@lifeaitools/clauth 2.15.6 → 2.15.7

package/cli/fingerprint.js

@@ -15,7 +15,33 @@ import path from "path";
 // Cache path — avoids re-querying WMI/CIM on every daemon start.
 // This eliminates the spawnSync cmd.exe ETIMEDOUT crash that occurs
 // when PowerShell/WMI is slow on first call after boot.
-const CACHE_FILE = path.join(os.tmpdir(), "clauth-machine.cache");
+//
+// Durable as of 2026-09-06 (was os.tmpdir(), see LEGACY_CACHE_FILE below).
+// getMachineId() derives (primary, secondary) from TWO independent execSync
+// calls, each wrapped in its own try/catch that falls through silently on
+// failure (see the comments at those calls). If either call transiently
+// timed out, the resulting pairing was composed differently than a
+// successful run, producing a DIFFERENT sha256 machine hash for the exact
+// same physical machine — surfacing server-side as a false
+// machine_not_found lockout, not a security event. A cache in system temp
+// does not survive Windows Disk Cleanup or some machines' reboot behavior,
+// which re-exposed the flaky first-computation path on any later restart
+// where WMI happened to be slow. Matches the durable pattern boot.key
+// already uses (getBootKeyPath() in cli/commands/serve.js) — same
+// AppData/Roaming/clauth (win32) / ~/.config/clauth (else) directory.
+function getCacheDir() {
+  if (os.platform() === "win32") {
+    return path.join(process.env.APPDATA || path.join(os.homedir(), "AppData", "Roaming"), "clauth");
+  }
+  return path.join(os.homedir(), ".config", "clauth");
+}
+const CACHE_FILE = path.join(getCacheDir(), "machine.cache");
+// Pre-2026-09-06 location. An already-registered machine may still have a
+// valid cache here; migrate it into the durable location on first read
+// instead of recomputing via WMI — recomputing is exactly the flaky path
+// this fix exists to avoid, and the durable write means this only ever
+// happens once per machine.
+const LEGACY_CACHE_FILE = path.join(os.tmpdir(), "clauth-machine.cache");
 
 function readCache() {
   try {
@@ -23,12 +49,24 @@ function readCache() {
     // Validate: must be two non-empty lines (primary:secondary)
     const [primary, secondary] = raw.split("\n");
     if (primary && secondary) return { primary: primary.trim(), secondary: secondary.trim() };
-  } catch { /* cache miss */ }
+  } catch { /* durable cache miss */ }
+  try {
+    const raw = fs.readFileSync(LEGACY_CACHE_FILE, "utf8").trim();
+    const [primary, secondary] = raw.split("\n");
+    if (primary && secondary) {
+      const migrated = { primary: primary.trim(), secondary: secondary.trim() };
+      writeCache(migrated.primary, migrated.secondary);
+      return migrated;
+    }
+  } catch { /* no legacy cache either */ }
   return null;
 }
 
 function writeCache(primary, secondary) {
-  try { fs.writeFileSync(CACHE_FILE, `${primary}\n${secondary}`, "utf8"); } catch { /* best effort */ }
+  try {
+    fs.mkdirSync(getCacheDir(), { recursive: true });
+    fs.writeFileSync(CACHE_FILE, `${primary}\n${secondary}`, "utf8");
+  } catch { /* best effort */ }
 }
 
 function getMachineId() {
@@ -140,4 +178,8 @@ export function deriveSeedHash(machineHash, password) {
     .digest("hex");
 }
 
+// Exported for test path introspection only — not part of the public
+// CLI/API surface.
+export { CACHE_FILE, LEGACY_CACHE_FILE, getCacheDir };
+
 export default { getMachineHash, deriveToken, deriveSeedHash };

package/cli/fingerprint.test.js

@@ -4,7 +4,12 @@ import fs from "node:fs";
 import os from "node:os";
 import path from "node:path";
 
-import { getMachineHash, deriveToken, deriveSeedHash } from "./fingerprint.js";
+import { getMachineHash, deriveToken, deriveSeedHash, CACHE_FILE, LEGACY_CACHE_FILE } from "./fingerprint.js";
+
+// CACHE_FILE/LEGACY_CACHE_FILE are the REAL production paths (durable
+// AppData/Roaming/clauth on win32, formerly os.tmpdir()) — read-only in this
+// suite. Every test below only ever reads mtimeMs, never asserts on or
+// writes machine-identifying content into either file.
 
 // getMachineId() normally shells out to WMI/registry/ioreg, which this harness
 // must never do (slow, platform-dependent, pollutes nothing but still real
@@ -84,12 +89,31 @@ test("deriveSeedHash changes with the password", () => {
   assert.notEqual(deriveSeedHash(hash, "one"), deriveSeedHash(hash, "two"));
 });
 
-test("machine id cache: a fresh CLAUTH_MACHINE_ID call never touches the WMI cache file", () => {
+test("machine id cache: a fresh CLAUTH_MACHINE_ID call never touches the WMI cache file (durable or legacy)", () => {
   // Positive control that the cache mechanism exists and this test can see it,
   // so "the cache file was untouched" below actually means something.
-  const cacheFile = path.join(os.tmpdir(), "clauth-machine.cache");
-  const before = fs.existsSync(cacheFile) ? fs.statSync(cacheFile).mtimeMs : null;
+  const before = {
+    durable: fs.existsSync(CACHE_FILE) ? fs.statSync(CACHE_FILE).mtimeMs : null,
+    legacy: fs.existsSync(LEGACY_CACHE_FILE) ? fs.statSync(LEGACY_CACHE_FILE).mtimeMs : null,
+  };
   withMachineId("container-fast-path", () => getMachineHash());
-  const after = fs.existsSync(cacheFile) ? fs.statSync(cacheFile).mtimeMs : null;
-  assert.equal(before, after, "the container-id fast path must not read or write the WMI cache file");
+  const after = {
+    durable: fs.existsSync(CACHE_FILE) ? fs.statSync(CACHE_FILE).mtimeMs : null,
+    legacy: fs.existsSync(LEGACY_CACHE_FILE) ? fs.statSync(LEGACY_CACHE_FILE).mtimeMs : null,
+  };
+  assert.deepEqual(before, after, "the container-id fast path must not read or write either cache file");
+});
+
+test("cache paths are durable (AppData/Roaming/clauth or ~/.config/clauth), never os.tmpdir()", () => {
+  // The whole point of this fix: CACHE_FILE must NOT live in system temp,
+  // which Windows Disk Cleanup (or equivalent) can wipe, re-exposing the
+  // flaky first-computation WMI path on the next restart.
+  assert.ok(!CACHE_FILE.startsWith(os.tmpdir()), `CACHE_FILE must be durable, got: ${CACHE_FILE}`);
+  assert.equal(path.basename(CACHE_FILE), "machine.cache");
+  const dir = path.dirname(CACHE_FILE);
+  assert.ok(dir.endsWith(path.join("clauth")), `cache dir must be a clauth-owned config directory, got: ${dir}`);
+  // LEGACY_CACHE_FILE is the pre-fix location, kept only so readCache() can
+  // migrate an already-registered machine's existing cache instead of
+  // recomputing via WMI (see fingerprint.js).
+  assert.equal(LEGACY_CACHE_FILE, path.join(os.tmpdir(), "clauth-machine.cache"));
 });

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@lifeaitools/clauth",
-  "version": "2.15.6",
+  "version": "2.15.7",
   "description": "Hardware-bound credential vault for the LIFEAI infrastructure stack",
   "type": "module",
   "bin": {

package/supabase/functions/auth-vault/index.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,12 @@
-// clauth — auth-vault Edge Function v2
-// Added: IP whitelist, rate limiting, machine lockout (fail_count + locked)
+// clauth — auth-vault Edge Function v3
+// IP whitelist + machine lockout (fail_count + locked) remain. Rate limiting
+// and audit logging (clauth_audit) removed 2026-09-03 -- see the comments at
+// validateHMAC and where auditLog used to be defined for why: the rate-limit
+// check was an unindexed COUNT against clauth_audit run on EVERY request,
+// pre-auth, and every rejection it produced also wrote an audit row -- a
+// feedback loop that took the whole project down under sustained load. The
+// security value it provided was already covered, tighter, by the
+// per-machine 5-failed-attempts lockout below.
 
 import { createClient } from "https://esm.sh/@supabase/supabase-js@2";
 
@@ -11,8 +18,6 @@ const ADMIN_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN = Deno.env.get("CLAUTH_ADMIN_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN")!;
 const ALLOWED_IPS: string[] = (Deno.env.get("CLAUTH_ALLOWED_IPS") || "")
   .split(",").map(s => s.trim()).filter(Boolean);
 
-const RATE_LIMIT_MAX    = 30;
-const RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW = 60;
 const REPLAY_WINDOW_MS  = 5 * 60 * 1000;
 const MAX_FAIL_COUNT    = 5;
 const DEFAULT_INSTALL_ID = "default";
@@ -55,20 +60,36 @@ function checkIP(ip: string): { allowed: boolean; reason?: string } {
   return { allowed: false, reason: `IP not whitelisted: ${ip}` };
 }
 
-async function checkRateLimit(sb: any, machine_hash: string): Promise<{ allowed: boolean; reason?: string }> {
-  const windowStart = new Date(Date.now() - RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW * 1000).toISOString();
-  const { count } = await sb.from("clauth_audit")
-    .select("id", { count: "exact", head: true })
-    .eq("machine_hash", machine_hash)
-    .gte("created_at", windowStart);
-  if ((count || 0) >= RATE_LIMIT_MAX) {
-    return { allowed: false, reason: `Rate limit: ${count}/${RATE_LIMIT_MAX} per ${RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW}s` };
-  }
-  return { allowed: true };
-}
-
+// rate-limiting removed 2026-09-03 -- see supervisor-registry.js's own
+// state.json lock history for the shape of this bug: checkRateLimit() ran
+// this exact query -- a COUNT against clauth_audit filtered by machine_hash
+// and created_at -- on EVERY request, BEFORE authentication (validateHMAC
+// below), against a table with no index on either column and no retention.
+// As the table grew (174,385 rows, unbounded), the scan cost grew with it;
+// under sustained traffic the queries started stacking, Postgres killed them
+// at statement_timeout, and Cloudflare killed the stacked connections at its
+// own 90s ceiling (522s) -- and every one of those rejections ALSO wrote an
+// audit row (see auditLog's removal below), so the failure fed itself. The
+// actual security protection this duplicated is already provided, tighter,
+// by the per-machine lockout in validateHMAC below (5 failed attempts locks
+// the machine -- well under the 30-per-60s this used to allow). Rate
+// limiting for a genuine runaway client belongs at Cloudflare, in front of
+// this function, not as a synchronous Postgres query on the hot path of
+// every request.
 async function validateHMAC(sb: any, body: any): Promise<{ valid: boolean; reason?: string }> {
   const now = Date.now();
+
+  // A caller that omits machine_hash entirely used to fall straight through
+  // to the clauth_machines lookup below with body.machine_hash === undefined.
+  // PostgREST's .single() then answers "0 rows" for a query that can never
+  // match, which comes back as an HTTP 406 -- 1,438 of these in 24h
+  // (2026-09-06), every one a wasted round trip for a request already known
+  // to be malformed. Reject before the DB call: same auth_failed response
+  // the caller already gets, no query, no spurious 406 in the logs.
+  if (typeof body.machine_hash !== "string" || !body.machine_hash) {
+    return { valid: false, reason: "machine_hash_missing" };
+  }
+
   if (Math.abs(now - body.timestamp) > REPLAY_WINDOW_MS) return { valid: false, reason: "timestamp_expired" };
 
   const { data: machine, error } = await sb.from("clauth_machines")
@@ -99,20 +120,23 @@ async function validateHMAC(sb: any, body: any): Promise<{ valid: boolean; reaso
   return { valid: true };
 }
 
-async function auditLog(sb: any, machine_hash: string, service_name: string, action: string, result: string, detail?: string) {
-  await sb.from("clauth_audit").insert({ machine_hash, service_name, action, result, detail });
-}
-
+// auditLog() removed 2026-09-03 alongside checkRateLimit() -- it wrote a row
+// to clauth_audit on every path through this function, including rejections
+// (rate-limited, auth-denied, IP-blocked), which is what turned "the table
+// got slow" into a feedback loop (more rejections -> more rows -> slower
+// scans -> more rejections). No retention policy ever existed for this
+// table. If durable audit logging is wanted back, it needs its own design --
+// write-only, indexed for its actual read pattern (if any), with a real
+// retention/partition policy -- not a bare insert-on-every-call with no cap.
 async function handleRetrieve(sb: any, body: any, mh: string) {
   const { service } = body;
   if (!service) return { error: "service required" };
   const { data: svc } = await sb.from("clauth_services").select("*").eq("name", service).single();
-  if (!svc)           { await auditLog(sb, mh, service, "retrieve", "fail", "service_not_found"); return { error: "service_not_found" }; }
-  if (!svc.enabled)   { await auditLog(sb, mh, service, "retrieve", "denied", "service_disabled"); return { error: "service_disabled" }; }
-  if (!svc.vault_key) { await auditLog(sb, mh, service, "retrieve", "fail", "no_key_stored"); return { error: "no_key_stored" }; }
+  if (!svc)           return { error: "service_not_found" };
+  if (!svc.enabled)   return { error: "service_disabled" };
+  if (!svc.vault_key) return { error: "no_key_stored" };
   const { data: secret } = await sb.rpc("vault_decrypt_secret", { secret_name: svc.vault_key });
   await sb.from("clauth_services").update({ last_retrieved: new Date().toISOString() }).eq("name", service);
-  await auditLog(sb, mh, service, "retrieve", "success");
   return { service, key_type: svc.key_type, value: secret };
 }
 
@@ -121,9 +145,8 @@ async function handleWrite(sb: any, body: any, mh: string) {
   if (!service || !value) return { error: "service and value required" };
   const vaultKey = `clauth.${service}`;
   const { error } = await sb.rpc("vault_upsert_secret", { secret_name: vaultKey, secret_value: typeof value === "string" ? value : JSON.stringify(value) });
-  if (error) { await auditLog(sb, mh, service, "write", "fail", error.message); return { error: error.message }; }
+  if (error) return { error: error.message };
   await sb.from("clauth_services").update({ vault_key: vaultKey, last_rotated: new Date().toISOString() }).eq("name", service);
-  await auditLog(sb, mh, service, "write", "success");
   return { success: true, service, vault_key: vaultKey };
 }
 
@@ -133,7 +156,6 @@ async function handleEnable(sb: any, body: any, mh: string) {
   q = service !== "all" ? q.eq("name", service) : q.not("vault_key", "is", null);
   const { error } = await q;
   if (error) return { error: error.message };
-  await auditLog(sb, mh, service, enabled ? "enable" : "disable", "success");
   return { success: true, service, enabled };
 }
 
@@ -144,7 +166,6 @@ async function handleAdd(sb: any, body: any, mh: string) {
   if (project) row.project = project;
   const { error } = await sb.from("clauth_services").insert(row);
   if (error) return { error: error.message };
-  await auditLog(sb, mh, name, "add", "success");
   return { success: true, name, label, key_type, project: project || null };
 }
 
@@ -157,7 +178,6 @@ async function handleUpdate(sb: any, body: any, mh: string) {
   if (description !== undefined) updates.description = description || null;
   const { error } = await sb.from("clauth_services").update(updates).eq("name", service);
   if (error) return { error: error.message };
-  await auditLog(sb, mh, service, "update", "success", `fields: ${Object.keys(updates).join(", ")}`);
   return { success: true, service, ...updates };
 }
 
@@ -166,7 +186,6 @@ async function handleRemove(sb: any, body: any, mh: string) {
   if (confirm !== `CONFIRM REMOVE ${service.toUpperCase()}`) return { error: "confirm phrase mismatch" };
   await sb.rpc("vault_delete_secret", { secret_name: `clauth.${service}` });
   await sb.from("clauth_services").delete().eq("name", service);
-  await auditLog(sb, mh, service, "remove", "success");
   return { success: true, service };
 }
 
@@ -182,7 +201,6 @@ async function handleRevoke(sb: any, body: any, mh: string) {
     await sb.rpc("vault_delete_secret", { secret_name: `clauth.${service}` });
     await sb.from("clauth_services").update({ vault_key: null, enabled: false }).eq("name", service);
   }
-  await auditLog(sb, mh, service, "revoke", "success");
   return { success: true, service };
 }
 
@@ -193,7 +211,6 @@ async function handleStatus(sb: any, body: any, mh: string) {
     .order("name");
   if (body.project) q = q.eq("project", body.project);
   const { data: services } = await q;
-  await auditLog(sb, mh, "all", "status", "success");
   return { services: services || [] };
 }
 
@@ -204,7 +221,6 @@ async function handleChangePassword(sb: any, body: any, mh: string) {
     .update({ hmac_seed_hash: new_hmac_seed_hash, fail_count: 0, locked: false })
     .eq("machine_hash", mh);
   if (error) return { error: error.message };
-  await auditLog(sb, mh, "system", "change-password", "success");
   return { success: true };
 }
 
@@ -231,12 +247,8 @@ async function handleCreateEnrollment(sb: any, body: any, mh: string) {
     created_by_machine_hash: mh,
     expires_at,
   });
-  if (error) {
-    await auditLog(sb, mh, "system", "create-enrollment", "fail", error.message);
-    return { error: error.message };
-  }
+  if (error) return { error: error.message };
 
-  await auditLog(sb, mh, "system", "create-enrollment", "success", `install_id=${install_id}`);
   return { success: true, enrollment_code: code, install_id, expires_at, label };
 }
 
@@ -274,7 +286,6 @@ async function handleRedeemEnrollment(sb: any, body: any) {
   if (consumeError) return { error: consumeError.message };
   if (!consumedRows || consumedRows.length !== 1) return { error: "enrollment_already_used" };
 
-  await auditLog(sb, machine_hash, "system", "redeem-enrollment", "success", `install_id=${install_id}`);
   return { success: true, machine_hash, install_id };
 }
 
@@ -314,21 +325,11 @@ Deno.serve(async (req: Request) => {
 
   const ipCheck = checkIP(ip);
   if (!ipCheck.allowed) {
-    await auditLog(sb, body.machine_hash || "unknown", "system", route, "blocked", ipCheck.reason);
     return Response.json({ error: "ip_blocked", reason: ipCheck.reason }, { status: 403 });
   }
 
-  if (body.machine_hash) {
-    const rateCheck = await checkRateLimit(sb, body.machine_hash);
-    if (!rateCheck.allowed) {
-      await auditLog(sb, body.machine_hash, "system", route, "rate_limited", rateCheck.reason);
-      return Response.json({ error: "rate_limited", reason: rateCheck.reason }, { status: 429 });
-    }
-  }
-
   const authResult = await validateHMAC(sb, { machine_hash: body.machine_hash, token: body.token, timestamp: body.timestamp, password: body.password });
   if (!authResult.valid) {
-    await auditLog(sb, body.machine_hash || "unknown", body.service || "unknown", route, "denied", authResult.reason);
     return Response.json({ error: "auth_failed", reason: authResult.reason }, { status: 401 });
   }