@lannguyensi/harness 0.63.0 → 1.0.0

package/dist/policy-packs/builtin/understanding-before-execution/ledger.js

@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
-// Ledger audit/forensics helpers, split out of the former monolithic
-// understanding-before-execution-runtime.ts (structural concentration
-// slice 2, agent-tasks 348a4d42). Pure move: see
-// src/policy-packs/builtin/understanding-before-execution/index.ts for
-// the re-exported public surface.
-import { POLICY_DECISION_TYPE } from "../../../io/ledger-record.js";
-import { APPROVAL_MARKER_DIRNAME } from "./markers.js";
-export const APPROVED_LEDGER_TAG_PREFIX = "understanding-approved:";
-/** Build the per-session ledger tag the pack searches for. */
-export function approvedLedgerTagFor(sessionId) {
-    return `${APPROVED_LEDGER_TAG_PREFIX}${sessionId}`;
-}
-/**
- * Phase 6 #6 — substring-pollution defence shared by every PreToolUse
- * blocker (Claude Code + Codex). Drops policy_decision rows so a
- * `understanding-approved:<sess>` substring inside an audit row's
- * JSON-encoded `reason` cannot accidentally satisfy the gate.
- */
-export function isPolicyDecisionRow(e) {
-    if (e.type === POLICY_DECISION_TYPE)
-        return true;
-    if (typeof e.content === "string" && e.content.startsWith(`${POLICY_DECISION_TYPE}:`)) {
-        return true;
-    }
-    return false;
-}
-/**
- * Match a ledger fetch against the per-session approval tag. Kept for
- * the audit / forensics path only: a ledger entry tagged
- * `understanding-approved:<sid>` is no longer a sufficient signal to
- * unblock the gate (agent-tasks/88ca4bb3: the agent has the same MCP
- * surface and could self-write the row). Use `checkApprovalMarker`
- * for the gate decision; this helper now serves `harness audit` /
- * `harness explain --trace` style read paths that surface the
- * historic ledger trail without granting approval power.
- */
-export function matchLedgerEntries(entries, sessionId) {
-    const wanted = approvedLedgerTagFor(sessionId);
-    let scanned = 0;
-    for (const e of entries) {
-        if (isPolicyDecisionRow(e))
-            continue;
-        scanned += 1;
-        if (typeof e.content === "string" && e.content.includes(wanted)) {
-            return {
-                matched: true,
-                detail: `audit: ledger tag ${wanted} present at ${e.createdAt} (no longer satisfies the gate; see harness.generated/${APPROVAL_MARKER_DIRNAME}/${sessionId})`,
-            };
-        }
-    }
-    return {
-        matched: false,
-        detail: `no ledger entry matched ${wanted} (scanned ${scanned} non-policy_decision row(s))`,
-    };
-}
-//# sourceMappingURL=ledger.js.map

package/dist/policy-packs/builtin/understanding-before-execution/ledger.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
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package/dist/policy-packs/builtin/understanding-before-execution/lifecycle.d.ts

@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-export interface ApprovalLifecycle {
-    /** Tool-name patterns whose successful PostToolUse expires the marker. */
-    expireOnToolMatch: string[];
-    /** Pre-compiled regex patterns matched against `Bash` tool_input.command. */
-    expireOnBashMatch: RegExp[];
-    /** Max marker age in milliseconds. Undefined means no TTL. */
-    maxAgeMs?: number;
-    /** Whether the operator explicitly opted out via `{ mode: "session" }`. */
-    legacyMode: boolean;
-}
-/**
- * Parse the optional `approval_lifecycle` block from a pack config.
- * Best-effort: malformed values fall back to the default (no expiry,
- * legacyMode=false) and write a one-line warning to the supplied
- * stderr. The PreToolUse / PostToolUse hooks must keep working even
- * when the operator typed a typo in the YAML.
- */
-export declare function parseApprovalLifecycle(raw: unknown, stderr?: {
-    write: (s: string) => void;
-} | null): ApprovalLifecycle;

package/dist/policy-packs/builtin/understanding-before-execution/lifecycle.js

@@ -1,93 +0,0 @@
-// `approval_lifecycle` pack-config parsing, split out of the former
-// monolithic understanding-before-execution-runtime.ts (structural
-// concentration slice 2, agent-tasks 348a4d42). Pure move: see
-// src/policy-packs/builtin/understanding-before-execution/index.ts for
-// the re-exported public surface.
-import { InvalidDurationError, parseDurationSeconds } from "../../../policies/index.js";
-const DEFAULT_LIFECYCLE = {
-    expireOnToolMatch: [],
-    expireOnBashMatch: [],
-    legacyMode: false,
-};
-/**
- * Parse the optional `approval_lifecycle` block from a pack config.
- * Best-effort: malformed values fall back to the default (no expiry,
- * legacyMode=false) and write a one-line warning to the supplied
- * stderr. The PreToolUse / PostToolUse hooks must keep working even
- * when the operator typed a typo in the YAML.
- */
-export function parseApprovalLifecycle(raw, stderr) {
-    if (raw === undefined || raw === null)
-        return DEFAULT_LIFECYCLE;
-    if (typeof raw !== "object" || Array.isArray(raw)) {
-        stderr?.write(`harness pack hook: config.approval_lifecycle ignored (expected object, got ${typeof raw})\n`);
-        return DEFAULT_LIFECYCLE;
-    }
-    const obj = raw;
-    if (obj["mode"] === "session") {
-        const maxAgeMs = parseMaxAge(obj["max_age"], stderr);
-        return {
-            expireOnToolMatch: [],
-            expireOnBashMatch: [],
-            ...(maxAgeMs !== undefined && { maxAgeMs }),
-            legacyMode: true,
-        };
-    }
-    const expireOnToolMatch = [];
-    const list = obj["expire_on_tool_match"];
-    if (Array.isArray(list)) {
-        for (const v of list) {
-            if (typeof v === "string" && v.length > 0)
-                expireOnToolMatch.push(v);
-        }
-    }
-    else if (list !== undefined) {
-        stderr?.write(`harness pack hook: config.approval_lifecycle.expire_on_tool_match ignored (expected string[], got ${typeof list})\n`);
-    }
-    const expireOnBashMatch = [];
-    const bashList = obj["expire_on_bash_match"];
-    if (Array.isArray(bashList)) {
-        for (const v of bashList) {
-            if (typeof v !== "string" || v.length === 0)
-                continue;
-            try {
-                expireOnBashMatch.push(new RegExp(v));
-            }
-            catch (err) {
-                stderr?.write(`harness pack hook: config.approval_lifecycle.expire_on_bash_match entry ignored ("${v}"): ${err.message}\n`);
-            }
-        }
-    }
-    else if (bashList !== undefined) {
-        stderr?.write(`harness pack hook: config.approval_lifecycle.expire_on_bash_match ignored (expected string[], got ${typeof bashList})\n`);
-    }
-    const maxAgeMs = parseMaxAge(obj["max_age"], stderr);
-    return {
-        expireOnToolMatch,
-        expireOnBashMatch,
-        ...(maxAgeMs !== undefined && { maxAgeMs }),
-        legacyMode: false,
-    };
-}
-/**
- * Parse `approval_lifecycle.max_age` into milliseconds. Shared by both the
- * boundary-lifecycle branch and the `{ mode: "session" }` branch (task
- * 496660c5) so a malformed value warns identically in either mode.
- */
-function parseMaxAge(maxAgeRaw, stderr) {
-    if (typeof maxAgeRaw === "string" && maxAgeRaw.length > 0) {
-        try {
-            return parseDurationSeconds(maxAgeRaw) * 1_000;
-        }
-        catch (err) {
-            const msg = err instanceof InvalidDurationError ? err.message : String(err);
-            stderr?.write(`harness pack hook: config.approval_lifecycle.max_age ignored: ${msg}\n`);
-            return undefined;
-        }
-    }
-    if (maxAgeRaw !== undefined) {
-        stderr?.write(`harness pack hook: config.approval_lifecycle.max_age ignored (expected duration string like "4h", got ${typeof maxAgeRaw})\n`);
-    }
-    return undefined;
-}
-//# sourceMappingURL=lifecycle.js.map

package/dist/policy-packs/builtin/understanding-before-execution/lifecycle.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
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package/dist/policy-packs/builtin/understanding-before-execution/markers.d.ts

@@ -1,126 +0,0 @@
-export declare const APPROVAL_MARKER_DIRNAME = ".approvals";
-/** Filesystem path of the per-session approval marker. */
-export declare function approvalMarkerPathFor(generatedDir: string, sessionId: string): string;
-export interface ApprovalMarker {
-    approvedAt: string;
-    approvedBy: string;
-    /**
-     * sha256 hex of the persisted-report content this approval is bound to
-     * at sign-time (harness/f9485cc7). Optional on write (defaults to
-     * `null` — a marker with no report to bind, e.g. `harness approve
-     * branch-protection`, or a ledger-only approval); always present
-     * (possibly `null`) on a marker `checkApprovalMarker` returns.
-     */
-    reportContentHash?: string | null;
-    /**
-     * Task binding (task 5018c0c4): the active-claim task id this approval
-     * was granted for, `null` when no claim was held at approval time.
-     * Signed. On write, omitted means "resolve it now from the active-claim
-     * file" (see `writeApprovalMarker`). On a marker `checkApprovalMarker`
-     * returns, the property is ABSENT for a marker that carries no binding
-     * (one written by a release before the binding existed); the gate's
-     * session-marker reader (`checkSessionApprovalMarker`) refuses such a
-     * marker.
-     */
-    claimTaskId?: string | null;
-}
-/**
- * Operator-side: write the marker file the gate consults. Atomic so a
- * crash mid-write cannot leave a half-empty file the gate would accept
- * as approved. Caller is `harness approve understanding`, which the
- * operator runs from their un-hooked shell; if the agent could call
- * this path the gate's value would collapse, so it lives behind the
- * approve CLI rather than as a generally importable verb.
- *
- * The marker is HMAC-signed (harness/f9485cc7) over (sessionId,
- * approvedAt, approvedBy, reportContentHash), plus the claimTaskId every
- * marker this writer signs carries (see `canonicalPayload`), using an operator-side key
- * lazily generated at `<generatedDir>/.approval-signing.key` — see
- * `src/runtime/approval-signing.ts` for the key-management contract and
- * the honest trust model. Mode 0600 on the marker file itself, best-
- * effort (matches the signing key's own permission convention); this is
- * defense-in-depth alongside the signature, not a substitute for it.
- *
- * Task binding (task 5018c0c4): every marker this writer signs records
- * the task id of the active claim at the moment of writing (`null` when
- * none is held), unless the caller passes `claimTaskId` explicitly. The
- * binding is resolved here, at the one writer, so no approve path (the
- * `harness approve understanding` CLI, the hook's auto-approval path)
- * can mint an unbound session marker. Only the understanding gate's
- * session-marker reader enforces it, and only outside
- * `approval_lifecycle: { mode: session }` (the field is written in every
- * mode so a later mode change takes effect); the branch-protection marker, which
- * shares this writer under its own id, carries the field unused.
- */
-export declare function writeApprovalMarker(generatedDir: string, sessionId: string, marker: ApprovalMarker): string;
-export interface MarkerCheck {
-    matched: boolean;
-    detail: string;
-    marker: ApprovalMarker | null;
-    /**
-     * True when `matched` is false SPECIFICALLY because a readable marker
-     * existed but its `approvedAt` exceeded `opts.maxAgeMs`
-     * (agent-tasks/d8ee60ca) — as opposed to the marker being absent
-     * (never approved, or cleared by a task-completion boundary tool via
-     * `clearApprovalMarker`), corrupted, or the session id malformed.
-     * False whenever `matched` is true. This is the signal task 6e888423's
-     * recovery-git-commit exemption keys off: "this session/task DID have
-     * a real operator approval and it merely aged out" is safe to treat
-     * differently from "this session/task was never approved" or "a task
-     * boundary just cleared it for a new task" — see
-     * src/runtime/recovery-git-commit.ts for the full argument.
-     */
-    expired: boolean;
-    /**
-     * True when a marker FILE existed at the expected path but failed
-     * signature verification (harness/f9485cc7): missing `signature`/`alg`
-     * fields (a legacy pre-signing marker, or a marker planted without the
-     * operator-side key), a mismatched `alg`, or a signature that does not
-     * verify against the current key. Distinct from the marker being
-     * simply absent (`forged: false`, `matched: false`) so a caller can
-     * log/alert on an active forgery attempt instead of the routine
-     * "nobody has approved yet" case. `matched` is always false when
-     * `forged` is true — a forged marker never satisfies the gate,
-     * regardless of `approval_lifecycle.max_age`. A transient I/O read
-     * failure (`forged: false`, `matched: false`) is kept distinct from
-     * both: it is neither "no marker" nor evidence of tampering, just a
-     * marker whose integrity cannot be proven right now.
-     */
-    forged: boolean;
-}
-export interface CheckApprovalMarkerOptions {
-    /**
-     * Max marker age in milliseconds (agent-tasks/d8ee60ca). When set,
-     * a marker whose `approvedAt` is older than `now - maxAgeMs` is
-     * treated as expired and returns `matched:false` with an
-     * "expired" detail. When omitted, the marker has no TTL — the
-     * legacy contract (one approval per session, no expiry).
-     */
-    maxAgeMs?: number;
-    /** Override "now" for deterministic tests. */
-    now?: Date;
-}
-/**
- * Gate-side: is the per-session marker file present, readable, AND
- * validly signed? (harness/f9485cc7 — this replaced the earlier
- * "existence is enough" contract: a marker's mere presence used to
- * satisfy the gate even with a malformed or corrupted body, on the
- * theory that Edit/Write/Bash being gated meant only the operator could
- * ever create the file. That theory holds only as long as no OTHER
- * write primitive reaches `harness.generated/` — exactly the invariant
- * this signing scheme no longer has to trust blindly.) A marker with no
- * `signature`, a wrong `alg`, or a signature that fails to verify is
- * REJECTED — see `MarkerCheck.forged` — with the SAME `matched: false`
- * outcome as no marker at all, but a distinct, forgery-specific detail
- * string so callers can tell the two apart for audit.
- *
- * `opts.maxAgeMs` (agent-tasks/d8ee60ca): when set, a validly-signed
- * marker whose `approvedAt` is older than the cutoff returns
- * `matched:false` with an "expired" detail so the agent gets the same
- * "no approval" UX as a never-approved session and must re-approve.
- * Expiry is only evaluated AFTER signature verification succeeds — an
- * unsigned/forged marker is rejected outright, never "expired".
- */
-export declare function checkApprovalMarker(generatedDir: string, sessionId: string, opts?: CheckApprovalMarkerOptions): MarkerCheck;
-/** Clear the per-session marker (used by `harness approve --revoke` and tests). */
-export declare function clearApprovalMarker(generatedDir: string, sessionId: string): void;

package/dist/policy-packs/builtin/understanding-before-execution/markers.js

@@ -1,245 +0,0 @@
-// Session-scoped approval marker file (the signed filesystem source that
-// is the gate's only approval authority), split out of the former monolithic
-// understanding-before-execution-runtime.ts (structural concentration
-// slice 2, agent-tasks 348a4d42). Pure move: see
-// src/policy-packs/builtin/understanding-before-execution/index.ts for
-// the re-exported public surface.
-import * as fs from "node:fs";
-import * as path from "node:path";
-import { atomicWriteFile } from "../../../io/atomic-write.js";
-import { readRegularFileRejectingSymlink } from "../../../io/read-regular-file.js";
-import { signMarker, verifyMarkerSignature } from "../../../runtime/approval-signing.js";
-import { rejectMalformedSessionId } from "../../../runtime/reject-malformed-session-id.js";
-import { safeJsonParse } from "../../../io/safe-json-parse.js";
-import { readActiveClaim } from "./active-claim.js";
-export const APPROVAL_MARKER_DIRNAME = ".approvals";
-/** Filesystem path of the per-session approval marker. */
-export function approvalMarkerPathFor(generatedDir, sessionId) {
-    rejectMalformedSessionId(sessionId);
-    return path.join(generatedDir, APPROVAL_MARKER_DIRNAME, sessionId);
-}
-/**
- * Operator-side: write the marker file the gate consults. Atomic so a
- * crash mid-write cannot leave a half-empty file the gate would accept
- * as approved. Caller is `harness approve understanding`, which the
- * operator runs from their un-hooked shell; if the agent could call
- * this path the gate's value would collapse, so it lives behind the
- * approve CLI rather than as a generally importable verb.
- *
- * The marker is HMAC-signed (harness/f9485cc7) over (sessionId,
- * approvedAt, approvedBy, reportContentHash), plus the claimTaskId every
- * marker this writer signs carries (see `canonicalPayload`), using an operator-side key
- * lazily generated at `<generatedDir>/.approval-signing.key` — see
- * `src/runtime/approval-signing.ts` for the key-management contract and
- * the honest trust model. Mode 0600 on the marker file itself, best-
- * effort (matches the signing key's own permission convention); this is
- * defense-in-depth alongside the signature, not a substitute for it.
- *
- * Task binding (task 5018c0c4): every marker this writer signs records
- * the task id of the active claim at the moment of writing (`null` when
- * none is held), unless the caller passes `claimTaskId` explicitly. The
- * binding is resolved here, at the one writer, so no approve path (the
- * `harness approve understanding` CLI, the hook's auto-approval path)
- * can mint an unbound session marker. Only the understanding gate's
- * session-marker reader enforces it, and only outside
- * `approval_lifecycle: { mode: session }` (the field is written in every
- * mode so a later mode change takes effect); the branch-protection marker, which
- * shares this writer under its own id, carries the field unused.
- */
-export function writeApprovalMarker(generatedDir, sessionId, marker) {
-    const filePath = approvalMarkerPathFor(generatedDir, sessionId);
-    const claimTaskId = marker.claimTaskId !== undefined ? marker.claimTaskId : readActiveClaim(generatedDir);
-    const signed = signMarker(generatedDir, sessionId, { ...marker, claimTaskId });
-    atomicWriteFile(filePath, `${JSON.stringify(signed, null, 2)}\n`, { mode: 0o600 });
-    return filePath;
-}
-/**
- * Gate-side: is the per-session marker file present, readable, AND
- * validly signed? (harness/f9485cc7 — this replaced the earlier
- * "existence is enough" contract: a marker's mere presence used to
- * satisfy the gate even with a malformed or corrupted body, on the
- * theory that Edit/Write/Bash being gated meant only the operator could
- * ever create the file. That theory holds only as long as no OTHER
- * write primitive reaches `harness.generated/` — exactly the invariant
- * this signing scheme no longer has to trust blindly.) A marker with no
- * `signature`, a wrong `alg`, or a signature that fails to verify is
- * REJECTED — see `MarkerCheck.forged` — with the SAME `matched: false`
- * outcome as no marker at all, but a distinct, forgery-specific detail
- * string so callers can tell the two apart for audit.
- *
- * `opts.maxAgeMs` (agent-tasks/d8ee60ca): when set, a validly-signed
- * marker whose `approvedAt` is older than the cutoff returns
- * `matched:false` with an "expired" detail so the agent gets the same
- * "no approval" UX as a never-approved session and must re-approve.
- * Expiry is only evaluated AFTER signature verification succeeds — an
- * unsigned/forged marker is rejected outright, never "expired".
- */
-export function checkApprovalMarker(generatedDir, sessionId, opts = {}) {
-    // Construct the path defensively: a malformed sessionId must fail CLOSED
-    // here (no valid marker, so the gate blocks and demands approval), not
-    // throw out of the gate hook, which the top-level handler turns into a
-    // non-blocking exit that would let the gated tool proceed.
-    let filePath;
-    try {
-        filePath = approvalMarkerPathFor(generatedDir, sessionId);
-    }
-    catch (err) {
-        return {
-            matched: false,
-            detail: `invalid sessionId for approval marker: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`,
-            marker: null,
-            expired: false,
-            forged: false,
-        };
-    }
-    const approvalsDir = path.join(generatedDir, APPROVAL_MARKER_DIRNAME);
-    let approvalsDirStat;
-    try {
-        approvalsDirStat = fs.lstatSync(approvalsDir);
-    }
-    catch {
-        return {
-            matched: false,
-            detail: `no approval marker at ${filePath}`,
-            marker: null,
-            expired: false,
-            forged: false,
-        };
-    }
-    if (!approvalsDirStat.isDirectory()) {
-        return {
-            matched: false,
-            detail: `approval marker containment refusal: ${approvalsDir} is not a plain directory`,
-            marker: null,
-            expired: false,
-            forged: false,
-        };
-    }
-    // Shared symlink-rejecting read (src/io/read-regular-file.ts): the lstat
-    // reject is defense-in-depth against a planted symlink
-    // (agent-tasks/d39f160e); each failure mode keeps its distinct detail.
-    const read = readRegularFileRejectingSymlink(filePath);
-    if (read.kind === "missing") {
-        return {
-            matched: false,
-            detail: `no approval marker at ${filePath}`,
-            marker: null,
-            expired: false,
-            forged: false,
-        };
-    }
-    if (read.kind === "symlink") {
-        return {
-            matched: false,
-            detail: `approval marker is a symlink, refusing for safety: ${filePath}`,
-            marker: null,
-            expired: false,
-            forged: false,
-        };
-    }
-    if (read.kind === "not-regular") {
-        return {
-            matched: false,
-            detail: `approval marker path is not a regular file: ${filePath}`,
-            marker: null,
-            expired: false,
-            forged: false,
-        };
-    }
-    if (read.kind === "unreadable") {
-        // A genuine I/O error reading an existing regular file (permissions
-        // changed mid-flight, etc.) — not evidence of tampering, but its
-        // signature cannot be proven either, so fail closed. Kept distinct
-        // from `forged` (no claim of an active forgery attempt).
-        return {
-            matched: false,
-            detail: `approval marker at ${filePath} exists but could not be read (I/O error); treating as unapproved since its signature cannot be verified`,
-            marker: null,
-            expired: false,
-            forged: false,
-        };
-    }
-    // read.kind === "ok"
-    const parsed = safeJsonParse(read.content);
-    if (!parsed || typeof parsed !== "object" || Array.isArray(parsed)) {
-        return {
-            matched: false,
-            detail: `forged/unsigned marker rejected: marker body at ${filePath} is not a JSON object`,
-            marker: null,
-            expired: false,
-            forged: true,
-        };
-    }
-    const obj = parsed;
-    const verification = verifyMarkerSignature(generatedDir, sessionId, obj);
-    if (!verification.ok) {
-        if (verification.kind === "key-unavailable") {
-            // Fail-closed I/O problem (permission error / disk issue reading or
-            // creating the signing key), NOT evidence of an active forgery
-            // attempt — a marker written by the operator with a perfectly valid
-            // signature would also fail this exact check if the key file became
-            // unreadable. Kept distinct from `forged` (review LOW 1,
-            // harness/f9485cc7) so a broken key file doesn't read as an attack
-            // in audit output, mirroring the `read.kind === "unreadable"` branch
-            // above.
-            return {
-                matched: false,
-                detail: `approval marker at ${filePath} could not be verified: ${verification.reason}; treating as unapproved`,
-                marker: null,
-                expired: false,
-                forged: false,
-            };
-        }
-        return {
-            matched: false,
-            detail: `forged/unsigned marker rejected: ${verification.reason} (${filePath})`,
-            marker: null,
-            expired: false,
-            forged: true,
-        };
-    }
-    const approvedAt = obj["approvedAt"];
-    const approvedBy = obj["approvedBy"];
-    const reportContentHash = typeof obj["reportContentHash"] === "string" ? obj["reportContentHash"] : null;
-    const marker = { approvedAt, approvedBy, reportContentHash };
-    // Signature verification above already rejected a malformed binding.
-    if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(obj, "claimTaskId")) {
-        marker.claimTaskId = obj["claimTaskId"];
-    }
-    if (opts.maxAgeMs !== undefined) {
-        const approvedAtMs = Date.parse(approvedAt);
-        if (Number.isFinite(approvedAtMs)) {
-            const nowMs = (opts.now ?? new Date()).getTime();
-            const ageMs = nowMs - approvedAtMs;
-            if (ageMs > opts.maxAgeMs) {
-                const ageMin = Math.round(ageMs / 60_000);
-                const maxMin = Math.round(opts.maxAgeMs / 60_000);
-                // KEEP IN SYNC: describeMarkerTtlExpiry (expiry-reason.ts) parses this detail.
-                return {
-                    matched: false,
-                    detail: `approval marker ${path.basename(filePath)} expired: age ${ageMin}m > max ${maxMin}m (approved at ${approvedAt})`,
-                    marker,
-                    expired: true,
-                    forged: false,
-                };
-            }
-        }
-    }
-    return {
-        matched: true,
-        detail: `approved via marker ${path.basename(filePath)}: approved at ${approvedAt} by ${approvedBy}, signature verified`,
-        marker,
-        expired: false,
-        forged: false,
-    };
-}
-/** Clear the per-session marker (used by `harness approve --revoke` and tests). */
-export function clearApprovalMarker(generatedDir, sessionId) {
-    try {
-        fs.rmSync(approvalMarkerPathFor(generatedDir, sessionId));
-    }
-    catch {
-        /* already gone */
-    }
-}
-//# sourceMappingURL=markers.js.map

package/dist/policy-packs/builtin/understanding-before-execution/markers.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
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package/dist/policy-packs/builtin/understanding-before-execution/measured-permission-modes.d.ts

@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-export type MeasuredHarness = "claude-code" | "codex";
-export interface MeasuredPermissionMode {
-    readonly harness: MeasuredHarness;
-    readonly permissionMode: string;
-    /** Repo-relative path under dogfood/ug-auto-mode-signals/payloads/. */
-    readonly fixture: string;
-}
-/** Repo-relative directory every registry fixture must live in. */
-export declare const MEASURED_FIXTURES_DIR = "dogfood/ug-auto-mode-signals/payloads";
-/**
- * Which harness a fixture file under {@link MEASURED_FIXTURES_DIR} was
- * captured from, by file-name convention: `codex-*` is Codex, anything
- * else is Claude Code. Shared with the sync test so the convention has
- * one definition.
- */
-export declare function harnessForFixtureFile(basename: string): MeasuredHarness;
-export declare const MEASURED_PERMISSION_MODES: ReadonlyArray<MeasuredPermissionMode>;
-/**
- * True when the given HARNESS has a measured fixture for this exact
- * literal. `auto_approve.harnesses` (docs/decisions/2026-08-27-ug-auto-mode-approval.md,
- * Slice 2) scopes which harnesses' PreToolUse hooks may take the auto
- * path at all, so "measured" is checked per listed harness, not across
- * the whole registry: a literal measured only for Claude Code is not
- * evidence that Codex ever emits it. Exact string equality: no case
- * folding, no wildcards.
- */
-export declare function isMeasuredPermissionModeFor(literal: string, harness: MeasuredHarness): boolean;
-/** Sorted, de-duplicated list of every literal measured for HARNESS. */
-export declare function measuredPermissionModeLiteralsFor(harness: MeasuredHarness): string[];