@lenne.tech/nest-server 11.28.1 → 11.29.0

package/docs/REQUEST-LIFECYCLE.md

@@ -528,6 +528,18 @@ Authenticates the request using three strategies in priority order:
 
 If authentication succeeds, `req.user` is set with the authenticated user (including `hasRole()` method).
 
+> **Native `/iam/*` routes bypass the `@Roles()`/`checkRoles` layer.** Better-Auth's own endpoints
+> (e.g. `POST /iam/update-user`, `POST /iam/sign-up/email`) that are **not** in
+> `CONTROLLER_HANDLED_PATHS` are forwarded raw by `CoreBetterAuthApiMiddleware` to Better-Auth's
+> native handler under its `sessionMiddleware` — i.e. reachable by **any authenticated user**,
+> independent of the controller's class-level `@Roles(ADMIN)` and nest-server's `checkRoles`. This is
+> why server-managed user fields (`roles`, `verified`, `verifiedAt`, `twoFactorEnabled`, `iamId`) are
+> locked at the Better-Auth schema layer with `input: false` (see `betterAuth.additionalUserFields[].input`
+> in `.claude/rules/configurable-features.md` and `.claude/rules/better-auth.md` §2): field-level
+> input rejection is the correct control here because the guard layer does not run on these
+> raw-forwarded routes. A forged `POST /iam/update-user {"roles":["admin"]}` is rejected with
+> `FIELD_NOT_ALLOWED` (HTTP 400) at the input-parse stage, before any persistence.
+
 #### 3. graphqlUploadExpress
 
 Only for GraphQL routes. Handles multipart file upload requests according to the [GraphQL multipart request specification](https://github.com/jaydenseric/graphql-multipart-request-spec).

package/migration-guides/11.28.1-to-11.29.0.md

@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
+# Migration Guide: 11.28.1 → 11.29.0
+
+## Overview
+
+| Category | Details |
+|----------|---------|
+| **Breaking Changes** | Server-managed Better-Auth user fields (`roles`, `verified`, `verifiedAt`, `twoFactorEnabled`, `iamId`, and by default `termsAndPrivacyAcceptedAt`) are now registered with `input: false`, so Better-Auth's **native** input parsing rejects client-supplied values. Behavioral change on `POST /iam/update-user` and `POST /iam/sign-up/email`. |
+| **Security Fix** | Closes a confirmed **vertical privilege-escalation** vulnerability (OWASP A01): any authenticated user could self-grant `admin` via `POST /iam/update-user {"roles":["admin"]}`. |
+| **New Features** | New per-field `input?: boolean` option on `IBetterAuthUserField` (`betterAuth.additionalUserFields`) so projects can mark their own fields as server-managed. New parallel-safe e2e test infrastructure (machine-wide run governor, startup sweep, `retry: 2`) — optional adoption, see below. |
+| **Bugfix** | `CoreUserService.create()` now checks email uniqueness at application level (the unique index alone misses duplicates on a fresh database while autoIndex is still building — same window on freshly deployed production DBs). **Behavioral note:** a duplicate email via `userService.create()` now always yields **400 "Email address already in use"** — previously, callers other than `signUp` could see a raw **422 Unprocessable Entity** when the error surfaced as a Mongo duplicate-key error. Adjust tests that asserted the 422. |
+| **Migration Effort** | **~0 minutes for most projects** (`pnpm update`). **Audit required** only if your project relied on client-setting one of the locked fields via the Better-Auth input path — see below. |
+
+MINOR was incremented because this repo's scheme treats behavioral/breaking changes as MINOR (MAJOR mirrors the NestJS version, still 11).
+
+---
+
+## Why this change
+
+Better-Auth registers `betterAuth.additionalUserFields` as native `additionalFields`, and Better-Auth
+defaults each field to `input: true` — i.e. **client-settable** via `POST /iam/sign-up/email` and
+`POST /iam/update-user`. Critically, `/iam/update-user` is **not** in `CONTROLLER_HANDLED_PATHS`, so
+`CoreBetterAuthApiMiddleware` forwards it raw to Better-Auth's native handler under its
+`sessionMiddleware` — reachable by **any authenticated user**, bypassing the controller's class-level
+`@Roles(ADMIN)` and nest-server's `checkRoles`.
+
+Before 11.29.0 the server-managed `roles` field was registered **without** `input: false`. The result:
+
+```http
+POST /iam/update-user
+Authorization: Bearer <any authenticated user's token>
+
+{ "roles": ["admin"] }
+```
+
+…wrote `roles: ["admin"]` onto the caller's own user row, which then became authoritative for
+`@Restricted(RoleEnum.ADMIN)`. A freshly self-registered user could make themselves admin.
+
+## What changed
+
+Server-managed core fields are now registered with `input: false` and **re-asserted after** any
+project `additionalUserFields` are merged, so a project override cannot silently re-open them. The
+security-critical, hard-locked set (`PROTECTED_INPUT_FALSE_KEYS`) is:
+
+| Field | Prevented attack |
+|-------|------------------|
+| `roles` | vertical privilege escalation (self-granting `admin`) |
+| `verified` / `verifiedAt` | email-verification bypass |
+| `twoFactorEnabled` | self-toggling the 2FA state |
+| `iamId` | identity / account-linking hijack |
+
+The lock is **column-scoped**: a shadow field whose `fieldName` maps to one of these columns
+(e.g. `{ customRoles: { fieldName: 'roles', input: true } }`) is also forced to `input: false`.
+
+Runtime behavior after the change:
+
+- `POST /iam/update-user {"roles":[...]}` (or `verified`, etc.) → **`FIELD_NOT_ALLOWED` (HTTP 400)**.
+- `POST /iam/sign-up/email {"roles":[...]}` → account created with the **server default** (`roles: []`);
+  the forged value is silently dropped, not persisted.
+- `termsAndPrivacyAcceptedAt` is `input: false` by **default** but is intentionally **not** in the
+  hard-lock set (it is a consent timestamp, not a privilege boundary) — a project may re-open it with
+  `additionalUserFields: { termsAndPrivacyAcceptedAt: { type: 'date', input: true } }`.
+
+**Unaffected:** nest-server's own role-assignment path — `UserService.setRoles`,
+`CrudService.update` (via `checkRoles`), and the Better-Auth user mapper's native `$set` writes — does
+**not** use Better-Auth input parsing and keeps working exactly as before. `input: false` only gates
+the Better-Auth native sign-up/update-user routes.
+
+---
+
+## Quick Migration (npm mode)
+
+For the overwhelming majority of projects, **no code change is required**:
+
+```bash
+pnpm add @lenne.tech/nest-server@11.29.0
+pnpm run build
+pnpm test
+```
+
+Your existing role assignment (admin panels calling `updateUser`/`setRoles`, sign-up flows,
+verification flows) continues to work — those go through nest-server's service layer, not the
+Better-Auth native input path.
+
+---
+
+## New: Parallel-Safe e2e Test Infrastructure (Optional Adoption)
+
+This release also overhauls the e2e test infrastructure so that MANY parallel sessions
+(`lt ticket` worktrees, several projects, agent sessions) can run test suites on one machine
+without starving each other or leaving database garbage behind. **These are repository files, not
+npm-package code** — `pnpm update` does NOT bring them into your project. Adopt them by syncing the
+test files from [nest-server-starter](https://github.com/lenneTech/nest-server-starter) (or via the
+lt-dev fullstack update agent):
+
+| File | What it adds |
+|------|--------------|
+| `tests/e2e-run-slots.ts` (new) | **Machine-wide run governor**: at most N concurrent e2e runs across ALL lt projects (slot files in the OS temp dir, PID-liveness crash recovery, fail-open). Knobs: `LT_E2E_MAX_RUNS` (0 disables), `LT_E2E_SLOT_DIR`, `LT_E2E_SLOT_TIMEOUT`. |
+| `tests/global-setup.ts` | **Startup sweep** — stale test DBs of this project AND leftover upload-test artifacts (`tests/*.txt` / `*.bin` from aborted file-upload specs) are removed when the next run STARTS, so cleanup survives SIGKILL (watchdog) and `--reporter` CLI overrides; then acquires a governor slot. |
+| `tests/db-lifecycle.reporter.ts` | Exports the shared `isStaleTestDb()` predicate used by the sweep; failure message now points to the startup-sweep semantics. |
+| `vitest-e2e.config.ts` | Auto low-resource mode when **another e2e run is active** (deterministic slot signal — the 1-minute load average structurally lags short runs) or load is high; **`retry: 2`** (a higher retry turns one broken spec file into an hour-long 0%-CPU grind that looks like a deadlock). |
+| `tests/unit/e2e-run-slots.spec.ts` (new) | Unit tests for the governor. |
+
+Measured effect (12-core machine): two overlapping full-speed runs previously drove load to 30 with
+spurious 401 failures; with the governor, 6 parallel project checks all pass in 109–125s. A run
+printing `[e2e-governor] waiting for a free e2e slot` every 15s is **queued, not hung**.
+
+Rule carried over from the reporter docs: specs that need an extra database must derive it via
+`deriveTestDbUri('<suffix>')` — never a hardcoded or `Date.now()`-based name — and drop their DB
+**after** `app.close()` (async module init can re-create a database dropped while the app is alive).
+
+**Related: `scripts/check.mjs` (canonical version distributed by the lt CLI).** The report-driven
+check wrapper gained the same robustness set across all lt base repos: an **idle-watchdog** that
+kills a test step after 300s of silence and diagnoses it as a hang (`CHECK_IDLE_TIMEOUT` /
+`--idle-timeout=<s>`, 0 disables), whole-process-tree kills (no orphaned fork workers), a
+SIGTERM/SIGKILL exit hint (a killed step is not an assertion failure), summed vitest metrics
+(unit + e2e runs are no longer under-reported), and the audit rendered like every other step.
+Consumer projects receive it via `lt fullstack update` (self-heal; skips a `scripts/check.mjs`
+with uncommitted local edits) — `lt dev doctor` warns when the local copy drifts from the
+canonical version.
+
+---
+
+## Audit Before Upgrading
+
+> **Mirrors the v11.28.x precedent in [`.claude/rules/role-system.md`](../.claude/rules/role-system.md)
+> ("Audit every `S_SELF`/`S_CREATOR` on an input type before upgrading").**
+
+You only need to act if **both** are true for your project:
+
+1. You send `roles`, `verified`, `verifiedAt`, `twoFactorEnabled`, `iamId` (or
+   `termsAndPrivacyAcceptedAt`) in the **body of `POST /iam/update-user` or `POST /iam/sign-up/email`**
+   (i.e. through Better-Auth's native input path), **and**
+2. You expected that value to be persisted.
+
+If so, those requests will now receive `400 FIELD_NOT_ALLOWED` (update-user) or silently get the
+server default (sign-up). **Move the assignment to the correct server-side path:**
+
+```typescript
+// BEFORE (relied on Better-Auth native input — now rejected):
+// POST /iam/update-user { "roles": ["admin"] }
+
+// AFTER — assign roles through nest-server's service layer (authorized + audited):
+await this.userService.setRoles(userId, [RoleEnum.ADMIN]);
+// or, from an admin-driven update that runs checkRoles:
+await this.userService.update(userId, { roles: [RoleEnum.ADMIN] }, { currentUser: adminUser });
+```
+
+If you deliberately need one of your **own** `additionalUserFields` to be server-managed, set
+`input: false` on it:
+
+```typescript
+betterAuth: {
+  additionalUserFields: {
+    internalScore: { type: 'number', defaultValue: 0, input: false }, // rejects client input
+  },
+}
+```
+
+**Note:** You cannot re-open a hard-locked key (`roles`, `verified`, `verifiedAt`, `twoFactorEnabled`,
+`iamId`) via `additionalUserFields` — the re-assertion re-locks it by design. This is intentional and
+is the security guarantee of this release.
+
+---
+
+## Compatibility Notes
+
+| Pattern | Status |
+|---------|--------|
+| Admin panel updating roles via `UserService`/`CrudService`/GraphQL `updateUser` | ✅ Unaffected — service layer, not Better-Auth input |
+| Sign-up / email verification / 2FA enable-disable flows | ✅ Unaffected — server-managed |
+| Reading `roles`/`verified` in responses | ✅ Unaffected — `input: false` only gates writes |
+| Client sending `roles`/`verified` in `/iam/update-user` or `/iam/sign-up/email` body | ⚠️ Now rejected/dropped — this was the vulnerability |
+| Custom `additionalUserFields` (non-protected keys) | ✅ Unaffected — still client-settable unless you set `input: false` |
+
+### Toolchain: `engines.pnpm` now advertised
+
+`package.json` now declares `engines.pnpm: "^11.0.0"` (and drops the repo-internal `packageManager`
+pin). Impact on consumers is **low and pnpm-only**:
+
+- **npm / yarn consumers:** unaffected — they ignore `engines.pnpm`.
+- **pnpm consumers on pnpm ≥ 11:** unaffected.
+- **pnpm consumers on pnpm < 11:** you may see an `EBADENGINE` / `ERR_PNPM_UNSUPPORTED_ENGINE`
+  **warning** on install (a hard error only if you run with `engine-strict=true`). Upgrade to pnpm 11
+  (`corepack use pnpm@11` or `npm i -g pnpm@11`) to silence it. The framework's runtime does not
+  depend on pnpm — this only concerns the install step for pnpm-based projects.
+
+No `engines.node` change (still `>= 22`).
+
+### Vendor-mode consumers (`src/core/` copied into your project)
+
+This release touches only `src/core/modules/better-auth/better-auth.config.ts`,
+`src/core/common/interfaces/server-options.interface.ts` and
+`src/core/modules/user/core-user.service.ts` (bugfix: application-level email-uniqueness check in
+`create()` — the unique index alone misses duplicates on a fresh database while autoIndex is still
+building; raw Mongo duplicate-key errors now also map to the correct "Email address already in use"
+message) — no new files, no new imports, no new runtime dependencies. After syncing `src/core/` (via `/lt-dev:backend:update-nest-server-core` /
+`lt-dev:nest-server-core-updater`), no additional package or config work is required. Run your
+Better-Auth tests to confirm.
+
+---
+
+## Troubleshooting
+
+### A client integration started getting `400 FIELD_NOT_ALLOWED` on `/iam/update-user`
+
+Working as intended. The client was setting a server-managed field (`roles`/`verified`/…) through the
+Better-Auth native input path. Move that assignment to the server (`UserService.setRoles` /
+`CrudService.update` with an authorized `currentUser`), or — for your own field — decide whether it
+should really be `input: false`.
+
+### A user's `roles` no longer update after sign-up
+
+If you relied on passing `roles` in the sign-up body, that value is now dropped (server default
+applied). Assign roles explicitly after account creation via `UserService.setRoles`, or through your
+admin-provisioning flow.
+
+### I need one of my own additional fields to reject client input
+
+Add `input: false` to it in `betterAuth.additionalUserFields`. See the "Audit" section above.
+
+---
+
+## References
+
+- [Role System — S_ roles, 401/403 policy, S_SELF/S_CREATOR ownership](../.claude/rules/role-system.md)
+- [Better-Auth Module Rules — §2 server-managed fields must be `input: false`](../.claude/rules/better-auth.md)
+- [Configurable Features — BetterAuth Server-Managed User Fields](../.claude/rules/configurable-features.md)
+- [Request Lifecycle — native `/iam/*` routes bypass the guard layer](../docs/REQUEST-LIFECYCLE.md)
+- Regression test: `tests/stories/better-auth-privilege-escalation.e2e-spec.ts`
+- [Migration Guide 11.28.0 → 11.28.1](./11.28.0-to-11.28.1.md) — previous release
+- [nest-server-starter](https://github.com/lenneTech/nest-server-starter) (reference implementation)

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@lenne.tech/nest-server",
-  "version": "11.28.1",
+  "version": "11.29.0",
   "description": "Modern, fast, powerful Node.js web framework in TypeScript based on Nest with a GraphQL API and a connection to MongoDB (or other databases).",
   "keywords": [
     "node",
@@ -23,9 +23,10 @@
     "build:dev": "pnpm run build",
     "c": "pnpm run check",
     "check": "node scripts/check.mjs",
-    "check:raw": "pnpm audit && pnpm run format:check && pnpm run lint && pnpm run check:swc-tdz && pnpm test && pnpm run build && bash scripts/check-server-start.sh",
-    "check:fix": "pnpm install && pnpm audit --fix && pnpm run format && pnpm run lint:fix && pnpm run check:swc-tdz && pnpm test && pnpm run build && bash scripts/check-server-start.sh",
-    "check:naf": "pnpm install && pnpm run format && pnpm run lint:fix && pnpm run check:swc-tdz && pnpm test && pnpm run build && bash scripts/check-server-start.sh",
+    "check:raw": "pnpm install --frozen-lockfile && pnpm audit && pnpm run format:check && pnpm run lint && pnpm run check:swc-tdz && pnpm test && pnpm run build && pnpm run check:manifest && bash scripts/check-server-start.sh",
+    "check:fix": "pnpm install && pnpm audit --fix && pnpm run format && pnpm run lint:fix && pnpm run check:swc-tdz && pnpm test && pnpm run build && pnpm run check:manifest && bash scripts/check-server-start.sh",
+    "check:naf": "pnpm install && pnpm run format && pnpm run lint:fix && pnpm run check:swc-tdz && pnpm test && pnpm run build && pnpm run check:manifest && bash scripts/check-server-start.sh",
+    "check:manifest": "node scripts/check-package-manifest.mjs",
     "check:swc-tdz": "nest build -b swc -p tsconfig.swc-tdz.json && node scripts/check-swc-tdz.mjs",
     "cf": "pnpm run check:fix",
     "cnaf": "pnpm run check:naf",
@@ -75,7 +76,8 @@
     "url": "https://github.com/lenneTech/nest-server/issues"
   },
   "engines": {
-    "node": ">= 22"
+    "node": ">= 22",
+    "pnpm": "^11.0.0"
   },
   "dependencies": {
     "@apollo/server": "5.5.1",
@@ -187,6 +189,5 @@
   ],
   "watch": {
     "build:dev": "src"
-  },
-  "packageManager": "pnpm@11.13.0"
+  }
 }

package/src/core/common/interfaces/server-options.interface.ts

@@ -727,6 +727,18 @@ export interface IBetterAuthUserField {
    */
   fieldName?: string;
 
+  /**
+   * Whether a client may supply this field's value via Better-Auth's native input parsing
+   * (sign-up create / update-user).
+   *
+   * When `false`, Better-Auth rejects client-supplied values: it throws `FIELD_NOT_ALLOWED`
+   * on the update-user route and silently substitutes the server-side default on sign-up.
+   * Use this to mark server-managed fields that must never be set from client input.
+   *
+   * @default true (Better-Auth default when omitted)
+   */
+  input?: boolean;
+
   /**
    * Whether this field is required
    */

package/src/core/modules/better-auth/README.md

@@ -641,6 +641,8 @@ const config = {
       department: { type: 'string', required: true },
       preferences: { type: 'string', defaultValue: '{}' },
       isActive: { type: 'boolean', defaultValue: true },
+      // Server-managed field: reject any client-supplied value (sign-up / update-user)
+      internalScore: { type: 'number', defaultValue: 0, input: false },
     },
   },
 };
@@ -648,6 +650,26 @@ const config = {
 
 **Available field types:** `'string'`, `'number'`, `'boolean'`, `'date'`, `'json'`, `'string[]'`, `'number[]'`
 
+**Field options:**
+
+| Option         | Type       | Default                      | Description                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
+| -------------- | ---------- | ---------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| `type`         | field type | —                            | Required. One of the field types above.                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
+| `defaultValue` | any        | —                            | Value used when the client does not (or may not) supply one.                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
+| `required`     | boolean    | `false`                      | Whether the field is required.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
+| `input`        | boolean    | `true` (Better-Auth default) | When `false`, Better-Auth rejects client-supplied values: it throws `FIELD_NOT_ALLOWED` (HTTP 400) on `POST /iam/update-user` and substitutes the server default on sign-up. Use it to mark **server-managed** fields that must never be set from client input. |
+
+> **⚠️ Security — server-managed core fields are hard-locked.** The core fields `roles`, `verified`,
+> `verifiedAt`, `twoFactorEnabled` and `iamId` are registered with `input: false` and **re-asserted
+> after** your `additionalUserFields` are merged, so a project override **cannot** re-open them for
+> client input. This closes a vertical privilege-escalation path (a client can no longer self-grant
+> `roles: ['admin']`, self-verify, or toggle 2FA via `POST /iam/update-user`). The lock also applies
+> to any shadow field whose `fieldName` maps to one of those columns. `roles`/`verified` etc. are
+> still assigned server-side through nest-server's own service layer (`UserService.setRoles`,
+> `CrudService.update` with `checkRoles`) — that path does not use Better-Auth input parsing and is
+> unaffected. (`termsAndPrivacyAcceptedAt` is `input: false` by default but is intentionally NOT
+> hard-locked — it is a consent timestamp, not a privilege boundary, so a project may re-open it.)
+
 ### Module Integration (Recommended Pattern)
 
 By default (`autoRegister: false`), projects integrate BetterAuth via an **extended module** in their project. This follows the same pattern as Legacy Auth and allows for custom resolvers, controllers, and project-specific authentication logic.

package/src/core/modules/better-auth/better-auth.config.ts

@@ -275,6 +275,14 @@ interface SocialProviderConfig {
 interface UserFieldConfig {
   defaultValue?: unknown;
   fieldName?: string;
+  /**
+   * Whether a client may supply this field's value via Better-Auth's native input parsing
+   * (sign-up create / update-user). When `false`, Better-Auth rejects client-supplied values
+   * (throws FIELD_NOT_ALLOWED on update, silently substitutes the server default on create).
+   * Defaults to `true` in Better-Auth when omitted. Used to lock server-managed fields
+   * (e.g. `roles`) so authenticated users cannot self-set them.
+   */
+  input?: boolean;
   required?: boolean;
   type: BetterAuthFieldType;
 }
@@ -808,6 +816,28 @@ export function buildTrustedOrigins(
   return undefined;
 }
 
+/**
+ * Server-managed, security-critical user fields whose `input: false` MUST be re-asserted after
+ * merging project-supplied `additionalUserFields`, so a project override cannot silently re-open
+ * a protected key. Each of these, if client-settable, is a concrete vulnerability:
+ *
+ * - `roles`            → vertical privilege escalation (self-granting `admin`)
+ * - `verified`         → email-verification bypass
+ * - `verifiedAt`       → email-verification bypass
+ * - `twoFactorEnabled` → self-toggling the 2FA state
+ * - `iamId`            → identity / account-linking hijack
+ *
+ * Note: `termsAndPrivacyAcceptedAt` is server-managed by default (input:false above) but is
+ * intentionally NOT hard-locked here — a project may legitimately choose to accept a client-set
+ * consent timestamp; it is not a privilege boundary.
+ *
+ * These protections only concern Better-Auth's native input parsing (sign-up / update-user).
+ * nest-server's own role assignment (UserService/CrudService `checkRoles` + Mongoose writes,
+ * `setRoles`, and the user mapper's native `$set` writes) does NOT use Better-Auth input parsing
+ * and is therefore unaffected by `input: false`.
+ */
+const PROTECTED_INPUT_FALSE_KEYS = ['iamId', 'roles', 'twoFactorEnabled', 'verified', 'verifiedAt'] as const;
+
 /**
  * Builds the user additional fields configuration.
  * Merges core fields (firstName, lastName, etc.) with custom fields from config.
@@ -824,6 +854,9 @@ function buildUserFields(config: IBetterAuth): Record<string, UserFieldConfig> {
     iamId: {
       defaultValue: null,
       fieldName: 'iamId',
+      // Server-managed: linked to the Better-Auth identity by the user mapper (native DB write),
+      // never from client input. input:false blocks identity/account-linking hijack.
+      input: false,
       type: 'string',
     },
     lastName: {
@@ -834,45 +867,83 @@ function buildUserFields(config: IBetterAuth): Record<string, UserFieldConfig> {
     roles: {
       defaultValue: [],
       fieldName: 'roles',
+      // Server-managed: assigned via UserService/CrudService (checkRoles guard) + setRoles,
+      // never from client input. input:false blocks vertical privilege escalation
+      // (e.g. a self-registered user POSTing {"roles":["admin"]} to /iam/update-user).
+      input: false,
       type: 'string[]',
     },
     // Track when terms and privacy policy were accepted (for sign-up checks)
     termsAndPrivacyAcceptedAt: {
       defaultValue: null,
       fieldName: 'termsAndPrivacyAcceptedAt',
+      // Server-managed consent timestamp: set by the sign-up flow, not client input.
+      input: false,
       type: 'date',
     },
     twoFactorEnabled: {
       defaultValue: false,
       fieldName: 'twoFactorEnabled',
+      // Server-managed: toggled by the 2FA enable/disable flow, never from client input.
+      // input:false blocks self-toggling the 2FA state.
+      input: false,
       type: 'boolean',
     },
     verified: {
       defaultValue: false,
       fieldName: 'verified',
+      // Server-managed: synced from Better-Auth email verification, never from client input.
+      // input:false blocks email-verification bypass.
+      input: false,
       type: 'boolean',
     },
     // Track when email was verified (synced from Better-Auth)
     verifiedAt: {
       defaultValue: null,
       fieldName: 'verifiedAt',
+      // Server-managed: synced from Better-Auth email verification, never from client input.
+      // input:false blocks email-verification bypass.
+      input: false,
       type: 'date',
     },
   };
 
   // Merge with custom additional fields from configuration
-  // Custom fields can override core fields or add new ones
+  // Custom fields can override core fields or add new ones.
+  // The `input` flag is carried through so projects can mark their own fields as server-managed.
   if (config.additionalUserFields) {
     for (const [key, field] of Object.entries(config.additionalUserFields)) {
       coreFields[key] = {
         defaultValue: field.defaultValue,
         fieldName: field.fieldName || key,
+        input: field.input,
         required: field.required,
         type: field.type,
       };
     }
   }
 
+  // Security: re-assert input:false on server-managed, security-critical fields AFTER the merge,
+  // so a project-supplied additionalUserFields override cannot silently re-open a protected key
+  // (privilege escalation, email-verification bypass, 2FA bypass, identity hijack).
+  for (const key of PROTECTED_INPUT_FALSE_KEYS) {
+    if (coreFields[key]) {
+      coreFields[key].input = false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Security (defense-in-depth): the loop above keys on the well-known object key. A project could
+  // still reopen a protected COLUMN by registering a shadow field under a different key that maps to
+  // it, e.g. `additionalUserFields: { customRoles: { fieldName: 'roles', input: true } }`. Lock any
+  // such field too, so no additionalUserFields entry — regardless of its key — can feed client input
+  // into a protected column.
+  const protectedColumns = new Set<string>(PROTECTED_INPUT_FALSE_KEYS);
+  for (const [key, field] of Object.entries(coreFields)) {
+    if (!protectedColumns.has(key) && field.fieldName && protectedColumns.has(field.fieldName)) {
+      field.input = false;
+    }
+  }
+
   return coreFields;
 }
 

package/src/core/modules/user/core-user.service.ts

@@ -53,6 +53,19 @@ export abstract class CoreUserService<
     serviceOptions = prepareServiceOptionsForCreate(serviceOptions);
     return this.process(
       async (data) => {
+        // Application-level email-uniqueness check. The unique index alone is NOT
+        // sufficient: on a FRESH database Mongoose builds indexes asynchronously
+        // (autoIndex), so an early duplicate sign-up can slip through before the
+        // index exists — observed as a load-dependent e2e flake, and the same
+        // window exists on a freshly deployed production database. The index
+        // remains the backstop for truly concurrent duplicate requests.
+        if (data.input?.email) {
+          const existing = await this.mainDbModel.findOne({ email: data.input.email }).lean().exec();
+          if (existing) {
+            throw new BadRequestException('Email address already in use');
+          }
+        }
+
         // Create user with verification token
         const currentUserId = serviceOptions?.currentUser?._id;
         const createdUser = new this.mainDbModel({
@@ -66,7 +79,7 @@ export abstract class CoreUserService<
         try {
           await createdUser.save();
         } catch (error) {
-          if (error?.errors?.email?.kind === 'unique') {
+          if (error?.errors?.email?.kind === 'unique' || error?.code === 11000) {
             throw new BadRequestException('Email address already in use');
           } else {
             throw new UnprocessableEntityException();