@lapxo/bound 0.2.4 → 0.2.6

package/docs/contracts/reference-port.md

@@ -38,3 +38,14 @@ For the opt-in `authenticated-standing@1` profile, the host checks the selected
 The original weather and editorial carriers, their signatures and effective-order counterexamples remain byte-identical. `inspectAuthenticatedReference` accepts their independently supplied legacy trust tuple without inventing the newer contract commitments. Its native vector verifies both positive carriers and their arrival-equivalent projection, and rejects signature, coverage, era, effective-order, blob and semantic-standing failures. Authority and context preparation use the existing host and SDK; no replacement verifier or form algebra is supplied by the carrier.
 
 This preserves the carrier/API contract, not an implicit native backend. The historical receiver TARGETs omit the explicit backend and interpretation-contract lines required by native opening in 0.2.1. They therefore refuse with `reference/backend` before transport; the vector asserts that refusal instead of re-signing or weakening the fixtures. No automatic ESM fallback is added. Native positive opening with the complete admitted context is demonstrated separately by the reference-export and reference-backend quartets, including ESM/WASM equality and altered-byte refusal. `compatibility.json` records every inherited condition and expected result; the no sample still contains the original bad signature.
+
+
+## Located content and declared previews
+
+The native `inspectReference` API and CLI consume Topos0.2.4 `#topos-reference:1` using its existing decoder and inspector. Content identity excludes the location. A holder may supply bytes; an absent location or a viewer produces `needs/bytes/<blob>` without a fetch. Unavailable bytes remain open. Available bytes must match both exact blob bytes and semantic standing. No inspection authenticates an origin, admits a declaration or folds an encounter. An authenticated host selection refuses a located-only profile rather than downgrading trust. Historical `#bound:1` bytes remain unchanged.
+
+The receiver may supply `signal` and `allowedOrigins`. Origin refusal happens before transport; redirects are not followed. HTTP enforces the declared byte budget while reading, cancels an overrun, and distinguishes cancellation/timeout from unavailable content. A late valid delivery can satisfy the same reference. Scheme and lifetime policy remain selected by admitted lines; a carrier chooses neither policy nor authority. Command transports retain their existing finite process contract.
+
+`inspectReferencePreview(line,budget,maxInlineBytes)` delegates to the Topos reference-projection contract. It never fetches. The receiver explicitly supplies record/inline byte budgets; overflow and wrong inline digests refuse without truncation. Duplicate relations follow the declared preserve/refuse choice. A preview neither replaces full content nor proves relation truth, completeness or authenticity. A fragment can be read by page code: secrecy is not promised, and secrets must not be included inline.
+
+The executable additional quartet is retained inside the selected process reader, as `vectors/reference-wire.vector.json`: positive and negative cases run over catalog and route-notes, using `test/reference-wire-acceptance.test.ts` and `test/response-protocol.test.ts`. The logical receipt is `conformance/reference-wire`; its contract, two positive places, corruption/stream/origin/cancellation negatives and exact process predicates are committed by that reader digest. Root judges the count; the reader does not alter policy. This adds no mandatory project server.

package/docs/contracts/reference-port.publication.json

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
     {
       "role": "contract",
       "path": "docs/contracts/reference-port.md",
-      "digest": "sha256:d6198b9ab177086cb334e9e9cd7adb5c67b0af7165a79d23812aa2496d17674c"
+      "digest": "sha256:7fe99f71468a800f88d64104710b8b877d874f3415b9f4480eee5d30a9d871ae"
     },
     {
       "role": "yes",