@lenne.tech/nest-server 11.34.1 → 11.35.1

package/src/core/modules/file/core-file-access-audit.initializer.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+import { Injectable, Logger, OnApplicationBootstrap, Optional } from '@nestjs/common';
+import { DiscoveryService } from '@nestjs/core';
+
+import { ConfigService } from '../../common/services/config.service';
+import { CoreFileController } from './core-file.controller';
+import { CoreFileResolver } from './core-file.resolver';
+import { CoreFileService } from './core-file.service';
+import {
+  FILE_ROLE_MEMBERS,
+  FileEndpointClassName,
+  ObservedFileHandler,
+  warnOnUndecidedEffectiveFileAccess,
+} from './file-roles.config';
+
+/**
+ * Audits the file endpoints a project ACTUALLY registered, and warns when one of them is open beyond
+ * platform admins for a reason the configuration cannot show.
+ *
+ * WHY THIS CANNOT LIVE WHERE THE OTHER FILE WARNINGS LIVE
+ * -------------------------------------------------------
+ * `warnOnUndecidedFileAccess()` runs in the `CoreFileService` constructor and reads CONFIGURATION.
+ * For an inherited member that is exactly right: `applyFileRoles()` writes the configured roles onto
+ * the base-class function, the subclass picks them up through the prototype chain, and configuration
+ * and reality agree.
+ *
+ * They stop agreeing when a project RE-DECLARES a member. Decorator metadata lives on the function
+ * object, so an override is a different function carrying its own `@Roles()` — and that is the
+ * function Nest registers. Answering "is the gate open?" from configuration then answers a question
+ * about a route that is not the one being served. Two consumer projects shipped anonymously readable
+ * downloads that way, and nothing said a word.
+ *
+ * Seeing the real answer needs the registered class, and the registered class only exists once Nest
+ * has built its route table. Neither the service constructor nor `CoreModule.forRoot()` — which runs
+ * before any of that — can reach it. Hence a provider, and hence `onApplicationBootstrap`.
+ *
+ * WHY DISCOVERY RATHER THAN A CONFIG OPTION
+ * ------------------------------------------
+ * The file module ships abstract classes only: there is no `CoreFileModule.forRoot()` to hand a class
+ * to, and a class reference cannot travel through `config.env.ts` (it has to survive
+ * `NEST_SERVER_CONFIG` / `NSC__*`, i.e. JSON). Asking every consumer to register their controller in
+ * a second place would also make the audit opt-in — and an opt-in audit is missing precisely where
+ * nobody thought about access control, which is the population it exists for.
+ *
+ * WARNING ONLY. It never changes a role, and deliberately so: rewriting an override's metadata would
+ * silently relax a route the project pinned on purpose, which is the trap that rules out adopting the
+ * TUS module's approach here. The audit reports; the project decides.
+ *
+ * Registered as a `CoreModule` provider; consumers never interact with it.
+ */
+@Injectable()
+export class CoreFileAccessAuditInitializer implements OnApplicationBootstrap {
+  protected readonly logger = new Logger(CoreFileAccessAuditInitializer.name);
+
+  constructor(@Optional() protected readonly discoveryService?: DiscoveryService) {}
+
+  onApplicationBootstrap(): void {
+    if (!this.discoveryService) {
+      return;
+    }
+
+    const handlers = this.collectHandlers();
+    // No file endpoint registered — there is no route to be wrong about, and the configuration-side
+    // warning in the service constructor already covers a service-only integration.
+    if (!handlers.length) {
+      return;
+    }
+
+    const config = ConfigService.configFastButReadOnly;
+    warnOnUndecidedEffectiveFileAccess({
+      fileConfig: config?.file,
+      handlers,
+      hasPerFileRule: this.hasPerFileRule(),
+      multiTenancyEnabled: !!config?.multiTenancy && config.multiTenancy.enabled !== false,
+    });
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * The effective roles of every known member on every registered file endpoint class.
+   *
+   * `proto[method]` resolves through the prototype chain, so it yields the OVERRIDE when there is one
+   * and the inherited base function otherwise — which is exactly the function Nest registered.
+   */
+  protected collectHandlers(): ObservedFileHandler[] {
+    const handlers: ObservedFileHandler[] = [];
+
+    for (const [className, target] of this.registeredEndpointClasses()) {
+      for (const member of FILE_ROLE_MEMBERS) {
+        if (member.className !== className) {
+          continue;
+        }
+
+        const fn = (target.prototype as Record<string, unknown>)?.[member.method];
+        if (typeof fn !== 'function') {
+          continue;
+        }
+
+        handlers.push({
+          key: member.key,
+          member: `${target.name}.${member.method}`,
+          roles: this.effectiveRoles(fn, target),
+        });
+      }
+    }
+
+    return handlers;
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * The union the guards will compute for a member.
+   *
+   * Mirrors `mergeRolesMetadata([handlerRoles, classRoles])`: both halves count, so a class-level
+   * `@Roles()` on the subclass is seen too. `Reflect.getMetadata` walks the prototype chain for the
+   * class, which is what makes an undecorated subclass inherit the core `@Roles(ADMIN)` — the same
+   * resolution Nest's `Reflector` performs.
+   */
+  protected effectiveRoles(fn: unknown, target: Function): string[] {
+    const handlerRoles: string[] = Reflect.getMetadata('roles', fn as object) ?? [];
+    const classRoles: string[] = Reflect.getMetadata('roles', target) ?? [];
+    return [...handlerRoles, ...classRoles];
+  }
+
+  /** Whether the registered `CoreFileService` overrides `checkRights()` — the project wrote a rule. */
+  protected hasPerFileRule(): boolean {
+    const services = (this.discoveryService?.getProviders() ?? [])
+      .map((wrapper) => wrapper.instance)
+      .filter((instance): instance is CoreFileService => instance instanceof CoreFileService);
+
+    return services.some((service) => (service as any).checkRights !== (CoreFileService.prototype as any).checkRights);
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Every registered class that IS one of the two file endpoint classes, deduplicated.
+   *
+   * Read off the instance rather than the wrapper's `metatype`, because that is the object whose
+   * prototype chain answers the `instanceof` question reliably for both controllers and providers.
+   */
+  protected registeredEndpointClasses(): [FileEndpointClassName, Function][] {
+    const found = new Map<Function, FileEndpointClassName>();
+
+    const consider = (instance: unknown): void => {
+      if (!instance || typeof instance !== 'object') {
+        return;
+      }
+      const target = (instance as object).constructor;
+      if (typeof target !== 'function' || found.has(target)) {
+        return;
+      }
+      if (instance instanceof CoreFileController) {
+        found.set(target, 'CoreFileController');
+      } else if (instance instanceof CoreFileResolver) {
+        found.set(target, 'CoreFileResolver');
+      }
+    };
+
+    for (const wrapper of this.discoveryService?.getControllers() ?? []) {
+      consider(wrapper.instance);
+    }
+    for (const wrapper of this.discoveryService?.getProviders() ?? []) {
+      consider(wrapper.instance);
+    }
+
+    return [...found].map(([target, className]) => [className, target]);
+  }
+}

package/src/core/modules/file/core-file.service.ts

@@ -10,9 +10,12 @@ import { GridFSHelper } from '../../common/helpers/gridfs.helper';
 import { check } from '../../common/helpers/input.helper';
 import { prepareOutput } from '../../common/helpers/service.helper';
 import { ConfigService } from '../../common/services/config.service';
+import { RequestContext } from '../../common/services/request-context.service';
 import { CoreS3Service } from '../../common/services/core-s3.service';
 import { MaybePromise } from '../../common/types/maybe-promise.type';
 import { CoreFileInfo } from './core-file-info.model';
+import { decideFileAccess, fileAccessNeedsRawDocument, resolveFileAccessPreset } from './file-access.helper';
+import { warnOnUndecidedFileAccess } from './file-roles.config';
 import { FileServiceOptions } from './interfaces/file-service-options.interface';
 import { FileUploadSource } from './interfaces/file-upload.interface';
 import {
@@ -83,6 +86,17 @@ export abstract class CoreFileService {
     this.storageResolution = resolveFileStorage(ConfigService.configFastButReadOnly);
     assertFileStorageAvailable(this.storageResolution, this.isStorageAvailable(this.storageResolution.driver));
     logFileStorage(this.storageResolution);
+
+    // Warn when the gate is open and nothing declares the per-file policy — see the helper for why
+    // the conditions are this narrow and why it is not gated on multi-tenancy. Checked here rather than in `CoreModule.forRoot()` because only
+    // an instance can answer whether `checkRights()` was overridden: the base implementation is a
+    // fixed function, so an identity comparison against it is exact and needs no naming convention.
+    const config = ConfigService.configFastButReadOnly;
+    warnOnUndecidedFileAccess({
+      fileConfig: config?.file,
+      hasPerFileRule: this.checkRights !== CoreFileService.prototype.checkRights,
+      multiTenancyEnabled: !!config?.multiTenancy && config.multiTenancy.enabled !== false,
+    });
   }
 
   /**
@@ -148,12 +162,16 @@ export abstract class CoreFileService {
     }
     const { createReadStream, filename, mimetype } = await file;
     const readStream = createReadStream();
+    // Resolved ONCE for all three driver branches: under an `'owner'` / `'tenant'` preset this adds
+    // the very fields the preset decides on, so an upload through this service is authorizable
+    // without any project code. Under the default preset it is `serviceOptions.metadata` verbatim.
+    const metadata = this.accessMetadata(serviceOptions);
     if (this.filesystemStorage) {
       const fsFileInfo = await FilesystemFileHelper.writeFile(this.filesystemDir, this.filesystemFiles, {
         body: readStream,
         contentType: mimetype,
         filename,
-        ...(serviceOptions?.metadata ? { metadata: serviceOptions.metadata } : {}),
+        ...(metadata ? { metadata } : {}),
       });
       return this.prepareOutput(fsFileInfo as unknown as CoreFileInfo, serviceOptions);
     }
@@ -165,14 +183,14 @@ export abstract class CoreFileService {
         buffer: await streamToBuffer(readStream),
         contentType: mimetype,
         filename,
-        ...(serviceOptions?.metadata ? { metadata: serviceOptions.metadata } : {}),
+        ...(metadata ? { metadata } : {}),
       });
       return this.prepareOutput(s3FileInfo as unknown as CoreFileInfo, serviceOptions);
     }
     const fileInfo = await GridFSHelper.writeFileFromStream(this.files, readStream, {
       contentType: mimetype,
       filename,
-      ...(serviceOptions?.metadata ? { metadata: serviceOptions.metadata } : {}),
+      ...(metadata ? { metadata } : {}),
     });
     return this.prepareOutput(fileInfo as unknown as CoreFileInfo, serviceOptions);
   }
@@ -537,6 +555,16 @@ export abstract class CoreFileService {
 
   /**
    * Get file stream (for big files) via filename
+   *
+   * Every branch resolves a DOCUMENT first and reads by its id — including the GridFS one, which
+   * used to fall through to `openDownloadStreamByName()`. That call defaults to `revision: -1` (the
+   * newest file of that name) while the by-name METADATA lookup answered the oldest, so with two
+   * files sharing a name this method streamed bytes belonging to a different document than the one
+   * `checkRights()` had just been asked about. An ownership rule then approved the caller's own file
+   * and handed over somebody else's — across tenants, since the file stores carry no tenant scope.
+   *
+   * `findFileByName()` is now newest-first in all three stores, so the bytes a caller receives are
+   * unchanged; what changed is that the document authorization inspected is the one being served.
    */
   async getFileStreamByName(filename: string, serviceOptions?: FileServiceOptions): Promise<Readable> {
     if (!(await this.checkRights(filename, { ...serviceOptions, checkInputType: 'filename' }))) {
@@ -550,7 +578,13 @@ export abstract class CoreFileService {
     if (fsFileInfo) {
       return FilesystemFileHelper.getStream(this.filesystemDir, fsFileInfo._id);
     }
-    return GridFSHelper.openDownloadStreamByName(this.files, filename);
+    const gridFsInfo = await GridFSHelper.findFileByName(this.files, filename);
+    if (!gridFsInfo) {
+      // Unchanged answer for an unknown name: GridFS is the terminal store and reports the miss
+      // itself, asynchronously on the stream, which the controller turns into a 404.
+      return GridFSHelper.openDownloadStreamByName(this.files, filename);
+    }
+    return GridFSHelper.openDownloadStream(this.files, gridFsInfo._id);
   }
 
   /**
@@ -584,7 +618,14 @@ export abstract class CoreFileService {
     if (fsFileInfo) {
       return FilesystemFileHelper.getBuffer(this.filesystemDir, fsFileInfo._id);
     }
-    return await GridFSHelper.readFileToBuffer(this.files, { filename });
+    // By id, for the same reason as getFileStreamByName(): reading by NAME here would pick the
+    // newest revision while checkRights() was asked about whichever document findFileByName()
+    // answered.
+    const gridFsInfo = await GridFSHelper.findFileByName(this.files, filename);
+    if (!gridFsInfo) {
+      return await GridFSHelper.readFileToBuffer(this.files, { filename });
+    }
+    return await GridFSHelper.readFileToBuffer(this.files, { _id: gridFsInfo._id });
   }
 
   /**
@@ -766,15 +807,43 @@ export abstract class CoreFileService {
    * `tests/file-ownership.e2e-spec.ts`. Prefer reading it there over copying
    * from here.
    *
+   * **Cover the `filterArgs` branch, and REFUSE it.** `findFileInfo()` consults this hook ONCE for the
+   * whole query, so there is no answer that means "…but only their own files". Returning `true` hands a
+   * caller a full inventory of every upload — `CoreFileInfo` carries `filename`, `length`, `uploadDate`
+   * and the `id`, and for medical data the filename frequently IS the content. Core exposes no listing
+   * endpoint, so this only bites once a project surfaces `findFileInfo()` — which is exactly when
+   * nobody re-reads the rule.
+   *
+   * A per-user listing is expressed by FORCING the constraint server-side:
+   *
+   * ```typescript
+   * this.fileService.findFileInfo(
+   *   { filter: { singleFilter: { field: 'metadata.ownerId', operator: ComparisonOperatorEnum.EQ,
+   *                               value: String(currentUser.id) } } },
+   *   { force: true },
+   * );
+   * ```
+   *
+   * Note what that is NOT: it does not inspect the caller's own `filterArgs` to check whether they are
+   * already narrowed. `filterArgs` is CLIENT-CONTROLLED, so approving a filter shape means validating
+   * attacker input, and any such check is one filter shape away from being wrong. **Override the
+   * filter; never approve it.**
+   *
    * @example
    * ```typescript
    * protected override async checkRights(
    *   input: any,
    *   options?: FileServiceOptions & { checkInputType: FileInputCheckType },
    * ): Promise<boolean> {
-   *   if (options?.force || (options?.checkInputType !== 'filename' && options?.checkInputType !== 'id')) {
+   *   // Writes stay on the coarse gate: an upload has no owner to compare against yet.
+   *   if (options?.force || options?.checkInputType === 'file' || options?.checkInputType === 'files') {
    *     return true;
    *   }
+   *   // A LISTING cannot be narrowed by a yes/no hook — it is asked once for the whole query, not
+   *   // once per row — so refuse the unrestricted one. See the note above.
+   *   if (options?.checkInputType === 'filterArgs') {
+   *     return false;
+   *   }
    *   if (options.currentUser?.hasRole?.([RoleEnum.ADMIN])) {
    *     return true;
    *   }
@@ -788,11 +857,99 @@ export abstract class CoreFileService {
    * }
    * ```
    */
+  /**
+   * The metadata a file is written with — the caller's, plus whatever the active preset decides on.
+   *
+   * A preset that only READ `metadata.ownerId` / `metadata.tenantId` would be a rule about data that
+   * does not exist: every file ADMIN-only. That is not hypothetical — it is exactly the shape TUS
+   * uploads had before 11.35.0, and the report came back from downstream rather than from a test.
+   *
+   * Three properties, each of which is a decision:
+   *
+   * - **Only under a preset that needs it.** With `file.access` unset (or `'public'` /
+   *   `'authenticated'`) this returns `serviceOptions.metadata` untouched, so no existing project's
+   *   documents grow a field.
+   * - **Never overrides what the caller supplied.** A project that records ownership itself — or
+   *   deliberately attributes a file to someone else, as an admin provisioning flow does — keeps
+   *   winning. `TUS_OWNER_METADATA_KEY` is the opposite case and overwrites on purpose, because there
+   *   the value arrives from the CLIENT.
+   * - **Stamps nothing it cannot know.** An anonymous upload gets no owner, which leaves the file
+   *   ADMIN-only rather than owned by `undefined`.
+   *
+   * `protected` so a project can add its own dimension (a project id, a case number) by overriding and
+   * calling `super`.
+   */
+  protected accessMetadata(serviceOptions?: FileServiceOptions): Record<string, any> | undefined {
+    const preset = resolveFileAccessPreset(ConfigService.configFastButReadOnly?.file);
+    if (preset !== 'owner' && preset !== 'tenant') {
+      return serviceOptions?.metadata;
+    }
+
+    const stamped: Record<string, any> = { ...serviceOptions?.metadata };
+    const ownerId = serviceOptions?.currentUser?.id;
+    if (stamped.ownerId === undefined && ownerId !== undefined && ownerId !== null && ownerId !== '') {
+      stamped.ownerId = String(ownerId);
+    }
+    if (preset === 'tenant') {
+      // The VALIDATED tenant, same source the read decision uses.
+      const tenantId = RequestContext.get()?.tenantId;
+      if (stamped.tenantId === undefined && tenantId) {
+        stamped.tenantId = tenantId;
+      }
+    }
+    return Object.keys(stamped).length ? stamped : undefined;
+  }
+
   protected checkRights(
-    _input: any,
-    _options?: FileServiceOptions & { checkInputType: FileInputCheckType },
+    input: any,
+    options?: FileServiceOptions & { checkInputType: FileInputCheckType },
   ): MaybePromise<boolean> {
-    return true;
+    // `MaybePromise<boolean>`, NOT `Promise<boolean>`, and not `async`. Narrowing the declared return
+    // type would break every consumer whose override returns a plain `boolean` — which the old
+    // signature explicitly invited — and TypeScript rejects that at the OVERRIDE, in their code, with
+    // an error that points at their file rather than at this change. `async` forces `Promise<T>`, so
+    // the async work lives in a separate method instead.
+    return this.resolveAccessPreset(input, options);
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * The async half of {@link checkRights}, split out only so the public seam can keep its
+   * `MaybePromise<boolean>` signature (see there).
+   */
+  private async resolveAccessPreset(
+    input: any,
+    options?: FileServiceOptions & { checkInputType: FileInputCheckType },
+  ): Promise<boolean> {
+    const preset = resolveFileAccessPreset(ConfigService.configFastButReadOnly?.file);
+
+    // `'custom'` is the default and returns true for every input — byte-for-byte the pre-11.35.0
+    // behaviour, including the absence of any lookup. An existing project sees no change at all.
+    if (preset === 'custom') {
+      return true;
+    }
+
+    // The lookup is skipped where the decision cannot use it: a forced (system) call, a write, a
+    // listing, and the two blanket presets. So enabling a preset never adds a query to a path that
+    // does not read a document — which matters most for `force: true`, the idiom internal callers use
+    // on hot paths precisely because they have already been decided about.
+    const raw =
+      !options?.force && fileAccessNeedsRawDocument(preset, options?.checkInputType)
+        ? options?.checkInputType === 'id'
+          ? await this.getRawFileInfo(input)
+          : await this.getRawFileInfoByName(input)
+        : undefined;
+
+    return decideFileAccess({
+      checkInputType: options?.checkInputType,
+      currentUser: options?.currentUser,
+      force: options?.force,
+      preset,
+      raw,
+      // The VALIDATED tenant, from the same source `mongooseTenantPlugin` filters by — never a raw
+      // header, and never `serviceOptions`, so a file decision and a database decision cannot
+      // disagree about which tenant the request is in.
+      tenantId: RequestContext.get()?.tenantId,
+    });
   }
 
   /**

package/src/core/modules/file/file-access.helper.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+/**
+ * The four project classes as ONE dial — `file.access`.
+ *
+ * WHY THIS EXISTS: the per-file rule is the only place a sentence like "…but only their own" can
+ * live, because that sentence needs data and no role name carries data. Until 11.35.0 the framework
+ * shipped that rule as an `@example` to copy, and the copy went wrong twice in this repository's own
+ * history — both times in the permissive direction:
+ *
+ *  - `if (!options.currentUser) return true` reads as "system-internal call", and is also exactly what
+ *    an ANONYMOUS request looks like;
+ *  - narrowing only `'id'` / `'filename'` waves `'filterArgs'` through, which hands over a full
+ *    inventory of every upload the moment a project surfaces `findFileInfo()`.
+ *
+ * Neither mistake is careless — both read as correct. That is the argument for a preset: the rule is
+ * always the same handful of sentences, so the framework should own them and the project should
+ * declare which one it wants.
+ *
+ * | `file.access`     | project class                                                  |
+ * |-------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|
+ * | `'custom'`        | the project writes its own rule — **the default**; the framework abstains entirely |
+ * | `'public'`        | open: anyone may read and write, the role gate is the whole policy |
+ * | `'authenticated'` | login-restricted: every signed-in user may use every file       |
+ * | `'owner'`         | per-user: only the uploader (plus ADMIN)                        |
+ * | `'tenant'`        | per-tenant: only within one's own validated tenant (plus ADMIN) |
+ *
+ * NOTHING CHANGES FOR AN EXISTING PROJECT. `'custom'` is the default and returns `true` for every
+ * input, which is byte-for-byte what `CoreFileService.checkRights()` did before. A project that
+ * overrides `checkRights()` keeps full control regardless of the setting — the override IS the rule,
+ * and the preset never runs.
+ *
+ * THE DECISION IS A PURE FUNCTION. It takes an already-loaded raw document instead of a service, so
+ * every row of the table can be stated in a unit test without a database, and so the service's only
+ * remaining job is to decide whether a lookup is needed at all
+ * ({@link fileAccessNeedsRawDocument}) — a listing and a write never need one.
+ *
+ * DELIBERATELY A LEAF: it imports the role enum and nothing else. `file-roles.helper` already had to
+ * be split for the same reason (it imports the endpoint classes, which inject `CoreFileService`), and
+ * this file is read FROM the service. See `.claude/rules/architecture.md` → "DI Token Placement".
+ */
+import { RoleEnum } from '../../common/enums/role.enum';
+
+/** Which of the four project classes this deployment is. */
+export type FileAccessPreset = 'authenticated' | 'custom' | 'owner' | 'public' | 'tenant';
+
+/** The input types `CoreFileService.checkRights()` distinguishes. */
+type CheckInputType = 'file' | 'filename' | 'files' | 'filterArgs' | 'id';
+
+const PRESETS: readonly FileAccessPreset[] = ['authenticated', 'custom', 'owner', 'public', 'tenant'] as const;
+
+/**
+ * Which preset a project asked for.
+ *
+ * An UNKNOWN value resolves to `'owner'`, the strictest of the data-driven presets — never to
+ * `'custom'`. A typo (`access: 'onwer'`) means somebody believes they have an ownership rule; giving
+ * them "the framework abstains" would confirm that belief and be wrong in the one direction that
+ * cannot be noticed from the outside. A too-strict answer surfaces as a 404 on the first request,
+ * which is a bug report; a too-permissive one surfaces as an incident.
+ *
+ * @default 'custom'
+ */
+export function resolveFileAccessPreset(fileConfig?: { access?: FileAccessPreset }): FileAccessPreset {
+  const configured = fileConfig?.access;
+  if (configured === undefined || configured === null) {
+    return 'custom';
+  }
+  return PRESETS.includes(configured) ? configured : 'owner';
+}
+
+/**
+ * Does the decision for this (preset, input type) pair read the stored document?
+ *
+ * Asked by the service so it can skip the metadata lookup where the answer cannot use it. A write has
+ * no document yet, a listing is not about one document, and the two blanket presets answer without
+ * looking — loading anyway would add a query per call for nothing.
+ */
+export function fileAccessNeedsRawDocument(preset: FileAccessPreset, checkInputType?: CheckInputType): boolean {
+  if (preset !== 'owner' && preset !== 'tenant') {
+    return false;
+  }
+  return checkInputType === 'id' || checkInputType === 'filename';
+}
+
+/**
+ * Decide one file access question.
+ *
+ * @param options.raw the stored metadata document, loaded by the caller when
+ *   {@link fileAccessNeedsRawDocument} says so. `null` means "no such file", which must not be
+ *   confused with "no restriction".
+ * @param options.tenantId the VALIDATED tenant of the current request (`RequestContext.tenantId`),
+ *   never a raw header — an unvalidated header would be worse than no tenant at all.
+ */
+export function decideFileAccess(options: {
+  checkInputType?: CheckInputType;
+  currentUser?: { hasRole?: (roles: string[]) => boolean; id?: any };
+  force?: boolean;
+  preset: FileAccessPreset;
+  raw?: null | Record<string, any>;
+  tenantId?: string;
+}): boolean {
+  const { checkInputType, currentUser, force, preset, raw, tenantId } = options;
+
+  // A system caller says so explicitly. This is the documented alternative to the
+  // `if (!currentUser) return true` shortcut: the exemption is stated at the call site, in the diff,
+  // rather than inferred from an absence that an anonymous request produces too.
+  if (force) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // The framework abstains — identical to the pre-11.35.0 base implementation.
+  if (preset === 'custom' || preset === 'public') {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  if (preset === 'authenticated') {
+    // Deliberately independent of the role gate: it still holds when `downloadRoles` is `S_EVERYONE`,
+    // which is the case where a project believes the login requirement is somewhere else.
+    return !!currentUser?.id;
+  }
+
+  // ADMIN is platform authority and is never locked out — the same union the role guards apply.
+  if (currentUser?.hasRole?.([RoleEnum.ADMIN])) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // Writes stay on the coarse role gate (`file.uploadRoles` / `deleteRoles`): an upload has no stored
+  // document yet, so there is nothing to compare against. Ownership of the RESULT is established by
+  // the metadata the service stamps as it writes.
+  if (checkInputType === 'file' || checkInputType === 'files') {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // A LISTING cannot be narrowed by a yes/no answer — this hook is asked once for the whole query,
+  // not once per row. Refusing is the only honest answer; a per-user listing is expressed by forcing
+  // the filter server-side and passing `force: true`. See CoreFileService.checkRights().
+  if (checkInputType === 'filterArgs') {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (preset === 'owner') {
+    // Requiring the field to be PRESENT is load-bearing twice over: without it an owner-less file
+    // compares `String(undefined)` with `String(undefined)` and matches, so every unowned file would
+    // be readable by every caller whose id is also missing — i.e. by anonymous requests.
+    return !!raw?.metadata?.ownerId && String(raw.metadata.ownerId) === String(currentUser?.id);
+  }
+
+  // 'tenant': both sides must be present. No tenant in context is a cron job on the HTTP path and an
+  // unresolvable header on the WebSocket path; neither may read tenant-scoped bytes.
+  return !!tenantId && !!raw?.metadata?.tenantId && String(raw.metadata.tenantId) === String(tenantId);
+}

package/src/core/modules/file/file-metadata.helper.ts

@@ -74,17 +74,25 @@ export async function findMetadataById(
 }
 
 /**
- * Find one metadata document by filename.
+ * Find one metadata document by filename — the MOST RECENT file with that name.
  *
- * Resolves the FIRST match — filenames are not unique in any of these stores, and
- * are client-supplied on both the multer and the tus path. Prefer the id lookup
- * wherever the caller has an id.
+ * Filenames are unique in NO store and are client-supplied on both the multer and the tus path, so
+ * a by-name lookup is inherently ambiguous: prefer the id lookup wherever the caller has an id.
+ * What must not be ambiguous is WHICH of the candidates every by-name path picks — an ownership
+ * rule reads one document and the download must serve that same one.
+ *
+ * A bare `findOne({ filename })` returns natural order, which is neither documented nor stable
+ * under compaction. Newest-first matches GridFS's own by-name revision semantics
+ * (`openDownloadStreamByName` defaults to `revision: -1`), so all three storage drivers answer the
+ * same question the same way; `_id` breaks the tie for two files written in one millisecond.
  */
 export async function findMetadataByName(
   collection: FileCollection,
   filename: string,
 ): Promise<FileMetadataInfo | null> {
-  return (await collection.findOne({ filename })) as FileMetadataInfo | null;
+  // `uploadDate` FIRST — MongoDB applies sort keys in document order, so leading with `_id` would
+  // make the tie-break the primary key.
+  return (await collection.findOne({ filename }, { sort: { uploadDate: -1, _id: -1 } })) as FileMetadataInfo | null;
 }
 
 /** Find metadata documents by filter */