@lifeaitools/clauth 1.30.6 → 1.30.7

package/.clauth-skill/SKILL.md

@@ -11,47 +11,23 @@ Hardware-bound credential vault for the LIFEAI stack. Your machine is the second
 
 ## How Claude Interfaces with clauth
 
-> **CRITICAL:** Agents should use the local daemon for credential discovery and
-> exact secret retrieval. Do not ask the user for the vault password just to get
-> a key, do not use interactive prompts, and do not walk every service.
+> **CRITICAL:** Never pipe input to clauth or use interactive prompts. The CLI uses `inquirer` which produces ANSI garbage when stdin is piped. Always use one of the two methods below.
 
-### Method 1 — Local daemon (preferred for agents)
+### Method 1 — CLI with `--pw` flag (simplest)
 
-Discover services without reading secrets:
-
-```bash
-curl -s http://127.0.0.1:52437/ping
-curl -s http://127.0.0.1:52437/knowledge
-curl -s http://127.0.0.1:52437/list-services
-```
-
-Retrieve exactly one credential only when the next command needs it:
-
-```bash
-curl -s http://127.0.0.1:52437/v/<service>
-```
-
-`/knowledge` is safe to cache for a session: it returns service metadata and
-`has_key`, but no raw secrets and no Vault secret names. `/status` uses the same
-short metadata cache and can be forced with `?refresh=1`.
-
-### Method 2 — CLI with `--pw` flag (admin/setup only)
-
-All clauth commands accept `-p` / `--pw <password>` to skip the interactive
-password prompt. Use this for local admin/setup tasks, not routine agent secret
-retrieval:
+All clauth commands accept `-p` / `--pw <password>` to skip the interactive password prompt:
 
 ```bash
 clauth status -p "YourPassword"
+clauth get github -p "YourPassword"
 clauth test -p "YourPassword"
 clauth enable github -p "YourPassword"
 clauth write key github -p "YourPassword"   # still prompts for the key value
 ```
 
-### Method 3 — Direct API calls (implementation/debugging only)
+### Method 2 — Direct API calls (full control, no CLI needed)
 
-Call the auth-vault Edge Function directly only when debugging clauth internals.
-Normal agents should not bypass the daemon metadata cache.
+Call the auth-vault Edge Function directly. This is the most reliable method for Claude.
 
 **Base URL:** `https://<project-ref>.supabase.co/functions/v1/auth-vault`
 **Auth header:** `Authorization: Bearer <supabase-anon-key>`
@@ -99,10 +75,10 @@ All auth routes require: `machine_hash`, `token`, `timestamp`, `password`.
 
 ### Password Handling
 
-- Do not ask the user for their clauth password for routine credential lookup
-- Use the unlocked local daemon whenever possible
+- Ask the user for their clauth password **once per session**
+- Store it in working memory for the duration of the conversation
 - Never log or echo the password
-- If the daemon is locked, ask the user to unlock `http://127.0.0.1:52437`
+- If the user says "use clauth" or "get my github key", ask for the password if you don't have it yet
 
 ---
 
@@ -168,9 +144,7 @@ clauth setup [--admin-token T] [-p P]  Register this machine
 clauth status [-p P]                   All services + state
 clauth test [-p P]                     Verify HMAC connection
 clauth list [-p P]                     Service names
-clauth search <query> [-p P]           Search names and metadata
-clauth search <query> --addresses [-p P]
-                                      Also search redacted address hints (may read multiple secrets)
+clauth search <query> [-p P]           Search names, metadata, and redacted server addresses
 
 clauth write key <service> [-p P]      Store a credential
 clauth write pw [-p P]                 Change password
@@ -201,64 +175,32 @@ Service type `fileserver` — mount configuration for fs tools (UI-only config).
 
 ---
 
-## Daemon Metadata Cache
-
-When discovering service names, do not retrieve secrets. Use the daemon metadata
-cache:
-
-```bash
-curl -s http://127.0.0.1:52437/knowledge
-curl -s http://127.0.0.1:52437/list-services
-```
+## MCP Server (v1.5.38+)
 
-`/knowledge` is agent-safe: it returns service metadata and `has_key`, but no
-raw secrets and no Vault secret names. Fetch `GET /v/<service>` only for the one
-exact credential needed by the next command. Never walk every service and never
-bulk-fetch all secrets.
-
-## MCP Server (v1.16.9+)
-
-clauth runs as an MCP server with five namespaced paths and safe
-credential-discovery tools:
+clauth runs as an MCP server with 3 namespaces and 27 tools:
 
 | Path | Namespace | Tools |
 |------|-----------|-------|
-| `/clauth` | `clauth_*` + runtime helpers | 23 default live tools, including `clauth_knowledge` |
+| `/clauth` | `clauth_*` | 13 credential vault tools |
 | `/gws` | `gws_*` | 6 Google Workspace tools |
-| `/fs` | `fs_*` | 20 filesystem and git-safe file tools |
-| `/chitchat` | `chitchat_*` | 7 collaboration relay tools |
-| `/codevelop` | `codevelop_*` | 7 peer development tools |
-| `/mcp` | all | 63 tools combined |
-
-The default live `/clauth` surface includes credential tools plus
-`call_agent`, `monkey_dispatch`, `handoff_start`, `terminal_*`, and `channel_*`.
-Admin write tools are gated by write-mode.
+| `/fs` | `fs_*` | 8 filesystem tools (read, write, grep, glob, list, delete, mkdir, mounts) |
+| `/mcp` | all | 27 tools combined |
 
 ### claude.ai Connector URLs (noauth mode)
 - `https://clauth.regendevcorp.com/clauth` — credential tools
 - `https://clauth.regendevcorp.com/gws` — Google Workspace
-- `https://clauth.regendevcorp.com/chitchat` — collaboration relay tools
-- `https://clauth.regendevcorp.com/codevelop` — peer development tools
 - `https://fs.regendevcorp.com/fs` — filesystem tools
 
 Noauth mode: fresh domains that return 404 on OAuth endpoints. claude.ai connects directly (Anthropic OAuth proxy bug workaround).
 
-Use `clauth_knowledge` or `clauth_status` for discovery. Use `clauth_get` only
-for one exact secret. `clauth_search` is metadata-only by default; pass
-`addresses: true` only when redacted address hints are intentionally needed.
-`clauth_inject` is guarded against accidental bulk vault sweeps.
-
 ### FS Tools
-`fs_read` `fs_write` `fs_stat` `fs_append` `fs_write_chunk` `fs_ingest_url`
-`fs_import_git_files` `fs_list` `fs_grep` `fs_glob` `fs_delete` `fs_mkdir`
-`fs_edit` `fs_move` `fs_copy` `fs_mounts` `fs_repo_status` `fs_use_branch`
-`fs_commit` `fs_diff`
+`fs_read` `fs_write` `fs_list` `fs_grep` `fs_glob` `fs_delete` `fs_mkdir` `fs_mounts`
 
 Path-jail security: all paths resolved against mount root. Permission flags (r/w/d) per mount. Uses `@vscode/ripgrep` for grep, `fast-glob` for glob.
 
 ### Testing
 ```bash
-node test-tools.mjs    # MCP tool execution smoke tests
+node test-tools.mjs    # 25 tool execution tests across all 3 namespaces
 ```
 
 ---

package/README.md

@@ -92,9 +92,7 @@ clauth install              Provision Supabase + install Claude skill
 clauth setup                Register this machine with the vault
 clauth enroll               Create one-time code to add another computer
 clauth status               All services + state
-clauth search <query>       Find services by name, project, description, or type
-clauth search <query> --addresses
-                            Also search redacted address hints (may read multiple secrets)
+clauth search <query>       Find services by name, project, description, or redacted address
 clauth test                 Verify connection
 
 clauth write key <service>  Store a credential
@@ -138,7 +136,7 @@ Nothing stored locally. Password never persisted. Machine hash is one-way only.
 clauth runs as an HTTP daemon on `http://127.0.0.1:52437`. The daemon provides:
 
 - **Web UI** — unlock vault, manage services, configure mounts
-- **REST API** — `GET /knowledge`, `GET /status`, `GET /v/<service>`, `GET /ping`, `POST /restart`, `GET /shutdown`
+- **REST API** — `GET /get/<service>`, `GET /ping`, `POST /restart`, `GET /shutdown`
 - **MCP server** — Model Context Protocol for Claude Code and claude.ai
 - **Cloudflare Tunnel** — exposes MCP endpoints publicly for claude.ai connectors
 
@@ -146,88 +144,32 @@ Start: `clauth serve start` (starts locked, auto-opens browser for unlock).
 
 Full daemon operations reference: see `regen-root/.claude/rules/clauth.md`.
 
-### Safe Metadata Cache
-
-Agents and scripts must discover services through metadata endpoints, not by
-walking every secret endpoint. The daemon caches service metadata for 30 seconds:
-
-```bash
-curl -s http://127.0.0.1:52437/knowledge      # sanitized, agent-safe metadata
-curl -s http://127.0.0.1:52437/list-services  # names only
-curl -s http://127.0.0.1:52437/status         # full daemon metadata, cached
-```
-
-`/knowledge` returns service names, labels, key types, enabled state, project,
-description, timestamps, and `has_key`. It never returns raw secrets or Vault
-secret names. Use `GET /v/<service>` only for the one exact secret needed by the
-next command. Do not bulk-fetch every service.
-
 ---
 
-## MCP Server — 5 Namespaces, 63 Tools
+## MCP Server — 3 Namespaces, 32 Tools
 
 clauth is the single MCP interface for all local tools. One process, namespaced paths:
 
 | Path | Namespace | Tools | Description |
 |------|-----------|-------|-------------|
-| `/clauth` | `clauth_*` + runtime helpers | 23 | Credential vault operations, safe metadata cache, and agent runtime helpers |
+| `/clauth` | `clauth_*` | 13 | Credential vault operations |
 | `/gws` | `gws_*` | 6 | Google Workspace (Gmail, Calendar, Drive) |
-| `/fs` | `fs_*` | 20 | Filesystem plus guarded git/local-branch tools |
-| `/chitchat` | `chitchat_*` | 7 | Collaboration relay sessions |
-| `/codevelop` | `codevelop_*` | 7 | Peer development sessions |
-| `/mcp` | all | 63 | All namespaces combined (Claude Code) |
-
-The default live `/clauth` surface includes 13 credential tools plus
-`call_agent`, `monkey_dispatch`, `handoff_start`, `terminal_*`, and `channel_*`
-runtime helpers. Admin write tools such as enable/disable/project/token actions
-are gated by write-mode.
-
-### TinTin Agent Setup
-
-clauth owns the local TinTin settings and isolated agent setup contract used by
-app sidebars and the standalone TinTin console.
-
-| Method | Route | Purpose |
-| --- | --- | --- |
-| `GET` | `/tintin/settings` | Read persisted TinTin app/agent/sidebar/dispatch/co-develop settings. |
-| `PUT` | `/tintin/settings` | Save TinTin app/agent/sidebar/dispatch/co-develop settings. |
-| `GET` | `/tintin/settings/ui` | Browser settings page for operators, with sections for Agent Setup, Agent Defaults, Sidebar Apps, Blackboard Dispatch, Co-develop Relay, and stored agent sessions. |
-| `POST` | `/tintin/agent-sessions` | Create or reuse an isolated agent cwd, normally a git worktree. |
-
-The agent-session response includes the requested agent/runtime/model, repo
-root, isolated `cwd`, worktree path, branch, launch mode, and launch command.
-This route prepares the proper Codex/Claude isolation path; separate supervisor
-code is still responsible for long-running process parking and wake/resume.
-
-### clauth MCP Usage
-
-Use `clauth_knowledge` or `clauth_status` for discovery. They use cached
-metadata and never retrieve raw secrets. `clauth_search` is metadata-only by
-default; pass `addresses: true` only when you intentionally need redacted address
-hints from connstrings/fileserver/oauth secrets. `clauth_get` is for one exact
-secret. `clauth_inject` refuses more than five services unless `allow_many: true`
-is explicitly supplied, to prevent accidental rate-limit lockouts from bulk
-secret sweeps.
+| `/fs` | `fs_*` | 13 | Filesystem (read, write, append, chunked write, URL ingest, Git import, stat, grep, glob, delete, mkdir, mounts) |
+| `/mcp` | all | 32 | All namespaces combined (Claude Code) |
 
 ### FS Tools
 
-20 filesystem tools with path-jail security:
-- `fs_read`, `fs_write`, `fs_stat`, `fs_append`, `fs_write_chunk`, `fs_ingest_url`, `fs_import_git_files`, `fs_list`, `fs_grep`, `fs_glob`, `fs_delete`, `fs_mkdir`, `fs_edit`, `fs_move`, `fs_copy`, `fs_mounts`, `fs_repo_status`, `fs_use_branch`, `fs_commit`, `fs_diff`
+13 filesystem tools with path-jail security:
+- `fs_read`, `fs_write`, `fs_stat`, `fs_append`, `fs_write_chunk`, `fs_ingest_url`, `fs_import_git_files`, `fs_list`, `fs_grep`, `fs_glob`, `fs_delete`, `fs_mkdir`, `fs_mounts`
 - Uses `node:fs/promises` (async), `@vscode/ripgrep` (shipped binary), `fast-glob`
 - Permission flags per mount: `r` (read), `w` (write), `d` (delete)
 - Mount config stored as "fileserver" service type in vault — only configurable through web UI
 - Large writes should use `fs_write_chunk`; cloud-to-local transfer should use `fs_ingest_url`; guarded appends should pass `expected_sha256` from `fs_stat`
 - Durable new files authored by Claude.ai in GitHub should use `fs_import_git_files` so the local dirty monorepo fetches and restores only named paths without `git pull`
 
-### Collaboration Tools
-
-Chitchat tools: `chitchat_start`, `chitchat_list`, `chitchat_send`, `chitchat_recv`, `chitchat_reply`, `chitchat_poll`, `chitchat_stop`
-
-Codevelop tools: `codevelop_start`, `codevelop_join`, `codevelop_send`, `codevelop_poll`, `codevelop_status`, `codevelop_stream`, `codevelop_stop`
-
 ### GWS Tools
 
-6 Google Workspace tools: `gws_run`, `gws_gmail_list`, `gws_gmail_read`, `gws_gmail_send`, `gws_calendar_list`, `gws_drive_list`
+6 Google Workspace tools: `gws_gmail_list`, `gws_gmail_read`, `gws_gmail_send`, `gws_gmail_draft`, `gws_calendar_list`, `gws_calendar_create`
 - Calls `gws` CLI via `execSync` with `shell: 'bash'` (fixes Windows cmd.exe JSON quoting)
 
 ---
@@ -254,8 +196,6 @@ Full OAuth 2.1 protocol implementation is present for future use when Anthropic
 |-----------|-----|
 | clauth | `https://clauth.regendevcorp.com/clauth` |
 | gws | `https://clauth.regendevcorp.com/gws` |
-| chitchat | `https://clauth.regendevcorp.com/chitchat` |
-| codevelop | `https://clauth.regendevcorp.com/codevelop` |
 | fs | `https://fs.regendevcorp.com/fs` |
 
 ---
@@ -270,7 +210,7 @@ Full OAuth 2.1 protocol implementation is present for future use when Anthropic
 ## Testing
 
 ```bash
-node test-tools.mjs    # MCP tool execution smoke tests
+node test-tools.mjs    # 25 tool execution tests across all 3 namespaces
 ```
 
 Tests actual MCP tool calls (not just OAuth + listing).

package/cli/api.js

@@ -27,119 +27,21 @@ export function getAnonKey() {
 // ============================================================
 // Core POST helper
 // ============================================================
-// Bound every vault round-trip with a wall-clock timeout. Without this, a TCP
-// stall (DNS black-hole, half-open socket — NOT a clean 4xx) hangs the caller
-// forever. Callers that treat persistence as best-effort (e.g. the call_agent
-// scratchpad mirror) rely on this resolving to an error rather than blocking.
-// Override via CLAUTH_VAULT_TIMEOUT_MS; default 8s.
-const VAULT_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS = (() => {
-  const n = Number(process.env.CLAUTH_VAULT_TIMEOUT_MS);
-  return Number.isFinite(n) && n > 0 ? n : 8000;
-})();
-
-// ============================================================
-// Backend / external-resource error model
-// ============================================================
-// A VaultBackendError means the vault backend (the auth-vault Edge Function or
-// the Postgres database behind it) never rendered an auth verdict — the request
-// timed out, the network failed, the function 5xx'd, the DB was unreachable, or
-// we were rate-limited. These are TRANSIENT and must NEVER be counted as an
-// authentication failure (a wrong password). Treating a database timeout as a
-// bad password is the bug that turned a DB blip into a permanent vault lockout.
-export class VaultBackendError extends Error {
-  constructor(kind, message, { status = null, detail = null, cause = null } = {}) {
-    super(message);
-    this.name = "VaultBackendError";
-    this.kind = kind;              // timeout | network | server_error | rate_limited | db_error | unknown
-    this.isBackend = true;         // marker for callers: do not strike
-    this.retriable = true;         // the verdict was never rendered — safe to retry
-    this.status = status;          // HTTP status if the server responded
-    this.detail = detail;          // human-readable backend detail
-    if (cause) this.cause = cause;
-  }
-}
-
-// Server `reason` strings that are genuine AUTH VERDICTS (the backend evaluated
-// the credential and answered). These DO count — they are not backend errors.
-const AUTH_VERDICT_REASONS = [
-  "invalid_token", "wrong_password", "invalid_password",
-  "machine_locked", "machine_disabled", "machine_not_found",
-];
-
-// Classify a server-supplied `reason` string. Returns a VaultBackendError kind
-// when the reason describes a backend/transient condition, or null when the
-// reason is a real auth verdict (or unknown — caller decides).
-export function classifyServerReason(reason) {
-  if (!reason || typeof reason !== "string") return null;
-  const r = reason.toLowerCase();
-  if (AUTH_VERDICT_REASONS.some((v) => r.includes(v))) return null; // genuine verdict
-  if (/rate[_\s-]?limit/.test(r)) return "rate_limited";
-  if (/(database|\bdb\b|postgres|connection|pool|statement timeout|unavailable|internal|timeout|5\d\d)/.test(r)) return "db_error";
-  return null;
-}
-
-// Classify a thrown error (transport/timeout/network/typed). Returns a kind
-// string when it is a backend/transient failure, or null when it is not.
-export function classifyBackendError(err) {
-  if (!err) return null;
-  if (err instanceof VaultBackendError) return err.kind;
-  const name = err.name || "";
-  const msg = (err.message || "").toString();
-  if (name === "TimeoutError" || name === "AbortError" || /\babort(ed)?\b|\btim(e|ed)?\s*out\b|timeout/i.test(msg)) return "timeout";
-  if (/fetch failed|ECONNREFUSED|ENOTFOUND|ETIMEDOUT|EAI_AGAIN|ECONNRESET|EPIPE|network|socket hang/i.test(msg)) return "network";
-  return null;
-}
-
 async function post(route, body) {
   const url = `${getBaseUrl()}/${route}`;
   const anonKey = getAnonKey();
 
-  let res;
-  try {
-    res = await fetch(url, {
-      method: "POST",
-      headers: {
-        "Content-Type": "application/json",
-        "Authorization": `Bearer ${anonKey}`
-      },
-      body: JSON.stringify(body),
-      signal: AbortSignal.timeout(VAULT_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS)
-    });
-  } catch (err) {
-    // Transport-level failure — the backend never answered. Surface a typed,
-    // non-strike error so callers report "backend unreachable", not "bad password".
-    const kind = classifyBackendError(err) || "network";
-    const why = kind === "timeout"
-      ? `vault backend did not respond within ${VAULT_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS}ms`
-      : `cannot reach vault backend (${err.message || "network error"})`;
-    throw new VaultBackendError(kind, why, { detail: err.message || String(err), cause: err });
-  }
-
-  let data;
-  try {
-    data = await res.json();
-  } catch (err) {
-    // 2xx/5xx with a non-JSON or empty body — the function errored without a
-    // structured verdict. Transient backend condition, not an auth failure.
-    throw new VaultBackendError("server_error", `vault backend returned an unreadable response (HTTP ${res.status})`, { status: res.status, detail: err.message });
-  }
-
-  // HTTP 5xx (or any non-ok with no structured error) = backend problem, never a verdict.
-  if (res.status >= 500 || (!res.ok && !data.error)) {
-    const reasonKind = classifyServerReason(data.reason || data.error) || "server_error";
-    throw new VaultBackendError(reasonKind, `vault backend error (HTTP ${res.status})`, { status: res.status, detail: data.error || data.reason || `HTTP ${res.status}` });
-  }
-
-  // 4xx WITH a structured error: could be a real verdict (invalid_token) or a
-  // transient backend signal surfaced as 4xx (rate_limited). Promote the latter
-  // to a typed backend error; leave genuine verdicts in `data` for the caller.
-  if (data.error) {
-    const reasonKind = classifyServerReason(data.reason || data.error);
-    if (reasonKind) {
-      throw new VaultBackendError(reasonKind, `vault backend ${reasonKind.replace("_", " ")}`, { status: res.status, detail: data.error || data.reason });
-    }
-  }
+  const res = await fetch(url, {
+    method: "POST",
+    headers: {
+      "Content-Type": "application/json",
+      "Authorization": `Bearer ${anonKey}`
+    },
+    body: JSON.stringify(body)
+  });
 
+  const data = await res.json();
+  if (!res.ok && !data.error) throw new Error(`HTTP ${res.status}`);
   return data;
 }
 
@@ -233,6 +135,5 @@ export async function redeemEnrollment(machineHash, seedHash, label, enrollmentC
 
 export default {
   retrieve, write, enable, addService, updateService, removeService, revoke,
-  status, test, createEnrollment, registerMachine, redeemEnrollment, getBaseUrl, getAnonKey,
-  VaultBackendError, classifyBackendError, classifyServerReason
+  status, test, createEnrollment, registerMachine, redeemEnrollment, getBaseUrl, getAnonKey
 };