInitializers$LWS, externalKeyedDistortionFactoryInitializers$LWS);
16121
+ // W-23969898: a same-origin iframe whose browsing context has been torn
16122
+ // down (e.g. detached from the DOM before LWS rebuilds the post-navigation
16123
+ // record) keeps its JavaScript intrinsics — Reflect, Function, Proxy — but
16124
+ // strips its DOM globals: `globalObject.Document` and the other DOM
16125
+ // constructors read back `undefined`. A full record build destructures
16126
+ // those absent interfaces and throws, and the caller's rebuild fallback
16127
+ // then installs a containment-free opaque record — leaving the realm's raw
16128
+ // `Reflect.get` free to leak the host `document.cookie` across the membrane.
16129
+ //
16130
+ // On such a realm, build only the distortions whose intrinsics survived the
16131
+ // teardown by skipping any initializer that throws. This preserves the
16132
+ // cross-realm containment family (Reflect.get/apply/construct,
16133
+ // Function.call/apply/bind, Proxy) — exactly what a leaked
16134
+ // `child.Reflect.get` needs — while dropping the DOM-interface distortions,
16135
+ // which cannot build and have nothing to protect on a realm with no live
16136
+ // DOM. `Document === undefined` distinguishes a torn-down window from a live
16137
+ // one (a live secondary window always exposes its DOM constructors).
16138
+ if (isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS('changesSince.266') && Document$LWS === undefined) {
16139
+ const survivingFactories$LWS = [];
16140
+ for (let i$LWS = 0, {
16141
+ length: length$LWS
16142
+ } = initializers$LWS; i$LWS < length$LWS; i$LWS += 1) {
16143
+ let factory$LWS;
16144
+ try {
16145
+ factory$LWS = initializers$LWS[i$LWS](record$LWS);
16146
+ } catch (_unused1$LWS) {
16147
+ // A DOM-dependent distortion cannot build on a torn-down realm;
16148
+ // skip it. The intrinsic-only cross-realm family still builds.
16149
+ continue;
16150
+ }
16151
+ survivingFactories$LWS[survivingFactories$LWS.length] = factory$LWS;
16152
+ }
16153
+ distortionFactoriesCache$LWS.set(document$LWS, survivingFactories$LWS);
16154
+ return survivingFactories$LWS;
16155
+ }
14629
16156
  addBlockedAttributeSetterDistortionFactoryInitializers$LWS(HTMLElement$LWS, 'HTMLElement', HTMLElementBlockedAttributes$LWS, initializers$LWS);
14630
- addBlockedAttributeSetterDistortionFactoryInitializers$LWS(HTMLEmbedElement, 'HTMLEmbedElement', HTMLEmbedElementBlockedAttributes$LWS, initializers$LWS);
14631
- addBlockedAttributeSetterDistortionFactoryInitializers$LWS(HTMLIFrameElement$LWS, 'HTMLIFrameElement', HTMLIFrameElementBlockedAttributes$LWS, initializers$LWS);
14632
- addBlockedAttributeSetterDistortionFactoryInitializers$LWS(HTMLScriptElement$LWS, 'HTMLScriptElement', HTMLScriptElementBlockedAttributes$LWS, initializers$LWS);
16157
+ addBlockedAttributeSetterDistortionFactoryInitializers$LWS(HTMLEmbedElement, 'HTMLEmbedElement', HTMLEmbedElementBlockedAttributes$LWS, initializers$LWS, 'embed');
16158
+ addBlockedAttributeSetterDistortionFactoryInitializers$LWS(HTMLIFrameElement$LWS, 'HTMLIFrameElement', HTMLIFrameElementBlockedAttributes$LWS, initializers$LWS, 'iframe');
16159
+ // A legacy `<frame>` is an HTMLFrameElement (sibling of HTMLIFrameElement),
16160
+ // never `instanceof HTMLIFrameElement`, so the iframe `srcdoc` block above
16161
+ // does not cover it. Without this, `setAttribute('srcdoc', ...)` on a
16162
+ // `<frame>` reparses into an unmembraned same-origin browsing context.
16163
+ if (isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS('changesSince.266')) {
16164
+ addBlockedAttributeSetterDistortionFactoryInitializers$LWS(HTMLFrameElement$LWS, 'HTMLFrameElement', HTMLFrameElementBlockedAttributes$LWS, initializers$LWS);
16165
+ }
16166
+ addBlockedAttributeSetterDistortionFactoryInitializers$LWS(HTMLScriptElement$LWS, 'HTMLScriptElement', HTMLScriptElementBlockedAttributes$LWS, initializers$LWS, 'script');
14633
16167
  addBlockedAttributeSetterDistortionFactoryInitializers$LWS(SVGElement$LWS, 'SVGElement', SVGElementBlockedAttributes$LWS, initializers$LWS);
14634
16168
  // Read-side block list: only the subset of write-blocked attributes that
14635
16169
  // ALSO must not be readable. Today this is `nonce` only; attributes like
@@ -17125,22 +18659,9 @@
17125
18659
  // Replace pending traps with live traps that can work with the
17126
18660
  // target without taking snapshots.
17127
18661
  this.deleteProperty = BoundaryProxyHandler$LWS.passthruDeletePropertyTrap;
18662
+ this.defineProperty = BoundaryProxyHandler$LWS.passthruDefinePropertyTrap;
17128
18663
  this.preventExtensions = BoundaryProxyHandler$LWS.passthruPreventExtensionsTrap;
17129
18664
  this.set = BoundaryProxyHandler$LWS.passthruSetTrap;
17130
- // `[[DefineOwnProperty]]` is passthru for DATA descriptors
17131
- // (the expando capability live targets actually need) but
17132
- // accessor descriptors are scoped to the shadow target. The
17133
- // passthru variant calls `foreignCallableDefineProperty` on the
17134
- // RAW foreign target; for an accessor that plants a
17135
- // sandbox-authored getter/setter directly onto a host-shared
17136
- // object. Because the descriptor's functions are marshalled as
17137
- // pointers back into the sandbox, any later access from the
17138
- // primary realm (a confused deputy reading the planted key)
17139
- // would execute sandbox code with the RAW object as `this` and
17140
- // read raw-global-only state through it. Data expandos carry no
17141
- // such callback, so they remain passthru; only accessors are
17142
- // contained. See `liveAccessorGuardedDefinePropertyTrap`.
17143
- this.defineProperty = BoundaryProxyHandler$LWS.liveAccessorGuardedDefinePropertyTrap;
17144
18665
  // `[[SetPrototypeOf]]` is the one live trap we do not
17145
18666
  // passthru. The passthru variant calls `ReflectSetPrototypeOf`
17146
18667
  // on the RAW foreign target, which lets sandbox code splice a
@@ -17151,9 +18672,9 @@
17151
18672
  // shadow target. It also lets sandbox code wipe a host-shared
17152
18673
  // object's prototype to `null`. Scoping the proto change to the
17153
18674
  // shadow target makes both observably inert while leaving
17154
- // `set`/`deleteProperty` passthru (the capabilities live targets
17155
- // actually need) untouched. No legitimate live target re-parents
17156
- // itself across the membrane.
18675
+ // `set`/`defineProperty`/`deleteProperty` passthru (the
18676
+ // capabilities live targets actually need) untouched. No
18677
+ // legitimate live target re-parents itself across the membrane.
17157
18678
  this.setPrototypeOf = BoundaryProxyHandler$LWS.staticSetPrototypeOfTrap;
17158
18679
  } : noop$LWS;
17159
18680
  this.makeProxyStatic = IS_IN_SHADOW_REALM$LWS ? function () {
@@ -17759,76 +19280,6 @@
17759
19280
  }
17760
19281
  return result$LWS;
17761
19282
  } : alwaysFalse$LWS;
17762
- // `[[DefineOwnProperty]]` trap for LIVE targets. Data descriptors are the
17763
- // expando capability live targets rely on and stay passthru to the RAW
17764
- // foreign target via `passthruDefinePropertyTrap`. Accessor descriptors
17765
- // (a `get` and/or `set`), however, would install sandbox-authored
17766
- // functions onto a host-shared object; a subsequent access from the
17767
- // primary realm would run that sandbox code with the RAW target as
17768
- // receiver and expose raw-global-only state. We contain accessors on the
17769
- // inert shadow target instead. This mirrors the `staticSetPrototypeOfTrap`
17770
- // contract: the operation is observably inert from every side. A live
17771
- // `get` resolves against the RAW foreign target (`lookupForeignDescriptor`
17772
- // reads the raw own descriptor and walks the RAW prototype chain; it only
17773
- // ever writes the shadow target, never reads its own properties), so the
17774
- // sandbox reads back `undefined` for a shadow-scoped accessor too. The
17775
- // security-relevant guarantee is that no sandbox-authored callback ever
17776
- // reaches the raw host-shared object.
17777
- //
17778
- // The shadow-scoped copy is always written with `configurable: true`,
17779
- // regardless of what the sandbox asked for. A live proxy's `has`,
17780
- // `ownKeys`, and `getOwnPropertyDescriptor` traps are NOT overridden by
17781
- // `makeProxyLive()` (see `hybridHasTrap`, `passthruOwnKeysTrap`,
17782
- // `passthruGetOwnPropertyDescriptorTrap`): they all resolve against the
17783
- // RAW foreign target and never consult the shadow target's own
17784
- // properties. `Object.defineProperty` defaults `configurable` to
17785
- // `false`, so the common `{ get() {...} }` shape would otherwise leave
17786
- // the shadow target — the proxy's actual `[[ProxyTarget]]` — holding a
17787
- // NON-CONFIGURABLE own key that those raw-resolving traps can never
17788
- // mirror. The engine's proxy invariants then throw on the very next
17789
- // `has`/`ownKeys`/`getOwnPropertyDescriptor` (`in`, `Object.keys`,
17790
- // spread, `JSON.stringify`, `Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor`, ...)
17791
- // because a non-configurable target key must be reported by those traps
17792
- // and it never can be. Since the accessor is invisible through the
17793
- // proxy either way (reads resolve against the raw target), forcing
17794
- // `configurable: true` is not observable to the sandbox, and it keeps
17795
- // every read-side invariant satisfiable. An explicit `configurable:
17796
- // false` request cannot be honored while preserving that invisibility;
17797
- // it now fails fast with a native TypeError raised by the engine's own
17798
- // `defineProperty` trap-result invariant check (requested
17799
- // non-configurable vs. an actually-configurable target descriptor) at
17800
- // the `defineProperty` call site itself, rather than deferring the
17801
- // detonation to a later, unrelated read.
17802
- BoundaryProxyHandler$LWS.liveAccessorGuardedDefinePropertyTrap = IS_IN_SHADOW_REALM$LWS ? function (shadowTarget$LWS, key$LWS, unsafePartialDesc$LWS) {
17803
- // A descriptor is an accessor iff it carries a `get` or `set`.
17804
- // Read membership before detaching the prototype so a poisoned
17805
- // `Object.prototype` getter cannot forge the answer.
17806
- const isAccessorDescriptor$LWS = 'get' in unsafePartialDesc$LWS || 'set' in unsafePartialDesc$LWS;
17807
- if (isAccessorDescriptor$LWS) {
17808
- lastProxyTrapCalled$LWS = 4 /* ProxyHandlerTraps.DefineProperty */;
17809
- // Build a fresh descriptor rather than writing the
17810
- // sandbox's `unsafePartialDesc` object directly, and
17811
- // force `configurable: true` on the shadow-scoped copy
17812
- // (see the block comment above).
17813
- const shadowDesc$LWS = {
17814
- __proto__: null
17815
- };
17816
- if ('get' in unsafePartialDesc$LWS) {
17817
- shadowDesc$LWS.get = unsafePartialDesc$LWS.get;
17818
- }
17819
- if ('set' in unsafePartialDesc$LWS) {
17820
- shadowDesc$LWS.set = unsafePartialDesc$LWS.set;
17821
- }
17822
- if ('enumerable' in unsafePartialDesc$LWS) {
17823
- shadowDesc$LWS.enumerable = unsafePartialDesc$LWS.enumerable;
17824
- }
17825
- shadowDesc$LWS.configurable = true;
17826
- // Scope the accessor to the shadow target: observably
17827
- // defined for the sandbox, never planted on the raw object.
17828
- return ReflectDefineProperty$LWS(shadowTarget$LWS, key$LWS, shadowDesc$LWS);
17829
- }
17830
- return ReflectApply$LWS(BoundaryProxyHandler$LWS.passthruDefinePropertyTrap, this, [shadowTarget$LWS, key$LWS, unsafePartialDesc$LWS]);
17831
- } : alwaysFalse$LWS;
17832
19283
  BoundaryProxyHandler$LWS.passthruGetTrap = IS_NOT_IN_SHADOW_REALM$LWS ? function (_shadowTarget$LWS, key$LWS, receiver$LWS) {
17833
19284
  // Only allow accessing handshake property values if the
17834
19285
  // "has" trap has been triggered immediately BEFORE and
@@ -19664,7 +21115,7 @@
19664
21115
  // eslint-disable-next-line no-unused-expressions
19665
21116
  bindings$LWS[i$LWS];
19666
21117
  // eslint-disable-next-line no-empty
19667
- } catch (_unused0$LWS) {}
21118
+ } catch (_unused35$LWS) {}
19668
21119
  }
19669
21120
  return spreadable$LWS(args$LWS);
19670
21121
  };
@@ -20063,7 +21514,7 @@
20063
21514
  // tools from mistaking the regexp or the replacement string for an
20064
21515
  // actual source mapping URL.
20065
21516
  /\/\/# sandbox(?=MappingURL=.*?\s*$)/, '//# source']);
20066
- sourceText$LWS = `\n//# LWS Version = "0.29.0"\n${sourceText$LWS}`;
21517
+ sourceText$LWS = `\n//# LWS Version = "0.29.2"\n${sourceText$LWS}`;
20067
21518
  return sourceType$LWS === 1 /* SourceType.Module */ && indexOfPragma$LWS(sourceText$LWS, 'use strict') === -1 ?
20068
21519
  // Append "'use strict'" to the extracted function body so it is
20069
21520
  // evaluated in strict mode.
@@ -20085,6 +21536,15 @@
20085
21536
  // causing the check to bail out and the DOMContentLoaded listener to never be
20086
21537
  // attached.
20087
21538
  const childWindowDocuments$LWS = toSafeMap$LWS$1(new MapCtor$LWS$1());
21539
+ // Sentinel "last document" recorded in childWindowDocuments for opaque child
21540
+ // windows whose real document cannot be read (cross-origin access throws). It
21541
+ // is a fresh object identity, so it is guaranteed distinct from any real
21542
+ // Document. The first same-origin document observed after an
21543
+ // opaque→same-origin transition therefore fails the `currentDoc !==
21544
+ // lastDocument` check in distortionCallback, causing a fresh secondary record
21545
+ // to be created for the new realm before its raw built-ins can be handed to
21546
+ // sandboxed code.
21547
+ const OPAQUE_CHILD_WINDOW_DOCUMENT_SENTINEL$LWS = {};
20088
21548
  function createGetVirtualEnvironment$LWS(record$LWS) {
20089
21549
  let virtualEnvironment$LWS;
20090
21550
  return () => {
@@ -20218,7 +21678,7 @@
20218
21678
  type: type$LWS
20219
21679
  }, _root$LWS);
20220
21680
  }
20221
- } catch (_unused1$LWS) {
21681
+ } catch (_unused36$LWS) {
20222
21682
  // Cross-origin window — document access throws.
20223
21683
  // Opaque sandbox record was already created on first
20224
21684
  // encounter; nothing more to do.
@@ -20239,6 +21699,13 @@
20239
21699
  // map with entries for the new realm's objects so the
20240
21700
  // re-lookup below can succeed.
20241
21701
  if (isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS('changesSince.262') && childWindowDocuments$LWS.size > 0) {
21702
+ // `lastDocument` is typed Document but may be
21703
+ // OPAQUE_CHILD_WINDOW_DOCUMENT_SENTINEL (a fresh `{}` cast to
21704
+ // Document) for an opaque child window whose real document
21705
+ // could not be read. It is a type-lie: only ever compare it
21706
+ // by identity (below); never read a property off it, or a
21707
+ // sentinel entry would fault instead of tripping the swap
21708
+ // check. See createOpaqueSecondaryWindowSandboxRecord.
20242
21709
  for (const [childGlobalObject$LWS, lastDocument$LWS] of childWindowDocuments$LWS) {
20243
21710
  // Only process child windows belonging to this
20244
21711
  // sandbox (each sandbox has its own distortion map).
@@ -20260,7 +21727,7 @@
20260
21727
  return newDistortedTarget$LWS;
20261
21728
  }
20262
21729
  }
20263
- } catch (_unused35$LWS) {
21730
+ } catch (_unused37$LWS) {
20264
21731
  // Cross-origin window — document access throws.
20265
21732
  }
20266
21733
  }
@@ -20277,7 +21744,7 @@
20277
21744
  if (!ObjectHasOwn$LWS$1(originalTarget$LWS, 'location')) {
20278
21745
  return originalTarget$LWS;
20279
21746
  }
20280
- } catch (_unused36$LWS) {
21747
+ } catch (_unused38$LWS) {
20281
21748
  // Likely an opaque object of a cross-origin window.
20282
21749
  // istanbul ignore next: an access of property iframe.contentWindow.location.href on an opaque window, that should reach this catch clause IS tested (see packages/integration-karma/test/distortions/HTMLIFrameElement/untrusted/snippets.js, "doesNotThrowOnCreationOrAccessOfCrossOriginIframeContentWindow"), but reported as uncovered
20283
21750
  return originalTarget$LWS;
@@ -20286,14 +21753,29 @@
20286
21753
  let originalTargetWindow$LWS;
20287
21754
  // Do the safe cross-origin window object check first to avoid
20288
21755
  // failure caused by touching non-cross-origin-safe properties.
20289
- if (ObjectHasOwn$LWS$1(originalTarget$LWS, 'window') && originalTarget$LWS.window === originalTarget$LWS) {
21756
+ //
21757
+ // Reading `window` invokes a getter when the target defines one, and a
21758
+ // hostile or exotic object can define `get window()` that throws. Guard
21759
+ // it exactly like the `location` check above: an unguarded throw here
21760
+ // propagates out of classification and through near-membrane's
21761
+ // pushErrorAcrossBoundary as a raw, unclassified value, letting an
21762
+ // undistorted host object escape the boundary into sandboxed code.
21763
+ let isSelfReferencingWindow$LWS = false;
21764
+ try {
21765
+ isSelfReferencingWindow$LWS = ObjectHasOwn$LWS$1(originalTarget$LWS, 'window') && originalTarget$LWS.window === originalTarget$LWS;
21766
+ } catch (_unused39$LWS) {
21767
+ // Not a window we can safely classify; treat it as a plain object
21768
+ // and let near-membrane wrap it normally.
21769
+ return originalTarget$LWS;
21770
+ }
21771
+ if (isSelfReferencingWindow$LWS) {
20290
21772
  // Slower check to detect a window object.
20291
21773
  try {
20292
21774
  // `WindowDocumentGetter` will throw if `originalTarget` is
20293
21775
  // not a window object, or if it is an opaque cross-origin window.
20294
21776
  originalTargetDocument$LWS = ReflectApply$LWS$1(WindowDocumentGetter$LWS, originalTarget$LWS, []);
20295
21777
  originalTargetWindow$LWS = originalTarget$LWS;
20296
- } catch (_unused37$LWS) {
21778
+ } catch (_unused40$LWS) {
20297
21779
  try {
20298
21780
  // istanbul ignore else: current tests have no way of expressing a state that would cause this condition to evaluate false
20299
21781
  if (ReflectApply$LWS$1(WindowLocationGetter$LWS, originalTarget$LWS, [])) {
@@ -20305,7 +21787,7 @@
20305
21787
  return originalTarget$LWS;
20306
21788
  }
20307
21789
  // eslint-disable-next-line no-empty
20308
- } catch (_unused38$LWS) {}
21790
+ } catch (_unused41$LWS) {}
20309
21791
  }
20310
21792
  // Check if originalTarget is a document and get its defaultView.
20311
21793
  } else if ('defaultView' in originalTarget$LWS) {
@@ -20319,7 +21801,7 @@
20319
21801
  // This will throw if `originalTarget` is not a document object.
20320
21802
  defaultView$LWS = ReflectApply$LWS$1(DocumentProtoDefaultViewGetter$LWS, originalTarget$LWS, []);
20321
21803
  // eslint-disable-next-line no-empty
20322
- } catch (_unused39$LWS) {}
21804
+ } catch (_unused42$LWS) {}
20323
21805
  if (defaultView$LWS) {
20324
21806
  originalTargetDocument$LWS = originalTarget$LWS;
20325
21807
  originalTargetWindow$LWS = defaultView$LWS;
@@ -20476,6 +21958,31 @@
20476
21958
  if (!seenGlobalObjects$LWS.has(globalObject$LWS)) {
20477
21959
  distortions$LWS.set(globalObject$LWS, globalObject$LWS);
20478
21960
  }
21961
+ // W-23475955: Track this opaque child window for document-swap detection,
21962
+ // mirroring the same-origin path in createSecondaryWindowSandboxRecord.
21963
+ // Without this, an opaque→same-origin transition (a cross-origin/opaque
21964
+ // browsing context later navigated to a same-origin document) is invisible
21965
+ // to the swap-detection loop in distortionCallback, which only walks
21966
+ // windows present in childWindowDocuments. The near-membrane caches the
21967
+ // WindowProxy's proxy pointer, so distortionCallback is never re-invoked
21968
+ // for the WindowProxy itself; the loop is the mechanism that eagerly
21969
+ // creates a secondary record for the new realm before its undistorted
21970
+ // built-ins can be reached. The opaque document is unreadable
21971
+ // (cross-origin access throws), so a sentinel is stored; the first
21972
+ // same-origin document observed after the transition differs from it and
21973
+ // trips the loop. The globalObject is not added to seenGlobalObjects here
21974
+ // so that, upon transition, createSecondaryWindowSandboxRecord still wires
21975
+ // up event-based navigation detection for the now-same-origin realm.
21976
+ //
21977
+ // Note on map growth: childWindowDocuments is a strong Map with no delete
21978
+ // path (pre-existing since the same-origin producer below, added in #2078).
21979
+ // This line adds one more producer of entries and inherits that same
21980
+ // characteristic — it does not change the growth profile. Bounding the map
21981
+ // is a separate, cross-cutting concern that also covers the same-origin
21982
+ // producer and is out of scope for this record-tracking fix.
21983
+ if (isGaterEnabledFeature$LWS('changesSince.266')) {
21984
+ childWindowDocuments$LWS.set(globalObject$LWS, OPAQUE_CHILD_WINDOW_DOCUMENT_SENTINEL$LWS);
21985
+ }
20479
21986
  // Add opaque window postMessage distortion for the child window to the root
20480
21987
  // window's distortion map.
20481
21988
  const opaqueWindowPostMessageDistortionFactory$LWS = getOpaqueWindowPostMessageDistortionFactory$LWS(record$LWS);
@@ -20609,7 +22116,7 @@
20609
22116
  type: type$LWS
20610
22117
  }, _root$LWS);
20611
22118
  }
20612
- } catch (_unused40$LWS) {
22119
+ } catch (_unused43$LWS) {
20613
22120
  // istanbul ignore next: this is a safety precaution that is unreachable via tests
20614
22121
  createOpaqueSecondaryWindowSandboxRecord$LWS({
20615
22122
  globalObject: globalObject$LWS,
@@ -20648,7 +22155,7 @@
20648
22155
  ReflectApply$LWS$1(EventTargetProtoAddEventListener$LWS, globalObject$LWS, ['DOMContentLoaded', onDOMContentLoadedOrWindowLoad$LWS, true]);
20649
22156
  // istanbul ignore next: currently unreachable via tests
20650
22157
  ReflectApply$LWS$1(EventTargetProtoAddEventListener$LWS, globalObject$LWS, ['unload', onWindowUnload$LWS, true]);
20651
- } catch (_unused41$LWS) {
22158
+ } catch (_unused44$LWS) {
20652
22159
  // istanbul ignore next: this is a safety precaution that is unreachable via tests
20653
22160
  createOpaqueSecondaryWindowSandboxRecord$LWS({
20654
22161
  globalObject: globalObject$LWS,
@@ -20762,7 +22269,7 @@
20762
22269
  // surrounding-whitespace variant of the two known separators back onto the
20763
22270
  // sandbox-scoped facade.
20764
22271
  toSafeSet$LWS(new SetCtor$LWS$1(['lightning/platformresourceloader', 'lightning:platformresourceloader', 'lightningmobileruntime/platformresourceloader', 'lightningmobileruntime:platformresourceloader']));
20765
- /*! version: 0.29.0 */
22272
+ /*! version: 0.29.2 */
20766
22273
 
20767
22274
  // Expose evaluateInSandbox on the window global so the browser harness page
20768
22275
  // (eval.html / component.html) can invoke it against source delivered by the