@learncard/lca-api-service 1.4.0 → 1.5.1

package/src/oidc.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,371 @@
+/**
+ * OIDC OAuth surface for the lca-api provider (AD-2), served as a Fastify
+ * plugin so it can issue real 302 redirects and read form-encoded bodies —
+ * things the tRPC/OpenAPI layer cannot do. Dual-mounted in the standalone
+ * Docker entry (`docker-entry.ts`) and the Lambda handler (`lambda.ts`),
+ * mirroring `src/dids.ts`.
+ *
+ * Endpoints (at the issuer root):
+ *  - GET  /.well-known/openid-configuration — discovery
+ *  - GET  /oidc/jwks — public signing keys
+ *  - GET  /oidc/authorize — redeem a `login_hint` login ticket, 302 back to the
+ *         relying party's `redirect_uri` with a one-time `code`. Invalid /
+ *         expired ticket → `error=login_required`.
+ *  - POST /oidc/token — confidential-client-authenticated exchange of a `code`
+ *         for a signed `id_token` + opaque `access_token`.
+ *  - GET  /oidc/userinfo — resolve an opaque `access_token` to verified claims.
+ */
+
+import Fastify, { type FastifyPluginAsync, type FastifyReply, type FastifyRequest } from 'fastify';
+import formbody from '@fastify/formbody';
+import fastifyRateLimit from '@fastify/rate-limit';
+import { environment } from '@config/oidcEnvironment';
+import cache from '@cache';
+import { redeemLoginTicket } from '@cache/login-tickets';
+
+import {
+    getOidcClientId,
+    getOidcDiscoveryDocument,
+    getOidcJwks,
+    getOidcIssuer,
+    isAllowedRedirectUri,
+    mintIdToken,
+    verifyOidcClientCredentials,
+} from '@helpers/oidc.helpers';
+import {
+    generateAuthorizationCode,
+    storeAuthorizationCode,
+    consumeAuthorizationCode,
+    generateAccessToken,
+    storeAccessToken,
+    getAccessToken,
+    type AuthorizationCodeData,
+    type AccessTokenData,
+} from '@helpers/login-ticket.helpers';
+import {
+    DEFAULT_MAX_FAILED_ATTEMPTS,
+    DEFAULT_RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS,
+    getRequestClientIp,
+    isRateLimited,
+    recordFailure,
+} from '@helpers/rate-limit.helpers';
+
+const RATE_LIMIT_PREFIX = 'oidc-rl:';
+const RATE_LIMIT_MAX_FAILURES = DEFAULT_MAX_FAILED_ATTEMPTS;
+const RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS = DEFAULT_RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS;
+
+// Coarse all-requests ceilings enforced by @fastify/rate-limit (per IP, per
+// minute). Discovery/JWKS are polled by Keycloak, so the global default is
+// generous. `/oidc/authorize` is hit by end-user browsers, so it gets a tight
+// per-IP cap. `/oidc/token` and `/oidc/userinfo` are only ever called by the
+// broker (Keycloak) server-side, so every legitimate request shares one NAT
+// egress IP: a per-IP cap there is a global login ceiling, not a per-user
+// control. They therefore get a high sanity ceiling only; the client secret /
+// bearer token and the failures-only counter are the real access controls.
+const GLOBAL_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE = 300;
+const BROWSER_ROUTE_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE = 60;
+const SERVER_ROUTE_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE = 3000;
+const BROWSER_ROUTE_RATE_LIMIT = {
+    config: { rateLimit: { max: BROWSER_ROUTE_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE, timeWindow: '1 minute' } },
+};
+const SERVER_ROUTE_RATE_LIMIT = {
+    config: { rateLimit: { max: SERVER_ROUTE_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE, timeWindow: '1 minute' } },
+};
+
+// @fastify/rate-limit throws whatever errorResponseBuilder returns; the plugin's
+// error handler must recognise it so the 429 is not flattened into a 500.
+interface RateLimitExceededError {
+    statusCode: 429;
+    error: 'temporarily_unavailable';
+}
+
+const isRateLimitExceeded = (error: unknown): error is RateLimitExceededError =>
+    typeof error === 'object' &&
+    error !== null &&
+    (error as { statusCode?: unknown }).statusCode === 429 &&
+    (error as { error?: unknown }).error === 'temporarily_unavailable';
+
+const rateLimitKey = (route: 'authorize' | 'token', request: FastifyRequest): string =>
+    `${RATE_LIMIT_PREFIX}${route}:${getRequestClientIp(request)}`;
+
+const sendRateLimited = (reply: FastifyReply): FastifyReply =>
+    reply
+        .header('Retry-After', String(RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS))
+        .status(429)
+        .send({ error: 'temporarily_unavailable' });
+
+const appendParams = (redirectUri: string, params: Record<string, string>): string => {
+    const url = new URL(redirectUri);
+    for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(params)) url.searchParams.set(key, value);
+    return url.toString();
+};
+
+interface ClientCredentials {
+    clientId: string;
+    clientSecret: string;
+}
+
+const tryFormUrlDecode = (value: string): string | undefined => {
+    try {
+        return decodeURIComponent(value.replace(/\+/g, ' '));
+    } catch {
+        return undefined;
+    }
+};
+
+/**
+ * Candidate credentials from an HTTP Basic header, raw form first.
+ *
+ * RFC 6749 §2.3.1 says the client id/secret are form-url-encoded before being
+ * base64'd, but Keycloak's broker (`SimpleHttp.authBasic`) sends them raw. A
+ * secret containing `+` or `%` would otherwise be mangled by decoding, so the
+ * raw pair is tried first and the decoded pair only as a fallback.
+ */
+const parseBasicCredentials = (authorization: string): ClientCredentials[] => {
+    if (!/^Basic /i.test(authorization)) return [];
+
+    const decoded = Buffer.from(authorization.slice(6), 'base64').toString('utf8');
+    const separator = decoded.indexOf(':');
+    if (separator < 0) return [];
+
+    const raw: ClientCredentials = {
+        clientId: decoded.slice(0, separator),
+        clientSecret: decoded.slice(separator + 1),
+    };
+    const candidates = [raw];
+
+    const formClientId = tryFormUrlDecode(raw.clientId);
+    const formClientSecret = tryFormUrlDecode(raw.clientSecret);
+    if (
+        formClientId !== undefined &&
+        formClientSecret !== undefined &&
+        (formClientId !== raw.clientId || formClientSecret !== raw.clientSecret)
+    ) {
+        candidates.push({ clientId: formClientId, clientSecret: formClientSecret });
+    }
+
+    return candidates;
+};
+
+export const oidcFastifyPlugin: FastifyPluginAsync = async fastify => {
+    await fastify.register(formbody);
+    await fastify.register(fastifyRateLimit, {
+        max: GLOBAL_REQUESTS_PER_MINUTE,
+        timeWindow: '1 minute',
+        keyGenerator: request => getRequestClientIp(request),
+        ...(cache.redis ? { redis: cache.redis } : {}),
+        errorResponseBuilder: (): RateLimitExceededError => ({
+            statusCode: 429,
+            error: 'temporarily_unavailable',
+        }),
+    });
+    fastify.addHook('onRequest', async (_request, reply) => {
+        reply.header('Cache-Control', 'no-store');
+        reply.header('Pragma', 'no-cache');
+        try {
+            getOidcIssuer();
+            await getOidcJwks();
+        } catch (error) {
+            console.error('OIDC provider is not configured:', error);
+            return reply.status(503).send({ error: 'server_error' });
+        }
+    });
+    fastify.setErrorHandler((error: unknown, request, reply) => {
+        if (isRateLimitExceeded(error)) {
+            return reply.status(429).send({ error: error.error });
+        }
+        console.error(`OIDC request failed (${request.method} ${request.url}):`, error);
+        return reply.status(500).send({ error: 'server_error' });
+    });
+
+    fastify.get('/.well-known/openid-configuration', async (_request, reply) => {
+        return reply.send(getOidcDiscoveryDocument());
+    });
+
+    fastify.get('/oidc/jwks', async (_request, reply) => {
+        reply.header('Cache-Control', 'public, max-age=300');
+        return reply.send(await getOidcJwks());
+    });
+
+    fastify.get('/oidc/authorize', BROWSER_ROUTE_RATE_LIMIT, async (request, reply) => {
+        const query = request.query as Record<string, string | undefined>;
+        const redirectUri = query.redirect_uri;
+        const state = query.state;
+        const responseType = query.response_type;
+        const clientId = query.client_id;
+        const loginHint = query.login_hint;
+        const nonce = query.nonce;
+
+        const limitKey = rateLimitKey('authorize', request);
+        const limited = await isRateLimited(limitKey, RATE_LIMIT_MAX_FAILURES);
+
+        if (clientId !== getOidcClientId() || !redirectUri || !isAllowedRedirectUri(redirectUri)) {
+            if (limited) return sendRateLimited(reply);
+            await recordFailure(limitKey, RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS);
+            return reply.status(400).send({ error: 'invalid_request' });
+        }
+
+        const failRedirect = (error: string): string =>
+            appendParams(redirectUri, state ? { error, state } : { error });
+
+        // The redirect URI is now trusted, so a limited client gets the OAuth
+        // error via redirect and its (possibly valid) ticket is left unconsumed.
+        if (limited) return reply.redirect(failRedirect('temporarily_unavailable'));
+
+        if (responseType !== 'code') {
+            return reply.redirect(failRedirect('unsupported_response_type'));
+        }
+
+        if (!query.scope?.split(/\s+/).includes('openid')) {
+            return reply.redirect(failRedirect('invalid_scope'));
+        }
+
+        const ticket = loginHint ? await redeemLoginTicket(loginHint) : null;
+        if (!ticket) {
+            await recordFailure(limitKey, RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS);
+            return reply.redirect(failRedirect('login_required'));
+        }
+
+        const code = generateAuthorizationCode();
+        const codeData: AuthorizationCodeData = {
+            code,
+            scope: query.scope,
+            clientId,
+            redirectUri,
+            nonce,
+            state,
+            subject: ticket.subject,
+            email: ticket.email,
+            emailVerified: ticket.emailVerified,
+            phoneNumber: ticket.phoneNumber,
+            phoneNumberVerified: ticket.phoneNumberVerified,
+            name: ticket.name,
+            picture: ticket.picture,
+            createdAt: Date.now(),
+        };
+        await storeAuthorizationCode(codeData);
+
+        return reply.redirect(appendParams(redirectUri, state ? { code, state } : { code }));
+    });
+
+    fastify.post('/oidc/token', SERVER_ROUTE_RATE_LIMIT, async (request, reply) => {
+        const limitKey = rateLimitKey('token', request);
+        if (await isRateLimited(limitKey, RATE_LIMIT_MAX_FAILURES)) {
+            return sendRateLimited(reply);
+        }
+        if (!environment.OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET) {
+            return reply.status(503).send({ error: 'server_error' });
+        }
+        const body = (request.body ?? {}) as Record<string, string | undefined>;
+
+        const authorization = request.headers.authorization;
+        let candidates: ClientCredentials[] = [];
+        if (authorization) {
+            candidates = parseBasicCredentials(authorization);
+        } else if (typeof body.client_id === 'string' && typeof body.client_secret === 'string') {
+            candidates = [{ clientId: body.client_id, clientSecret: body.client_secret }];
+        }
+
+        const authenticated = candidates.find(credentials =>
+            verifyOidcClientCredentials(credentials.clientId, credentials.clientSecret)
+        );
+        if (!authenticated) {
+            await recordFailure(limitKey, RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS);
+            return reply
+                .header('WWW-Authenticate', 'Basic realm="oidc"')
+                .status(401)
+                .send({ error: 'invalid_client' });
+        }
+        const clientId = authenticated.clientId;
+
+        if (body.grant_type !== 'authorization_code') {
+            return reply.status(400).send({ error: 'unsupported_grant_type' });
+        }
+        if (typeof body.code !== 'string' || !body.code || typeof body.redirect_uri !== 'string') {
+            return reply.status(400).send({ error: 'invalid_request' });
+        }
+
+        // Past this point the caller has proven the client secret, i.e. it is the
+        // broker. `invalid_grant` is deliberately NOT counted against the IP:
+        // the broker forwards whatever `code` a browser hands it, so an attacker
+        // (or ordinary expired/replayed codes) could otherwise trip the shared
+        // NAT IP's failure counter and lock every user out of login. Codes are
+        // 256-bit random and single-use, so guessing is not a realistic threat.
+        const codeData = await consumeAuthorizationCode(body.code);
+        if (
+            !codeData ||
+            codeData.clientId !== clientId ||
+            body.redirect_uri !== codeData.redirectUri
+        ) {
+            return reply.status(400).send({ error: 'invalid_grant' });
+        }
+
+        const { token, expiresAt } = await mintIdToken({
+            subject: codeData.subject,
+            nonce: codeData.nonce,
+            email: codeData.email,
+            emailVerified: codeData.emailVerified,
+            phoneNumber: codeData.phoneNumber,
+            phoneNumberVerified: codeData.phoneNumberVerified,
+            name: codeData.name,
+            picture: codeData.picture,
+        });
+
+        const accessToken = generateAccessToken();
+        const accessData: AccessTokenData = {
+            subject: codeData.subject,
+            email: codeData.email,
+            emailVerified: codeData.emailVerified,
+            phoneNumber: codeData.phoneNumber,
+            phoneNumberVerified: codeData.phoneNumberVerified,
+            name: codeData.name,
+            picture: codeData.picture,
+            createdAt: Date.now(),
+        };
+        await storeAccessToken(accessToken, accessData);
+
+        reply.header('Cache-Control', 'no-store');
+        reply.header('Pragma', 'no-cache');
+        return reply.send({
+            access_token: accessToken,
+            id_token: token,
+            token_type: 'Bearer',
+            scope: codeData.scope,
+            expires_in: Math.max(0, expiresAt - Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000)),
+        });
+    });
+
+    fastify.get('/oidc/userinfo', SERVER_ROUTE_RATE_LIMIT, async (request, reply) => {
+        const authorization = request.headers.authorization;
+        if (!authorization?.startsWith('Bearer ')) {
+            return reply
+                .header('WWW-Authenticate', 'Bearer error="invalid_token"')
+                .status(401)
+                .send({ error: 'invalid_token' });
+        }
+
+        const accessToken = authorization.slice('Bearer '.length).trim();
+        const data = await getAccessToken(accessToken);
+        if (!data) {
+            return reply
+                .header('WWW-Authenticate', 'Bearer error="invalid_token"')
+                .status(401)
+                .send({ error: 'invalid_token' });
+        }
+
+        const claims: Record<string, unknown> = { sub: data.subject };
+        if (data.email !== undefined) claims.email = data.email;
+        if (data.emailVerified !== undefined) claims.email_verified = data.emailVerified;
+        if (data.phoneNumber !== undefined) claims.phone_number = data.phoneNumber;
+        if (data.phoneNumberVerified !== undefined) {
+            claims.phone_number_verified = data.phoneNumberVerified;
+        }
+        if (data.name !== undefined) claims.name = data.name;
+        if (data.picture !== undefined) claims.picture = data.picture;
+
+        return reply.send(claims);
+    });
+};
+
+export const app = Fastify();
+app.register(oidcFastifyPlugin);

package/src/routes/auth.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
+import { z } from 'zod';
+import { TRPCError } from '@trpc/server';
+import { t, openRoute } from '@routes';
+import { consumeMatchingCode } from '@cache/getDel';
+import { issueLoginTicket } from '@cache/login-tickets';
+import {
+    findAuthSubjectByIdentityKey,
+    getOrCreateAuthSubject,
+    getOrCreateAuthSubjectLinkedTo,
+    type AuthSubjectAttributes,
+    type MongoAuthSubjectType,
+} from '../models/AuthSubject';
+import {
+    getSocialProviderConfig,
+    verifySocialIdToken,
+    type SocialClaims,
+    type SocialProviderId,
+} from '@helpers/social-token.helpers';
+import { isRateLimited, recordFailure } from '@helpers/rate-limit.helpers';
+
+const resultSchema = z.object({
+    success: z.boolean(),
+    ticket: z.string().optional(),
+    error: z.string().optional(),
+});
+
+const RATE_PREFIX = 'oidc:rate:';
+const ATTEMPT_TTL_SECONDS = 10 * 60;
+// Only failed attempts count. The per-IP ceiling is a backstop for shared NATs
+// (schools, offices); the per-email limit is what actually blocks code guessing.
+const MAX_FAILED_ATTEMPTS_PER_IP = 50;
+const MAX_FAILED_ATTEMPTS_PER_EMAIL = 5;
+
+const INVALID_CODE_ERROR = 'Invalid or expired code.';
+const INVALID_SOCIAL_ERROR = 'Invalid or expired sign-in. Please try again.';
+const SERVER_ERROR = 'Something went wrong. Please request a new code.';
+const RATE_LIMIT_ERROR = 'Too many login attempts. Please try again later.';
+
+const rateKey = (scope: string, id: string): string => `${RATE_PREFIX}${scope}:${id}`;
+
+const assertUnderLimit = async (key: string, max: number): Promise<void> => {
+    if (await isRateLimited(key, max)) {
+        throw new TRPCError({ code: 'TOO_MANY_REQUESTS', message: RATE_LIMIT_ERROR });
+    }
+};
+
+const recordFailedAttempt = async (...keys: string[]): Promise<void> => {
+    for (const key of keys) await recordFailure(key, ATTEMPT_TTL_SECONDS);
+};
+
+const isUnauthorized = (error: unknown): boolean =>
+    error instanceof TRPCError && error.code === 'UNAUTHORIZED';
+
+/**
+ * Share one subject across email-code and verified native social sign-ins, regardless
+ * of sign-in order. Existing subjects are permanent; conflicting legacy identities
+ * are reported without automatically merging accounts.
+ */
+const resolveSocialAuthSubject = async (
+    provider: SocialProviderId,
+    claims: SocialClaims
+): Promise<MongoAuthSubjectType> => {
+    const identityKey = `${provider}:${claims.sub}`;
+    const attrs: AuthSubjectAttributes = {
+        email: claims.email,
+        emailVerified: true,
+        displayName: claims.name,
+        pictureUrl: claims.picture,
+    };
+    if (claims.email && claims.email_verified) {
+        const email = claims.email.trim().toLowerCase();
+        const emailIdentityKey = `email:${email}`;
+        const emailAttrs = { email, emailVerified: true };
+        const existing = await findAuthSubjectByIdentityKey(identityKey);
+        if (existing) {
+            const emailRecord = await getOrCreateAuthSubjectLinkedTo(
+                emailIdentityKey,
+                existing.subject,
+                emailAttrs
+            );
+            if (emailRecord.subject !== existing.subject) {
+                console.warn(
+                    'Social and email authentication subjects conflict; preserving both subjects.'
+                );
+            }
+            return getOrCreateAuthSubject(identityKey, attrs);
+        }
+        // Create the shared email identity first so concurrent providers adopt its winner.
+        const emailRecord = await getOrCreateAuthSubject(emailIdentityKey, emailAttrs);
+        return getOrCreateAuthSubjectLinkedTo(identityKey, emailRecord.subject, attrs);
+    }
+    return getOrCreateAuthSubject(identityKey, attrs);
+};
+
+export const authRouter = t.router({
+    requestLoginTicket: openRoute
+        .meta({ openapi: { method: 'POST', path: '/auth/login-ticket', tags: ['Auth'] } })
+        .input(z.object({ email: z.string().trim().email(), code: z.string().length(6) }))
+        .output(resultSchema)
+        .mutation(async ({ input, ctx }) => {
+            const email = input.email.trim().toLowerCase();
+            const ipKey = rateKey('email-login-ticket', ctx.clientIp ?? 'unknown');
+            const emailKey = rateKey('email', email);
+            await assertUnderLimit(ipKey, MAX_FAILED_ATTEMPTS_PER_IP);
+            await assertUnderLimit(emailKey, MAX_FAILED_ATTEMPTS_PER_EMAIL);
+
+            // Match the existing email-code issuance key exactly, before identity normalization.
+            // Compare and consume atomically; a wrong code must not delete the valid one.
+            let consumed: boolean;
+            try {
+                consumed = await consumeMatchingCode(`login-code:${input.email}`, input.code);
+            } catch (error) {
+                console.error('Error consuming login code:', error);
+                return { success: false, error: SERVER_ERROR };
+            }
+            if (!consumed) {
+                await recordFailedAttempt(ipKey, emailKey);
+                return { success: false, error: INVALID_CODE_ERROR };
+            }
+
+            try {
+                const identityKey = `email:${email}`;
+                const record = await getOrCreateAuthSubject(identityKey, {
+                    email,
+                    emailVerified: true,
+                });
+                const ticket = await issueLoginTicket({
+                    subject: record.subject,
+                    email,
+                    emailVerified: true,
+                    identityKey,
+                });
+                return { success: true, ticket };
+            } catch (error) {
+                console.error('Error issuing login ticket after consuming code:', error);
+                return { success: false, error: SERVER_ERROR };
+            }
+        }),
+    requestSocialLoginTicket: openRoute
+        .meta({ openapi: { method: 'POST', path: '/auth/social/native', tags: ['Auth'] } })
+        .input(z.object({ provider: z.enum(['google', 'apple']), idToken: z.string() }))
+        .output(resultSchema)
+        .mutation(async ({ input, ctx }) => {
+            const ipKey = rateKey('social-login-ticket', ctx.clientIp ?? 'unknown');
+            await assertUnderLimit(ipKey, MAX_FAILED_ATTEMPTS_PER_IP);
+            if (!getSocialProviderConfig(input.provider)) {
+                return {
+                    success: false,
+                    error: `Sign-in with ${input.provider} is not configured.`,
+                };
+            }
+            try {
+                const claims = await verifySocialIdToken(input.provider, input.idToken);
+                const record = await resolveSocialAuthSubject(input.provider, claims);
+                const ticket = await issueLoginTicket({
+                    subject: record.subject,
+                    identityKey: `${input.provider}:${claims.sub}`,
+                    email: claims.email,
+                    emailVerified: true,
+                    name: claims.name,
+                    picture: claims.picture,
+                });
+                return { success: true, ticket };
+            } catch (error) {
+                if (isUnauthorized(error)) {
+                    await recordFailedAttempt(ipKey);
+                    return { success: false, error: INVALID_SOCIAL_ERROR };
+                }
+                console.error('Error issuing social login ticket:', error);
+                return { success: false, error: INVALID_SOCIAL_ERROR };
+            }
+        }),
+});