@locker/cli 0.28.5 → 0.28.6

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
package/dist/index.cjs.js CHANGED
@@ -2,4 +2,4 @@
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  * Copyright (C) 2026 salesforce.com, inc.
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  */
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  'use strict';
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- /*! version: 0.28.5 */
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+ /*! version: 0.28.6 */
package/dist/index.mjs.js CHANGED
@@ -2,4 +2,4 @@
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  * Copyright (C) 2026 salesforce.com, inc.
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  */
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- /*! version: 0.28.5 */
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+ /*! version: 0.28.6 */
@@ -1539,7 +1539,7 @@
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  const PromiseResolve$LWS = PromiseCtor$LWS.resolve.bind(PromiseCtor$LWS);
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  const PromiseReject$LWS = PromiseCtor$LWS.reject.bind(PromiseCtor$LWS);
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  toSafeSet$LWS(new SetCtor$LWS$1());
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- /*! version: 0.28.5 */
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+ /*! version: 0.28.6 */
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  /*!
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  * Copyright (C) 2019 salesforce.com, inc.
@@ -1998,15 +1998,43 @@
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  const lowerCasedInput$LWS = ReflectApply$LWS$1(StringProtoToLowerCase$LWS, toSafeStringValue$LWS(input$LWS), []);
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  return ReflectApply$LWS$1(StringProtoReplace$LWS, lowerCasedInput$LWS, [INVISIBLE_CHARS_REGEX$LWS, replacement$LWS]);
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  }
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- // Regex to detect DOCTYPE with internal DTD subset containing entity definitions.
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- // Matches: <!DOCTYPE root [...anything...]>
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- // The internal subset can contain ENTITY, ELEMENT, ATTLIST, NOTATION declarations.
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- // This is an XXE attack vector where entities can contain malicious script content.
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- const DOCTYPE_WITH_INTERNAL_SUBSET_REGEX$LWS = /<!doctype\s+\S+\s*\[/;
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- // Regex to detect DOCTYPE with SYSTEM or PUBLIC external entity references.
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- // Matches: <!DOCTYPE root SYSTEM "..."> or <!DOCTYPE root PUBLIC "..." "...">
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- // External DTDs can define entities that get expanded with malicious content.
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- const DOCTYPE_EXTERNAL_ENTITY_REGEX$LWS = /<!doctype\s+\S+\s+(?:system|public)\s/;
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+ // Regexes to detect a dangerous DOCTYPE — one carrying an internal DTD subset
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+ // (e.g. <!DOCTYPE root [...]>, which can hold ENTITY/ELEMENT/ATTLIST/NOTATION
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+ // declarations) or a SYSTEM/PUBLIC external-entity reference. Both are XXE
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+ // vectors: entities can be expanded with malicious content when the markup is
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+ // parsed as XML/SVG.
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+ //
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+ // These UNANCHORED forms are used only by the legacy whole-input fallback (when
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+ // the prolog-scan gate is off). They must match a DOCTYPE anywhere in the input,
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+ // so they cannot be anchored. The root-name token is [^>\s]+ (not \S+) so it
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+ // cannot span a DOCTYPE's own closing `>`, which trims — but does not eliminate —
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+ // bridging across unrelated downstream text in the broad scan. The prolog-scan
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+ // path below uses the anchored forms instead, which is the accurate check.
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+ const DOCTYPE_WITH_INTERNAL_SUBSET_REGEX$LWS = /<!doctype\s+[^>\s]+\s*\[/;
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+ const DOCTYPE_EXTERNAL_ENTITY_REGEX$LWS = /<!doctype\s+[^>\s]+\s+(?:system|public)\s/;
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+ // Anchored forms of the two DOCTYPE checks, used by the prolog-scan path.
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+ // findPrologDoctype() returns a slice that begins EXACTLY at the document's
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+ // prolog DOCTYPE — the only DOCTYPE a parser treats as a DTD. Anchoring with `^`
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+ // classifies that leading DOCTYPE and nothing else, so the regex cannot scan
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+ // downstream and re-match a later, inert `<!DOCTYPE ...` that is merely source
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+ // text — e.g. a string literal inside a minified XML-serializer bundle that
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+ // builds `"<!DOCTYPE "+rootName+" PUBLIC ..."`. Such a literal has no `>` between
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+ // `<!doctype` and `public`, so the unanchored [^>\s]+ bound alone does not stop
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+ // it; anchoring to the prolog slice does. (W-23591510-r1: the print-iframe fix
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+ // bounded the token but left the regex free to roam the whole 30 KB–2 MB slice.)
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+ const PROLOG_DOCTYPE_INTERNAL_SUBSET_REGEX$LWS = /^<!doctype\s+[^>\s]+\s*\[/;
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+ const PROLOG_DOCTYPE_EXTERNAL_ENTITY_REGEX$LWS = /^<!doctype\s+[^>\s]+\s+(?:system|public)\s/;
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+ // Regex to detect a namespaced <script> whose start tag carries an xmlns
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+ // declaration. Matches <script or <prefix:script (the leading [<:]), then a
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+ // whitespace or `/` separator so decoy tags like <scripting> or <scriptx> are
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+ // not matched, then scans the start tag up to xmlns. The gap alternation treats
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+ // quoted attribute values as opaque ("[^"]*" and '[^']*') so a `>` inside an
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+ // attribute value (e.g. title=">") cannot prematurely end the start tag and let
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+ // the real xmlns escape the scan. Requiring xmlns inside the script start tag —
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+ // rather than anywhere in the body — is what distinguishes the executable XML
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+ // namespaced-script vector from benign HTML that merely mentions "xmlns"
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+ // elsewhere (e.g. a sanitizer's attribute allowlist).
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+ const NAMESPACED_SCRIPT_XMLNS_REGEX$LWS = /[<:]script[\s/](?:[^>"']|"[^"]*"|'[^']*')*xmlns/;
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  const DOCTYPE_OPENER$LWS = '<!doctype';
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  const PI_OPENER$LWS = '<?';
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  const PI_CLOSER$LWS = '?>';
@@ -2106,7 +2134,7 @@
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  if (prologDoctype$LWS === null) {
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  return false;
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  }
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- return ReflectApply$LWS$1(RegExpProtoTest$LWS$1, DOCTYPE_WITH_INTERNAL_SUBSET_REGEX$LWS, [prologDoctype$LWS]) || ReflectApply$LWS$1(RegExpProtoTest$LWS$1, DOCTYPE_EXTERNAL_ENTITY_REGEX$LWS, [prologDoctype$LWS]);
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+ return ReflectApply$LWS$1(RegExpProtoTest$LWS$1, PROLOG_DOCTYPE_INTERNAL_SUBSET_REGEX$LWS, [prologDoctype$LWS]) || ReflectApply$LWS$1(RegExpProtoTest$LWS$1, PROLOG_DOCTYPE_EXTERNAL_ENTITY_REGEX$LWS, [prologDoctype$LWS]);
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  }
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  return ReflectApply$LWS$1(RegExpProtoTest$LWS$1, DOCTYPE_WITH_INTERNAL_SUBSET_REGEX$LWS, [normalizedInput$LWS]) || ReflectApply$LWS$1(RegExpProtoTest$LWS$1, DOCTYPE_EXTERNAL_ENTITY_REGEX$LWS, [normalizedInput$LWS]);
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  };
@@ -2116,10 +2144,18 @@
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  // when the namespace is XHTML or SVG. The namespace URL itself can be
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  // obfuscated with XML character entities in attribute values, but the
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  // xmlns attribute name cannot, so checking for "xmlns" is reliable.
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+ //
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+ // The xmlns must appear inside the script start tag for the namespace to
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+ // apply to that script. An earlier form only checked for a <script> tag and
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+ // the substring "xmlns" anywhere in the body; that false-positived on benign
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+ // HTML that carries a plain <script> and also mentions "xmlns" in an
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+ // unrelated place (a sanitizer's attribute allowlist, an SVG child element,
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+ // a string literal). NAMESPACED_SCRIPT_XMLNS_REGEX ties the two together by
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+ // scanning from the script start tag to xmlns within the same tag.
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  // eslint-disable-next-line class-methods-use-this
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  this.isXMLNamespacedScriptAttack = input$LWS => {
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- const normalizedInput$LWS = normalizeInput$LWS(input$LWS);
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- return hasTag$LWS(normalizedInput$LWS, 'script') && ReflectApply$LWS$1(StringProtoIncludes$LWS, normalizedInput$LWS, ['xmlns']);
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+ const normalizedInput$LWS = ReflectApply$LWS$1(StringProtoReplace$LWS, normalizeInput$LWS(input$LWS), [/\s+/g, ' ']);
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+ return ReflectApply$LWS$1(RegExpProtoTest$LWS$1, NAMESPACED_SCRIPT_XMLNS_REGEX$LWS, [normalizedInput$LWS]);
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  };
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  // Detects the iframe+srcdoc substring combination in raw input.
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  // Any HTML or XML containing both <iframe> and the substring
@@ -2619,7 +2655,7 @@
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  const XhrProtoResponseTextGetter$LWS = ObjectLookupOwnGetter$LWS$1(XhrProto$LWS, 'responseText');
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  const XhrProtoStatusGetter$LWS = ObjectLookupOwnGetter$LWS$1(XhrProto$LWS, 'status');
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  ObjectLookupOwnSetter$LWS(XhrProto$LWS, 'withCredentials');
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- /*! version: 0.28.5 */
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+ /*! version: 0.28.6 */
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  /*!
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  * Copyright (C) 2019 salesforce.com, inc.
@@ -2787,7 +2823,7 @@
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  }
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  return sanitized$LWS;
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  }
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- /*! version: 0.28.5 */
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+ /*! version: 0.28.6 */
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  /*!
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  * Copyright (C) 2023 salesforce.com, inc.
@@ -2863,7 +2899,7 @@
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  // swallow
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  }
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  const trusted = createPolicy('trusted', policyOptions);
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- /*! version: 0.28.5 */
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+ /*! version: 0.28.6 */
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  /*!
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  * Copyright (C) 2019 salesforce.com, inc.
@@ -3172,7 +3208,7 @@
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  }
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  return getSanitizerForConfig$LWS(sandboxKey$LWS, 'STRING_BLOB_HTML');
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  }
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- /*! version: 0.28.5 */
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+ /*! version: 0.28.6 */
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  /*!
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  * Copyright (C) 2023 salesforce.com, inc.
@@ -3381,7 +3417,7 @@
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  ReflectApply$LWS$1(ElementProtoSetAttributeNS$LWS, targetElement$LWS, [attributeNamespaceURI$LWS, attributeName$LWS, src$LWS]);
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  };
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  }
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- /*! version: 0.28.5 */
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+ /*! version: 0.28.6 */
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  /*!
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  * Copyright (C) 2019 salesforce.com, inc.
@@ -12769,7 +12805,7 @@
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  const UIEventProtoBlockedProperties$LWS = ['rangeParent'];
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  const WindowBlockedProperties$LWS = ['find', 'requestFileSystem', 'webkitRequestFileSystem'];
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  const XSLTProcessorProtoBlockedProperties$LWS = ['transformToDocument', 'transformToFragment'];
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- /*! version: 0.28.5 */
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+ /*! version: 0.28.6 */
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  /*!
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  * Copyright (C) 2021 salesforce.com, inc.
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  function getPdpSchema$LWS() {
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  return pdpSchema$LWS;
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  }
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- /*! version: 0.28.5 */
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+ /*! version: 0.28.6 */
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  /*!
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  * Copyright (C) 2019 salesforce.com, inc.
@@ -18170,7 +18206,7 @@
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  // tools from mistaking the regexp or the replacement string for an
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  // actual source mapping URL.
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  /\/\/# sandbox(?=MappingURL=.*?\s*$)/, '//# source']);
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- sourceText$LWS = `\n//# LWS Version = "0.28.5"\n${sourceText$LWS}`;
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+ sourceText$LWS = `\n//# LWS Version = "0.28.6"\n${sourceText$LWS}`;
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  return sourceType$LWS === 1 /* SourceType.Module */ && indexOfPragma$LWS(sourceText$LWS, 'use strict') === -1 ?
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  // Append "'use strict'" to the extracted function body so it is
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  // evaluated in strict mode.
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  }
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  toSafeMap$LWS$1(new MapCtor$LWS$1());
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  toSafeSet$LWS(new SetCtor$LWS$1(['lightning/platformResourceLoader', 'lightning:platformResourceLoader', 'lightningmobileruntime/platformResourceLoader', 'lightningmobileruntime:platformResourceLoader']));
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- /*! version: 0.28.5 */
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+ /*! version: 0.28.6 */
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  // Expose evaluateInSandbox on the window global so the browser harness page
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  // (eval.html / component.html) can invoke it against source delivered by the
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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  {
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  "name": "@locker/cli",
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- "version": "0.28.5",
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+ "version": "0.28.6",
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  "license": "SEE LICENSE IN LICENSE.txt",
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  "author": "Salesforce UI Security Team",
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  "description": "Lightning Web Security CLI",
@@ -27,9 +27,9 @@
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  },
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  "dependencies": {
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  "@babel/parser": "7.28.0",
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- "@locker/rollup-plugin": "0.28.5",
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- "@locker/sandbox": "0.28.5",
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- "@locker/shared": "0.28.5",
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+ "@locker/rollup-plugin": "0.28.6",
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+ "@locker/sandbox": "0.28.6",
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+ "@locker/shared": "0.28.6",
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  "@lwc/engine-dom": "8.21.1",
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  "@lwc/rollup-plugin": "8.21.1",
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  "@rollup/plugin-commonjs": "21.1.0",
@@ -43,5 +43,5 @@
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  "rollup-plugin-ts": "3.4.5",
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  "yargs": "17.7.2"
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  },
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- "gitHead": "16f7eebf99a3b13eeb1831518cbb1de79a7aff15"
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+ "gitHead": "d55906f587fffdeffb3b57e011de6248a0f623b5"
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  }