@learncard/sss-key-manager 0.2.1 → 0.2.2

package/src/escrow-authority.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,597 @@
+import { base64ToBuffer, bufferToBase64, bytesToHex } from './crypto';
+import { parseEscrowEnvelope } from './escrow-crypto';
+import { EscrowEvidenceError } from './escrow-authority.types';
+import type { HistoricalEscrowEvidence } from './escrow-authority.types';
+import type { EscrowAttestationPolicy } from './types';
+import {
+    encodeEscrowEnrollmentIntent,
+    getEscrowBlobIdentity,
+    signEscrowEnrollmentIntent,
+} from './escrow-enrollment-intent';
+import type { EscrowBlobPlaintext, EscrowEnvelope } from './escrow-crypto';
+import type {
+    EscrowEnrollmentIntent,
+    SignedEscrowEnrollmentIntent,
+} from './escrow-enrollment-intent.types';
+import type {
+    EscrowAuthorityRecord,
+    EscrowAuthorityState,
+    VerifiedEnclaveIdentity,
+    VerifiedEscrowMutation,
+} from './escrow-authority.types';
+
+const fail = (): never => {
+    throw new EscrowEvidenceError();
+};
+const requireEvidence = (condition: boolean): void => {
+    if (!condition) fail();
+};
+const object = (value: unknown): Record<string, unknown> => {
+    if (!value || typeof value !== 'object' || Array.isArray(value)) return fail();
+    return value as Record<string, unknown>;
+};
+const keys = (value: Record<string, unknown>, names: string[]): void => {
+    requireEvidence(
+        Object.keys(value).length === names.length &&
+            names.every(name => Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(value, name))
+    );
+};
+const integer = (value: unknown, minimum = 0, maximum = Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER): number => {
+    if (
+        typeof value !== 'number' ||
+        !Number.isSafeInteger(value) ||
+        value < minimum ||
+        value > maximum
+    )
+        return fail();
+    return value;
+};
+const text = (value: unknown, maximum: number): string => {
+    if (typeof value !== 'string' || !value.length || value.length > maximum) return fail();
+    return value;
+};
+const bytes = (value: unknown, length: number): Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer> => {
+    if (
+        !Array.isArray(value) ||
+        value.length !== length ||
+        !value.every(
+            byte => typeof byte === 'number' && Number.isInteger(byte) && byte >= 0 && byte <= 255
+        )
+    )
+        return fail();
+    return Uint8Array.from(value);
+};
+const base64 = (value: unknown, maximum: number): Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer> => {
+    const encoded = text(value, maximum);
+    try {
+        const decoded = new Uint8Array(base64ToBuffer(encoded));
+        requireEvidence(bufferToBase64(decoded.buffer) === encoded);
+        return decoded;
+    } catch {
+        return fail();
+    }
+};
+const frame = (value: Uint8Array): Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer> => {
+    const result = new Uint8Array(4 + value.length);
+    new DataView(result.buffer).setUint32(0, value.length, false);
+    result.set(value, 4);
+    return result;
+};
+const join = (...values: Uint8Array[]): Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer> => {
+    const result = new Uint8Array(values.reduce((n, v) => n + v.length, 0));
+    let offset = 0;
+    for (const value of values) {
+        result.set(value, offset);
+        offset += value.length;
+    }
+    return result;
+};
+const hash = async (value: Uint8Array): Promise<string> =>
+    bytesToHex(new Uint8Array(await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', new Uint8Array(value))));
+const utf8 = (value: string): Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer> => new TextEncoder().encode(value);
+
+/** Derive historical receipt pins from the same complete PCR tuples used for
+ * Nitro attestation. Legacy image-only pins and malformed tuples authorize nothing. */
+export const escrowAuthorityMeasurements = async (
+    policy: EscrowAttestationPolicy
+): Promise<string[]> => {
+    if (policy.mode !== 'nitro') return [];
+    const hashes: string[] = [];
+    for (const pin of policy.pinnedMeasurements) {
+        const tuple = [pin.pcr0, pin.pcr1, pin.pcr2];
+        if (!tuple.every(pcr => typeof pcr === 'string' && /^[0-9a-f]{96}$/i.test(pcr))) continue;
+        if (pin.pcr0 === '00'.repeat(48)) continue;
+        const encoded = tuple.join('');
+        const decoded = Uint8Array.from({ length: 144 }, (_, i) =>
+            parseInt(encoded.slice(i * 2, i * 2 + 2), 16)
+        );
+        hashes.push(await hash(decoded));
+    }
+    return hashes;
+};
+const P256_ORDER = BigInt('0xffffffff00000000ffffffffffffffffbce6faada7179e84f3b9cac2fc632551');
+
+/** Verify the exact Rust record bytes and artifact kind before interpreting JSON. */
+const verifyRecord = async (
+    input: unknown,
+    kind: 'snapshot' | 'commit',
+    identity: VerifiedEnclaveIdentity,
+    historical?: HistoricalEscrowEvidence
+): Promise<{ record: EscrowAuthorityRecord; payload: unknown }> => {
+    requireEvidence(identity.mode === 'nitro' && !!identity.authority);
+    const raw = object(input);
+    keys(raw, ['version', 'kind', 'keyId', 'measurement', 'payload', 'signature']);
+    requireEvidence(raw.version === 1 && raw.kind === kind);
+    const keyId = text(raw.keyId, 128);
+    requireEvidence(
+        historical
+            ? [identity.keyId, ...identity.previousKeyIds].includes(keyId)
+            : keyId === identity.keyId
+    );
+    const measurement = bytes(raw.measurement, 32);
+    requireEvidence(
+        historical
+            ? historical.allowedMeasurements.includes(bytesToHex(measurement))
+            : bytesToHex(measurement) === identity.authority?.measurement
+    );
+    const payloadB64 = text(raw.payload, kind === 'snapshot' ? 49_152 : 8192);
+    const signatureB64 = text(raw.signature, 88);
+    const payload = base64(payloadB64, kind === 'snapshot' ? 49_152 : 8192);
+    const signature = base64(signatureB64, 88);
+    const ledgerKey = base64(identity.authority?.ledgerPublicKey, 88);
+    requireEvidence(ledgerKey.length === 65 && ledgerKey[0] === 4);
+    requireEvidence(signature.length === 64);
+    const s = BigInt(`0x${bytesToHex(signature.slice(32))}`);
+    requireEvidence(s > 0n && s <= P256_ORDER / 2n);
+    const message = join(
+        utf8('learncard-authority-signed-record-v1\0'),
+        Uint8Array.of(kind === 'snapshot' ? 2 : 1),
+        frame(utf8(keyId)),
+        measurement,
+        frame(payload)
+    );
+    try {
+        const key = await crypto.subtle.importKey(
+            'raw',
+            ledgerKey,
+            { name: 'ECDSA', namedCurve: 'P-256' },
+            false,
+            ['verify']
+        );
+        // WebCrypto hashes the message once; Rust signs SHA-256(message) as a prehash.
+        requireEvidence(
+            await crypto.subtle.verify({ name: 'ECDSA', hash: 'SHA-256' }, key, signature, message)
+        );
+        const decoded: unknown = JSON.parse(
+            new TextDecoder('utf-8', { fatal: true }).decode(payload)
+        );
+        const record: EscrowAuthorityRecord = {
+            version: 1,
+            kind,
+            keyId,
+            measurement: Array.from(measurement),
+            payload: payloadB64,
+            signature: signatureB64,
+        };
+        return { record, payload: decoded };
+    } catch {
+        return fail();
+    }
+};
+
+const envelope = (value: unknown): EscrowEnvelope => {
+    try {
+        const e = parseEscrowEnvelope(value);
+        return {
+            version: e.version,
+            algorithm: e.algorithm,
+            keyId: e.keyId,
+            ephemeralPublicKey: e.ephemeralPublicKey,
+            salt: e.salt,
+            iv: e.iv,
+            ciphertext: e.ciphertext,
+        };
+    } catch {
+        return fail();
+    }
+};
+const state = (value: unknown): EscrowAuthorityState => {
+    const raw = object(value);
+    keys(raw, [
+        'tenant',
+        'authorityGeneration',
+        'did',
+        'enrollmentVersion',
+        'enrollmentEpoch',
+        'status',
+        'envelope',
+        'shareVersion',
+        'hasPin',
+        'pinGeneration',
+        'attemptsUsed',
+    ]);
+    if (raw.status !== 'empty' && raw.status !== 'active' && raw.status !== 'disabled')
+        return fail();
+    if (typeof raw.hasPin !== 'boolean') return fail();
+    const result: EscrowAuthorityState = {
+        tenant: text(raw.tenant, 128),
+        authorityGeneration: text(raw.authorityGeneration, 128),
+        did: text(raw.did, 8192),
+        enrollmentVersion: integer(raw.enrollmentVersion),
+        enrollmentEpoch: integer(raw.enrollmentEpoch),
+        status: raw.status,
+        envelope: raw.envelope === null ? null : envelope(raw.envelope),
+        shareVersion: raw.shareVersion === null ? null : integer(raw.shareVersion, 1, 0xffffffff),
+        hasPin: raw.hasPin,
+        pinGeneration: integer(raw.pinGeneration),
+        attemptsUsed: integer(raw.attemptsUsed, 0, 10),
+    };
+    requireEvidence(
+        result.pinGeneration <= result.enrollmentVersion &&
+            result.enrollmentEpoch <= result.enrollmentVersion &&
+            (!result.hasPin || result.pinGeneration > 0) &&
+            (result.hasPin || result.attemptsUsed === 0)
+    );
+    if (result.status === 'empty')
+        requireEvidence(
+            result.enrollmentVersion === 0 &&
+                result.enrollmentEpoch === 0 &&
+                !result.envelope &&
+                result.shareVersion === null &&
+                !result.hasPin
+        );
+    else requireEvidence(result.enrollmentVersion > 0 && result.enrollmentEpoch > 0);
+    if (result.status === 'active')
+        requireEvidence(!!result.envelope && result.shareVersion !== null);
+    else requireEvidence(result.envelope === null && result.shareVersion === null);
+    return result;
+};
+
+/** Check challenge, scope and signed state; never trust the unsigned duplicate. */
+export const verifyEscrowAuthorityState = async (
+    response: unknown,
+    nonce: string,
+    tenant: string,
+    did: string,
+    identity: VerifiedEnclaveIdentity
+): Promise<EscrowAuthorityState> => {
+    requireEvidence(/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(nonce) && nonce.length === 64);
+    const raw = object(response);
+    keys(raw, ['state', 'proof']);
+    const { payload } = await verifyRecord(raw.proof, 'snapshot', identity);
+    if (!Array.isArray(payload) || payload.length !== 2 || payload[0] !== nonce) return fail();
+    const signed = state(payload[1]);
+    requireEvidence(signed.tenant === tenant && signed.did === did);
+    requireEvidence(JSON.stringify(signed) === JSON.stringify(state(raw.state)));
+    if (signed.envelope) {
+        requireEvidence(
+            [identity.keyId, ...identity.previousKeyIds].includes(signed.envelope.keyId)
+        );
+        await getEscrowBlobIdentity(signed.envelope);
+    }
+    return signed;
+};
+
+/** Accept only the committed output of this exact owner intent, including reseals. */
+export const verifyEscrowEnrollmentCommit = async (
+    response: unknown,
+    intent: EscrowEnrollmentIntent,
+    identity: VerifiedEnclaveIdentity
+): Promise<VerifiedEscrowMutation> => {
+    const raw = object(response);
+    const { record, payload } = await verifyRecord(raw.receipt, 'commit', identity);
+    const data = object(payload);
+    keys(data, ['commit', 'eventHash', 'requestDigest', 'resultBlobIdentity', 'enrollmentEpoch']);
+    const commit = object(data.commit);
+    keys(commit, ['schemaVersion', 'binding', 'executionId', 'revisions', 'transactionDigest']);
+    const binding = object(commit.binding);
+    keys(binding, ['tenant', 'generation', 'didHash']);
+    const revisions = object(commit.revisions);
+    keys(revisions, ['operation', 'enrollment']);
+    requireEvidence(
+        commit.schemaVersion === 1 &&
+            binding.tenant === intent.tenant &&
+            binding.generation === intent.authorityGeneration
+    );
+    requireEvidence(bytesToHex(bytes(binding.didHash, 32)) === (await hash(utf8(intent.did))));
+    requireEvidence(
+        integer(revisions.enrollment, 1) === intent.expectedEnrollmentVersion + 1 &&
+            integer(revisions.operation, 1) >= integer(revisions.enrollment, 1)
+    );
+    bytes(commit.executionId, 16);
+    bytes(commit.transactionDigest, 32);
+    bytes(data.eventHash, 32);
+    requireEvidence(integer(data.enrollmentEpoch, 1) === intent.enrollmentEpoch);
+    requireEvidence(
+        bytesToHex(bytes(data.requestDigest, 32)) ===
+            (await hash(encodeEscrowEnrollmentIntent(intent)))
+    );
+    if (intent.action === 'disable') {
+        requireEvidence(
+            (raw.envelope === null || raw.envelope === undefined) &&
+                data.resultBlobIdentity === null
+        );
+        return { envelope: null, receipt: record };
+    }
+    const output = envelope(raw.envelope);
+    requireEvidence(
+        output.keyId === identity.keyId &&
+            bytesToHex(bytes(data.resultBlobIdentity, 32)) === (await getEscrowBlobIdentity(output))
+    );
+    return { envelope: output, receipt: record };
+};
+
+/** Opaque wire shape of `SignedHoldRecord` (wire.rs `HoldRecord` / policy.rs
+ * `SignedHoldRecord`) — exactly the fields `hold_hash` commits to, plus the
+ * embedded enclave signature over the hold's own creation. */
+export interface EscrowHoldRecordLike {
+    hold: {
+        holdId: string;
+        did: string;
+        shareVersion: number;
+        blobHash: string;
+        enrollmentEpoch: number;
+        releasePolicy: 'hold' | 'pin';
+        clientEphemeralPublicKey: string;
+        createdLo: number;
+        createdHi: number;
+        policyVersion: number;
+        signature: string;
+    };
+    holdDurationMs: number;
+    ledgerSeq: number;
+}
+
+export interface VerifiedEscrowHold {
+    receipt: EscrowAuthorityRecord;
+    authorityGeneration: string;
+    holdDigest: string;
+}
+
+/** Mirrors `hold_hash` in escrow-enclave-app's policy.rs exactly: SHA-256 of
+ * compact JSON of this fixed-order array. Every later operation on a hold
+ * (confirm, release, cancel, and the idempotent-retry snapshot) commits to
+ * this same value, so recomputing and comparing it is what actually binds a
+ * later receipt to the SAME hold a client started, not merely the same
+ * `holdId` string. */
+const holdDigest = async (tenant: string, record: EscrowHoldRecordLike): Promise<string> => {
+    const h = record.hold;
+    const didHash = await hash(utf8(h.did));
+    return hash(
+        utf8(
+            JSON.stringify([
+                'learncard-hold-v1',
+                tenant,
+                h.holdId,
+                didHash,
+                h.shareVersion,
+                h.blobHash,
+                h.enrollmentEpoch,
+                h.releasePolicy,
+                h.clientEphemeralPublicKey,
+                h.createdLo,
+                h.createdHi,
+                record.holdDurationMs,
+                h.policyVersion,
+                record.ledgerSeq,
+            ])
+        )
+    );
+};
+
+/** Verify the enclave committed to creating THIS exact hold before trusting
+ * a `SignedHoldRecord` returned by lca-api: recipient key, DID, blob
+ * identity and hold id all come from the caller's own expectations (never
+ * from the record alone), and the embedded signature is checked against the
+ * attested ledger key exactly like `verifyEscrowEnrollmentCommit`. Returns
+ * the record's own `authorityGeneration` so a later confirmation/warning
+ * receipt for the SAME hold can be pinned to it.
+ * `historical` explicitly permits an older signed measurement only if it is
+ * allowlisted, verifies with the current attested ledger key and an attested
+ * current/previous key ID, and matches the retained authority generation.
+ * Never use historical verification for newly produced confirmation evidence. */
+export const verifyEscrowHoldRecord = async (
+    record: EscrowHoldRecordLike,
+    expected: {
+        tenant: string;
+        did: string;
+        clientEphemeralPublicKey: string;
+        blobHash: string;
+        holdId: string;
+    },
+    identity: VerifiedEnclaveIdentity,
+    historical?: HistoricalEscrowEvidence
+): Promise<VerifiedEscrowHold> => {
+    requireEvidence(
+        record.hold.holdId === expected.holdId &&
+            record.hold.did === expected.did &&
+            record.hold.clientEphemeralPublicKey === expected.clientEphemeralPublicKey &&
+            record.hold.blobHash === expected.blobHash
+    );
+    let signed: unknown;
+    try {
+        signed = JSON.parse(
+            new TextDecoder('utf-8', { fatal: true }).decode(base64(record.hold.signature, 8192))
+        );
+    } catch {
+        return fail();
+    }
+    const { record: receipt, payload } = await verifyRecord(signed, 'commit', identity, historical);
+    const data = object(payload);
+    keys(data, ['commit', 'eventHash', 'requestDigest', 'resultBlobIdentity', 'enrollmentEpoch']);
+    const commit = object(data.commit);
+    keys(commit, ['schemaVersion', 'binding', 'executionId', 'revisions', 'transactionDigest']);
+    const binding = object(commit.binding);
+    keys(binding, ['tenant', 'generation', 'didHash']);
+    requireEvidence(commit.schemaVersion === 1 && binding.tenant === expected.tenant);
+    const authorityGeneration = text(binding.generation, 128);
+    if (historical) requireEvidence(authorityGeneration === historical.authorityGeneration);
+    requireEvidence(bytesToHex(bytes(binding.didHash, 32)) === (await hash(utf8(expected.did))));
+    requireEvidence(integer(data.enrollmentEpoch, 1) === record.hold.enrollmentEpoch);
+    requireEvidence(bytesToHex(bytes(data.resultBlobIdentity, 32)) === record.hold.blobHash);
+    const digest = await holdDigest(expected.tenant, record);
+    requireEvidence(bytesToHex(bytes(data.requestDigest, 32)) === digest);
+    return { receipt, authorityGeneration, holdDigest: digest };
+};
+
+/** Verify a confirm-hold / send-release-warning result commits to THIS exact
+ * hold (the one `verifyEscrowHoldRecord` already verified). A fresh
+ * `commit`'s `requestDigest` is a secret-keyed, PIN-style hash the client
+ * cannot recompute by design (publishing an unkeyed digest here would be an
+ * offline oracle — see escrow-enclave-app's ledger "Operation commitments"),
+ * so a fresh commit is checked on tenant/generation/DID binding, epoch and
+ * blob identity only. The idempotent retry **snapshot** instead embeds
+ * `signedHoldDigest` directly in its (unkeyed) payload, so a snapshot
+ * additionally recomputes and compares the hold digest — exactly binding a
+ * retry to the hold the client itself started, not a different one. A caller
+ * receiving a commit MUST also obtain and verify this snapshot before claiming
+ * hold-specific confirmation (as createSSSStrategy does). */
+export const verifyEscrowHoldConfirmation = async (
+    receipt: unknown,
+    record: EscrowHoldRecordLike,
+    expected: { tenant: string; did: string; authorityGeneration: string },
+    identity: VerifiedEnclaveIdentity
+): Promise<EscrowAuthorityRecord> => {
+    const raw = object(receipt);
+    const kind = raw.kind;
+    if (kind !== 'commit' && kind !== 'snapshot') return fail();
+    const { record: verified, payload } = await verifyRecord(raw, kind, identity);
+    if (kind === 'snapshot') {
+        if (!Array.isArray(payload) || payload.length !== 7) return fail();
+        const [tag, holdId, digestBytes] = payload;
+        requireEvidence(
+            tag === 'learncard-authority-hold-snapshot-v2' &&
+                holdId === record.hold.holdId &&
+                payload[6] === expected.authorityGeneration
+        );
+        requireEvidence(
+            bytesToHex(bytes(digestBytes, 32)) === (await holdDigest(expected.tenant, record))
+        );
+        requireEvidence(payload[3] === 'pending');
+        integer(payload[4], 1);
+        return verified;
+    }
+    const data = object(payload);
+    keys(data, ['commit', 'eventHash', 'requestDigest', 'resultBlobIdentity', 'enrollmentEpoch']);
+    const commit = object(data.commit);
+    keys(commit, ['schemaVersion', 'binding', 'executionId', 'revisions', 'transactionDigest']);
+    const binding = object(commit.binding);
+    keys(binding, ['tenant', 'generation', 'didHash']);
+    requireEvidence(
+        commit.schemaVersion === 1 &&
+            binding.tenant === expected.tenant &&
+            binding.generation === expected.authorityGeneration
+    );
+    requireEvidence(bytesToHex(bytes(binding.didHash, 32)) === (await hash(utf8(expected.did))));
+    requireEvidence(integer(data.enrollmentEpoch, 1) === record.hold.enrollmentEpoch);
+    requireEvidence(bytesToHex(bytes(data.resultBlobIdentity, 32)) === record.hold.blobHash);
+    bytes(data.requestDigest, 32);
+    return verified;
+};
+
+export type EscrowEnrollmentActionInput = 'automatic' | 'set' | 'clear' | 'disable';
+
+/** Pure action resolution, shared between intent-building (here) and blob
+ * plaintext construction (sss-strategy.ts's `enrollEscrow`), so both always
+ * agree on enroll/replace/carry/disable from the same inputs instead of
+ * maintaining two copies of this decision. P9.1 (attack C) / P2-d:
+ * `bindsRecoveryContact` is the single source of truth for whether
+ * `recoveryEmail`/`recoveryLanguage` may appear in EITHER the signed intent
+ * or the target blob plaintext — Rust rejects a Carry target blob whose
+ * plaintext already carries either field (the enclave fills them in from
+ * the source blob instead), so this must be computed identically in both
+ * places or a carry can be built with a blob the enclave will refuse. */
+export const resolveEscrowEnrollmentAction = (
+    current: Pick<EscrowAuthorityState, 'status' | 'hasPin'>,
+    input: EscrowEnrollmentActionInput
+): {
+    action: EscrowEnrollmentIntent['action'];
+    pinAction: EscrowEnrollmentIntent['pinAction'];
+    bindsRecoveryContact: boolean;
+} => {
+    const disabling = input === 'disable';
+    const pinAction = disabling
+        ? 'keep'
+        : input === 'set'
+          ? current.hasPin
+              ? 'change'
+              : 'set'
+          : input === 'clear'
+            ? current.hasPin
+                ? 'clear'
+                : 'keep'
+            : 'keep';
+    const action = disabling
+        ? 'disable'
+        : current.status !== 'active'
+          ? 'enroll'
+          : current.hasPin && pinAction === 'keep'
+            ? 'carry'
+            : 'replace';
+    return { action, pinAction, bindsRecoveryContact: action === 'enroll' || action === 'replace' };
+};
+
+/** P2-d cross-language contract: mirrors the enclave's Carry contact-field
+ * rejection rule (`apply_enrollment_intent` in authority.rs) — true means
+ * the enclave would refuse this target blob. The enclave always fills
+ * recoveryEmail/recoveryLanguage in from the source blob on carry, so a
+ * target that already claims either field is refused. Shared by
+ * `escrow-carry-contact-contract-v1.json`'s TS and Rust tests, and by any
+ * caller (e.g. a test fake) that wants to fail the same way the real
+ * enclave does instead of accepting a shape it would reject. */
+export const violatesCarryContactRule = (
+    action: EscrowEnrollmentIntent['action'],
+    target: Pick<EscrowBlobPlaintext, 'recoveryEmail' | 'recoveryLanguage'> | null
+): boolean =>
+    action === 'carry' && !!target && (!!target.recoveryEmail || !!target.recoveryLanguage);
+
+/** Owner-only mutation selection. Recovery itself never calls this helper.
+ * P9.1 (attack C): `recoveryEmail`/`recoveryLanguage` are always supplied by the
+ * caller (the device's authenticated account email + app locale) but are only
+ * bound into the intent for enroll/replace; disable/carry null them out here
+ * regardless of input, since the enclave carries the prior value forward. */
+export const createEscrowEnrollmentIntent = async (input: {
+    state: EscrowAuthorityState;
+    target: EscrowEnvelope | null;
+    shareVersion: number;
+    privateKey: string;
+    pinAction: EscrowEnrollmentActionInput;
+    recoveryEmail: string;
+    recoveryLanguage: string;
+}): Promise<SignedEscrowEnrollmentIntent> => {
+    const current = state(input.state);
+    const target = input.target === null ? null : envelope(input.target);
+    const disabling = input.pinAction === 'disable';
+    requireEvidence(
+        current.enrollmentVersion < Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER &&
+            (disabling || current.enrollmentEpoch < Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER)
+    );
+    if (disabling && current.status !== 'active') return fail();
+    if (current.status === 'disabled' && current.hasPin && input.pinAction === 'automatic')
+        return fail();
+    const { action, pinAction, bindsRecoveryContact } = resolveEscrowEnrollmentAction(
+        current,
+        input.pinAction
+    );
+    requireEvidence(!disabling || input.target === null);
+    requireEvidence(disabling || input.target !== null);
+    if (action === 'carry') requireEvidence(input.shareVersion > (current.shareVersion ?? 0));
+    const intent: EscrowEnrollmentIntent = {
+        version: 2,
+        tenant: current.tenant,
+        did: current.did,
+        authorityGeneration: current.authorityGeneration,
+        expectedEnrollmentVersion: current.enrollmentVersion,
+        action,
+        sourceBlobIdentity: current.envelope ? await getEscrowBlobIdentity(current.envelope) : null,
+        targetBlobIdentity: target ? await getEscrowBlobIdentity(target) : null,
+        pinAction,
+        shareVersion: disabling ? current.shareVersion! : input.shareVersion,
+        enrollmentEpoch: current.enrollmentEpoch + (disabling ? 0 : 1),
+        requestId: crypto.randomUUID(),
+        allowRewrap: !disabling,
+        recoveryEmail: bindsRecoveryContact ? input.recoveryEmail : null,
+        recoveryLanguage: bindsRecoveryContact ? input.recoveryLanguage : null,
+    };
+    return signEscrowEnrollmentIntent(intent, input.privateKey);
+};

package/src/escrow-authority.types.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+import type { EscrowEnvelope } from './escrow-crypto';
+
+/** Unverifiable or substituted recovery evidence; callers must not continue recovery. */
+export class EscrowEvidenceError extends Error {
+    constructor() {
+        super('Automatic recovery evidence could not be verified.');
+        this.name = 'EscrowEvidenceError';
+    }
+}
+
+/** Opt-in for previously issued hold evidence only. Measurements are SHA-256
+ * hashes of complete configured PCR0/1/2 tuples, never server-supplied values.
+ * The original authority generation and current attested ledger key remain pinned.
+ * Fresh receipts must omit this option and match the current measurement exactly. */
+export interface HistoricalEscrowEvidence {
+    historical: true;
+    allowedMeasurements: readonly string[];
+    authorityGeneration: string;
+}
+
+/** Only construct from verified, nonce-bound NSM evidence (never wrapper JSON). */
+export interface VerifiedEnclaveIdentity {
+    publicKey: string;
+    keyId: string;
+    previousKeyIds: string[];
+    mode: 'software' | 'nitro';
+    authority?: { ledgerPublicKey: string; measurement: string };
+}
+
+export interface EscrowAuthorityRecord {
+    version: 1;
+    kind: 'proposal' | 'commit' | 'snapshot';
+    keyId: string;
+    measurement: number[];
+    payload: string;
+    signature: string;
+}
+
+export interface EscrowAuthorityState {
+    tenant: string;
+    authorityGeneration: string;
+    did: string;
+    enrollmentVersion: number;
+    enrollmentEpoch: number;
+    status: 'empty' | 'active' | 'disabled';
+    envelope: EscrowEnvelope | null;
+    shareVersion: number | null;
+    hasPin: boolean;
+    pinGeneration: number;
+    attemptsUsed: number;
+}
+
+export interface VerifiedEscrowMutation {
+    envelope: EscrowEnvelope | null;
+    receipt: EscrowAuthorityRecord;
+}