@lateos/npm-scan 0.15.4 → 0.15.6

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
Files changed (25) hide show
  1. package/README.de.md +7 -2
  2. package/README.fr.md +7 -2
  3. package/README.ja.md +7 -2
  4. package/README.md +55 -29
  5. package/README.zh.md +7 -2
  6. package/backend/detectors/cve-2026-48710-badhost/codePattern.js +99 -0
  7. package/backend/detectors/cve-2026-48710-badhost/findings.js +105 -0
  8. package/backend/detectors/cve-2026-48710-badhost/index.js +15 -0
  9. package/backend/detectors/cve-2026-48710-badhost/manifest.js +305 -0
  10. package/backend/detectors/cve-2026-48710-badhost/transitive.js +189 -0
  11. package/backend/detectors/index.js +2 -0
  12. package/backend/detectors/mini-shai-hulud/d5-ioc-check.js +1 -1
  13. package/backend/detectors/mini-shai-hulud/index.js +41 -3
  14. package/backend/detectors/mini-shai-hulud/iocs.json +32 -0
  15. package/backend/vsix-scan/detectors/activation-event-risk.js +116 -0
  16. package/backend/vsix-scan/detectors/burst-publish.js +52 -0
  17. package/backend/vsix-scan/detectors/exfil-pattern.js +88 -0
  18. package/backend/vsix-scan/detectors/known-ioc.js +105 -0
  19. package/backend/vsix-scan/detectors/orphan-commit-fetch.js +69 -0
  20. package/backend/vsix-scan/detectors/publisher-anomaly.js +70 -0
  21. package/backend/vsix-scan/index.js +183 -0
  22. package/backend/vsix-scan/marketplace-client.js +145 -0
  23. package/backend/vsix-scan/vsix-iocs.json +31 -0
  24. package/cli/cli.js +21 -4
  25. package/package.json +1 -1
package/README.de.md CHANGED
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
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  [![npm version](https://img.shields.io/npm/v/@lateos/npm-scan?style=flat-square)](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@lateos/npm-scan)
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  [![License](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-Apache%202.0%20%2B%20Commons%20Clause-blue?style=flat-square)](LICENSING.md)
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  [![Node](https://img.shields.io/badge/node-%3E%3D18-brightgreen?style=flat-square)](package.json)
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- [![Tests](https://img.shields.io/badge/tests-222%20passing-brightgreen?style=flat-square)](https://github.com/lateos-ai/npm-scan)
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+ [![Tests](https://img.shields.io/badge/tests-459%20passing-brightgreen?style=flat-square)](https://github.com/lateos-ai/npm-scan)
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  [![Coverage](https://img.shields.io/badge/coverage-85%25-yellowgreen?style=flat-square)](https://github.com/lateos-ai/npm-scan)
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  [![Docker](https://img.shields.io/badge/docker-lateos%2Fnpm--scan-2496ED?style=flat-square&logo=docker)](https://hub.docker.com/r/lateos/npm-scan)
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  [![Sigstore](https://img.shields.io/static/v1?label=Sigstore&message=Provenance&color=green&style=flat-square&logo=sigstore)](https://github.com/lateos-ai/npm-scan/actions/workflows/publish.yml)
@@ -227,6 +227,7 @@ npm-scan report --pdf # alle Scans (Premium)
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  | **ATK-009** | Bedingte/schlafende Auslöser (CI-Erkennung, zeitbasiert) | Verhaltensbasiert | 🔴 hoch | SR-9.2 |
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  | **ATK-010** | Sandbox-Evasion / Anti-Analyse | Verhaltensbasiert | 🟠 mittel | SR-10.3 |
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  | **ATK-011** | Transitive Verbreitung (wurmartige laterale Ausbreitung) | Verhaltensbasiert | 🔴 hoch | SR-11.4 |
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+ | **CVE-2026-48710** | BadHost — Starlette Authentifizierungs-Bypass via Host-Header-Injection (CVE-2026-48710, CVSS 7.0). Python-Abhängigkeitsversionserkennung (requirements.txt, pyproject.toml, poetry.lock, Pipfile, setup.py/cfg), transitive Heuristik (15 bekannte Downstream-Pakete: fastapi, vllm, litellm, MCP-Server, etc.), statische Code-Pattern-Analyse für gefährliche `request.url.path`-Nutzung in Auth/Middleware-Kontexten mit `request.scope["path"]`-Unterdrückung | Statisch + Registry | 🔴 hoch / 🟠 mittel / ℹ️ info | SR-3.1, SR-5.3 |
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  > **Wie ausweichende Angriffe erkannt werden:** ATK-009 erkennt Pakete, die `process.env.CI` prüfen, Hostnamen sondieren oder zeitbasierte Aktivierung verwenden. ATK-010 markiert `debugger`-Anweisungen, `os.hostname()`-Sonden und Umgebungs-Fingerprinting. ATK-011 verfolgt Peer-Abhängigkeitsgraphen, um wurmartige Verbreitungsmuster zu erkennen.
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  > Vollständige Dokumentation der Ausweichfläche und PoC-Beispiele finden Sie in [`docs/attack-taxonomy.md`](docs/attack-taxonomy.md).
@@ -548,7 +549,7 @@ Siehe den obigen [Docker-Schnellstart-Abschnitt](#-lateosnpm-scan-überall-mit-d
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  ### Kostenlose Stufe (ausgeliefert)
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- - Alle 11 ATK-Detektoren (statisch + verhaltensbasiert)
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+ - Alle 11 ATK-Detektoren (statisch + verhaltensbasiert) + **MEGALODON** + **HF_IMPERSONATION** + **MINI_SHAI_HULUD** + **VSIX_SCAN** + **CVE-2026-48710 (BadHost)**
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  - SBOM-Ausgabe (CycloneDX + SPDX)
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  - HTML-, Text- und Compliance-Berichte (NIST + EU CRA)
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  - Policy-as-Code-Engine (YAML)
@@ -611,6 +612,10 @@ node --test test/detectors-corpus.test.js
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  - `test/fetch.test.js` — Tarball-Extraktion, Bereinigung temporärer Verzeichnisse
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  - `test/policy-edge-cases.test.js` — Grenzfälle bei Unterdrückung, Überschreibung, Ladevalidierung
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  - `test/report-snapshots.test.js` — HTML/Text/CRA/PDF-Format-Assertions
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+ - `test/cve-2026-48710-badhost/manifest.test.js` — 13 Python-Manifest-Parsing-Tests (requirements.txt, pyproject.toml, poetry.lock, Version-Grenzfälle)
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+ - `test/cve-2026-48710-badhost/transitive.test.js` — 7 transitive Abhängigkeitstests (Tier 1/2, fastapi-Version-Gating, Pin-Unterdrückung)
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+ - `test/cve-2026-48710-badhost/codePattern.test.js` — 6 statische Code-Pattern-Tests (Auth-Kontext, INFO-Durchgriff, Scope-Unterdrückung)
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+ - `test/cve-2026-48710-badhost/integration.test.js` — 4 Integrationstests (End-to-End-Composite-Findings, sauberes Projekt, keine Python-Dateien)
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  - `test/cli.test.js` — Commander-Integrationstests (Hilfe, Version, Scan, Bericht, Fehlerbehandlung)
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  ### Hilfe benötigt?
package/README.fr.md CHANGED
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
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  [![npm version](https://img.shields.io/npm/v/@lateos/npm-scan?style=flat-square)](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@lateos/npm-scan)
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  [![License](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-Apache%202.0%20%2B%20Commons%20Clause-blue?style=flat-square)](LICENSING.md)
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  [![Node](https://img.shields.io/badge/node-%3E%3D18-brightgreen?style=flat-square)](package.json)
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- [![Tests](https://img.shields.io/badge/tests-222%20passing-brightgreen?style=flat-square)](https://github.com/lateos-ai/npm-scan)
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+ [![Tests](https://img.shields.io/badge/tests-459%20passing-brightgreen?style=flat-square)](https://github.com/lateos-ai/npm-scan)
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  [![Coverage](https://img.shields.io/badge/coverage-85%25-yellowgreen?style=flat-square)](https://github.com/lateos-ai/npm-scan)
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  [![Docker](https://img.shields.io/badge/docker-lateos%2Fnpm--scan-2496ED?style=flat-square&logo=docker)](https://hub.docker.com/r/lateos/npm-scan)
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  [![Sigstore](https://img.shields.io/static/v1?label=Sigstore&message=Provenance&color=green&style=flat-square&logo=sigstore)](https://github.com/lateos-ai/npm-scan/actions/workflows/publish.yml)
@@ -227,6 +227,7 @@ npm-scan report --pdf # tous les scans (premium)
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  | **ATK-009** | Déclencheurs conditionnels/dormants (détection CI, temporel) | Comportementale | 🔴 élevée | SR-9.2 |
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  | **ATK-010** | Contournement de sandbox / anti-analyse | Comportementale | 🟠 moyenne | SR-10.3 |
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  | **ATK-011** | Propagation transitive (dissémination latérale de type ver) | Comportementale | 🔴 élevée | SR-11.4 |
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+ | **CVE-2026-48710** | BadHost — contournement d'authentification Starlette par injection d'en-tête Host (CVE-2026-48710, CVSS 7.0). Détection de version de dépendance Python (requirements.txt, pyproject.toml, poetry.lock, Pipfile, setup.py/cfg), heuristique transitive (15 paquets aval connus : fastapi, vllm, litellm, serveurs MCP, etc.), analyse statique de code pour `request.url.path` dangereux en contexte auth/middleware avec suppression par `request.scope["path"]` | Statique + Registre | 🔴 élevée / 🟠 moyenne / ℹ️ info | SR-3.1, SR-5.3 |
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  > **Comment les attaques furtives sont détectées :** ATK-009 détecte les paquets qui vérifient `process.env.CI`, sondent les noms d'hôte ou utilisent une activation temporelle. ATK-009 signale les instructions `debugger`, les sondes `os.hostname()` et l'empreinte environnementale. ATK-011 trace les graphes de dépendances peer pour détecter les schémas de propagation de type ver.
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  > Voir [`docs/attack-taxonomy.md`](docs/attack-taxonomy.md) pour la documentation complète de la surface d'évasion et des exemples de PoC.
@@ -548,7 +549,7 @@ Voir la [section Démarrage rapide Docker](#-exécutez-lateosnpm-scan-partout-av
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  ### Niveau gratuit (livré)
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- - Les 11 détecteurs ATK (statique + comportemental)
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+ - Les 11 détecteurs ATK (statique + comportemental) + **MEGALODON** + **HF_IMPERSONATION** + **MINI_SHAI_HULUD** + **VSIX_SCAN** + **CVE-2026-48710 (BadHost)**
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  - Sortie SBOM (CycloneDX + SPDX)
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  - Rapports HTML, texte et conformité (NIST + EU CRA)
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  - Moteur de politique en tant que code (YAML)
@@ -611,6 +612,10 @@ node --test test/detectors-corpus.test.js
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  - `test/fetch.test.js` — extraction de tarball, nettoyage de répertoire temporaire
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  - `test/policy-edge-cases.test.js` — cas limites dans la suppression, la surcharge, la validation de chargement
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  - `test/report-snapshots.test.js` — assertions de format HTML/texte/CRA/PDF
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+ - `test/cve-2026-48710-badhost/manifest.test.js` — 13 tests d'analyse de manifeste Python (requirements.txt, pyproject.toml, poetry.lock, cas limites de version)
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+ - `test/cve-2026-48710-badhost/transitive.test.js` — 7 tests de dépendances transitives (Tier 1/2, contrôle de version fastapi, suppression par épinglage)
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+ - `test/cve-2026-48710-badhost/codePattern.test.js` — 6 tests de motifs de code statiques (contexte auth, passage INFO, suppression scope)
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+ - `test/cve-2026-48710-badhost/integration.test.js` — 4 tests d'intégration (résultats composites de bout en bout, projet propre, pas de fichiers Python)
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  - `test/cli.test.js` — tests d'intégration commander (aide, version, scan, rapport, gestion d'erreurs)
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  ### Besoin d'aide ?
package/README.ja.md CHANGED
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  [![npm version](https://img.shields.io/npm/v/@lateos/npm-scan?style=flat-square)](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@lateos/npm-scan)
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  [![License](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-Apache%202.0%20%2B%20Commons%20Clause-blue?style=flat-square)](LICENSING.md)
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  [![Node](https://img.shields.io/badge/node-%3E%3D18-brightgreen?style=flat-square)](package.json)
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- [![Tests](https://img.shields.io/badge/tests-222%20passing-brightgreen?style=flat-square)](https://github.com/lateos-ai/npm-scan)
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+ [![Tests](https://img.shields.io/badge/tests-459%20passing-brightgreen?style=flat-square)](https://github.com/lateos-ai/npm-scan)
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  [![Coverage](https://img.shields.io/badge/coverage-85%25-yellowgreen?style=flat-square)](https://github.com/lateos-ai/npm-scan)
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  [![Docker](https://img.shields.io/badge/docker-lateos%2Fnpm--scan-2496ED?style=flat-square&logo=docker)](https://hub.docker.com/r/lateos/npm-scan)
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  [![Sigstore](https://img.shields.io/static/v1?label=Sigstore&message=Provenance&color=green&style=flat-square&logo=sigstore)](https://github.com/lateos-ai/npm-scan/actions/workflows/publish.yml)
@@ -223,6 +223,7 @@ npm-scan report --pdf # すべてのスキャン（プレミアム
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  | **ATK-009** | 条件付き／潜伏トリガー（CI検出、時間ベース） | 行動 | 🔴 高 | SR-9.2 |
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  | **ATK-010** | サンドボックス回避／アンチ解析 | 行動 | 🟠 中 | SR-10.3 |
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  | **ATK-011** | 推移的伝播（ワーム型横方向拡散） | 行動 | 🔴 高 | SR-11.4 |
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+ | **CVE-2026-48710** | BadHost — Starlette Host ヘッダーインジェクション認証バイパス (CVE-2026-48710, CVSS 7.0)。Python 依存関係バージョン検出 (requirements.txt, pyproject.toml, poetry.lock, Pipfile, setup.py/cfg)、推移的ヒューリスティック (15 の既知ダウンストリームパッケージ：fastapi, vllm, litellm, MCP サーバー等)、auth/middleware コンテキストでの危険な `request.url.path` 使用の静的コードパターンスキャン、`request.scope["path"]` による抑制対応 | 静的 + レジストリ | 🔴 高 / 🟠 中 / ℹ️ 情報 | SR-3.1, SR-5.3 |
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  > **回避型攻撃の捕捉方法：** ATK-009は`process.env.CI`をチェックする、ホスト名をプローブする、または時間ベースのアクティベーションを使用するパッケージを検出します。ATK-010は`debugger`文、`os.hostname()`プローブ、環境フィンガープリンティングをフラグ付けします。ATK-011はピア依存関係グラフをトレースしてワーム型伝播パターンを検出します。
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  > 完全な回避面のドキュメントとPoC例については、[`docs/attack-taxonomy.md`](docs/attack-taxonomy.md)を参照してください。
@@ -544,7 +545,7 @@ npm-scan report --html > report.html
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  ### 無料版（出荷済み）
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- - 全11ATK検出器（静的＋行動）
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+ - 全11ATK検出器（静的＋行動）+ **MEGALODON** + **HF_IMPERSONATION** + **MINI_SHAI_HULUD** + **VSIX_SCAN** + **CVE-2026-48710 (BadHost)**
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  - SBOM出力（CycloneDX + SPDX）
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  - HTML、テキスト、コンプライアンスレポート（NIST + EU CRA）
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  - ポリシー・アズ・コードエンジン（YAML）
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  - `test/fetch.test.js` — tarball抽出、一時ディレクトリクリーンアップ
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  - `test/policy-edge-cases.test.js` — 抑制、上書き、ロード検証のエッジケース
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  - `test/report-snapshots.test.js` — HTML/テキスト/CRA/PDF形式のアサーション
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+ - `test/cve-2026-48710-badhost/manifest.test.js` — 13のPythonマニフェスト解析テスト（requirements.txt, pyproject.toml, poetry.lock, バージョンエッジケース）
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+ - `test/cve-2026-48710-badhost/transitive.test.js` — 7の推移的依存関係テスト（Tier 1/2, fastapiバージョンゲーティング, 固定抑制）
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+ - `test/cve-2026-48710-badhost/codePattern.test.js` — 6の静的コードパターンテスト（authコンテキスト, INFOフォールスルー, scope抑制）
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+ - `test/cve-2026-48710-badhost/integration.test.js` — 4の統合テスト（エンドツーエンド複合発見項目, クリーンプロジェクト, Pythonファイルなし）
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  ### ヘルプが必要ですか？
package/README.md CHANGED
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  [![npm version](https://img.shields.io/npm/v/@lateos/npm-scan?style=flat-square)](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@lateos/npm-scan)
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  [![License](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-Apache%202.0%20%2B%20Commons%20Clause-blue?style=flat-square)](LICENSING.md)
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  [![Node](https://img.shields.io/badge/node-%3E%3D18-brightgreen?style=flat-square)](package.json)
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- [![Tests](https://img.shields.io/badge/tests-384%20passing-brightgreen?style=flat-square)](https://github.com/lateos-ai/npm-scan)
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+ [![Tests](https://img.shields.io/badge/tests-459%20passing-brightgreen?style=flat-square)](https://github.com/lateos-ai/npm-scan)
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  [![Docker](https://img.shields.io/badge/docker-lateos%2Fnpm--scan-2496ED?style=flat-square&logo=docker)](https://hub.docker.com/r/lateos/npm-scan)
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@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ A growing attack vector is **HuggingFace org impersonation** — packages that m
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  The **Megalodon campaign** (2026) alone compromised 5,500+ repositories via fake GitHub PRs, malicious workflow injection, and cloud credential exfiltration — all coordinated through a single actor automating the entire kill chain. **@lateos/npm-scan** now detects artifacts of this campaign out of the box.
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+ Critical infrastructure vulnerabilities in the Python ecosystem are also in scope. The **BadHost (CVE-2026-48710)** vulnerability in Starlette < 1.0.1 enables authentication bypass via unvalidated HTTP Host header injection, affecting FastAPI, vLLM, LiteLLM, MCP servers, and any project using Starlette transitively — now detected across Python manifests, transitive dependency chains, and source code patterns in a single scan.
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  **npm audit** checks known CVEs. **Snyk** scans for vulnerabilities. **Socket** looks at package behavior. None of them were designed for the generation of attacks that emerged in 2025 — attacks that look benign until they reach production.
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  **@lateos/npm-scan** was built for this moment.
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  | Sandbox evasion detection (ATK-010) | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ |
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  | Transitive worm propagation (ATK-011) | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ |
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  | Campaign detection (Megalodon CI/CD) | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ |
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+ | Worm campaign detection (Mini Shai-Hulud Wave 1–3) | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ |
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  | HF model repo impersonation + README clone | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ |
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+ | VS Code extension supply chain scan (--vsix) | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ |
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+ | Python vulnerability detection (CVE-2026-48710 BadHost) | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ |
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  | Attack taxonomy (ATK series) | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ |
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  | SBOM output (CycloneDX + SPDX) | ❌ | ✅ | ❌ | ✅ |
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  | SARIF v2.1 (GitHub Code Scanning) | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ |
@@ -68,6 +73,9 @@ The **Megalodon campaign** (2026) alone compromised 5,500+ repositories via fake
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  | 🕵️ | **Heuristic static analysis** | AST-level inspection catches obfuscation, eval chains, env probing, and suspicious lifecycle scripts that regex-based tools miss |
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  | 🧠 | **Behavioral detection** | Identifies conditional triggers (time-based, CI-aware), sandbox evasion, and dormant activation patterns |
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  | 🧬 | **ATK attack taxonomy** | 11 classified attack types with NIST 800-161 mappings — versioned, documented, and PR-able |
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+ | 🪱 | **Worm campaign detection** | Mini Shai-Hulud — 6 sub-checks detecting burst publish, sibling compromise, SLSA attestation mismatch, publisher drift, IOC match, and token exfil across 3 waves (TanStack, AntV/atool, Nx Console) |
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+ | 🧩 | **VSIX extension scanning** | `npm-scan scan --vsix nrwl.angular-console` — detects VS Code Marketplace supply chain attacks: burst publish, publisher anomaly, activation event risk, orphan commit fetch, known IOC, and exfil patterns (Nx Console 18.95.0 CVE-2026-48027) |
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+ | 🐍 | **Python vulnerability detection** | CVE-2026-48710 (BadHost) — Starlette Host header injection across 6 Python manifest formats, 15 transitive downstream packages (fastapi, vllm, litellm, MCP), and static `request.url.path` code pattern analysis with `scope["path"]` suppression |
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  | 📦 | **SBOM generation** | CycloneDX 1.5 and SPDX 2.3 with findings embedded as vulnerabilities |
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  | 🔍 | **SARIF output** | GitHub Advanced Security / CodeQL compatible SARIF v2.1 — shows findings directly in Security tab |
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  | 🧾 | **Compliance reporting** | NIST SP 800-161 traceability matrix + EU Cyber Resilience Act mapping (free tier) |
@@ -193,41 +201,28 @@ npm-scan scan some-package --policy .npm-scan.yml
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+ # Scan a VS Code extension for Marketplace supply chain attacks
206
+ npm-scan scan --vsix nrwl.angular-console
207
+
208
+ # Scan a package AND a VSIX extension together (findings merge)
209
+ npm-scan scan lodash --vsix nrwl.angular-console
196
210
  ```
197
211
 
198
212
  ### Scan a lockfile
199
213
 
200
214
  ```bash
201
- # Scan the current project's dependencies (auto-detects npm/yarn/pnpm)
202
- npm-scan scan-lockfile
203
-
204
- # Scan a specific lockfile
205
- npm-scan scan-lockfile -f ./path/to/package-lock.json
206
-
207
- # Scan yarn.lock or pnpm-lock.yaml
208
- npm-scan scan-lockfile -f ./yarn.lock --yarn
209
- npm-scan scan-lockfile -f ./pnpm-lock.yaml --pnpm
210
-
211
- # Fail CI/CD on high or critical findings (exit code 1)
212
- npm-scan scan-lockfile --fail-on high
213
-
214
- # Fail on any findings (low and above)
215
- npm-scan scan-lockfile --fail-on low
216
-
217
- # Generate SARIF v2.1 output for GitHub Advanced Security / VS Code
218
- npm-scan scan-lockfile --sarif results.sarif
219
-
220
- # Watch for changes and auto-rescan (single lockfile)
221
- npm-scan scan-lockfile --watch
215
+ # Scan a single package
216
+ npm-scan scan lodash
222
217
 
223
- # Watch with faster debounce (500ms) — great for dev workflows
224
- npm-scan scan-lockfile --watch --debounce 500
218
+ # Scan your lockfile
219
+ npm-scan scan-lockfile
225
220
 
226
- # Watch monorepo (all lockfiles — npm/yarn/pnpm — in workspace)
227
- npm-scan scan-lockfile --watch --monorepo
221
+ # Scan a VS Code extension for supply chain threats
222
+ npm-scan scan --vsix nrwl.angular-console
228
223
 
229
- # Output only risk score (0-10) for dashboards/thresholds
230
- npm-scan scan-lockfile --score-only
224
+ # View latest scans
225
+ npm-scan report
231
226
  ```
232
227
 
233
228
  ### Generate reports
@@ -288,10 +283,16 @@ npm-scan report --pdf # all scans (premium)
288
283
  | **ATK-011** | Transitive propagation (worm-style lateral spread) | Behavioral | 🔴 high | SR-11.4 |
289
284
  | **MEGALODON** | Megalodon CI/CD campaign — workflow C2 exfil, credential harvest, publish velocity spike, publisher drift | Static + Registry | ⚫ critical | SR-3.1, SR-7.5 |
290
285
  | **HF_IMPERSONATION** | HuggingFace org spoof detection — Jaro-Winkler similarity against 15 known-good orgs, SimHash README clone detection, artifact mismatch (`.exe`/`.dll` in model repos), postinstall escalation, new-org amplifier | Static + Network (Stage 2) | 🔴 high / ⚫ critical | SR-2.1 |
286
+ | **MINI_SHAI_HULUD** | Mini Shai-Hulud worm campaign — burst publish velocity (≥3 versions/30 min), co-temporal sibling compromise, SLSA attestation mismatch (sub-60s gap, first-ever, builder mismatch), publisher drift (<10 min account change), IOC match (scope/sha512/publisher from seed file), token exfil (NPM_TOKEN/.npmrc/atob patterns), Nx Console downstream detection | Static + Registry | 🔴 high / ⚫ critical | SR-3.1, SR-7.5 |
287
+ | **VSIX_SCAN** | VS Code extension supply chain scan — burst publish (≥2 versions/30 min, hot-pull <20 min), publisher anomaly (account substitution, new-account on high-install ext, 15-min add+publish), activation event risk (onStartupFinished→HIGH, *→CRITICAL, escalation on shell keywords), orphan commit fetch (GitHub API SHA refs, npx git URL, MCP-disguised exfil, Bun install), known IOC (extensionId/publisherAccount/commit hash from seed), exfil patterns (cred paths, DNS tunneling, AES+RSA, anti-analysis, Bun APIs) | Static + Registry | 🟠 medium / 🔴 high / ⚫ critical | SR-3.1, SR-5.3 |
288
+ | **CVE-2026-48710** | BadHost — Starlette authentication bypass via Host header injection (CVE-2026-48710, CVSS 7.0). Python dependency version detection (requirements.txt, pyproject.toml, poetry.lock, Pipfile, setup.py/cfg), transitive heuristic (15 known downstream packages: fastapi, vllm, litellm, MCP servers, etc.), static code pattern scan for dangerous `request.url.path` usage in auth/middleware context with `request.scope["path"]` suppression | Static + Registry | 🔴 high / 🟠 medium / ℹ️ info | SR-3.1, SR-5.3 |
291
289
 
292
290
  > **How evasive attacks are caught:** ATK-009 detects packages that check `process.env.CI`, probe hostnames, or use time-based activation. ATK-010 flags `debugger` statements, `os.hostname()` probes, and env fingerprinting. ATK-011 traces peer dependency graphs to detect worm-like propagation patterns.
293
291
  > **MEGALODON** campaign detection analyzes bundled `.github/workflows/` files for C2 co-occurrence and base64 decode chains, scans tarball files for credential + outbound network patterns, detects version publish velocity spikes via npm registry metadata, and identifies publisher account drift — all without any network calls beyond the initial package fetch.
294
292
  > **HF_IMPERSONATION** detection uses a lazy two-stage evaluation: Stage 1 scans `package.json` scripts and JS/TS sources for HuggingFace references (URLs, `from_pretrained()`, `hub.download()`) and runs Jaro-Winkler similarity against 15 known-good HF orgs — zero network. If spoofs are found, Stage 2 fetches the HF model API, computes SimHash of both READMEs for clone detection, validates artifact type consistency (e.g., `transformers` library with `.exe` files is flagged as critical), applies a new-org amplifier (<30 days), and escalates when the reference appears in a lifecycle script.
293
+ > **MINI_SHAI_HULUD** worm campaign detection uses a lazy two-stage evaluation: Stage 1 runs burst velocity, publisher drift, IOC, and token exfil checks (in-memory, no network). If burst triggers, Stage 2 queries npm attestation endpoints for SLSA anomalies and fetches sibling package registry metadata for co-temporal burst detection. Composite finding includes wave attribution (wave1-tanstack, wave2-antv, wave3-nx-console) and critical severity when SLSA or IOC match. NX_CONSOLE_DOWNSTREAM (D7) flags npm packages with `@nx/*` dependencies and checks for `nrwl.angular-console` in `.vscode/extensions.json`.
294
+ > **VSIX_SCAN** extension scanning wraps both VS Code Marketplace and Open VSX registries with rate-limited (10 req/min), cached (5 min TTL) API clients. All 6 detectors run asynchronously and aggregate into a single composite `VSIX_SCAN` finding. Zero extension code is executed — all analysis is static regex/text-pattern matching. No Bun installation required for Bun pattern detection.
295
+ > **CVE-2026-48710 (BadHost)** detection uses three independent layers: Layer 1 parses 6 Python manifest formats (requirements.txt, pyproject.toml, poetry.lock, Pipfile, setup.py, setup.cfg) with PEP 440 semver-aware version comparison. Layer 2 scans for 15 known Starlette-downstream packages with Tier 1 (HIGH confidence) and Tier 2 (MEDIUM confidence) transitive heuristics, suppressed by explicit `starlette >= 1.0.1` pin. Layer 3 performs function-boundary static analysis on `.py` files for `request.url.path` usage, escalating to MEDIUM severity in auth/middleware contexts and suppressing when `request.scope["path"]` is used in the same function.
295
296
  > See [`docs/attack-taxonomy.md`](docs/attack-taxonomy.md) for full evasion surface documentation and PoC examples.
296
297
 
297
298
  ---
@@ -367,6 +368,18 @@ npm-scan scan target --policy .npm-scan.yml
367
368
  | `NPM_SCAN_LICENSE_KEY` | Premium / enterprise license key | — |
368
369
  | `NPM_SCAN_DATA_DIR` | Scan history directory | `./.npm-scan` |
369
370
  | `NPM_SCAN_LOG_LEVEL` | Log verbosity | `info` |
371
+ | `NPM_SCAN_LICENSE_SECRET` | HMAC key for license generation/validation | `npm-scan-default-dev-key` |
372
+
373
+ ### IOC configuration
374
+
375
+ Campaign detectors use seed IOC files for known-malicious fingerprints:
376
+
377
+ | IOC File | Detector | Types |
378
+ |----------|----------|-------|
379
+ | `backend/detectors/mini-shai-hulud/iocs.json` | Mini Shai-Hulud (Waves 1–3) | `packageScope`, `publisherAccount`, `sha512`, `extensionId` |
380
+ | `backend/vsix-scan/vsix-iocs.json` | VSIX extension scan | `extensionId`, `publisherAccount`, `orphanCommitHash` |
381
+
382
+ IOC files follow a unified schema (`iocs: [{ type, value, ... }]`) and are loaded at module init. Update them from your threat intel feed to extend detection coverage without code changes.
370
383
 
371
384
  ### Premium licensing
372
385
 
@@ -638,7 +651,7 @@ See the [Docker quick-start section](#-run-lateosnpm-scan-anywhere-with-docker--
638
651
 
639
652
  ### Free tier (shipped)
640
653
 
641
- - All 11 ATK detectors + **MEGALODON** CI/CD campaign detection (D1–D6) + **HF_IMPERSONATION** detector
654
+ - All 11 ATK detectors + **MEGALODON** CI/CD campaign detection (D1–D6) + **HF_IMPERSONATION** detector + **MINI_SHAI_HULUD** worm campaign (D1–D7, 3 waves) + **VSIX_SCAN** extension supply chain scan (6 detectors) + **CVE-2026-48710 (BadHost)** Python vulnerability detection (3 layers)
642
655
  - SBOM output (CycloneDX + SPDX)
643
656
  - HTML, text, and compliance reports (NIST + EU CRA)
644
657
  - Policy-as-code engine (YAML)
@@ -647,6 +660,7 @@ See the [Docker quick-start section](#-run-lateosnpm-scan-anywhere-with-docker--
647
660
  - Pre-commit hook (husky + lint-staged)
648
661
  - Docker images + Compose pipeline
649
662
  - Watch mode (--watch / --monorepo for auto-rescan)
663
+ - VS Code extension scanning (--vsix flag with Marketplace + Open VSX registries)
650
664
 
651
665
  ### Premium (🔐 license key)
652
666
 
@@ -708,6 +722,18 @@ node --test test/detectors-corpus.test.js
708
722
  - `test/report.test.js` — SARIF, CSV, STIG, risk score format tests
709
723
  - `test/lockfile.test.js` — npm/yarn/pnpm parser, auto-detect, ATK-007/011 lockfile tests
710
724
  - `test/hf-impersonation.test.js` — 13 HF impersonation detection tests (no-ref, exact match, spoof, README clone, artifact mismatch, postinstall escalation, new-org tag)
725
+ - `test/mini-shai-hulud.test.js` — 22 Mini Shai-Hulud worm campaign detection tests (burst, sibling, SLSA, maintainer, IOC, exfil, wave attribution)
726
+ - `test/vsix-scan/burst-publish.test.js` — 4 VSIX burst publish tests (threshold, sub-threshold, hot-pull, Open VSX window)
727
+ - `test/vsix-scan/publisher-anomaly.test.js` — 5 publisher anomaly tests (cross-namespace, new-account, add+publish, substitution, silent)
728
+ - `test/vsix-scan/activation-event-risk.test.js` — 5 activation event risk tests (onStartupFinished, wildcard, escalation, first-time, silent)
729
+ - `test/vsix-scan/orphan-commit-fetch.test.js` — 5 orphan commit tests (GitHub SHA, npx git, MCP exfil, Bun install, silent)
730
+ - `test/vsix-scan/known-ioc.test.js` — 4 known IOC tests (extensionId, publisher window, outside window)
731
+ - `test/vsix-scan/exfil-pattern.test.js` — 5 exfil pattern tests (creds, DNS tunnel, AES+RSA, anti-analysis, silent)
732
+ - `test/vsix-scan/integration.test.js` — 4 integration tests (Nx Console CRITICAL, safe version clean, orphan commit, skipNetwork)
733
+ - `test/cve-2026-48710-badhost/manifest.test.js` — 13 Python manifest parsing tests (requirements.txt, pyproject.toml, poetry.lock, version edge cases)
734
+ - `test/cve-2026-48710-badhost/transitive.test.js` — 7 transitive dependency tests (Tier 1/2, fastapi version gating, pin suppression)
735
+ - `test/cve-2026-48710-badhost/codePattern.test.js` — 6 static code pattern tests (auth context, INFO fallthrough, scope suppression)
736
+ - `test/cve-2026-48710-badhost/integration.test.js` — 4 integration tests (end-to-end composite findings, clean project, no Python files)
711
737
  - `test/cli.test.js` — commander integration tests (help, version, scan, report, error handling)
712
738
  - `test/cli-lockfile.test.js` — scan-lockfile CLI options, yarn/pnpm/monorepo/watch tests
713
739
 
package/README.zh.md CHANGED
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
9
9
  [![npm version](https://img.shields.io/npm/v/@lateos/npm-scan?style=flat-square)](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@lateos/npm-scan)
10
10
  [![License](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-Apache%202.0%20%2B%20Commons%20Clause-blue?style=flat-square)](LICENSING.md)
11
11
  [![Node](https://img.shields.io/badge/node-%3E%3D18-brightgreen?style=flat-square)](package.json)
12
- [![Tests](https://img.shields.io/badge/tests-222%20passing-brightgreen?style=flat-square)](https://github.com/lateos-ai/npm-scan)
12
+ [![Tests](https://img.shields.io/badge/tests-459%20passing-brightgreen?style=flat-square)](https://github.com/lateos-ai/npm-scan)
13
13
  [![Coverage](https://img.shields.io/badge/coverage-85%25-yellowgreen?style=flat-square)](https://github.com/lateos-ai/npm-scan)
14
14
  [![Docker](https://img.shields.io/badge/docker-lateos%2Fnpm--scan-2496ED?style=flat-square&logo=docker)](https://hub.docker.com/r/lateos/npm-scan)
15
15
  [![Sigstore](https://img.shields.io/static/v1?label=Sigstore&message=Provenance&color=green&style=flat-square&logo=sigstore)](https://github.com/lateos-ai/npm-scan/actions/workflows/publish.yml)
@@ -227,6 +227,7 @@ npm-scan report --pdf # 所有扫描（高级版）
227
227
  | **ATK-009** | 条件/潜伏触发器（CI 检测、基于时间） | 行为 | 🔴 高 | SR-9.2 |
228
228
  | **ATK-010** | 沙箱逃逸 / 反分析 | 行为 | 🟠 中 | SR-10.3 |
229
229
  | **ATK-011** | 传递性传播（蠕虫式横向扩散） | 行为 | 🔴 高 | SR-11.4 |
230
+ | **CVE-2026-48710** | BadHost — Starlette Host 头注入认证绕过 (CVE-2026-48710, CVSS 7.0)。Python 依赖版本检测 (requirements.txt, pyproject.toml, poetry.lock, Pipfile, setup.py/cfg)，传递性启发式检测 (15 个已知下游包：fastapi, vllm, litellm, MCP 服务器等)，auth/middleware 上下文中危险 `request.url.path` 使用的静态代码模式扫描，支持 `request.scope["path"]` 抑制 | 静态 + 注册表 | 🔴 高 / 🟠 中 / ℹ️ 信息 | SR-3.1, SR-5.3 |
230
231
 
231
232
  > **如何捕获逃避式攻击：** ATK-009 检测检查 `process.env.CI`、探测主机名或使用时间激活的包。ATK-010 标记 `debugger` 语句、`os.hostname()` 探测和环境指纹采集。ATK-011 追踪同级依赖图以检测蠕虫式传播模式。
232
233
  > 完整逃避面文档和 PoC 示例请参阅 [`docs/attack-taxonomy.md`](docs/attack-taxonomy.md)。
@@ -548,7 +549,7 @@ npm-scan report --html > report.html
548
549
 
549
550
  ### 免费版（已发布）
550
551
 
551
- - 全部 11 个 ATK 检测器（静态 + 行为）
552
+ - 全部 11 个 ATK 检测器（静态 + 行为）+ **MEGALODON** + **HF_IMPERSONATION** + **MINI_SHAI_HULUD** + **VSIX_SCAN** + **CVE-2026-48710 (BadHost)**
552
553
  - SBOM 输出（CycloneDX + SPDX）
553
554
  - HTML、文本和合规报告（NIST + EU CRA）
554
555
  - 策略即代码引擎（YAML）
@@ -611,6 +612,10 @@ node --test test/detectors-corpus.test.js
611
612
  - `test/fetch.test.js` — tarball 提取、临时目录清理
612
613
  - `test/policy-edge-cases.test.js` — 抑制、覆盖、加载验证的边缘情况
613
614
  - `test/report-snapshots.test.js` — HTML/文本/CRA/PDF 格式断言
615
+ - `test/cve-2026-48710-badhost/manifest.test.js` — 13 个 Python 清单解析测试（requirements.txt, pyproject.toml, poetry.lock, 版本边界情况）
616
+ - `test/cve-2026-48710-badhost/transitive.test.js` — 7 个传递性依赖测试（Tier 1/2, fastapi 版本门控, 固定版本抑制）
617
+ - `test/cve-2026-48710-badhost/codePattern.test.js` — 6 个静态代码模式测试（auth 上下文, INFO 穿透, scope 抑制）
618
+ - `test/cve-2026-48710-badhost/integration.test.js` — 4 个集成测试（端到端复合发现项, 清洁项目, 无 Python 文件）
614
619
  - `test/cli.test.js` — commander 集成测试（帮助、版本、扫描、报告、错误处理）
615
620
 
616
621
  ### 需要帮助？
package/backend/detectors/cve-2026-48710-badhost/codePattern.js ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
1
+ import { codePatternAuthFinding, codePatternInfoFinding } from './findings.js';
2
+
3
+ const AUTH_CONTEXT_PATHS = [
4
+ 'middleware',
5
+ 'auth',
6
+ 'security',
7
+ 'router',
8
+ 'depends',
9
+ 'guard',
10
+ 'permission',
11
+ ];
12
+
13
+ const URL_PATH_PATTERN = /request\.url\.path|req\.url\.path|self\.request\.url\.path/g;
14
+ const SCOPE_PATH_PATTERN = /request\.scope\s*\[\s*["']path["']\s*\]|request\.scope\.get\s*\(\s*["']path["']\s*\)/g;
15
+
16
+ function hasAuthContext(filePath) {
17
+ const lower = filePath.toLowerCase();
18
+ return AUTH_CONTEXT_PATHS.some(ctx => lower.includes(ctx));
19
+ }
20
+
21
+ function findFunctionBoundaries(lines) {
22
+ const functions = [];
23
+ let currentFn = null;
24
+ let fnBodyStart = -1;
25
+ let indent = 0;
26
+
27
+ for (let i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
28
+ const line = lines[i];
29
+ const defMatch = line.match(/^(def\s+\w+|async\s+def\s+\w+)/);
30
+ if (defMatch) {
31
+ if (currentFn) {
32
+ functions.push({ name: currentFn, startLine: fnBodyStart, endLine: i - 1 });
33
+ }
34
+ currentFn = defMatch[1];
35
+ fnBodyStart = i;
36
+ indent = line.length - line.trimStart().length;
37
+ } else if (currentFn && line.trim() && line.length - line.trimStart().length <= indent && !line.trim().startsWith('#') && !line.trim().startsWith('@')) {
38
+ functions.push({ name: currentFn, startLine: fnBodyStart, endLine: i - 1 });
39
+ currentFn = null;
40
+ }
41
+ }
42
+ if (currentFn) {
43
+ functions.push({ name: currentFn, startLine: fnBodyStart, endLine: lines.length - 1 });
44
+ }
45
+
46
+ return functions;
47
+ }
48
+
49
+ function hasScopePathInFunction(lines, fnStart, fnEnd) {
50
+ for (let i = fnStart; i <= fnEnd && i < lines.length; i++) {
51
+ if (SCOPE_PATH_PATTERN.test(lines[i])) return true;
52
+ }
53
+ return false;
54
+ }
55
+
56
+ export function scanCodePatterns(allFiles) {
57
+ const findings = [];
58
+
59
+ for (const file of (allFiles || [])) {
60
+ const content = typeof file.content === 'string' ? file.content : '';
61
+ if (!content) continue;
62
+ const path = file.path || '';
63
+ if (!path.endsWith('.py')) continue;
64
+
65
+ const lines = content.split('\n');
66
+ const isAuthContext = hasAuthContext(path);
67
+ const functions = findFunctionBoundaries(lines);
68
+ const suppressedLines = new Set();
69
+
70
+ for (const fn of functions) {
71
+ if (hasScopePathInFunction(lines, fn.startLine, fn.endLine)) {
72
+ for (let i = fn.startLine; i <= fn.endLine && i < lines.length; i++) {
73
+ if (URL_PATH_PATTERN.test(lines[i])) {
74
+ suppressedLines.add(i + 1);
75
+ }
76
+ URL_PATH_PATTERN.lastIndex = 0;
77
+ }
78
+ }
79
+ }
80
+
81
+ if (isAuthContext) {
82
+ let m;
83
+ while ((m = URL_PATH_PATTERN.exec(content)) !== null) {
84
+ const lineNumber = content.slice(0, m.index).split('\n').length;
85
+ if (suppressedLines.has(lineNumber)) continue;
86
+ findings.push(codePatternAuthFinding(path, lineNumber));
87
+ }
88
+ } else {
89
+ let m;
90
+ while ((m = URL_PATH_PATTERN.exec(content)) !== null) {
91
+ const lineNumber = content.slice(0, m.index).split('\n').length;
92
+ if (suppressedLines.has(lineNumber)) continue;
93
+ findings.push(codePatternInfoFinding(path, lineNumber));
94
+ }
95
+ }
96
+ }
97
+
98
+ return findings;
99
+ }
package/backend/detectors/cve-2026-48710-badhost/findings.js ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
1
+ const CVE = 'CVE-2026-48710';
2
+ const NICKNAME = 'BadHost';
3
+ const CVSS = 7.0;
4
+ const REFERENCES = [
5
+ 'https://ostif.org/disclosing-the-badhost-vulnerability-in-starlette/',
6
+ 'https://github.com/Kludex/starlette/security/advisories/GHSA-86qp-5c8j-p5mr',
7
+ 'https://badhost.org/',
8
+ 'https://osv.dev/vulnerability/PYSEC-2026-161',
9
+ ];
10
+
11
+ const MITIGATION_NOTE = 'Partial mitigation: Cloudflare and AWS ALB reject malformed Host headers for properly proxied deployments. Direct uvicorn/hypercorn/daphne/granian exposure with no reverse proxy in front is highest risk.';
12
+
13
+ const DEPENDENCY_REMEDIATION = 'Upgrade starlette to >= 1.0.1. If starlette is inherited transitively through fastapi, vllm, litellm, or an MCP server package, upgrade the top-level package to a version that pins starlette >= 1.0.1. Verify with: pip show starlette.';
14
+
15
+ const CODE_REMEDIATION = 'Replace request.url.path with request.scope["path"] for all security-sensitive decisions (auth checks, path allowlists, rate limiting gates). The reconstructed request.url is influenced by the unvalidated Host header in Starlette < 1.0.1.';
16
+
17
+ function makeFinding(overrides = {}) {
18
+ return {
19
+ id: CVE,
20
+ severity: 'high',
21
+ title: `${NICKNAME} — ${overrides.source || 'unknown'}`,
22
+ description: '',
23
+ remediation: '',
24
+ evidence: JSON.stringify({
25
+ cve: CVE,
26
+ nickname: NICKNAME,
27
+ cvss: CVSS,
28
+ references: REFERENCES,
29
+ ...overrides,
30
+ }),
31
+ ...overrides,
32
+ };
33
+ }
34
+
35
+ export function directDependencyFinding(version, specifier) {
36
+ return makeFinding({
37
+ severity: 'high',
38
+ confidence: 'HIGH',
39
+ source: 'direct-dependency',
40
+ title: `${NICKNAME}: Starlette ${version} vulnerable`,
41
+ description: `Starlette ${version} (${specifier}) is vulnerable to CVE-2026-48710 (BadHost) — authentication bypass via Host header injection. Upgrade to starlette >= 1.0.1.`,
42
+ remediation: `${DEPENDENCY_REMEDIATION} ${MITIGATION_NOTE}`,
43
+ file: null,
44
+ line: null,
45
+ via: null,
46
+ });
47
+ }
48
+
49
+ export function directDependencyUnpinnedFinding() {
50
+ return makeFinding({
51
+ severity: 'high',
52
+ confidence: 'HIGH',
53
+ source: 'direct-dependency-unpinned',
54
+ title: `${NICKNAME}: Starlette unpinned`,
55
+ description: 'Starlette is declared with no version constraint — assume vulnerable to CVE-2026-48710 (BadHost) until pinned to >= 1.0.1.',
56
+ remediation: `${DEPENDENCY_REMEDIATION} ${MITIGATION_NOTE}`,
57
+ file: null,
58
+ line: null,
59
+ via: null,
60
+ });
61
+ }
62
+
63
+ export function transitiveDependencyFinding(packageName, tier) {
64
+ const confidence = tier === 1 ? 'HIGH' : 'MEDIUM';
65
+ const tierLabel = tier === 1 ? 'Tier 1' : 'Tier 2';
66
+ return makeFinding({
67
+ severity: 'high',
68
+ confidence,
69
+ source: 'transitive-dependency',
70
+ title: `${NICKNAME}: Transitive via ${packageName}`,
71
+ description: `Starlette not directly pinned; inherited through ${packageName} (${tierLabel}). ${packageName} depends on Starlette — if its version constraint allows Starlette < 1.0.1, your deployment is vulnerable.`,
72
+ remediation: `${DEPENDENCY_REMEDIATION} ${MITIGATION_NOTE}`,
73
+ file: null,
74
+ line: null,
75
+ via: packageName,
76
+ });
77
+ }
78
+
79
+ export function codePatternAuthFinding(filePath, lineNumber) {
80
+ return makeFinding({
81
+ severity: 'medium',
82
+ confidence: 'MEDIUM',
83
+ source: 'code-pattern',
84
+ title: `${NICKNAME}: Dangerous path extraction in auth/middleware`,
85
+ description: `request.url.path used in auth/middleware context at ${filePath}:${lineNumber} — use request.scope['path'] instead. The reconstructed request.url is influenced by the unvalidated Host header in Starlette < 1.0.1.`,
86
+ remediation: `${CODE_REMEDIATION} ${MITIGATION_NOTE}`,
87
+ file: filePath,
88
+ line: lineNumber,
89
+ via: null,
90
+ });
91
+ }
92
+
93
+ export function codePatternInfoFinding(filePath, lineNumber) {
94
+ return makeFinding({
95
+ severity: 'info',
96
+ confidence: 'LOW',
97
+ source: 'code-pattern',
98
+ title: `${NICKNAME}: request.url.path usage detected`,
99
+ description: `request.url.path used at ${filePath}:${lineNumber} — may be influenced by unvalidated Host header in Starlette < 1.0.1. Verify request.scope['path'] is used for security decisions.`,
100
+ remediation: `${CODE_REMEDIATION} ${MITIGATION_NOTE}`,
101
+ file: filePath,
102
+ line: lineNumber,
103
+ via: null,
104
+ });
105
+ }
package/backend/detectors/cve-2026-48710-badhost/index.js ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
1
+ import { scanFiles } from './manifest.js';
2
+ import { scanTransitive } from './transitive.js';
3
+ import { scanCodePatterns } from './codePattern.js';
4
+
5
+ export async function scan(pkgJson, files = [], registryMeta = null, allFiles = null) {
6
+ const targetFiles = allFiles || files;
7
+
8
+ const manifestFindings = scanFiles(targetFiles);
9
+ const transitiveFindings = scanTransitive(targetFiles);
10
+ const codeFindings = scanCodePatterns(targetFiles);
11
+
12
+ const allFindings = [...manifestFindings, ...transitiveFindings, ...codeFindings];
13
+
14
+ return allFindings;
15
+ }