@langchain/core 1.2.0-dev-1765937705265 → 1.2.0

package/dist/load/index.d.cts

@@ -1,12 +1,135 @@
 import { OptionalImportMap, SecretMap } from "./import_type.cjs";
 
 //#region src/load/index.d.ts
-declare function load<T>(text: string, mappings?: {
+/**
+ * Options for loading serialized LangChain objects.
+ *
+ * @remarks
+ * **Security considerations:**
+ *
+ * Deserialization can instantiate arbitrary classes from the allowed namespaces.
+ * When loading untrusted data, be aware that:
+ *
+ * 1. **`secretsFromEnv`**: Defaults to `false`. Setting to `true` allows the
+ *    deserializer to read environment variables, which could leak secrets if
+ *    the serialized data contains malicious secret references.
+ *
+ * 2. **`importMap` / `optionalImportsMap`**: These allow extending which classes
+ *    can be instantiated. Never populate these from user input. Only include
+ *    modules you explicitly trust.
+ *
+ * 3. **Class instantiation**: Allowed classes will have their constructors called
+ *    with the deserialized kwargs. If a class performs side effects in its
+ *    constructor (network calls, file I/O, etc.), those will execute.
+ */
+interface LoadOptions {
+  /**
+   * A map of secrets to load. Keys are secret identifiers, values are the secret values.
+   *
+   * If a secret is not found in this map and `secretsFromEnv` is `false`, an error is
+   * thrown. If `secretsFromEnv` is `true`, the secret will be loaded from environment
+   * variables (if not found there either, an error is thrown).
+   */
   secretsMap?: SecretMap;
+  /**
+   * Whether to load secrets from environment variables when not found in `secretsMap`.
+   *
+   * @default false
+   *
+   * @remarks
+   * **Security warning:** Setting this to `true` allows the deserializer to read
+   * environment variables, which could be a security risk if the serialized data
+   * is not trusted. Only set this to `true` when deserializing data from trusted
+   * sources (e.g., your own database, not user input).
+   */
+  secretsFromEnv?: boolean;
+  /**
+   * A map of optional imports. Keys are namespace paths (e.g., "langchain_community/llms"),
+   * values are the imported modules.
+   *
+   * @remarks
+   * **Security warning:** This extends which classes can be instantiated during
+   * deserialization. Never populate this map with values derived from user input.
+   * Only include modules that you explicitly trust and have reviewed.
+   *
+   * Classes in these modules can be instantiated with attacker-controlled kwargs
+   * if the serialized data is untrusted.
+   */
   optionalImportsMap?: OptionalImportMap;
+  /**
+   * Additional optional import entrypoints to allow beyond the defaults.
+   *
+   * @remarks
+   * **Security warning:** This extends which namespace paths are considered valid
+   * for deserialization. Never populate this array with values derived from user
+   * input. Each entrypoint you add expands the attack surface for deserialization.
+   */
   optionalImportEntrypoints?: string[];
+  /**
+   * Additional import map for the "langchain" namespace.
+   *
+   * @remarks
+   * **Security warning:** This extends which classes can be instantiated during
+   * deserialization. Never populate this map with values derived from user input.
+   * Only include modules that you explicitly trust and have reviewed.
+   *
+   * Any class exposed through this map can be instantiated with attacker-controlled
+   * kwargs if the serialized data is untrusted.
+   */
   importMap?: Record<string, unknown>;
-}): Promise<T>;
+  /**
+   * Maximum recursion depth allowed during deserialization.
+   *
+   * @default 50
+   *
+   * @remarks
+   * This limit protects against denial-of-service attacks using deeply nested
+   * JSON structures that could cause stack overflow. If your legitimate data
+   * requires deeper nesting, you can increase this limit.
+   */
+  maxDepth?: number;
+}
+/**
+ * Load a LangChain object from a JSON string.
+ *
+ * **WARNING — insecure deserialization risk.** This function instantiates
+ * classes and invokes constructors based on the contents of `text`. If `text`
+ * originates from an untrusted source, an attacker can craft a payload that
+ * instantiates arbitrary allowed classes with attacker-controlled arguments,
+ * potentially causing secret exfiltration, SSRF, or other side effects.
+ *
+ * A serialized payload should be treated as executable configuration — it can
+ * configure models with custom endpoints, headers, or other constructor kwargs
+ * that execute during instantiation.
+ *
+ * Only call `load()` on data you have produced yourself or received from a
+ * fully trusted origin (e.g., your own database). **Never deserialize
+ * user-supplied or network-received JSON without independent validation.**
+ *
+ * @param text - The JSON string to parse and load.
+ * @param options - Options for loading. See {@link LoadOptions} for security guidance.
+ * @returns The loaded LangChain object.
+ *
+ * @example
+ * ```typescript
+ * import { load } from "@langchain/core/load";
+ * import { AIMessage } from "@langchain/core/messages";
+ *
+ * // Basic usage - secrets must be provided explicitly
+ * const msg = await load<AIMessage>(jsonString);
+ *
+ * // With secrets from a map (preferred over secretsFromEnv)
+ * const msg = await load<AIMessage>(jsonString, {
+ *   secretsMap: { OPENAI_API_KEY: "sk-..." }
+ * });
+ *
+ * // Allow loading secrets from environment — ONLY for fully trusted data
+ * const msg = await load<AIMessage>(jsonString, {
+ *   secretsFromEnv: true
+ * });
+ * ```
+ */
+declare function load<T>(text: string, options?: LoadOptions): Promise<T>;
 //#endregion
-export { load };
+export { LoadOptions, load };
 //# sourceMappingURL=index.d.cts.map

package/dist/load/index.d.cts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"index.d.cts","names":["OptionalImportMap","SecretMap","load","T","Record","Promise"],"sources":["../../src/load/index.d.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import type { OptionalImportMap, SecretMap } from \"./import_type.js\";\nexport declare function load<T>(text: string, mappings?: {\n    secretsMap?: SecretMap;\n    optionalImportsMap?: OptionalImportMap;\n    optionalImportEntrypoints?: string[];\n    importMap?: Record<string, unknown>;\n}): Promise<T>;\n//# sourceMappingURL=index.d.ts.map"],"mappings":";;;iBACwBE,8BAIRE;eAHCH;EADOC,kBAAIC,CAAAA,EAEHH,iBAFG;EACXC,yBAAAA,CAAAA,EAAAA,MAAAA,EAAAA;EACQD,SAAAA,CAAAA,EAETI,MAFSJ,CAAAA,MAAAA,EAAAA,OAAAA,CAAAA;CAETI,CAAAA,EACZC,OADYD,CACJD,CADIC,CAAAA"}
+{"version":3,"file":"index.d.cts","names":[],"sources":["../../src/load/index.ts"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;UAuGiB,WAAA;;;;;;;;EAQf,UAAA,GAAa,SAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;EAab,cAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;EAcA,kBAAA,GAAqB,iBAAA;;;;;;;;;EAUrB,yBAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;EAaA,SAAA,GAAY,MAAA;;;;;;;;;;;EAYZ,QAAA;AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;iBA6SoB,IAAA,GAAA,CAAQ,IAAA,UAAc,OAAA,GAAU,WAAA,GAAc,OAAA,CAAQ,CAAA"}

package/dist/load/index.d.ts

@@ -1,12 +1,135 @@
 import { OptionalImportMap, SecretMap } from "./import_type.js";
 
 //#region src/load/index.d.ts
-declare function load<T>(text: string, mappings?: {
+/**
+ * Options for loading serialized LangChain objects.
+ *
+ * @remarks
+ * **Security considerations:**
+ *
+ * Deserialization can instantiate arbitrary classes from the allowed namespaces.
+ * When loading untrusted data, be aware that:
+ *
+ * 1. **`secretsFromEnv`**: Defaults to `false`. Setting to `true` allows the
+ *    deserializer to read environment variables, which could leak secrets if
+ *    the serialized data contains malicious secret references.
+ *
+ * 2. **`importMap` / `optionalImportsMap`**: These allow extending which classes
+ *    can be instantiated. Never populate these from user input. Only include
+ *    modules you explicitly trust.
+ *
+ * 3. **Class instantiation**: Allowed classes will have their constructors called
+ *    with the deserialized kwargs. If a class performs side effects in its
+ *    constructor (network calls, file I/O, etc.), those will execute.
+ */
+interface LoadOptions {
+  /**
+   * A map of secrets to load. Keys are secret identifiers, values are the secret values.
+   *
+   * If a secret is not found in this map and `secretsFromEnv` is `false`, an error is
+   * thrown. If `secretsFromEnv` is `true`, the secret will be loaded from environment
+   * variables (if not found there either, an error is thrown).
+   */
   secretsMap?: SecretMap;
+  /**
+   * Whether to load secrets from environment variables when not found in `secretsMap`.
+   *
+   * @default false
+   *
+   * @remarks
+   * **Security warning:** Setting this to `true` allows the deserializer to read
+   * environment variables, which could be a security risk if the serialized data
+   * is not trusted. Only set this to `true` when deserializing data from trusted
+   * sources (e.g., your own database, not user input).
+   */
+  secretsFromEnv?: boolean;
+  /**
+   * A map of optional imports. Keys are namespace paths (e.g., "langchain_community/llms"),
+   * values are the imported modules.
+   *
+   * @remarks
+   * **Security warning:** This extends which classes can be instantiated during
+   * deserialization. Never populate this map with values derived from user input.
+   * Only include modules that you explicitly trust and have reviewed.
+   *
+   * Classes in these modules can be instantiated with attacker-controlled kwargs
+   * if the serialized data is untrusted.
+   */
   optionalImportsMap?: OptionalImportMap;
+  /**
+   * Additional optional import entrypoints to allow beyond the defaults.
+   *
+   * @remarks
+   * **Security warning:** This extends which namespace paths are considered valid
+   * for deserialization. Never populate this array with values derived from user
+   * input. Each entrypoint you add expands the attack surface for deserialization.
+   */
   optionalImportEntrypoints?: string[];
+  /**
+   * Additional import map for the "langchain" namespace.
+   *
+   * @remarks
+   * **Security warning:** This extends which classes can be instantiated during
+   * deserialization. Never populate this map with values derived from user input.
+   * Only include modules that you explicitly trust and have reviewed.
+   *
+   * Any class exposed through this map can be instantiated with attacker-controlled
+   * kwargs if the serialized data is untrusted.
+   */
   importMap?: Record<string, unknown>;
-}): Promise<T>;
+  /**
+   * Maximum recursion depth allowed during deserialization.
+   *
+   * @default 50
+   *
+   * @remarks
+   * This limit protects against denial-of-service attacks using deeply nested
+   * JSON structures that could cause stack overflow. If your legitimate data
+   * requires deeper nesting, you can increase this limit.
+   */
+  maxDepth?: number;
+}
+/**
+ * Load a LangChain object from a JSON string.
+ *
+ * **WARNING — insecure deserialization risk.** This function instantiates
+ * classes and invokes constructors based on the contents of `text`. If `text`
+ * originates from an untrusted source, an attacker can craft a payload that
+ * instantiates arbitrary allowed classes with attacker-controlled arguments,
+ * potentially causing secret exfiltration, SSRF, or other side effects.
+ *
+ * A serialized payload should be treated as executable configuration — it can
+ * configure models with custom endpoints, headers, or other constructor kwargs
+ * that execute during instantiation.
+ *
+ * Only call `load()` on data you have produced yourself or received from a
+ * fully trusted origin (e.g., your own database). **Never deserialize
+ * user-supplied or network-received JSON without independent validation.**
+ *
+ * @param text - The JSON string to parse and load.
+ * @param options - Options for loading. See {@link LoadOptions} for security guidance.
+ * @returns The loaded LangChain object.
+ *
+ * @example
+ * ```typescript
+ * import { load } from "@langchain/core/load";
+ * import { AIMessage } from "@langchain/core/messages";
+ *
+ * // Basic usage - secrets must be provided explicitly
+ * const msg = await load<AIMessage>(jsonString);
+ *
+ * // With secrets from a map (preferred over secretsFromEnv)
+ * const msg = await load<AIMessage>(jsonString, {
+ *   secretsMap: { OPENAI_API_KEY: "sk-..." }
+ * });
+ *
+ * // Allow loading secrets from environment — ONLY for fully trusted data
+ * const msg = await load<AIMessage>(jsonString, {
+ *   secretsFromEnv: true
+ * });
+ * ```
+ */
+declare function load<T>(text: string, options?: LoadOptions): Promise<T>;
 //#endregion
-export { load };
+export { LoadOptions, load };
 //# sourceMappingURL=index.d.ts.map

package/dist/load/index.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"index.d.ts","names":["OptionalImportMap","SecretMap","load","T","Record","Promise"],"sources":["../../src/load/index.d.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import type { OptionalImportMap, SecretMap } from \"./import_type.js\";\nexport declare function load<T>(text: string, mappings?: {\n    secretsMap?: SecretMap;\n    optionalImportsMap?: OptionalImportMap;\n    optionalImportEntrypoints?: string[];\n    importMap?: Record<string, unknown>;\n}): Promise<T>;\n//# sourceMappingURL=index.d.ts.map"],"mappings":";;;iBACwBE,8BAIRE;eAHCH;EADOC,kBAAIC,CAAAA,EAEHH,iBAFG;EACXC,yBAAAA,CAAAA,EAAAA,MAAAA,EAAAA;EACQD,SAAAA,CAAAA,EAETI,MAFSJ,CAAAA,MAAAA,EAAAA,OAAAA,CAAAA;CAETI,CAAAA,EACZC,OADYD,CACJD,CADIC,CAAAA"}
+{"version":3,"file":"index.d.ts","names":[],"sources":["../../src/load/index.ts"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;UAuGiB,WAAA;;;;;;;;EAQf,UAAA,GAAa,SAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;EAab,cAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;EAcA,kBAAA,GAAqB,iBAAA;;;;;;;;;EAUrB,yBAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;EAaA,SAAA,GAAY,MAAA;;;;;;;;;;;EAYZ,QAAA;AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;iBA6SoB,IAAA,GAAA,CAAQ,IAAA,UAAc,OAAA,GAAU,WAAA,GAAc,OAAA,CAAQ,CAAA"}

package/dist/load/index.js

@@ -1,10 +1,82 @@
 import { keyFromJson, mapKeys } from "./map_keys.js";
+import { isEscapedObject, unescapeValue } from "./validation.js";
 import { get_lc_unique_name } from "./serializable.js";
 import { getEnvironmentVariable } from "../utils/env.js";
 import { optionalImportEntrypoints } from "./import_constants.js";
 import { import_map_exports } from "./import_map.js";
-
 //#region src/load/index.ts
+/**
+* Load LangChain objects from JSON strings or objects.
+*
+* **WARNING: `load()` deserializes data by instantiating classes and invoking
+* constructors. Never call `load()` on untrusted or user-supplied input.**
+* Doing so can lead to insecure deserialization — including arbitrary class
+* instantiation, secret exfiltration, and server-side request forgery (SSRF).
+* Only deserialize data that originates from a trusted source you control.
+*
+* ## How it works
+*
+* Each `Serializable` LangChain object has a unique identifier (its "class path"),
+* which is a list of strings representing the module path and class name. For example:
+*
+* - `AIMessage` -> `["langchain_core", "messages", "ai", "AIMessage"]`
+* - `ChatPromptTemplate` -> `["langchain_core", "prompts", "chat", "ChatPromptTemplate"]`
+*
+* When deserializing, the class path is validated against supported namespaces.
+*
+* ## Threat model
+*
+* A serialized LangChain payload crosses a trust boundary because the manifest
+* may contain serialized objects and configuration that affect runtime behavior.
+* For example, a payload can configure a chat model with a custom `base_url`,
+* custom headers, a different model name, or other constructor arguments. These
+* are supported features, but they also mean the payload contents should be
+* treated as executable configuration rather than plain text.
+*
+* Concretely, deserialization instantiates classes, so any constructor on an
+* allowed class will run during `load()`. A crafted payload that is allowed to
+* reach an unintended class — or an intended class with attacker-controlled
+* kwargs — could cause network calls, file operations, or environment-variable
+* access while the object is being built.
+*
+* ## Security model
+*
+* The `secretsFromEnv` parameter controls whether secrets can be loaded from environment
+* variables:
+*
+* - `false` (default): Secrets must be provided in `secretsMap`. If a secret is not
+*   found, `null` is returned instead of loading from environment variables.
+* - `true`: If a secret is not found in `secretsMap`, it will be loaded from
+*   environment variables. Use this only in trusted environments.
+*
+* ### Hardening recommendations
+*
+* - **Never enable `secretsFromEnv`** unless the serialized data is fully trusted.
+*   A crafted payload can reference arbitrary environment variable names, leaking
+*   secrets to an attacker-controlled class constructor.
+* - **Keep `secretsMap` minimal.** Only include the specific secrets the serialized
+*   object actually needs.
+* - **Keep `importMap` / `optionalImportsMap` as small and static as possible.**
+*   Each entry widens the set of classes an attacker can instantiate. Never
+*   populate these maps from user input.
+*
+* ### Injection protection (escape-based)
+*
+* During serialization, plain objects that contain an `'lc'` key are escaped by wrapping
+* them: `{"__lc_escaped__": {...}}`. During deserialization, escaped objects are unwrapped
+* and returned as plain objects, NOT instantiated as LC objects.
+*
+* This is an allowlist approach: only objects explicitly produced by
+* `Serializable.toJSON()` (which are NOT escaped) are treated as LC objects;
+* everything else is user data.
+*
+* @module
+*/
+/**
+* Default maximum recursion depth for deserialization.
+* This provides protection against DoS attacks via deeply nested structures.
+*/
+const DEFAULT_MAX_DEPTH = 50;
 function combineAliasesAndInvert(constructor) {
 	const aliases = {};
 	for (let current = constructor; current && current.prototype; current = Object.getPrototypeOf(current)) Object.assign(aliases, Reflect.get(current.prototype, "lc_aliases"));
@@ -13,24 +85,42 @@ function combineAliasesAndInvert(constructor) {
 		return acc;
 	}, {});
 }
+/**
+* Recursively revive a value, handling escape markers and LC objects.
+*
+* This function handles:
+* 1. Escaped dicts - unwrapped and returned as plain objects
+* 2. LC secret objects - resolved from secretsMap or env
+* 3. LC constructor objects - instantiated
+* 4. Regular objects/arrays - recursed into
+*/
 async function reviver(value) {
-	const { optionalImportsMap = {}, optionalImportEntrypoints: optionalImportEntrypoints$1 = [], importMap = {}, secretsMap = {}, path = ["$"] } = this;
+	const { optionalImportsMap, optionalImportEntrypoints: optionalImportEntrypoints$1, importMap, secretsMap, secretsFromEnv, path, depth, maxDepth } = this;
 	const pathStr = path.join(".");
-	if (typeof value === "object" && value !== null && !Array.isArray(value) && "lc" in value && "type" in value && "id" in value && value.lc === 1 && value.type === "secret") {
-		const serialized = value;
-		const [key] = serialized.id;
+	if (depth > maxDepth) throw new Error(`Maximum recursion depth (${maxDepth}) exceeded during deserialization. This may indicate a malicious payload or you may need to increase maxDepth.`);
+	if (typeof value !== "object" || value == null) return value;
+	if (Array.isArray(value)) return Promise.all(value.map((v, i) => reviver.call({
+		...this,
+		path: [...path, `${i}`],
+		depth: depth + 1
+	}, v)));
+	const record = value;
+	if (isEscapedObject(record)) return unescapeValue(record);
+	if ("lc" in record && "type" in record && "id" in record && record.lc === 1 && record.type === "secret") {
+		const [key] = record.id;
 		if (key in secretsMap) return secretsMap[key];
-		else {
+		else if (secretsFromEnv) {
 			const secretValueInEnv = getEnvironmentVariable(key);
 			if (secretValueInEnv) return secretValueInEnv;
-			else throw new Error(`Missing key "${key}" for ${pathStr} in load(secretsMap={})`);
 		}
-	} else if (typeof value === "object" && value !== null && !Array.isArray(value) && "lc" in value && "type" in value && "id" in value && value.lc === 1 && value.type === "not_implemented") {
-		const serialized = value;
-		const str = JSON.stringify(serialized);
+		throw new Error(`Missing secret "${key}" at ${pathStr}`);
+	}
+	if ("lc" in record && "type" in record && "id" in record && record.lc === 1 && record.type === "not_implemented") {
+		const str = JSON.stringify(record);
 		throw new Error(`Trying to load an object that doesn't implement serialization: ${pathStr} -> ${str}`);
-	} else if (typeof value === "object" && value !== null && !Array.isArray(value) && "lc" in value && "type" in value && "id" in value && "kwargs" in value && value.lc === 1) {
-		const serialized = value;
+	}
+	if ("lc" in record && "type" in record && "id" in record && "kwargs" in record && record.lc === 1 && record.type === "constructor") {
+		const serialized = record;
 		const str = JSON.stringify(serialized);
 		const [name, ...namespaceReverse] = serialized.id.slice().reverse();
 		const namespace = namespaceReverse.reverse();
@@ -62,30 +152,77 @@ async function reviver(value) {
 		if (typeof module !== "object" || module === null) throw new Error(`Invalid namespace: ${pathStr} -> ${str}`);
 		const builder = module[name] ?? Object.values(module).find((v) => typeof v === "function" && get_lc_unique_name(v) === name);
 		if (typeof builder !== "function") throw new Error(`Invalid identifer: ${pathStr} -> ${str}`);
-		const kwargs = await reviver.call({
+		const instance = new builder(mapKeys(await reviver.call({
 			...this,
-			path: [...path, "kwargs"]
-		}, serialized.kwargs);
-		if (serialized.type === "constructor") {
-			const instance = new builder(mapKeys(kwargs, keyFromJson, combineAliasesAndInvert(builder)));
-			Object.defineProperty(instance.constructor, "name", { value: name });
-			return instance;
-		} else throw new Error(`Invalid type: ${pathStr} -> ${str}`);
-	} else if (typeof value === "object" && value !== null) if (Array.isArray(value)) return Promise.all(value.map((v, i) => reviver.call({
+			path: [...path, "kwargs"],
+			depth: depth + 1
+		}, serialized.kwargs), keyFromJson, combineAliasesAndInvert(builder)));
+		Object.defineProperty(instance.constructor, "name", { value: name });
+		return instance;
+	}
+	const result = {};
+	for (const [key, val] of Object.entries(record)) result[key] = await reviver.call({
 		...this,
-		path: [...path, `${i}`]
-	}, v)));
-	else return Object.fromEntries(await Promise.all(Object.entries(value).map(async ([key, value$1]) => [key, await reviver.call({
-		...this,
-		path: [...path, key]
-	}, value$1)])));
-	return value;
+		path: [...path, key],
+		depth: depth + 1
+	}, val);
+	return result;
 }
-async function load(text, mappings) {
+/**
+* Load a LangChain object from a JSON string.
+*
+* **WARNING — insecure deserialization risk.** This function instantiates
+* classes and invokes constructors based on the contents of `text`. If `text`
+* originates from an untrusted source, an attacker can craft a payload that
+* instantiates arbitrary allowed classes with attacker-controlled arguments,
+* potentially causing secret exfiltration, SSRF, or other side effects.
+*
+* A serialized payload should be treated as executable configuration — it can
+* configure models with custom endpoints, headers, or other constructor kwargs
+* that execute during instantiation.
+*
+* Only call `load()` on data you have produced yourself or received from a
+* fully trusted origin (e.g., your own database). **Never deserialize
+* user-supplied or network-received JSON without independent validation.**
+*
+* @param text - The JSON string to parse and load.
+* @param options - Options for loading. See {@link LoadOptions} for security guidance.
+* @returns The loaded LangChain object.
+*
+* @example
+* ```typescript
+* import { load } from "@langchain/core/load";
+* import { AIMessage } from "@langchain/core/messages";
+*
+* // Basic usage - secrets must be provided explicitly
+* const msg = await load<AIMessage>(jsonString);
+*
+* // With secrets from a map (preferred over secretsFromEnv)
+* const msg = await load<AIMessage>(jsonString, {
+*   secretsMap: { OPENAI_API_KEY: "sk-..." }
+* });
+*
+* // Allow loading secrets from environment — ONLY for fully trusted data
+* const msg = await load<AIMessage>(jsonString, {
+*   secretsFromEnv: true
+* });
+* ```
+*/
+async function load(text, options) {
 	const json = JSON.parse(text);
-	return reviver.call({ ...mappings }, json);
+	const context = {
+		optionalImportsMap: options?.optionalImportsMap ?? {},
+		optionalImportEntrypoints: options?.optionalImportEntrypoints ?? [],
+		secretsMap: options?.secretsMap ?? {},
+		secretsFromEnv: options?.secretsFromEnv ?? false,
+		importMap: options?.importMap ?? {},
+		path: ["$"],
+		depth: 0,
+		maxDepth: options?.maxDepth ?? DEFAULT_MAX_DEPTH
+	};
+	return reviver.call(context, json);
 }
-
 //#endregion
 export { load };
+
 //# sourceMappingURL=index.js.map

package/dist/load/index.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"index.js","names":["constructor: typeof Serializable","aliases: { [key: string]: string }","value: unknown","coreImportMap","module:\n      | (typeof importMaps)[\"langchain_core\"][keyof (typeof importMaps)[\"langchain_core\"]]\n      | (typeof importMaps)[\"langchain\"][keyof (typeof importMaps)[\"langchain\"]]\n      | OptionalImportMap[keyof OptionalImportMap]\n      | null","defaultOptionalImportEntrypoints","optionalImportEntrypoints","finalImportMap:\n        | (typeof importMaps)[\"langchain\"]\n        | (typeof importMaps)[\"langchain_core\"]","importMapKey: string","value","text: string","mappings?: {\n    secretsMap?: SecretMap;\n    optionalImportsMap?: OptionalImportMap;\n    optionalImportEntrypoints?: string[];\n    importMap?: Record<string, unknown>;\n  }"],"sources":["../../src/load/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import {\n  Serializable,\n  SerializedConstructor,\n  SerializedNotImplemented,\n  SerializedSecret,\n  get_lc_unique_name,\n} from \"./serializable.js\";\nimport { optionalImportEntrypoints as defaultOptionalImportEntrypoints } from \"./import_constants.js\";\nimport * as coreImportMap from \"./import_map.js\";\nimport type { OptionalImportMap, SecretMap } from \"./import_type.js\";\nimport { type SerializedFields, keyFromJson, mapKeys } from \"./map_keys.js\";\nimport { getEnvironmentVariable } from \"../utils/env.js\";\n\nfunction combineAliasesAndInvert(constructor: typeof Serializable) {\n  const aliases: { [key: string]: string } = {};\n  for (\n    let current = constructor;\n    current && current.prototype;\n    current = Object.getPrototypeOf(current)\n  ) {\n    Object.assign(aliases, Reflect.get(current.prototype, \"lc_aliases\"));\n  }\n  return Object.entries(aliases).reduce((acc, [key, value]) => {\n    acc[value] = key;\n    return acc;\n  }, {} as Record<string, string>);\n}\n\nasync function reviver(\n  this: {\n    optionalImportsMap?: OptionalImportMap;\n    optionalImportEntrypoints?: string[];\n    secretsMap?: SecretMap;\n    importMap?: Record<string, unknown>;\n    path?: string[];\n  },\n  value: unknown\n): Promise<unknown> {\n  const {\n    optionalImportsMap = {},\n    optionalImportEntrypoints = [],\n    importMap = {},\n    secretsMap = {},\n    path = [\"$\"],\n  } = this;\n  const pathStr = path.join(\".\");\n  if (\n    typeof value === \"object\" &&\n    value !== null &&\n    !Array.isArray(value) &&\n    \"lc\" in value &&\n    \"type\" in value &&\n    \"id\" in value &&\n    value.lc === 1 &&\n    value.type === \"secret\"\n  ) {\n    const serialized = value as SerializedSecret;\n    const [key] = serialized.id;\n    if (key in secretsMap) {\n      return secretsMap[key as keyof SecretMap];\n    } else {\n      const secretValueInEnv = getEnvironmentVariable(key);\n      if (secretValueInEnv) {\n        return secretValueInEnv;\n      } else {\n        throw new Error(\n          `Missing key \"${key}\" for ${pathStr} in load(secretsMap={})`\n        );\n      }\n    }\n  } else if (\n    typeof value === \"object\" &&\n    value !== null &&\n    !Array.isArray(value) &&\n    \"lc\" in value &&\n    \"type\" in value &&\n    \"id\" in value &&\n    value.lc === 1 &&\n    value.type === \"not_implemented\"\n  ) {\n    const serialized = value as SerializedNotImplemented;\n    const str = JSON.stringify(serialized);\n    throw new Error(\n      `Trying to load an object that doesn't implement serialization: ${pathStr} -> ${str}`\n    );\n  } else if (\n    typeof value === \"object\" &&\n    value !== null &&\n    !Array.isArray(value) &&\n    \"lc\" in value &&\n    \"type\" in value &&\n    \"id\" in value &&\n    \"kwargs\" in value &&\n    value.lc === 1\n  ) {\n    const serialized = value as SerializedConstructor;\n    const str = JSON.stringify(serialized);\n    const [name, ...namespaceReverse] = serialized.id.slice().reverse();\n    const namespace = namespaceReverse.reverse();\n    const importMaps = { langchain_core: coreImportMap, langchain: importMap };\n\n    let module:\n      | (typeof importMaps)[\"langchain_core\"][keyof (typeof importMaps)[\"langchain_core\"]]\n      | (typeof importMaps)[\"langchain\"][keyof (typeof importMaps)[\"langchain\"]]\n      | OptionalImportMap[keyof OptionalImportMap]\n      | null = null;\n\n    const optionalImportNamespaceAliases = [namespace.join(\"/\")];\n    if (namespace[0] === \"langchain_community\") {\n      optionalImportNamespaceAliases.push(\n        [\"langchain\", ...namespace.slice(1)].join(\"/\")\n      );\n    }\n    const matchingNamespaceAlias = optionalImportNamespaceAliases.find(\n      (alias) => alias in optionalImportsMap\n    );\n    if (\n      defaultOptionalImportEntrypoints\n        .concat(optionalImportEntrypoints)\n        .includes(namespace.join(\"/\")) ||\n      matchingNamespaceAlias\n    ) {\n      if (matchingNamespaceAlias !== undefined) {\n        module = await optionalImportsMap[\n          matchingNamespaceAlias as 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importMapKey = namespace.join(\"__\");\n        if (importMapKey in finalImportMap) {\n          break;\n        } else {\n          namespace.pop();\n        }\n      } while (namespace.length > 0);\n\n      // If no matching namespace is found, throw an error.\n      if (importMapKey in finalImportMap) {\n        module = finalImportMap[importMapKey as keyof typeof finalImportMap];\n      }\n    }\n\n    if (typeof module !== \"object\" || module === null) {\n      throw new Error(`Invalid namespace: ${pathStr} -> ${str}`);\n    }\n\n    // Extract the builder from the import map.\n    const builder =\n      // look for a named export with the same name as the class\n      module[name as keyof typeof module] ??\n      // look for an export with a lc_name property matching the class name\n      // this is necessary for classes that are minified\n      Object.values(module).find(\n        (v) =>\n          typeof v === \"function\" &&\n          get_lc_unique_name(v as typeof 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+{"version":3,"file":"index.js","names":["serialized","coreImportMap","defaultOptionalImportEntrypoints","optionalImportEntrypoints"],"sources":["../../src/load/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Load LangChain objects from JSON strings or objects.\n *\n * **WARNING: `load()` deserializes data by instantiating classes and invoking\n * constructors. Never call `load()` on untrusted or user-supplied input.**\n * Doing so can lead to insecure deserialization — including arbitrary class\n * instantiation, secret exfiltration, and server-side request forgery (SSRF).\n * Only deserialize data that originates from a trusted source you control.\n *\n * ## How it works\n *\n * Each `Serializable` LangChain object has a unique identifier (its \"class path\"),\n * which is a list of strings representing the module path and class name. For example:\n *\n * - `AIMessage` -> `[\"langchain_core\", \"messages\", \"ai\", \"AIMessage\"]`\n * - `ChatPromptTemplate` -> `[\"langchain_core\", \"prompts\", \"chat\", \"ChatPromptTemplate\"]`\n *\n * When deserializing, the class path is validated against supported namespaces.\n *\n * ## Threat model\n *\n * A serialized LangChain payload crosses a trust boundary because the manifest\n * may contain serialized objects and configuration that affect runtime behavior.\n * For example, a payload can configure a chat model with a custom `base_url`,\n * custom headers, a different model name, or other constructor arguments. These\n * are supported features, but they also mean the payload contents should be\n * treated as executable configuration rather than plain text.\n *\n * Concretely, deserialization instantiates classes, so any constructor on an\n * allowed class will run during `load()`. A crafted payload that is allowed to\n * reach an unintended class — or an intended class with attacker-controlled\n * kwargs — could cause network calls, file operations, or environment-variable\n * access while the object is being built.\n *\n * ## Security model\n *\n * The `secretsFromEnv` parameter controls whether secrets can be loaded from environment\n * variables:\n *\n * - `false` (default): Secrets must be provided in `secretsMap`. If a secret is not\n *   found, `null` is returned instead of loading from environment variables.\n * - `true`: If a secret is not found in `secretsMap`, it will be loaded from\n *   environment variables. Use this only in trusted environments.\n *\n * ### Hardening recommendations\n *\n * - **Never enable `secretsFromEnv`** unless the serialized data is fully trusted.\n *   A crafted payload can reference arbitrary environment variable names, leaking\n *   secrets to an attacker-controlled class constructor.\n * - **Keep `secretsMap` minimal.** Only include the specific secrets the serialized\n *   object actually needs.\n * - **Keep `importMap` / `optionalImportsMap` as small and static as possible.**\n *   Each entry widens the set of classes an attacker can instantiate. Never\n *   populate these maps from user input.\n *\n * ### Injection protection (escape-based)\n *\n * During serialization, plain objects that contain an `'lc'` key are escaped by wrapping\n * them: `{\"__lc_escaped__\": {...}}`. During deserialization, escaped objects are unwrapped\n * and returned as plain objects, NOT instantiated as LC objects.\n *\n * This is an allowlist approach: only objects explicitly produced by\n * `Serializable.toJSON()` (which are NOT escaped) are treated as LC objects;\n * everything else is user data.\n *\n * @module\n */\n\nimport {\n  Serializable,\n  SerializedConstructor,\n  SerializedNotImplemented,\n  SerializedSecret,\n  get_lc_unique_name,\n} from \"./serializable.js\";\nimport { optionalImportEntrypoints as defaultOptionalImportEntrypoints } from \"./import_constants.js\";\nimport * as coreImportMap from \"./import_map.js\";\nimport type { OptionalImportMap, SecretMap } from \"./import_type.js\";\nimport { type SerializedFields, keyFromJson, mapKeys } from \"./map_keys.js\";\nimport { getEnvironmentVariable } from \"../utils/env.js\";\nimport { isEscapedObject, unescapeValue } from \"./validation.js\";\n\n/**\n * Options for loading serialized LangChain objects.\n *\n * @remarks\n * **Security considerations:**\n *\n * Deserialization can instantiate arbitrary classes from the allowed namespaces.\n * When loading untrusted data, be aware that:\n *\n * 1. **`secretsFromEnv`**: Defaults to `false`. Setting to `true` allows the\n *    deserializer to read environment variables, which could leak secrets if\n *    the serialized data contains malicious secret references.\n *\n * 2. **`importMap` / `optionalImportsMap`**: These allow extending which classes\n *    can be instantiated. Never populate these from user input. Only include\n *    modules you explicitly trust.\n *\n * 3. **Class instantiation**: Allowed classes will have their constructors called\n *    with the deserialized kwargs. If a class performs side effects in its\n *    constructor (network calls, file I/O, etc.), those will execute.\n */\nexport interface LoadOptions {\n  /**\n   * A map of secrets to load. Keys are secret identifiers, values are the secret values.\n   *\n   * If a secret is not found in this map and `secretsFromEnv` is `false`, an error is\n   * thrown. If `secretsFromEnv` is `true`, the secret will be loaded from environment\n   * variables (if not found there either, an error is thrown).\n   */\n  secretsMap?: SecretMap;\n\n  /**\n   * Whether to load secrets from environment variables when not found in `secretsMap`.\n   *\n   * @default false\n   *\n   * @remarks\n   * **Security warning:** Setting this to `true` allows the deserializer to read\n   * environment variables, which could be a security risk if the serialized data\n   * is not trusted. Only set this to `true` when deserializing data from trusted\n   * sources (e.g., your own database, not user input).\n   */\n  secretsFromEnv?: boolean;\n\n  /**\n   * A map of optional imports. Keys are namespace paths (e.g., \"langchain_community/llms\"),\n   * values are the imported modules.\n   *\n   * @remarks\n   * **Security warning:** This extends which classes can be instantiated during\n   * deserialization. Never populate this map with values derived from user input.\n   * Only include modules that you explicitly trust and have reviewed.\n   *\n   * Classes in these modules can be instantiated with attacker-controlled kwargs\n   * if the serialized data is untrusted.\n   */\n  optionalImportsMap?: OptionalImportMap;\n\n  /**\n   * Additional optional import entrypoints to allow beyond the defaults.\n   *\n   * @remarks\n   * **Security warning:** This extends which namespace paths are considered valid\n   * for deserialization. Never populate this array with values derived from user\n   * input. Each entrypoint you add expands the attack surface for deserialization.\n   */\n  optionalImportEntrypoints?: string[];\n\n  /**\n   * Additional import map for the \"langchain\" namespace.\n   *\n   * @remarks\n   * **Security warning:** This extends which classes can be instantiated during\n   * deserialization. Never populate this map with values derived from user input.\n   * Only include modules that you explicitly trust and have reviewed.\n   *\n   * Any class exposed through this map can be instantiated with attacker-controlled\n   * kwargs if the serialized data is untrusted.\n   */\n  importMap?: Record<string, unknown>;\n\n  /**\n   * Maximum recursion depth allowed during deserialization.\n   *\n   * @default 50\n   *\n   * @remarks\n   * This limit protects against denial-of-service attacks using deeply nested\n   * JSON structures that could cause stack overflow. If your legitimate data\n   * requires deeper nesting, you can increase this limit.\n   */\n  maxDepth?: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Default maximum recursion depth for deserialization.\n * This provides protection against DoS attacks via deeply nested structures.\n */\nconst DEFAULT_MAX_DEPTH = 50;\n\nfunction combineAliasesAndInvert(constructor: typeof Serializable) {\n  const aliases: { [key: string]: string } = {};\n  for (\n    let current = constructor;\n    current && current.prototype;\n    current = Object.getPrototypeOf(current)\n  ) {\n    Object.assign(aliases, Reflect.get(current.prototype, \"lc_aliases\"));\n  }\n  return Object.entries(aliases).reduce(\n    (acc, [key, value]) => {\n      acc[value] = key;\n      return acc;\n    },\n    {} as Record<string, string>\n  );\n}\n\ninterface ReviverContext {\n  optionalImportsMap: OptionalImportMap;\n  optionalImportEntrypoints: string[];\n  secretsMap: SecretMap;\n  secretsFromEnv: boolean;\n  importMap: Record<string, unknown>;\n  path: string[];\n  depth: number;\n  maxDepth: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Recursively revive a value, handling escape markers and LC objects.\n *\n * This function handles:\n * 1. Escaped dicts - unwrapped and returned as plain objects\n * 2. LC secret objects - resolved from secretsMap or env\n * 3. LC constructor objects - instantiated\n * 4. Regular objects/arrays - recursed into\n */\nasync function reviver(this: ReviverContext, value: unknown): Promise<unknown> {\n  const {\n    optionalImportsMap,\n    optionalImportEntrypoints,\n    importMap,\n    secretsMap,\n    secretsFromEnv,\n    path,\n    depth,\n    maxDepth,\n  } = this;\n  const pathStr = path.join(\".\");\n\n  // Check recursion depth to prevent DoS via deeply nested structures\n  if (depth > maxDepth) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `Maximum recursion depth (${maxDepth}) exceeded during deserialization. ` +\n        `This may indicate a malicious payload or you may need to increase maxDepth.`\n    );\n  }\n\n  // If not an object, return as-is\n  if (typeof value !== \"object\" || value == null) {\n    return value;\n  }\n\n  // Handle arrays - recurse into elements\n  if (Array.isArray(value)) {\n    return Promise.all(\n      value.map((v, i) =>\n        reviver.call({ ...this, path: [...path, `${i}`], depth: depth + 1 }, v)\n      )\n    );\n  }\n\n  // It's an object - check for escape marker FIRST\n  const record = value as Record<string, unknown>;\n  if (isEscapedObject(record)) {\n    // This is an escaped user object - unwrap and return as-is (no LC processing)\n    return unescapeValue(record);\n  }\n\n  // Check for LC secret object\n  if (\n    \"lc\" in record &&\n    \"type\" in record &&\n    \"id\" in record &&\n    record.lc === 1 &&\n    record.type === \"secret\"\n  ) {\n    const serialized = record as unknown as SerializedSecret;\n    const [key] = serialized.id;\n    if (key in secretsMap) {\n      return secretsMap[key as keyof SecretMap];\n    } else if (secretsFromEnv) {\n      const secretValueInEnv = getEnvironmentVariable(key);\n      if (secretValueInEnv) {\n        return secretValueInEnv;\n      }\n    }\n    throw new Error(`Missing secret \"${key}\" at ${pathStr}`);\n  }\n\n  // Check for LC not_implemented object\n  if (\n    \"lc\" in record &&\n    \"type\" in record &&\n    \"id\" in record &&\n    record.lc === 1 &&\n    record.type === \"not_implemented\"\n  ) {\n    const serialized = record as unknown as SerializedNotImplemented;\n    const str = JSON.stringify(serialized);\n    throw new Error(\n      `Trying to load an object that doesn't implement serialization: ${pathStr} -> ${str}`\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Check for LC constructor object\n  if (\n    \"lc\" in record &&\n    \"type\" in record &&\n    \"id\" in record &&\n    \"kwargs\" in record &&\n    record.lc === 1 &&\n    record.type === \"constructor\"\n  ) {\n    const serialized = record as unknown as SerializedConstructor;\n    const str = JSON.stringify(serialized);\n    const [name, ...namespaceReverse] = serialized.id.slice().reverse();\n    const namespace = namespaceReverse.reverse();\n    const importMaps = { langchain_core: coreImportMap, langchain: importMap };\n\n    let module:\n      | (typeof importMaps)[\"langchain_core\"][keyof (typeof importMaps)[\"langchain_core\"]]\n      | (typeof importMaps)[\"langchain\"][keyof (typeof importMaps)[\"langchain\"]]\n      | OptionalImportMap[keyof OptionalImportMap]\n      | null = null;\n\n    const optionalImportNamespaceAliases = [namespace.join(\"/\")];\n    if (namespace[0] === \"langchain_community\") {\n      optionalImportNamespaceAliases.push(\n        [\"langchain\", ...namespace.slice(1)].join(\"/\")\n      );\n    }\n    const matchingNamespaceAlias = optionalImportNamespaceAliases.find(\n      (alias) => alias in optionalImportsMap\n    );\n    if (\n      defaultOptionalImportEntrypoints\n        .concat(optionalImportEntrypoints)\n        .includes(namespace.join(\"/\")) ||\n      matchingNamespaceAlias\n    ) {\n      if (matchingNamespaceAlias !== undefined) {\n        module =\n          await optionalImportsMap[\n            matchingNamespaceAlias as keyof typeof optionalImportsMap\n          ];\n      } else {\n        throw new Error(\n          `Missing key \"${namespace.join(\n            \"/\"\n          )}\" for ${pathStr} in load(optionalImportsMap={})`\n        );\n      }\n    } else {\n      let finalImportMap:\n        | (typeof importMaps)[\"langchain\"]\n        | (typeof importMaps)[\"langchain_core\"];\n      // Currently, we only support langchain and langchain_core imports.\n      if (namespace[0] === \"langchain\" || namespace[0] === \"langchain_core\") {\n        finalImportMap = importMaps[namespace[0]];\n        namespace.shift();\n      } else {\n        throw new Error(`Invalid namespace: ${pathStr} -> ${str}`);\n      }\n\n      // The root namespace \"langchain\" is not a valid import.\n      if (namespace.length === 0) {\n        throw new Error(`Invalid namespace: ${pathStr} -> ${str}`);\n      }\n\n      // Find the longest matching namespace.\n      let importMapKey: string;\n      do {\n        importMapKey = namespace.join(\"__\");\n        if (importMapKey in finalImportMap) {\n          break;\n        } else {\n          namespace.pop();\n        }\n      } while (namespace.length > 0);\n\n      // If no matching namespace is found, throw an error.\n      if (importMapKey in finalImportMap) {\n        module = finalImportMap[importMapKey as keyof typeof finalImportMap];\n      }\n    }\n\n    if (typeof module !== \"object\" || module === null) {\n      throw new Error(`Invalid namespace: ${pathStr} -> ${str}`);\n    }\n\n    // Extract the builder from the import map.\n    const builder =\n      // look for a named export with the same name as the class\n      module[name as keyof typeof module] ??\n      // look for an export with a lc_name property matching the class name\n      // this is necessary for classes that are minified\n      Object.values(module).find(\n        (v) =>\n          typeof v === \"function\" &&\n          get_lc_unique_name(v as typeof Serializable) === name\n      );\n    if (typeof builder !== \"function\") {\n      throw new Error(`Invalid identifer: ${pathStr} -> ${str}`);\n    }\n\n    // Recurse on the arguments, which may be serialized objects themselves\n    const kwargs = await reviver.call(\n      { ...this, path: [...path, \"kwargs\"], depth: depth + 1 },\n      serialized.kwargs\n    );\n\n    // Construct the object\n    // oxlint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any\n    const instance = new (builder as any)(\n      mapKeys(\n        kwargs as SerializedFields,\n        keyFromJson,\n        combineAliasesAndInvert(builder)\n      )\n    );\n\n    // Minification in severless/edge runtimes will mange the\n    // name of classes presented in traces. As the names in import map\n    // are present as-is even with minification, use these names instead\n    Object.defineProperty(instance.constructor, \"name\", { value: name });\n\n    return instance;\n  }\n\n  // Regular object - recurse into values\n  const result: Record<string, unknown> = {};\n  for (const [key, val] of Object.entries(record)) {\n    result[key] = await reviver.call(\n      { ...this, path: [...path, key], depth: depth + 1 },\n      val\n    );\n  }\n  return result;\n}\n\n/**\n * Load a LangChain object from a JSON string.\n *\n * **WARNING — insecure deserialization risk.** This function instantiates\n * classes and invokes constructors based on the contents of `text`. If `text`\n * originates from an untrusted source, an attacker can craft a payload that\n * instantiates arbitrary allowed classes with attacker-controlled arguments,\n * potentially causing secret exfiltration, SSRF, or other side effects.\n *\n * A serialized payload should be treated as executable configuration — it can\n * configure models with custom endpoints, headers, or other constructor kwargs\n * that execute during instantiation.\n *\n * Only call `load()` on data you have produced yourself or received from a\n * fully trusted origin (e.g., your own database). **Never deserialize\n * user-supplied or network-received JSON without independent validation.**\n *\n * @param text - The JSON string to parse and load.\n * @param options - Options for loading. See {@link LoadOptions} for security guidance.\n * @returns The loaded LangChain object.\n *\n * @example\n * ```typescript\n * import { load } from \"@langchain/core/load\";\n * import { AIMessage } from \"@langchain/core/messages\";\n *\n * // Basic usage - secrets must be provided explicitly\n * const msg = await load<AIMessage>(jsonString);\n *\n * // With secrets from a map (preferred over secretsFromEnv)\n * const msg = await load<AIMessage>(jsonString, {\n *   secretsMap: { OPENAI_API_KEY: \"sk-...\" }\n * });\n *\n * // Allow loading secrets from environment — ONLY for fully trusted data\n * const msg = await load<AIMessage>(jsonString, {\n *   secretsFromEnv: true\n * });\n * ```\n */\nexport async function load<T>(text: string, options?: LoadOptions): Promise<T> {\n  const json = JSON.parse(text);\n\n  const context: ReviverContext = {\n    optionalImportsMap: options?.optionalImportsMap ?? {},\n    optionalImportEntrypoints: options?.optionalImportEntrypoints ?? 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package/dist/load/map_keys.cjs

@@ -1,22 +1,29 @@
-const require_rolldown_runtime = require('../_virtual/rolldown_runtime.cjs');
-const decamelize = require_rolldown_runtime.__toESM(require("decamelize"));
-const camelcase = require_rolldown_runtime.__toESM(require("camelcase"));
-
 //#region src/load/map_keys.ts
+const UPPER_TO_WORD_BOUNDARY = /([A-Z]+)([A-Z][a-z0-9]+)/g;
+const LOWER_TO_UPPER_BOUNDARY = /([a-z0-9])([A-Z])/g;
+const SEPARATORS = /[-_\s]+/g;
+function snakeCase(key) {
+	return key.replace(UPPER_TO_WORD_BOUNDARY, "$1_$2").replace(LOWER_TO_UPPER_BOUNDARY, "$1_$2").replace(SEPARATORS, "_").toLowerCase();
+}
+function camelCase(key) {
+	const trimmed = key.trim();
+	if (!/[-_\s]/.test(trimmed)) return trimmed;
+	return trimmed.replace(SEPARATORS, "_").toLowerCase().replace(/_+([a-z0-9])/g, (_, char) => char.toUpperCase());
+}
 function keyToJson(key, map) {
-	return map?.[key] || (0, decamelize.default)(key);
+	return map?.[key] || snakeCase(key);
 }
 function keyFromJson(key, map) {
-	return map?.[key] || (0, camelcase.default)(key);
+	return map?.[key] || camelCase(key);
 }
 function mapKeys(fields, mapper, map) {
 	const mapped = {};
 	for (const key in fields) if (Object.hasOwn(fields, key)) mapped[mapper(key, map)] = fields[key];
 	return mapped;
 }
-
 //#endregion
 exports.keyFromJson = keyFromJson;
 exports.keyToJson = keyToJson;
 exports.mapKeys = mapKeys;
+
 //# sourceMappingURL=map_keys.cjs.map