@librechat/agents 3.1.75 → 3.1.77-dev.1

package/dist/cjs/tools/ToolNode.cjs

@@ -2,10 +2,12 @@
 
 var messages = require('@langchain/core/messages');
 var langgraph = require('@langchain/langgraph');
+var singletons = require('@langchain/core/singletons');
 var _enum = require('../common/enum.cjs');
 require('nanoid');
 require('../messages/core.cjs');
 var truncation = require('../utils/truncation.cjs');
+var langchain = require('../messages/langchain.cjs');
 var events = require('../utils/events.cjs');
 require('uuid');
 var run = require('../utils/run.cjs');
@@ -20,6 +22,88 @@ var toolOutputReferences = require('./toolOutputReferences.cjs');
 function isSend(value) {
     return value instanceof langgraph.Send;
 }
+/**
+ * Format a fail-closed diagnostic for malformed approval-decision
+ * fields. Hosts deserialize resume payloads from untyped JSON, so
+ * `responseText` and `updatedInput` can land here as anything; the
+ * blocking ToolMessage carries this string so the host can debug the
+ * exact wire shape that was rejected.
+ */
+function describeOfferedShape(value) {
+    if (value === undefined) {
+        return '<missing>';
+    }
+    if (value === null) {
+        return 'null';
+    }
+    if (Array.isArray(value)) {
+        return 'array';
+    }
+    return typeof value;
+}
+/**
+ * Build the `tool_approval` interrupt payload from the set of pending
+ * `ask`-decision entries collected during PreToolUse hook handling.
+ * Pure function — doesn't touch ToolNode state — so it lives at module
+ * scope. The interrupt itself is raised by the caller (which still
+ * needs `interrupt()` plus the AsyncLocalStorage anchoring shim).
+ */
+function buildToolApprovalInterruptPayload(askEntries) {
+    return {
+        type: 'tool_approval',
+        action_requests: askEntries.map(({ entry, reason }) => {
+            const request = {
+                tool_call_id: entry.call.id,
+                name: entry.call.name,
+                arguments: entry.args,
+            };
+            if (reason != null) {
+                request.description = reason;
+            }
+            return request;
+        }),
+        review_configs: askEntries.map(({ entry, allowedDecisions }) => ({
+            action_name: entry.call.name,
+            tool_call_id: entry.call.id,
+            allowed_decisions: (allowedDecisions ?? [
+                'approve',
+                'reject',
+                'edit',
+                'respond',
+            ]),
+        })),
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * Build a `tool_call_id → ToolApprovalDecision` map from the host's
+ * resume value. Hosts may return decisions either as an array (one per
+ * action_request, in order) or as a record keyed by `tool_call_id`. Any
+ * unrecognized shape (or a decision missing for a given call id) is
+ * treated as "no decision" by callers — typically rejected so the run
+ * doesn't silently invoke a tool the human never approved.
+ */
+function normalizeApprovalDecisions(callIds, resumeValue) {
+    const map = new Map();
+    if (resumeValue == null) {
+        return map;
+    }
+    if (Array.isArray(resumeValue)) {
+        const limit = Math.min(callIds.length, resumeValue.length);
+        for (let i = 0; i < limit; i++) {
+            map.set(callIds[i], resumeValue[i]);
+        }
+        return map;
+    }
+    if (typeof resumeValue === 'object') {
+        for (const callId of callIds) {
+            const decision = resumeValue[callId];
+            if (decision !== undefined) {
+                map.set(callId, decision);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    return map;
+}
 /**
  * Merges code execution session context into the sessions map.
  *
@@ -92,6 +176,12 @@ class ToolNode extends run.RunnableCallable {
     maxToolResultChars;
     /** Hook registry for PreToolUse/PostToolUse lifecycle hooks */
     hookRegistry;
+    /**
+     * Run-scoped HITL config. When `enabled`, `ask` decisions from
+     * PreToolUse hooks raise a LangGraph `interrupt()` instead of being
+     * treated as fail-closed denies.
+     */
+    humanInTheLoop;
     /**
      * Registry of tool outputs keyed by `tool<idx>turn<turn>`.
      *
@@ -112,7 +202,7 @@ class ToolNode extends run.RunnableCallable {
      * other's in-flight state.
      */
     anonBatchCounter = 0;
-    constructor({ tools, toolMap, name, tags, errorHandler, toolCallStepIds, handleToolErrors, loadRuntimeTools, toolRegistry, sessions, eventDrivenMode, agentId, directToolNames, maxContextTokens, maxToolResultChars, hookRegistry, toolOutputReferences: toolOutputReferences$1, toolOutputRegistry, }) {
+    constructor({ tools, toolMap, name, tags, errorHandler, toolCallStepIds, handleToolErrors, loadRuntimeTools, toolRegistry, sessions, eventDrivenMode, agentId, directToolNames, maxContextTokens, maxToolResultChars, hookRegistry, humanInTheLoop, toolOutputReferences: toolOutputReferences$1, toolOutputRegistry, }) {
         super({ name, tags, func: (input, config) => this.run(input, config) });
         this.toolMap = toolMap ?? new Map(tools.map((tool) => [tool.name, tool]));
         this.toolCallStepIds = toolCallStepIds;
@@ -128,6 +218,7 @@ class ToolNode extends run.RunnableCallable {
         this.maxToolResultChars =
             maxToolResultChars ?? truncation.calculateMaxToolResultChars(maxContextTokens);
         this.hookRegistry = hookRegistry;
+        this.humanInTheLoop = humanInTheLoop;
         /**
          * Precedence: an explicitly passed `toolOutputRegistry` instance
          * wins over a config object so a host (`Graph`) can share one
@@ -668,13 +759,40 @@ class ToolNode extends run.RunnableCallable {
         });
         const messageByCallId = new Map();
         const approvedEntries = [];
+        /**
+         * Batch-level accumulator for `additionalContext` strings returned
+         * by any PreToolUse / PostToolUse / PostToolUseFailure hook in this
+         * dispatch. We emit one consolidated `HumanMessage` after all tool
+         * results land so the next model turn sees the injected context
+         * exactly once, ordered after the ToolMessages.
+         */
+        const batchAdditionalContexts = [];
+        /**
+         * Batch-level outcome record keyed by `tool_call_id`. Captures
+         * every tool call's final result (success / error from the host,
+         * blocked from HITL deny / reject, substituted from HITL respond)
+         * across the three call sites that touch it. We materialize the
+         * `PostToolBatch` entry array in `toolCalls` order at dispatch
+         * time so hooks correlating outcomes by position see exactly the
+         * same sequence the model emitted — independent of when each
+         * outcome was recorded (deny entries land synchronously in the
+         * hook loop, approved entries land after host execution, respond
+         * entries land in the resume branch).
+         */
+        const postToolBatchEntryByCallId = new Map();
         const HOOK_FALLBACK = Object.freeze({
             additionalContexts: [],
             errors: [],
         });
         if (this.hookRegistry?.hasHookFor('PreToolUse', runId) === true) {
+            /**
+             * Capture as a non-null local so the inner `blockEntry` closure
+             * doesn't lose narrowing on `this.hookRegistry` and we don't have
+             * to defensively `?.` it across every reference inside.
+             */
+            const hookRegistry = this.hookRegistry;
             const preResults = await Promise.all(preToolCalls.map((entry) => executeHooks.executeHooks({
-                registry: this.hookRegistry,
+                registry: hookRegistry,
                 input: {
                     hook_event_name: 'PreToolUse',
                     runId,
@@ -689,79 +807,347 @@ class ToolNode extends run.RunnableCallable {
                 sessionId: runId,
                 matchQuery: entry.call.name,
             }).catch(() => HOOK_FALLBACK)));
-            for (let i = 0; i < preToolCalls.length; i++) {
-                const hookResult = preResults[i];
-                const entry = preToolCalls[i];
-                const isDenied = hookResult.decision === 'deny' || hookResult.decision === 'ask';
-                if (isDenied) {
-                    const reason = hookResult.reason ?? 'Blocked by hook';
-                    const contentString = `Blocked: ${reason}`;
-                    messageByCallId.set(entry.call.id, new messages.ToolMessage({
-                        status: 'error',
-                        content: contentString,
-                        name: entry.call.name,
-                        tool_call_id: entry.call.id,
-                    }));
-                    this.dispatchStepCompleted(entry.call.id, entry.call.name, entry.args, contentString, config);
-                    if (this.hookRegistry.hasHookFor('PermissionDenied', runId)) {
+            /**
+             * Side effects deferred from `blockEntry` until after any pending
+             * `interrupt()` resolves. Without deferral, a batch that mixes a
+             * `deny` decision with an `ask` decision would dispatch
+             * `ON_RUN_STEP_COMPLETED` for the denied tool on the FIRST node
+             * execution (before `interrupt()` throws), then dispatch the
+             * same event AGAIN on the resume re-execution — hosts would
+             * observe two completion events for one logical denial. By
+             * queueing the dispatch + PermissionDenied hook here and
+             * flushing after the interrupt block, we ensure each side effect
+             * fires exactly once: never on the first pass when interrupt
+             * throws (the flush is unreachable), once on resume / no-ask
+             * passes when control reaches the flush.
+             */
+            const deferredBlockedSideEffects = [];
+            const blockEntry = (entry, reason) => {
+                const contentString = `Blocked: ${reason}`;
+                messageByCallId.set(entry.call.id, new messages.ToolMessage({
+                    status: 'error',
+                    content: contentString,
+                    name: entry.call.name,
+                    tool_call_id: entry.call.id,
+                }));
+                postToolBatchEntryByCallId.set(entry.call.id, {
+                    toolName: entry.call.name,
+                    toolInput: entry.args,
+                    toolUseId: entry.call.id,
+                    stepId: entry.stepId,
+                    /**
+                     * Records the pre-invocation turn count — the same value the
+                     * executed path captures before incrementing `toolUsageCount`.
+                     * For a blocked tool the counter is never incremented (no
+                     * invocation happened), so this is always the count of prior
+                     * successful invocations of this tool name in earlier batches.
+                     * Surfaces in the `PostToolBatch` entry so batch hooks see
+                     * a uniform shape regardless of outcome.
+                     */
+                    turn: this.toolUsageCount.get(entry.call.name) ?? 0,
+                    status: 'error',
+                    error: contentString,
+                });
+                deferredBlockedSideEffects.push({
+                    callId: entry.call.id,
+                    toolName: entry.call.name,
+                    args: entry.args,
+                    contentString,
+                    reason,
+                });
+            };
+            const flushDeferredBlockedSideEffects = () => {
+                for (const item of deferredBlockedSideEffects) {
+                    this.dispatchStepCompleted(item.callId, item.toolName, item.args, item.contentString, config);
+                    if (hookRegistry.hasHookFor('PermissionDenied', runId)) {
                         executeHooks.executeHooks({
-                            registry: this.hookRegistry,
+                            registry: hookRegistry,
                             input: {
                                 hook_event_name: 'PermissionDenied',
                                 runId,
                                 threadId,
                                 agentId: this.agentId,
-                                toolName: entry.call.name,
-                                toolInput: entry.args,
-                                toolUseId: entry.call.id,
-                                reason,
+                                toolName: item.toolName,
+                                toolInput: item.args,
+                                toolUseId: item.callId,
+                                reason: item.reason,
                             },
                             sessionId: runId,
-                            matchQuery: entry.call.name,
+                            matchQuery: item.toolName,
                         }).catch(() => {
                             /* PermissionDenied is observational — swallow errors */
                         });
                     }
+                }
+                deferredBlockedSideEffects.length = 0;
+            };
+            /**
+             * Apply a hook-supplied or host-supplied input override to a pending
+             * entry, re-running the `{{tool<i>turn<n>}}` resolver so any new
+             * placeholders introduced by the override are substituted (and any
+             * formerly-unresolved refs cleared from the unresolved set).
+             *
+             * Mixed direct+event batches must use the pre-batch snapshot so a
+             * hook-introduced placeholder cannot accidentally resolve to a
+             * same-turn direct output that has just registered. Pure event
+             * batches don't have a snapshot and resolve against the live
+             * registry — safe because no event-side registrations have happened
+             * yet.
+             */
+            const applyInputOverride = (entry, nextArgs) => {
+                if (registry != null) {
+                    const view = preBatchSnapshot ?? {
+                        resolve: (args) => registry.resolve(registryRunId, args),
+                    };
+                    const { resolved, unresolved } = view.resolve(nextArgs);
+                    entry.args = resolved;
+                    if (entry.call.id != null) {
+                        if (unresolved.length > 0) {
+                            unresolvedByCallId.set(entry.call.id, unresolved);
+                        }
+                        else {
+                            unresolvedByCallId.delete(entry.call.id);
+                        }
+                    }
+                    return;
+                }
+                entry.args = nextArgs;
+            };
+            const askEntries = [];
+            for (let i = 0; i < preToolCalls.length; i++) {
+                const hookResult = preResults[i];
+                const entry = preToolCalls[i];
+                for (const ctx of hookResult.additionalContexts) {
+                    batchAdditionalContexts.push(ctx);
+                }
+                if (hookResult.decision === 'deny') {
+                    blockEntry(entry, hookResult.reason ?? 'Blocked by hook');
+                    continue;
+                }
+                if (hookResult.decision === 'ask') {
+                    /**
+                     * HITL is OFF by default — hosts must explicitly opt in via
+                     * `humanInTheLoop: { enabled: true }` to engage the
+                     * `interrupt()` path. When opted out (or omitted), `ask`
+                     * collapses into the pre-HITL fail-closed path: a blocked
+                     * tool with an error `ToolMessage`. The default stays
+                     * conservative until host UIs are ready to render
+                     * `tool_approval` interrupts; see `HumanInTheLoopConfig`
+                     * JSDoc for the full rationale and the migration plan.
+                     */
+                    if (this.humanInTheLoop?.enabled !== true) {
+                        blockEntry(entry, hookResult.reason ?? 'Blocked by hook');
+                        continue;
+                    }
+                    /**
+                     * Apply `updatedInput` BEFORE queuing into `askEntries` —
+                     * a hook is allowed to return both a sanitization rewrite
+                     * and an `ask` decision (e.g. one matcher redacts secrets,
+                     * another matcher requires approval). Without this, the
+                     * interrupt payload would surface the original args to the
+                     * reviewer AND the post-approve execution would run with
+                     * the original args, silently dropping the hook's rewrite.
+                     */
+                    if (hookResult.updatedInput != null) {
+                        applyInputOverride(entry, hookResult.updatedInput);
+                    }
+                    askEntries.push({
+                        entry,
+                        reason: hookResult.reason,
+                        allowedDecisions: hookResult.allowedDecisions,
+                    });
                     continue;
                 }
                 if (hookResult.updatedInput != null) {
+                    applyInputOverride(entry, hookResult.updatedInput);
+                }
+                approvedEntries.push(entry);
+            }
+            /**
+             * If any entries asked for approval, raise a single LangGraph
+             * `interrupt()` carrying every pending request together. The host
+             * pauses, gathers human input, and resumes the run with one
+             * decision per request. On resume LangGraph re-executes this node
+             * from the start; `interrupt()` then returns the resume value
+             * instead of throwing, so the loop above re-runs and the same
+             * `askEntries` list is rebuilt deterministically (assuming hooks
+             * are pure — see `humanInTheLoop` docs).
+             */
+            if (askEntries.length > 0) {
+                const payload = buildToolApprovalInterruptPayload(askEntries);
+                /**
+                 * `interrupt()` reads the current `RunnableConfig` from
+                 * AsyncLocalStorage, but our `RunnableCallable` sets
+                 * `trace = false` for ToolNode (intentional — avoids LangSmith
+                 * tracing per tool call). Without the trace path, the upstream
+                 * `runWithConfig` frame is never established, so we re-anchor
+                 * here using the node's own `config` — Pregel hands us a
+                 * config that already carries every checkpoint/scratchpad key
+                 * `interrupt()` needs to suspend and resume.
+                 */
+                const resumeValue = singletons.AsyncLocalStorageProviderSingleton.runWithConfig(config, () => langgraph.interrupt(payload));
+                const decisionByCallId = normalizeApprovalDecisions(askEntries.map(({ entry }) => entry.call.id), resumeValue);
+                for (const { entry, reason: askReason, allowedDecisions, } of askEntries) {
+                    const decision = decisionByCallId.get(entry.call.id) ?? {
+                        type: 'reject',
+                        reason: 'No decision provided for tool approval',
+                    };
+                    /**
+                     * Read `decision.type` through a widened view once: hosts
+                     * deserialize resume payloads from untyped JSON, so the
+                     * runtime value can be a typo, the wrong type, or missing
+                     * entirely. Both the `allowedDecisions` enforcement
+                     * immediately below and the unknown-type fallthrough at the
+                     * end of this loop body share this single read so the
+                     * fail-closed checks compare against the same source.
+                     */
+                    const declaredType = decision.type;
                     /**
-                     * Re-resolve after PreToolUse replaces the input: a hook may
-                     * introduce new `{{tool<i>turn<n>}}` placeholders (e.g., by
-                     * copying user-supplied text) that the pre-hook pass never
-                     * saw. Re-running the resolver on the hook-rewritten args
-                     * keeps substitution and the unresolved-refs record in sync
-                     * with what the tool will actually receive.
+                     * Enforce the per-tool `allowedDecisions` allowlist that the
+                     * `PreToolUse` hook surfaced in `review_configs`. The host
+                     * UI is supposed to honor this when collecting the user's
+                     * decision, but the wire is untrusted: a buggy or hostile
+                     * host could submit a decision type the policy explicitly
+                     * forbids (e.g. `'edit'` when the hook restricted to
+                     * `['approve', 'reject']`), bypassing argument-mutation /
+                     * response-substitution safeguards. Fail closed when the
+                     * declared type isn't in the allowlist.
                      */
-                    if (registry != null) {
+                    if (allowedDecisions != null &&
+                        (typeof declaredType !== 'string' ||
+                            !allowedDecisions.includes(declaredType))) {
+                        const offered = typeof declaredType === 'string' ? declaredType : '<missing>';
+                        blockEntry(entry, `Decision "${offered}" not in allowedDecisions [${allowedDecisions.join(', ')}] — failing closed`);
+                        continue;
+                    }
+                    if (decision.type === 'reject') {
+                        blockEntry(entry, decision.reason ?? askReason ?? 'Rejected by user');
+                        continue;
+                    }
+                    /**
+                     * `respond` short-circuits tool execution: the human supplies
+                     * the result the model should see in place of running the
+                     * tool. We emit a successful `ToolMessage` directly and skip
+                     * dispatch — no host event fires, no real tool side effect
+                     * occurs. Mirrors LangChain HITL middleware semantics.
+                     */
+                    if (decision.type === 'respond') {
                         /**
-                         * Mixed direct+event batches must use the pre-batch
-                         * snapshot so a hook-introduced placeholder cannot
-                         * accidentally resolve to a same-turn direct output that
-                         * has just registered. Pure event batches don't have a
-                         * snapshot and resolve against the live registry — safe
-                         * because no event-side registrations have happened yet.
+                         * Validate the wire shape before touching it: hosts
+                         * deserialize resume payloads from untyped JSON, so a
+                         * malformed `{ type: 'respond' }` (no `responseText`) or
+                         * `{ type: 'respond', responseText: 42 }` would crash
+                         * `truncateToolResultContent` (which calls
+                         * `content.length`) and turn a fail-closed approval path
+                         * into a hard run failure. Route bad shapes through
+                         * `blockEntry` like any other unusable decision.
                          */
-                        const view = preBatchSnapshot ?? {
-                            resolve: (args) => registry.resolve(registryRunId, args),
-                        };
-                        const { resolved, unresolved } = view.resolve(hookResult.updatedInput);
-                        entry.args = resolved;
-                        if (entry.call.id != null) {
-                            if (unresolved.length > 0) {
-                                unresolvedByCallId.set(entry.call.id, unresolved);
-                            }
-                            else {
-                                unresolvedByCallId.delete(entry.call.id);
-                            }
+                        const responseText = decision
+                            .responseText;
+                        if (typeof responseText !== 'string') {
+                            blockEntry(entry, `Decision "respond" missing string responseText (got ${describeOfferedShape(responseText)}) — failing closed`);
+                            continue;
                         }
+                        /**
+                         * Truncate the human-supplied text just like the success
+                         * path does for real tool output. Without this, a user
+                         * pasting a large document as a manual response bypasses
+                         * `maxToolResultChars` and can blow past the model's
+                         * context window. The PostToolBatch entry surfaces the
+                         * truncated text too so batch hooks see what the model
+                         * will actually see.
+                         */
+                        const truncatedResponse = truncation.truncateToolResultContent(responseText, this.maxToolResultChars);
+                        messageByCallId.set(entry.call.id, new messages.ToolMessage({
+                            status: 'success',
+                            content: truncatedResponse,
+                            name: entry.call.name,
+                            tool_call_id: entry.call.id,
+                        }));
+                        postToolBatchEntryByCallId.set(entry.call.id, {
+                            toolName: entry.call.name,
+                            toolInput: entry.args,
+                            toolUseId: entry.call.id,
+                            stepId: entry.stepId,
+                            turn: this.toolUsageCount.get(entry.call.name) ?? 0,
+                            status: 'success',
+                            toolOutput: truncatedResponse,
+                        });
+                        /**
+                         * Safe to dispatch immediately — unlike `blockEntry` which
+                         * defers, `respond` only executes inside the decision-
+                         * processing loop, which is reachable only AFTER
+                         * `interrupt()` has returned (the resume pass). There is
+                         * no risk of being rolled back by a subsequent throw, so
+                         * no risk of a duplicate `ON_RUN_STEP_COMPLETED` event.
+                         */
+                        this.dispatchStepCompleted(entry.call.id, entry.call.name, entry.args, truncatedResponse, config);
+                        continue;
                     }
-                    else {
-                        entry.args = hookResult.updatedInput;
+                    if (decision.type === 'edit') {
+                        /**
+                         * Validate the wire shape before touching it: hosts
+                         * deserialize resume payloads from untyped JSON, so a
+                         * malformed `{ type: 'edit' }` (no `updatedInput`),
+                         * `{ type: 'edit', updatedInput: 'string' }` (non-object),
+                         * or `{ type: 'edit', updatedInput: [...] }` (array, not a
+                         * plain object) would feed garbage into
+                         * `applyInputOverride` and silently approve a tool with
+                         * undefined / wrong-shape args. Same trust boundary as
+                         * the `respond` validation above — fail closed via
+                         * `blockEntry` with a diagnostic.
+                         */
+                        const updatedInput = decision
+                            .updatedInput;
+                        if (updatedInput === null ||
+                            typeof updatedInput !== 'object' ||
+                            Array.isArray(updatedInput)) {
+                            blockEntry(entry, `Decision "edit" missing object updatedInput (got ${describeOfferedShape(updatedInput)}) — failing closed`);
+                            continue;
+                        }
+                        applyInputOverride(entry, updatedInput);
+                        approvedEntries.push(entry);
+                        continue;
                     }
+                    /**
+                     * Defensive type widening: hosts deserialize resume payloads
+                     * from untyped JSON, so the `decision.type` value at runtime
+                     * is whatever string the wire sent — not necessarily one of
+                     * the four union variants TS knows about. We compare against
+                     * the literal `'approve'` through the widened `declaredType`
+                     * captured at the top of this iteration, so a typo or schema
+                     * drift (`'aproved'`, `null`, `undefined`) hits the fail-
+                     * closed branch below instead of silently approving the
+                     * tool. Without this widening, TS narrows the union after
+                     * the three earlier branches and treats `=== 'approve'` as
+                     * trivially true.
+                     */
+                    if (declaredType === 'approve') {
+                        approvedEntries.push(entry);
+                        continue;
+                    }
+                    /**
+                     * Unknown / missing decision type — fail closed. The whole
+                     * point of an approval gate is that "no decision" or
+                     * "garbled decision" deny by default.
+                     */
+                    const unknownType = typeof declaredType === 'string' ? declaredType : '<missing>';
+                    blockEntry(entry, `Unknown approval decision type "${unknownType}" — failing closed`);
                 }
-                approvedEntries.push(entry);
             }
+            /**
+             * Flush deferred denial side effects exactly once. On the FIRST
+             * pass through a batch that contains an `ask`, `interrupt()`
+             * threw above and we never reach this line — so no
+             * `ON_RUN_STEP_COMPLETED` / `PermissionDenied` events fire
+             * for blocked tools yet. On resume the node re-executes from
+             * scratch, `blockEntry` re-queues the same entries, and the
+             * flush below dispatches them once. For batches without any
+             * `ask` (deny-only or empty), the flush still runs here and
+             * dispatches in the same relative position as the pre-deferral
+             * code did (after hook processing, before tool execution).
+             */
+            flushDeferredBlockedSideEffects();
         }
         else {
             approvedEntries.push(...preToolCalls);
@@ -830,6 +1216,15 @@ class ToolNode extends run.RunnableCallable {
                 const toolName = request?.name ?? 'unknown';
                 let contentString;
                 let toolMessage;
+                /**
+                 * Tracks the post-PostToolUse-hook output so the
+                 * `PostToolBatch` entry below sees the final transformed value
+                 * even when a hook replaced the original via `updatedOutput`.
+                 * Lives at the loop-iteration scope so the success branch can
+                 * mutate it; the error branch leaves it unset (and the batch
+                 * entry uses `error` instead of `toolOutput` in that case).
+                 */
+                let finalToolOutput = result.content;
                 if (result.status === 'error') {
                     contentString = `Error: ${result.errorMessage ?? 'Unknown error'}\n Please fix your mistakes.`;
                     /**
@@ -853,7 +1248,7 @@ class ToolNode extends run.RunnableCallable {
                         }),
                     });
                     if (hasFailureHook) {
-                        await executeHooks.executeHooks({
+                        const failureHookResult = await executeHooks.executeHooks({
                             registry: this.hookRegistry,
                             input: {
                                 hook_event_name: 'PostToolUseFailure',
@@ -869,9 +1264,21 @@ class ToolNode extends run.RunnableCallable {
                             },
                             sessionId: runId,
                             matchQuery: toolName,
-                        }).catch(() => {
-                            /* PostToolUseFailure is observational — swallow errors */
-                        });
+                        }).catch(() => undefined);
+                        /**
+                         * Collect `additionalContext` from failure hooks too. Without
+                         * this, recovery guidance returned on tool errors (e.g.
+                         * "if this tool errors with X, suggest Y to the user") is
+                         * silently dropped even though the API surface advertises
+                         * `additionalContext` for this event. PostToolUseFailure
+                         * remains observational for errors thrown by the hook
+                         * itself, but a successfully-returned result is honored.
+                         */
+                        if (failureHookResult != null) {
+                            for (const ctx of failureHookResult.additionalContexts) {
+                                batchAdditionalContexts.push(ctx);
+                            }
+                        }
                     }
                 }
                 else {
@@ -897,12 +1304,18 @@ class ToolNode extends run.RunnableCallable {
                             sessionId: runId,
                             matchQuery: toolName,
                         }).catch(() => undefined);
+                        if (hookResult != null) {
+                            for (const ctx of hookResult.additionalContexts) {
+                                batchAdditionalContexts.push(ctx);
+                            }
+                        }
                         if (hookResult?.updatedOutput != null) {
                             const replaced = typeof hookResult.updatedOutput === 'string'
                                 ? hookResult.updatedOutput
                                 : JSON.stringify(hookResult.updatedOutput);
                             registryRaw = replaced;
                             contentString = truncation.truncateToolResultContent(replaced, this.maxToolResultChars);
+                            finalToolOutput = hookResult.updatedOutput;
                         }
                     }
                     const batchIndex = batchIndexByCallId.get(result.toolCallId);
@@ -925,14 +1338,98 @@ class ToolNode extends run.RunnableCallable {
                     });
                 }
                 this.dispatchStepCompleted(result.toolCallId, toolName, request?.args ?? {}, contentString, config, request?.turn);
+                postToolBatchEntryByCallId.set(result.toolCallId, {
+                    toolName,
+                    toolInput: request?.args ?? {},
+                    toolUseId: result.toolCallId,
+                    stepId: request?.stepId,
+                    turn: request?.turn,
+                    status: result.status === 'error' ? 'error' : 'success',
+                    ...(result.status === 'error'
+                        ? { error: result.errorMessage ?? 'Unknown error' }
+                        : { toolOutput: finalToolOutput }),
+                });
                 messageByCallId.set(result.toolCallId, toolMessage);
             }
         }
         const toolMessages = toolCalls
             .map((call) => messageByCallId.get(call.id))
             .filter((m) => m != null);
+        await this.dispatchPostToolBatchAndInjectContext({
+            toolCalls,
+            entriesByCallId: postToolBatchEntryByCallId,
+            batchAdditionalContexts,
+            injected,
+            runId,
+            threadId,
+        });
         return { toolMessages, injected };
     }
+    /**
+     * Fires the `PostToolBatch` hook (if registered) and appends the
+     * accumulated batch-level `additionalContext` strings to `injected`
+     * as a single `HumanMessage`. Entries are materialized in the
+     * original `toolCalls` order so hooks correlating outcomes by
+     * position (as the type docs promise) see exactly the sequence
+     * the model emitted, regardless of when each individual outcome
+     * was recorded into the map (deny synchronous, approved
+     * post-execution, respond on resume).
+     *
+     * The PostToolBatch hook's `additionalContexts` flow into the same
+     * batch accumulator per-tool hooks already use, so a single
+     * batch-level convention message can be injected through one path.
+     *
+     * Mutates `batchAdditionalContexts` (push from batch hook) and
+     * `injected` (push the consolidated HumanMessage). The caller owns
+     * those arrays and consumes them right after this returns.
+     */
+    async dispatchPostToolBatchAndInjectContext(args) {
+        const { toolCalls, entriesByCallId, batchAdditionalContexts, injected, runId, threadId, } = args;
+        const orderedBatchEntries = [];
+        for (const call of toolCalls) {
+            const callId = call.id;
+            if (callId == null) {
+                continue;
+            }
+            const entry = entriesByCallId.get(callId);
+            if (entry != null) {
+                orderedBatchEntries.push(entry);
+            }
+        }
+        if (this.hookRegistry?.hasHookFor('PostToolBatch', runId) === true &&
+            orderedBatchEntries.length > 0) {
+            const batchHookResult = await executeHooks.executeHooks({
+                registry: this.hookRegistry,
+                input: {
+                    hook_event_name: 'PostToolBatch',
+                    runId,
+                    threadId,
+                    agentId: this.agentId,
+                    entries: orderedBatchEntries,
+                },
+                sessionId: runId,
+            }).catch(() => undefined);
+            if (batchHookResult != null) {
+                for (const ctx of batchHookResult.additionalContexts) {
+                    batchAdditionalContexts.push(ctx);
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        if (batchAdditionalContexts.length > 0) {
+            /**
+             * `HumanMessage` carrying a metadata `role: 'system'` marker —
+             * see `convertInjectedMessages` for the wider rationale. Anthropic
+             * and Google reject mid-conversation `SystemMessage`s, so we use
+             * a user-role message and surface the system intent through
+             * `additional_kwargs` for hosts inspecting state. The model sees
+             * a user message; `role` is metadata only.
+             */
+            injected.push(new messages.HumanMessage({
+                content: batchAdditionalContexts.join('\n\n'),
+                additional_kwargs: { role: 'system', source: 'hook' },
+            }));
+        }
+    }
     dispatchStepCompleted(toolCallId, toolName, args, output, config, turn) {
         const stepId = this.toolCallStepIds?.get(toolCallId) ?? '';
         if (!stepId) {
@@ -974,7 +1471,10 @@ class ToolNode extends run.RunnableCallable {
                 additional_kwargs.source = msg.source;
             if (msg.skillName != null)
                 additional_kwargs.skillName = msg.skillName;
-            converted.push(new messages.HumanMessage({ content: msg.content, additional_kwargs }));
+            converted.push(new messages.HumanMessage({
+                content: langchain.toLangChainContent(msg.content),
+                additional_kwargs,
+            }));
         }
         return converted;
     }