@lmzhen/dsh-evolution-core 0.3.60 → 0.3.62

package/lib/index.js

@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ async function renameWithRetry(tmp, target, fn = rename) {
 async function writeDurableTmp(target, content, openImpl = open) {
 	const tmp = `${target}.${process.pid}.${randomBytes(6).toString("hex")}.tmp`;
 	try {
-		const handle = await openImpl(tmp, "wx");
+		const handle = await openImpl(tmp, "wx", process.platform === "win32" ? void 0 : await stat(target).then((value) => value.mode & 511).catch(() => void 0));
 		try {
 			await handle.writeFile(content, "utf8");
 			await handle.sync();
@@ -312,8 +312,16 @@ function nodeEvolutionIo(lockAttempts = 40) {
 				}).catch(async () => {
 					const body = await readFile(lock, "utf8").catch(() => "");
 					if (pendingSelfCleanup.size >= 64) {
-						const oldest = pendingSelfCleanup.keys().next().value;
-						if (oldest !== void 0) pendingSelfCleanup.delete(oldest);
+						let droppable;
+						for (const candidate of pendingSelfCleanup.keys()) {
+							if (candidate === lock) continue;
+							if (await readFile(candidate, "utf8").then(() => false, () => true)) {
+								droppable = candidate;
+								break;
+							}
+						}
+						const victim = droppable ?? pendingSelfCleanup.keys().next().value;
+						if (victim !== void 0) pendingSelfCleanup.delete(victim);
 					}
 					pendingSelfCleanup.set(lock, body);
 				});
@@ -452,8 +460,9 @@ function nodeEvolutionIo(lockAttempts = 40) {
 		async isSymlink(path) {
 			try {
 				return (await lstat(path)).isSymbolicLink();
-			} catch {
-				return null;
+			} catch (error) {
+				if (isMissing(error)) return null;
+				throw error;
 			}
 		},
 		async mtime(path) {
@@ -614,7 +623,9 @@ function foldCuratorFields(disk, curated, stateOwned) {
 /** Whole-file usage write (V6-37, 0.3.37): this is the ONE path that bypasses
 * the malformed-defense and the transact lock — prefer `mutateUsage` for any
 * read-modify-write so a concurrent writer cannot lose its update and a
-* malformed sidecar stays recoverable. Kept for fixture/test seeding. */
+* malformed sidecar stays recoverable. Kept for fixture/test seeding.
+* @internal P3-16 (v14): no production caller (verified by grep); exported for
+* the family's tests only. Do not use it to write the sidecar in new code. */
 async function saveUsage(root, map, io = nodeEvolutionIo()) {
 	const obj = Object.fromEntries(map.entries());
 	await io.writeText(usageFile(root), JSON.stringify(obj, null, 2));
@@ -778,6 +789,13 @@ const DEFAULT_USER_CHAR_LIMIT = 1375;
 /** Consolidation-failure backoff cap, shared by MemoryStore and memory-files' Config default. */
 const DEFAULT_CONSOLIDATION_FAILURES = 3;
 const DEFAULT_SKILL_CONTENT_CHARS = 1e5;
+/** P3-19 (v14): defaults that were written twice (schema `.default()` AND the
+* clamp fallback literal) now have one home per value. */
+const DEFAULT_REVIEW_TIMEOUT_MS = 12e4;
+const DEFAULT_REVIEW_CONTEXT_MESSAGES = 60;
+const DEFAULT_REVIEW_MESSAGE_CHARS = 2e3;
+const DEFAULT_CURATOR_BOOT_GRACE_SECONDS = 10;
+const DEFAULT_CURATOR_REVIEW_MAX_TOKENS = 2048;
 /** 0.3.17 (S3.10, T-1): control-plane fields a model-facing write call may
 * never carry — single source for plan-validator, evolution-policy and the
 * threat scanner (they used to each hardcode the list). */
@@ -1339,10 +1357,14 @@ async function readEvolutionTimeline(io, path) {
 * reads inside patch YAML `!!js` expressions (session-query path/openAt) stay
 * in the profile config evaluation — they are NOT migrated (they are resolved
 * at cordis config time, not plugin time) but are documented in the README
-* env table.
+* env table. `EVOLUTION_SCOPE` is read by the source installers only
+* (`packages/scripts/install-layered.mjs`, `packages/test-support/row-contract.ts`),
+* never by plugin runtime code.
+*
+* v14 P3-1: the former `EVOLUTION_ENV_KEYS` export was deleted — nothing read
+* it, so the "generated env reference" it claimed to source was never
+* generated (the README table is maintained by hand and now lists every key).
 */
-/** Plugin-side DSH_EVOLUTION_* keys (config-layer keys are documented separately). */
-const EVOLUTION_ENV_KEYS = ["DSH_EVOLUTION_ALLOW_ROW_COLLISIONS"];
 const ALLOW_ROW_COLLISIONS = "1";
 /** N-5 escape: `DSH_EVOLUTION_ALLOW_ROW_COLLISIONS=1` downgrades a delta-row
 * collision from fail-loud to warn+keep-both. Any other value (including an
@@ -1977,7 +1999,7 @@ const PATTERNS = [
 		label: "read_secrets",
 		category: "exfiltration",
 		scope: "all",
-		regex: /\bcat\s+[^\n]{0,512}(?:\.env|credentials|\.netrc|\.pgpass|\.npmrc|\.pypirc)/i
+		regex: /\bcat\s+[^\n]{0,512}(?:\.env(?!\w)|(?:\bcredentials\b)|\.netrc|\.pgpass|\.npmrc|\.pypirc)/i
 	},
 	{
 		label: "ssh_backdoor",
@@ -2027,6 +2049,12 @@ const PATTERNS = [
 		scope: "strict",
 		regex: /(?:api[_-]?key|token|secret|password)\s*[=:]\s*["'][a-z0-9+/=_-]{20,}["']/i
 	},
+	{
+		label: "jwt_like_secret",
+		category: "hardcoded_secrets",
+		scope: "strict",
+		regex: /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/
+	},
 	{
 		label: "private_key_block",
 		category: "hardcoded_secrets",
@@ -2060,12 +2088,13 @@ const PATTERN_OVERLAP = 4096;
 function scanThreats(text, scope = "strict", maxScanChars = 65536, options = NO_SCAN_OPTIONS) {
 	const windowSize = clampedNumber(maxScanChars, 65536, { min: 4097 });
 	const findings = [];
-	if (ZERO_WIDTH_CHARS.test(text)) findings.push({
+	const excluded = new Set(options.excludeLabels ?? []);
+	if (ZERO_WIDTH_CHARS.test(text) && !excluded.has("unicode_zero_width")) findings.push({
 		label: "unicode_zero_width",
 		category: "unicode_obfuscation",
 		scope
 	});
-	if (BIDI_CHARS.test(text)) findings.push({
+	if (BIDI_CHARS.test(text) && !excluded.has("unicode_bidi_override")) findings.push({
 		label: "unicode_bidi_override",
 		category: "unicode_obfuscation",
 		scope
@@ -2077,7 +2106,6 @@ function scanThreats(text, scope = "strict", maxScanChars = 65536, options = NO_
 		const step = Math.max(Math.floor(windowSize / 2), 1);
 		for (let start = 0; start < normalized.length; start += step) windows.push(normalized.slice(start, start + windowSize));
 	}
-	const excluded = new Set(options.excludeLabels ?? []);
 	const seen = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
 	for (const window of windows) for (const pattern of PATTERNS) {
 		if (SCOPE_ORDER[pattern.scope] > SCOPE_ORDER[scope]) continue;
@@ -2121,9 +2149,11 @@ function scanContentThreats(text, maxScanChars = 65536, options = NO_SCAN_OPTION
 * V10-03 (P2-18): suffix the SkillLibrary/MemoryStore write gates append to a
 * block message — the hit label is already embedded by scanContentThreats /
 * scanMemoryThreats, this names the deployable self-heal path so the model
-* (or operator) can allowlist a known-benign label. The evolution-threat tool
-* channel deliberately does NOT append it: that channel has no
-* threatExemptLabels option to advertise.
+* (or operator) can allowlist a known-benign label. P2-4 (v14): the
+* evolution-threat guard channel now carries `threatExemptLabels` too, so its
+* block message (which embeds the same exemption sentence) is accurate there
+* as well; this suffix stays store-side because the guard returns the scan
+* message verbatim.
 */
 const THREAT_EXEMPT_HINT = " If this is a legitimate false positive, the deployment can allow its label via the threatExemptLabels store option.";
 //#endregion
@@ -2300,11 +2330,14 @@ var MemoryStore = class {
 	async backupFile(target) {
 		const path = fileFor(this.root, target);
 		const backup = `${path}.bak`;
+		const staging = `${backup}.${process.pid}.${Date.now().toString(36)}.tmp`;
 		try {
-			await this.io.remove(backup).catch(() => {});
-			await this.io.copy(path, backup);
+			await this.io.remove(staging).catch(() => {});
+			await this.io.copy(path, staging);
+			await this.io.rename(staging, backup);
 			return backup;
 		} catch {
+			await this.io.remove(staging).catch(() => {});
 			return null;
 		}
 	}
@@ -2650,7 +2683,7 @@ var MemoryStore = class {
 				const note = safe.length === entries.length ? "" : ` (${entries.length - safe.length} threat-matched entries filtered)`;
 				const usage = limit > 0 ? ` [${Math.min(100, Math.floor(body.length * 100 / limit))}% — ${body.length}/${limit} chars]` : "";
 				parts.push(`## ${label} (${safe.length} entries)${usage}${note}\n${body}`);
-			}
+			} else if (entries.length > 0) parts.push(`## ${label} — ${entries.length} entries withheld by the security scan; none injected`);
 		}
 		return parts.join("\n\n");
 	}
@@ -3982,14 +4015,29 @@ var SkillLibrary = class {
 	dirOf(name) {
 		return skillDir(this.root, name.trim());
 	}
-	/** Name-format guard shared by every path-building mutator/reader. */
+	/**
+	* Name-format guard for every path-building entry point (P1-1/v14 closed the
+	* one gap: `patch`). Write paths, protection probes and support-file
+	* enumeration all call it before `dirOf`, so no directory path is ever built
+	* from a name that could escape the skills root. `list()` and `snapshotAll()`
+	* are the deliberate exceptions — their names come from `listNames()`, i.e.
+	* from the tree itself, never from caller input.
+	*/
 	badName(name) {
 		const normalized = name.trim();
 		if (!SKILL_NAME_RE.test(normalized) || normalized.length > this.limits.maxNameLength) return `Invalid skill name "${normalized}". Use lowercase letters, digits, and hyphens (<= ${this.limits.maxNameLength}).`;
 		return null;
 	}
+	/**
+	* Refusal reason for a write to `rawName`, or null when the write may
+	* proceed: a protection marker on the directory, or an invalid name
+	* (P1-1/v14 — the name guard lives HERE as well as at every entry point, so
+	* no caller can build a path from an unvalidated name).
+	*/
 	async writeProtection(rawName, origin = "foreground") {
 		const name = rawName.trim();
+		const badName = this.badName(name);
+		if (badName) return badName;
 		const dir = this.dirOf(name);
 		for (const marker of ["bundled", "hub-installed"]) if (await this.io.exists(markerPath(dir, marker))) return marker;
 		if (origin === "background_review" && await this.io.exists(markerPath(dir, "pinned"))) return "pinned";
@@ -3997,6 +4045,8 @@ var SkillLibrary = class {
 	}
 	async deleteProtection(rawName, options = {}) {
 		const name = rawName.trim();
+		const badName = this.badName(name);
+		if (badName) return badName;
 		const dir = this.dirOf(name);
 		const markers = options.allowBundled ? ["hub-installed", "pinned"] : [
 			"bundled",
@@ -4008,6 +4058,7 @@ var SkillLibrary = class {
 	}
 	async isManaged(rawName) {
 		const name = rawName.trim();
+		if (this.badName(name) !== null) return false;
 		const dir = this.dirOf(name);
 		return await this.io.exists(markerPath(dir, "hermes-managed"));
 	}
@@ -4051,7 +4102,9 @@ var SkillLibrary = class {
 	* Used by the maintenance enrichment (011 §7) and probe reads.
 	*/
 	async listSupportFiles(rawName) {
-		const dir = this.dirOf(rawName);
+		const name = rawName.trim();
+		if (this.badName(name) !== null) return [];
+		const dir = this.dirOf(name);
 		let entries;
 		try {
 			entries = await this.io.list(dir);
@@ -4295,6 +4348,11 @@ var SkillLibrary = class {
 		return await this.serial(() => this.patchCore(name, oldString, newString, filePath, replaceAll, origin));
 	}
 	async patchCore(name, oldString, newString, filePath, replaceAll, origin) {
+		const badName = this.badName(name);
+		if (badName) return {
+			ok: false,
+			message: badName
+		};
 		const dir = this.dirOf(name);
 		const skillMd = join(dir, "SKILL.md");
 		if (!await this.io.exists(skillMd)) return {
@@ -4333,6 +4391,13 @@ var SkillLibrary = class {
 				},
 				write: null
 			};
+			if (oldString === "" || trimPatternBoundaries(oldString) === "") return {
+				result: {
+					ok: false,
+					message: `old_string is empty (or whitespace-only) — a patch of "${name}/${patchLabel}" needs an anchor; use update for a full rewrite.`
+				},
+				write: null
+			};
 			const patched = fuzzyPatch(md, oldString, newString, replaceAll);
 			if (patched === null) return {
 				result: {
@@ -4499,7 +4564,9 @@ var SkillLibrary = class {
 			}
 		}
 		const reason = options.reason ?? (options.absorbedInto ? `Consolidated into ${options.absorbedInto}` : "Archived by self-evolution curator");
-		await this.io.writeText(join(dest, ".archive-reason"), `${(/* @__PURE__ */ new Date()).toISOString()}: ${reason}\n`);
+		try {
+			await this.io.writeText(join(dest, ".archive-reason"), `${(/* @__PURE__ */ new Date()).toISOString()}: ${reason}\n`);
+		} catch {}
 		await this.audit(name, "archive", md, null, reason);
 		this.notifyMutation({
 			action: "archive",
@@ -5256,4 +5323,4 @@ var SkillLibrary = class {
 	}
 };
 //#endregion
-export { AUTHORING_DESCRIPTION_BAR, COMBINED_REVIEW_PLAN_PROMPT, COMBINED_REVIEW_PROMPT, COMPLETION_SKILL_REVIEW_PROMPT, CURATOR_DRY_RUN_BANNER, CURATOR_PROMPT, DEFAULT_ARCHIVE_AFTER_DAYS, DEFAULT_CONSOLIDATION_FAILURES, DEFAULT_CURATOR_INTERVAL_HOURS, DEFAULT_HEALTH_THRESHOLDS, DEFAULT_MAX_OPS_PER_PLAN, DEFAULT_MEMORY_CHAR_LIMIT, DEFAULT_MIN_IDLE_HOURS, DEFAULT_MUTATION_CAP, DEFAULT_REVIEW_MEMORY_INTERVAL, DEFAULT_REVIEW_SKILL_INTERVAL, DEFAULT_SKILL_CONTENT_CHARS, DEFAULT_SKILL_LIMITS, DEFAULT_SKILL_REVIEW_COMPLETION_MIN_TOOL_CALLS, DEFAULT_SKILL_REVIEW_TRIGGER, DEFAULT_STALE_AFTER_DAYS, DEFAULT_SUBSTANTIVE_MIN_AGENT_CHARS, DEFAULT_SUBSTANTIVE_MIN_TOOL_CALLS, DEFAULT_SUBSTANTIVE_MIN_USER_CHARS, DEFAULT_USER_CHAR_LIMIT, DRIFT_MAX_LINE_CHARS, DRIFT_SIGNALS_VERSION, DRIFT_SIGNAL_NOUNS, DSH_AUTHORING_STANDARDS, ENTRY_DELIMITER, EVENT_ARCHIVE_PREFIX, EVENT_LOG_RETAIN_ARCHIVES, EVENT_LOG_ROTATE_AT, EVENT_LOG_VERSION, EVOLUTION_ENV_KEYS, EVOLUTION_WRITE_TOOLS, EvolutionGateSet, FORBIDDEN_CONTROL_KEYS, HEALTH_STAMP_RE, LOW_QUALITY_THRESHOLD, MAINTAIN_OUTPUT_INSTRUCTION, MAINTAIN_PROMPT, MAX_DESCRIPTION_LENGTH, MAX_RESTRUCTURE_MOVES, MAX_SKILL_CONTENT_CHARS, MAX_SKILL_FILE_BYTES, MAX_SKILL_NAME_LENGTH, MEMORY_REVIEW_PROMPT, MIN_STAMP_BODY_CHARS, MUTATIONS_FILE_VERSION, MemoryStore, PATTERN_OVERLAP, PROMPT_BUNDLE, PROMPT_BUNDLE_ID, PROMPT_BUNDLE_VERSION, PROTECTED_BUILTIN_SKILLS, QUALITY_WEIGHTS, RESTRUCTURE_TARGET_RE, SKILLS_GUIDANCE, SKILL_NAME_RE, SKILL_REVIEW_PLAN_PROMPT, SKILL_REVIEW_PROMPT, SNAPSHOT_EXTRA_NAME_RE, SUPPORT_DIRS, SUPPRESSED_FILE_VERSION, SkillLibrary, THREAT_EXEMPT_HINT, advanceReview, allowRowCollisions, appendEvolutionEvent, applyCuratorFields, applyCuratorLifecycleFields, applyCuratorMetaFields, assessStructureHealth, authoringFeedback, buildCuratorRunReport, buildLearnPrompt, bumpPatch, bumpUse, bumpView, clampedNumber, composePresetComposition, computeDedupGroups, computeDriftSignals, computeLifecycleTransitions, computePrefixClusters, computeQualityScores, computeScopeView, contentHash, createGateSet, duplicateHeadings, emptyRecord, evaluateThreat, eventsFile, evolutionHome, evolutionIoAdapter, evolutionRoot, findDriftSignal, foldCuratorFields, foldTurn, frontmatterBlock, frontmatterYamlUnsafeValues, getRecord, latestActivityAt, lifecycleCandidate, listEventArchives, loadMutations, loadSuppressedNames, loadUsage, makeSerialQueue, markAgentCreated, markerEntryName, memoryRoot, missingSupportPointers, mutateUsage, mutationsFile, narrowNameMatches, nodeEvolutionIo, normalizeFrontmatter, normalizeUsageRecord, observeEvent, overlongLines, parseCuratorNominations, parseEvolutionEvents, parseFrontmatter, pendingSelfCleanup, readEvolutionEvents, readEvolutionTimeline, recordMutation, redactSecrets, relatedSkillNames, renameWithRetry, renderCuratorReportMarkdown, resolveOrigins, resolveSkillsRoot, retainEventArchives, reviewPrompt, saveSuppressedNames, saveUsage, scanContentThreats, scanMemoryThreats, scanThreats, skillsRoot, suppressedFile, transactIo, updateSuppressedNames, usageFile, usageObserved, validateFrontmatter, verifyPromptBundle, writeDurableTmp, yamlPlainScalarNeedsQuotes };
+export { AUTHORING_DESCRIPTION_BAR, COMBINED_REVIEW_PLAN_PROMPT, COMBINED_REVIEW_PROMPT, COMPLETION_SKILL_REVIEW_PROMPT, CURATOR_DRY_RUN_BANNER, CURATOR_PROMPT, DEFAULT_ARCHIVE_AFTER_DAYS, DEFAULT_CONSOLIDATION_FAILURES, DEFAULT_CURATOR_BOOT_GRACE_SECONDS, DEFAULT_CURATOR_INTERVAL_HOURS, DEFAULT_CURATOR_REVIEW_MAX_TOKENS, DEFAULT_HEALTH_THRESHOLDS, DEFAULT_MAX_OPS_PER_PLAN, DEFAULT_MEMORY_CHAR_LIMIT, DEFAULT_MIN_IDLE_HOURS, DEFAULT_MUTATION_CAP, DEFAULT_REVIEW_CONTEXT_MESSAGES, DEFAULT_REVIEW_MEMORY_INTERVAL, DEFAULT_REVIEW_MESSAGE_CHARS, DEFAULT_REVIEW_SKILL_INTERVAL, DEFAULT_REVIEW_TIMEOUT_MS, DEFAULT_SKILL_CONTENT_CHARS, DEFAULT_SKILL_LIMITS, DEFAULT_SKILL_REVIEW_COMPLETION_MIN_TOOL_CALLS, DEFAULT_SKILL_REVIEW_TRIGGER, DEFAULT_STALE_AFTER_DAYS, DEFAULT_SUBSTANTIVE_MIN_AGENT_CHARS, DEFAULT_SUBSTANTIVE_MIN_TOOL_CALLS, DEFAULT_SUBSTANTIVE_MIN_USER_CHARS, DEFAULT_USER_CHAR_LIMIT, DRIFT_MAX_LINE_CHARS, DRIFT_SIGNALS_VERSION, DRIFT_SIGNAL_NOUNS, DSH_AUTHORING_STANDARDS, ENTRY_DELIMITER, EVENT_ARCHIVE_PREFIX, EVENT_LOG_RETAIN_ARCHIVES, EVENT_LOG_ROTATE_AT, EVENT_LOG_VERSION, EVOLUTION_WRITE_TOOLS, EvolutionGateSet, FORBIDDEN_CONTROL_KEYS, HEALTH_STAMP_RE, LOW_QUALITY_THRESHOLD, MAINTAIN_OUTPUT_INSTRUCTION, MAINTAIN_PROMPT, MAX_DESCRIPTION_LENGTH, MAX_RESTRUCTURE_MOVES, MAX_SKILL_CONTENT_CHARS, MAX_SKILL_FILE_BYTES, MAX_SKILL_NAME_LENGTH, MEMORY_REVIEW_PROMPT, MIN_STAMP_BODY_CHARS, MUTATIONS_FILE_VERSION, MemoryStore, PATTERN_OVERLAP, PROMPT_BUNDLE, PROMPT_BUNDLE_ID, PROMPT_BUNDLE_VERSION, PROTECTED_BUILTIN_SKILLS, QUALITY_WEIGHTS, RESTRUCTURE_TARGET_RE, SKILLS_GUIDANCE, SKILL_NAME_RE, SKILL_REVIEW_PLAN_PROMPT, SKILL_REVIEW_PROMPT, SNAPSHOT_EXTRA_NAME_RE, SUPPORT_DIRS, SUPPRESSED_FILE_VERSION, SkillLibrary, THREAT_EXEMPT_HINT, advanceReview, allowRowCollisions, appendEvolutionEvent, applyCuratorFields, applyCuratorLifecycleFields, applyCuratorMetaFields, assessStructureHealth, authoringFeedback, buildCuratorRunReport, buildLearnPrompt, bumpPatch, bumpUse, bumpView, clampedNumber, composePresetComposition, computeDedupGroups, computeDriftSignals, computeLifecycleTransitions, computePrefixClusters, computeQualityScores, computeScopeView, contentHash, createGateSet, duplicateHeadings, emptyRecord, evaluateThreat, eventsFile, evolutionHome, evolutionIoAdapter, evolutionRoot, findDriftSignal, foldCuratorFields, foldTurn, frontmatterBlock, frontmatterYamlUnsafeValues, getRecord, latestActivityAt, lifecycleCandidate, listEventArchives, loadMutations, loadSuppressedNames, loadUsage, makeSerialQueue, markAgentCreated, markerEntryName, memoryRoot, missingSupportPointers, mutateUsage, mutationsFile, narrowNameMatches, nodeEvolutionIo, normalizeFrontmatter, normalizeUsageRecord, observeEvent, overlongLines, parseCuratorNominations, parseEvolutionEvents, parseFrontmatter, pendingSelfCleanup, readEvolutionEvents, readEvolutionTimeline, recordMutation, redactSecrets, relatedSkillNames, renameWithRetry, renderCuratorReportMarkdown, resolveOrigins, resolveSkillsRoot, retainEventArchives, reviewPrompt, saveSuppressedNames, saveUsage, scanContentThreats, scanMemoryThreats, scanThreats, skillsRoot, suppressedFile, transactIo, updateSuppressedNames, usageFile, usageObserved, validateFrontmatter, verifyPromptBundle, writeDurableTmp, yamlPlainScalarNeedsQuotes };

package/lib/types/constants.d.ts

@@ -54,6 +54,13 @@ export declare const DEFAULT_USER_CHAR_LIMIT = 1375;
 /** Consolidation-failure backoff cap, shared by MemoryStore and memory-files' Config default. */
 export declare const DEFAULT_CONSOLIDATION_FAILURES = 3;
 export declare const DEFAULT_SKILL_CONTENT_CHARS = 100000;
+/** P3-19 (v14): defaults that were written twice (schema `.default()` AND the
+ * clamp fallback literal) now have one home per value. */
+export declare const DEFAULT_REVIEW_TIMEOUT_MS = 120000;
+export declare const DEFAULT_REVIEW_CONTEXT_MESSAGES = 60;
+export declare const DEFAULT_REVIEW_MESSAGE_CHARS = 2000;
+export declare const DEFAULT_CURATOR_BOOT_GRACE_SECONDS = 10;
+export declare const DEFAULT_CURATOR_REVIEW_MAX_TOKENS = 2048;
 /** 0.3.17 (S3.10, T-1): control-plane fields a model-facing write call may
  * never carry — single source for plan-validator, evolution-policy and the
  * threat scanner (they used to each hardcode the list). */

package/lib/types/env.d.ts

@@ -7,10 +7,14 @@
  * reads inside patch YAML `!!js` expressions (session-query path/openAt) stay
  * in the profile config evaluation — they are NOT migrated (they are resolved
  * at cordis config time, not plugin time) but are documented in the README
- * env table.
+ * env table. `EVOLUTION_SCOPE` is read by the source installers only
+ * (`packages/scripts/install-layered.mjs`, `packages/test-support/row-contract.ts`),
+ * never by plugin runtime code.
+ *
+ * v14 P3-1: the former `EVOLUTION_ENV_KEYS` export was deleted — nothing read
+ * it, so the "generated env reference" it claimed to source was never
+ * generated (the README table is maintained by hand and now lists every key).
  */
-/** Plugin-side DSH_EVOLUTION_* keys (config-layer keys are documented separately). */
-export declare const EVOLUTION_ENV_KEYS: readonly ["DSH_EVOLUTION_ALLOW_ROW_COLLISIONS"];
 /** N-5 escape: `DSH_EVOLUTION_ALLOW_ROW_COLLISIONS=1` downgrades a delta-row
  * collision from fail-loud to warn+keep-both. Any other value (including an
  * EMPTY/whitespace string — a set-but-unset variable) keeps the fail-loud. */

package/lib/types/skill-health.d.ts

@@ -47,7 +47,13 @@ export declare const HEALTH_STAMP_RE: RegExp;
  */
 export declare const MIN_STAMP_BODY_CHARS = 2000;
 export type SkillHealthVerdict = 'healthy' | 'warn' | 'needs-restructure';
-/** Facts a caller already has; assessors never do IO. */
+/** Facts a caller already has; assessors never do IO.
+ *
+ * `bodyChars`/`bodyText` are the WHOLE `SKILL.md` text as read from disk
+ * (frontmatter included), matching both callers: `SkillLibrary.assessHealth`
+ * and `snapshotFromLibrary` feed `read()` verbatim. The field names predate
+ * that convention; the thresholds are calibrated against the whole file, so a
+ * caller must not strip frontmatter before measuring. */
 export interface SkillHealthSnapshot {
     skillName: string;
     bodyChars: number;

package/lib/types/skill-store.d.ts

@@ -280,8 +280,21 @@ export declare class SkillLibrary {
   
      */
     private dirOf;
-    /** Name-format guard shared by every path-building mutator/reader. */
+    /**
+     * Name-format guard for every path-building entry point (P1-1/v14 closed the
+     * one gap: `patch`). Write paths, protection probes and support-file
+     * enumeration all call it before `dirOf`, so no directory path is ever built
+     * from a name that could escape the skills root. `list()` and `snapshotAll()`
+     * are the deliberate exceptions — their names come from `listNames()`, i.e.
+     * from the tree itself, never from caller input.
+     */
     private badName;
+    /**
+     * Refusal reason for a write to `rawName`, or null when the write may
+     * proceed: a protection marker on the directory, or an invalid name
+     * (P1-1/v14 — the name guard lives HERE as well as at every entry point, so
+     * no caller can build a path from an unvalidated name).
+     */
     writeProtection(rawName: string, origin?: WriteOrigin): Promise<string | null>;
     deleteProtection(rawName: string, options?: {
         allowBundled?: boolean | undefined;

package/lib/types/threats.d.ts

@@ -52,9 +52,11 @@ export declare function scanContentThreats(text: string, maxScanChars?: number,
  * V10-03 (P2-18): suffix the SkillLibrary/MemoryStore write gates append to a
  * block message — the hit label is already embedded by scanContentThreats /
  * scanMemoryThreats, this names the deployable self-heal path so the model
- * (or operator) can allowlist a known-benign label. The evolution-threat tool
- * channel deliberately does NOT append it: that channel has no
- * threatExemptLabels option to advertise.
+ * (or operator) can allowlist a known-benign label. P2-4 (v14): the
+ * evolution-threat guard channel now carries `threatExemptLabels` too, so its
+ * block message (which embeds the same exemption sentence) is accurate there
+ * as well; this suffix stays store-side because the guard returns the scan
+ * message verbatim.
  */
 export declare const THREAT_EXEMPT_HINT = " If this is a legitimate false positive, the deployment can allow its label via the threatExemptLabels store option.";
 //# sourceMappingURL=threats.d.ts.map

package/lib/types/usage.d.ts

@@ -76,7 +76,9 @@ export declare function foldCuratorFields(disk: UsageMap, curated: UsageMap, sta
 /** Whole-file usage write (V6-37, 0.3.37): this is the ONE path that bypasses
  * the malformed-defense and the transact lock — prefer `mutateUsage` for any
  * read-modify-write so a concurrent writer cannot lose its update and a
- * malformed sidecar stays recoverable. Kept for fixture/test seeding. */
+ * malformed sidecar stays recoverable. Kept for fixture/test seeding.
+ * @internal P3-16 (v14): no production caller (verified by grep); exported for
+ * the family's tests only. Do not use it to write the sidecar in new code. */
 export declare function saveUsage(root: string, map: UsageMap, io?: EvolutionIoLike): Promise<void>;
 export declare function getRecord(map: UsageMap, name: string): UsageRecord;
 export declare function bumpView(map: UsageMap, name: string, when?: Date): void;

package/package.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "name": "@lmzhen/dsh-evolution-core",
   "description": "Shared stores, prompts, signals and lifecycle logic for the dsh-evolution plugin family (community build)",
-  "version": "0.3.60",
+  "version": "0.3.62",
   "publishConfig": {
     "access": "public"
   },