@librechat/agents 3.3.7 → 3.3.9

package/dist/cjs/messages/injected.cjs

@@ -43,7 +43,16 @@ function convertInjectedMessages(messages) {
 	const converted = [];
 	for (const msg of messages) {
 		if (isEmptyInjectedContent(msg.content)) continue;
-		const additional_kwargs = { role: msg.role };
+		/** Provenance, recorded here because this is the only place that knows it.
+		*  `isMeta` and `source` are both optional on `InjectedMessage`, so a bare
+		*  entry is otherwise indistinguishable from a message replayed out of the
+		*  payload — and downstream consumers such as compaction coverage need to
+		*  know that this message has no persisted source ID to name. Kept separate
+		*  from `isMeta`, which carries UI and cache meaning of its own. */
+		const additional_kwargs = {
+			role: msg.role,
+			injected: true
+		};
 		if (msg.isMeta != null) additional_kwargs.isMeta = msg.isMeta;
 		if (msg.source != null) additional_kwargs.source = msg.source;
 		if (msg.skillName != null) additional_kwargs.skillName = msg.skillName;

package/dist/cjs/messages/injected.cjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"injected.cjs","names":["HumanMessage","toLangChainContent"],"sources":["../../../src/messages/injected.ts"],"sourcesContent":["// src/messages/injected.ts\nimport { HumanMessage } from '@langchain/core/messages';\nimport type { BaseMessage } from '@langchain/core/messages';\nimport type { InjectedMessage } from '@/types/tools';\nimport { ContentTypes } from '@/common';\nimport { toLangChainContent } from './langchain';\n\n/**\n * Converts `InjectedMessage` instances to LangChain `HumanMessage` objects.\n * Both 'user' and 'system' roles become `HumanMessage` to avoid provider\n * rejections (Anthropic/Google reject non-leading SystemMessages). The\n * original role is preserved in `additional_kwargs` for downstream consumers.\n *\n * Shared by both injection boundaries — `ToolNode`'s tool-batch dispatch and\n * `StandardGraph`'s preempt-boundary dispatch. Keeping one implementation is\n * load-bearing rather than tidy: the provider-safety argument for sealing a\n * stream mid-generation rests on the injected turn having byte-identical\n * shape to the one the already-shipped tool boundary emits, so the two sites\n * must not be able to drift.\n */\n/**\n * True when an entry carries nothing a provider will accept as a turn.\n *\n * The public `InjectedMessage` type admits `content: ''` and `content: []`,\n * and a host hook is free to return one. Converting it anyway produces a\n * `HumanMessage` that passes the caller's `length > 0` test, so the graph\n * resumes and sends a trailing EMPTY user turn — which Anthropic and other\n * strict providers reject outright, turning a cooperative seal into a failed\n * run. Permissive providers merely burn a model call.\n *\n * Whitespace counts as empty, matching the standard `canSealPreempt` applies\n * to the assistant side of the same pair. Non-text blocks count as content: a\n * media-only steer is a real turn and must survive.\n */\nfunction isEmptyInjectedContent(content: InjectedMessage['content']): boolean {\n  if (typeof content === 'string') {\n    return content.trim() === '';\n  }\n  if (content.length === 0) {\n    return true;\n  }\n  return content.every((block) => {\n    if (block.type !== ContentTypes.TEXT) {\n      return false;\n    }\n    const text = block[ContentTypes.TEXT];\n    return typeof text !== 'string' || text.trim() === '';\n  });\n}\n\nexport function convertInjectedMessages(\n  messages: InjectedMessage[]\n): BaseMessage[] {\n  const converted: BaseMessage[] = [];\n  for (const msg of messages) {\n    if (isEmptyInjectedContent(msg.content)) {\n      continue;\n    }\n    const additional_kwargs: Record<string, unknown> = {\n      role: msg.role,\n    };\n    if (msg.isMeta != null) additional_kwargs.isMeta = msg.isMeta;\n    if (msg.source != null) additional_kwargs.source = msg.source;\n    if (msg.skillName != null) additional_kwargs.skillName = msg.skillName;\n\n    converted.push(\n      new HumanMessage({\n        content: toLangChainContent(msg.content),\n        additional_kwargs,\n      })\n    );\n  }\n  return converted;\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAkCA,SAAS,uBAAuB,SAA8C;CAC5E,IAAI,OAAO,YAAY,UACrB,OAAO,QAAQ,KAAK,MAAM;CAE5B,IAAI,QAAQ,WAAW,GACrB,OAAO;CAET,OAAO,QAAQ,OAAO,UAAU;EAC9B,IAAI,MAAM,SAAA,QACR,OAAO;EAET,MAAM,OAAO,MAAA;EACb,OAAO,OAAO,SAAS,YAAY,KAAK,KAAK,MAAM;CACrD,CAAC;AACH;AAEA,SAAgB,wBACd,UACe;CACf,MAAM,YAA2B,CAAC;CAClC,KAAK,MAAM,OAAO,UAAU;EAC1B,IAAI,uBAAuB,IAAI,OAAO,GACpC;EAEF,MAAM,oBAA6C,EACjD,MAAM,IAAI,KACZ;EACA,IAAI,IAAI,UAAU,MAAM,kBAAkB,SAAS,IAAI;EACvD,IAAI,IAAI,UAAU,MAAM,kBAAkB,SAAS,IAAI;EACvD,IAAI,IAAI,aAAa,MAAM,kBAAkB,YAAY,IAAI;EAE7D,UAAU,KACR,IAAIA,yBAAAA,aAAa;GACf,SAASC,kBAAAA,mBAAmB,IAAI,OAAO;GACvC;EACF,CAAC,CACH;CACF;CACA,OAAO;AACT"}
+{"version":3,"file":"injected.cjs","names":["HumanMessage","toLangChainContent"],"sources":["../../../src/messages/injected.ts"],"sourcesContent":["// src/messages/injected.ts\nimport { HumanMessage } from '@langchain/core/messages';\nimport type { BaseMessage } from '@langchain/core/messages';\nimport type { InjectedMessage } from '@/types/tools';\nimport { toLangChainContent } from './langchain';\nimport { ContentTypes } from '@/common';\n\n/**\n * Converts `InjectedMessage` instances to LangChain `HumanMessage` objects.\n * Both 'user' and 'system' roles become `HumanMessage` to avoid provider\n * rejections (Anthropic/Google reject non-leading SystemMessages). The\n * original role is preserved in `additional_kwargs` for downstream consumers.\n *\n * Shared by both injection boundaries — `ToolNode`'s tool-batch dispatch and\n * `StandardGraph`'s preempt-boundary dispatch. Keeping one implementation is\n * load-bearing rather than tidy: the provider-safety argument for sealing a\n * stream mid-generation rests on the injected turn having byte-identical\n * shape to the one the already-shipped tool boundary emits, so the two sites\n * must not be able to drift.\n */\n/**\n * True when an entry carries nothing a provider will accept as a turn.\n *\n * The public `InjectedMessage` type admits `content: ''` and `content: []`,\n * and a host hook is free to return one. Converting it anyway produces a\n * `HumanMessage` that passes the caller's `length > 0` test, so the graph\n * resumes and sends a trailing EMPTY user turn — which Anthropic and other\n * strict providers reject outright, turning a cooperative seal into a failed\n * run. Permissive providers merely burn a model call.\n *\n * Whitespace counts as empty, matching the standard `canSealPreempt` applies\n * to the assistant side of the same pair. Non-text blocks count as content: a\n * media-only steer is a real turn and must survive.\n */\nfunction isEmptyInjectedContent(content: InjectedMessage['content']): boolean {\n  if (typeof content === 'string') {\n    return content.trim() === '';\n  }\n  if (content.length === 0) {\n    return true;\n  }\n  return content.every((block) => {\n    if (block.type !== ContentTypes.TEXT) {\n      return false;\n    }\n    const text = block[ContentTypes.TEXT];\n    return typeof text !== 'string' || text.trim() === '';\n  });\n}\n\nexport function convertInjectedMessages(\n  messages: InjectedMessage[]\n): BaseMessage[] {\n  const converted: BaseMessage[] = [];\n  for (const msg of messages) {\n    if (isEmptyInjectedContent(msg.content)) {\n      continue;\n    }\n    /** Provenance, recorded here because this is the only place that knows it.\n     *  `isMeta` and `source` are both optional on `InjectedMessage`, so a bare\n     *  entry is otherwise indistinguishable from a message replayed out of the\n     *  payload — and downstream consumers such as compaction coverage need to\n     *  know that this message has no persisted source ID to name. Kept separate\n     *  from `isMeta`, which carries UI and cache meaning of its own. */\n    const additional_kwargs: Record<string, unknown> = {\n      role: msg.role,\n      injected: true,\n    };\n    if (msg.isMeta != null) additional_kwargs.isMeta = msg.isMeta;\n    if (msg.source != null) additional_kwargs.source = msg.source;\n    if (msg.skillName != null) additional_kwargs.skillName = msg.skillName;\n\n    converted.push(\n      new HumanMessage({\n        content: toLangChainContent(msg.content),\n        additional_kwargs,\n      })\n    );\n  }\n  return converted;\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAkCA,SAAS,uBAAuB,SAA8C;CAC5E,IAAI,OAAO,YAAY,UACrB,OAAO,QAAQ,KAAK,MAAM;CAE5B,IAAI,QAAQ,WAAW,GACrB,OAAO;CAET,OAAO,QAAQ,OAAO,UAAU;EAC9B,IAAI,MAAM,SAAA,QACR,OAAO;EAET,MAAM,OAAO,MAAA;EACb,OAAO,OAAO,SAAS,YAAY,KAAK,KAAK,MAAM;CACrD,CAAC;AACH;AAEA,SAAgB,wBACd,UACe;CACf,MAAM,YAA2B,CAAC;CAClC,KAAK,MAAM,OAAO,UAAU;EAC1B,IAAI,uBAAuB,IAAI,OAAO,GACpC;;;;;;;EAQF,MAAM,oBAA6C;GACjD,MAAM,IAAI;GACV,UAAU;EACZ;EACA,IAAI,IAAI,UAAU,MAAM,kBAAkB,SAAS,IAAI;EACvD,IAAI,IAAI,UAAU,MAAM,kBAAkB,SAAS,IAAI;EACvD,IAAI,IAAI,aAAa,MAAM,kBAAkB,YAAY,IAAI;EAE7D,UAAU,KACR,IAAIA,yBAAAA,aAAa;GACf,SAASC,kBAAAA,mBAAmB,IAAI,OAAO;GACvC;EACF,CAAC,CACH;CACF;CACA,OAAO;AACT"}

package/dist/cjs/messages/prune.cjs

@@ -716,7 +716,19 @@ function createBoundedTruncationValue(preview, originalChars, maxChars) {
 	if (JSON.stringify({
 		_truncated: "",
 		_originalChars: originalChars
-	}).length > normalizedMaxChars) return null;
+	}).length > normalizedMaxChars)
+ /**
+	* Even the empty envelope overflows the cap, so no preview survives —
+	* but the result must still be a JSON OBJECT, never `null`. This value
+	* replaces a `tool_use.input` / tool-call `args` on messages that are
+	* mutated IN PLACE into graph state (`preFlightTruncateToolCallInputs`),
+	* and Anthropic rejects a replayed non-object input with a 400
+	* (`tool_use.input: Input should be an object`). Observed live: a tight
+	* summarization budget shrank the cap below the envelope, nulled a
+	* retained calculator call's input and args, and the next model call
+	* failed on replay.
+	*/
+	return {};
 	let low = 0;
 	let high = Math.min(preview.length, normalizedMaxChars);
 	while (low < high) {