@lenne.tech/nest-server 11.22.1 → 11.23.1

package/docs/REQUEST-LIFECYCLE.md

@@ -863,6 +863,28 @@ The `process()` method in `ModuleService` is the **primary** way to handle CRUD
   +---------------------------------------------------------------+
 ```
 
+### Depth-Based Optimization (v11.23.0+)
+
+When `process()` is called from within another `process()` call (service cascades like A.create → B.create → C.create), steps 4–6 are **conditionally skipped** on inner calls to avoid redundant work:
+
+| Step | Depth 0 (outermost) | Depth > 0 (nested) |
+|------|---------------------|---------------------|
+| 1. prepareInput | Runs | Runs |
+| 2. checkRights (INPUT) | Runs | Runs |
+| 3. serviceFunc | Runs | Runs |
+| 4. processFieldSelection | Runs | **Skipped** (unless `populate` explicitly set) |
+| 5. prepareOutput (model mapping) | Runs | **Skipped** (secret removal still active) |
+| 6. checkRights (OUTPUT) | Runs | **Skipped** |
+
+**Security is maintained** because:
+1. Input authorization (step 2) always runs at every depth
+2. Output authorization (step 6) runs at the outermost call
+3. `CheckSecurityInterceptor` (Safety Net) runs on the final HTTP response
+
+**Important:** Code running at depth > 0 (cron jobs, queue consumers, event handlers outside the HTTP cycle) must NOT return data directly to external consumers without either an outer depth-0 `process()` call or manual `checkRights` — the output rights check is skipped at depth > 0.
+
+See [process() Performance Optimization](process-performance-optimization.md) for details.
+
 ### Key Options
 
 | Option | Type | Default | Effect |
@@ -870,8 +892,9 @@ The `process()` method in `ModuleService` is the **primary** way to handle CRUD
 | `force` | boolean | `false` | Disables checkRights, checkRoles, removeSecrets, bypasses role guard plugin |
 | `raw` | boolean | `false` | Disables prepareInput and prepareOutput entirely |
 | `checkRights` | boolean | `true` | Enable/disable authorization checks |
-| `populate` | object | - | Field selection for population |
+| `populate` | object | - | Field selection for population (overrides nested skip) |
 | `currentUser` | object | from request | Override the current user |
+| `debugProcessInput` | boolean | `false` | Config flag: log when prepareInput changes the input type (performance cost) |
 
 ### Alternative: processResult()
 
@@ -883,7 +906,7 @@ const doc = await this.mainDbModel.findById(id).exec();
 return this.processResult(doc, serviceOptions);
 ```
 
-`processResult()` handles population and `prepareOutput()` only. Security is handled by the Safety Net (Mongoose plugins for input, interceptors for output).
+`processResult()` handles population and `prepareOutput()` only. It does **not** perform authorization checks (`checkRights`). Security is handled by the Safety Net (Mongoose plugins for input, interceptors for output). If called outside an HTTP request cycle (cron, queue), call `checkRights` manually before returning data to external consumers.
 
 ---
 

package/docs/native-driver-security.md

@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+# Native MongoDB Driver Access — Security Policy
+
+## Problem
+
+Mongoose registers plugins (Tenant isolation, Audit fields, RoleGuard, Password hashing, ID transformation) as pre/post hooks on schema operations. These hooks **only** fire on Mongoose Model methods — not on the native MongoDB driver.
+
+Three access paths bypass all plugins:
+
+```typescript
+// Path 1: model.collection.* (native driver via Mongoose Model)
+await this.userModel.collection.insertOne(doc);     // No tenantId, no audit, no password hash
+
+// Path 2: model.db (Mongoose Connection → native Db → native MongoClient)
+await this.userModel.db.db.collection('users').insertOne(doc);  // Same problem
+
+// Path 3: connection.db.collection() (native driver via injected Connection)
+await this.connection.db.collection('users').insertOne(doc);  // Same problem
+```
+
+### What Gets Bypassed
+
+| Plugin | Function | Risk When Bypassed |
+|--------|---------|---------------------|
+| **Tenant Plugin** | Sets tenantId on new documents, filters queries | Data leak between tenants |
+| **Audit Plugin** | Sets createdBy/updatedBy | No traceability |
+| **RoleGuard Plugin** | Prevents role escalation | Privilege escalation |
+| **Password Plugin** | Hashes passwords (bcrypt) | Plaintext passwords in DB |
+| **ID Plugin** | Transforms _id to id | Inconsistent API responses |
+
+---
+
+## Protection: Three Layers
+
+### Layer 1: TypeScript Type Guard in CrudService
+
+`mainDbModel` is blocked via `Omit<Model, 'collection' | 'db'>` type (`SafeModel`):
+
+```typescript
+this.mainDbModel.find(...)           // Works
+this.mainDbModel.insertMany(...)     // Works
+this.mainDbModel.collection          // TypeScript error
+this.mainDbModel.db                  // TypeScript error
+
+this.getNativeCollection('reason')   // Escape hatch for native Collection, with logging
+this.getNativeConnection('reason')           // Escape hatch for Mongoose Connection, with logging
+```
+
+**`getNativeCollection(reason)`** and **`getNativeConnection(reason)`** are the only ways to access the native driver from CrudService-based services. They:
+- Require a reason (string parameter)
+- Log a `[SECURITY]` warning on every access
+- Throw an error if no reason is provided
+
+### Layer 2: CLAUDE.md Rules
+
+Documented in `nest-server/CLAUDE.md`, `nest-server-starter/CLAUDE.md`, and `lt-monorepo/CLAUDE.md`:
+- `model.collection.*` is forbidden
+- `connection.db.collection()` only for schema-less collections
+- Mongoose Model methods as alternatives
+
+### Layer 3: AI Review Rules
+
+Review agents (backend-reviewer, security-reviewer, code-reviewer) check on every review:
+- `.collection.` access on Mongoose Models → Security risk (HIGH)
+- `.db.collection()` on tenant-scoped collections → Security risk
+- `.db.collection()` on schema-less collections → Allowed
+
+---
+
+## Secure Alternatives
+
+| Forbidden (native driver) | Allowed (Mongoose — plugins active) |
+|--------------------------|-------------------------------------|
+| `collection.insertOne(doc)` | `Model.insertMany([doc])` |
+| `collection.bulkWrite(ops)` | `Model.bulkWrite(ops)` |
+| `collection.updateOne(f, u)` | `Model.updateOne(f, u)` |
+| `collection.updateMany(f, u)` | `Model.updateMany(f, u)` |
+| `collection.deleteOne(f)` | `Model.deleteOne(f)` |
+| `collection.deleteMany(f)` | `Model.deleteMany(f)` |
+| `collection.find(f)` | `Model.find(f)` or `Model.find(f).lean()` |
+| `collection.findOne(f)` | `Model.findOne(f)` or `Model.findOne(f).lean()` |
+| `collection.aggregate(p)` | `Model.aggregate(p)` |
+| `collection.countDocuments(f)` | `Model.countDocuments(f)` |
+
+**Performance:** Mongoose Model methods have minimal overhead compared to the native driver — the plugins themselves cost < 0.1ms per call (see `docs/process-performance-optimization.md`).
+
+---
+
+## Allowed Cases for connection.db.collection()
+
+| Use Case | Example | Why Allowed |
+|----------|---------|-------------|
+| Schema-less collections | `db.collection('mcp_oauth_clients')` | No Mongoose schema, no tenantId field |
+| BetterAuth tables | `db.collection('session')`, `db.collection('account')` | IAM infrastructure, not tenant-scoped |
+| Read-only aggregations | `db.collection('incidents').countDocuments({tenantId, ...})` | Read-only, manual tenant filter |
+| Admin operations | `db.collection('users').createIndex(...)` | Index management, no CRUD |
+| DevOps/Backup | `db.collection(name).drop()` | One-time admin actions |
+
+### Not Allowed
+
+```typescript
+// Write on tenant-scoped collection without Mongoose
+await this.connection.db.collection('orders').insertOne({ ... });
+// → await this.orderModel.insertMany([{ ... }]);
+
+// Read without tenant filter on tenant-scoped data
+await this.connection.db.collection('orders').find({}).toArray();
+// → await this.orderModel.find({});  // Tenant plugin filters automatically
+```
+
+---
+
+## getNativeCollection() / getNativeConnection() Reference
+
+```typescript
+// Definitions in CrudService:
+protected getNativeCollection(reason: string): Collection
+protected getNativeConnection(reason: string): Connection
+
+// Usage — native Collection:
+const col = this.getNativeCollection('Migration: Bulk import of historical data without tenant context');
+await col.insertOne(doc);
+
+// Usage — native Db (for cross-collection reads, schema-less collections):
+const conn = this.getNativeConnection('Statistics: count chatmessages across all tenants');
+const count = await conn.db.collection('chatmessages').countDocuments({ ... });
+
+// Without reason → Error:
+this.getNativeCollection('');  // throws Error
+this.getNativeConnection('');          // throws Error
+
+// Logging:
+// [SECURITY] Native collection access: Migration: Bulk import... (Model: MonitorCheck)
+// [SECURITY] Native db access: Statistics: count chatmessages... (Model: Statistics)
+```
+
+---
+
+## Review Checklist
+
+When reviewing code (manual or AI), check for `.collection.` and `.db.collection(`:
+
+```
+1. Is it model.collection.* ?
+   → ALWAYS a security risk. Use getNativeCollection() or Model method.
+
+2. Is it connection.db.collection('name') ?
+   → Does the collection have a Mongoose schema with tenantId?
+     YES → Security violation. Use Mongoose Model.
+     NO  → Continue to 3.
+   → Are data being written?
+     YES → Verify tenantId/audit is set manually.
+     NO  → Allowed (read-only).
+```

package/docs/process-performance-optimization.md

@@ -0,0 +1,493 @@
+# nest-server: process() Performance-Optimierung
+
+## Kontext
+
+Die `process()` Pipeline in `ModuleService` ist der zentrale Verarbeitungspfad fuer alle CRUD-Operationen. Bei hochfrequenten oder verschachtelten Aufrufen (Service-Kaskaden) entsteht unnoetig hoher Memory- und CPU-Verbrauch. Die folgenden Optimierungen reduzieren den Overhead ohne die Sicherheit herabzusetzen.
+
+**Analyse-Basis:** 8 Kundenprojekte + 13 lenne.tech-Projekte geprueft — alle Aenderungen sind rueckwaertskompatibel.
+
+---
+
+## Aenderung 1: JSON.stringify Debug konfigurierbar machen
+
+### Datei: `src/core/common/services/module.service.ts`
+
+### Problem
+
+Zeilen 149-164 serialisieren den Input bei **jedem** process()-Aufruf zweimal (vorher/nachher) — nur fuer einen `console.debug` Vergleich. Das `new Promise(() => ...)` ist ein Fire-and-Forget ohne await.
+
+### Aktueller Code (Zeile 149-165)
+
+```typescript
+const originalInput = config.input;
+const inputJSON = JSON.stringify(originalInput);
+const preparedInput = await this.prepareInput(config.input, config);
+new Promise(() => {
+  if (
+    inputJSON?.replace(/"password":\s*"[^"]*"/, '') !==
+    JSON.stringify(preparedInput)?.replace(/"password":\s*"[^"]*"/, '')
+  ) {
+    console.debug(
+      'CheckSecurityInterceptor: securityCheck changed input of type',
+      originalInput.constructor.name,
+      'to type',
+      preparedInput.constructor.name,
+    );
+  }
+});
+config.input = preparedInput;
+```
+
+### Neuer Code
+
+```typescript
+const preparedInput = await this.prepareInput(config.input, config);
+
+// Debug-Vergleich nur wenn explizit konfiguriert (default: false)
+if (this.configService?.getFastButReadOnly('debugProcessInput', false)) {
+  try {
+    const originalJSON = JSON.stringify(config.input)?.replace(/"password":\s*"[^"]*"/, '');
+    const preparedJSON = JSON.stringify(preparedInput)?.replace(/"password":\s*"[^"]*"/, '');
+    if (originalJSON !== preparedJSON) {
+      console.debug(
+        'process: prepareInput changed input of type',
+        config.input?.constructor?.name,
+        'to type',
+        preparedInput?.constructor?.name,
+      );
+    }
+  } catch {
+    // JSON.stringify kann bei zirkulaeren Referenzen fehlschlagen — ignorieren
+  }
+}
+
+config.input = preparedInput;
+```
+
+### Datei: `src/core/common/interfaces/server-options.interface.ts`
+
+In das `IServerOptions`-Interface (oder dem passenden Config-Bereich) hinzufuegen:
+
+```typescript
+/**
+ * When true, logs a debug message when prepareInput() changes the input type.
+ * Default: false. Enable only for debugging — has performance cost due to JSON.stringify.
+ */
+debugProcessInput?: boolean;
+```
+
+### Sicherheit
+
+Nicht betroffen — rein diagnostisch.
+
+### Kompatibilitaet
+
+Default `false` — kein bestehendes Projekt aendert sein Verhalten.
+
+---
+
+## Aenderung 2: this.get(dbObject) durch Lean Query ersetzen
+
+### Datei: `src/core/common/services/module.service.ts`
+
+### Problem
+
+Zeilen 168-176 rufen `this.get()` auf, was **rekursiv** die gesamte process()-Pipeline durchlaeuft — inklusive prepareInput, checkRights, processFieldSelection, prepareOutput. Das ist unnoetig, weil das dbObject nur als Kontext fuer den Rights-Check gebraucht wird.
+
+Zusaetzlich ist es sogar **kontraproduktiv**: `this.get()` ohne `force` kann Felder wie `createdBy` entfernen (wegen `@Restricted(RoleEnum.ADMIN)`), die dann fuer den `S_CREATOR`-Check fehlen.
+
+### Aktueller Code (Zeile 168-176)
+
+```typescript
+// Get DB object
+if (config.dbObject && config.checkRights && this.checkRights) {
+  if (typeof config.dbObject === 'string' || config.dbObject instanceof Types.ObjectId) {
+    const dbObject = await this.get(getStringIds(config.dbObject));
+    if (dbObject) {
+      config.dbObject = dbObject;
+    }
+  }
+}
+```
+
+### Neuer Code
+
+```typescript
+// Get DB object for rights checking — lean query to avoid recursive process() call.
+// Using lean preserves ALL fields (including createdBy) which is needed for
+// S_CREATOR and S_SELF checks. The full process() pipeline would remove
+// restricted fields, potentially breaking these checks.
+if (config.dbObject && config.checkRights && this.checkRights) {
+  if (typeof config.dbObject === 'string' || config.dbObject instanceof Types.ObjectId) {
+    if (this.mainDbModel) {
+      const rawDoc = await this.mainDbModel.findById(getStringIds(config.dbObject)).lean().exec();
+      if (rawDoc) {
+        // Map to Model instance so securityCheck() is available as a method
+        config.dbObject = (this.mainModelConstructor as any)?.map
+          ? (this.mainModelConstructor as any).map(rawDoc)
+          : rawDoc;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}
+```
+
+### Sicherheit
+
+**Verbessert** — lean Query behaelt alle Felder (z.B. `createdBy`), was den `S_CREATOR`-Check zuverlaessiger macht als der aktuelle Code.
+
+### Nachfolgende Prozesse geprueft
+
+- `checkRights(input)` (Zeile 179-184): Verwendet `config.dbObject` fuer `S_CREATOR`/`S_SELF`/`memberOf` Checks via `equalIds()` — funktioniert mit lean+map, da `equalIds` sowohl ObjectIds als auch Strings vergleicht.
+- `checkRights(output)` (Zeile 239-250): Gleiche Nutzung — funktioniert.
+- `validateRestricted()` in `checkRestricted()` (restricted.decorator.ts, Zeile 172-174): Prueft `'createdBy' in data && equalIds(data.createdBy, user)` — lean-Objekt hat `createdBy` immer (nicht entfernt durch Pipeline).
+- `memberOf`-Check (Zeile 196-218): Liest `config.dbObject?.[property]` — lean-Objekt hat alle Properties.
+
+### Kompatibilitaet
+
+- `CrudService.update()` (Zeile 552): Setzt `dbObject` bereits als lean-Objekt (`findById().lean()`) → konsistent.
+- Kein Projekt uebergibt ein Mongoose-Document als dbObject → kein Konflikt.
+- Services die `process()` direkt aufrufen mit `dbObject` als String (z.B. swaktiv/OfferService): Profitieren von der Optimierung.
+
+---
+
+## Aenderung 3: Depth-Tracking in RequestContext
+
+### Datei: `src/core/common/services/request-context.service.ts`
+
+### Problem
+
+Bei Service-Kaskaden (A.create → B.create → C.create) laeuft die volle process()-Pipeline auf jeder Ebene. Populate, prepareOutput-Mapping und Output-checkRights auf inneren Ebenen sind unnoetig, weil die aeussere Ebene und der CheckSecurityInterceptor diese Aufgaben uebernehmen.
+
+### Aenderung am Interface
+
+```typescript
+export interface IRequestContext {
+  // ... bestehende Felder ...
+
+  /**
+   * Tracks the nesting depth of process() calls.
+   * 0 = outermost call (full pipeline), > 0 = nested call (reduced pipeline).
+   * Used to skip redundant populate, output mapping, and output rights checks
+   * on inner calls — the outermost call and CheckSecurityInterceptor handle these.
+   */
+  processDepth?: number;
+}
+```
+
+### Neue Methoden
+
+```typescript
+/**
+ * Get the current process() nesting depth.
+ * Returns 0 if not inside a process() call.
+ */
+static getProcessDepth(): number {
+  return this.storage.getStore()?.processDepth || 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Run a function with incremented process depth.
+ * Skips context creation if already at depth > 0 to avoid redundant object spread.
+ */
+static runWithIncrementedProcessDepth<T>(fn: () => T): T {
+  const currentStore = this.storage.getStore();
+  const currentDepth = currentStore?.processDepth || 0;
+  const context: IRequestContext = {
+    ...currentStore,
+    processDepth: currentDepth + 1,
+  };
+  return this.storage.run(context, fn);
+}
+```
+
+### Sicherheit
+
+Nicht betroffen — das Depth-Tracking ist rein informativ und aendert keine Berechtigungen.
+
+---
+
+## Aenderung 4: process() — Depth-basierte Optimierung
+
+### Datei: `src/core/common/services/module.service.ts`
+
+### Aenderung in process() (Zeile 81ff)
+
+Am Anfang der Methode nach der Config-Erstellung (nach Zeile 108):
+
+```typescript
+// Detect nested process() calls
+const currentDepth = RequestContext.getProcessDepth();
+const isNested = currentDepth > 0;
+```
+
+### serviceFunc mit Depth-Tracking ausfuehren (Zeile 201-205 ersetzen)
+
+```typescript
+// Run service function with incremented depth
+// When force is enabled, also bypass the Mongoose role guard plugin
+const executeServiceFunc = () =>
+  RequestContext.runWithIncrementedProcessDepth(() => serviceFunc(config));
+
+let result = config.force
+  ? await RequestContext.runWithBypassRoleGuard(executeServiceFunc)
+  : await executeServiceFunc();
+```
+
+### processFieldSelection bei inneren Calls ueberspringen (Zeile 207-217 ersetzen)
+
+```typescript
+// Pop and map main model
+// Skip on nested calls UNLESS populate was explicitly requested —
+// the outermost call handles population for the final response.
+if (config.processFieldSelection && config.fieldSelection && this.processFieldSelection) {
+  if (!isNested || config.populate) {
+    let temps = result;
+    if (!Array.isArray(result)) {
+      temps = [result];
+    }
+    for (const temp of temps) {
+      const field = config.outputPath ? _.get(temp, config.outputPath) : temp;
+      await this.processFieldSelection(field, config.fieldSelection, config.processFieldSelection);
+    }
+  }
+}
+```
+
+**Logik:**
+- `isNested = false` (Depth 0, aeusserster Call): Populate laeuft immer → User bekommt vollstaendiges Ergebnis.
+- `isNested = true` (Depth > 0, innerer Call) OHNE `config.populate`: Populate wird uebersprungen → Ergebnis wird intern weiterverarbeitet.
+- `isNested = true` MIT `config.populate` (explizit vom Caller gesetzt): Populate laeuft → der innere Service hat das explizit angefordert weil er die Daten braucht.
+
+### prepareOutput bei inneren Calls reduzieren (Zeile 219-236 ersetzen)
+
+```typescript
+// Prepare output
+if (config.prepareOutput && this.prepareOutput) {
+  const opts = config.prepareOutput;
+  if (!opts.targetModel && config.outputType) {
+    opts.targetModel = config.outputType;
+  }
+
+  // On nested calls without explicit populate: skip model mapping
+  // (the outermost call and CheckSecurityInterceptor handle final mapping).
+  // Secret removal (removeSecrets) stays active at ALL depths.
+  if (isNested && !config.populate && typeof opts === 'object') {
+    opts.targetModel = undefined;
+  }
+
+  if (config.outputPath) {
+    let temps = result;
+    if (!Array.isArray(result)) {
+      temps = [result];
+    }
+    for (const temp of temps) {
+      _.set(temp, config.outputPath, await this.prepareOutput(_.get(temp, config.outputPath), opts));
+    }
+  } else {
+    result = await this.prepareOutput(result, config);
+  }
+}
+```
+
+### Output-checkRights bei inneren Calls ueberspringen (Zeile 238-250 ersetzen)
+
+```typescript
+// Check output rights
+// Skip on nested calls — the outermost process() and CheckSecurityInterceptor
+// perform the final output rights check on the complete response.
+if (!isNested && config.checkRights && (await this.checkRights(undefined, config.currentUser as any, config))) {
+  const opts: any = {
+    dbObject: config.dbObject,
+    processType: ProcessType.OUTPUT,
+    roles: config.roles,
+    throwError: false,
+  };
+  if (config.outputType) {
+    opts.metatype = config.outputType;
+  }
+  result = await this.checkRights(result, config.currentUser as any, opts);
+}
+```
+
+### Sicherheit
+
+**Gewaehrleistet durch drei Schichten:**
+
+1. **Input-checkRights laeuft IMMER** (auch bei isNested) — unberechtigte Eingaben werden auf jeder Ebene abgefangen.
+2. **Output-checkRights auf Depth 0** — der aeusserste Call filtert das finale Ergebnis.
+3. **CheckSecurityInterceptor** — das letzte Sicherheitsnetz in der HTTP-Response-Pipeline ruft `securityCheck()` rekursiv auf dem gesamten Response-Baum auf, inklusive aller verschachtelten Objekte.
+
+**Gegenprobe:** Was passiert wenn ein innerer Service ein Objekt zurueckgibt das der User nicht sehen darf?
+- Der innere process() ueberspringt den Output-Rights-Check → Objekt bleibt unveraendert
+- Der aeussere process() fuehrt den Output-Rights-Check durch → Felder werden entfernt
+- Falls der aeussere process() es auch verpasst → CheckSecurityInterceptor entfernt die Felder
+
+### Kompatibilitaet
+
+Geprueft an realen Kaskaden:
+- **CompanyService.create()** (5-Ebenen-Kaskade): Innere creates (ProfileSite, ProfileCategory, ProfileEntry, Form) brauchen kein Populate — Ergebnisse werden nur fuer IDs weiterverwendet.
+- **ParticipationService → UserService**: UserService.create() Ergebnis wird inline weiterverwendet, nicht an User zurueckgegeben.
+- **ShippingService → BounceService/EmailService**: Kein Populate auf inneren Ebenen noetig.
+- **Services mit explizitem `populate:`**: Funktionieren weiterhin, da `config.populate` den isNested-Skip ueberschreibt.
+
+---
+
+## Aenderung 5: checkRestricted Metadata-Caching
+
+### Datei: `src/core/common/decorators/restricted.decorator.ts`
+
+### Problem
+
+`getRestricted()` (Zeile 50-58) ruft bei jedem Property-Check `Reflect.getMetadata()` auf. Bei einem Objekt mit 15 Properties und verschachtelten Objekten summieren sich hunderte Reflect-Lookups pro Request. Die Metadata aendert sich zur Laufzeit nie (Decorators sind statisch).
+
+### Aktueller Code (Zeile 50-58)
+
+```typescript
+export const getRestricted = (object: unknown, propertyKey?: string): RestrictedType => {
+  if (!object) {
+    return null;
+  }
+  if (!propertyKey) {
+    return Reflect.getMetadata(restrictedMetaKey, object);
+  }
+  return Reflect.getMetadata(restrictedMetaKey, object, propertyKey);
+};
+```
+
+### Neuer Code
+
+```typescript
+// Cache for Restricted metadata — decorators are static, metadata never changes at runtime.
+// Map<CacheTarget, Map<propertyKey | '__class__', RestrictedType>>
+//
+// CacheTarget is the class constructor (for instances) or the class itself (when object IS a constructor).
+// This distinction is critical: getRestricted(data.constructor) passes a class as `object`,
+// and (classFunction).constructor === Function for ALL classes — so we must use the class itself.
+const restrictedMetadataCache = new Map<unknown, Map<string, RestrictedType>>();
+
+export const getRestricted = (object: unknown, propertyKey?: string): RestrictedType => {
+  if (!object) {
+    return null;
+  }
+
+  // Determine cache target: use the class constructor for instances, the object itself for classes.
+  // When object IS a constructor (typeof === 'function'), using object.constructor would give Function
+  // for ALL classes, causing cache collisions.
+  const cacheTarget = typeof object === 'function' ? object : (object as any).constructor;
+  if (!cacheTarget) {
+    // Fallback for objects without constructor (e.g. Object.create(null))
+    return propertyKey
+      ? Reflect.getMetadata(restrictedMetaKey, object, propertyKey)
+      : Reflect.getMetadata(restrictedMetaKey, object);
+  }
+
+  // Cache lookup
+  let classCache = restrictedMetadataCache.get(cacheTarget);
+  if (!classCache) {
+    classCache = new Map();
+    restrictedMetadataCache.set(cacheTarget, classCache);
+  }
+
+  const cacheKey = propertyKey || '__class__';
+  if (classCache.has(cacheKey)) {
+    return classCache.get(cacheKey);
+  }
+
+  // Cache miss: perform Reflect lookup and cache the result
+  const metadata = propertyKey
+    ? Reflect.getMetadata(restrictedMetaKey, object, propertyKey)
+    : Reflect.getMetadata(restrictedMetaKey, object);
+
+  classCache.set(cacheKey, metadata);
+  return metadata;
+};
+```
+
+### Zusaetzlich: _.uniq()-Optimierung in checkRestricted (Zeile 260)
+
+```typescript
+// Aktuell:
+const concatenatedRestrictions = config.mergeRoles ? _.uniq(objectRestrictions.concat(restricted)) : restricted;
+
+// Optimiert — vermeidet Array-Allokation wenn objectRestrictions leer:
+const concatenatedRestrictions = config.mergeRoles && objectRestrictions.length
+  ? _.uniq(objectRestrictions.concat(restricted))
+  : restricted;
+```
+
+Diese Zeile wird fuer **jede Property jedes Objekts** aufgerufen. Wenn `objectRestrictions` leer ist (haeufig bei Models ohne Class-Level `@Restricted`), spart das eine Array-Allokation + uniq-Berechnung pro Property.
+
+### Sicherheit
+
+**Nicht betroffen** — gleiche Ergebnisse, da Decorator-Metadata sich zur Laufzeit nicht aendert. Der Cache liefert exakt die gleichen Werte wie der direkte Reflect-Lookup.
+
+### Kompatibilitaet
+
+Transparent — kein Projekt muss angepasst werden.
+
+---
+
+## Zusammenfassung der Einsparungen
+
+### Einzelner API-Call (Depth 0, kein Nesting):
+
+| Aenderung | Einsparung |
+|-----------|------------|
+| JSON.stringify entfaellt | ~0.1-1 KB + 2x Serialisierung |
+| Lean dbObject statt this.get() | ~5-15 KB + 1 rekursiver process()-Durchlauf |
+| Metadata-Cache | CPU: ~hunderte Reflect-Lookups weniger |
+
+### Verschachtelter Call (Depth > 0):
+
+| Schritt | Vorher | Nachher |
+|---------|--------|---------|
+| JSON.stringify | 2x Serialisierung | Uebersprungen |
+| prepareInput | Laeuft | Laeuft (unveraendert) |
+| this.get(dbObject) | Rekursives process() | Lean Query + Map |
+| checkRights(input) | Laeuft | Laeuft (unveraendert) |
+| serviceFunc | Laeuft | Laeuft (unveraendert) |
+| processFieldSelection | Volle Population | Uebersprungen (ausser explizites populate) |
+| prepareOutput | Volles Mapping | Nur Secrets-Removal |
+| checkRights(output) | Laeuft | Uebersprungen |
+
+**Pro verschachteltem Call: ~30-70 KB + 2-5 DB-Queries weniger.**
+
+### Beispiel: 8-stufige Service-Kaskade (z.B. Incident-Handling):
+
+- Vorher: 8 x ~50 KB = ~400 KB
+- Nachher: 1 x ~50 KB (aeusserer) + 7 x ~10 KB (innere) = ~120 KB
+- **~70% weniger Memory**
+
+---
+
+## Betroffene Dateien
+
+| Datei | Aenderung |
+|-------|-----------|
+| `src/core/common/services/module.service.ts` | Aenderungen 1, 2, 4 |
+| `src/core/common/services/request-context.service.ts` | Aenderung 3 |
+| `src/core/common/decorators/restricted.decorator.ts` | Aenderung 5 |
+| `src/core/common/interfaces/server-options.interface.ts` | Config-Option `debugProcessInput` |
+
+---
+
+## Verifizierung
+
+1. **Bestehende E2E-Tests** muessen alle gruen bleiben — die Aenderungen sind rueckwaertskompatibel
+2. **Service-Kaskade testen**: z.B. ein create() das intern andere Services aufruft
+3. **Populate auf aeusserster Ebene**: `{ populate: ['user', 'customer'] }` muss weiterhin funktionieren
+4. **securityCheck()**: Sensitive Felder (password, etc.) duerfen nie in der Response auftauchen
+5. **S_CREATOR-Check**: User der ein Objekt erstellt hat, muss es weiterhin bearbeiten koennen
+6. **Performance**: `process.memoryUsage()` vor/nach Optimierung bei verschachtelten Calls messen
+
+---
+
+## Risiken
+
+| Risiko | Absicherung |
+|--------|-------------|
+| Innerer Service braucht populate-Ergebnis | `config.populate` ueberschreibt den isNested-Skip — explizite Anforderung wird respektiert |
+| Output-Rights-Check auf innerem Ergebnis fehlt | CheckSecurityInterceptor ist das Sicherheitsnetz auf HTTP-Ebene |
+| Metadata-Cache wird stale | Unmoeglich — Decorator-Metadata ist zur Compile-Zeit fixiert |
+| Lean dbObject hat andere Struktur als hydriertes | `modelConstructor.map()` stellt die erwartete Struktur her |