@leaflow/sdk 0.188.0 → 0.190.0

package/dist/fleet/v1/generated/validators/updateGroupRequest.zod.d.ts

@@ -105,8 +105,9 @@
  * keep a member out of some machines, deny them `fleet:machines.login` on those machines.
  * Elevation through sudo is never approved by a password; see "Approving sudo".
  *
- * Members log in over SSH with the keys they own among the project's SSH keys, while they may
- * log in to the machine.
+ * Members log in over SSH with the SSH keys of their own accounts (`/account/v1/me/ssh-keys` on
+ * the account API), while they may log in to the machine. The SSH keys a project shares sign in
+ * to no directory account.
  *
  * Machines resolve directory accounts and groups themselves and never write them into their local
  * account files. A local account or group that already uses a name or id of the directory keeps
@@ -139,16 +140,28 @@
  * applies:
  *
  * - inside a command run through this API, by the request itself;
- * - at once, while the user has approved their requests on the machine without asking, for a
- *   while or until removed (`PUT /api/v1/machines/{machineId}/privilege-auto-approval`);
+ * - by the user's automatic approval for the machine, for a while or until removed
+ *   (`PUT /api/v1/machines/{machineId}/privilege-auto-approval`), in one of two modes:
+ *   - `automatic_review`, the recommended one: a large language model reviews each request and
+ *     approves or denies it with a reason. It stops most dangerous requests, but not all of
+ *     them. Each review is a request to Canopy, the model platform, through the project's
+ *     Canopy service, and may incur Canopy charges; the project needs Canopy enabled. A
+ *     request that cannot be reviewed, such as when the project has not enabled Canopy or the
+ *     review does not complete in time, is denied with a reason saying so;
+ *   - `always_approve`: every request is approved at once. This is dangerous: any program that
+ *     runs as the account, such as a script or an AI agent, becomes root without anyone being
+ *     asked;
  * - by the user, on any of their devices, for a request listed by `GET /api/v1/privilege-requests`
  *   (`POST …:approve` or `…:deny`), or on a participant of the session the asking process belongs
  *   to. A request nobody decides expires, and sudo fails.
  *
+ * A denied sudo shows whoever ran it the reason, when the denial gave one.
+ *
  * Requests reach the user's devices as they happen through EventBus: the event
- * `leaflow.fleet.privilege.requested` when one is waiting and `leaflow.fleet.privilege.decided`
- * when it ends, each addressed to the user in the current project and carrying the request's
- * `id`. A client that subscribes to them needs no polling; one that does not can list the
+ * `leaflow.fleet.privilege.requested` when one waits for the user and
+ * `leaflow.fleet.privilege.decided` when it ends, each addressed to the user in the current
+ * project and carrying the request's `id`. Requests decided without asking the user raise
+ * neither. A client that subscribes to them needs no polling; one that does not can list the
  * pending requests.
  *
  * ## Connections that drop

package/dist/fleet/v1/generated/validators/updateGroupRequest.zod.js

@@ -105,8 +105,9 @@
  * keep a member out of some machines, deny them `fleet:machines.login` on those machines.
  * Elevation through sudo is never approved by a password; see "Approving sudo".
  *
- * Members log in over SSH with the keys they own among the project's SSH keys, while they may
- * log in to the machine.
+ * Members log in over SSH with the SSH keys of their own accounts (`/account/v1/me/ssh-keys` on
+ * the account API), while they may log in to the machine. The SSH keys a project shares sign in
+ * to no directory account.
  *
  * Machines resolve directory accounts and groups themselves and never write them into their local
  * account files. A local account or group that already uses a name or id of the directory keeps
@@ -139,16 +140,28 @@
  * applies:
  *
  * - inside a command run through this API, by the request itself;
- * - at once, while the user has approved their requests on the machine without asking, for a
- *   while or until removed (`PUT /api/v1/machines/{machineId}/privilege-auto-approval`);
+ * - by the user's automatic approval for the machine, for a while or until removed
+ *   (`PUT /api/v1/machines/{machineId}/privilege-auto-approval`), in one of two modes:
+ *   - `automatic_review`, the recommended one: a large language model reviews each request and
+ *     approves or denies it with a reason. It stops most dangerous requests, but not all of
+ *     them. Each review is a request to Canopy, the model platform, through the project's
+ *     Canopy service, and may incur Canopy charges; the project needs Canopy enabled. A
+ *     request that cannot be reviewed, such as when the project has not enabled Canopy or the
+ *     review does not complete in time, is denied with a reason saying so;
+ *   - `always_approve`: every request is approved at once. This is dangerous: any program that
+ *     runs as the account, such as a script or an AI agent, becomes root without anyone being
+ *     asked;
  * - by the user, on any of their devices, for a request listed by `GET /api/v1/privilege-requests`
  *   (`POST …:approve` or `…:deny`), or on a participant of the session the asking process belongs
  *   to. A request nobody decides expires, and sudo fails.
  *
+ * A denied sudo shows whoever ran it the reason, when the denial gave one.
+ *
  * Requests reach the user's devices as they happen through EventBus: the event
- * `leaflow.fleet.privilege.requested` when one is waiting and `leaflow.fleet.privilege.decided`
- * when it ends, each addressed to the user in the current project and carrying the request's
- * `id`. A client that subscribes to them needs no polling; one that does not can list the
+ * `leaflow.fleet.privilege.requested` when one waits for the user and
+ * `leaflow.fleet.privilege.decided` when it ends, each addressed to the user in the current
+ * project and carrying the request's `id`. Requests decided without asking the user raise
+ * neither. A client that subscribes to them needs no polling; one that does not can list the
  * pending requests.
  *
  * ## Connections that drop

package/dist/fleet/v1/generated/validators/updateMachineRequest.zod.d.ts

@@ -105,8 +105,9 @@
  * keep a member out of some machines, deny them `fleet:machines.login` on those machines.
  * Elevation through sudo is never approved by a password; see "Approving sudo".
  *
- * Members log in over SSH with the keys they own among the project's SSH keys, while they may
- * log in to the machine.
+ * Members log in over SSH with the SSH keys of their own accounts (`/account/v1/me/ssh-keys` on
+ * the account API), while they may log in to the machine. The SSH keys a project shares sign in
+ * to no directory account.
  *
  * Machines resolve directory accounts and groups themselves and never write them into their local
  * account files. A local account or group that already uses a name or id of the directory keeps
@@ -139,16 +140,28 @@
  * applies:
  *
  * - inside a command run through this API, by the request itself;
- * - at once, while the user has approved their requests on the machine without asking, for a
- *   while or until removed (`PUT /api/v1/machines/{machineId}/privilege-auto-approval`);
+ * - by the user's automatic approval for the machine, for a while or until removed
+ *   (`PUT /api/v1/machines/{machineId}/privilege-auto-approval`), in one of two modes:
+ *   - `automatic_review`, the recommended one: a large language model reviews each request and
+ *     approves or denies it with a reason. It stops most dangerous requests, but not all of
+ *     them. Each review is a request to Canopy, the model platform, through the project's
+ *     Canopy service, and may incur Canopy charges; the project needs Canopy enabled. A
+ *     request that cannot be reviewed, such as when the project has not enabled Canopy or the
+ *     review does not complete in time, is denied with a reason saying so;
+ *   - `always_approve`: every request is approved at once. This is dangerous: any program that
+ *     runs as the account, such as a script or an AI agent, becomes root without anyone being
+ *     asked;
  * - by the user, on any of their devices, for a request listed by `GET /api/v1/privilege-requests`
  *   (`POST …:approve` or `…:deny`), or on a participant of the session the asking process belongs
  *   to. A request nobody decides expires, and sudo fails.
  *
+ * A denied sudo shows whoever ran it the reason, when the denial gave one.
+ *
  * Requests reach the user's devices as they happen through EventBus: the event
- * `leaflow.fleet.privilege.requested` when one is waiting and `leaflow.fleet.privilege.decided`
- * when it ends, each addressed to the user in the current project and carrying the request's
- * `id`. A client that subscribes to them needs no polling; one that does not can list the
+ * `leaflow.fleet.privilege.requested` when one waits for the user and
+ * `leaflow.fleet.privilege.decided` when it ends, each addressed to the user in the current
+ * project and carrying the request's `id`. Requests decided without asking the user raise
+ * neither. A client that subscribes to them needs no polling; one that does not can list the
  * pending requests.
  *
  * ## Connections that drop

package/dist/fleet/v1/generated/validators/updateMachineRequest.zod.js

@@ -105,8 +105,9 @@
  * keep a member out of some machines, deny them `fleet:machines.login` on those machines.
  * Elevation through sudo is never approved by a password; see "Approving sudo".
  *
- * Members log in over SSH with the keys they own among the project's SSH keys, while they may
- * log in to the machine.
+ * Members log in over SSH with the SSH keys of their own accounts (`/account/v1/me/ssh-keys` on
+ * the account API), while they may log in to the machine. The SSH keys a project shares sign in
+ * to no directory account.
  *
  * Machines resolve directory accounts and groups themselves and never write them into their local
  * account files. A local account or group that already uses a name or id of the directory keeps
@@ -139,16 +140,28 @@
  * applies:
  *
  * - inside a command run through this API, by the request itself;
- * - at once, while the user has approved their requests on the machine without asking, for a
- *   while or until removed (`PUT /api/v1/machines/{machineId}/privilege-auto-approval`);
+ * - by the user's automatic approval for the machine, for a while or until removed
+ *   (`PUT /api/v1/machines/{machineId}/privilege-auto-approval`), in one of two modes:
+ *   - `automatic_review`, the recommended one: a large language model reviews each request and
+ *     approves or denies it with a reason. It stops most dangerous requests, but not all of
+ *     them. Each review is a request to Canopy, the model platform, through the project's
+ *     Canopy service, and may incur Canopy charges; the project needs Canopy enabled. A
+ *     request that cannot be reviewed, such as when the project has not enabled Canopy or the
+ *     review does not complete in time, is denied with a reason saying so;
+ *   - `always_approve`: every request is approved at once. This is dangerous: any program that
+ *     runs as the account, such as a script or an AI agent, becomes root without anyone being
+ *     asked;
  * - by the user, on any of their devices, for a request listed by `GET /api/v1/privilege-requests`
  *   (`POST …:approve` or `…:deny`), or on a participant of the session the asking process belongs
  *   to. A request nobody decides expires, and sudo fails.
  *
+ * A denied sudo shows whoever ran it the reason, when the denial gave one.
+ *
  * Requests reach the user's devices as they happen through EventBus: the event
- * `leaflow.fleet.privilege.requested` when one is waiting and `leaflow.fleet.privilege.decided`
- * when it ends, each addressed to the user in the current project and carrying the request's
- * `id`. A client that subscribes to them needs no polling; one that does not can list the
+ * `leaflow.fleet.privilege.requested` when one waits for the user and
+ * `leaflow.fleet.privilege.decided` when it ends, each addressed to the user in the current
+ * project and carrying the request's `id`. Requests decided without asking the user raise
+ * neither. A client that subscribes to them needs no polling; one that does not can list the
  * pending requests.
  *
  * ## Connections that drop

package/dist/fleet/v1/generated/validators/updateMcpServerRequest.zod.d.ts

@@ -105,8 +105,9 @@
  * keep a member out of some machines, deny them `fleet:machines.login` on those machines.
  * Elevation through sudo is never approved by a password; see "Approving sudo".
  *
- * Members log in over SSH with the keys they own among the project's SSH keys, while they may
- * log in to the machine.
+ * Members log in over SSH with the SSH keys of their own accounts (`/account/v1/me/ssh-keys` on
+ * the account API), while they may log in to the machine. The SSH keys a project shares sign in
+ * to no directory account.
  *
  * Machines resolve directory accounts and groups themselves and never write them into their local
  * account files. A local account or group that already uses a name or id of the directory keeps
@@ -139,16 +140,28 @@
  * applies:
  *
  * - inside a command run through this API, by the request itself;
- * - at once, while the user has approved their requests on the machine without asking, for a
- *   while or until removed (`PUT /api/v1/machines/{machineId}/privilege-auto-approval`);
+ * - by the user's automatic approval for the machine, for a while or until removed
+ *   (`PUT /api/v1/machines/{machineId}/privilege-auto-approval`), in one of two modes:
+ *   - `automatic_review`, the recommended one: a large language model reviews each request and
+ *     approves or denies it with a reason. It stops most dangerous requests, but not all of
+ *     them. Each review is a request to Canopy, the model platform, through the project's
+ *     Canopy service, and may incur Canopy charges; the project needs Canopy enabled. A
+ *     request that cannot be reviewed, such as when the project has not enabled Canopy or the
+ *     review does not complete in time, is denied with a reason saying so;
+ *   - `always_approve`: every request is approved at once. This is dangerous: any program that
+ *     runs as the account, such as a script or an AI agent, becomes root without anyone being
+ *     asked;
  * - by the user, on any of their devices, for a request listed by `GET /api/v1/privilege-requests`
  *   (`POST …:approve` or `…:deny`), or on a participant of the session the asking process belongs
  *   to. A request nobody decides expires, and sudo fails.
  *
+ * A denied sudo shows whoever ran it the reason, when the denial gave one.
+ *
  * Requests reach the user's devices as they happen through EventBus: the event
- * `leaflow.fleet.privilege.requested` when one is waiting and `leaflow.fleet.privilege.decided`
- * when it ends, each addressed to the user in the current project and carrying the request's
- * `id`. A client that subscribes to them needs no polling; one that does not can list the
+ * `leaflow.fleet.privilege.requested` when one waits for the user and
+ * `leaflow.fleet.privilege.decided` when it ends, each addressed to the user in the current
+ * project and carrying the request's `id`. Requests decided without asking the user raise
+ * neither. A client that subscribes to them needs no polling; one that does not can list the
  * pending requests.
  *
  * ## Connections that drop

package/dist/fleet/v1/generated/validators/updateMcpServerRequest.zod.js

@@ -105,8 +105,9 @@
  * keep a member out of some machines, deny them `fleet:machines.login` on those machines.
  * Elevation through sudo is never approved by a password; see "Approving sudo".
  *
- * Members log in over SSH with the keys they own among the project's SSH keys, while they may
- * log in to the machine.
+ * Members log in over SSH with the SSH keys of their own accounts (`/account/v1/me/ssh-keys` on
+ * the account API), while they may log in to the machine. The SSH keys a project shares sign in
+ * to no directory account.
  *
  * Machines resolve directory accounts and groups themselves and never write them into their local
  * account files. A local account or group that already uses a name or id of the directory keeps
@@ -139,16 +140,28 @@
  * applies:
  *
  * - inside a command run through this API, by the request itself;
- * - at once, while the user has approved their requests on the machine without asking, for a
- *   while or until removed (`PUT /api/v1/machines/{machineId}/privilege-auto-approval`);
+ * - by the user's automatic approval for the machine, for a while or until removed
+ *   (`PUT /api/v1/machines/{machineId}/privilege-auto-approval`), in one of two modes:
+ *   - `automatic_review`, the recommended one: a large language model reviews each request and
+ *     approves or denies it with a reason. It stops most dangerous requests, but not all of
+ *     them. Each review is a request to Canopy, the model platform, through the project's
+ *     Canopy service, and may incur Canopy charges; the project needs Canopy enabled. A
+ *     request that cannot be reviewed, such as when the project has not enabled Canopy or the
+ *     review does not complete in time, is denied with a reason saying so;
+ *   - `always_approve`: every request is approved at once. This is dangerous: any program that
+ *     runs as the account, such as a script or an AI agent, becomes root without anyone being
+ *     asked;
  * - by the user, on any of their devices, for a request listed by `GET /api/v1/privilege-requests`
  *   (`POST …:approve` or `…:deny`), or on a participant of the session the asking process belongs
  *   to. A request nobody decides expires, and sudo fails.
  *
+ * A denied sudo shows whoever ran it the reason, when the denial gave one.
+ *
  * Requests reach the user's devices as they happen through EventBus: the event
- * `leaflow.fleet.privilege.requested` when one is waiting and `leaflow.fleet.privilege.decided`
- * when it ends, each addressed to the user in the current project and carrying the request's
- * `id`. A client that subscribes to them needs no polling; one that does not can list the
+ * `leaflow.fleet.privilege.requested` when one waits for the user and
+ * `leaflow.fleet.privilege.decided` when it ends, each addressed to the user in the current
+ * project and carrying the request's `id`. Requests decided without asking the user raise
+ * neither. A client that subscribes to them needs no polling; one that does not can list the
  * pending requests.
  *
  * ## Connections that drop

package/dist/fleet/v1/generated/validators/updateMcpServerResponse.zod.d.ts

@@ -105,8 +105,9 @@
  * keep a member out of some machines, deny them `fleet:machines.login` on those machines.
  * Elevation through sudo is never approved by a password; see "Approving sudo".
  *
- * Members log in over SSH with the keys they own among the project's SSH keys, while they may
- * log in to the machine.
+ * Members log in over SSH with the SSH keys of their own accounts (`/account/v1/me/ssh-keys` on
+ * the account API), while they may log in to the machine. The SSH keys a project shares sign in
+ * to no directory account.
  *
  * Machines resolve directory accounts and groups themselves and never write them into their local
  * account files. A local account or group that already uses a name or id of the directory keeps
@@ -139,16 +140,28 @@
  * applies:
  *
  * - inside a command run through this API, by the request itself;
- * - at once, while the user has approved their requests on the machine without asking, for a
- *   while or until removed (`PUT /api/v1/machines/{machineId}/privilege-auto-approval`);
+ * - by the user's automatic approval for the machine, for a while or until removed
+ *   (`PUT /api/v1/machines/{machineId}/privilege-auto-approval`), in one of two modes:
+ *   - `automatic_review`, the recommended one: a large language model reviews each request and
+ *     approves or denies it with a reason. It stops most dangerous requests, but not all of
+ *     them. Each review is a request to Canopy, the model platform, through the project's
+ *     Canopy service, and may incur Canopy charges; the project needs Canopy enabled. A
+ *     request that cannot be reviewed, such as when the project has not enabled Canopy or the
+ *     review does not complete in time, is denied with a reason saying so;
+ *   - `always_approve`: every request is approved at once. This is dangerous: any program that
+ *     runs as the account, such as a script or an AI agent, becomes root without anyone being
+ *     asked;
  * - by the user, on any of their devices, for a request listed by `GET /api/v1/privilege-requests`
  *   (`POST …:approve` or `…:deny`), or on a participant of the session the asking process belongs
  *   to. A request nobody decides expires, and sudo fails.
  *
+ * A denied sudo shows whoever ran it the reason, when the denial gave one.
+ *
  * Requests reach the user's devices as they happen through EventBus: the event
- * `leaflow.fleet.privilege.requested` when one is waiting and `leaflow.fleet.privilege.decided`
- * when it ends, each addressed to the user in the current project and carrying the request's
- * `id`. A client that subscribes to them needs no polling; one that does not can list the
+ * `leaflow.fleet.privilege.requested` when one waits for the user and
+ * `leaflow.fleet.privilege.decided` when it ends, each addressed to the user in the current
+ * project and carrying the request's `id`. Requests decided without asking the user raise
+ * neither. A client that subscribes to them needs no polling; one that does not can list the
  * pending requests.
  *
  * ## Connections that drop

package/dist/fleet/v1/generated/validators/updateMcpServerResponse.zod.js

@@ -105,8 +105,9 @@
  * keep a member out of some machines, deny them `fleet:machines.login` on those machines.
  * Elevation through sudo is never approved by a password; see "Approving sudo".
  *
- * Members log in over SSH with the keys they own among the project's SSH keys, while they may
- * log in to the machine.
+ * Members log in over SSH with the SSH keys of their own accounts (`/account/v1/me/ssh-keys` on
+ * the account API), while they may log in to the machine. The SSH keys a project shares sign in
+ * to no directory account.
  *
  * Machines resolve directory accounts and groups themselves and never write them into their local
  * account files. A local account or group that already uses a name or id of the directory keeps
@@ -139,16 +140,28 @@
  * applies:
  *
  * - inside a command run through this API, by the request itself;
- * - at once, while the user has approved their requests on the machine without asking, for a
- *   while or until removed (`PUT /api/v1/machines/{machineId}/privilege-auto-approval`);
+ * - by the user's automatic approval for the machine, for a while or until removed
+ *   (`PUT /api/v1/machines/{machineId}/privilege-auto-approval`), in one of two modes:
+ *   - `automatic_review`, the recommended one: a large language model reviews each request and
+ *     approves or denies it with a reason. It stops most dangerous requests, but not all of
+ *     them. Each review is a request to Canopy, the model platform, through the project's
+ *     Canopy service, and may incur Canopy charges; the project needs Canopy enabled. A
+ *     request that cannot be reviewed, such as when the project has not enabled Canopy or the
+ *     review does not complete in time, is denied with a reason saying so;
+ *   - `always_approve`: every request is approved at once. This is dangerous: any program that
+ *     runs as the account, such as a script or an AI agent, becomes root without anyone being
+ *     asked;
  * - by the user, on any of their devices, for a request listed by `GET /api/v1/privilege-requests`
  *   (`POST …:approve` or `…:deny`), or on a participant of the session the asking process belongs
  *   to. A request nobody decides expires, and sudo fails.
  *
+ * A denied sudo shows whoever ran it the reason, when the denial gave one.
+ *
  * Requests reach the user's devices as they happen through EventBus: the event
- * `leaflow.fleet.privilege.requested` when one is waiting and `leaflow.fleet.privilege.decided`
- * when it ends, each addressed to the user in the current project and carrying the request's
- * `id`. A client that subscribes to them needs no polling; one that does not can list the
+ * `leaflow.fleet.privilege.requested` when one waits for the user and
+ * `leaflow.fleet.privilege.decided` when it ends, each addressed to the user in the current
+ * project and carrying the request's `id`. Requests decided without asking the user raise
+ * neither. A client that subscribes to them needs no polling; one that does not can list the
  * pending requests.
  *
  * ## Connections that drop

package/dist/fleet/v1/generated/validators/updatePrivilegeAutoApprovalRequest.zod.d.ts

@@ -105,8 +105,9 @@
  * keep a member out of some machines, deny them `fleet:machines.login` on those machines.
  * Elevation through sudo is never approved by a password; see "Approving sudo".
  *
- * Members log in over SSH with the keys they own among the project's SSH keys, while they may
- * log in to the machine.
+ * Members log in over SSH with the SSH keys of their own accounts (`/account/v1/me/ssh-keys` on
+ * the account API), while they may log in to the machine. The SSH keys a project shares sign in
+ * to no directory account.
  *
  * Machines resolve directory accounts and groups themselves and never write them into their local
  * account files. A local account or group that already uses a name or id of the directory keeps
@@ -139,16 +140,28 @@
  * applies:
  *
  * - inside a command run through this API, by the request itself;
- * - at once, while the user has approved their requests on the machine without asking, for a
- *   while or until removed (`PUT /api/v1/machines/{machineId}/privilege-auto-approval`);
+ * - by the user's automatic approval for the machine, for a while or until removed
+ *   (`PUT /api/v1/machines/{machineId}/privilege-auto-approval`), in one of two modes:
+ *   - `automatic_review`, the recommended one: a large language model reviews each request and
+ *     approves or denies it with a reason. It stops most dangerous requests, but not all of
+ *     them. Each review is a request to Canopy, the model platform, through the project's
+ *     Canopy service, and may incur Canopy charges; the project needs Canopy enabled. A
+ *     request that cannot be reviewed, such as when the project has not enabled Canopy or the
+ *     review does not complete in time, is denied with a reason saying so;
+ *   - `always_approve`: every request is approved at once. This is dangerous: any program that
+ *     runs as the account, such as a script or an AI agent, becomes root without anyone being
+ *     asked;
  * - by the user, on any of their devices, for a request listed by `GET /api/v1/privilege-requests`
  *   (`POST …:approve` or `…:deny`), or on a participant of the session the asking process belongs
  *   to. A request nobody decides expires, and sudo fails.
  *
+ * A denied sudo shows whoever ran it the reason, when the denial gave one.
+ *
  * Requests reach the user's devices as they happen through EventBus: the event
- * `leaflow.fleet.privilege.requested` when one is waiting and `leaflow.fleet.privilege.decided`
- * when it ends, each addressed to the user in the current project and carrying the request's
- * `id`. A client that subscribes to them needs no polling; one that does not can list the
+ * `leaflow.fleet.privilege.requested` when one waits for the user and
+ * `leaflow.fleet.privilege.decided` when it ends, each addressed to the user in the current
+ * project and carrying the request's `id`. Requests decided without asking the user raise
+ * neither. A client that subscribes to them needs no polling; one that does not can list the
  * pending requests.
  *
  * ## Connections that drop
@@ -225,6 +238,10 @@
  */
 import * as zod from "zod";
 export declare const UpdatePrivilegeAutoApprovalRequest: zod.ZodObject<{
+    mode: zod.ZodEnum<{
+        automatic_review: "automatic_review";
+        always_approve: "always_approve";
+    }>;
     expires_at: zod.ZodNullable<zod.z.ZodISODateTime>;
 }, zod.z.core.$strict>;
 export type UpdatePrivilegeAutoApprovalRequest = zod.input<typeof UpdatePrivilegeAutoApprovalRequest>;

package/dist/fleet/v1/generated/validators/updatePrivilegeAutoApprovalRequest.zod.js

@@ -105,8 +105,9 @@
  * keep a member out of some machines, deny them `fleet:machines.login` on those machines.
  * Elevation through sudo is never approved by a password; see "Approving sudo".
  *
- * Members log in over SSH with the keys they own among the project's SSH keys, while they may
- * log in to the machine.
+ * Members log in over SSH with the SSH keys of their own accounts (`/account/v1/me/ssh-keys` on
+ * the account API), while they may log in to the machine. The SSH keys a project shares sign in
+ * to no directory account.
  *
  * Machines resolve directory accounts and groups themselves and never write them into their local
  * account files. A local account or group that already uses a name or id of the directory keeps
@@ -139,16 +140,28 @@
  * applies:
  *
  * - inside a command run through this API, by the request itself;
- * - at once, while the user has approved their requests on the machine without asking, for a
- *   while or until removed (`PUT /api/v1/machines/{machineId}/privilege-auto-approval`);
+ * - by the user's automatic approval for the machine, for a while or until removed
+ *   (`PUT /api/v1/machines/{machineId}/privilege-auto-approval`), in one of two modes:
+ *   - `automatic_review`, the recommended one: a large language model reviews each request and
+ *     approves or denies it with a reason. It stops most dangerous requests, but not all of
+ *     them. Each review is a request to Canopy, the model platform, through the project's
+ *     Canopy service, and may incur Canopy charges; the project needs Canopy enabled. A
+ *     request that cannot be reviewed, such as when the project has not enabled Canopy or the
+ *     review does not complete in time, is denied with a reason saying so;
+ *   - `always_approve`: every request is approved at once. This is dangerous: any program that
+ *     runs as the account, such as a script or an AI agent, becomes root without anyone being
+ *     asked;
  * - by the user, on any of their devices, for a request listed by `GET /api/v1/privilege-requests`
  *   (`POST …:approve` or `…:deny`), or on a participant of the session the asking process belongs
  *   to. A request nobody decides expires, and sudo fails.
  *
+ * A denied sudo shows whoever ran it the reason, when the denial gave one.
+ *
  * Requests reach the user's devices as they happen through EventBus: the event
- * `leaflow.fleet.privilege.requested` when one is waiting and `leaflow.fleet.privilege.decided`
- * when it ends, each addressed to the user in the current project and carrying the request's
- * `id`. A client that subscribes to them needs no polling; one that does not can list the
+ * `leaflow.fleet.privilege.requested` when one waits for the user and
+ * `leaflow.fleet.privilege.decided` when it ends, each addressed to the user in the current
+ * project and carrying the request's `id`. Requests decided without asking the user raise
+ * neither. A client that subscribes to them needs no polling; one that does not can list the
  * pending requests.
  *
  * ## Connections that drop
@@ -224,7 +237,9 @@
  * OpenAPI spec version: 1.0.0
  */
 import * as zod from "zod";
+import { PrivilegeAutoApprovalMode } from "./privilegeAutoApprovalMode.zod.js";
 export const UpdatePrivilegeAutoApprovalRequest = zod.strictObject({
+    mode: PrivilegeAutoApprovalMode,
     expires_at: zod.iso
         .datetime({ offset: true })
         .nullable()

package/dist/iam/v1/generated/functions.d.ts

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
  * Generated by orval 🍺
  * Do not edit manually.
  * Leaflow IAM API
- * What happens inside a project: members, roles, invitations and SSH keys.
+ * What happens inside a project: members, roles, invitations and the SSH keys the project shares.
  *
  * Every request carries a scoped token; see the `bearerAuth` security scheme. No path carries a
  * `projectId`, and the current project is the one the token states. Tokens are obtained from the
@@ -590,7 +590,7 @@ export type listSshKeysResponseError = listSshKeysResponseDefault & {
 export type listSshKeysResponse = listSshKeysResponseSuccess | listSshKeysResponseError;
 export declare const getListSshKeysUrl: (params?: ListSshKeysParams) => string;
 /**
- * Both the keys belonging to members and the keys belonging to the project are listed; the `owner_user_id` on each one tells them apart.
+ * The keys the project shares. The keys of members are their own and belong to their accounts (`/account/v1/me/ssh-keys` on the account API), so they are not listed here.
  * @summary List the SSH keys of this project
  */
 export declare const listSshKeys: (params?: ListSshKeysParams, options?: RequestInit, fetchFn?: typeof globalThis.fetch) => Promise<listSshKeysResponse>;
@@ -611,8 +611,10 @@ export type createSshKeyResponseError = createSshKeyResponseDefault & {
 export type createSshKeyResponse = createSshKeyResponseSuccess | createSshKeyResponseError;
 export declare const getCreateSshKeyUrl: () => string;
 /**
- * `owner=me` adds a key of the caller's own, which any member may do. `owner=project` adds a key shared by the project, requires `iam:ssh_keys.manage`, and lands on every machine created in the project afterwards.
- * @summary Add an SSH key
+ * Adds a key the project shares, such as one used by CI or a bastion. Compute installs it on every server created in the project afterwards. It belongs to no member, so it signs in as nobody on Fleet machines; a member adds a key of their own to their account (`POST /account/v1/me/ssh-keys` on the account API).
+ *
+ * Requires `iam:ssh_keys.manage`.
+ * @summary Add an SSH key to this project
  */
 export declare const createSshKey: (createSSHKeyRequestBody: CreateSSHKeyRequestBody, options?: RequestInit, fetchFn?: typeof globalThis.fetch) => Promise<createSshKeyResponse>;
 export type getSshKeyResponse200 = {
@@ -652,7 +654,7 @@ export type renameSshKeyResponseError = renameSshKeyResponseDefault & {
 export type renameSshKeyResponse = renameSshKeyResponseSuccess | renameSshKeyResponseError;
 export declare const getRenameSshKeyUrl: (keyId: string) => string;
 /**
- * Only the name can change. The key, its type and its fingerprint are three statements about one thing, and changing one of them would leave the row describing a key that does not exist.
+ * Only the name can change. The key, its type and its fingerprint are three statements about one thing, and changing one of them would leave the row describing a key that does not exist. Requires `iam:ssh_keys.manage`.
  * @summary Rename an SSH key
  */
 export declare const renameSshKey: (keyId: string, renameSSHKeyRequestBody: RenameSSHKeyRequestBody, options?: RequestInit, fetchFn?: typeof globalThis.fetch) => Promise<renameSshKeyResponse>;
@@ -673,7 +675,7 @@ export type revokeSshKeyResponseError = revokeSshKeyResponseDefault & {
 export type revokeSshKeyResponse = revokeSshKeyResponseSuccess | revokeSshKeyResponseError;
 export declare const getRevokeSshKeyUrl: (keyId: string) => string;
 /**
- * The row remains and its status becomes `REVOKED`, so it stays answerable afterwards which key was trusted at the time.
+ * The row remains and its status becomes `REVOKED`, so it stays answerable afterwards which key was trusted at the time. A server on which Compute installed the key keeps it until it is removed there. Requires `iam:ssh_keys.manage`.
  * @summary Revoke an SSH key
  */
 export declare const revokeSshKey: (keyId: string, options?: RequestInit, fetchFn?: typeof globalThis.fetch) => Promise<revokeSshKeyResponse>;

package/dist/iam/v1/generated/functions.js

@@ -649,7 +649,7 @@ export const getListSshKeysUrl = (params) => {
         : `https://iam.leaflow.cloud/api/v1/ssh-keys`;
 };
 /**
- * Both the keys belonging to members and the keys belonging to the project are listed; the `owner_user_id` on each one tells them apart.
+ * The keys the project shares. The keys of members are their own and belong to their accounts (`/account/v1/me/ssh-keys` on the account API), so they are not listed here.
  * @summary List the SSH keys of this project
  */
 export const listSshKeys = async (params, options, fetchFn) => {
@@ -665,8 +665,10 @@ export const getCreateSshKeyUrl = () => {
     return `https://iam.leaflow.cloud/api/v1/ssh-keys`;
 };
 /**
- * `owner=me` adds a key of the caller's own, which any member may do. `owner=project` adds a key shared by the project, requires `iam:ssh_keys.manage`, and lands on every machine created in the project afterwards.
- * @summary Add an SSH key
+ * Adds a key the project shares, such as one used by CI or a bastion. Compute installs it on every server created in the project afterwards. It belongs to no member, so it signs in as nobody on Fleet machines; a member adds a key of their own to their account (`POST /account/v1/me/ssh-keys` on the account API).
+ *
+ * Requires `iam:ssh_keys.manage`.
+ * @summary Add an SSH key to this project
  */
 export const createSshKey = async (createSSHKeyRequestBody, options, fetchFn) => {
     const getHeaders = (h) => {
@@ -713,7 +715,7 @@ export const getRenameSshKeyUrl = (keyId) => {
     return `https://iam.leaflow.cloud/api/v1/ssh-keys/${encodeURIComponent(String(keyId))}`;
 };
 /**
- * Only the name can change. The key, its type and its fingerprint are three statements about one thing, and changing one of them would leave the row describing a key that does not exist.
+ * Only the name can change. The key, its type and its fingerprint are three statements about one thing, and changing one of them would leave the row describing a key that does not exist. Requires `iam:ssh_keys.manage`.
  * @summary Rename an SSH key
  */
 export const renameSshKey = async (keyId, renameSSHKeyRequestBody, options, fetchFn) => {
@@ -746,7 +748,7 @@ export const getRevokeSshKeyUrl = (keyId) => {
     return `https://iam.leaflow.cloud/api/v1/ssh-keys/${encodeURIComponent(String(keyId))}`;
 };
 /**
- * The row remains and its status becomes `REVOKED`, so it stays answerable afterwards which key was trusted at the time.
+ * The row remains and its status becomes `REVOKED`, so it stays answerable afterwards which key was trusted at the time. A server on which Compute installed the key keeps it until it is removed there. Requires `iam:ssh_keys.manage`.
  * @summary Revoke an SSH key
  */
 export const revokeSshKey = async (keyId, options, fetchFn) => {