@lievclouds/dsh-cortex 0.4.3 → 0.4.4

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@lievclouds/dsh-cortex",
-  "version": "0.4.3",
+  "version": "0.4.4",
   "description": "Cortex workbench for DeepSeek Harness: the original Cortex UI (vulnerabilities, assets, internal operations, Memory Nebula, snapshots, retest) as a native DSH panel, plus 12 native agent tools so DSH conversations use the local Cortex SQLite without MCP.",
   "type": "module",
   "main": "index.js",

package/src/cortex-ui/renderer/components/retest/RepeaterPanel.tsx

@@ -24,6 +24,21 @@ interface ParsedRawRequest {
   body: string
 }
 
+/**
+ * Protocol-level headers copied from a report are re-derived by the outbound
+ * request (Host from the URL, length/connection by the HTTP client). Dropping
+ * them here keeps raw requests sendable without a validation error.
+ */
+const DERIVED_HEADERS = new Set([
+  'host',
+  'content-length',
+  'connection',
+  'transfer-encoding',
+  'upgrade',
+  'keep-alive',
+  'proxy-connection'
+])
+
 /** Parse a Burp-like raw request into the typed repeater payload. */
 function parseRawRequest(text: string): ParsedRawRequest {
   const lines = text.replace(/\r\n/g, '\n').split('\n')
@@ -157,11 +172,14 @@ export function RepeaterPanel({ vuln, loading }: RepeaterPanelProps) {
     setError(null)
     try {
       const parsed = parseRawRequest(raw)
+      const headers = Object.fromEntries(
+        Object.entries(parsed.headers).filter(([name]) => !DERIVED_HEADERS.has(name.toLowerCase()))
+      )
       const response = await api.sendRepeaterRequest({
         vulnId: vuln.id,
         method: parsed.method,
         url: resolveRepeaterUrl(parsed.url, vuln.target_url),
-        headers: parsed.headers,
+        headers,
         ...(parsed.body === '' ? {} : { body: parsed.body }),
         followRedirects
       })

package/src/host/retest.js

@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ export const MAX_HEADER_VALUE = 8000
 
 /** Headers a retest caller may never set (they are protocol-level). */
 const FORBIDDEN_HEADERS = new Set([
-  'host',
   'content-length',
   'connection',
   'transfer-encoding',
@@ -38,6 +37,14 @@ const FORBIDDEN_HEADERS = new Set([
   'proxy-connection',
 ])
 
+/**
+ * Headers that are silently ignored instead of rejected: `Host` is derived
+ * from the already-validated request URL, so a raw request copied from a report
+ * (`Host: target`) must not fail validation. Letting callers override Host
+ * would allow vhost tricks outside the origin allowlist.
+ */
+const IGNORED_HEADERS = new Set(['host'])
+
 const HEADER_NAME_RE = /^[!#$%&'*+\-.^_`|~0-9A-Za-z]+$/
 
 const REDIRECT_STATUSES = new Set([301, 302, 303, 307, 308])
@@ -152,6 +159,7 @@ export function normalizeHeaders(headers) {
     if (FORBIDDEN_HEADERS.has(name.toLowerCase())) {
       throw badRequest(`header ${name} is not allowed`)
     }
+    if (IGNORED_HEADERS.has(name.toLowerCase())) continue
     if (/[\r\n]/.test(value)) throw badRequest(`header ${name} has an invalid value`)
     if (value.length > MAX_HEADER_VALUE) throw badRequest(`header ${name} is too long`)
     out[name] = value