@lannguyensi/harness 0.54.0 → 0.56.0

package/dist/policy-packs/builtin/understanding-before-execution/inflight-records.js

@@ -0,0 +1,619 @@
+// Signed in-flight records for Agent-tool subagents (slice 1 of the
+// subagent-gate work, docs/decisions/2026-08-27-ug-auto-mode-approval.md
+// "Invariants", "Threat model", "Delegation marker shape").
+//
+// THE PROBLEM THIS CLOSES. An Agent-tool subagent shares its parent's
+// `session_id`; it has no way to call `harness approve understanding`
+// itself. The understanding gate's own boundary-expiry mechanism
+// (`applyPostToolUseExpiry`) deletes the parent's session marker the
+// moment the parent crosses a task boundary, even while a subagent it
+// spawned is still mid-flight — stranding that subagent with no
+// approval it can present. An in-flight record is what lets a
+// subagent keep the approval its parent held at the moment the
+// subagent STARTED, independent of what happens to the parent's own
+// marker afterwards.
+//
+// WHY ITS OWN DIRECTORY, NOT `.approvals/`. Exactly the delegation
+// precedent (`delegation-markers.ts`'s module header): a record is
+// evidence that a parent was once approved, not itself an approval a
+// human granted, so it stays out of every `.approvals/` scan (the
+// doctor `approvedBy`-prefix listing, `checkApprovalMarker`'s own
+// directory) and out of `.delegations/` (a different artifact kind,
+// scoped to `claude -p` children, not Agent-tool subagents). A record
+// copied onto either of those directories fails signature verification
+// there on markerId mismatch, mirroring the delegation module's own
+// two-way argument.
+//
+// CONTAINMENT: `verifyInflightRecord` lstats both the `.inflight/` root
+// and the session directory before ever touching the leaf file, so a
+// symlinked root or session directory (reached only by following a link
+// out of `.inflight/`) reads as no record rather than being followed.
+// `.approvals/`'s own reader has the same pre-existing gap (it lstats
+// neither its root nor a session-scoped subdirectory the same way); left
+// as a follow-up there rather than fixed in this module.
+//
+// WHY EVERY BINDING TRAVELS INSIDE `approvedBy`. `signMarker` signs
+// exactly the tuple `(markerId, approvedAt, approvedBy,
+// reportContentHash)`; adding a signed field is a `SIGNING_ALG` bump.
+// So the one thing this record signs beyond the marker id and the
+// issue timestamp — which parent authority actually matched — rides in
+// `approvedBy` as `inflight:<agentType>:parent=<task|session>`, the
+// same shape choice `delegation-markers.ts` and the auto-approval path
+// already made for their own extra bindings.
+//
+// SIGNATURE SCOPE, DELIBERATELY NARROW. The signed tuple binds
+// `markerId` (which is itself `inflight:<sessionId>:<agentId>`),
+// `approvedAt`, `approvedBy`, and a `null` report hash; it does NOT
+// cover the `sessionId`/`agentId` fields stored in the body for
+// convenience. A verifier that only recomputed the signature could
+// therefore be fooled by a record left in place with its own body
+// fields edited to claim a different agent id than the path it lives
+// at — the signature over `inflight:<sessionId>:<agentId>` would still
+// verify because `markerId` is derived from the REQUESTED ids, not
+// from the body. `verifyInflightRecord` closes that gap with an
+// explicit equality check between the body's own `sessionId`/`agentId`
+// and the ids the caller is asking about, independent of the signature
+// check: a record copied onto a different id's path recomputes the
+// SAME signature (the markerId is derived from the requested ids, which
+// still match its new path), so this equality check is the only thing
+// that catches that shape of forgery.
+//
+// UNSIGNED CONVENIENCE FIELDS ARE NEVER LOAD-BEARING ON THEIR OWN. The
+// body also carries `startedAt`, `agentType` and `parentSource` outside
+// the signed tuple, for display and for readers (`listInflightRecords`,
+// `harness gc`) that intentionally skip signature verification because
+// they are deciding retention, not trust. `verifyInflightRecord` treats
+// every one of those unsigned fields as untrustworthy on its own: it
+// requires `startedAt` to equal the SIGNED `approvedAt` byte-for-byte
+// (the writer always sets them to the same instant), and it requires
+// `agentType`/`parentSource` to equal the values parsed back out of the
+// SIGNED `approvedBy` string. Either disagreement is `forged`, never a
+// silent fallback to the signed value — an editable field that could
+// diverge from its signed twin without consequence would be exactly the
+// same hole as trusting the unsigned field outright. Staleness itself is
+// therefore computed from `approvedAt` (signed), not `startedAt`
+// (unsigned): reviving an expired record by rewriting its unsigned
+// timestamp is closed by verification failing outright, not merely by
+// picking "the right" field to trust.
+import * as fs from "node:fs";
+import * as path from "node:path";
+import { atomicWriteFile } from "../../../io/atomic-write.js";
+import { readRegularFileRejectingSymlink } from "../../../io/read-regular-file.js";
+import { safeJsonParse } from "../../../io/safe-json-parse.js";
+import { signMarker, verifyMarkerSignature } from "../../../runtime/approval-signing.js";
+import { rejectMalformedSessionId } from "../../../runtime/reject-malformed-session-id.js";
+/** Directory holding in-flight records, a sibling of `.approvals/` and `.delegations/` under `generatedDir`. */
+export const INFLIGHT_RECORD_DIRNAME = ".inflight";
+/** Default staleness window: a record older than this is treated as dead weight even though nothing ever cleared it. */
+export const DEFAULT_INFLIGHT_STALE_AFTER_MS = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
+/** Prefix of the signed markerId, mirroring `delegation-<child-sid>`. */
+const INFLIGHT_MARKER_ID_PREFIX = "inflight:";
+/**
+ * An agent id is a value Claude Code hands the hook, never one the
+ * repository's own path-traversal-sensitive session ids need to share
+ * a shape with, but it lands in `path.join` the same way, so it gets
+ * its own narrow allowlist rather than reusing
+ * `rejectMalformedSessionId`'s looser "no `/`, `\`, `..`" rule: 1..128
+ * characters, first character alphanumeric (so it can never literally
+ * be `.` or `..`), every other character one of
+ * `[A-Za-z0-9._-]` (no control characters, no path separators).
+ */
+const AGENT_ID_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,127}$/;
+/** Rejects an agent id outside the allowlist above. Throws; never returns a value. */
+export function rejectMalformedAgentId(agentId) {
+    if (agentId.length === 0) {
+        throw new Error("agentId is empty");
+    }
+    if (agentId.length > 128) {
+        throw new Error(`agentId exceeds 128 characters (got ${agentId.length})`);
+    }
+    if (!AGENT_ID_RE.test(agentId)) {
+        throw new Error(`agentId must start with an alphanumeric character and contain only letters, digits, ".", "_", or "-": ${JSON.stringify(agentId)}`);
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * The signed markerId for a record: `inflight:<sessionId>:<agentId>`.
+ * Binding both ids into the signed payload is what stops a validly
+ * signed record from being copied onto another agent id, or another
+ * session, and still verifying.
+ */
+export function inflightMarkerIdFor(sessionId, agentId) {
+    return `${INFLIGHT_MARKER_ID_PREFIX}${sessionId}:${agentId}`;
+}
+/**
+ * Filesystem path of a subagent's in-flight record:
+ * `<generatedDir>/.inflight/<sessionId>/<agentId>`. Validates both ids
+ * before they reach `path.join`, the same defensive posture every
+ * other marker path function in this pack takes.
+ */
+export function inflightRecordPathFor(generatedDir, sessionId, agentId) {
+    rejectMalformedSessionId(sessionId);
+    rejectMalformedAgentId(agentId);
+    return path.join(generatedDir, INFLIGHT_RECORD_DIRNAME, sessionId, agentId);
+}
+/**
+ * `agentType` is a Claude-Code-supplied label (e.g. `general-purpose`)
+ * that rides inside the signed `approvedBy` string as a `:`-delimited
+ * segment, so it gets the narrowest allowlist that keeps it from ever
+ * introducing a `:` (which `parseInflightApprovedBy` relies on to find
+ * the `:parent=` boundary) or a control character: 1..64 characters,
+ * first character alphanumeric, every other character one of
+ * `[A-Za-z0-9._-]`.
+ */
+const AGENT_TYPE_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,63}$/;
+/**
+ * Clock-skew tolerance for a record's signed `approvedAt`: an approval
+ * timestamp more than this far in the future cannot come from a clock
+ * this process trusts, so it is never matched — but unlike a forgery it
+ * is not evidence of tampering (a clock can simply be wrong), so it is
+ * reported as `stale`, the same bucket `harness gc` and the doctor
+ * listing already sweep on the aged side of the window.
+ */
+const INFLIGHT_FUTURE_SKEW_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000;
+/** The exact shape `writeInflightRecord` signs into `approvedBy`. */
+const INFLIGHT_APPROVED_BY_RE = /^inflight:([A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,63}):parent=(task|session)$/;
+/**
+ * Parse a signed `approvedBy` string back into the bindings it carries.
+ * `null` on anything that does not match the exact shape
+ * `writeInflightRecord` produces — this is the reader half of "every
+ * binding travels inside `approvedBy`" (see the module header): a
+ * value the writer could not have produced is never trusted as a source
+ * of bindings, even though its bytes passed HMAC verification (a valid
+ * signature only proves the bytes were signed by this key, not that
+ * they match the shape a caller can safely destructure).
+ */
+function parseInflightApprovedBy(approvedBy) {
+    const match = INFLIGHT_APPROVED_BY_RE.exec(approvedBy);
+    if (match === null)
+        return null;
+    const [, agentType, parentSource] = match;
+    return { agentType: agentType, parentSource: parentSource };
+}
+/**
+ * Write a signed in-flight record, but only when `parent` names a
+ * MATCHED operator approval — a record is a copy of authority the
+ * parent already had, never a new grant, so an unmatched parent
+ * refuses outright with nothing written: the guard below is the entire
+ * enforcement point, not a redundant belt-and-suspenders check on top
+ * of some other gate. Atomic and mode 0600, like every other marker
+ * write in this pack.
+ */
+export function writeInflightRecord(opts) {
+    if (!opts.parent.matched || opts.parent.source === null) {
+        return {
+            ok: false,
+            reason: "parent_not_approved",
+            detail: "refusing to write an in-flight record: the parent has no matched operator approval",
+        };
+    }
+    if (!AGENT_TYPE_RE.test(opts.agentType)) {
+        return {
+            ok: false,
+            reason: "malformed_agent_type",
+            detail: `agentType must be 1-64 characters, first character alphanumeric, every other character one of letters, digits, ".", "_", or "-": ${JSON.stringify(opts.agentType)}`,
+        };
+    }
+    let filePath;
+    try {
+        filePath = inflightRecordPathFor(opts.generatedDir, opts.sessionId, opts.agentId);
+    }
+    catch (err) {
+        return {
+            ok: false,
+            reason: "invalid-input",
+            detail: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),
+        };
+    }
+    const parentSource = opts.parent.source;
+    const startedAt = (opts.now ?? new Date()).toISOString();
+    const markerId = inflightMarkerIdFor(opts.sessionId, opts.agentId);
+    const signed = signMarker(opts.generatedDir, markerId, {
+        approvedAt: startedAt,
+        approvedBy: `inflight:${opts.agentType}:parent=${parentSource}`,
+        reportContentHash: null,
+    });
+    const body = {
+        sessionId: opts.sessionId,
+        agentId: opts.agentId,
+        agentType: opts.agentType,
+        startedAt,
+        parentSource,
+        parentDetail: opts.parent.detail,
+        ...signed,
+    };
+    try {
+        atomicWriteFile(filePath, `${JSON.stringify(body, null, 2)}\n`, { mode: 0o600 });
+    }
+    catch (err) {
+        return {
+            ok: false,
+            reason: "write-failed",
+            detail: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),
+        };
+    }
+    return { ok: true, filePath };
+}
+/**
+ * Consult the in-flight record for `(sessionId, agentId)`. Checks, in
+ * order: the `.inflight/` root and the session directory are real
+ * directories, not symlinks (module header, "CONTAINMENT"); the
+ * requested `agentId` names an EXACT directory entry, not merely a path
+ * that resolves (guards a case-insensitive filesystem); the file is
+ * present and JSON-readable; its signature verifies against
+ * `inflight:<sessionId>:<agentId>` RECOMPUTED FROM THE REQUESTED ids
+ * (never from anything stored in the body); its own `sessionId`/`agentId`
+ * fields agree with those requested ids (the check the signature alone
+ * cannot make, see the module header); it is not older than the
+ * staleness window.
+ *
+ * Fail-closed shape mirrors `verifyDelegation`: every refusal names a
+ * distinct reason, `forged` and `stale` are reachable only from the
+ * branches documented above, and there is no branch that turns a
+ * missing, malformed, moved, or aged record into `matched: true`.
+ */
+export function verifyInflightRecord(generatedDir, sessionId, agentId, opts = {}) {
+    let filePath;
+    try {
+        filePath = inflightRecordPathFor(generatedDir, sessionId, agentId);
+    }
+    catch (err) {
+        return {
+            matched: false,
+            forged: false,
+            stale: false,
+            detail: `invalid sessionId/agentId for in-flight record: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`,
+        };
+    }
+    // lstat the root and the session directory before ever reading the
+    // leaf, mirroring `listInflightRecords`' own guard: a `readdirSync` or
+    // `readFileSync` reached only by following a symlink out of
+    // `.inflight/` would let a linked root or session directory smuggle a
+    // record from elsewhere on disk. Absent, a symlink, or not a directory
+    // all read as "no record" here, never `forged`: none of them is
+    // evidence of a tampered signature, only that the expected containment
+    // does not hold.
+    const rootDir = path.join(generatedDir, INFLIGHT_RECORD_DIRNAME);
+    const sessionDir = path.join(rootDir, sessionId);
+    for (const dir of [rootDir, sessionDir]) {
+        let dirStat;
+        try {
+            dirStat = fs.lstatSync(dir);
+        }
+        catch {
+            return { matched: false, forged: false, stale: false, detail: `no in-flight record at ${filePath}` };
+        }
+        if (!dirStat.isDirectory()) {
+            return {
+                matched: false,
+                forged: false,
+                stale: false,
+                detail: `no in-flight record at ${filePath} (${dir} is not a plain directory)`,
+            };
+        }
+    }
+    // The requested agentId must name an EXACT entry in the session
+    // directory, not merely a path `path.join` can resolve to. On a
+    // case-insensitive filesystem the read below would happily open a
+    // differently-cased sibling's record; its signature — recomputed from
+    // the REQUESTED, case-variant id — would then fail to verify and be
+    // classified forged, even though nothing was tampered with. A
+    // case-variant request simply names no record; `readdirSync` lists
+    // literal entry names regardless of the filesystem's own case
+    // sensitivity, so this is the one check that can tell the two apart.
+    //
+    // ONLY the agentId segment gets this exact-entry check. The sessionId
+    // segment (the `sessionDir` lstat above) inherits whatever the
+    // underlying filesystem does with `path.join` + `lstatSync`: on a
+    // case-insensitive volume a case-variant sessionId still resolves to
+    // the same directory, so the lstat passes, and the record is read and
+    // signature-checked against the REQUESTED (case-variant) sessionId —
+    // which the SIGNED body never matches, so it comes back `forged`, not
+    // "no record". This is the same fail-closed outcome the module header
+    // argues for generally; it is merely a less precise diagnostic than
+    // the agentId case gets (see the ADR's "TTL, cwd, and subagents"
+    // section for the write side that never produces one anyway: session
+    // ids are runtime-generated UUIDs, not operator-chosen strings, so a
+    // case collision is not a realistic write-time input).
+    let sessionEntries;
+    try {
+        sessionEntries = fs.readdirSync(sessionDir);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return { matched: false, forged: false, stale: false, detail: `no in-flight record at ${filePath}` };
+    }
+    if (!sessionEntries.includes(agentId)) {
+        return {
+            matched: false,
+            forged: false,
+            stale: false,
+            detail: `no in-flight record at ${filePath} (no exact entry named ${JSON.stringify(agentId)} in ${sessionDir})`,
+        };
+    }
+    const read = readRegularFileRejectingSymlink(filePath);
+    if (read.kind === "missing") {
+        return { matched: false, forged: false, stale: false, detail: `no in-flight record at ${filePath}` };
+    }
+    if (read.kind === "symlink") {
+        return {
+            matched: false,
+            forged: false,
+            stale: false,
+            detail: `in-flight record is a symlink, refusing for safety: ${filePath}`,
+        };
+    }
+    if (read.kind === "not-regular") {
+        return {
+            matched: false,
+            forged: false,
+            stale: false,
+            detail: `in-flight record path is not a regular file: ${filePath}`,
+        };
+    }
+    if (read.kind === "unreadable") {
+        return {
+            matched: false,
+            forged: false,
+            stale: false,
+            detail: `in-flight record at ${filePath} exists but could not be read (I/O error); treating as absent since its signature cannot be verified`,
+        };
+    }
+    const parsed = safeJsonParse(read.content);
+    if (parsed === null || typeof parsed !== "object" || Array.isArray(parsed)) {
+        return {
+            matched: false,
+            forged: false,
+            stale: false,
+            detail: `unparsable in-flight record body at ${filePath}`,
+        };
+    }
+    const body = parsed;
+    const markerId = inflightMarkerIdFor(sessionId, agentId);
+    const verification = verifyMarkerSignature(generatedDir, markerId, body);
+    if (!verification.ok) {
+        if (verification.kind === "key-unavailable") {
+            // Fail-closed I/O problem, not evidence of tampering — same
+            // distinction `verifyDelegation` draws for its own `unreadable`.
+            return {
+                matched: false,
+                forged: false,
+                stale: false,
+                detail: `in-flight record at ${filePath} could not be verified: ${verification.reason}`,
+            };
+        }
+        return {
+            matched: false,
+            forged: true,
+            stale: false,
+            detail: `forged/unsigned in-flight record rejected: ${verification.reason} (${filePath})`,
+        };
+    }
+    const bodySessionId = typeof body["sessionId"] === "string" ? body["sessionId"] : undefined;
+    const bodyAgentId = typeof body["agentId"] === "string" ? body["agentId"] : undefined;
+    if (bodySessionId !== sessionId || bodyAgentId !== agentId) {
+        return {
+            matched: false,
+            forged: true,
+            stale: false,
+            detail: `in-flight record at ${filePath} disagrees with its own path (body sessionId=${JSON.stringify(bodySessionId)}, agentId=${JSON.stringify(bodyAgentId)}, expected ${sessionId}/${agentId})`,
+        };
+    }
+    // `verifyMarkerSignature` already rejected a non-string/empty
+    // `approvedAt` before returning `ok: true`, so this cast is safe; the
+    // finite-instant check below still guards against a signed-but-garbage
+    // value (e.g. a non-date string that happens to be non-empty).
+    const approvedAt = body["approvedAt"];
+    const approvedAtMs = Date.parse(approvedAt);
+    if (!Number.isFinite(approvedAtMs)) {
+        return {
+            matched: false,
+            forged: true,
+            stale: false,
+            detail: `in-flight record at ${filePath} has a signed approvedAt that is not a valid instant: ${JSON.stringify(approvedAt)}`,
+        };
+    }
+    // The unsigned `startedAt` convenience field must agree with the
+    // SIGNED `approvedAt` byte-for-byte (the writer always sets them to
+    // the same instant). Divergence means the unsigned copy was edited
+    // after signing — the shape that would revive an aged, genuinely
+    // stale record by rewriting only its unsigned timestamp.
+    const startedAt = typeof body["startedAt"] === "string" ? body["startedAt"] : undefined;
+    if (startedAt !== approvedAt) {
+        return {
+            matched: false,
+            forged: true,
+            stale: false,
+            detail: `in-flight record at ${filePath} has an unsigned startedAt that disagrees with its signed approvedAt (startedAt=${JSON.stringify(startedAt)}, approvedAt=${JSON.stringify(approvedAt)})`,
+        };
+    }
+    // `approvedBy` is likewise guaranteed a non-empty string by
+    // `verifyMarkerSignature`. Its parsed bindings must agree with the
+    // unsigned `agentType`/`parentSource` fields the body carries for
+    // display — an attacker who could edit only the unsigned pair (the
+    // signed `approvedBy` unchanged) would otherwise reach the success
+    // detail below with a body/approvedBy that disagree.
+    const approvedBy = body["approvedBy"];
+    const bindings = parseInflightApprovedBy(approvedBy);
+    const bodyAgentType = typeof body["agentType"] === "string" ? body["agentType"] : undefined;
+    const bodyParentSource = typeof body["parentSource"] === "string" ? body["parentSource"] : undefined;
+    if (bindings === null || bindings.agentType !== bodyAgentType || bindings.parentSource !== bodyParentSource) {
+        return {
+            matched: false,
+            forged: true,
+            stale: false,
+            detail: `in-flight record at ${filePath} has an approvedBy binding that disagrees with its own body (approvedBy=${JSON.stringify(approvedBy)}, body agentType=${JSON.stringify(bodyAgentType)}, parentSource=${JSON.stringify(bodyParentSource)})`,
+        };
+    }
+    const nowMs = (opts.now ?? new Date()).getTime();
+    const staleAfterMs = opts.staleAfterMs ?? DEFAULT_INFLIGHT_STALE_AFTER_MS;
+    // A clock this process trusts would never see its own signed approval
+    // land more than a few minutes in the future; treat it like staleness
+    // (not a forgery) since a clock skew is not evidence of tampering.
+    if (approvedAtMs - nowMs > INFLIGHT_FUTURE_SKEW_MS) {
+        return {
+            matched: false,
+            forged: false,
+            stale: true,
+            detail: `in-flight record at ${filePath} is dated more than ${INFLIGHT_FUTURE_SKEW_MS / 60_000} minutes in the future: approved at ${approvedAt}`,
+        };
+    }
+    // `nowMs - approvedAtMs > staleAfterMs`, not the reverse: swapping the
+    // comparison would mark a fresh record stale and a genuinely stale one
+    // fresh.
+    if (nowMs - approvedAtMs > staleAfterMs) {
+        return {
+            matched: false,
+            forged: false,
+            stale: true,
+            detail: `in-flight record at ${filePath} is stale: approved at ${approvedAt}`,
+        };
+    }
+    return {
+        matched: true,
+        forged: false,
+        stale: false,
+        detail: `in-flight record matched: agent ${agentId} (${bindings.agentType}), parent=${bindings.parentSource}, approved at ${approvedAt}`,
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * Remove a subagent's in-flight record, then best-effort remove its
+ * now-possibly-empty session directory. Never throws when the record,
+ * or the session directory, is already gone — mirrors
+ * `clearApprovalMarker` / `clearTaskApprovalMarker`.
+ */
+export function clearInflightRecord(generatedDir, sessionId, agentId) {
+    let filePath;
+    try {
+        filePath = inflightRecordPathFor(generatedDir, sessionId, agentId);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return;
+    }
+    try {
+        fs.rmSync(filePath);
+    }
+    catch {
+        /* already gone */
+    }
+    try {
+        fs.rmdirSync(path.dirname(filePath));
+    }
+    catch {
+        /* not empty, or already gone */
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Read-only audit listing of every in-flight record on disk, mirroring
+ * `buildUgDelegations`'s own shape: no signature check (this is
+ * evidence for `harness doctor` and `harness gc`, not a trust
+ * decision), tolerant of a missing `.inflight/` directory (empty
+ * result rather than an error), and an entry gc/doctor cannot make
+ * sense of is `skipped` rather than silently dropped.
+ *
+ * lstat the root itself first, not a bare `readdirSync`-then-catch: a
+ * `readdirSync` on a symlinked `.inflight/` would happily follow it and
+ * list whatever real directory it points at, the same trap
+ * `sweepInflightRecords` in `src/cli/gc/index.ts` already guards
+ * against one level up. A symlinked or non-directory root reads as
+ * absent here too, for the same reason `buildUgInflight` already lstats
+ * before calling this function: it must not report on records reached
+ * only by following a link out of `.inflight/`.
+ */
+export function listInflightRecords(generatedDir, now, staleAfterMs) {
+    const dir = path.join(generatedDir, INFLIGHT_RECORD_DIRNAME);
+    const nowMs = (now ?? new Date()).getTime();
+    const effectiveStaleAfterMs = staleAfterMs ?? DEFAULT_INFLIGHT_STALE_AFTER_MS;
+    let rootStat;
+    try {
+        rootStat = fs.lstatSync(dir);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return { total: 0, stale: 0, sessions: [], skipped: [] };
+    }
+    if (!rootStat.isDirectory()) {
+        return { total: 0, stale: 0, sessions: [], skipped: [] };
+    }
+    let sessionDirents;
+    try {
+        sessionDirents = fs.readdirSync(dir, { withFileTypes: true });
+    }
+    catch {
+        return { total: 0, stale: 0, sessions: [], skipped: [] };
+    }
+    let total = 0;
+    let stale = 0;
+    const sessions = [];
+    const skipped = [];
+    for (const sessionDirent of sessionDirents) {
+        const sessionPath = path.join(dir, sessionDirent.name);
+        if (!sessionDirent.isDirectory()) {
+            skipped.push(sessionPath);
+            continue;
+        }
+        try {
+            rejectMalformedSessionId(sessionDirent.name);
+        }
+        catch {
+            skipped.push(sessionPath);
+            continue;
+        }
+        let agentDirents;
+        try {
+            agentDirents = fs.readdirSync(sessionPath, { withFileTypes: true });
+        }
+        catch {
+            skipped.push(sessionPath);
+            continue;
+        }
+        const agentIds = [];
+        for (const agentDirent of agentDirents) {
+            const full = path.join(sessionPath, agentDirent.name);
+            if (!agentDirent.isFile()) {
+                skipped.push(full);
+                continue;
+            }
+            try {
+                rejectMalformedAgentId(agentDirent.name);
+            }
+            catch {
+                skipped.push(full);
+                continue;
+            }
+            const read = readRegularFileRejectingSymlink(full);
+            if (read.kind !== "ok") {
+                skipped.push(full);
+                continue;
+            }
+            const parsed = safeJsonParse(read.content);
+            if (parsed === null || typeof parsed !== "object" || Array.isArray(parsed)) {
+                skipped.push(full);
+                continue;
+            }
+            const body = parsed;
+            // No signature check here (audit listing, not a trust decision —
+            // see the function doc), so this reads the SAME `approvedAt`
+            // field `verifyInflightRecord` trusts only once it has verified
+            // the signature: an unsigned `startedAt` copy is never consulted,
+            // by either reader, for a staleness decision.
+            const approvedAt = typeof body["approvedAt"] === "string" ? body["approvedAt"] : undefined;
+            const approvedAtMs = approvedAt !== undefined ? Date.parse(approvedAt) : NaN;
+            if (approvedAt === undefined || !Number.isFinite(approvedAtMs)) {
+                skipped.push(full);
+                continue;
+            }
+            total += 1;
+            agentIds.push(agentDirent.name);
+            // Aged past the window, or dated implausibly far in the future
+            // (clock skew, or a tampered field this listing does not verify):
+            // both count as `stale` here, mirroring `verifyInflightRecord`'s
+            // own future-skew handling.
+            if (nowMs - approvedAtMs > effectiveStaleAfterMs || approvedAtMs - nowMs > INFLIGHT_FUTURE_SKEW_MS) {
+                stale += 1;
+            }
+        }
+        if (agentIds.length > 0) {
+            sessions.push({ sessionId: sessionDirent.name, agentIds });
+        }
+    }
+    return { total, stale, sessions, skipped };
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=inflight-records.js.map

package/dist/policy-packs/builtin/understanding-before-execution/inflight-records.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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