@lerianstudio/matcher-mcp 1.3.0 → 1.4.0-beta.2

package/dist/copilot/tools.js

@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
+// Read-only tool surface over the matcher operation index.
+//
+// The copilot agent loop offers the model a list of matcher GET operations as
+// JSON-Schema function defs (`buildReadToolDefs`) and — in task 1.2.2 —
+// executes one by operationId through the capability layer. The GET filter is
+// the safe read gate: a mutation can never enter the tool list, so the agent is
+// structurally read-only in Phase 1. POST-shaped reads (e.g. simulateFeeSchedule)
+// are deliberately excluded here and deferred to Phase 4's allow-list.
+//
+// The index is parsed once and memoized (`getIndex`), mirroring server.ts's
+// boot-index memo so the tool-list builder and the executor share one parse and
+// importing this module never touches the filesystem.
+import { requireMatcherClient } from '../auth/request-token.js';
+import { loadSpec } from '../spec/load.js';
+import { InvokeError, Invoker } from '../tools/generic/invoke.js';
+import { isMatcherApiError } from '../tools/tool-error.js';
+/** The boot operation index, parsed once and memoized. Lazy so importing this
+ * module reads no files; the spec is immutable boot data. */
+let indexCache;
+export function getIndex() {
+    if (indexCache === undefined) {
+        indexCache = loadSpec().index;
+    }
+    return indexCache;
+}
+/**
+ * The read + write tool-def lists derived from an operation index, memoized by
+ * the index's IDENTITY. `getIndex()` returns one stable object, so the production
+ * path is built once; an injected index (tests) is memoized under its own
+ * identity, so it never returns another index's stale lists. The def-array
+ * synthesis is pure over the immutable index, so caching it is sound.
+ */
+const toolDefsCache = new WeakMap();
+export function getToolDefs(index) {
+    let cached = toolDefsCache.get(index);
+    if (cached === undefined) {
+        cached = { read: buildReadToolDefs(index), write: buildWriteToolDefs(index) };
+        toolDefsCache.set(index, cached);
+    }
+    return cached;
+}
+/**
+ * The config write surface the copilot may PROPOSE (never execute). Every entry
+ * is a non-GET operation over one of the seven configuration resource families —
+ * match rules, reconciliation contexts, fee schedules, fee rules, sources, field
+ * maps, and source bindings — across the create/update/delete/archive/restore/
+ * reorder/clone verbs the spec declares. This set is the write-barrier's positive
+ * gate: an operationId absent from it produces NO write tool def
+ * (`buildWriteToolDefs`) and the agent loop never routes a call to the proposal
+ * path — structurally unproposable, mirroring how a non-GET op is unreadable.
+ * Exception, match-run, ingestion, discovery, and governance mutations are
+ * deliberately excluded — scheduling and the simulate/preview POST-shaped
+ * "reads" too (they mutate nothing, so they are neither read nor proposed here).
+ */
+export const WRITE_ALLOWLIST = new Set([
+    // match rules
+    'createMatchRule',
+    'updateMatchRule',
+    'deleteMatchRule',
+    'reorderMatchRules',
+    // reconciliation contexts
+    'createContext',
+    'updateContext',
+    'archiveContext',
+    'restoreContext',
+    'cloneContext',
+    // fee schedules
+    'createFeeSchedule',
+    'updateFeeSchedule',
+    'deleteFeeSchedule',
+    // fee rules
+    'createFeeRule',
+    'updateFeeRule',
+    'deleteFeeRule',
+    // sources
+    'createSource',
+    'updateSource',
+    'archiveSource',
+    'restoreSource',
+    // field maps
+    'createFieldMap',
+    'updateFieldMap',
+    'deleteFieldMap',
+    // source bindings
+    'createSourceBinding',
+    'updateSourceBinding',
+    'deleteSourceBinding',
+]);
+/**
+ * Synthesize the JSON Schema (2020-12) an operation's tool def advertises: a
+ * `pathParams` object (each name → `{type:'string'}`, all required), a `query`
+ * object (from the op's query params, `required` honored), and — when
+ * `includeBody` is set and the op declares a request body — a `body` property
+ * carrying the op's dereferenced request-body schema verbatim (required, so the
+ * model supplies a complete write). Containers are omitted when the op has none,
+ * so a param-less op advertises an empty object schema. Reads pass
+ * `includeBody: false` (GET carries no body); writes pass `true`.
+ */
+function inputSchemaFor(op, includeBody = false) {
+    const properties = {};
+    const required = [];
+    if (op.pathParams.length > 0) {
+        const props = {};
+        for (const name of op.pathParams) {
+            props[name] = { type: 'string' };
+        }
+        properties.pathParams = {
+            type: 'object',
+            properties: props,
+            required: [...op.pathParams],
+        };
+        required.push('pathParams');
+    }
+    const queryEntries = Object.entries(op.queryParams);
+    if (queryEntries.length > 0) {
+        const props = {};
+        const requiredQuery = [];
+        for (const [name, param] of queryEntries) {
+            props[name] = { type: param.type };
+            if (param.required) {
+                requiredQuery.push(name);
+            }
+        }
+        properties.query = {
+            type: 'object',
+            properties: props,
+            ...(requiredQuery.length > 0 ? { required: requiredQuery } : {}),
+        };
+        if (requiredQuery.length > 0) {
+            required.push('query');
+        }
+    }
+    if (includeBody && op.requestBodySchema !== undefined) {
+        properties.body = op.requestBodySchema;
+        required.push('body');
+    }
+    return {
+        type: 'object',
+        properties,
+        ...(required.length > 0 ? { required } : {}),
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * Build the read-only tool list: one `LLMToolDef` per GET operation in the
+ * index, each with a synthesized JSON-Schema input. The GET filter is the read
+ * gate — no mutating operation can appear. Description is the op summary,
+ * falling back to `METHOD path` when the spec omits one.
+ */
+export function buildReadToolDefs(index) {
+    const defs = [];
+    for (const op of index.operations.values()) {
+        if (op.method !== 'GET') {
+            continue;
+        }
+        defs.push({
+            name: op.operationId,
+            description: op.summary || `${op.method} ${op.path}`,
+            inputSchema: inputSchemaFor(op),
+        });
+    }
+    return defs;
+}
+/**
+ * Build the write tool list: one `LLMToolDef` per `WRITE_ALLOWLIST` operation
+ * present in the index, each advertising its request body (plus path/query
+ * params) so the model can PROPOSE a complete, well-shaped write. This set is
+ * disjoint from `buildReadToolDefs` by construction — the allow-list holds only
+ * non-GET config ops — so the agent loop routes a call by allow-list membership:
+ * a member is proposed (never executed), everything else takes the read path. An
+ * operationId absent from the allow-list yields no def and is unproposable.
+ */
+export function buildWriteToolDefs(index) {
+    const defs = [];
+    for (const op of index.operations.values()) {
+        if (!WRITE_ALLOWLIST.has(op.operationId)) {
+            continue;
+        }
+        defs.push({
+            name: op.operationId,
+            description: op.summary || `${op.method} ${op.path}`,
+            inputSchema: inputSchemaFor(op, true),
+        });
+    }
+    return defs;
+}
+/**
+ * Execute one model-requested read tool through the existing capability layer
+ * (`Invoker.assemble` + the token-bound `MatcherClient`) and return a
+ * `LLMToolResult` the agent loop feeds back into the next turn.
+ *
+ * The op is looked up and GET-gated first (defense in depth — the tool list is
+ * already GET-only), so a mutating operationId is refused before any client is
+ * built and can never issue a request. The model's `input` carries `pathParams`
+ * and `query` per the schema `buildReadToolDefs` advertises; they are forwarded
+ * verbatim to `Invoker.assemble`, which owns path substitution and the tenant
+ * guardrail (a tenant_id/tenantId/tenant key is rejected there — the third rail
+ * stays enforced, never stripped-and-hidden). This function NEVER throws: every
+ * path — success, pre-flight InvokeError, matcher RFC 9457 problem, or an
+ * unexpected fault — resolves to a result so the loop always has one per call.
+ * The bearer token is never logged and never placed in a returned message.
+ *
+ * `clientFor` is injectable for tests (mirrors `dispatch`'s param); production
+ * passes nothing and gets the request-scoped, fail-closed `requireMatcherClient`.
+ */
+export async function executeReadTool(call, index, clientFor = requireMatcherClient) {
+    const op = index.operations.get(call.name);
+    if (op === undefined || op.method !== 'GET') {
+        return { id: call.id, content: 'operation not available', isError: true };
+    }
+    try {
+        const pathParams = call.input.pathParams;
+        const query = call.input.query;
+        // ponytail: one Invoker per call (a fresh Ajv2020 that a GET never compiles);
+        // negligible next to the network round-trip. Memoize by index if tool-call
+        // volume ever dominates.
+        const request = new Invoker(index).assemble({
+            operationId: call.name,
+            ...(pathParams !== undefined ? { pathParams } : {}),
+            ...(query !== undefined ? { query } : {}),
+        });
+        const data = await clientFor().request(request);
+        return { id: call.id, content: JSON.stringify(data ?? null) };
+    }
+    catch (err) {
+        // Pre-flight failure (unknown op, missing path param, tenant guardrail, …).
+        if (err instanceof InvokeError) {
+            return { id: call.id, content: err.message, isError: true };
+        }
+        // Matcher RFC 9457 problem — safe to show the model (never token-bearing).
+        if (isMatcherApiError(err)) {
+            return {
+                id: call.id,
+                content: JSON.stringify({ status: err.status, ...err.problem }),
+                isError: true,
+            };
+        }
+        // Anything unexpected: a fixed, information-free message (no leak).
+        return { id: call.id, content: 'tool execution failed', isError: true };
+    }
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=tools.js.map

package/dist/copilot/tools.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/copilot/turns-handler.js

@@ -0,0 +1,322 @@
+// The `POST /agent/turns` request handler — the copilot's HTTP entry point.
+//
+// It streams one agent turn over Server-Sent Events: parse + validate the
+// stateless `AgentTurnRequest`, resolve the config-selected provider, build the
+// tool list (read ops executed inline + allow-listed write ops the loop only
+// PROPOSES) + matcher system prompt, fail fast on a missing bearer AND probe
+// matcher's auth (one cheap authenticated GET) before constructing any paid
+// provider, then drive the agent loop, forwarding text/tool/proposal/done to the
+// SSE sink. Every
+// named failure (bad body, over-cap body, unconfigured provider, missing bearer,
+// unexpected fault) degrades to a single SSE `error` + `done` — the browser reads
+// SSE, so there is no bare HTTP status to react to once the stream may have begun.
+//
+// Security: the bearer token is resolved from the request-scoped ALS store by
+// `requireMatcherClient` (seeded at the HTTP boundary) and is never read, logged,
+// or emitted here. No tenant identifier is accepted or forwarded — the tenant is
+// implicit in the relayed JWT (the Invoker guardrail enforces it downstream).
+import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';
+import { getRequestBearerToken, getRequestTenantId, requireMatcherClient, UnauthenticatedError, } from '../auth/request-token.js';
+import { MatcherApiError } from '../matcher/client.js';
+import { BodyTooLargeError, readBody } from '../transport/body-limit.js';
+import { runAgentTurn } from './agent.js';
+import { CopilotUnconfiguredError, getProvider } from './provider-factory.js';
+import { RateLimiter } from './rate-limit.js';
+import { createSseSink } from './sse.js';
+import { buildSystemPrompt } from './system-prompt.js';
+import { resolveCopilotConfig } from './tenant-config.js';
+import { getIndex, getToolDefs } from './tools.js';
+/**
+ * Process-lifetime rate limiter shared across turns. Buckets are keyed on the
+ * key-only tenant id; a turn with no decodable tenant shares one bucket under
+ * RATE_LIMIT_ANON_KEY (the BYOC single-tenant / spoofed-token case — bounds a
+ * runaway client, not a determined adversary). Per-process → effective cluster
+ * limit is this × replica count.
+ */
+const turnRateLimiter = new RateLimiter();
+/** Shared bucket key for turns whose relayed token carries no decodable tenant. */
+const RATE_LIMIT_ANON_KEY = '__no_tenant__';
+/**
+ * Auth-probe decision cache: sha256(bearer) → epoch-ms expiry of a matcher-verified
+ * "authenticated" verdict. A short TTL lets one probe cover a burst of turns from
+ * the same caller instead of one probe per turn. Only SUCCESS is cached — a token
+ * matcher rejects re-probes each turn (a cheap Authorize reject; the attacker gains
+ * nothing and legit token refresh is never locked out). The raw token is NEVER
+ * stored — only its hash keys the map.
+ *
+ * Bounded at PROBE_CACHE_MAX_ENTRIES: on an insert that finds the map at/over the
+ * cap, expired entries are swept first, so a stream of distinct short-lived tokens
+ * cannot grow the map for the process lifetime. Exported for the bound test only.
+ */
+const PROBE_CACHE_TTL_MS = 5_000;
+export const PROBE_CACHE_MAX_ENTRIES = 10_000;
+export const probeOkCache = new Map();
+/**
+ * The cheapest Bearer-authenticated matcher GET. Matcher's `Authorize` middleware
+ * gates `/v1/contexts`, so a forged/expired token is rejected (401/403) here —
+ * before any paid LLM call. `limit=1` bounds the matcher-side query; the response
+ * body is discarded (only the auth verdict matters).
+ */
+const AUTH_PROBE_REQUEST = {
+    method: 'GET',
+    path: '/v1/contexts',
+    query: { limit: 1 },
+};
+/** Operator remediation shown when matcher REJECTS the relayed token (401/403). */
+const PROBE_REJECTED_REMEDIATION = 'The matcher credential was rejected. Check that your token is valid and has ' +
+    'not expired, then retry. This server relays your credential verbatim and holds ' +
+    'none of its own.';
+/**
+ * Verify the relayed bearer against matcher BEFORE any paid provider call: a
+ * JWT-shaped but unauthorized token must not be able to spend LLM budget. Issues
+ * ONE authenticated GET (matcher's `Authorize` gates it) unless a fresh cached
+ * verdict exists. Returns `true` when matcher accepts the token, `false` when it
+ * rejects it (401/403). Any OTHER matcher failure (5xx, transport) is rethrown to
+ * the caller's last-resort guard — we fail closed rather than burn budget against
+ * an unverifiable backend. The raw token is never stored or logged; only its
+ * sha256 hash keys the cache.
+ */
+async function probeMatcherAuth(client) {
+    const token = getRequestBearerToken();
+    const cacheKey = token !== undefined
+        ? createHash('sha256').update(token).digest('hex')
+        : undefined;
+    const now = Date.now();
+    if (cacheKey !== undefined && (probeOkCache.get(cacheKey) ?? 0) > now) {
+        return true; // fresh authenticated verdict — skip the probe
+    }
+    try {
+        await client.request(AUTH_PROBE_REQUEST);
+    }
+    catch (err) {
+        if (err instanceof MatcherApiError &&
+            (err.status === 401 || err.status === 403)) {
+            return false;
+        }
+        throw err;
+    }
+    if (cacheKey !== undefined) {
+        // ponytail: sweep-expired-on-insert-past-cap. The O(n) sweep runs only when the
+        // map is at the cap; with a 5s TTL, >10k live entries within that window is not
+        // a real load, so no LRU. If it ever is, evict oldest-by-expiry here.
+        if (probeOkCache.size >= PROBE_CACHE_MAX_ENTRIES) {
+            for (const [key, expiry] of probeOkCache) {
+                if (expiry <= now) {
+                    probeOkCache.delete(key);
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        probeOkCache.set(cacheKey, now + PROBE_CACHE_TTL_MS);
+    }
+    return true;
+}
+/**
+ * The messages the agent loop receives. Browser-supplied `screenContext` is
+ * injected as a synthetic FIRST user message — the SAME (untrusted) trust tier as
+ * the operator's own input — rather than folded into the system prompt, so a
+ * crafted route/summary can never reach the higher-trust system tier. The label
+ * is a plain statement of fact, not an instruction.
+ */
+function buildTurnMessages(request) {
+    const { screenContext } = request;
+    if (screenContext === undefined) {
+        return request.messages;
+    }
+    const parts = [`route ${screenContext.route}`];
+    if (screenContext.contextId !== undefined) {
+        parts.push(`reconciliation context ${screenContext.contextId}`);
+    }
+    if (screenContext.summary !== undefined) {
+        parts.push(screenContext.summary);
+    }
+    return [
+        {
+            role: 'user',
+            content: `[screen context] The operator is currently viewing: ${parts.join(' — ')}.`,
+        },
+        ...request.messages,
+    ];
+}
+/**
+ * Validate an unknown parsed body as an `AgentTurnRequest`. Returns the typed
+ * request on success, or `undefined` when the shape is wrong (non-empty
+ * `messages` of `{role,content}` with role in {user,assistant}). A malformed
+ * `screenContext` is dropped rather than rejecting the turn.
+ */
+function parseAgentTurnRequest(body) {
+    if (typeof body !== 'object' || body === null) {
+        return undefined;
+    }
+    const record = body;
+    const { messages } = record;
+    if (!Array.isArray(messages) || messages.length === 0) {
+        return undefined;
+    }
+    for (const message of messages) {
+        if (typeof message !== 'object' || message === null) {
+            return undefined;
+        }
+        const { role, content } = message;
+        if (role !== 'user' && role !== 'assistant') {
+            return undefined;
+        }
+        if (typeof content !== 'string') {
+            return undefined;
+        }
+    }
+    const screenContext = parseScreenContext(record.screenContext);
+    return {
+        messages: messages,
+        ...(screenContext !== undefined ? { screenContext } : {}),
+    };
+}
+/** Parse an optional `screenContext`; drops it unless it carries a string `route`. */
+function parseScreenContext(raw) {
+    if (typeof raw !== 'object' || raw === null) {
+        return undefined;
+    }
+    const record = raw;
+    if (typeof record.route !== 'string') {
+        return undefined;
+    }
+    return {
+        route: record.route,
+        ...(typeof record.contextId === 'string' ? { contextId: record.contextId } : {}),
+        ...(typeof record.summary === 'string' ? { summary: record.summary } : {}),
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * Handle one `POST /agent/turns` request, streaming the turn over SSE. Resolves
+ * once the turn is fully written (a terminal `done` has been emitted). Does not
+ * rethrow: any unexpected fault is caught and surfaced as a single `error`+`done`
+ * so the boundary never has to answer a half-streamed response.
+ */
+export async function handleAgentTurn(config, req, res, deps = {}) {
+    const sink = createSseSink(res);
+    try {
+        // Fail fast on a missing/blank bearer before any body parsing or provider
+        // construction — the cheapest gate first, and so an unauthenticated probe
+        // learns nothing about the server's config (e.g. copilot_unconfigured). The
+        // client built here is REUSED for the pre-provider auth probe below (the read
+        // tools still resolve their own per-call client from the same request store).
+        let matcherClient;
+        try {
+            matcherClient = (deps.requireClient ??
+                (() => requireMatcherClient(undefined, config)))();
+        }
+        catch (err) {
+            if (err instanceof UnauthenticatedError) {
+                sink.error('unauthenticated', err.message);
+                sink.done('end');
+                return;
+            }
+            throw err;
+        }
+        const contentType = (req.headers['content-type'] ?? '').toLowerCase();
+        if (!contentType.includes('application/json')) {
+            sink.error('bad_request', 'content-type must be application/json');
+            sink.done('end');
+            return;
+        }
+        let body;
+        try {
+            const raw = await readBody(req, config.maxBodyBytes);
+            body = raw.length > 0 ? JSON.parse(raw) : undefined;
+        }
+        catch (err) {
+            if (err instanceof BodyTooLargeError) {
+                sink.error('payload_too_large', 'request body is too large');
+                sink.done('end');
+                return;
+            }
+            // JSON parse failure or a read error — a client fault, no internal detail.
+            sink.error('bad_request', 'request body is not valid JSON');
+            sink.done('end');
+            return;
+        }
+        const request = parseAgentTurnRequest(body);
+        if (request === undefined) {
+            sink.error('bad_request', 'messages must be a non-empty array of {role,content}, role one of user|assistant');
+            sink.done('end');
+            return;
+        }
+        // Probe matcher's `Authorize` with the relayed token BEFORE any tenant-derived
+        // work AND before constructing the paid provider (M1): a JWT-shaped-but-
+        // unauthorized token is rejected here and never reaches a billable LLM call —
+        // and, crucially, never selects a config slice or consumes a rate bucket, so a
+        // forged `tenant_id` cannot target a victim tenant's quota. Runs right after the
+        // body parse; probe volume is floored by the no-bearer reject in
+        // `requireMatcherClient`. A fresh cached verdict (keyed by token hash) skips the
+        // probe entirely.
+        if (!(await probeMatcherAuth(matcherClient))) {
+            sink.error('unauthenticated', PROBE_REJECTED_REMEDIATION);
+            sink.done('end');
+            return;
+        }
+        // Resolve the per-tenant config slice from the key-only tenant id decoded off
+        // the relayed JWT (getRequestTenantId). The token is already matcher-verified by
+        // the probe above, so a forged `tenant_id` can no longer reach this point to
+        // select a slice or key a bucket. A tenant with an override runs its own
+        // provider/model/key/limits; a tenant with no entry — or no decodable tenant —
+        // falls back to the global env config unchanged. The tenant is NEVER used for
+        // authorization here (matcher owns that via the relayed token); it only selects
+        // the config slice this turn uses and keys the rate bucket.
+        const tenantId = getRequestTenantId();
+        const resolvedConfig = resolveCopilotConfig(config, tenantId);
+        // Rate-limit gate: keyed on the now-verified tenant, applied before any provider
+        // spin-up so a rejected caller never triggers an LLM call. On limit → a single
+        // `rate_limited` SSE error + terminal done (a non-calm code → renders as
+        // TurnError in the UI, no UI change required). Sits after the auth probe, so a
+        // forged token is rejected as `unauthenticated` before it can touch a bucket.
+        const decision = (deps.rateLimiter ?? turnRateLimiter).check(tenantId ?? RATE_LIMIT_ANON_KEY, resolvedConfig.copilotRateLimitPerMin, resolvedConfig.copilotRateLimitBurst);
+        if (!decision.allowed) {
+            sink.error('rate_limited', `too many copilot requests; retry in ${decision.retryAfterSeconds}s`);
+            sink.done('end');
+            return;
+        }
+        let provider;
+        try {
+            provider = (deps.resolveProvider ?? getProvider)(resolvedConfig);
+        }
+        catch (err) {
+            if (err instanceof CopilotUnconfiguredError) {
+                sink.error('copilot_unconfigured', 'the copilot is not configured on this server');
+                sink.done('end');
+                return;
+            }
+            throw err;
+        }
+        const index = deps.index ?? getIndex();
+        // Reads execute inline; allow-listed writes are PROPOSED (never executed) by
+        // the agent loop's write-barrier. Both classes must be advertised or the model
+        // can never emit a write call and the proposal path is dead. The def lists are
+        // memoized by index identity (getToolDefs), so this is a cache hit per turn.
+        const { read, write } = getToolDefs(index);
+        await (deps.runTurn ?? runAgentTurn)({
+            provider,
+            tools: [...read, ...write],
+            index,
+            system: buildSystemPrompt(),
+            messages: buildTurnMessages(request),
+            sink,
+            maxIterations: resolvedConfig.copilotMaxToolIterations,
+            maxTurnTokens: resolvedConfig.copilotMaxTurnTokens,
+            // Telemetry labels (4.2.1): the instrumentation lives in runAgentTurn but is
+            // inert unless fed the resolved provider id, model, and key-only tenant.
+            providerName: resolvedConfig.copilotProvider,
+            ...(resolvedConfig.copilotModel !== undefined
+                ? { model: resolvedConfig.copilotModel }
+                : {}),
+            ...(tenantId !== undefined ? { tenant: tenantId } : {}),
+        });
+    }
+    catch (err) {
+        // Last-resort guard: a single safe SSE error + done, never a token or stack.
+        sink.error('internal', 'the copilot encountered an internal error');
+        sink.done('end');
+        // Log only the message string, never the raw error object — a provider-SDK
+        // error can carry request context (headers, config) we must not log wholesale.
+        console.error('matcher-mcp agent turn failed:', err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err));
+    }
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=turns-handler.js.map

package/dist/copilot/turns-handler.js.map

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