@lenne.tech/nest-server 11.34.1 → 11.35.0

package/src/core/modules/file/core-file.service.ts

@@ -10,9 +10,12 @@ import { GridFSHelper } from '../../common/helpers/gridfs.helper';
 import { check } from '../../common/helpers/input.helper';
 import { prepareOutput } from '../../common/helpers/service.helper';
 import { ConfigService } from '../../common/services/config.service';
+import { RequestContext } from '../../common/services/request-context.service';
 import { CoreS3Service } from '../../common/services/core-s3.service';
 import { MaybePromise } from '../../common/types/maybe-promise.type';
 import { CoreFileInfo } from './core-file-info.model';
+import { decideFileAccess, fileAccessNeedsRawDocument, resolveFileAccessPreset } from './file-access.helper';
+import { warnOnUndecidedFileAccess } from './file-roles.config';
 import { FileServiceOptions } from './interfaces/file-service-options.interface';
 import { FileUploadSource } from './interfaces/file-upload.interface';
 import {
@@ -83,6 +86,17 @@ export abstract class CoreFileService {
     this.storageResolution = resolveFileStorage(ConfigService.configFastButReadOnly);
     assertFileStorageAvailable(this.storageResolution, this.isStorageAvailable(this.storageResolution.driver));
     logFileStorage(this.storageResolution);
+
+    // Warn when the gate is open and nothing declares the per-file policy — see the helper for why
+    // the conditions are this narrow and why it is not gated on multi-tenancy. Checked here rather than in `CoreModule.forRoot()` because only
+    // an instance can answer whether `checkRights()` was overridden: the base implementation is a
+    // fixed function, so an identity comparison against it is exact and needs no naming convention.
+    const config = ConfigService.configFastButReadOnly;
+    warnOnUndecidedFileAccess({
+      fileConfig: config?.file,
+      hasPerFileRule: this.checkRights !== CoreFileService.prototype.checkRights,
+      multiTenancyEnabled: !!config?.multiTenancy && config.multiTenancy.enabled !== false,
+    });
   }
 
   /**
@@ -148,12 +162,16 @@ export abstract class CoreFileService {
     }
     const { createReadStream, filename, mimetype } = await file;
     const readStream = createReadStream();
+    // Resolved ONCE for all three driver branches: under an `'owner'` / `'tenant'` preset this adds
+    // the very fields the preset decides on, so an upload through this service is authorizable
+    // without any project code. Under the default preset it is `serviceOptions.metadata` verbatim.
+    const metadata = this.accessMetadata(serviceOptions);
     if (this.filesystemStorage) {
       const fsFileInfo = await FilesystemFileHelper.writeFile(this.filesystemDir, this.filesystemFiles, {
         body: readStream,
         contentType: mimetype,
         filename,
-        ...(serviceOptions?.metadata ? { metadata: serviceOptions.metadata } : {}),
+        ...(metadata ? { metadata } : {}),
       });
       return this.prepareOutput(fsFileInfo as unknown as CoreFileInfo, serviceOptions);
     }
@@ -165,14 +183,14 @@ export abstract class CoreFileService {
         buffer: await streamToBuffer(readStream),
         contentType: mimetype,
         filename,
-        ...(serviceOptions?.metadata ? { metadata: serviceOptions.metadata } : {}),
+        ...(metadata ? { metadata } : {}),
       });
       return this.prepareOutput(s3FileInfo as unknown as CoreFileInfo, serviceOptions);
     }
     const fileInfo = await GridFSHelper.writeFileFromStream(this.files, readStream, {
       contentType: mimetype,
       filename,
-      ...(serviceOptions?.metadata ? { metadata: serviceOptions.metadata } : {}),
+      ...(metadata ? { metadata } : {}),
     });
     return this.prepareOutput(fileInfo as unknown as CoreFileInfo, serviceOptions);
   }
@@ -537,6 +555,16 @@ export abstract class CoreFileService {
 
   /**
    * Get file stream (for big files) via filename
+   *
+   * Every branch resolves a DOCUMENT first and reads by its id — including the GridFS one, which
+   * used to fall through to `openDownloadStreamByName()`. That call defaults to `revision: -1` (the
+   * newest file of that name) while the by-name METADATA lookup answered the oldest, so with two
+   * files sharing a name this method streamed bytes belonging to a different document than the one
+   * `checkRights()` had just been asked about. An ownership rule then approved the caller's own file
+   * and handed over somebody else's — across tenants, since the file stores carry no tenant scope.
+   *
+   * `findFileByName()` is now newest-first in all three stores, so the bytes a caller receives are
+   * unchanged; what changed is that the document authorization inspected is the one being served.
    */
   async getFileStreamByName(filename: string, serviceOptions?: FileServiceOptions): Promise<Readable> {
     if (!(await this.checkRights(filename, { ...serviceOptions, checkInputType: 'filename' }))) {
@@ -550,7 +578,13 @@ export abstract class CoreFileService {
     if (fsFileInfo) {
       return FilesystemFileHelper.getStream(this.filesystemDir, fsFileInfo._id);
     }
-    return GridFSHelper.openDownloadStreamByName(this.files, filename);
+    const gridFsInfo = await GridFSHelper.findFileByName(this.files, filename);
+    if (!gridFsInfo) {
+      // Unchanged answer for an unknown name: GridFS is the terminal store and reports the miss
+      // itself, asynchronously on the stream, which the controller turns into a 404.
+      return GridFSHelper.openDownloadStreamByName(this.files, filename);
+    }
+    return GridFSHelper.openDownloadStream(this.files, gridFsInfo._id);
   }
 
   /**
@@ -584,7 +618,14 @@ export abstract class CoreFileService {
     if (fsFileInfo) {
       return FilesystemFileHelper.getBuffer(this.filesystemDir, fsFileInfo._id);
     }
-    return await GridFSHelper.readFileToBuffer(this.files, { filename });
+    // By id, for the same reason as getFileStreamByName(): reading by NAME here would pick the
+    // newest revision while checkRights() was asked about whichever document findFileByName()
+    // answered.
+    const gridFsInfo = await GridFSHelper.findFileByName(this.files, filename);
+    if (!gridFsInfo) {
+      return await GridFSHelper.readFileToBuffer(this.files, { filename });
+    }
+    return await GridFSHelper.readFileToBuffer(this.files, { _id: gridFsInfo._id });
   }
 
   /**
@@ -766,15 +807,43 @@ export abstract class CoreFileService {
    * `tests/file-ownership.e2e-spec.ts`. Prefer reading it there over copying
    * from here.
    *
+   * **Cover the `filterArgs` branch, and REFUSE it.** `findFileInfo()` consults this hook ONCE for the
+   * whole query, so there is no answer that means "…but only their own files". Returning `true` hands a
+   * caller a full inventory of every upload — `CoreFileInfo` carries `filename`, `length`, `uploadDate`
+   * and the `id`, and for medical data the filename frequently IS the content. Core exposes no listing
+   * endpoint, so this only bites once a project surfaces `findFileInfo()` — which is exactly when
+   * nobody re-reads the rule.
+   *
+   * A per-user listing is expressed by FORCING the constraint server-side:
+   *
+   * ```typescript
+   * this.fileService.findFileInfo(
+   *   { filter: { singleFilter: { field: 'metadata.ownerId', operator: ComparisonOperatorEnum.EQ,
+   *                               value: String(currentUser.id) } } },
+   *   { force: true },
+   * );
+   * ```
+   *
+   * Note what that is NOT: it does not inspect the caller's own `filterArgs` to check whether they are
+   * already narrowed. `filterArgs` is CLIENT-CONTROLLED, so approving a filter shape means validating
+   * attacker input, and any such check is one filter shape away from being wrong. **Override the
+   * filter; never approve it.**
+   *
    * @example
    * ```typescript
    * protected override async checkRights(
    *   input: any,
    *   options?: FileServiceOptions & { checkInputType: FileInputCheckType },
    * ): Promise<boolean> {
-   *   if (options?.force || (options?.checkInputType !== 'filename' && options?.checkInputType !== 'id')) {
+   *   // Writes stay on the coarse gate: an upload has no owner to compare against yet.
+   *   if (options?.force || options?.checkInputType === 'file' || options?.checkInputType === 'files') {
    *     return true;
    *   }
+   *   // A LISTING cannot be narrowed by a yes/no hook — it is asked once for the whole query, not
+   *   // once per row — so refuse the unrestricted one. See the note above.
+   *   if (options?.checkInputType === 'filterArgs') {
+   *     return false;
+   *   }
    *   if (options.currentUser?.hasRole?.([RoleEnum.ADMIN])) {
    *     return true;
    *   }
@@ -788,11 +857,99 @@ export abstract class CoreFileService {
    * }
    * ```
    */
+  /**
+   * The metadata a file is written with — the caller's, plus whatever the active preset decides on.
+   *
+   * A preset that only READ `metadata.ownerId` / `metadata.tenantId` would be a rule about data that
+   * does not exist: every file ADMIN-only. That is not hypothetical — it is exactly the shape TUS
+   * uploads had before 11.35.0, and the report came back from downstream rather than from a test.
+   *
+   * Three properties, each of which is a decision:
+   *
+   * - **Only under a preset that needs it.** With `file.access` unset (or `'public'` /
+   *   `'authenticated'`) this returns `serviceOptions.metadata` untouched, so no existing project's
+   *   documents grow a field.
+   * - **Never overrides what the caller supplied.** A project that records ownership itself — or
+   *   deliberately attributes a file to someone else, as an admin provisioning flow does — keeps
+   *   winning. `TUS_OWNER_METADATA_KEY` is the opposite case and overwrites on purpose, because there
+   *   the value arrives from the CLIENT.
+   * - **Stamps nothing it cannot know.** An anonymous upload gets no owner, which leaves the file
+   *   ADMIN-only rather than owned by `undefined`.
+   *
+   * `protected` so a project can add its own dimension (a project id, a case number) by overriding and
+   * calling `super`.
+   */
+  protected accessMetadata(serviceOptions?: FileServiceOptions): Record<string, any> | undefined {
+    const preset = resolveFileAccessPreset(ConfigService.configFastButReadOnly?.file);
+    if (preset !== 'owner' && preset !== 'tenant') {
+      return serviceOptions?.metadata;
+    }
+
+    const stamped: Record<string, any> = { ...serviceOptions?.metadata };
+    const ownerId = serviceOptions?.currentUser?.id;
+    if (stamped.ownerId === undefined && ownerId !== undefined && ownerId !== null && ownerId !== '') {
+      stamped.ownerId = String(ownerId);
+    }
+    if (preset === 'tenant') {
+      // The VALIDATED tenant, same source the read decision uses.
+      const tenantId = RequestContext.get()?.tenantId;
+      if (stamped.tenantId === undefined && tenantId) {
+        stamped.tenantId = tenantId;
+      }
+    }
+    return Object.keys(stamped).length ? stamped : undefined;
+  }
+
   protected checkRights(
-    _input: any,
-    _options?: FileServiceOptions & { checkInputType: FileInputCheckType },
+    input: any,
+    options?: FileServiceOptions & { checkInputType: FileInputCheckType },
   ): MaybePromise<boolean> {
-    return true;
+    // `MaybePromise<boolean>`, NOT `Promise<boolean>`, and not `async`. Narrowing the declared return
+    // type would break every consumer whose override returns a plain `boolean` — which the old
+    // signature explicitly invited — and TypeScript rejects that at the OVERRIDE, in their code, with
+    // an error that points at their file rather than at this change. `async` forces `Promise<T>`, so
+    // the async work lives in a separate method instead.
+    return this.resolveAccessPreset(input, options);
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * The async half of {@link checkRights}, split out only so the public seam can keep its
+   * `MaybePromise<boolean>` signature (see there).
+   */
+  private async resolveAccessPreset(
+    input: any,
+    options?: FileServiceOptions & { checkInputType: FileInputCheckType },
+  ): Promise<boolean> {
+    const preset = resolveFileAccessPreset(ConfigService.configFastButReadOnly?.file);
+
+    // `'custom'` is the default and returns true for every input — byte-for-byte the pre-11.35.0
+    // behaviour, including the absence of any lookup. An existing project sees no change at all.
+    if (preset === 'custom') {
+      return true;
+    }
+
+    // The lookup is skipped where the decision cannot use it: a forced (system) call, a write, a
+    // listing, and the two blanket presets. So enabling a preset never adds a query to a path that
+    // does not read a document — which matters most for `force: true`, the idiom internal callers use
+    // on hot paths precisely because they have already been decided about.
+    const raw =
+      !options?.force && fileAccessNeedsRawDocument(preset, options?.checkInputType)
+        ? options?.checkInputType === 'id'
+          ? await this.getRawFileInfo(input)
+          : await this.getRawFileInfoByName(input)
+        : undefined;
+
+    return decideFileAccess({
+      checkInputType: options?.checkInputType,
+      currentUser: options?.currentUser,
+      force: options?.force,
+      preset,
+      raw,
+      // The VALIDATED tenant, from the same source `mongooseTenantPlugin` filters by — never a raw
+      // header, and never `serviceOptions`, so a file decision and a database decision cannot
+      // disagree about which tenant the request is in.
+      tenantId: RequestContext.get()?.tenantId,
+    });
   }
 
   /**

package/src/core/modules/file/file-access.helper.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+/**
+ * The four project classes as ONE dial — `file.access`.
+ *
+ * WHY THIS EXISTS: the per-file rule is the only place a sentence like "…but only their own" can
+ * live, because that sentence needs data and no role name carries data. Until 11.35.0 the framework
+ * shipped that rule as an `@example` to copy, and the copy went wrong twice in this repository's own
+ * history — both times in the permissive direction:
+ *
+ *  - `if (!options.currentUser) return true` reads as "system-internal call", and is also exactly what
+ *    an ANONYMOUS request looks like;
+ *  - narrowing only `'id'` / `'filename'` waves `'filterArgs'` through, which hands over a full
+ *    inventory of every upload the moment a project surfaces `findFileInfo()`.
+ *
+ * Neither mistake is careless — both read as correct. That is the argument for a preset: the rule is
+ * always the same handful of sentences, so the framework should own them and the project should
+ * declare which one it wants.
+ *
+ * | `file.access`     | project class                                                  |
+ * |-------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|
+ * | `'custom'`        | the project writes its own rule — **the default**; the framework abstains entirely |
+ * | `'public'`        | open: anyone may read and write, the role gate is the whole policy |
+ * | `'authenticated'` | login-restricted: every signed-in user may use every file       |
+ * | `'owner'`         | per-user: only the uploader (plus ADMIN)                        |
+ * | `'tenant'`        | per-tenant: only within one's own validated tenant (plus ADMIN) |
+ *
+ * NOTHING CHANGES FOR AN EXISTING PROJECT. `'custom'` is the default and returns `true` for every
+ * input, which is byte-for-byte what `CoreFileService.checkRights()` did before. A project that
+ * overrides `checkRights()` keeps full control regardless of the setting — the override IS the rule,
+ * and the preset never runs.
+ *
+ * THE DECISION IS A PURE FUNCTION. It takes an already-loaded raw document instead of a service, so
+ * every row of the table can be stated in a unit test without a database, and so the service's only
+ * remaining job is to decide whether a lookup is needed at all
+ * ({@link fileAccessNeedsRawDocument}) — a listing and a write never need one.
+ *
+ * DELIBERATELY A LEAF: it imports the role enum and nothing else. `file-roles.helper` already had to
+ * be split for the same reason (it imports the endpoint classes, which inject `CoreFileService`), and
+ * this file is read FROM the service. See `.claude/rules/architecture.md` → "DI Token Placement".
+ */
+import { RoleEnum } from '../../common/enums/role.enum';
+
+/** Which of the four project classes this deployment is. */
+export type FileAccessPreset = 'authenticated' | 'custom' | 'owner' | 'public' | 'tenant';
+
+/** The input types `CoreFileService.checkRights()` distinguishes. */
+type CheckInputType = 'file' | 'filename' | 'files' | 'filterArgs' | 'id';
+
+const PRESETS: readonly FileAccessPreset[] = ['authenticated', 'custom', 'owner', 'public', 'tenant'] as const;
+
+/**
+ * Which preset a project asked for.
+ *
+ * An UNKNOWN value resolves to `'owner'`, the strictest of the data-driven presets — never to
+ * `'custom'`. A typo (`access: 'onwer'`) means somebody believes they have an ownership rule; giving
+ * them "the framework abstains" would confirm that belief and be wrong in the one direction that
+ * cannot be noticed from the outside. A too-strict answer surfaces as a 404 on the first request,
+ * which is a bug report; a too-permissive one surfaces as an incident.
+ *
+ * @default 'custom'
+ */
+export function resolveFileAccessPreset(fileConfig?: { access?: FileAccessPreset }): FileAccessPreset {
+  const configured = fileConfig?.access;
+  if (configured === undefined || configured === null) {
+    return 'custom';
+  }
+  return PRESETS.includes(configured) ? configured : 'owner';
+}
+
+/**
+ * Does the decision for this (preset, input type) pair read the stored document?
+ *
+ * Asked by the service so it can skip the metadata lookup where the answer cannot use it. A write has
+ * no document yet, a listing is not about one document, and the two blanket presets answer without
+ * looking — loading anyway would add a query per call for nothing.
+ */
+export function fileAccessNeedsRawDocument(preset: FileAccessPreset, checkInputType?: CheckInputType): boolean {
+  if (preset !== 'owner' && preset !== 'tenant') {
+    return false;
+  }
+  return checkInputType === 'id' || checkInputType === 'filename';
+}
+
+/**
+ * Decide one file access question.
+ *
+ * @param options.raw the stored metadata document, loaded by the caller when
+ *   {@link fileAccessNeedsRawDocument} says so. `null` means "no such file", which must not be
+ *   confused with "no restriction".
+ * @param options.tenantId the VALIDATED tenant of the current request (`RequestContext.tenantId`),
+ *   never a raw header — an unvalidated header would be worse than no tenant at all.
+ */
+export function decideFileAccess(options: {
+  checkInputType?: CheckInputType;
+  currentUser?: { hasRole?: (roles: string[]) => boolean; id?: any };
+  force?: boolean;
+  preset: FileAccessPreset;
+  raw?: null | Record<string, any>;
+  tenantId?: string;
+}): boolean {
+  const { checkInputType, currentUser, force, preset, raw, tenantId } = options;
+
+  // A system caller says so explicitly. This is the documented alternative to the
+  // `if (!currentUser) return true` shortcut: the exemption is stated at the call site, in the diff,
+  // rather than inferred from an absence that an anonymous request produces too.
+  if (force) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // The framework abstains — identical to the pre-11.35.0 base implementation.
+  if (preset === 'custom' || preset === 'public') {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  if (preset === 'authenticated') {
+    // Deliberately independent of the role gate: it still holds when `downloadRoles` is `S_EVERYONE`,
+    // which is the case where a project believes the login requirement is somewhere else.
+    return !!currentUser?.id;
+  }
+
+  // ADMIN is platform authority and is never locked out — the same union the role guards apply.
+  if (currentUser?.hasRole?.([RoleEnum.ADMIN])) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // Writes stay on the coarse role gate (`file.uploadRoles` / `deleteRoles`): an upload has no stored
+  // document yet, so there is nothing to compare against. Ownership of the RESULT is established by
+  // the metadata the service stamps as it writes.
+  if (checkInputType === 'file' || checkInputType === 'files') {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // A LISTING cannot be narrowed by a yes/no answer — this hook is asked once for the whole query,
+  // not once per row. Refusing is the only honest answer; a per-user listing is expressed by forcing
+  // the filter server-side and passing `force: true`. See CoreFileService.checkRights().
+  if (checkInputType === 'filterArgs') {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (preset === 'owner') {
+    // Requiring the field to be PRESENT is load-bearing twice over: without it an owner-less file
+    // compares `String(undefined)` with `String(undefined)` and matches, so every unowned file would
+    // be readable by every caller whose id is also missing — i.e. by anonymous requests.
+    return !!raw?.metadata?.ownerId && String(raw.metadata.ownerId) === String(currentUser?.id);
+  }
+
+  // 'tenant': both sides must be present. No tenant in context is a cron job on the HTTP path and an
+  // unresolvable header on the WebSocket path; neither may read tenant-scoped bytes.
+  return !!tenantId && !!raw?.metadata?.tenantId && String(raw.metadata.tenantId) === String(tenantId);
+}

package/src/core/modules/file/file-metadata.helper.ts

@@ -74,17 +74,25 @@ export async function findMetadataById(
 }
 
 /**
- * Find one metadata document by filename.
+ * Find one metadata document by filename — the MOST RECENT file with that name.
  *
- * Resolves the FIRST match — filenames are not unique in any of these stores, and
- * are client-supplied on both the multer and the tus path. Prefer the id lookup
- * wherever the caller has an id.
+ * Filenames are unique in NO store and are client-supplied on both the multer and the tus path, so
+ * a by-name lookup is inherently ambiguous: prefer the id lookup wherever the caller has an id.
+ * What must not be ambiguous is WHICH of the candidates every by-name path picks — an ownership
+ * rule reads one document and the download must serve that same one.
+ *
+ * A bare `findOne({ filename })` returns natural order, which is neither documented nor stable
+ * under compaction. Newest-first matches GridFS's own by-name revision semantics
+ * (`openDownloadStreamByName` defaults to `revision: -1`), so all three storage drivers answer the
+ * same question the same way; `_id` breaks the tie for two files written in one millisecond.
  */
 export async function findMetadataByName(
   collection: FileCollection,
   filename: string,
 ): Promise<FileMetadataInfo | null> {
-  return (await collection.findOne({ filename })) as FileMetadataInfo | null;
+  // `uploadDate` FIRST — MongoDB applies sort keys in document order, so leading with `_id` would
+  // make the tie-break the primary key.
+  return (await collection.findOne({ filename }, { sort: { uploadDate: -1, _id: -1 } })) as FileMetadataInfo | null;
 }
 
 /** Find metadata documents by filter */

package/src/core/modules/file/file-roles.config.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
+/**
+ * File-role CONFIGURATION and the two boot warnings — the half that touches no endpoint class.
+ *
+ * SPLIT OUT OF `file-roles.helper.ts` because that file imports `CoreFileController` and
+ * `CoreFileResolver` (it writes role metadata onto their prototypes), and both of them inject
+ * `CoreFileService`. So a service reading a warning from there closes
+ *
+ *   core-file.service -> file-roles.helper -> core-file.controller -> core-file.service
+ *
+ * and the controller dereferences `CoreFileService` in `design:paramtypes`, i.e. at CLASS-DEFINITION
+ * time. That is the fatal shape: SWC -> CommonJS dies at startup with
+ * `Cannot access 'CoreFileService' before initialization`, while tsc, vitest and oxlint all stay
+ * green. `pnpm run check:swc-tdz` caught exactly that when the warning was first added here.
+ *
+ * This file therefore imports only enums and interfaces. See
+ * `.claude/rules/architecture.md` -> "DI Token Placement (SWC-Safe)".
+ */
+import { Logger } from '@nestjs/common';
+
+import { RoleEnum } from '../../common/enums/role.enum';
+import { IFileConfig, IS3Config } from '../../common/interfaces/server-options.interface';
+
+const logger = new Logger('CoreFileRoles');
+
+/**
+ * Roles applied when `file` is not configured at all.
+ *
+ * Restrictive on purpose: one GridFS bucket is shared by every feature of the
+ * consuming project, and the ObjectIds naming its blobs are not secrets.
+ */
+export type FileRoleKey = 'deleteRoles' | 'downloadRoles' | 'uploadRoles';
+
+export const FILE_ROLE_DEFAULTS: Record<FileRoleKey, string[]> = {
+  deleteRoles: [RoleEnum.ADMIN],
+  downloadRoles: [RoleEnum.ADMIN],
+  uploadRoles: [RoleEnum.ADMIN],
+};
+
+/**
+ * Resolve one knob to the role list that will actually be applied.
+ *
+ * An empty array is treated as "not configured". It cannot mean "nobody": the
+ * guards read an all-empty role set as "no roles required" and return true, so
+ * honouring it literally would OPEN the route instead of closing it — the exact
+ * opposite of what someone writing `[]` intends.
+ */
+export function resolveRoles(key: FileRoleKey, config?: IFileConfig): string[] {
+  const configured = config?.[key];
+
+  if (configured === undefined) {
+    return FILE_ROLE_DEFAULTS[key];
+  }
+
+  if (!Array.isArray(configured) || configured.length === 0 || configured.some((role) => typeof role !== 'string')) {
+    logger.warn(
+      `Ignoring file.${key}: expected a non-empty array of role strings, got ${JSON.stringify(configured)}. ` +
+        `Falling back to ${JSON.stringify(FILE_ROLE_DEFAULTS[key])}.`,
+    );
+    return FILE_ROLE_DEFAULTS[key];
+  }
+
+  return configured;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Warn when presigned S3 downloads are combined with a restricted `downloadRoles`.
+ *
+ * The two settings pull in opposite directions, and the conflict is invisible at the call site:
+ *
+ * - `downloadRoles` says "only these roles may download this file". It is enforced on every request.
+ * - `presignedDownloads` answers `302` with a time-limited S3 URL instead of streaming. That URL is
+ *   a BEARER capability — authorized once, at issue time. Whoever holds it afterwards fetches the
+ *   object with no session, from any IP, until it expires, and **the grant cannot be revoked in
+ *   between**. It survives in browser history, `Referer` headers, proxy logs and chat messages.
+ *
+ * So the second setting hands out exactly what the first one restricts. That is a sound trade for
+ * public assets (which is what presigning is FOR — hence no warning when downloads are
+ * `S_EVERYONE`), and almost never what a project means when it has narrowed the roles.
+ *
+ * A warning rather than a boot failure: unlike an incoherent role vocabulary, this combination has
+ * legitimate uses (short expiry, a CDN in front, files whose audience really is "anyone who once
+ * held the link"). The operator has to be able to choose it — they just should not choose it by
+ * accident.
+ */
+export function warnOnPresignedDownloadsWithRestrictedRoles(
+  s3Config?: IS3Config,
+  fileConfig?: IFileConfig,
+): string | undefined {
+  const presigned = s3Config?.presignedDownloads;
+  const presignedEnabled =
+    presigned === true || (!!presigned && typeof presigned === 'object' && (presigned as any).enabled !== false);
+  if (!presignedEnabled) {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+
+  const downloadRoles = resolveRoles('downloadRoles', fileConfig);
+  // Public downloads are the intended use of presigning — nothing to warn about.
+  if (downloadRoles.includes(RoleEnum.S_EVERYONE)) {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+
+  // Returned as well as logged: the message IS the contract here (an operator has to be able to act
+  // on it), and a module-private Logger instance cannot be asserted against from a unit test.
+  const message =
+    `s3.presignedDownloads is enabled while file.downloadRoles restricts downloads to ` +
+    `${JSON.stringify(downloadRoles)}. A presigned URL is a BEARER capability: it is authorized ` +
+    `once, at issue time, and afterwards anyone holding it can fetch the object with no session, ` +
+    `from any IP, until it expires — the grant cannot be revoked in between, and it survives in ` +
+    `browser history, Referer headers and proxy logs. The role check therefore applies to ` +
+    `obtaining the link, not to reading the file. If these files are sensitive (personal or ` +
+    `medical data), set s3.presignedDownloads: false so the API streams them and re-checks ` +
+    `rights on every request.`;
+
+  logger.warn(message);
+  return message;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Warn when the file gate is open and NOTHING decides the per-file policy.
+ *
+ * THE GAP: the role knobs are a coarse audience filter — they answer "may this caller reach the route
+ * at all". They cannot express "…but only their own", because that sentence needs data. So a deployment
+ * that widened the gate past platform admins and expressed no per-file policy anywhere has a store
+ * every holder of that role can read in full.
+ *
+ * And that is practically reachable, not theoretically: file ids are ENUMERABLE. An ObjectId is 4 bytes
+ * of timestamp + 5 bytes of randomness generated once PER PROCESS + a 3-byte incrementing counter, so a
+ * caller who obtains one valid id — their own upload — knows the random part and a counter reference
+ * point, and neighbouring files sit on neighbouring values. Nothing rate-limits the file routes either.
+ *
+ * WHY THE CONDITIONS ARE THIS NARROW — a warning that fires on a correct configuration gets muted, and
+ * a muted warning is worse than none. So every way of DECIDING silences it, and all three are
+ * legitimate:
+ *
+ *  1. `file.access` names a project class (`'public'`, `'authenticated'`, `'owner'`, `'tenant'`);
+ *  2. `checkRights()` is overridden — the project wrote its own rule, and grading it is beyond what a
+ *     boot check can do;
+ *  3. the gate is still admin-only — a platform admin legitimately sees everything.
+ *
+ * That leaves exactly one case: the gate is open and nothing says what the policy is. This warning is
+ * about the difference between a DECISION and an OMISSION, which is the only thing a boot check can
+ * usefully detect.
+ *
+ * Multi-tenancy changes only the WORDING. An earlier version of this warning fired only for tenant
+ * projects, which was too narrow: `downloadRoles: [S_USER]` with no rule leaks every file to every
+ * signed-in user whether or not tenants exist. Where tenants DO exist, the leak also crosses that
+ * boundary, and that sentence has to appear — the file stores are reached outside Mongoose, so
+ * `mongooseTenantPlugin` never scopes them and these role names resolve against `user.roles`, a GLOBAL
+ * attribute.
+ *
+ * A warning, not a boot failure. The framework cannot know whether the files are patient documents or
+ * public logos, and refusing to start on a configuration that is correct for the second would be
+ * wrong. What it can do is refuse to be silent.
+ *
+ * @param hasPerFileRule whether `CoreFileService.checkRights()` is overridden — the caller knows,
+ *   because it has the instance; this helper stays a pure function so it can be unit-tested.
+ * @returns the message, or `undefined` when there is nothing to warn about. Returned as well as
+ *   logged for the same reason as {@link warnOnPresignedDownloadsWithRestrictedRoles}: the message IS
+ *   the contract, and a module-private Logger cannot be asserted against.
+ */
+export function warnOnUndecidedFileAccess(options: {
+  fileConfig?: IFileConfig;
+  hasPerFileRule: boolean;
+  multiTenancyEnabled: boolean;
+}): string | undefined {
+  const { fileConfig, hasPerFileRule, multiTenancyEnabled } = options;
+
+  // (1) and (2): somebody decided.
+  if (hasPerFileRule || (fileConfig?.access && fileConfig.access !== 'custom')) {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+
+  // (3): admin-only. ADMIN is unioned in by the class-level decorator regardless, so it never widens.
+  const widened: string[] = [];
+  for (const key of ['deleteRoles', 'downloadRoles', 'uploadRoles'] as FileRoleKey[]) {
+    const roles = resolveRoles(key, fileConfig);
+    if (roles.some((role) => role !== RoleEnum.ADMIN)) {
+      widened.push(`file.${key}=${JSON.stringify(roles)}`);
+    }
+  }
+  if (!widened.length) {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+
+  const tenantNote = multiTenancyEnabled
+    ? ' multiTenancy is active, and the leak crosses tenants too: the file stores are reached outside ' +
+      'Mongoose, so mongooseTenantPlugin never scopes them and these role names resolve against ' +
+      'user.roles — a GLOBAL attribute — never against membership.role.'
+    : '';
+
+  const message =
+    `The file gate is open beyond platform admins (${widened.join(', ')}), but no per-file policy is ` +
+    `declared: file.access is unset and CoreFileService.checkRights() is not overridden. Every holder ` +
+    `of such a role can therefore read, overwrite or delete EVERY file — and file ids are not secret, ` +
+    `they are ENUMERABLE (an ObjectId shares a per-process random part and an incrementing counter, so ` +
+    `one own upload reveals the neighbourhood), with no rate limit on the file routes.${tenantNote} ` +
+    `Declare the project class with file.access ('public' | 'authenticated' | 'owner' | 'tenant'), or ` +
+    `override checkRights() — see src/core/modules/file/README.md § Access control.`;
+
+  logger.warn(message);
+  return message;
+}