@lobu/gateway 3.0.5 → 3.0.7

package/src/proxy/http-proxy.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,752 @@
+import crypto from "node:crypto";
+import type { LookupAddress } from "node:dns";
+import * as dns from "node:dns/promises";
+import * as http from "node:http";
+import * as net from "node:net";
+import { URL } from "node:url";
+import type { WorkerTokenData } from "@lobu/core";
+import { createLogger, verifyWorkerToken } from "@lobu/core";
+import {
+  isUnrestrictedMode,
+  loadAllowedDomains,
+  loadDisallowedDomains,
+} from "../config/network-allowlist";
+import type { GrantStore } from "../permissions/grant-store";
+
+const logger = createLogger("http-proxy");
+
+interface ResolvedNetworkConfig {
+  allowedDomains: string[];
+  deniedDomains: string[];
+}
+
+interface TargetResolutionResult {
+  ok: boolean;
+  resolvedIp?: string;
+  statusCode?: number;
+  clientMessage?: string;
+  reason?: string;
+}
+
+const blockedIpv4Ranges: ReadonlyArray<readonly [string, number]> = [
+  ["0.0.0.0", 8],
+  ["10.0.0.0", 8],
+  ["100.64.0.0", 10],
+  ["127.0.0.0", 8],
+  ["169.254.0.0", 16],
+  ["172.16.0.0", 12],
+  ["192.168.0.0", 16],
+  ["198.18.0.0", 15],
+  ["224.0.0.0", 4],
+  ["240.0.0.0", 4],
+];
+
+const blockedIpv6Ranges: ReadonlyArray<readonly [string, number]> = [
+  ["fc00::", 7],
+  ["fe80::", 10],
+  ["ff00::", 8],
+];
+
+const blockedIpv4List = new net.BlockList();
+for (const [address, prefix] of blockedIpv4Ranges) {
+  blockedIpv4List.addSubnet(address, prefix, "ipv4");
+}
+
+const blockedIpv6List = new net.BlockList();
+blockedIpv6List.addAddress("::", "ipv6");
+blockedIpv6List.addAddress("::1", "ipv6");
+for (const [address, prefix] of blockedIpv6Ranges) {
+  blockedIpv6List.addSubnet(address, prefix, "ipv6");
+}
+
+// Cache for global defaults (used when no deployment identified)
+let globalConfig: ResolvedNetworkConfig | null = null;
+
+// Module-level grant store reference for domain grant checks
+let proxyGrantStore: GrantStore | null = null;
+
+/**
+ * Set the grant store for the HTTP proxy to check domain grants.
+ * Called during gateway initialization.
+ */
+export function setProxyGrantStore(store: GrantStore): void {
+  proxyGrantStore = store;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Get global network config (lazy loaded)
+ */
+function getGlobalConfig(): ResolvedNetworkConfig {
+  if (!globalConfig) {
+    globalConfig = {
+      allowedDomains: loadAllowedDomains(),
+      deniedDomains: loadDisallowedDomains(),
+    };
+  }
+  return globalConfig;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Unified domain access check: global config → grant store.
+ *
+ * 1. If denied by global blocklist → block
+ * 2. If allowed by global allowlist → check grantStore.isDenied() → allow/block
+ * 3. If not in global list → check grantStore.hasGrant() → allow/block
+ */
+async function checkDomainAccess(
+  hostname: string,
+  agentId: string | undefined
+): Promise<boolean> {
+  const global = getGlobalConfig();
+
+  // Global blocklist always takes precedence
+  if (
+    global.deniedDomains.length > 0 &&
+    matchesDomainPattern(hostname, global.deniedDomains)
+  ) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // Check if globally allowed (unrestricted or in allowlist)
+  const globallyAllowed = isHostnameAllowed(
+    hostname,
+    global.allowedDomains,
+    global.deniedDomains
+  );
+
+  if (globallyAllowed) {
+    // Even if globally allowed, a per-agent deny grant can override
+    if (proxyGrantStore && agentId) {
+      const denied = await proxyGrantStore.isDenied(agentId, hostname);
+      if (denied) {
+        logger.debug(`Domain ${hostname} denied via grant (agent: ${agentId})`);
+        return false;
+      }
+    }
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // Not globally allowed — check grant store for per-agent access
+  if (proxyGrantStore && agentId) {
+    const granted = await proxyGrantStore.hasGrant(agentId, hostname);
+    if (granted) {
+      logger.debug(`Domain ${hostname} allowed via grant (agent: ${agentId})`);
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return false;
+}
+
+interface ProxyCredentials {
+  deploymentName: string;
+  token: string;
+}
+
+function parseMappedIpv4Address(ip: string): string | null {
+  const normalized = ip.toLowerCase();
+  if (!normalized.startsWith("::ffff:")) {
+    return null;
+  }
+
+  const mapped = normalized.substring("::ffff:".length);
+  return net.isIP(mapped) === 4 ? mapped : null;
+}
+
+function parseMappedIpv4HexAddress(ip: string): string | null {
+  const normalized = ip.toLowerCase();
+  if (!normalized.startsWith("::ffff:")) {
+    return null;
+  }
+
+  const mapped = normalized.substring("::ffff:".length);
+  if (mapped.includes(".")) {
+    return null;
+  }
+
+  const parts = mapped.split(":");
+  if (parts.length !== 2) {
+    return null;
+  }
+
+  const high = Number.parseInt(parts[0] || "", 16);
+  const low = Number.parseInt(parts[1] || "", 16);
+  if (
+    Number.isNaN(high) ||
+    Number.isNaN(low) ||
+    high < 0 ||
+    high > 0xffff ||
+    low < 0 ||
+    low > 0xffff
+  ) {
+    return null;
+  }
+
+  return `${(high >> 8) & 0xff}.${high & 0xff}.${(low >> 8) & 0xff}.${low & 0xff}`;
+}
+
+function isBlockedIpAddress(ip: string): boolean {
+  const ipv6WithoutZone = ip.split("%", 1)[0] || ip;
+  const mappedIpv4 =
+    parseMappedIpv4Address(ipv6WithoutZone) ||
+    parseMappedIpv4HexAddress(ipv6WithoutZone);
+  if (mappedIpv4) {
+    return blockedIpv4List.check(mappedIpv4, "ipv4");
+  }
+
+  const family = net.isIP(ipv6WithoutZone);
+  if (family === 4) {
+    return blockedIpv4List.check(ipv6WithoutZone, "ipv4");
+  }
+  if (family === 6) {
+    return blockedIpv6List.check(ipv6WithoutZone, "ipv6");
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+
+export const __testOnly = {
+  isBlockedIpAddress,
+};
+
+async function resolveAndValidateTarget(
+  hostname: string
+): Promise<TargetResolutionResult> {
+  const ipFamily = net.isIP(hostname);
+  if (ipFamily !== 0) {
+    if (isBlockedIpAddress(hostname)) {
+      return {
+        ok: false,
+        statusCode: 403,
+        clientMessage: `403 Forbidden - Target IP not allowed: ${hostname}`,
+        reason: `target is local/private IP (${hostname})`,
+      };
+    }
+    return { ok: true, resolvedIp: hostname };
+  }
+
+  let addresses: LookupAddress[];
+  try {
+    addresses = await dns.lookup(hostname, { all: true, verbatim: true });
+  } catch (error) {
+    const message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : "unknown error";
+    return {
+      ok: false,
+      statusCode: 502,
+      clientMessage: `Bad Gateway: Could not resolve target host ${hostname}`,
+      reason: `DNS lookup failed for ${hostname}: ${message}`,
+    };
+  }
+
+  if (addresses.length === 0) {
+    return {
+      ok: false,
+      statusCode: 502,
+      clientMessage: `Bad Gateway: No DNS results for ${hostname}`,
+      reason: `DNS lookup returned no addresses for ${hostname}`,
+    };
+  }
+
+  const blockedAddress = addresses.find((addr) =>
+    isBlockedIpAddress(addr.address)
+  );
+  if (blockedAddress) {
+    return {
+      ok: false,
+      statusCode: 403,
+      clientMessage: `403 Forbidden - Target resolves to local/private IP: ${hostname}`,
+      reason: `${hostname} resolved to blocked IP ${blockedAddress.address}`,
+    };
+  }
+
+  return { ok: true, resolvedIp: addresses[0]?.address };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Extract deployment name and token from Proxy-Authorization Basic auth header.
+ * Workers send: HTTP_PROXY=http://<deploymentName>:<token>@gateway:8118
+ * This creates a Basic auth header with username=deploymentName, password=token
+ */
+function extractProxyCredentials(
+  req: http.IncomingMessage
+): ProxyCredentials | null {
+  const authHeader = req.headers["proxy-authorization"];
+  if (!authHeader || typeof authHeader !== "string") {
+    return null;
+  }
+
+  // Parse Basic auth: "Basic base64(username:password)"
+  const match = authHeader.match(/^Basic\s+(.+)$/i);
+  if (!match || !match[1]) {
+    return null;
+  }
+
+  try {
+    const decoded = Buffer.from(match[1], "base64").toString("utf-8");
+    const colonIndex = decoded.indexOf(":");
+    if (colonIndex === -1) {
+      return null;
+    }
+    const deploymentName = decoded.substring(0, colonIndex);
+    const token = decoded.substring(colonIndex + 1);
+    if (!deploymentName || !token) {
+      return null;
+    }
+    return { deploymentName, token };
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
+interface ValidatedProxy {
+  deploymentName: string;
+  tokenData: WorkerTokenData;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Validate proxy authentication by verifying the encrypted worker token
+ * and cross-checking the claimed deployment name.
+ */
+function validateProxyAuth(req: http.IncomingMessage): ValidatedProxy | null {
+  const creds = extractProxyCredentials(req);
+  if (!creds) {
+    return null;
+  }
+
+  const tokenData = verifyWorkerToken(creds.token);
+  if (!tokenData) {
+    logger.warn(
+      `Proxy auth failed: invalid token (claimed deployment: ${creds.deploymentName})`
+    );
+    return null;
+  }
+
+  const deploymentMatch =
+    tokenData.deploymentName.length === creds.deploymentName.length &&
+    crypto.timingSafeEqual(
+      Buffer.from(tokenData.deploymentName),
+      Buffer.from(creds.deploymentName)
+    );
+  if (!deploymentMatch) {
+    logger.warn(
+      `Proxy auth failed: deployment mismatch (claimed: ${creds.deploymentName}, token: ${tokenData.deploymentName})`
+    );
+    return null;
+  }
+
+  return { deploymentName: creds.deploymentName, tokenData };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check if a hostname matches any domain patterns
+ * Supports exact matches and wildcard patterns (.example.com matches *.example.com)
+ */
+function matchesDomainPattern(hostname: string, patterns: string[]): boolean {
+  const lowerHostname = hostname.toLowerCase();
+
+  for (const pattern of patterns) {
+    const lowerPattern = pattern.toLowerCase();
+
+    if (lowerPattern.startsWith(".")) {
+      // Wildcard pattern: .example.com matches *.example.com
+      const domain = lowerPattern.substring(1);
+      if (lowerHostname === domain || lowerHostname.endsWith(`.${domain}`)) {
+        return true;
+      }
+    } else if (lowerPattern === lowerHostname) {
+      // Exact match
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check if a hostname is allowed based on allowlist/blocklist configuration.
+ * Rules:
+ * - deniedDomains are checked first (take precedence)
+ * - allowedDomains are checked second
+ * - If allowedDomains contains "*", unrestricted mode is enabled
+ * - If allowedDomains is empty, complete isolation (deny all)
+ */
+function isHostnameAllowed(
+  hostname: string,
+  allowedDomains: string[],
+  deniedDomains: string[]
+): boolean {
+  // Unrestricted mode - allow all except explicitly disallowed
+  if (isUnrestrictedMode(allowedDomains)) {
+    if (deniedDomains.length === 0) {
+      return true; // No blocklist, allow all
+    }
+    return !matchesDomainPattern(hostname, deniedDomains);
+  }
+
+  // Complete isolation mode - deny all
+  if (allowedDomains.length === 0) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // Allowlist mode - check if allowed
+  const isAllowed = matchesDomainPattern(hostname, allowedDomains);
+
+  // Even if allowed, check blocklist
+  if (isAllowed && deniedDomains.length > 0) {
+    return !matchesDomainPattern(hostname, deniedDomains);
+  }
+
+  return isAllowed;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Extract hostname from CONNECT request
+ */
+function extractConnectHostname(url: string): string | null {
+  // CONNECT requests are in format: "host:port"
+  const match = url.match(/^([^:]+):\d+$/);
+  return match?.[1] ? match[1] : null;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Handle HTTPS CONNECT tunneling with per-deployment network config
+ */
+async function handleConnect(
+  req: http.IncomingMessage,
+  clientSocket: import("stream").Duplex,
+  head: Buffer
+): Promise<void> {
+  const url = req.url || "";
+  const hostname = extractConnectHostname(url);
+
+  if (!hostname) {
+    logger.warn(`Invalid CONNECT request: ${url}`);
+    clientSocket.write("HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request\r\n\r\n");
+    clientSocket.end();
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // Validate worker token
+  const auth = validateProxyAuth(req);
+  if (!auth) {
+    logger.warn(`Proxy auth required for CONNECT to ${hostname}`);
+    try {
+      clientSocket.write(
+        'HTTP/1.1 407 Proxy Authentication Required\r\nProxy-Authenticate: Basic realm="lobu-proxy"\r\n\r\n'
+      );
+      clientSocket.end();
+    } catch {
+      // Client may have already disconnected
+    }
+    return;
+  }
+
+  const { deploymentName, tokenData } = auth;
+
+  // Check domain access: global config → grant store
+  const allowed = await checkDomainAccess(hostname, tokenData.agentId);
+  if (!allowed) {
+    logger.warn(
+      `Blocked CONNECT to ${hostname} (deployment: ${deploymentName})`
+    );
+    try {
+      clientSocket.write(
+        `HTTP/1.1 403 Domain not allowed: ${hostname}. Network access is configured via lobu.toml or the gateway configuration APIs.\r\nContent-Type: text/plain\r\n\r\n403 Forbidden - Domain not allowed: ${hostname}. Network access is configured via lobu.toml or the gateway configuration APIs.\r\n`
+      );
+      clientSocket.end();
+    } catch {
+      // Client may have already disconnected
+    }
+    return;
+  }
+
+  const targetResolution = await resolveAndValidateTarget(hostname);
+  if (!targetResolution.ok) {
+    logger.warn(
+      `Blocked CONNECT to ${hostname} (deployment: ${deploymentName}) - ${targetResolution.reason}`
+    );
+    try {
+      clientSocket.write(
+        `HTTP/1.1 ${targetResolution.statusCode} ${
+          targetResolution.statusCode === 403 ? "Forbidden" : "Bad Gateway"
+        }\r\nContent-Type: text/plain\r\n\r\n${targetResolution.clientMessage}\r\n`
+      );
+      clientSocket.end();
+    } catch {
+      // Client may have already disconnected
+    }
+    return;
+  }
+
+  const resolvedIp = targetResolution.resolvedIp;
+  if (!resolvedIp) {
+    clientSocket.write("HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error\r\n\r\n");
+    clientSocket.end();
+    return;
+  }
+
+  logger.debug(`Allowing CONNECT to ${hostname} via ${resolvedIp}`);
+
+  // Parse host and port
+  const [host, portStr] = url.split(":");
+  const port = portStr ? parseInt(portStr, 10) || 443 : 443;
+
+  if (!host) {
+    logger.warn(`Invalid CONNECT host: ${url}`);
+    clientSocket.write("HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request\r\n\r\n");
+    clientSocket.end();
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // Establish connection to target
+  const targetSocket = net.connect(port, resolvedIp, () => {
+    // Send success response to client
+    clientSocket.write("HTTP/1.1 200 Connection Established\r\n\r\n");
+
+    // Pipe the connection bidirectionally
+    targetSocket.write(head);
+    targetSocket.pipe(clientSocket);
+    clientSocket.pipe(targetSocket);
+  });
+
+  targetSocket.on("error", (err) => {
+    logger.debug(`Target connection error for ${hostname}: ${err.message}`);
+    try {
+      clientSocket.end();
+    } catch {
+      // Ignore errors when closing already-closed socket
+    }
+  });
+
+  clientSocket.on("error", (err) => {
+    // ECONNRESET is common when clients drop connections - don't log as error
+    if ((err as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code === "ECONNRESET") {
+      logger.debug(`Client disconnected for ${hostname} (ECONNRESET)`);
+    } else {
+      logger.debug(`Client connection error for ${hostname}: ${err.message}`);
+    }
+    try {
+      targetSocket.end();
+    } catch {
+      // Ignore errors when closing already-closed socket
+    }
+  });
+
+  // Handle close events to clean up
+  targetSocket.on("close", () => {
+    try {
+      clientSocket.end();
+    } catch {
+      // Ignore
+    }
+  });
+
+  clientSocket.on("close", () => {
+    try {
+      targetSocket.end();
+    } catch {
+      // Ignore
+    }
+  });
+}
+
+/**
+ * Handle regular HTTP proxy requests with per-deployment network config
+ */
+async function handleProxyRequest(
+  req: http.IncomingMessage,
+  res: http.ServerResponse
+): Promise<void> {
+  const targetUrl = req.url;
+
+  if (!targetUrl) {
+    res.writeHead(400, { "Content-Type": "text/plain" });
+    res.end("Bad Request: No URL provided\n");
+    return;
+  }
+
+  let parsedUrl: URL;
+  try {
+    parsedUrl = new URL(targetUrl);
+  } catch {
+    res.writeHead(400, { "Content-Type": "text/plain" });
+    res.end("Bad Request: Invalid URL\n");
+    return;
+  }
+
+  const hostname = parsedUrl.hostname;
+
+  // Validate worker token
+  const auth = validateProxyAuth(req);
+  if (!auth) {
+    logger.warn(`Proxy auth required for ${req.method} ${hostname}`);
+    res.writeHead(407, {
+      "Content-Type": "text/plain",
+      "Proxy-Authenticate": 'Basic realm="lobu-proxy"',
+    });
+    res.end("407 Proxy Authentication Required\n");
+    return;
+  }
+
+  const { deploymentName, tokenData } = auth;
+
+  // Check domain access: global config → grant store
+  const allowed = await checkDomainAccess(hostname, tokenData.agentId);
+  if (!allowed) {
+    logger.warn(
+      `Blocked request to ${hostname} (deployment: ${deploymentName})`
+    );
+    res.writeHead(403, `Domain not allowed: ${hostname}`, {
+      "Content-Type": "text/plain",
+    });
+    res.end(
+      `403 Forbidden - Domain not allowed: ${hostname}. Network access is configured via lobu.toml or the gateway configuration APIs.\n`
+    );
+    return;
+  }
+
+  const targetResolution = await resolveAndValidateTarget(hostname);
+  if (!targetResolution.ok) {
+    logger.warn(
+      `Blocked request to ${hostname} (deployment: ${deploymentName}) - ${targetResolution.reason}`
+    );
+    res.writeHead(targetResolution.statusCode ?? 502, {
+      "Content-Type": "text/plain",
+    });
+    res.end(`${targetResolution.clientMessage}\n`);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  const resolvedIp = targetResolution.resolvedIp;
+  if (!resolvedIp) {
+    res.writeHead(500, { "Content-Type": "text/plain" });
+    res.end("Internal proxy error\n");
+    return;
+  }
+
+  logger.debug(
+    `Proxying ${req.method} ${hostname}${parsedUrl.pathname} via ${resolvedIp}`
+  );
+
+  // Remove proxy-authorization header before forwarding
+  const forwardHeaders = { ...req.headers };
+  delete forwardHeaders["proxy-authorization"];
+
+  // Forward the request
+  const options: http.RequestOptions = {
+    hostname: resolvedIp,
+    port: parsedUrl.port || (parsedUrl.protocol === "https:" ? 443 : 80),
+    path: parsedUrl.pathname + parsedUrl.search,
+    method: req.method,
+    headers: forwardHeaders,
+  };
+
+  const proxyReq = http.request(options, (proxyRes) => {
+    // Forward response headers
+    res.writeHead(proxyRes.statusCode || 500, proxyRes.headers);
+    // Stream response body
+    proxyRes.pipe(res);
+  });
+
+  proxyReq.on("error", (err) => {
+    logger.error(`Proxy request error for ${hostname}:`, err.message);
+    if (!res.headersSent) {
+      res.writeHead(502, { "Content-Type": "text/plain" });
+      res.end("Bad Gateway: Could not reach target server\n");
+    } else {
+      res.end();
+    }
+  });
+
+  // Stream request body
+  req.pipe(proxyReq);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Start HTTP proxy server with per-deployment network config support.
+ *
+ * Workers identify themselves via Proxy-Authorization Basic auth:
+ *   HTTP_PROXY=http://<deploymentName>:<token>@gateway:8118
+ *
+ * The proxy validates the encrypted worker token, cross-checks the
+ * claimed deployment name, and looks up per-deployment network config.
+ * Returns 407 if authentication fails.
+ *
+ * @param port - Port to listen on (default 8118)
+ * @param host - Bind address (default "::" for all interfaces)
+ * @returns Promise that resolves with the server once listening, or rejects on error
+ */
+export function startHttpProxy(
+  port: number = 8118,
+  host: string = "::"
+): Promise<http.Server> {
+  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+    const global = getGlobalConfig();
+
+    const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
+      handleProxyRequest(req, res).catch((err) => {
+        logger.error("Error handling proxy request:", err);
+        if (!res.headersSent) {
+          res.writeHead(500, { "Content-Type": "text/plain" });
+          res.end("Internal proxy error\n");
+        }
+      });
+    });
+
+    // Handle CONNECT method for HTTPS tunneling
+    server.on("connect", (req, clientSocket, head) => {
+      handleConnect(req, clientSocket, head).catch((err) => {
+        logger.error("Error handling CONNECT:", err);
+        try {
+          clientSocket.write("HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error\r\n\r\n");
+          clientSocket.end();
+        } catch {
+          // Ignore
+        }
+      });
+    });
+
+    server.on("error", (err) => {
+      logger.error("HTTP proxy server error:", err);
+      reject(err);
+    });
+
+    server.listen(port, host, () => {
+      // Remove the startup error listener so it doesn't reject later operational errors
+      server.removeAllListeners("error");
+      server.on("error", (err) => {
+        logger.error("HTTP proxy server error:", err);
+      });
+
+      let mode: string;
+      if (isUnrestrictedMode(global.allowedDomains)) {
+        mode = "unrestricted";
+      } else if (global.allowedDomains.length > 0) {
+        mode = "allowlist";
+      } else {
+        mode = "complete-isolation";
+      }
+
+      logger.debug(
+        `HTTP proxy started on ${host}:${port} (mode=${mode}, allowed=${global.allowedDomains.length}, denied=${global.deniedDomains.length})`
+      );
+      resolve(server);
+    });
+  });
+}
+
+/**
+ * Stop HTTP proxy server
+ */
+export function stopHttpProxy(server: http.Server): Promise<void> {
+  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+    server.close((err) => {
+      if (err) {
+        logger.error("Error stopping HTTP proxy:", err);
+        reject(err);
+      } else {
+        logger.info("HTTP proxy stopped");
+        resolve();
+      }
+    });
+  });
+}